The Indo-Pak Summit, Kashmir and the Taj Mahal

Read this article and note the progress made by women in indian (this articl e is about muslim girls). It shows you the world of difference in the appraoches the two States take:

One State going down the route of condoning and encouraging the practise of honour killing and not valuing a woman.

Another trying to change attitudes of the society by providing a chance to all and creating a framework whereby all can flourish.

A quote from the article

``Nosheen, a resident of Bombay Central, was confident about topping her college, but coming first in

the University was a surprise.

She says the results have flabbergasted her orthodox Memon community. ``It is very rare for girls to

achieve this kind of academic distinction in our community. In fact very few girls from the community

attend college. And when they do, it is just to pass time before marriage,`` says Nosheen. ``

the article is available at

http://www.chalomumbai.com/asp/article.asp?cat_id=29&art_id=13077&cat_code=2F574841545F535F4F4E5F4D554D4241492F5441415A415F4B4841424152

Balanced article on Pakistan in today`s Economist. Highlights signs of optimism (rising literacy, female education, greater urbanization) and areas of concern.

ARE GENERALS GOOD FOR YOU?

Jul 12th 2001 | ISLAMABAD, LAHORE AND PESHAWAR

From The Economist print edition

GENERAL PERVEZ MUSHARRAF SUSPENDED DEMOCRACY IN ORDER TO SORT OUT PAKISTAN. SO FAR, SUCCESS IS LIMITED, AND DEMOCRACY MAY BE A LONG TIME RETURNING

HE IS a general who calls himself president, but he sees himself as a saviour. “I have a job to do here and therefore I cannot and will not let the nation down,” declared Pervez Musharraf upon appointing himself president of Pakistan on June 20th. There is no doubt that Pakistan needs saving. It is deeply in debt and poverty has been rising. It is an Islamic federation regarded as insufficiently Islamic by zealots and imperfectly federal by most of its ethnic groups. Many of the malcontents are armed. Formally, Pakistan calls itself a democracy, but it has no sitting parliament.

If Pakistan were a run-of-the-mill third-world dictatorship, few apart from its 134m citizens would care. But Pakistan is not ordinary. It is the world’s seventh declared nuclear power, at bitter odds with the sixth, India. It is the chief sponsor of the dread Taliban government in neighbouring Afghanistan and itself a nursery for groups of all sorts that seek to wed politics to intolerant versions of Islam. The possibility that Pakistan might someday fall into the hands of religious radicals concerns not only India but China (now a friend), the United States and others. The number of people who ought to care how well General Musharraf does as saviour runs into the billions.

His biggest opportunity since seizing power in October 1999 will come on July 14th, when he is to meet India’s prime minister after more than two years of angry silence between the two countries. The summit is important for India, too. Its half-century-long dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir, a Muslim-majority state now parcelled out among the two old foes and China, costs India men, treasure and reputation. Without coming to terms with Pakistan, India is unlikely to assume what it regards as its rightful place in the world, which includes a seat on the UN Security Council. But for Pakistan the stakes are still higher. The conflict with India sustains a gigantic military establishment that has been ruinous both for the exchequer and for democracy. To keep a proxy war going in India’s part of Kashmir, Pakistan sponsors mujahideen who, fear liberal Pakistanis, could turn their guns and their ideology on Pakistan itself. Peace could liberate Pakistan from these burdens.

Hope flies in the face of intuition and history. It supposes that a military man can make peace with India, thereby diminishing the institution that made him. It suggests that a president who has arrogated to himself near-absolute power can create the basis for a durable democracy. It implies that a country that for more than 20 years has pursued its foreign aims by exploiting religious zealotry can now tame it. It has not happened before, and most Pakistanis do not expect it to happen now.

Reform deferred

Such legitimacy as General Musharraf’s regime enjoys depends on the awfulness of what came before. Nawaz Sharif, the prime minister he toppled, was democratically elected but behaved like an autocrat, shearing the presidency of its powers and undermining the judiciary. While talking to India of peace, he authorised an incursion into Indian-controlled Kashmir that ended in a humiliating pull-out. The economy tottered on the verge of default.

In taking power from him, General Musharraf promised relief. He would bring “true” democracy in place of Mr Sharif’s “sham” one. The corrupt would be hounded, but even-handedly. The economy would be revived and “inter-provincial disharmony” quelled. Mr Sharif had flirted with theocracy, but General Musharraf asked clerics to practise tolerance.







So far, he has disappointed most Pakistanis. The regime’s favourable rating has slumped from 57% at the start of its tenure to 23% now. Ijaz Gilani, director of Gallup, a polling firm, describes the government as “friendless but tolerated”. The main organised opposition is the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy, more than a dozen parties (including those of Mr Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, a former prime minister), which the general has so far kept in line by banning political rallies. The only people who seem happy with him are international agencies, such as the IMF, which underwrite Pakistan’s economy.



At the upcoming summit, General Musharraf will be obliged to clarify his stand on India and Kashmir



The time has come when General Musharraf will no longer be able to rule without leading. The summit will oblige him to begin to clarify where he stands on India and Kashmir. The next month or two will show how serious the government is about “deweaponisation”, its programme to disarm anyone, including religious extremists, who holds illegal weapons. August will mark the debut of devolution, which promises a revolution in local government but evades the highly charged question of where the provinces fit in.

