The Quest for Power

From The Telegraph THE THIRD GENERAL

BY K.P. NAYAR


In a decade which extols the virtues of democracy non-stop from Vancouver to Vladivostok, it is tempting to assume that an usurper to state power like General Pervez Musharraf will have a natural disadvantage over a democratically elected leader like Atal Bihari Vajpayee when the two men get together for a summit which will be closely followed in capitals around the world.
However, India’s experience with three generals in Pakistan — Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Musharraf himself — should warn Vajpayee against even the slightest trace of complacency at the Indo-Pakistan summit next month. There is a popular — at times, dangerous — thread of conviction which runs through the Indian media, the country’s intelligence community and among its strategic analysts that patriotism demands they should run Pakistan down and ride a moral high horse while talking of that country even when Pakistan is clearly getting the better of India.

Notwithstanding the fact that some grandiose schemes against India by all these three generals came to nought, Ayub, Zia and Musharraf have been more than a match to India’s legitimate rulers. Those who were present at Vajpayee’s first meeting as prime minister with Nawaz Sharif in Colombo in 1998 were witness to the reality that Sharif was putty in the seasoned hands of the Bharatiya Janata Party prime minister. Nobody, none of us from the media present in Colombo at any rate, believed Indian officials who told us, off-the-record, on the night of that summit that Sharif had confided in Vajpayee about shunting off his vitriolic, acerbic foreign minister, Gohar Ayub Khan, who spat venom at India at every opportunity.

But that was precisely what happened. In less than a month, the high-flying Gohar Ayub was relieved of his charge and packed off to the less glamorous water resources ministry. It was a performance by Vajpayee which the Indian prime minister repeated when he met Sharif for the second time in New York a few months later. Vajpayee’s aides would be making a monumental folly if they advise him that the prime minister’s meeting with Musharraf next month will be anything like his three summits with the man whom the general deposed in October 1999.

Witness the way Musharraf handled the Americans through last week’s events when he strode into the presidency. His foreign minister, Abdul Sattar, a veteran of two high commissionerships in New Delhi, showed no trace of red-facedness or embarrassment when he met United States officials the day after Musharraf staged his “second coup”. Sattar’s performance was dramatically different from that of Sharif when the former president, Bill Clinton, summoned the Pakistani leader to Washington on July 4, 1999, and pressured Pakistan into pulling out of Kargil.

Last week, the deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitage, did bring up the awkward subject of Musharraf dissolving parliament and evicting Pakistan’s sole left-over from a democratic past: the president, Rafiq Tarrar.

Sources privy to the conversation assert that Sattar explained to Armitage that he had been away from Islamabad for about 10 days, and therefore, did not know about the general’s immediate plans. It may or may not have been true, but it was certainly more than what K. Raghunath, India’s foreign secretary during the 1998 nuclear tests, could do. Unlike Sattar, Raghunath could never make the Americans believe that he did not know about Pokhran II in advance. State department officials are convinced to this day that Raghunath, who was in Washington four days before the tests, misled the Americans on that score.

Sattar reinforced his alibi by declaring at a press conference in Washington just before meeting Armitage that he was told about Musharraf becoming head of state only the day before — after he had met the secretary of state, Colin Powell, and the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice. No politician in India would admit to such ignorance or acknowledge that he had been left out of decision-making.

But the most important aspect of the Sattar-Armitage meeting was that having had his say about democracy in Pakistan, the deputy secretary of state went on to engage the visiting foreign minister about issues that really mattered in Indo-Pakistan relations.

At the end of the meeting Sattar and Armitage had agreed that Pakistan’s foreign secretary would travel to Washington as soon as the Vajpayee-Musharraf summit was over to apprise his US counterpart, Marc Grossman, of what transpired in New Delhi and Agra — and to chart out the future for US-Pakistan relations.

By the time Sattar was on his plane back to Islamabad, Musharraf had allowed the Americans to bask in the belief that they had walked a high moral road in dealing with totalitarian excesses in Pakistan. In the process, the wily general lost nothing; he gave away zero.

The Bush administration is in the process of drawing up a new policy towards Pakistan. It aims to get rid of the pu$$y-footing that was the hallmark of the second-term Clinton administration’s Pakistan policy and return to the certainties of the Clinton team’s first term. But the new policy will also take into account the change in relations with India which have brought New Delhi into Washington’s strategic calculus and avoid parity between India and Pakistan, at least overtly.

