Would Devolution Empower “We the People”?

bahmed#254 you write: ``Ahmed, I am just curious. Are your thoughts based on your personal experience of Pakistani politics or on secondary published sources? If former, please write more about your actual experiences. If latter, please suggest a few good references.``

I have no personal experience of Pakistani politics, although I have had the opportunity to meet with and discuss issues with some Pakistani politicians and to get an understanding for myself of what are like as individuals. I do read on a variety of subjects, but find Pakistani politicians and politics to be generally quite uninspiring. I think one can serve Pakistan very well indeed without getting into politics (like so many Pakistanis are quietly doing). On writing about my experiences: I think I have been using up all my writing time on chowk the past day or two :-).

I should say that it has been a pleasure to discuss these important issues with you and other friends on chowk, and the discussion helps to clarify one`s own thoughts on these issues.

Dear Chowkwallas:

In my Reply # 255, I wrote: “If Mumtaz Bhutto represents the wishes of a majority of people in Sindh province, then the federation of Pakistan is no doubt in hot waters.” In this statement, I should have said “so-called federation of Pakistan.”

Why so-called? Because a federation is a collection of somewhat autonomous governments within a single state. It is a unity whereby neither the central nor the regional governments engage in a dominant/subordinate relationship. It is neither a unitary state nor a confederation. Is Pakistan a federation? The PONAM (the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement) argues that it is not. The PONAM wants integration in the form of a federation, while Mumtaz Bhutto wants integration in the form of a confederation. Apparently, neither PONAM not Mumtaz Bhutto want succession. This is a position that Baluch-Pakistani politician Ghaus Bux Bizenjo also took after his release from prison by General Zia-ul-Haq (we shouln`t forget Shaikh Mujeebur Rahman of erstwhile East Pakistan). We also need to consider why Mumtaz Bhutto, unlike Bizenjo, wants a confederation? What kind of relationship between various states does he want to develop in his conceptualization of confederation? Should the process of our (multi)national reconstruction be transparent?

Bizenjo, using the platform of the National Democratic Party (NDP), searched for a formula that would guarantee a federation of four major cultural units (what he called “tehzeebi ikaiyan”). We Pakistanis need to think if we ever reached such a formula during our entire political history. If we have, when and in what form? If we haven’t, why not? We also need to think if we really need to make Pakistan a truly federal state. If no, why not? If yes, why (specifying the basis of such an arrangement)?

Dr. Feroz Ahmed, with whom I had some acquaintance, wrote a useful article. This article was (I think) reprinted as Chapter I, entitled “The Nationality Theory,” in his “Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan” (1998). I highly recommend Feroz Ahmed’s writings to all those who are interested in the construction and reconstruction of Pakistan.

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

A very topical article from today`s Dawn:

Contextualizing devolution

By Kaiser Bengali

THE military took over the reins of power in October 1999 and promised a range of reforms and

measures to put the country back on the rails. Eleven months down the road, it has little to show for

its tenure so far. General Musharraf`s military administration started with a vigorous campaign for

recovery of defaulted bank loans.

The drive fizzled out with less than 10 per cent of the stated amount recovered. Within weeks the

issue disappeared from the administration`s agenda and from the newspaper headlines. Other

crusades - drawing in the Bara traders into the tax net and procedural amendments to the blasphemy

law - ended in outright failure.

On the issue of extending GST to retail trade, the administration has been reduced to pleading with the

traders with offers of one concession after another. The macroeconomic situation is turning bleaker by

the day, with foreign exchange reserves down to less than three week`s imports. Unemployment and

inflation are turning into a situation of abject despair, symbolized so painfully by the growing epidemic

of suicides.

Under the circumstances, the Musharraf administration`s fetish with its devolution plan is

understandable. It is its only `action` to show for. And in any case, good governance and devolution

are popular catch phrases of the times with the general public and, more importantly, with the donor

community. However, the single-minded zeal with which devolution has been pursued leads one to

suspect that there is perhaps a hidden agenda beyond or even other than mere good local governance.

After all, the Musharraf administration is not the first the military administration in Pakistan to develop

a fixation with local government.

Generals Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq have tread the path earlier. A postmortem of their policies in this

respect have revealed that their motivations were simple: to divert and expend political steam at the

local levels, throw up a new leadership to challenge the national and provincial political leadership,

weaken the established political parties, and secure the military`s hold over the state and government.

What the present administration`s motivations are deserves a close analysis.