The Supreme Court has given General Musharraf a nearly free hand to amend the constitution but a deadline for doing so: he must hold elections by October 2002. If his constitutional changes are to gain democratic assent, he must now start consulting political parties, which he regards as the root of most of Pakistan’s problems. His rule will be considered a success only if he accomplishes a paradox, using the untrammelled power he has acquired to give power away.

Some glimmers of light

General Musharraf is trying to resolve by fiat contradictions that were embedded in Pakistan at its creation. Islam was the reason for carving Pakistan out of India in 1947, but the chief carver, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was for most of his life secular in outlook. Pakistan remains uncomfortably poised between the two world views. Its four provinces are also mismatched. Punjabis account for more than half the population, dominate the army and bureaucracy and, say non-Punjabis, exploit the wealth of other provinces.

Pakistan’s unsettled state encourages caricature. The back-and-forth between military and civilian governments is the stuff of opera buffa, the corruption tragi-comic. Armed mullahs are thought to roam about like turbaned gunslingers. Political and sectarian disputes can be lethal, periodically turning cities like Karachi into virtual war zones. The population is mostly rural and pitifully poor. Many see Pakistani society as feudal: the serfs supply their lords with votes as well as labour.

There is truth in these images, but they obscure the extent to which Pakistan has modernised despite its frail economy and exploitative political class. The literacy rate in 1998, according to the census, was 45%, still far too low but 20 points higher than it was in 1980. Electrification of rural households rose from 16% to 61% during the same period. Terrestrial television, which shows state-owned channels, reaches 75% of urbanites and half the rural population. The share of parents who want their daughters to have at least a college education has doubled to 60% in the past decade.



Pakistan is both more modern, and more urban, than its reputation



Pakistan is also more urban than its reputation. Reza Ali, director of the Urbanisation Research Programme, points out that city outskirts and “ribbons of development” along roads, especially in Punjab, have population densities and economies that resemble those of cities. Although the census classifies a third of the population as urban, Mr Ali calculates that the share of Pakistanis living in urban conditions is close to half.

General Musharraf must deal with these novelties as well as the clichés. So far, though, his most notable achievement has been the accumulation of power. In this he has not been far different from his civilian predecessor, Nawaz Sharif. The courts are no less beholden to him. The Supreme Court has taken an oath under the “provisional constitutional order”, with which he installed himself in power. His stand-in as president when he is away is the chief justice. The drive for accountability, through a special office that investigates and prosecutes corruption, has largely bypassed the military and judiciary; it is seen as more effective but little more even-handed than Mr Sharif’s.

The slap of firm government

When the time comes, General Musharraf may find it awkward to restore democracy. Under the constitution, the president is elected by parliament and the four provincial assemblies. If elections to these houses are free, they are likely to be packed with politicians hostile to his rule. General Musharraf will be tempted to rig them, or find some other way to remain in power. “There will be no election,” predicts Haji Mohammad Adeel, a former deputy speaker of the dissolved assembly of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Although General Musharraf has refrained from imposing martial law, some analysts suspect he eventually will.

He has inducted more uniformed men into civilian institutions than previous military rulers, says Hasan Askari Rizvi, an observer of the armed forces. Military monitoring teams have been dispatched to most nooks and crannies of the bureaucracy with a mission to discourage graft. There is a justification for this pushiness: the claim by the top brass that they alone can provide technocratic rule.

Comparing General Musharraf with previous governments, economists give him highish marks. For the first time in its history Pakistan is staying on a course of therapy, prescribed by the IMF, which entails cutting subsidies and tariffs and other politically unpleasant measures. It is no longer in immediate peril of default on its $37 billion external debt, and now has some prospect of climbing out of the financial hole into which earlier governments had plunged it.

Institutions that largely preyed on the public are being told to serve it. Independent commissions are being set up to hear citizens’ complaints against the police and if necessary recommend (though not carry out) dismissals. The generals, it is said, have banished corruption from the top ranks of government.

Many foreigners involved in helping Pakistan give its military government good reviews. “Pervez Musharraf is the best thing that happened to this country in years,” says Simon Gillett, who until recently helped run a development project connected with the UN’s drug-control programme. But the list of only-the-army-can-do-it reforms is lengthy, and there is some shying away from battle. The government has so far ducked the restructuring of the notorious Central Board of Revenue, whose corruption robs the state of income and discourages businessmen from investing. Officers or ex-officers have taken over institutions that are ill suited to management by command, such as universities.



Despite promises of continuity in economic policy, investors are stying away



Better administration has yet to thrill ordinary Pakistanis. Although Pakistan is financially more stable, the economy is weak. Drought held growth to just 2.6% in the fiscal year ending in June, barely faster than the rate of population increase. Pakistanis complain of unemployment and rising prices, though official inflation rates are moderate. Despite General Musharraf’s promises of continuity in economic policy, investors—both foreign and domestic—are staying away.







Pakistan’s most explosive problems are unlikely to be solved in a democratic limbo. In the smaller provinces resentment against the centre is running high, though few Pakistanis are outright secessionists. “GHQ [General Headquarters] decides the fate of our province,” says Mr Adeel of NWFP. “Provinces are more unhappy now than before.” This is truest of Sindh, the second-largest province, which has been hit especially hard by the drought. The belief that Punjab is drinking Sindh’s water helped forge an alliance between groups usually hostile to one another: mohajirs, descendants of immigrants from India living mainly in Karachi, and Sindhi nationalists drawn from the rural population. In a demonstration on June 10th police killed two Sindhi activists and injured dozens of protesters. The main mohajir party, the MQM, boycotted the local election in Karachi on July 2nd.