No one is more interested in the contours of this new policy than Musharraf who, like Zia before him, hopes to be around in Islamabad for some time to come. It is wishful thinking in New Delhi that Musharraf will do anything to sabotage an emerging new relationship with the Republican administration: his elevation to the presidency was carefully timed to make sure that it will cause the least ripples in Washington. Contrary to all the hype in India about the continuing US sanctions against Pakistan and Washington’s insistence on a democratic Pakistan, the lasting message which Sattar left behind in the US last week was that the Bush administration had better work with Pakistan on a cooperative relationship.

Just as New Delhi convinced the US over the last two years that the full potential of Indo-US relations cannot be realized as long as sanctions are in effect, Islamabad has convinced the Bush administration that sanctions have only served to strengthen Islamic fundamentalist forces in Pakistan.

Notwithstanding the general’s military attire, Musharraf has persuaded the Americans to take his administrative reforms and his war on corruption seriously. His finance minister, Shaukat Aziz, has done a good job of getting international lending institutions to loosen their purse-strings in dealing with Pakistan.

For that matter, Sattar stopped just short of accusing the Americans of being responsible for south Asia’s current nuclear impasse. Without mentioning the Americans by name, of course, Sattar said that with the erosion of Pakistan’s conventional military capability — on account of the Pressler amendment and so on — Islamabad has been forced to rely on strategic defence, including nuclear weapons and missiles.

There will be enough takers in the Republican administration for this line. After all, this is precisely what many Republicans have been telling the Clinton team for the last four years when Washington’s tilt towards India began to manifest itself. Besides, there is bipartisan support in the US on preventing Pakis- tan from becoming a failed state. So, in a way, Musharraf will be looking for the failure of his talks with Vajpayee next month. This will help advance his cause not only in Washington, but elsewhere in the world as well. Musharraf’s only concern will be to ensure that he does not get blamed for the summit’s failure.

His grand gesture in pleading with the Indian prime minister to tone down the rhetoric in the run up to the summit is a classic example of how Musharraf will try to manipulate New Delhi so that the world blames Big Brother India for south Asia’s perceived strategic woes.

Vajpayee’s big challenge, on the other hand, is to find a way of moving forward on Kashmir. The BJP leadership will be loathe to admit that the prime minister had no option but to invite Musharraf for talks. The ceasefire initiative by the Vajpayee government in November had reached a dead end. The choice before the prime minister’s office was to either lose men and material in Kashmir on account of the non-working ceasefire or prepare for a massive deterioration of the ground situation there.

Even a decision to just call off the ceasefire would have created ripples abroad with Musharraf accusing India of raising tensions in a “nuclear-armed” south Asia. India successfully overcame this dilemma by calling off the ceasefire and, in quick succession, inviting the general for talks. It was a master-stroke which worked. But now Vajpayee has to pay the price for it by actually playing political chess with a general who has already outsmarted politicians in his own country

MH: This is the third Bulletin you have issued, and you will as before continue to maintain a lordly silence on the comments. I guess bad habits as Minister of Information to NS die hard - You just tell people what you want, but are not interested in their views.

This will be your last post on Chowk unless you have the thick skin of an elephant and the shamelessness of a minister of information who jails journalists (ooops! I guess that is what you are), or the shamelessness of a minister in a government that storms the Supreme Court (oooops again. I guess you are that too), or the shamelessness of a politician who watches quietly as his party leader goes about destroying all checks and balances to his power (ooops again! you are that too!!!!). I guess nothing is beneath you as you stumble around thirsting for power.

Dear Mushahid Husain Sahib,

Why is it that Pakistan is taken over by its own military after every few years of democratic rule?

The 64 thousand dollar answer is:

Because the democratically elected civilian governments were corroupt to the core.

Please stop blaming the generals and look what wrong your government did when it was in power.

If democratically elected governments keep doing the same mistakes then chances are that some general will keep coming to power by over throwing the ``democratically`` elected governemnt.

Asfand Siddiqui

Sacramento CA

Re: Fuzair #3

This man Mushahid is a certified bayghairat-why should he care. What is distressing is that Chowk keeps printing his verbal diahrrea.

