The Indo-Pak Summit, Kashmir and the Taj Mahal

http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/11/international/11KASH.html

RE sameer

Right now, it appears that the visa position is one-sided as the Paki govt is yet to reciprocate. If at all, some on the other side can claim that there could be an influx of disgruntled mohajirs who want to come back, right? :) And if so, what would be your position?

Sameer JB #8

``we already have so much problems from Afghan

refugees(they must be sent back) and cannot afford another flood of Muslim refugees from UP,

Bihar, Bangladesh and stranded Biharis in BD``

Absolutely correct on all points.Just one question

what would be your principled stand if the stranded Biharis were stranded Punjabis.I know it

is hypothetical,but would still appreciate your

response.

Regards

Dear Ras:

Great column. Objective, balanced, and moving. Piece of unbiased high class journalism.

Only question: when are you going to write the part II of this column.

What about some possible scenarios of the summit’s success/failures-- some probable solutions of the Kashmir imbroglio -- how about some prognostications?

Regards

From The Pioneer

Don`t let Pervez grab our house: Jinnah daughter

Deepak Sharma/New Delhi

Pakistan President General Musharraf may well have to reconsider claims to Jinnah House in Mumbai. For, none other than the Quaid-e-Azam`s only child, Dina N Wadia, has raised serious objection over Pakistan`s request to acquire her father`s mansion.

In a two-page letter addressed to Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Ms Wadia said the mansion is the personal property of the Jinnahs and should not be handed over to Pakistan.





``This property has nothing to do with the State of Pakistan as it`s a private residence. As his only child and heir, the mansion should rightfully be handed over to me and my family,`` Ms Wadia, mother of Bombay Dyeing proprietor Nusli Wadia, wrote.

Ms Wadia wrote that the house was built by her father with ``great personal affection and care. It has a great historical, sentimental and emotional value to me and my family as it is the only property of my father in India and hence our sole family heritage.`` Ms Wadia`s letter further says, ``When my father went to Pakistan, I did not go with him despite several opportunities to do so. It is believed that my father conveyed to various representatives of the then Government of India such as Shri Prakash and B G Kher his desire to come back and live in this house. My father also did not claim or receive any property in Pakistan in lieu of any property in India, including the Mumbai house.``

In the letter, faxed from her New York residence to the PMO on July 6, Ms Wadia said that she had written to the then Law Minister of Pakistan, Syed Pirzada, asking him to ensure that the Pakistan Government does not claim the house.

Jinnah House, which Gen Musharraf wants to turn into the Pakistan Consulate office, has been lying vacant for over 20 years. It is badly neglected, decayed and requires urgent repair.

In her letter, Ms Wadia hints that everytime there is dialogue between India and Pakistan there seems to be an inappropriate demand from Islamabad for this ``private property belonging to my father.``

``I assure that if the property is handed over to me, I will restore it to its original condition and maintain it as a heritage property for use only by me and my family. I am sure even the Government of Pakistan cannot object to the property being handed over to the sole and rightful heir of Quaid-e-Azam,`` Ms Wadia wrote to the Prime Minister.

ReAAmir

BTW, I just posted this as an FYI.

Here you are, some hyperventilating zealot with bad grammar spouting the same warmed over bs views again and again...and there he is, a former oxbridge law lecturer and Times of London US correspondent now writing for the Wall Street Journal.

Guess whose words carry more weight?

Most newspaper articles have been focussing on what Pakistan wants from India and whether it`ll get it or not. What I am not able to figure out is what does Pakistan bring with it to the bargaining table? After all, this is supposed to be a summit where there is give-and-take, not a surrender by India.