Sindh has also seen sectarian violence, most recently between doctrinally strict Deobandis and the more relaxed Barelvis. The murder of a Barelvi leader prompted his armed adherents to impose a statewide “curfew” on May 28th. General Musharraf declared that such extremists represent no more than 1% of the population. That shopkeepers were nonetheless too scared to open up is, as one columnist wrote, “a severe indictment of the state.”

Devolve and disarm

General Musharraf’s hopes of dispelling such doubts hang largely on three initiatives. The first is devolution of power to local bodies. Historically minded Pakistanis sneer. An earlier dictator, Ayub Khan, used such a scheme to give the illusion of democracy and cement his position in power. Soldiers, instinctive centralisers, like local democracy in part because it distracts attention from provincial issues, which are the real challenge to Pakistan’s architecture.



General Musharraf`s scheme would encourage political participation by women, peasants and workers



General Musharraf has not proved the cynics wrong, but the scheme has features that make it worth watching. One is its attempt to encourage participation in politics by segments of society that have largely been excluded. All three tiers of local government have assemblies with a third of their seats reserved for women, a revolutionary notion. Seats are also reserved for peasants and workers, though a minimum educational requirement will bar many of them from advancing to the post of nazim (administrator). In theory, local services such as schools and health clinics will be held accountable by citizen community boards, which will report on them to committees of the local council.

Also revolutionary is the subordination of the bureaucracy to elected officials. Under a system inherited from Pakistan’s former British rulers, district commissioners are nearly omnipotent in their realms, with administrative, police and revenue responsibilities. Under the new system, a district co-ordination officer will manage the dozen functions assigned to the districts. He is expected to be shorn of judicial and revenue-raising powers and to answer to the district nazim. The bureaucracy is furiously resisting. Lastly, the plan brings rural areas, for the first time, into a framework for obtaining municipal services. Mr Ali, partly a sceptic, describes this as a “giant step”.

In the eyes of some critics, the local-government scheme is perhaps too deeply flawed ever to work. Arif Hasan, chairman of the Urban Resource Centre in Karachi, notes among several examples that the city’s municipal government will not apply to army cantonment areas, which account for nearly half of the area and a fifth of the population. “They are effectively not citizens of Karachi,” he says.

General Musharraf’s greatest challenge, though, is to deal with religious extremism. The government fears no force more than the religious right, or so it seems. It backed away from an earlier plan to make it harder to file blasphemy charges, which carry the death penalty, for fear of a collision with the right. The diffidence is unsurprising. Successive governments have used zealots as warriors, first against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and now against India in Kashmir. Pakistan’s constitution invites the enforcement of religious norms at home. Under a court order, for example, Pakistan has a year to abolish interest from banking. Religious groups have the power to mobilise the faithful on the streets, as the curfew in Karachi showed.

The threat of zealotry

So far, their power has not been political. Religious parties rarely win seats in parliament, because they are split and because Pakistan’s first-past-the-post voting system rewards the biggest parties. But political power for them some day is not unthinkable. According to Mr Gilani of Gallup, the religious parties combined have the support of about a quarter of the would-be electorate. That support normally melts away in elections, because people vote for parties that can win. But that could change if, as some expect, the government introduces proportional representation.

Pakistan will never drive Islam out of politics. General Musharraf has promised to tame the most extreme groups by disarming them and anyone else who holds illegal weapons. General Moinuddin Haider, the interior minister, boasted last month that 86,000 weapons had been turned in before an amnesty expired. He promises to “take arms from all and sundry, no exceptions made.” But guesses about the number of illegal weapons, many of them kept by law-abiding folk, run into the millions.

Divorce from the extremists will come only if Pakistan makes peace with India. The hurdles, some of them on the Indian side, are innumerable. One of the highest, the army’s presumed reluctance to give up its pre-eminence, may be surmountable. General Musharraf looks likely to entrench the army’s role by giving formal status to the security council, which will oversee the work of the government. Mr Askari Rizvi argues that the army is now so bound into institutions and the economy that it need not depend so much on the Indian bogey. “Even with peace with India the army continues to enjoy a privileged position,” he says. This year it accepted a freeze in its budget, which means a decline in real spending on defence.

Whatever happens, the army will not fade away. The government has indicated that General Musharraf means to be president for five years at least. Less clear is whether he will let Pakistan develop a workable democracy, or continue to stifle politics in the name of good government. Perhaps as president he will grasp the difference between soldiers and politicians: the former take orders from above, the latter from below.

Upman:

(1/ can pakistan in the near future, with this or an alternative political dispensation reconcile to living without kashmir?)

yes i think so...not the extremist ``kashmir hamara hae` types but most sane people id say are sick of this constant killing of people for no reason...i till not long ago felt that kashmir was ours and blah blah blah but reading of a few sane readings on chowk these past few months, specifically sameeerJb`s have shown me the light...seriously though, people, kashmiris and militants are dieing everyday...its a terrible waste of precious human lives..whole generations of indian soldiers and kashmiri young men and women have been wasted...also i believe that all this truckloads of money we`re squandering on siachen and in defense of you evil indians could make a whole big difference to our poverty stricken country...kashmir ka maslah needs to be solved since both your country and ours has people with no food to eat and thats far more important than killing people in any isolated piece of land no matter how historically significant or beautiful...

my doe annas

shammi, temporal, sadna, nasah,.......

It is difficult for me to respond individually to a lot of questions raised by one of my post. Previously, I explained my position in terms of India-Pakistan rivalry although I always wished it was not there. Here is part II of that post which deals with intra-Pakistani rivalries.

