Should Pakistan Honor the Lahore Resolution?

Shammi #432

Your arguments are flawed.

First it is the Kashmir problem which is the core problem between India and Pakistan relations. And as Feroz K aptly reached the conclusion that it has no military solution but political.

Second India needs some excuse to come out of its commitment. The reason is two fold. First you gave the date of Seato and Cento as 1954 or acquiring of foreign arms by Pakistan in 1954. But even before that in 1953 hand picked Kashmir parliament by intrigue and putting Sheikh Abdullah in Jail decided to join India. Do you think India was serious in plebiscite after 1948 and renegade on its promise after 1954. You are either deceiving yourself, or are trying to deceive all of us.

I think religious parties have both a positive and negative aspect in Pakistan.

Their positive aspect is their imparting of education, which if streamlined can result in remarkable improvement in quality education in Pakistan at minimum cost to government.

Also their religious zeal makes them a very brave fighters.

The negative aspect is imposition of their version of society in Pakistan and increase in Klashinkov culture in Pakistan.

Religious groups are more of a pressure group and not political force and cannot be because of their rigid thinking. Once they become more pragmatic and accomodating to other points of view without compromising their own principles, they will be a formidable force, as middle class alternative to current elite politics.

*Militarism, not military expenses *

Dear Krashid,

Thank you for clarifying your remarks. I now have a far greater understanding of your views. I wish we all (including myself) always attempted to do what you did this time- focus on communicating the essence of our ideas. Clearly I failed to do so earlier. Let me try again, briefly.

I was wrong, if I seemed to imply, that India`s military expenses are justified while Pakistan`s are not. Expenses, to me at least, are not the core issue at all. They are merely the most visible symptom of a far deeper and invidious problem, one of militarism. If skewed distribution of national resources was the only problem, resources could be redirected tomorrow. But they can`t be.

As I mentioned earlier, militarism is the extent to which the rest of the society surrenders (or is forced to surrender) decision-making authority in key areas of collective life to the institution of military. The flow of most national resources to the armed forces is the natural consequence of militarism (for simplicity, I will use the term to describe extreme cases of power-imbalance in favor of the military).

I argued that both India and Pakistan spend more of their national resources on their armed forces than they perhaps would in an `ideal world` of no perceived external threats. Pakistan has had the additional misfortune (in my opinion) of falling into the trap of militarism. My intent was to show that the MAIN intellectual argument supporting and feeding militarism in Pakistan (just like militarism anywhere)--fear of and an inescapable need to constantly fight external hegemony--is fundamentally flawed.

Every other nation in general and India in particular share this `natural fear of external hegemony,` but few nations (outside Africa, Burma perhaps) have fallen prey to extreme militarism. I may be quite wrong, but having followed Pakistani newspapers for many years now, it seems that in Pakistan the entire concept of nationhood has been hijacked by the military. The military, under this paradigm, becomes `the only institution with integrity,` the ultimate arbiter of the destiny of all other institutions, and the judge of competing national doctrines.

A counterargument is that what we have in Pakistan is the unfolding of perfect democracy: Pakistani military only reflects what all other groups and all other people in Pakistan really want. Thus, it is fully possible that most Punjabis, Sindhis, Baloochis, Pakhtoons, and Mohajirs do rank resisting Indian hegemony so much higher than everything else in their lives than they happily support the status quo of militarism. It is also possible that the military is truly far less corrupt and more capable in all affairs of governance and statecraft than any other institution. Given current circumstances, however, there is no way of knowing the `truth.` So we have to make up our own minds.

I do not think any of this is unique to Pakistan. It will be all true in any nation under militarism. And the same will be true in India were the Indian military to become the unchallenged ruler of our lives.

I hope you will agree that such Indian militarism will not be good for India.

Best.

Prem

Re: Umairr #403

Umairr, thanks for your reply. I was hoping to hear more about the threat that you feel that the jehadists pose to Pakistan. You have explained why the jehadists are serving a useful purpose for Pakistan in Kashmir. That much is well-known. However, the jehadists in Kashmir are the tip of the iceberg – their infrastructure (madrassas, recruitment, fund-raising, weapons accumulation) exists in Pakistan, and can be quickly turned inwards should the situation warrant or conditions change. You are correct that the Pakistan military is walking a tight-rope over its jehadists policy. I want to learn more about how big a threat they pose to Pakistan.