Decentralization or devolution has been accepted the world over for its many positive aspects. The

process must, however, be properly designed and implemented if it is to provide the desired political

and economic benefits. Improperly designed and applied, decentralization can have serious adverse

implications. In Pakistan`s context, any devolution plan must fulfil four prerequisites. One, it must

define the new relationships between federal, provincial and local tiers of the state and within the local

tiers itself. Two, it must identify the tier where devolved local authority is to be located. Three, it must

designate the functions/services which are to be devolved. And four, it must draw up a fiscal plan to

ensure that political autonomy is not cancelled out by lack of fiscal autonomy.

The four elements need to be part of a conceptual framework. The administration`s devolution plan,

generally known as the NRB plan, appears to be lacking in all these respects. The plan bypasses the

key issue of federal-provincial relations. It does not provide a coherent rationale for the level to which

devolution is to be taken or the functions/services which are to be devolved. And there does not

appear to be a fiscal plan beyond transfers from the provincial government.

The process of devolution has been underway in Europe and South America for about two to three

decades. Their experience has been well documented and the literature provides a list of dos and

don`ts in the process of implementing a devolution plan. One of the priority dos is that in federal states,

provincial/state autonomy precedes local autonomy or where local autonomy has been granted, it has

been in the context of provincial/state autonomy. The NRB plan violates this precept. All the subjects

being transferred to the district governments are provincial subjects. Not one single federal subject or

function or service is being transferred. And no federal subject is being transferred to the provinces.

Similarly, the entire fiscal burden of devolution will be borne by the provinces. Not a single federal tax

base or revenue source is being transferred to either the province or to the districts.

Operationally, the first task in the devolution exercise is to determine what level to decentralize to, i.e.,

the place of local government as the third tier in the federal hierarchy. Theoretical literature in this

respect is fairly well developed and there is sufficient international experience to provide considerable

guidance. There are issues of critical mass, geographical spillovers, economies of scale, economies of

scope, cost efficiency, service efficiency, externalities, equity, and so on. In the light of the above

criteria, the existing architecture of local government in Pakistan appears to be in what may be

described as a state of `institutional anarchy.`

However, the NRB plan is likely to further compound the confusion in an already crowded field by

adding village councils and community development boards to the roster of local bodies. they village

council is likely to be unfeasible as, in many parts of Sindh, Balochistan and Kohistan (Hazara), the

village is not necessarily an integrated community entity. Some villages are single household entities

and some, comprising of nomads, are also mobile. The community development boards would

constitute an unelected anachronism in a sphere of representative local democracy.

If conceptually rational considerations are followed, a two-tier local government structure may be

postulated: an upper tier, which meets the critical mass and economies of scale considerations, and a

lower tier, which meets the economies of scope, service efficiency and equity considerations. In the

given situation, the district does not appear to be a viable unit of local government administration and

the division and union councils appear to be more rational choices for the upper and lower tiers,

respectively, of local government.

The second task in the devolution exercise is the allocation of functions to the local level. Here again,

theoretical literature provides excellent guidance. Services, which cross jurisdictional boundaries, must

lie in the domain of higher level governments. Thus, national defence has geographical spillovers

across the whole country and has to be centralized, while changing street light bulbs can be

decentralized down to the individual lane level. The NRB plan is wanting in this respect as well. For

example, irrigation has been decentralized to the district level. A canal passes through several districts

and it is clear that there are geographical spillovers. Different levels of maintenance of a canal over

different stretches will play havoc with the system as a whole.

Further, there does not appear to be a logical relationship between the size of the local government

unit and the functions being devolved. There are few functions with zero geographical spillovers or

small economies of scale. Thus, if the size of the local government unit is small, the range of functions

assigned to it must also be necessarily small. Conversely, if the range of functions are large, the size of

the local government unit has to be larger. The NRB plan violates this axiom.

More than half the districts in the country have a population of less than one million. There are some

very small districts as well. In the NWFP, Hangu has a population of just a little over 300,000 and

Tank has a population of less than 240,000. The average population size of districts in Balochistan is

250,000 and there are districts like Barkhan and Kohlu with less than 100,000 people. Ziarat has a

population of only 33,000.

Most of the districts outside the irrigated belt do not have the economic base to be fiscally viable or

the human resource base to set up a functioning administration. Yet, the districts have been entrusted

with a wide range of functions. It is highly unlikely that the demographically small and economically

weak district-level local governments will be able to discharge the heavy burden of responsibilities

they have been entrusted with. The net casualty in this respect will be the quality of local governance,

which is unlikely to improve.