Re: SameerJB - more on liberal visa scheme

Sameer, there is another aspect to the `people strategy` that Vajpayee seems to be rolling out. First, note that not all new visa offices will be in the south, some are planned for the LoC in Kashmir. Since the Pakistani dictatorship severly limits ordinary Pakistanis` expression towards India (e.g: ordinary Pakistanis do not bear as much hostility towards Indians, as the military junta suggests), Vajpayee is perhaps calculating that encouraging greater people-to-people contact through visits/exchanges, etc. are one remaining way of defusing the tension. Crude and severly handicapped though this strategy may be, it is nonetheless one of the few viable ones remaining when the military junta opposes anything that is `not Kashmir first` (e.g. MFN, trade, etc.). An article from The Hindu suggests the same:

India ready for a long haul

By C. Raja Mohan

NEW DELHI, JULY 10. Irrespective of the final outcome from the talks with Gen. Pervez Musharraf at Agra later this week, India is gearing itself up for ``a patient, long-term engagement with Pakistan``, well-placed sources in the Government say.

India does not see the Agra summit as a ``one-shot event``, but an occasion to revive the peace process initiated at Lahore two- and-a-half years ago and move it a little forward.

The Government is hopeful it is possible to realise this modest outcome at Agra. What if, at the end of the summit, it is clear that Gen. Musharraf might not be ready to walk ``the high road`` to peace and prosperity that Mr. Vajpayee talked about?

Even if the results from Agra turn out to be negative, the sources suggest, India will persevere with its new strategy of engaging Pakistan at many levels.

As the goodwill gestures announced over the last few days indicate, the Government believes it is possible to change the context of the relations with Pakistan through a series of unilateral actions on issues such as educational exchanges, easier travel arrangements, and greater economic interaction.

India`s positive unilateralism towards Pakistan does not expect immediate reciprocal gestures from Islamabad; but it is apparently designed to chip away at the deep-seated hostility across the border. Mr. Vajpayee, in his message at the all-party meeting on talks with Pakistan yesterday, revealed another element of India`s strategy - of engaging the people of Pakistan besides their current military rulers.

Insisting that neither the old cliches nor new forms of violence would help resolve the problems between the two countries, he said the time had come to address the ``core concerns of the peoples`` of the subcontinent.

According to sources, India`s historic move to crack open the intensely militarised Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir is part of a conscious strategy to address the ``core concerns`` of the people in the divided and hapless State.

The new Indian strategy of positive unilateralism is drawing approbation from the international community. Diplomatic sources here say if pursued vigorously, the current Indian line towards Pakistan could only add to New Delhi`s image as a responsible power ready to address long-standing problems with its neighbours.

Independent analysts suggest that the prospects for a failure at Agra have considerably increased with the indications from Islamabad that Gen. Musharraf has no desire to discuss anything other than Kashmir.

Sources in the Government believe this could just be the General`s bluster on the eve of his talks with Mr. Vajpayee. But if it does turn out that Gen. Musharraf has nothing else on offer, the talks are likely to go nowhere.

In this context, New Delhi is putting out a simple message - India is looking for a positive outcome at Agra; but it is equally prepared for a negative one.

A failure at Agra, it is being emphasised here, will in no way discourage India from pursuing its new engagement with Pakistan`s civil society aimed at changing the mindset across the border.

http://www.hinduonnet.com/stories/01110003.htm

well, when you talk about your loyalty for a nation like india, its does relate to your ethnic background as well. punjabis were the protectors of hinduism in the olden days. so, hindus and sikhs can always remain brothers but it is not the same incase of the muslims. we are not talking about india and pakistan, we are talking about hindus and muslims. The issue about kashmir is all about religion. you have to keep it in mind when you talk about kashmir.

=== Interact Filtered ===
view this users filtered interacts

I do not want to post Irfan`s article here
because it may appear on CHOWK later, but for a preview:

http://www.timesofindia.com/today/11edit4.htm

re SameerJB #23:

Your likening of Musharraf to Gorbachev is extremely prescient. The poor guy is presiding over the remains of a failed idealogy kept in line by decades of military dictators. Was Jinnah another Lenin? Iqbal another Marx? And why is there a scary resemblance between Zia and Stalin? The next couple of years will provide a definite answer.

later

-sac

In today`s Opinionjournal:

India Grows Up

That could herald a strategic shift for the U.S.