Khokrapar is Ellis Island for those who came throught his Inida-Pakistan border post and considered a Liaquat Ali Khan`s political arrogance for the rest of ethnicities in Pakistan. The word Khokrapar raises red flags for all those including myself who do not suffer from the Ellis Island syndrome. The number of posts and the language of responses itself speak of sharp division among immigrants and non-immigrants. Contrary to popular belief of this to be the result of economically unfair practices rampant throughout the history of Pakistan, it is actually cultural. I will try to explain it in my next post, perhaps over the weekend-those who agreed or understood my point of view expect a response from me also, I mean rozaiba.

Can you imagine the outcome, if Liaquat Ali Khan`s policies of 1948-51 were made known as ML manifesto during 1946 referendum/ election on the basis of separate electorates? The fear of imposition of Urdu and upsetting the ethnic balance in Sindh would have resulted in ML losing the plurity of Muslim voters in Sindh, Bengal and even in Punjab. Had Liaquat opted for general election, ML would have been wiped out within 3 years of independence. In order to quell rebellion in Punjab under Daultana, he was the first to made use of Islam in Pakistani internal politicals from the highest position in the land. Since one can not and should not blame the poeple who immigrated to Pakistan due to Liaquat`s policies, his place in history is comletely revised and inverted. From Shaheed-e-Millat and public holiday on his assassination day to no more holiday and complete ignoring his title. I opposed Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan, I was against welcoming Afghan refugees and can not be a hypocrat to support Punjabi or non-Punjabi immigrants to Pakistan. It is true that immigrants bring fresh ideas and dedication to hard work but society must be in dynamic mode in order to benefit from it. Our society is idle, in static mode with thin fragile balance between various groups hanging by a thread. Only a fair and secular constitution with determination to abide by it can provide a framework to rise above the threshold of idleness and move.

nasah: The term stranded Pakistanis is not acceptable to me. I strongly believe in the rule of law and to the best of my knowledge, Pakistan does not accept them as Pakistanis. Actually, they will be granted citizenship, when and if Pakistan decides to take them. Past citizenship is no guarentee for continued citizenship while away for 30 years, willingly or unwillingly. If they are considered citizen of Pakistan, then all those who left 54 years ago, willingly or pushed into India, Hindus and Sikhs, after August 14, 1947 are also Pakistani citizen. Actually, according to international laws, all those who were killed after August 14, 1947, during partition rioting in Pakistan were Pakistani citizen and same holds true for Muslims killed in India. It is ironic that Pakistanis mourn the massacres of Indian Muslims and India mourns massacres of Pakistani Hindus and Sikhs.

A willingness to be granted Pakistani or US citizenship has no legal status. If you think that they should be honored for their loyalty to Pakistan, I will counter that by saying that they are paying the price for adamantly sticking to Urdu culture in a sea of Bengali culture despite uneasiness between the two. That is stupidity. They are stranded Biharis!!

http://www.dailypioneer.com/secon3.asp?cat= opd1&d=OPED


Time for counter-pressure
Abhijit Bhattacharyya

In 1994, the Pakistani military expenditure as percentage of GNP stood at six per cent (against world three per cent) and per capita expenditure was US $24. In 1995, however, the figure of six per cent rose to 6.1 per cent of Pakistan`s GNP (against world 2.8 per cent). The per capita expenditure too shot up to US $27. In comparison, the 1995 percentage of Indian military expenditure vis-a-vis GNP stood as low as 2.4 per cent (world 2.8 per cent) and per capita defence expenditure at US $8.

Compare the Pakistani brawn with its brain. In 1990, a total of 73.8 per cent of its population age 25 and over had no formal schooling; 9.7 per cent had some primary education; 14 per cent secondary education; and, only 2.5 per cent went through post-secondary education. In the sphere of literacy too only 37.8 per cent of the total population age 15 and over were literate in 1995, compared to India`s figure of 52 per cent. In short, the Pakistanis as a nation seem to run their guns and prefer avoiding quality education. Why and how does one say so? By going back to the day of action of 1980s initiated by the former Pakistani Army chief and dictator Zia-ul-Haq. An Indian Punjabi by birth, a Pakistani citizen through migration, professional soldier, usurper of Pakistani throne and a zealous Muslim, Zia`s injection of Islam in the barracks of the Pakistani military had a far-reaching effect, especially the attachment of the maulvis to every army unit which resulted in a heady cocktail of mullah-military entente. Henceforth, the explicitly Islamic minded officers stood more than fair chance to climb the ladder of the Army leadership, and entry to the President`s office through coup.



Astounding though it may sound, another action of Zia, slowly and steadily, is leading the Pakistani army`s officer corps towards Talibanisation. How? Zia`s zest for the Urdu language, and downgrading of English as the medium of instruction and official communication, and the proliferation of madarsas across the border areas of Pakistan to confront the Russians in Afghanistan with the cooperation of Afghans, ensured qualitative decline in Pakistani army`s recruits. Moreover, with the Afghans being normally adept in violent activities of all types and eschewing modern education of science and technology, their mixture with the Pakistan-born and trained madarsa students turned into a veritable source of frontline saboteurs reliving some pressure from the Pakistani army`s border duty tension, in the west. Subsequently, even when the Russians left Afghanistan, the madarsa products did not leave their vocation which later turned them into fanatic professionals. Thus, the combination of Pak-Afghan youth of the madarsa, in the name of Islam, and under the able guidance and assistance of 9 Corps Commanders and the ISI chief, continue to play their ``rightful role`` for fulfilling the sole goal of development and augmentation of their ``mazhab`` and the destruction and desecration of the ``quaum`` of the ``kafir``.