The NRB plan, it appears, has not only paid insufficient attention to the issue of structural balance, but

is also largely silent on the fiscal front. Far more has been said about electoral procedures and the

procedures for functioning of local entities than about the functions they will perform. A line-by-line

assessment of the latest version of the plan released on August 14 reveals the relative priorities of the

Musharraf administration. The assessment shows that about 75 per cent of the document is devoted

to election modes and procedures, modes of removal of office-bearers, and modes of functioning of

elected bodies; about 10 per cent is devoted to the structures of local government; and 5 per cent

each to the functions to be performed and to fiscal issues.

The relative stress on local elections as against the crucial issues of institutional and fiscal viability

perhaps betrays the fact that the motivations of the administration are no different from that of its

earlier military predecessors. General Zia`s sole motivation was to divert political energies and to

create a new breed of local leadership to challenge the national political leadership. The model proved

to be enormously successful. The leadership generated through local bodies elections was channelled

by the ISI into the formation of the IJI and then the Muslim League, which successfully displaced the

Peoples` Party as the dominant political force.

Zia`s `children` have now come of age and, thus, there is a need for the military establishment to repeat

the tried and tested model for displacing the now-established political leadership. Perhaps, the

Musharraf administration too aims at using the smokescreen of good local governance to divert and

expend political steam at the local levels, to throw up a new leadership to challenges the national and

provincial political leadership, weaken the established political parties, and secure the military`s hold

over the state and government. This time around, though, there appears to be a new element to the

agenda: to emasculate the provinces, so as to ensure that there is no challenge to central power bases.

So many thoughts are being presented that it will take time for me to internalize.

One thing, is sure regarding Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP (PakhtunKhwah) including Karachiites (or Mohajir if Faridinkum accepts) that Pakistan and Islam no longer play much role in their political thinking. Thinking is mainly economics related and practical.

One of the argument against local unions and Center and abolishing the provinces is that politicians over the decades and so the people over the decades have started identifying themselves with a certain regions. For example Baluch are a very significant people in the politics of Sind and identify themselves as such.

Moreover the local bodies will be so powerless in National matter, that there will be no chances of redress for the people in different provinces.

I only see the role of local bodies as the solution of local problem. i.e it is political as well as organizational unit for the solution of local problems, which provincial and National Governement failed to take care of in past.

But who will take care of the overall rights of people in a province, so that they are not trampled as was the norm.

A small example will suffice. If Nawaz Sharif can impose Governor`s rule in Sind during most of his tenure inspite of powerful opposition like MQM and most of parties in Sind, how can apolitical, single individuals in local bodies can resist any pressure from center.

Particularly if the current setup in Center means Punjab-Pathan or at other times, Punjab-Mohajir alliance.

No word mincing, but clear facts.

And if Pervez Musharraf fails to deliver provincial devolution of power, it will definitely lead to break-up of Pakistan.

(Just to clarify. I am only one of few Mohajirs who have vehemently opposed MQM throughout, because I don`t believe in politics of ethnicity). But putting the head in sand is no solution. These realities exist. And until there is more justice, it is futile to talk of abolition of provinces. It will only further alienate the already alienated people.

bahmad #255

The federation is indeed in hot waters, and has been for quite some time. I can tell you that educated in Sindh are likely to agree with Mr. Bhutto. Politically, it is better to demand for a confederation.....we might get some autonomy as result :)

bahmad #244

Dear Bilal,

I apologize for not including the reference in my last post. Indeed, it becomes difficult to understand any argument without a proper reference and context. I’d be more careful in future.

Bilal, Sadhna, and Ahmad,

I have no experience of living or working in US or Europe, so my knowledge of local government structures etc. and the whole ethos/philosophy/culture of western European or US democracy (which Fuzair describes as liberal democracy as opposed to “vulgar” democracy) is limited. I always thought that democracy evolves with time and even if a country has “vulgar” democracy e.g., India, which, I presume, is not as sophisticated as a “liberal” democracy, it eventually evolves into a liberal democracy with time. I, however, do not claim to have an in-depth understanding of this issue and would be interested to know Bilal’s or Fuzair’s view on this. Sorry about the digression here.