Do you think that if disillusionment with democracy is followed with disillusionment with military rule, the jehadists will turn their focus on controlling Pakistan? I base this belief upon the fact that the Kashmir objectives of the Pakistan military (negotiate settlement with India) and the jehadists (no climb-down from maximalist position of Taliban-style rule) have subtle differences today that may become larger in the future, as this conflict drags on longer. In that event, the jehadists might turn against the Pakistan military too, after they run out of ‘patience’, or infiltrate it. How big a threat is that? After all, the infrastructure that feeds the jehadists is quite large, and must be worrisome to anyone trying to exert control/authority over them. At some point, when they grow powerful enough, they could challenge the military’s supremacy. No nation state can tolerate private armies operating on their territory for long – friendliness today may turn to hostility tomorrow.

I say this because the jehadists influence in extracting concessions from the Pakistan government is growing, and their operations are spreading over large parts of Pakistan (virtually all provinces) and beyond (Afghanistan). They may pose a threat to the Pakistan government, sooner than the Pakistan military might be able to extract a negotiated settlement over Kashmir with India (thus largely negating the gains from pinning down Indian forces in Kashmir – more on this below). This would certainly be a disappointment for Bilal and his vision of a more federal structure operating under the law in Pakistan. The jehadists will have a very divisive effect on Pakistan (ethnic and religious). And this can be disastrous.

In light of the above, do you not think that the military should quit pandering to the jehadists to minimize the risk on Pakistan?

Now to a more important point – if policy planners in India and Pakistan continue to allow defence competition and Kashmir dictate their relations, then the current win-lose scenario will continue till eternity. The only way that this can be changed is by creating incentives (primarily economic) for both countries to work together. Business and trade offer several win-win opportunities that may grow so large one day that both countries might even ask – why did they not bury the hatchet a long time ago? I think that the responsibility of exploring such options should be shouldered by all enlightened Chowk-wallahs bear. Do you agree?

Responses to other issues raised in your post:

Nuclear weapons costs – the biggest costs are in manufacturing (enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, operating production reactors, machining precision parts, storage, monitoring, clean-up). Manufacturing consists of enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel (both are notoriously ‘dirty’ and polluting and the environmental clean-up costs can be in tens of billions of dollars alone. The US will spend approximately $150 bn to clean up weapons production sites). R&D for new weapons and delivery systems is also very expensive. Maintaining weapons, as you call it, or ‘stockpile stewardship’ as it is known in the US costs about $6bn/year in the US alone! This is much more involved than simply putting weapons in a silo and locking it – it requires continuous testing, replacing warheads as they radioactively decay, etc. An important thing to note is that warhead material does not have an infinite shelf life – as it decays, the weapon becomes unreliable. If the enemy knows your stockpile size, and your rates of warhead material production (which can be estimated from the rate of your fissile material production), it can make a good guess as to how reliable your stockpile is. Therefore, effective deterrence requires continuous testing for reliability and warhead replacement, and most importantly – communicating that fact to the enemy. Not cheap and costs cannot be reduced! Costs are comparable, if not higher than for conventional weapons in the Subcontinent’s context (consider stockpile stewardship costs of $6 bn/yr tag – which exceeds the entire Pakistan defence budget). Of course, the US can afford it because its defense budget is $300 bn/yr, but for India and Pakistan, this is a massive increase – and will represent by far the single most expensive weapon system. This does not even reflect the cost of delivery systems – submarines, missiles, aircraft, etc.

--“they (India and Pakistan) have to bilaterally de-escalate their militaries to a level where they are not a threat to each other. This is the tricky part. This, in my opinion, is even more important than making peace”. I think that if suspicions are removed, then military size matters less. For example, US/Canada,US/Mexico, China/Pakistan, India/Bhutan, India/Nepal, India/Bangladesh, India/Burma are examples of countries with large militaries coexisting with countries with smaller militaries, without the Indo-Pak hostility. Suspicions should be removed at a higher priority, and weapons reductions may follow. Suspicions are rooted not in military size, but the perceived ideological threat that India poses to Pakistan and vice versa. There will never be parity in armaments between India and Pakistan (because of geography and different external threats) – much as there will never be military parity between the US and Mexico. But, that does not mean that there should be permanent hostility, either. How can we turn India-Pakistan relations from win-lose to win-win?