One needs to make a slight digression here in order to understand the Pakistan-Afghan lunacy on Asian security and Indian insecurity. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, 88.5 per cent of Afghan population above 25 years have had no formal schooling; 6.8 per cent did have some primary education and only 3.2 per cent are post-secondary qualified. Of the population age 15 and above, however, the literate figure is 31.5 per cent with 47.2 per cent males and 15 per cent females. Clearly, Afghanistan, the ally of Pakistan, in its quest for Talibanisation, is a nation without education, with average births per child-bearing woman standing at 6.1 to Pakistan`s 5.1 to India`s 3.2. India may be a populous country, but Afghanistan and Pakistan combined, hold the prospect of brighter proliferation of fanaticism with a superior fertility rate and inferior education system.

The order of battle, therefore, is clear now. Diplomacy or discussion, dinner or development, the Indians, for long time to come, will face the prospect of violence, Indo-Pak summits notwithstanding.

Today, India`s neighbour Pakistan realises that its days of basketful of unaccounted dollars ostensibly for Afghan war are over. The Pakistani army, which rose from 7 Corps of 400,000 soldiers to 450,000 during Zia`s regime, is a 9 Corps Army of 550,000 soldiers with seven of them being deployed to face the Indians and two garrisoned at Quetta (XII Corps) and Peshawar (XI Corps). Pakistan`s finance may be in a shambles but its Corps Headquarters at Rawalpindi (X Corps with 3 Infantry Divisions, 1 Armoured and 2 Infantry Brigades); Mangla (1 Corps with 1 Infantry, 1 Mechanised, 1 Armoured Div. and 1 Armoured Brigade); Gujranwala (XXX Corps with 2 Infantry Div and 1 Armoured and Mechanised Brigade each); Sialkot (IV Corps with 2 Infantry and 1 Armoured Div and 2 Infantry Brigades); Multan (II Corps with 1 Armoured and 1 Mechanised Div); Pano Aqil (XXXI Corps with 2 Infantry Div and 1 Armoured and Mechanised Brigade each); and Karachi (V Corps with 2 Infantry Div and 1 Armoured and Mechanised Brigade each) - are ready for conventional warfare as well as indirect war operated through religious fundamentalists and violent fanatics.

Let there be no illusion about the status and focus of General Musharraf, the President of Pakistan. According to the General`s mother, the ``first love of Pervez is the Army``. Born in India in 1943, refugee from India 1946-47, commissioned in Pakistani Army 1964, escaping Indian cannon in 1965, vanquished by India in 1971, leading the Talibanisation of the Afghans and the Mujahideens of Pakistan in 1980s and misleading his own nation against India in 1999 in Kargil, the aim and objective of Gen. Musharraf is simple: Kashmir first and last. When it is Kashmir, there is no economics and no politics. It is got to be the aim of the sharp shooter Arjuna and full concentration of firepower of the General.


Kashmir, to Musharraf, is one of the ``Muslim conflicts`` like ``those raging in Palestine, Chechnya and Kosovo``. Kashmir is the manifestation of the ``rising atrocities`` of the Indian troops, feels the Pakistani General President. For the sake of Kashmir only, the General`s entourage is reduced. For the sake of Kashmir also the itinerary may be changed tomorrow.

The General President of Pakistan, however, is fully aware of his own political limitations and Pakistan`s growing isolation in matters terrorism and fundamentalism. So much so, that even China and the four states of Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyztan and Kazakhstan apprehend the spreading of Pakistan-Afghan joint terrorist venture in Central Asia.

Thus on April 19, 2001, the Shanghai Five met at Bishkek (capital of Kyrgztan) to discuss the threat posed by ``bands of terrorists`` and plan multilateral measures to deal with the problem. Earlier, in December 2000, ``a senior Chinese delegation headed by Beijing`s ambassador to Pakistan Lu Shulin visited the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar and raised the issue`` of terrorism/ fundamentalist violence. In March 2001 also, reports the Jane`s Defence Weekly (May 2, 2001): ``China pressed Pakistan for details regarding the possible presence of Chinese nationals in training camps in Afghanistan where several thousand Pakistani nationals are serving in Taliban ranks.``

The background of Pakistani supported, sponsored, financed, trained and instigated terrorism and religious fundamentalism is there for the world to see. It is good that the General President Musharraf is focussed on Kashmir. Like China and the Shanghai Five, it is time for counter-pressure. ``Stop terrorism. Help us to help you`` - should be the stand of India.

(The writer is an alumnus of the National Defence College of India and the views are his personal)

#67 Ras Siddiqui

You quote:``the Tamil

conundrum in Sri Lanka is fuelled by an arms inflow, and the

recent riots in Nepal have led to speculation about India`s role in its

internal politics.``

I can`t believe a mainstream paper like TOI allowed this garbage in. Not only is the author clueless but also lazy to boot. I haven`t come across a single pakistani who knows india`s role vis-a-vis srilanka. This one here is no exception.

Re:Reply #: 1

Romair,

``These three states, internally, had opposing scenarios. Kashmir had a Hindu ruler with a majority Muslim population. The ruler wanted to join India (although initially he wanted to be independent), while the population wanted to join Pakistan``.