BY TUNKU VARADARAJAN

Tuesday, July 10, 2001 12:01 a.m. EDT

Adamant adversaries will face each other on Thursday when Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan`s dictator, arrives in New Delhi for talks with the Indian government. Though the meeting is bilateral, its occurrence is evidence of an admirable, if unheralded, shift in U.S. foreign policy.

First the local facts. Gen. Musharraf was the architect of a small, brutal war two years ago, when he oversaw the infiltration of Indian territory in the Kargil sector of Kashmir by Pakistani soldiers and Islamic guerrillas. The war over, he seized political power, ousting, and then exiling, the elected prime minister. Last month, by personal fiat, he declared himself president. Also on his curriculum vitae is the stewardship of Pakistan`s terrorist-jihad complex, which orchestrates intrusions by mujahideen into Indian-run Kashmir and sponsors the Afghan Taliban.

India`s invitation to this disreputable man--who will receive a guard of honor in Delhi from soldiers of some of the regiments which fought, and lost men, in the bloody battles to retake Kargil--was made for obvious reasons. The Hindu nationalist government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee is sincere in its pursuit of peace with Pakistan and deeply concerned--as any responsible administration should be--about the strategic and economic cost of its sapping counterinsurgency campaign in Kashmir. It also hopes to exploit Pakistan`s enfeebled condition, caused by economic bankruptcy and its increasing isolation from the civilized poles of international relations. Pakistan`s involvement in Afghanistan and Kashmir, and its weapons dealings with North Korea, place it only a hair`s breadth away from classification as a ``rogue state`` by the State Department.

Underlying India`s decision to invite Gen. Musharraf is the unusual current of goodwill that now runs through its relations with Washington. There is, today, greater strategic congruence between the U.S. and India than there has ever been. The striking improvement in relations began under President Clinton (one of the few things he did absolutely right), and has, in the first months of the Bush administration, begun to assume all the qualities of a tectonic shift in policy. India will talk to Gen. Musharraf secure in the knowledge that he, unlike previous Pakistani heads of government, does not enjoy Washington`s support in any form. The Bush administration has abandoned a policy that was once set in stone--to wit, the reflexive equation of India with Pakistan, and the insistence on viewing India always through a ``Pakistan`` prism.



If there were a pithy phrase that is the opposite of ``strange bedfellows``--perhaps ``the strangely bed-averse``?--it would have served, until now, to describe relations between the U.S. and India. It is almost clichéd to point out the many common features that should, at the very least, have inclined India and the U.S. toward each other in principle: These include entrenched democracy, ethnic and religious plurality, and an anticolonial heritage, not to mention the English language and a shared interest in global stability. But the Cold War kept the two apart, as India--the India of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi--allied itself misguidedly with the Soviet Union.

That chapter is over. India`s diplomats and strategic planners, once hypnotized by Nehru`s sanctimonious anti-Americanism, his ``nonalignment`` and his socialist economic mantras, have grown wise to the ways of the real world.

That world is perilous, and both India and the U.S. have reason to fear, and to slay, the dragon of Islamic fundamentalism. The spread of Islamic absolutism in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia is not just a cultural question, or one of ``civilizations``: It has serious repercussions for the security of access to energy. Here, one cannot ignore the turmoil in Indonesia, as yet immune to the spread of fundamentalism but possibly ripe for the fall. India and the U.S. have a critical stake in the stability of the entire Indian Ocean region, from the straits of Hormuz to those of Malacca. India is the only country in the region that has the military potential--as well as the independent economic and strategic incentive--to be a reliable American partner.