With regards to China, the situation is more complex. While tanks are useless in a Sino-Indian conflict, ships and a blue-water navy are not. Further, India perceives a need to keep the shipping lanes open. One has to remember that India’s coastline is longer than its land borders. Historically, the size of the Indian military has been decided by two major events that influenced Indian military thinking – (a) Sino-Indian border war, and (b) Bangladesh war. The first occurred when the politicians refused to believe that China would attack across the Himalayas – and maintained a diminished military that was consistent with that world-view. The war changed that perception completely and was a watershed in Indian strategic thinking. The decision by Nixon to send the US 7th Fleet to the Bay of Bengal during the Bangladesh war was seen to be an event in which India could be coerced (a la Yugoslavia in 1999) by a sea-based foreign power. These are some of the reasons that India chooses to keep a large military that have little to do with Pakistan. You could also ask, why do the Chinese need 3 million men under arms and $40 bn defence budget? The responses that you get will be quite similar to Indian responses.

You also said, “The driving force behind the South Asian arms race is the India military buildup”. If you take a long view of history, you will notice that the first South Asian country to introduce foreign weapons and even foreign soldiers on its soil was Pakistan in 1954. That cannot be ignored. That was also the single most important reason why India rescinded on the plebiscite in Kashmir – for after that event the UN Security Council lost its impartiality in the Indo-Pak conflict (as all of the members sans USSR were members of the Western alliance). I think that at a time when the Kashmir issue could have been solved amicably, the opportunity was lost by this single act – it did not serve Pakistan’s long-term interests anyway, and Pakistan left CENTO voluntarily in 1965. There are lessons to be learnt here. Further, India still spends less then 3% GDP on defence.

Re: bahmad

``If the Objectives Resolution or the Constitution of 1973 recognize Pakistan as a Federation, then why some politicians persistently bring the issues of the Federation, provincial rights, and provincial autonomy into limelight? Maybe the ANP also wants to disintegrate Pakistan?``

I think the main problem these politicians have is that they miss the good `ol times of making money as lawmakers and ministers. The Armed Forces have taken away all that.

Re: bahmad

``For long and medium-term development, we need to make a few fundamental changes in the way we think and work. Let us take a few potential security risks and invest in the future of our country.``

Dear Bilal Ahmad Sahib,

Why does it have to be at the expense of national security? The armed forces budget can be streamlined, efforts can be made to insure that there`s no wastefulness (read Fuzair`s post), but in my opinion nothing should be done that puts our national security at risk.

Regards,

Re: bahmad

``Despite my distinction, I don’t treat the personnel as a monolithic body. I will explain this point in two posts. Army personnel may be categorized into at least four or five major categories, which include the common soldiers, non-commissioned officers, junior commissioned officer (Lieutenant through Major), and senior commissioned officers or staff officer (Lieutenant Colonnel onwards). It is the last of these categories which may be viewed as a truly privileged class (though the degree of privilege is contingent upon several additional factors). Brigadier Usman Khalid belongs to the last class, yet he is distinctively different from many of his peers. Khalid lives in London and is the leader of an organization called “Al-Ansar.”

I`ll skip the corrections needed in your categories. Not that important. But yes a Brigadier is a senior Amry officer.



``Khalid has issued a press release which accuses Altaf Hussain as an “Agent of Hindu RSS and Hindu BJP” (for details, search the Information Times web site). These are very serious charges, and the RSS is even hated by a significant chunk of Indian populaiton). On a domestic front, such charges are most likely to further alienate the supporters of MQM. It could also pit one ethnic community against another. A case in point is the (generally latent) tension between the Mohajir and Punjabis in Karachi.``

Maybe Brigadier Sahib is implying that all those million of dollars being spent on and by Altaf Sahib may have some other source than the mureeds of Altaf Sahib. The last I checked the economic conditions of Pakistanis was not that good.

``How does Khalid know that Hussain is an agent of the RSS and BJP? Is this a patriotic effort on the part of Khalid to expose a (bad?) Pakistani politician? For my position about Usman Khalid’s contribution to the Pakistani society, please see my letter (below).``

I don`t know what his source of information is, you might want to ask him. But I think he has valid problems with Altaf. I think the Brigadier Sahib probably got carried away when he called Altaf an RSS agent. But one does`nt need to be a statesman to recognize that Altaf is doing nothing but aid in Indian propaganda against Pakistan. That man has done nothing good for Pakistan. He is a miscreant and last I checked not the sole spokesman of the Karachittes.

Bilal Ahmad Sahib, I did`nt get the gist of your post. You started by saying that you make a distinction and then gave this example. Let`s for a secong assume that Khalid`s statement was irresponsible (which in my opinion can only be described as exaggarated but not off the mark) - now should you make up your opinion of the whole Army based on this retired soldier`s statement. I think he speaks now for the `Al-Ansar` as you mentioned.