Mr. Hussain:

I hope that you`ll care to interact on this board. Laiken Ho Suktaa Hae Keh Chowk`s management is churao-fying[stealing] your views from somewhere and are posting them here. Who knows? Anything is possible. In that case, your absence is fine :)

``The biggest irony is that those who applauded the “original sin”, i.e., the military coup of October 12, are now, 20 months down the line, suddenly lamenting the “loss of democracy” terming the June 20 take over of the top civilian slot as “extra-constitutional”. It has taken the civil society wallahs, the ‘democratic’ political forces and the religious political forces a long time to understand the basic home-truth that once the armed forces are ‘invited’ in to oust an elected government, then, after taking over, the men in khaki promote their own political agenda, their own policies and priorities, most of these at variance with those who initially welcomed the coup-makers.``

The above made me comment that something must have stirred to bring these ``men in khaki``[personally, I like them]on the forefront. Your comment on `Invited In` sounded strange as if someone was `invited in` for a chai-kee-pyali[a cup of tea] and the person refused to leave. For any invitation, there has to be a rhyme or reason.

``· The more powerful a person, the less authority he is able to exercise. A simple check on how many of the Chief Executive or Prime Ministerial directives were ever implemented would confirm the veracity of this statement. ``

Yeh Bhee Bari Hairan-Kun theory Hae`. More Power and Less Authority! Then, what is power? A bhari kursee ? What?

``In the last 20 months, the military regime’s task has been made somewhat easier by a combination of actions and circumstances. The fact that the top political leaders are out of the country has helped the military regime politically, because there is an absence of serious resistance to its plans.``

Top Politcians ? Who are they ? I do not read Pakistani newspapers any more so I would love to be enlightened in that regard. Koan Haen Woh Jo Top Political Ins-and-Outs Sae Waqif Haen ? Who are they ? I thought we are left with none and therefore are constantly reading about our leaders from the past on Chowk. Yep, there are many acrobats and circus players. They are also in hiding, I guess. We are not hearing of many interesting circus games nowdayas. Are we ? :) :)

I remembered hearing Maleeha Lodhi in DC. Her speech as a journalist, spoke of who she was. Now when she had to wear the other face, a representative of the government, she did not do very well. In short, you cannot switch people and throw them in spots to cover yourself. That`s where I think our people are taken advantage of. But this is the prevalent psyche. The same thing used to happen in our professional schools. Some of the students were very sweetly enticed into the political buk buk[networks] and were misused in personal vendettas. As a result, they spent a torn-apart outlook towards life for a long time.

``Second, by putting education on top of the priority list, even if it means slashing the defence budget. This area concerns not just the future generation of Pakistanis, but education will also be pivotal in determining Pakistan’s role in the comity of nations.``