I do not think in 1947 most Kashmiris would have wanted to join Pakistan. Anyway no referendum was ever done then to prove the popular sentiment. I think most then as now would have preferred independece.

sridhar

Hindu Minority Seeking Own Homeland

By HEMA SHUKLA, Associated Press Writer

NEW DELHI, India (AP) - Pinni Suri remembers the scene exactly though 11 years have passed. Dawn had just broken when two teen-agers knocked on the front door of her home in the Kashmir (news - web sites) Valley, where her Hindu ancestors had lived for centuries among the majority Muslims.

Two minutes later, one of the young men shot Suri`s husband in the chest. The attackers disappeared into the narrow lanes of Srinagar, Kashmir`s summer capital. Muslim neighbors, watching from their window, turned away as she begged for help.

``They shot dead my husband on Aug. 1, 1990, and I left Srinagar the same day. I haven`t gone back since,`` said Suri. An uncle of her husband was killed weeks later.

It was a time of terrible fear among Kashmiri Pandits, Hindus indigenous to the beautiful Himalayan valley. They and Hindu settlers were being killed, kidnapped and robbed by Islamic militant groups demanding independence from India or to unite with Muslim-majority Pakistan. Between October 1989 and August 1990, some 350,000 Kashmiri Pandits fled and live mostly in squalid camps in Jammu, Kashmir`s winter capital.

Now as India prepares for a three-day summit starting Friday between Pakistan`s Gen. Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Pandits are raising anew their demand for a homeland, which they say must be separate because of fears they will be targeted again.

``They wanted to Islamize Kashmir and they wanted us out. It was ethnic cleansing,`` said Ramesh Manavati, spokesman for Our Own Kashmir, an organization that says it represents more than 700,000 Kashmiri Pandits and demands an enclave in the Kashmir Valley.

Thousands of Kashmiri Pandits say they feel forsaken by their government, which failed to protect them and their property.

``We are the forgotten ones, refugees in our own country,`` Manavati said.

The All Party Hurriyat Conference, an umbrella group of Islamic and political parties that claims to speak for Kashmir, says the Pandits are welcome back, but a separate Pandit homeland is unacceptable. Kashmir is for all Kashmiris, says the group, which favors separation of the region from India.

``The Hurriyat is not in favor of division along communal (religious) lines,`` said Hurriyat spokesman Abdul Majid Banday.

The Hurriyat has outraged the Pandits by saying that the stories of killings and intimidation were exaggerated and that the Pandit exodus was part of a government strategy to show the separatist movement in a bad light.

Those who fled said the militants` method was to kill one and terrorize hundreds. Mosques blared warnings to Hindus, telling ``infidels`` to leave. Graffiti on walls said the valley was reserved for ``the faithful.``

Hindus who remained behind continue to live in fear. According to statistics compiled by The Associated Press, nearly 400 Hindus have been killed in 33 separate attacks in the past eight years. Many have been pulled out of buses and shot at close range.

India accuses Islamic Pakistan of arming the Kashmir militants. Pakistan denies the charge, saying its support is only political. But most militant groups in Kashmir are based in Pakistan and run training camps for fighters under the eyes of Pakistan`s government.

According to the latest census completed in February, Kashmir has 6.2 million Muslims and 3.4 million Hindus, including 500,000 Kashmiri Pandits, as well as 300,000 Sikhs and 100,000 Buddhists.

The displaced Hindus live safe but squalid lives in several large camps in Jammu, which is in the foothills of the Himalayas and has a Hindu majority. Extended families live in single rooms, with leaky roofs, poor ventilation and no toilets.

``What is here? Nothing. Mosquito bites and fear of snakes,`` said 65-year-old Lakshmanjoo, who uses only one name. He has been sharing a room with 10 other family members since they fled 11 years ago.

``My valley is beautiful.``

..inspite of my tenor in some of the posts here, i have always sincerely wanted that India and Pakistan start living on friendlier terms...though reason had told me that nothing would come out of these talks, somehow the hoopla and festivities in the (esp. Indian) media was getting to me- and i thought maybe, just maybe.....now that even thats over, i am surprised at the disappointment i feel...i do not want to distribute blame for this but here are a few questions i`d like to ask Pakistanis here to be able to appreciate the situation better, and the prognosis...

1/ can pakistan in the near future, with this or an alternative political dispensation reconcile to living without kashmir?

2/ can it, in the near future, and without prejudicing its current position on Kashmir, agree to initiate and encourage relations and people-to-people contacts in alternative areas?

3/ does a significant section of the Pakistani population believe that Vajpayee called for this summit under US ``pressure`` and/ or because the Indian Army is unwilling to continue because of the `heat from jehadis` in Kashmir?

to put it alternatively, is it believed that if the status quo continued india will be forced to vacate kashmir in, say, 10 years?

4/ how many of you here believe that the Indo-Pak relations is less of an attitude problem and just because of the existence of the kashmir issue? i.e. had there been no Kashmir problem, indo-pak relations would have ben exemplary..

5/ how many of you genuinely believe that India may give up Kashmir in the near future for any other reason e.g. seat in security Council, a nobel for vajpayee or to be acknowledged as a ``major`` power?

6/ what is the maximum that Pakistan can ever voluntarily give up from its present stand on kashmir?

...this is a genuine attempt to understand the dynamics of the situation and whether, ever, a solution other than through the momentum of time will happen...a reply shorn of rhetoric will be appreciated...

..i hold what i think is liberal, left-of-centre views from the indian POV, and would be happy to share it....