Regards,

WHAT KIND OF NATION ARE WE?

In a recent opinion piece, Masud Akhtar Shaikh wrote (The News, October 6, 2000):

“Addressing the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industry the other day, Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf paid to the Pakistani nation a glowing tribute that made even the most stupid among us feel highly sagacious. That`s really great. Thank you General, for making us realise that we are the most intelligent nation in the world. The only problem with us is that we use our overflowing intelligence the wrong way.” Shaikh’s entire piece is worth reading. He provides several examples to make his point. I will cite only one example. Shaikh writes:

“Look at the way we use our numerous intelligence agencies, for example. By the very weight of their numbers, these agencies could make life hell for our enemies. Instead, we use them in such an absurd manner that they make our own lives a real hell. They would tell us exactly how many Indian secret agents or saboteurs have entered Pakistan, from exactly which point on our borders, and where exactly they have planned to stay before launching their covert operations. With all this vital information in their pocket, they prefer not to lay their hands upon these intruders.

Perhaps they are trained to keep their intelligence in reserve for use in an emergency, and to let the enemy agents carry out their nefarious plans unhindered. Granted that they have been blessed by the God Almighty with an abundant supply of intelligence, but that does not mean they should go about recklessly throwing away this divine blessing just to chase enemy agents. They normally wait till the damage has been done, and then proudly announce that security in the capital (or elsewhere, as the case may be) has been beefed up.”

Comment: What is the role of our intelligence agencies in creating disunity in existing Pakistan? Air Marshall Asghar Khan has recently called for disbanding the ISI. What good or bad will such a measure do to Pakistan?

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

PPP AND NATIONAL UNITY

On April 2000, Farhatullah Baber wrote an article on the basis of a statement issued by Benazir Bhutto. This article was published in the Frontier Post. I want to reproduce a relevant excerpt from this article. Baber writes:

“Former Prime Minister said that our goal should be to create a society free of class divisions where merit counts. We need to create an even playing field by ensuring that all segments and all areas receive their due share in the great federation of Pakistan we as a people need to unite and we can unite as we did in the past if we are allowed freedom, law, compassion and tolerance.

Hate only creates hate, revenge creates more revenge. We, living in the land of the great saints, have the capacity to love each other, respect each other and allow each other individual rights even if we differ with each other. The essence of a successful, pluralistic society is the ability to accommodate each other’s differing views and perspectives. Therefore, on behalf of the PPP, I appeal to all patriotic forces to forge unity within our ranks and with one voice to call for the return of democracy, even if some of us have reservations about that democracy. I call upon all patriotic Pakistanis to call for respect for the electoral verdict and an end to the politics of hate, violence and retribution.

A great future beckons us if we work hard. We could unite to do so and in doing so safeguard our future and territorial integrity and sovereignty , live in a peaceful environment, safe in our homes and society, free of prejudice and discrimination. In so doing we would be fulfilling the dreams of Quaid-i-Azam, Quaid-i-Millat, Quaid-i-Awam and all our heroes who served for the fulfilment of the aspirations of the people, She concluded.”

Comment: This piece raises a few questions. Is Bhutto content with the present unitary/federal make-up of Pakistan? In other words, does she consider Pakistan to be a de facto federation? What role did she play in the past in making Pakistan a “society free of class divisions where merit counts”? What steps did she take to ensure that “all segments and all areas receive their due share in the great federation of Pakistan”? What kind of freedom, compassion and tolerance did she allow to unite the people of Pakistan during her two tenures? Babers piece is written and suggest the sincerity of Benazir. Is her rhetoric now is different from what she has said earlier. Is she prepared to reform her party? A visit to the PPP web site would suggest that there are a few major changes made. One major change that I noticed is the element of deference to Benazir Bhutto (such as the boldly projected word “Mohtarma” is no more there). Would a third term of Benazir Bhutto likely to be better than the first two? What kind of new promises has she made to the people of Pakistan? Is she going to honor them? Does she or the state of Pakistan has the capacity to honor them?

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

P.S. This post of mine is neither anti- nor pro-Bhutto. I want other Chowkwallas to know her position on the issue of national cohesion and development. Would other Chowkwalla show us the position of other Pakistani leaders (political or otherwise)?

Re: Ahmadb #423

A minor clarification on terminology, if I may, Professor.