Ok, lets get to back to our main subject of discussion. Provincial autonomy of the kind I am interested in i.e. an autonomy for provinces to the extent that they are able to negotiate, make decisions about, and implement their own economic, trade, education, health care, and employment policies -just to name a few, and I’d also add to this Sadhna’s useful contribution in her post #242 where she states:

“The special needs of a region such as oppressive social practices, high birthrate, or poor educational/health facilities which may also be more effectively dealt with an region-integrated approach supplementing the local efforts. If allied with legislative powers and responsibilities, the people of the region can participate in these decisions and activities.”

A demand for autonomy of this magnitude, as Bilal rightly pointed out, cannot be de-linked from the issue of identity/identities. And although this idea may not be identical to what Mr. Bhutto is demanding (i.e. confederation), it nevertheless, brings the question of identity into play due to:

1) The unique synthesis of Pakistan’s population
2) The history of various regions/provinces and its people, which currently form what we call Pakistan
3) The strategic geographical location of Sindh and Baluchistan, and the unique culture of Sind

I will endeavour to answer some of the questions Bilal has posed such as couple of questions in his following statement:
“Both Rashid and Fairdinkum presumably link the merger of Karachi and Bombay Stock Exchanges with the issue of local control. Could you please explain, how such an aspatial merger is linked with the nature and/or inadequacy of our existing federation (federal system)? Would the devolution of power (Musharraf style) help in this regard? “ bahmad post #244

Fifty odd years of Pakistan’s existence, is a sad story of less than harmonious relationship between its various regions. The current federal system of government, in my view, has failed due to fanaticism, and an insatiable appetite of centre to keep a strangle hold on power. This fanaticism has resulted in loss of East Pakistan and discontent and dissatisfaction in the existing federating units. The idea of one-unit, as suggested by tahmad321, came into being as a result of 1956 constitution under the leadership of Choudhary Mohammad Ali, the then prime minister. The constitution embodied the Islamic provisions of the ``aims and objectives`` resolution of 1949 and declared Pakistan to be an Islamic republic. The 1956 constitution also attempted to create a better balance between the West and East wings, the provinces and parts of West Pakistan were amalgamated into one administrative unit. This “one unit” however, was not popular amongst the political representatives of smaller provinces of West Pakistan from the onset, and eventually lead to factionalism, regionalism, and sectarianism. The idea was rather simplistic as it totally ignored the question of regional identity/identities, unique cultures and history, and specific needs of various regions and all the rest we have discussed earlier. 1956 constitution, in my view, was also the very first attempt by the political leadership of Pakistan to “educate” the population of Pakistan into identities appropriate to its political agenda. The dominant discourse around the notion of an Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which Bilal often talks about, was given a shape and a direction. The backdrop of 1956 constitution of “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” were militant Muslims, led by the Ahrars, a puritanical political group, who called for the purification of national life. In 1953 they demanded that the Ahmadiyah sect be outlawed from the Islamic community. Khwaja Nazimuddin temporized, and rioting and arson enveloped Lahore and other Punjabi towns.
And btw, the current President of Pakistan has strong links with this militant organization of the past.

Prior to the creation of Pakistan (and even few decades after its creation), Sindh enjoyed an environment of religious tolerance. There was harmony and peace amongst its Hindu and Muslim population, and the sectarianism amongst its Muslim population was almost non-existent. The brunt of the affects of our dominant discourse reached rural Sindh in late sixties early seventies. Hindus were labelled as agents of India, traitors, and kafirs. Their temples were attacked on a number of occasions. Shias were massacred in Khairpur. Purification of Sindh began. Ordinary Sindhis were confused, and shaken by what was happening. Muslim militants were preaching hatred with missionary zeal. Hindus were removed from mainstream life, and became second-class citizens (officially). Mosques were clearly marked as “shia” mosques or “sunni” mosques. In other words, “education” of ordinary Sindhis in the new dominant discourse of Pakistan began.