History has also shown us something very clearly here. This aspect was never our priority and will never be our priority. So let`s not waste our time here.


````General Musharraf’s real test has now begun. What will he do with accumulation of such absolute, unchecked power? His challenge will be to show whether he can change the country’s direction by making a difference, otherwise the quest for power as a means for self-perpetuation and its consequences is something that Pakistanis are quite familiar with.``

Absolute Power? I think that is where people need to be slapped and properly kicked and then told that NONE can acquire ``Absolute Power.`` When human beings start acting like gods, their fate is clearly obvious - regardless of their surroundings, hawaris, and all the other paraphernalia. We have many eye-openers in that arena as well.

Suggestion:

I think what we need now is someone who can compile all the lessons learnt from the past ruling governments. This should include positive points that worked out well and negative ones that should be avoided in all cases. The 3rd column should be the steps that each government promised and could not deliver for whatever reasons. These points should be compiled and prioritized so that the forthcoming government should look into them first than wasting time to start from scracth.

Take Care.

#9
`` Washington hopes that a successful summit will strengthen Musharraf at home. The catch is that this ``success`` may need concessions that no Indian prime minister can deliver.

Once again, India is being asked to bail out Pakistan, a process that has already begun with New Delhi`s support for a fresh $3 billion IBRD-IMF accommodation to Pakistan this year, as well as the concessions over Kashmir, like the extended ceasefire.``

Thats right, India has to `bail out` Pakistan for a situation created solely because Pakistanis cannot be bothered to stir themselves and tackle their own leaders through their awareness and activism AND THEIR VOTE.

And then we have to hear lectures on how much better off ordinary Pakistanis are than ordinary Indians, but electoral democracy is not suitable for us Pakistanis, thank you. Who says jihad is not profitable foreign policy? A whine in the voice must accompany it, remember.

We need a coup in India, too to put everything in perspective here. Lets go ballistic and all unreasonable with armed Bajarang Dali`s swarming everywhere killing without discrimination so that the world will wring its hands and our neighbours will asked to ``bail us out`` .

From The Hindustan Times (Op/Ed) today:

Turkey on his mind

By Gajendra Singh

General Pervez Musharraf has anointed himself President of Pakistan while retaining the all-powerful post of army chief. A careful and calculating man, he seized the opportunity of an invitation for talks from Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, prodded and blessed by the United States. Although he had visited Muslim countries and China, Musharraf felt that the moment was now ripe for the ‘final step’. He thus becomes the first Mohajir Pakistani head of State.

India may repaint the dilapidated haveli near Old Delhi’s Golcha cinema from where Musharraf and his family migrated after Partition in 1947. But the general has more abiding and inspiring memories from his school days in the Turkish capital of Ankara where his father, a junior diplomat, was posted in the Fifties. Soon after the October 12, 1999 coup, in his first press conference, Musharraf idealised Kemal Ataturk and hoped to emulate him. (The Jamaat-i-Islami immediately opposed the secular ideology of Ataturk.)

But Musharraf’s real role model remains Turkish general Kenan Evren who had carried out a coup in 1980. During his one-day Ankara visit in November 1999, Musharraf lunched with the chief of protocol, a schoolmate. But he was an unwelcome guest. The hosts were embarrassed and advised the general to restore democracy at the earliest. The Turkish daily News castigated his visit as “untimely and unnecessary so soon after grabbing power and jailing the elected Prime Minister. Turks had concluded that coups had not solved Turkey’s problems, on the contrary it had further complicated things”.

On taking over, Musharraf first created a National Security Council (NSC) on the Turkish pattern. His choice of advisors showed similarities with Gen Evren. But while the Turkish general’s shrewd choice of technocrat Turgut Ozal (later Prime Minister and President) turned around Turkey’s moribund economy, Pakistan’s economic plight remains precarious.

Gen Evren took a couple of years to sort out the mess, got a new Constitution approved by a referendum — which also confirmed him as President and further institutionalised the role of the armed forces in politics. He remained in power for nine years.

The Turkish armed forces were forced to intervene in 1980 as the country was at the edge of an abyss. Over a thousand people had been killed in violence in the previous six months. The then Prime Minister, Suleyman Demirel, and opposition leader Bulent Ecevit had literally abdicated their responsibility by refusing to even elect a President for many months.

In Pakistan, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif used his two-thirds parliamentary majority to bully the President, bend the higher judiciary to his will and challenged the military by forcing Musharraf’s predecessor, Gen Jehangir Karamat, to resign. Politicians like Sharif and Benazir Bhutto had the opportunity and political support to lay the foundations for democracy, but blundered.

Proposals to form an NSC in Pakistan on Turkish lines were not new. Gen Zia-ul-Haq had wanted to create one in the Eighties but was dissuaded. President Farooq Leghari had even decreed one in January 1997. It was allowed to lapse after Sharif’s victory. In suggesting the formation of an NSC, Gen Karamat was only stating a political reality which might lead to a more peaceful path towards democracy. In any case, barring perhaps Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto — after the military had been totally discredited in the Bangladesh war — Pakistan’s armed forces have been de facto rulers for most of the time.