Other Ranks: sepahi, jawans, lance-naik, (sowar, acting-lance daffadar, in cavalry), etc.
Non-Commissioned officers: naik, havildar, havildar-major, (in cavalry: lance-daffadar, daffadar, daffadar-major)
Junior Commissioned Officers: naib-subedar, subedar, subedar-major (in cavalry: naib rissaldar, rissaldar, rissaldar-major).

(Some service branches, I believe, also have Warrant Officer ranks but we can ignore these since they are not relevant as there are so few of them.)

2nd Lt to Captain: Junior officers (NOT Junior Commissioned Officers)
Major to Lt. Col: Field officers.
Col and Brigadiers: Staff officers;
Major Generals and above: General officers.

(Naval and Air Force ranks are somewhat different for JCOs, NCOs and ORs.)

I realize that your usage may not intend to conform directly to Army usage, but your use of terms such as ``Junior Commissioned Officers`` for major and below is too confusing for any one who has any exposure to the Pakistani Army.

Regards.

Re: Macgupta #416

I just meant that our enemy, the army we`ll be fighthing, isn`t realy that much better than us in some, many, respects.

As an aside, I would like to point out that, as Umairr said, as proportionately the PAF and PN get a much larger budget than the PakArmy does, their VIP rooms and general officer perks are also much, much better than the Army`s. I`ve been to PAF Kamra and I`ve seen the facilities there: much much better than any I`ve seen in any army cantonment!

Re: Rajanjua #420

Nope, its still Hodson`s Horse. One Horse is still Skinner`s Yellowboys, the Scinde Horse is still Jacob`s. And there is a battalion in the Indian Army that still proudly calls itself Wellesley`s Own as he was their CO years before he became the Duke of Wellington. I don`t know if the Central India Horse is still called by the other rissalas, derogatorively, ``The Hindu Blues`` but it might well be. As a general rule, the Indians have kept up almost all of the old Indian Army`s traditions while we have made sure that we discarded all of ours. Such farangi traditions did not fit in with the Islamic ethos of the new state so we got rid of them pretty quickly. For example, no one calls 12 Cav ``Sam Browne`s`` anymore as far as I know, although 5 Horse is still Probyn`s. I think old timers still call 11 Cav, PAVO, which of course stood for Prince Albert Victor`s Own--until 1956, 11 Cav wore ``PAVO`` as their epaulet insignia.

Regards.

THE ISSUE OF FEDERATION

According to the News, the Awami National Party (which has strong roots among the Pakhtoons) believes that:

“. . . General Musharraf has failed in the implementation of his seven-point agenda and the masses have been hit by unprecedented price hike, unemployment and the worst kind of law and order situation. The [ANP] meeting noted that provinces are still deprived of their basic rights and no practical steps have been taken to give provincial autonomy to the federating units as promised by the chief executive. The meeting demanded that the government should immediately publish the Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission report without any change and must move to punish those responsible for the division of the country.”

If the Objectives Resolution or the Constitution of 1973 recognize Pakistan as a Federation, then why some politicians persistently bring the issues of the Federation, provincial rights, and provincial autonomy into limelight? Maybe the ANP also wants to disintegrate Pakistan?

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

In response to rajanjua (Reply # 409) Part III
Dear Janjua Sahib:

In my Reply # 394, I wrote:

“I have repeatedly clarified my position that I distinguish between the army as an institution and the army as army personnel. I have also maintained that these two aspects of the army are not mutually exclusive. We, therefore, need to analyze how each of these has contributed both positively and negatively.” I also said: “The positive role is well-known to all of us, thanks to a continuous and unceasing effort to construct a good image of the armed forces (particularly the army).”

Despite my distinction, I don’t treat the personnel as a monolithic body. I will explain this point in two posts. Army personnel may be categorized into at least four or five major categories, which include the common soldiers, non-commissioned officers, junior commissioned officer (Lieutenant through Major), and senior commissioned officers or staff officer (Lieutenant Colonnel onwards). It is the last of these categories which may be viewed as a truly privileged class (though the degree of privilege is contingent upon several additional factors). Brigadier Usman Khalid belongs to the last class, yet he is distinctively different from many of his peers. Khalid lives in London and is the leader of an organization called “Al-Ansar.”

Khalid has issued a press release which accuses Altaf Hussain as an “Agent of Hindu RSS and Hindu BJP” (for details, search the Information Times web site). These are very serious charges, and the RSS is even hated by a significant chunk of Indian populaiton). On a domestic front, such charges are most likely to further alienate the supporters of MQM. It could also pit one ethnic community against another. A case in point is the (generally latent) tension between the Mohajir and Punjabis in Karachi.