This insistence of central government/dominant Punjab/the Army to adopt this new discourse and take on the identity of “Muslim” as opposed to Sindhi, Punjabi, Pakhtoon, Baluchi or Mohajir and their attempt to reduce ethnicity/ethnic identities of various regions of Pakistan to something not worth cherishing as our heritage, and their twisted reconstruction of our history to suit the new dominant discourse has resulted in tragic consequences. On one hand, we now live in a fantasy world of great Muslim empires of the past. We are taught in schools that we are proud Muslim conquers who dominated this region and half the world in the past. We were let down by a few traitors like Mir Sadiq and Mir Jafar otherwise we would still be ruling India. This twisted reconstruction of history is dangerous. Such fanaticise can lead us to tragic consequences. Holocaust of Jew in Nazi Germany is a good example of tragic consequences of such fantsies. On the other hand our economy has suffered immensely due to this, especially in Sindh.. In my view, ethnicity has always been a potential vehicle for opposition to the dominance of centre/Punjab/army. So constructing ethnicity “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” style is to redefine it according to the definition formulated by federal government/Punjab/Army. This has ensured that federal government remains in charge of ethnic agenda. Any attempt to define it regionally, of course, goes against the dominant discourse, and is fiercely dealt with by law enforcement agencies. It is this discourse around the notion of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which assumes that all the people living within the boundaries of Islamic Republic are homogeneous just because they follow one religion. While adopting a postmodernist approach, tahmad321 hinted at the heterogeneous nature, and presence of class struggle in Sindh. I am adopting the same approach and saying that we are no longer interested in the grand narrative of Islamic empire/ideology. Nor we are interested in any ideological fanaticism of Punjab/Army/religious right. I want social pragmatism to take control. I want issues affecting our region/district/province be dealt locally. I want federal government to realize that fighting wars over Kashmir while majority of ordinary Pakistanis struggle to put food on the table does not make sense..

Autonomy for Sindh, means greater opportunities to trade with India. Access to a much larger and deeper market. It is currently not possible due to the dominance of Punjab in all affairs. Kashmir is meaningless to Sindh. Why are we sacrificing economic progress, peace, and the future of our children? Just because Punjab insists on fighting for Kashmir? Revenues generated in Sindh are used by Pakistan Army to fight for something, which Sindh absolutely has no interest in. Their fanatic support for Talibans (which is not unconnected to Pakistan’s dominant discourse) in Afghanistan has resulted in spread of drugs, firearms, astronomical crime rate, and tragic loss of young lives in Karachi. What benefit is there for Sindh in all of this? How relevant is such a federation?

According to a news report (Dawn, September 13, 2000), the chairman of the Sindh National Front (SNF), Mumtaz Bhutto, views the devolution plan ``a conspiracy to once again impose one-unit over the country.``

Bhutto maintains that the provinces would be rendered ineffective on the pretext of devolution of power. He further argues that the devolution plan was forced upon the people and it would lead to bloodshed.

Bhutto alleges that this plan was the brainchild of Air Marshal Asghar Khan, who wanted to implement it through his son. He warned that if this plan was implemented by force, the rulers will not be able to stem the tide of protest.

Bhutto urged the rulers to shelve the devolution plan or hold a referendum in each province to find out what type of devolution they want.

Bhutto said he did not want to break the country but wanted equitable rights which could only be guaranteed through a confederal system.

What is a confederation? A confederation may be described as that form of association between states in which the central government is dependent upon the regional governments. It thus embodies the principle of subordination of the central government to the regional governments. In a federation, neither the central government no the regional/local level government is at the mercy of the other. In a confederation, there is no direct contact between the peoples and the central authority. It only reaches them through the respective regional governments. Once a federatoion is created, every member unit has to abide by the decisions of the Center in the sphere of its constitutional competence. In a nutshell, a confederation may be considered as a cohesive form of international administrative union, whereas a federation is regarded as a collection of governments in a single state.

Mumtaz Bhutto’s demand for a confederation (based upon the Lahore Resolution of 1940) suggests that he has no confidence in the federal government in Pakistan. If Mumtaz Bhutto represents the wishes of a majority of people in Sindh province, then the federation of Pakistan is no doubt in hot waters.

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

In response to tahmed321 (Reply # 253)
Dear Ahmed:

Your statement: “bahmed#251 in your response to Sadna, you say that you accept the logic behind eliminating provinces and devolving powers to districts, but you fear bloodshed.”

Comment: I did not say that I accept the logic behind eliminating provinces. I said: “Sadhna, in a country like Pakistan, I have no difficulty with the elimination of the provincial tier provided it is willingly and almost unanimously accepted by the people of Pakistan. I am sure, the probability of such an occurrence, without considerable bloodshed, is nothing but zero.”

Ahmad, I try to express myself fairly precisely. I believe, you have inadvertently twisted my statement. I think, it is better to quote a person (as I do).