Realism has replaced the old Nehruvian preachiness to such an extent that India has been one of the few countries to back President Bush`s plan for ballistic missile defense. Indeed, India`s mature endorsement of BMD is in telling contrast to the boorish reaction of America`s allies in Europe, some of whom have been as shrill as the Chinese in their condemnation. Of course, the strategic elegance of BMD suits India`s diplomacy to perfection, as it is now able to argue that its own modest nuclear arsenal is defensive too. That Washington is sympathetic to this position is clear from reports that sanctions on India, imposed after its nuclear tests in 1998, are soon to be lifted. (The Bush administration is also respectful of the argument that if China upgrades its arsenal in reaction to BMD, India would, more than ever, need its own nuclear shield.)

Once the nuclear question is addressed--or finessed--in this way, there will be no fundamental source of conflict between Washington and New Delhi. An increasing convergence on economic and political issues, especially those with their origins in Asia, should ensure that the two forge a mutually beneficial alliance, one akin, perhaps, to that between the U.S. and Israel. In return for U.S. support, India will need to embrace greater economic reform--particularly a willingness to open up its economy fully to foreign investment.

This is a long-term project. But the Bush administration, committed to a realist foreign policy, shows every sign of having grasped India`s strategic worth. Deeper American engagement will reinforce positive trends within India, home to one-fifth of the world`s population. And in doing so, the U.S. will bolster its own national and security interests. Can there be a clearer ``win-win`` situation?

Mr. Varadarajan is deputy editorial features editor of The Wall Street Journal. His column appears Tuesdays.

Re: SameerJB

I see your point. (Vajpayee is more cunning than I thought!) However, do you agree that if India is playing this card, it is only because conditions exist today for it to be possible? Would it have been a viable Indian strategy in the 1950s or 60s? In the end, opposing it will have negative repurcussions for the ruling Pakistani junta, since the people most inconvenienced will be those in South Pakistan. Besides, why be so pessimistic/negative anyway? The rest of the world seems to have embraced the idea of people to people contacts, tourism, and cross border trade.

A very good article. But where do we go from here.

We know the respective positions of the two governments:

1. Pakistan wants whole of Kashmir

2. India wants whole of Kashmir but may settle to make LOC as permanent border.

Is a solution possible if those positions are permanent. If not then what do we do ?

I have a humble suggestion. make LOC the international border temporarily with both countries having joint supervision of the border. Allow free travel of people on the two sides to help move towards peace and stability. And agree to hold a referendum (after an agreed reasonable period)with all the three options Pakistan/India/Independence for the whole of Kashmir.

Romair,

{{It is very refreshing to finally (!!!!!) see honest answers to questions like this. I have been asking them for quite a while, and nearly all the responses received from Indians, attempt to somehow or the other justify India`s actions to be fair and humane in regard to these states (specially Kashmir), based on illogical, self-serving, and inhumane legalistic mumbo-jumbo.}}

I think that kind of generalisation was a wee bit uncalled for:) See, I told you once, MOST, not all, of your posts makes sense:) Now dont go & parse phrases by saying ``I said NEARLY ALL Indians..``, ya spin doctor ya.. Or maybe you think I`m a Pakistani posing as an Indian.

OK, jokes aside, what do you feel about the WHOLE of Kashmir (Indian & Pakistani) given independance? Granted, that may go against the wishes of Kashmiri muslims. But in terms of realpolitick ,in our current state of affairs, India will NEVER accept Kashmir going to Pakistan. Yes, Azad Kashmiris are generally satisfied with Pakistan. However, in Azad Kashmir, any talk of Kashmiri independance from Pakistan is also harshly muzzled.

There is a worrisome conclusion made by some Pakistani experts that Vaju is forced to talk to Mushy because the jehadis have bought him to his knees. It kinda implies that ``freedom fighting`` jehad is winning. Thats a lot of bull. Personally, I think Vaju is genuinely interested in improving relations with Pakistan. Of course a sutble bit of US armtwisting by using a ``carrot & stick`` approach has helped.

In the real politick game of poker, Vaju has more aces in hand than Mushy. The jehadi ``ace`` that Mushy has can backfire & come to bite Pakistan, as well as India.

Here`s hoping all of us can have that cup of tea on Dal Lake...But it better be Darjeeling tea...not ``Mumtaz brand`` chai :)