SameerJB:

Some comments regarding your comments:

``The new paradigm is ethnocentric with respect for a new secular constitution as the most sacred document. To me, aboveall, Punjabi Muslims are most responsible for the degradation of Punjabi culture in favor of others. They traded it as a commodity through Islamic empire period, through British period and throughout last 54 years in exchange for power and domination of bureaucracy in Pakistan.``

If they traded it and they`re left with only remnants of the true Punjabi culture (whatever that is), please tell me what they had to or chose to give-up.



Also you say,

``Syed Ahmed, the world in economic sense is becoming multicultural, in political sense, democratic with respect for laws of the land and in cultural sense (my focus more often) ethno-centric. If you see fascism, xenophobia or ethnophobia, I can`t do anything else to change your mind.``

I disagree. The world is becoming multi-cultural in an ethnic sense. More inter-marriages between ethnicities, nationalities and even across religions. More exposure to different cultures, music, & food. Things are changing and have always been changing. I sense a fear on your part of people losing the `pure` (whatever that is) Punjabi culture as these changes occur.... that sounds like xenophobia and ethnophobia (fear of the influence of other ethnicities) to me.

Punjabis have survived alot and many have survived the influence of the Punjabis- life goes on.

Please don`t make Punjabiat a religion.

Peace.

``Shia Muslims seek transit facilities through Pak``

A prominent body of Shia Muslims has urged President Pervez Musharraf to provide transit facilities through Pakistan to Indian pilgrims to reduce the expenditure involved in travelling to pilgrim centres in countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia...Zaidi said Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, in a unilateral gesture recently, had liberalised visa procedures for Pakistanis visiting India. ``President Musharraf should reciprocate this goodwill gesture by granting permission to Indian Shia Muslims to travel through Pakistan to visit holy Islamic shrines,`` he said

http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/jul/12inpak1.htm

``According to a recent UN study 17.6 percent of the primary school children, 22.8 percent of middle school children, and 21.2 percent of metric students, and 10.2 percent of intermediate students in Pakistan are hooked on to some kind of addictive drug. ``

Can India be far behind?

From The Times of India (Friday, July 13, 2001)

Let`s Talk Kashmir
Visas & Scholarships are a Distraction

By AYESHA HAROON

WHAT a roller-coaster ride Pakistan-India relations have been on in the last few years - almost as if the operator had gone beserk with the controls. From the heady Lahore yatra to the blood-soaked tracts of Kargil to the euphoria preceding the Agra summit...and all this while the sound of bullets in Kashmir refuses to fade away. There was and can be no way that Islamabad or New Delhi can dodge the Kashmir issue.

What made New Delhi realise that talks are needed to improve Pak-India relations is anybody`s guess. Speculation in Islamabad`s drawing rooms ranged from it being the need of the time to the changing global patterns of international relations. But there was a near consensus on one theory: That the Americans had played an important part in forcing New Delhi`s hand. Indeed, in private, American diplomats were quick to take credit for it, albeit calling themselves facilitators rather than mediators. The Indian diplomatic corps, however, wanted to dub it a desi idea while the Pakistanis said they had been expecting this invitation for some time now. All of which still leaves the questions why and why now, not completely answered.

That said, the summit can yield a lot of positive economic gains flowing from a peace dividend. For one, we, and this is not just Pakistan and India but all the countries of the subcontinent, need to optimise our resources for the well-being of our people. If India keeps its defence budget high whether because of Pakistan or Kashmir - even if it insists on calling Kashmir its internal issue - it forces all of its neighbours to increase the throttle on the defence pedal.

Indo-Pakistan relations are not the only ones to be soured by the untenable increase in military expenses. There have been skirmishes on the Bangladesh-India border lately, the Tamil conundrum in Sri Lanka is fuelled by an arms inflow, and the recent riots in Nepal have led to speculation about India`s role in its internal politics. While New Delhi might say that all these developments in India`s immediate neighbourhood cannot directly be ascribed to its heightened military expenses, there is nevertheless a linkage between the security vulnerabilities of these countries and an arms build-up by India.

In a more Pak-India context, the boundaries drawn at the time of Partition were unnatural to the extent that they cut the traditional trade routes, disrupting badly the established areas of specialisation. For instance, the jute mills were in West Bengal while jute was grown in East Bengal, and so on. So there are indeed very specific trade gains that regions are set to make if relations between India and Pakistan normalise.

Trade economists believe that a lot of transnational advantages can also be reaped provided political disputes are resolved amicably. ``Nepal has a lot of hydroelectricity potential but it neither has the money to build the dams nor the need for the excess electricity. If say Pakistan and India finance such projects and pay a royalty to Nepal for the use of cheap electricity, all three countries stand to benefit immensely. Similar is the case with the Iran-India gas pipeline that has to go through Pakistan,`` says an economist.

But if India thinks that by telling Teheran to deal with Islamabad on the gas pipeline issue so it can get its way without talking to Pakistan, it is living in cloud cuckoo land. The regional settlement of issues cannot be substituted by such clever moves. Talking of regional settlement of bilateral issues, one hopes that the reasons for SAARC`s ineffectiveness also come up for discussion at the summit. Its efficacy has been reduced due to one of the clauses that says that no bilateral issue will be brought onto its agenda. Kashmir might be a bilateral issue between Pakistan and India, but the consequent arms build-up is a regional issue.