How does Khalid know that Hussain is an agent of the RSS and BJP? Is this a patriotic effort on the part of Khalid to expose a (bad?) Pakistani politician? For my position about Usman Khalid’s contribution to the Pakistani society, please see my letter (below).

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

Cultivate Solidarity, Not Dissension
Frontier Post, Circa February 6, 2000

I am writing in response to Brigadier Usman Khalid’s recent article in which he appeals to General Musharraf to identify his constituency (FP, February 2, 2000). Khalid has identified several dualisms: consolidationists and disintegrationists, Islamists and secularists, patriots and traitors, nationalists and ethnic chauvinists. Although Khalid seems to treat himself as the champion of the consolidationists, Islamists, patriots, and nationalists, his dualisms are beset with misconceptions which create problems in our understanding of the complex Pakistani society.

The thrust of Khalid’s article is essentially militaristic, where he clearly identifies both internal and external enemies of Pakistan and supports a violent approach to crush both. On both counts, I find Khalid’s militaristic strategy detrimental for the well-being of Pakistan and her people. Lest we forget, the practice of danda shahi has already cost us not only disharmony between various provinces, but the fall of East Pakistan. Moreover, the practice of questioning the loyalty of Pakistani nationals and labeling them as traitors is deplorable. Law must prohibit slander unless the accuser provides sound evidence to support his/her claim in a “just” court of law.

If Khalid is really what he purports to be, he should try to understand the dialectics of our society and use his pen to cultivate national unity rather than disunity.

Bilal Ahmad
USA

In response to rajanjua (Reply # 409) Part II
Dear Janjua Sahib:

Your statement: “Can`t you think of anything good done by the present regime in the last year? And for a minute forget that its a military regime.”

Comment: My comments generally reflect my historical-geographical understanding of the situation in Pakistan. I generally do not focus upon the personalities as such. Please do not assume that I am oblivious to what Musharraf has tried to do over the past thirteen months (even if I view his regime as unconstitutional).

First, he gave us a seven-point agenda (nothing new, yet it provides a vision – a good sense of direction). The implementation of such a visionary agenda is, however, virtually impossible in the present state of affair unless Musharraf takes the whole nation into confidence. Our nation consists of both good and bad elements, which are a part of our reality. One important step in this direction is to start a democratic-political process (not just electoral process).

Second, as a part of his agenda, the Musharraf regime has developed a devolution plan. This is a great move in spirit Unfortunately, the plan is half-baked. For a few insights, please see my Chowk article on devolution and browse through the responses too.

Third, Musharraf has persistently invited India for peaceful talks and for developing good neighborly relations. This is a step in the right direction. Unfortunately, India has over-inflated the Kargil issue. Indian administrations would use every possible opportunity to maintain the status quo, if a change is likely to result in the loss of Kashmir and/or political/social instability in the rest of India. I believe that India must open the lines of communication. Musharraf’s strategy has helped improve Pakistan’s image in my mind, at least. I want this process to continue as long as it takes India to realize the need for mutual talks.

I have a mixed feeling about the Musharraf regime. Musharraf does not have too many options available. The times are hard, and the situation is likely to worsen. Musharraf’s regime has worked hard but neither he nor the army nor the politicians have the capacity to deal with the difficulties of Pakistan on their own, at least in the short run.

For long and medium-term development, we need to make a few fundamental changes in the way we think and work. Let us take a few potential security risks and invest in the future of our country.

Let us outperform Indian governments by formulating and by implementing a long-term policy of peace and prosperity. This approach will bring Pakistan close to the people of India. The task is very challenging, but we must accept the challenge.

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

Prem #

In your first post, you are justifying the acquiring of Indian arms because of threat from China.

Also it means you justify it to prevent the political and economic hegemony or dominance of China over India.

You are justified.

But in the next post you are preaching, that world will have ``hegemon`` whether someone like it or not.

Covertly implying that it is useless for Pakistan to counter the political and economic dominance of India.

My argument was all the preparedness of India against China is used against Pakistan.

Can you still see the dichotomy with which you are trying to justify Indian action and unjustify Pakistan`s.

And my second response was ``see you in battlefield`` meaning if you don`t accept our right to protect ourselves, what is the answer. It is definitely not logic.

Re: Fuzair

Yes I know about Faiz- But in his case one is tempted to make an exception. I am surprised they have`nt change the name of Hodson`s Horse to ShivaJi`s Own or something like that.

Another attempt to understand the military`s hegemony over civilian life.

http://server35.hypermart.net/thefridaytimes/ejaz.htm