In the 11 years between Gen Zia’s death and Musharraf’s take-over, Benazir Bhutto and Sharif were eased in and out whenever they tried to cross the line and interfere in the military’s autonomy. Constantly squabbling with each other, they remained busy amassing huge fortunes by corrupt means.

Established after the 1960 coup, the Turkish NSC was composed of military and civilian members. It was strengthened following the 1971 and 1980 military interventions. Threats from the military members of the NSC made Demirel resign in 1971 and the first ever Islamist Prime Minister of Turkey, Necemettin Erbakan, was installed in 1997.

Chaired by the President, the ‘representatives’ of the armed forces offer ‘recommendations’ on internal and external security to which the government must give priority. The Turkish armed forces enjoy total autonomy in their affairs. Its Chief of General Staff (CGS) is second in rank only to the Prime Minister.

In Pakistan, the position of the army’s CGS — originally based on the British colonial pattern but modified later — is even more decisive and certainly more arbitrary. Perhaps there is some merit in legalising the de facto position of the Pakistani military and making its role more accountable. But while the Turkish armed forces, a bastion of secularism, expel officers suspected of an ‘Islamic bias’, Pakistan’s armed forces have become Islamised at the lower and middle levels.

Since the 1960 coup, Turkish politicians have slowly worked out a modus vivendi with military leaders with incremental assertion of civilian supremacy. Since 1923, apart from President Celal Bayar, all Turkish Presidents were retired military chiefs. But Ozal (1989-1993) and Demirel (1993-2000) strengthened the civilian hand by getting themselves elected as Presidents. They had to, however, take note of the military’s views in regular NSC meetings.

Benazir Bhutto played a seminal role in promoting the stranglehold of Islamic fundamentalist groups in 1996. Today, they have become deeply entrenched in the Pakistani armed forces. Tacitly approved by the US and with support from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan created jehadis.

On the whole, Musharraf has handled a difficult situation rather well. He has not promised elections and then gone back on his promise like Gen Zia so far. He has tried to reform the economy and reduce corruption. The media are relatively free. Pakistan’s judiciary cannot remove him.

Despite his placing of loyal generals like Usmani to guard his position, in such a situation the toss up is between takht (throne) and takhta (noose). We, in India, will no doubt fuss over the visit of the “architect of Kargil and the wrecker of the Delhi-Lahore bus diplomacy”.

But let us not forget that when Gen Zia visited Jaipur for a cricket Test match, he was also planning ‘Operation Topaz’ for Kashmir.

Kemal Ataturk, Musharraf’s proclaimed role model, had boldly carried out modernisation and westernising reforms against religious obscurantism and dogma. He forged the remnants of the Ottoman Empire with a 99 per cent Muslim population and turned it into the secular Republic of Turkey in the Twenties. He had kept his ambitions abroad in check and did not claim former Ottoman provinces lost in World War I.

Musharraf, a child of his times, is riding the fundamentalist tiger that he helped nurture and still has to nourish and humour. Like most Pakistanis, his obsession with Kashmir borders on paranoia. Ataturk was born in Salonike in Greece and his family came from Macedonia. Musharraf was born in Delhi and his family comes from eastern Uttar Pradesh. But can he seize the chance that destiny has offered?

Ataturk had to first vanquish the Ottoman Sultan’s forces sent to kill him. He then had to defeat friend-turned-foe Ethem and his Islamic army. Later, Ataturk ruthlessly crushed the religious revolts led by Kurdish chiefs and others. He even neutralised his old nationalist comrades to fulfil his destiny. Only time will tell whether Musharraf will be able to emulate his role model.

From The Times of India today:

Musharraf faces coup threat in his backyard

By M D NALAPAT

WASHINGTON: With President Bush and his team reacting strongly to the strategic monopoly of Beijing in Asia, the Pakistan Army has emerged as a significant cockpit of the US-China rivalry. Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who many perceive to be pro-US, seems to be at a disadvantage for now.

From the 1973 Nixon visit to Beijing, both China and the US concerted to harass and finally overthrow the USSR. Whether in East Europe or in theatres such as Afghanistan, Beijing lent (often clandestine) support to specific US policies designed to weaken the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

In consequence, there was no conflict of interest in Pakistan, a client state of both. Today, with President Bush and his core team reacting to the very strategic monopoly of Beijing in Asia that was the fruit of the 1993-2000 policies of his predecessor, the Pakistan Army has emerged as a significant cockpit of US-China rivalry.

Within this force - which has been in direct control of Pakistan for half of that country`s life - there has emerged a ``pro-China`` lobby that is trying to oust the ``pro-US`` group from power. This group, which has close links to the People`s Liberation Army, is headed by Lt. Gen. M H Usmani, Deputy Chief of Army Staff, ISI chief Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed and Lahore Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Mohammed Aziz.

While it was this troika that launched the coup that brought the newly minted Pakistani president to power 18 months ago, today they have turned against Gen. Pervez Musharraf, convinced that he is only a cat`s paw for a Washington that they (and their friends in China) perceive as increasingly tilting to India.

As a result, they blocked the promotion of key ``US lobby`` personnel such as Maj. Gen. Anis Bajwa and former principal secretary Tariq Aziz. Slowly, the ``pro-China`` group is taking over the key positions within the Pakistan Army.