Today, international bodies are dictating the agenda on issues that are of vital import for our socio-economic well-being. We need to have a much more effective lobby for ourselves. Unless this region starts voting as a bloc, its votes will not carry weight in international forums. If we undermine India in these forums or vice versa, then we both lose. Pakistan has won an official international emerging markets conference to be held in Lahore in November this year, not the least because India threw its weight behind Pakistan`s case.

And yet despite all these positives, the euphoria surrounding the summit makes one jittery. Is it cynicism or a justified feeling of distrust? The Kashmir issue has been outstanding since 1947; three wars, lives lost, rapes, humiliation and terror stalking the Valley - can this all be resolved and absolved through one meeting? The summit is a good step but no more than a step.

Interestingly, the diplomatic community in Islamabad is keen to rationalise the euphoria and cautions against the build-up of expectations. All very well. But the thing is that after the hype surrounding Kargil and the blood-soaked, frenzied reports, the many Bollywood blockbusters playing on these moods, it is not easy to mould and manipulate public sentiments. It can only be done through another euphoric media build-up. The entire notion of euphoria is bad. The summit is nothing but a venue of talks and discussions and it is not as if the two countries have not talked before; or for that matter, not talked of Kashmir being the core issue.

India has made some conciliatory gestures but these are but gestures. The release of maritime prisoners, offers of scholarships and so on are gestures that actually have no relevance to the essential issues dogging Pak-India relations, and certainly have no connection with the Kashmir issue. These are meant for a larger international audience. Pakistan will come off looking too rigid in its stance if it also does not make similar irrelevant gestures. Pakistan`s constraint is that it is not as economically sound as India and, therefore, might appear too willing to talk on all issues. But that does not mean that everything is up for grabs. At the end of the day, in principle, we believe that Kashmiris should get the right to self-determination. Therefore, it is important that the party central to the dispute - the Kashmiris - are included in the talks.

(The author is resident editor, The Nation, Lahore

Sameer JB,

I think you are being too pessimistic in your outlook. Regarding the structure of Pakistan, due to the failure of one religion one language + military equation, Pakistan is more unified inspite of it. That equation has been deterimental, but it`s not worse off- if you know what I mean. Maybe I am too optimistic.

You have a very valid point regarding Punjabi. And the reaction of being labelled fascist only justifies what you are trying to say or ask for. At the recent conference in Lahore when punjabis from Pakistand India gathered to support the struggels fo the language, the urdu media was full of criticism and claimed it being unPakistani!

Punjabis have accepted Urdu. I would go as far as saying that Urdu is actually a language of the Punjabis! It may not have survived if it was not accepted by them. And punjabis FEEL and own it now as THEIR language. The leading poets and writers of urdu hail from here. This is would be a great had the Punjabis not ended up rejecting Punjabi itself.

Punjabis don`t seem to have the desire to defend themselves. Be it on standing up for their language in the face of criticism by the taikedars of the one language, one religion Pakistaniat, or on water rights issues (i.e. kalabagh dam). I admire you for not shying away after reasoning for basic rights...

#60 Amit,

Perhaps Vajpayee genuinely wants peace and is trying to ease the situation for the PEOPLE of pakistan. His gestures are aimed at that.

Musharraf, on the other hand, is acting like the warrior he is. He probably believes that the invitation to talks itself reflects india`s weakness and wants to make the most of it. From his actions so far, he knows nothing of governance and is very simple minded in thinking that an organized force can solve any problems. The only thing he has been good at so far is keeping his job. His intransigence may also be because anything else will end up costing him his job, the most precious thing in this world.

I am extremely skeptical of the outcome of the talks. It`s good that expectations are low everywhere except among the poor kashmiris - who will clutch at anything now - so when the talks fizzle, the situations will be no worse.

It`s hard for me to see what options Musharraf has. By staking out an extreme position, he has made it impossible for himself to make any concessions. The saddest part in the whole affair is that india has confered legitimacy on a dictatorship.

As the talks fail, Vajpayee should unequivocally DEMAND elections in pakistan. That would be the brahmin cunningness ;)

Re: Amit #60

A cynical viewpoint of India`s CBMs from MA Niazi in today`s `The Nation` expresses grave concerns (mirroring SameerJB)regarding Vajpayee`s decision to open up border crossing points. Excerpts:

``India would be converting the divided families into its propagandists on both sides of the border or LoC. Pakistani members of such families, now with easy access to their relatives would resent their Indian kin not having the same ease of movement making Pakistan appear as isolationist as Myanmar.

Another significant diplomatic point is specific to the LoC. Checkpoints are usually established on international borders, not disputed demarcation lines. However, apparently, the relaxation would only apply to Pakistani passport-holders, not to foreigners. Pakistan would have to think through carefully its response to this. An easy way-out would be to refuse to open any checkpoint opposite, providing no passport control for Pakistanis to go to Held Kashmir or to return. The AJK residents, some of them desperate to see their loved ones, might try to go through the Indian checkpoints nonetheless.

Would Pakistan then stop them by force, and thereby earn the ire of Kashmiris on both sides of the LoC? Or accept the Indian fait accompli? Clearly, the Indian CBMs are carefully calculated not just to score points, but to provide substantial advantages down the line. Also, the best thing about the travel CBMs so far, from the Indian point of view, is that they are scheduled for the future. Depending on the outcome of the Summit, they can be implemented or delayed indefinitely, depending on whether they provide any advantage at that point or not. The travel CBMs are already proving a useful tool for manipulating public opinion and perceptions about the two countries. Pakistan needs to think through its response, whatever it might be, and prepare to face the eventualities that arise.``