Your statement: “. . . I [tahmed321] dont think that we would have bloodshed if this thing is handled right, as follows: Have a debate and then a referendum on this question. I think that logic is so strongly in favor of simplifying government that, properly presented and discussed, this proposal would win by a landslide. If not, at least the question would have had the benefit of debate rather than taking it for granted like we take some many other unnecessary problems in Pakistan for granted.”

Comment: Your suggestion for a debate and referendum is good. Let us hope, we start resolving our problems effectively in the manner that you have suggested.

Your statement: “If after debate and acceptance via referendum, there are some disaffected people (these would be politicians I mentioned earlier) who threaten bloodshed: let us be prepared to stand up to them since otherwise we would allow Pakistan to be run by those who threaten violence and concepts of consensus would be a joke.”

Comment: Another good suggestion. I, however, believe that our difficulties are not a product of a few disaffected politicians only.

Ahmed, I am just curious. Are your thoughts based on your personal experience of Pakistani politics or on secondary published sources? If former, please write more about your actual experiences. If latter, please suggest a few good references.

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

bahmed #245 you wonder why I left out external security from among the national level functions. This would obviously have to be left at the national level so I did not bother to mention it.

bahmed#251 in your response to Sadna, you say that you accept the logic behind eliminating provinces and devolving powers to districts, but you fear bloodshed. Personally, I dont think that we would have bloodshed if this thing is handled right, as follows: Have a debate and then a referendum on this question. I think that logic is so strongly in favor of simplifying government that, properly presented and discussed, this proposal would win by a landslide. If not, at least the question would have had the benefit of debate rather than taking it for granted like we take some many other unnecessary problems in Pakistan for granted.

If after debate and acceptance via referendum, there are some disaffected people (these would be politicians I mentioned earlier) who threaten bloodshed: let us be prepared to stand up to them since otherwise we would allow Pakistan to be run by those who threaten violence and concepts of consensus would be a joke.

In response to Fuzair (Reply # 228)
Dear Fuzair:

Your statement: “And then PONAM`s belief (and I assume, perhaps incorrectly, your`s as well) that breaking up the existing provincial structures along dominant ethnic lines would make the Pakistani state less repressive and more representative of the different ethno/linguistic groups found therein. I was simply pointing out that history offers us no evidence to suggest that doing this would significantly reduce oppression of minority groups . It would simply change who is doing the actual oppressing.”

Comment: Let me first clarify my position. I have never said that “breaking up the existing provincial structures along dominant ethnic lines would make the Pakistani state less repressive.” I have also never said that such an action would make the Pakistani state “more representative of the different ethno/linguistic groups found therein.” Permit me to reproduce a letter of mine.

Frontier Post; June 11, 1999
Protect minorities, ensure national unity

The Quid-e-Azam was very sensitive to the minority question. In pre-Partition India, particularly during the 1930s and the 1940s, the Muslim minority developed a sense of insecurity. It was this sense of economic, political, and cultural insecurity that eventually led to the creation of Pakistan.

Given the ethno-linguistic setup of Pakistan, the Baluchis, the Pukhtuns, and the Sindhis are some of the leading minority groups. Pakistan, however, is the home of numerous additional minority groups. Majority-minority relations exist in every province of Pakistan. Can we say with pride that the minorities in Pakistan are fully protected against the kind of alienation, oppression, and deprivation that the Indian Muslim minority felt some fifty-two odd years back?

The imagined community of the Indians was shattered in the late 1940s. Can we protect ours in this period of gradual and persistent decadence? If we, as a Pakistani nation, have some hope, then we must find ways to save ourselves from further disintegration. One major step would be to show real concern for our socially and geographically variable economic, political, and cultural insecurities.

Bilal Ahmad, USA

Fuzair, I tend to agree with you that breaking up of existing provincial structures would simply change the degree and arena of oppression. I, however, tend to belive that if. for example, a Saraiki province is carved out of Punjab and some additional territory (voluntarily and peacefully), it may bring satisfaction to a good number of dissatisfied Saraiki speaking people. This action may, however, create many other conflicts both inside and outside the newly carved territory. I think, we neeed to restructure Pakistan on a different set of principles to resolve conflicts associated with various social and spatial identities, this in particular includes the restructuration of our dominant national ideology and worldviews in light of the values of freedom, equality, fairness, and peaceful coexistence.