This is bad news not just for the US but equally for India, as most of the PLA-friendly officers have close links with the jihadi groups, and favour an aggressive policy of insurgency to ``not just bring India to its knees but cut its limbs off``, as a Pakistani analyst close to the group told this correspondent in Washington.

However, the clock is ticking for them: Usmani retires as early as next January, while the ISI`s Mahmood Ahmed leaves service in June 2002 and the ``pro-China mastermind`` Lt. Gen. Aziz demits office on October 17, 2002. This will give Musharraf the chance to replace them with US-friendly officers less entangled with the jihadis.

The question analysts here are asking is whether the CEO-turned-President will be able to withstand the reaction of the jihadi group to his plans. Visiting Pakistani officers, speaking on strict confidentiality, said that they expected a second coup before the end of this year, designed to replace Musharraf with Usmani.

It was this fear, they say, that prompted Musharraf to name the chief justice as his second-in-line rather than the deputy chief of army staff. According to them, the jihadis are mobilising opinion within the army against Musharraf, aware that they need to act within a year, before he consolidates.

US officials say that it was the fear of a countercoup against Musharraf that motivated US Secretary of State Colin Powell to nudge New Delhi into inviting the CEO-turned-President for talks.

Washington hopes that a successful summit will strengthen Musharraf at home. The catch is that this ``success`` may need concessions that no Indian prime minister can deliver.

Once again, India is being asked to bail out Pakistan, a process that has already begun with New Delhi`s support for a fresh $3 billion IBRD-IMF accommodation to Pakistan this year, as well as the concessions over Kashmir, like the extended ceasefire.

One act play being displayed by the General is nothing new and surprising. However I give entire

credit to him for holding the drift of the pakistan society towards Taliban Culture.People have realized that leaning towards Omar..or Bin Laaaden will not serve them their purpose.

This General has realized that he has many things

to do to change history, not only in international relation but also intrastate relations like Punjabi dominance, indifference towards Ahamadis, stone walling at Mohajirs neglect of Baluchistan are few which the General knows he needs to redress.

His assendency is mostly criticized by people from

punjab and followers of feudilism. Let a guy from Karachi hold the batton for few years. Judge him

by his deeds and not his origin. Don`t you think

he was right suppressing people like Fazlur Rehaman, Hamid Gul and other hardliners.

Fuzair #3:

...will use the Lord as a last resort...but if you could please send out some probes and find out if `he` can read?...with his third foray here we are beginning to understand that he can `write`...this repetition reminds me of the sermon from the perch delivered to the faithful every friday in Urdu...just prior to the rendition of the officially sanctioned arabic sermons...full of...and insult to...:)...and `they` don`t hear either!

rgds,

t


PS: ...thought should let you know have profound differences with you and my fellow curmudgeon hamidm over the merits of certain single malts the two of you have been discussing...and am willing to resolve the matter in person with you and hamidm over cuban monte cristos at a date and time of your choice...needless the residence in west toronto will be selected by me:)

What is this??Mushaid Hussain week??Puhleeezzz

Rule of Law -- Just exactly what, does this mean?? Did we not have rule of Law during BB and NS governments?

Did BB or NS take us away from bigotry, intolerance or Diktat?

Were not elected Majlis available during those govenments? Did they not participate in the looting of the nation? How many Laws did they propose, debate or pass?

What was the reaction of the private economy to BB and NS, rule of law? How much growth did the Pakistani economy register during the 90`s?

Which Pakistani institutions registered or were percieved as legitimate during the rule of law?

Was provincial harmony increased or decreased during the rule of law?

Perhaps if Mr. Musharraf can just finish the restructuring the Pakistani State (create a hybrid state) and put in place policies that will result in the reduction of the public role, opening of the economy to larger numbers or even a more level playing field, millions will be helped. If the concept accountablity can be made to be seen as potent and unfair, Pakistani citizens will have been served well. And if the devolution of power plan will serve not only the administrative requirments of the public but also serve to filter the personal ambitions of the so called political elite, Pakistanis will have been well served.

Good Lord!

The man has no shame! How the Minister of Disinformation for Nawaz Sharif can have the nerve to write this stuff is beyond me. The pasting he got on the other articles has not affected him one bit!

Mushahid:

Hollow words...sir...hollow words:

``...Pakistan’s history teaches us when a ruler perceives himself at the peak of power, in apparent total control, lord and master of all that he surveys, unchecked by any ‘checks and balances’, that’s when the problem arises. How will all this power be used for the good of the people? How will General Musharraf make a difference that will be felt in Pakistan?...``


Subsititute Nawaz Shareef for Gen. Musharraf. You were there in cahoots with him. What did he/you do?


Do you have no shame?


---t

I dont think that people of Pakistan should even be allowed to wimper or moan or cry foul at this backstabbing. It was well deserved. When people start taking sides with everybody but themselves then they deserve it.

My condolences to all Pakistanis on this dark night that is about to begin to haunt us for the next indetermined number of years.

Inna lillah he wa inna elayhay raajayoon.