Fuzair, in drawing your attention to liberal democracy, pluralism, and consociational democracy, I wanted to suggest: (1) that the concept and practice of democracy entails many different forms; and (2) there exists a remarkable degree of discrepancy in the rhetoric and actions of people and political regimes across the world (who claim to be democrats and democratic). I shall post additional information, perhaps in the form of a short Chowk article on Democracy.
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

sadna #248 You say ``If local entities in Pakistan have the same powers as US states, you will realise you are essentially asking for 50+ provinces in Pakistan``. Actually, with 105 Districts (as BAhmed mentions in his previous post) in a country of 135 million, we already have administrative units that are large enough to delegate significant powers, and corresponding revenue collecting authority, to make it feasible to manage functions like education, police, development planning and so forth.

On your question regarding the New Economy: This phrase has been popularized just a few months ago I think. It is used in recognition of the fact that the revolution in information technology is bringing about a shift in basic economic assumptions. While no one knows what the ultimate affect will be, it is recognized that we are going through a revolution that is changing society even more than the Industrial Revolution. You ask how it affects India and Pakistan where we have laborers. I think it opens up great opportunities in a number of ways. Most obviously: (a) demand for software - India exports $35 billion worth of software along with tens of thousands of programmers. India`s GDP grew at 7% last year, which is truly magnificent for a country of 1 billion, and this was driven by the stimulus provided by this (remember the multiplier affect where each wage earner in turn consumes goods that generate employment for other people, including laborers building houses for the newly rich). (b) global labor markets: work that required physical presence in the rich countries can now be done overseas. There are many other aspects to this and if I knew them all I would get the Nobel Prize :-)

In response to sadna (Replies # 242 and 248)
Dear Sadhna:

Thanks for your insightful posts. I am somewhat sympathetic to your views and want to draw you attention toward a few additional points.

A comparison between two different kind of states and their internal political/administrative systems is an extremely cumbersome task. The best we can do is to learn about a particular system and gain insights from it.

Just for our understanding could you tell us what kind of reactions would develop in different parts of India if Delhi unilaterally decide (which it will not) to eliminate the states (as initially suggested by Ahmed)?

Sadhna’s querry: There will be 105 District Councils, 275 Tehsil Councils, and 5,135 Union Councils, after the implementation of the Local Government Plan 2000.

Sadhna, in a country like Pakistan, I have no difficulty with the elimination of the provincial tier provided it is willingly and almost unanimously accepted by the people of Pakistan. I am sure, the probability of such an occurrence, without considerable bloodshed, is nothing but zero. Let me give you a simple example. In the North West Frontier Province, there is a movement to change its name to Pakhtunkhawa (or Pakhtun kwa) which means pure Pakhtun culture. NWFP is also called Frontier (or Sarhad). Formal adoption of Sarhad or any other mellow name is not acceptable to the proponets of Pakhtunkhawa. Why there is no unanimous support for Pakhtunkhwa? For a few basic insights, see pp. 121-139 of Khalid Bin Sayeed’s “Politics in Pakistan” (1980). The issue of name may appear to be minor, but it has major implications for identity politics.

From the standpoint of conventional wisdom, I agree with you on the need for regional level political/administrative structures. Let me introduce, what Finnish geographer Anssi Passi has to say about the regional level.

Passi distinguishes between place and region and argues that regions produce places. He treats place as a subjective individual concept/entity which is constituted through personal histories – individual experiences and shared meanings of life history – having real, imagined, or utopian geographical dimensions. In this sense, a place may not be limited to a single locality since people’s life histories may encompass several localities. A region, in contrast, is a sociospatial unit and a historical-cultural category with an explicitly collective dimension representing institutional practices. Regions as material and symbolic structures transcend everyday, local, face-to-face social interaction and resulting face-to-face communities. But, regions do not grow by themselves. Regions are institutionalized through a historically contingent, sociospatial process. It is this process in which the specific identity of a region is acknowledged in various spheres of social action and consciousness and reproduced continually in various individual and institutional practices. Passi maintains that region-specific structures of expectations (such as regionalism, progressivism or nationalism) structure the way in which people organize their knowledge of the world and use it in the interpretation of new information, events and exigencies. Moreover, the collective, institutionally mediated roles expressed in the structures of expectations tend to transform regions into places as centers of a feeling of belonging by creating interpretive communities. These interpretive communities are a crucial means of social control and hidden power relations since they transcend group formation based on class or any other means of social differentiation. Passi, finally, relaxes his theory by allowing the possibility of resistence and change by introducing the notion of generation. Passi argues that the spatiality of concrete historical experiences of young adults in a region can be constitutive of generations as actual social entities capable of bridging gaps between actual life histories and larger-scale social histories and enabling regional social transformation.

Although Passi has made a strong case for combining the political economic analysis of a region with an analysis of its collectivities, concrete studies of the social constitution of spatiality are needed to explore the ways in which the notion of generation actually conjoins with other bases of collective identification and action in the production of different worlds of structured expectations. In short, what is the moral of this tedious theoretical understanding? I think, Passi’s conceptualization forces us to treat regions as a process and an ever changing entity.

In Pakistan, we need to understand if our provinces qualify to be treated as regions, and if they do, how and under what kind of processes they have transformed socially and spatially over time. And if our provinces have transformed, which I think they have, it is unwise to simply go back to the Pakistan Resolution of 1940 to drastically restructure our existing nation-state on such lines. I think, such an effort is bound to fail and create unnecessary tensions and conflicts. If my argument makes some sense, we simply need to restructure our administrative and political structure based upon the ground realities of today and with a sense of direction for a better future for our coming generations. I think, this is what most Pakistanis want.

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

Bilal:

I have to show my appreciation. You have again conducted yourself here with diligence, patience and respect. Thank you.

Also, if it has not been pointed out earlier there is an interesting colum by Kuldip Nayyar reproduced in today`s nation at

http://www.nation.com.pk/

called Power game opens Pandora`s box dealing with devolution.

regards,

t

tahmad321 #246
Greetings to you, too. I`m disappointed you have chosen to respond to only my postscript.

If one is into comparisons, you might compare the powers, judicial, legislative, executive, financial, of local government proposed in Pakistan in the latest plan to the similar powers vested in the US states. If local entities in Pakistan have the same powers as US states, you will realise you are essentially asking for 50+ provinces in Pakistan, not dissolution of existing provinces. btw, can anyone say how many in number are local government units are proposed?

tahmad, I would like to understand what is meant by the New Economy and what is its relevance to the `common man` of Pakistan(and India, if you wish), so many of whom are illiterate landless laborers?

Sadhana

Dear Bilal,

I inadvertantly omitted to address you in my post #242. Please feel free to comment on it(or not) as you wish.

Sadhana

Prof. Ahmed #245 you ask ``What kind of marker does Dikshit`s description provide to evaluate Musharraf`s devolution plan?``

Ramesh Dikshit writes that ``a federation is born when a number of usually separate or politically autonomous units (or unit with some pretentions to autonomy) mutually agree to merge together``

I think Ramesh Dikshit`s description fits with the way a handful of states (notably the bonding of the original thirteen colonies of US in the 18th century, the Italian ``risorgimento`` in the 19th century) and no more. States were either formed through force (e.g. the takeover of Scotland by the English), or by hasty line drawing by retreating colonialists (e.g. most of sub-saharan Africa, and the messy lines drawn on their way to the airport by the Brits between India and Pakistan) or even by simple purchase (e.g. the Louisiana purchase, and the purchase of Alaska from the Russians by the US).

As for the future, Mr. Dikshit is provides scant guidance. As you say, he leaves out the entire question of individual human rights. Also, he ignores the emerging New Economy to which our political structures must align if we are to benefit from it. I believe the current government has the right instincts in some key aspects of the New Economy. However, it has not so far focussed enough on issues of politics above the local government level, on establishing human rights, on relations with India, and that is where I think we need a national debate and consensus building involving all interested Pakistanis (and also seeking the benefit of perspectives provided by non-Pakistanis), not just the politicians. Such a debate would lend great legitimacy to actions taken by the military, and also allow the military to step out of power with honor and having won back the hearts and gratitude of all Pakistanis.

sadna #242 Greetings. You say ``Nor yet is the US anywhere near declaring its state units to be irrelevant``. In the US, the population of the average state is about 5 million vs. a little over 30 million for India and Pakistan. So, the US state government is closer to being a local government than a provincial government in any case (so thanks for adding support to my stand :-) And this is not all: in the US local governments below the state level (i.e. city/county and in some cases even at the level of housing development) are more active in things of practical concern to the residents (zoning, education, crime prevention) than are state or federal governments.

The point is that our political structures need to be rationalized. This cannot be left to the politicians (for whom more levels of government are good because that means more ``business``, or if they are discredited, like BB, it is a means to rebuild a regional constituency). It is a job for the army to do before it goes back to it`s parade grounds.