A Medley of Internal Contradictions

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Formal burial

Husain Naqi

Search for surrogates to serve with the military dominated establishment has resumed. The multiple capped head of government after announcing his roadmap has started meeting feudal and tribal scions belonging to vote-bank holding parties. The self-appointed President will represent the country at the UN General Assembly later in the month. In post Cold-War years the moot will find fewer generals representing their nations of whom, he, from a nuclear state, will be the most distinguished. The General will meet the leaders of the world’s most armed and most populous democracies. With the latter, he will discuss the core issue of Kashmir while the former may raise with him their ‘core’ issue of the Taliban, their honoured guest and his exploits against the US and her global interests.

On the home front General Musharraf inaugurated some half-a-dozen non-controversial development projects followed by the Indus River System Authority disclosing that except for Sindh, consensus was achieved amongst provincial bureaucrats on the Kalabagh Dam. The announcement was followed by strong reaction from nationalists in Sindh and NWFP. Another significant development was the ‘jihadi’ organisations finally succeeding in humbling the Interior Minister over fundraising. And last but not least four citizens were slain in Karachi on a single day in apparent terrorist attacks.

General Musharraf’s meetings with pliant and not-so-pliant leaders clearly indicates the military top brass has partially conceded that direct political control failed to bear fruit. The economy they desired to kickstart and discipline and national cohesion, did not occur. Instead, there was discontent as there was unemployment and price-rise, as well as divisive tendencies and intolerance were inciting terrorist violence. The regime was also worried that despite condemnation through intelligence outfits and controlled media, the former surrogates turned into formidable votebank-holders. Even direct interference by Services’ personnel could not ensure ‘positive’ results, especially at the top local bodies tier. This resulted in political parties’ rank and file regaining self-confidence. That self-confidence seems lacking among the nominated leaderships, of whom some seem to be getting nervous and wishing to cut a quick deal. If that happens, politics will be the loser. That may, of course, provide a safe exit to a few but will severely damage the political interests of the co-opted party, the PPP.

So far the PPP had played its cards well. Its recapture of its political constituency in the Punjab was possible due to PML(N) leaders’ deal with the regime for obtaining a safe-exit in exile. That also helped the rise of Sharif critics within the PML to emerge into an organised force in the shape of PML (LM/QA). With the PPP becoming the main competing party in the Punjab, with a base in Sindh and strong presence in NWFP, its political interests will be better served if it waits to enter the electoral fray next year, instead of entering a suspect deal that will only strengthen the regime politically. Bhutto who during the past couple of years has developed her writing skills has almost a year to convince her readers about the critical ailments caused by military interference, both direct and indirect, in politics.

Politically, it is not crucial that by attaining majority in the next elections Bhutto or someone else becomes PM. After all, she was PM twice, as was Sharif. Now it is no more secret that both could exercise only the powers the military allowed. They failed to wrest the power PMs in parliamentary democracies have. The military booted them out, not once but twice. Instead of giving battle to achieve the people’s rights, both indulged in authoritarianism, suppression of democratic institutions and rights of the opposition. Worse still they and/or their hangers-on indulged in plunder, distancing themselves from their constituencies and the people at large. The military regime came with the promise of across-the-board accountability, revival of economy, redressing injustices perceived by less populated provinces, better tidings for the common man. But in the times that followed, the people found that accountability was selective. Those opting to come under regime’s umbrella were spared. The economic situation worsened. There were large scale downsizings while personnel from military were being inducted everywhere. Prices of essential items soared and hardly any utility services showed improvement. There was flight of capital and lack of investment. Despite talk of retiring debts through sale of family silver there were few takers.

Now there is an awakening that howsoever corrupt they be, all ills are not of the making of political leaders. The military is neither regarded as better manager nor a sacred cow. There is across the board consensus among the intelligentsia that the armed forces’ expenditure needs to be rationalised and should function strictly within its domain of duties. Its interference in politics is resented and its watchdog role is despised. Its only role should be confined to protecting country’s borders, is the common response to the junta’s demand for a constitutionally recognised role of the national security council. While recognising that the Constitution in its present shape and form was the mutilated version of the 1973’s original document, any further amendment/s by procedures other than the one provided under the Constitution would be unacceptable. Seasoned politicians have warned that the move will open a pandora’s box as already demands have been made for a fresh constituent assembly to draft a constitution based on the 1940 Pakistan Resolution.

Meanwhile the gulf between the people and major political parties and the government is increasing. The latter desperately needs bridging this gulf before it turns into open confrontation. It is looking for some quick fix that strengthens its position and causes damage to the party that so far withstood the onslaught and rebuffed the factionalism. Apparently there is no reason the present weakening regime’s efforts succeed. In fact the worsening situation demands political parties subscribing to federal parliamentary system to come around and demand a formal burial to the post Zia ‘troika’ misrule. The roadmap cannot offer any space to military interference. Instead, the political parties should commit to participatory democracy at all levels from top to bottom and demand the military to account for all the investment incurred on its upkeep while the people remained impoverished, illiterate, ill-fed and ill-clothed. Hundreds of thousands (almost 1/3rd of total population) remained without minimum calorie intake, a state of health far worse than at the time of independence in the region that now constitutes Pakistan. Democratic political forces should also demand complete ban on induction of military personnel to jobs in civilian and corporate undertakings and placing before public scrutiny all budgetary demands for defence, as is the practice in all civilised democratic countries.

E-mail queries and comments to: naqi@nation.com.pk

From Nation daily, dated August 29, 2001.

Esfand Yar

In Shahbaz Sharif’s first week as Punjab CM, I saw him in a white Corolla at a red signal on The Mall. No motorcade, no hooters, no protocol fleet. I thought it was a political gimmick. But I was wrong. From that day on he never looked back. Normally people work from nine to five, but he and his team literally worked from five to nine. Lahoris saw his 6-am on-the-spot meetings at development projects. These ‘good morning get-togethers’ were a nightmare for the bureaucrats and technocrats concerned.

But despite his acquittal twice in the hijacking case, he was bars without any charge for 14 months and was forced into exile. Does he really deserve this? I have prepared a chargesheet against him for his 32-month tenure as CM.

1. Unparalleled infrastructure development. Initially, the focus was on major cities like Lahore, Rawalpindi, Multan, Faisalabad, Sialkot, DG Khan and Bahawalpur. In Lahore only, over 600 roads were widened and relaid. Roadside drains, footpaths, streetlights, traffic signals and signs, bus shelters, and green belts became mandatory for major roads. If privileged Jail Road and Main Boulevard were improved, so were deprived Satto Katla Double Road, Shadbagh Triple Road and Shalimar Link Road. He personally had proper seats, a water cooler, telephone booth and bin installed in each bus shelter. Critics called this micromanagement. But these shelters provided relief for the users in summer.

Three flyovers and three underpasses built in two years in Lahore, new parks and green verges coming up everywhere, existing ones improved. No less than 14 sports complexes were under construction when his government ended. What is their fate now?

2. A massive anti-encroachment drive was conducted in Lahore without favour. A strong message was sent to qabza groups that rule of law was back. Plazas, petrol pumps and shops violating building by-laws were demolished to widen roads. Nine mammoth fuel pumps, one owned by a near relative of the CM were razed in one day from Jail Road. Another benefit was resource generation. Billions were collected by auctioning state land retrieved from encroachers. These funds went to the Road Rehabilitation Project. The Punjab C&W Minister recently blamed the previous government for creating a huge debt to FWO and NLC. In fact, the debt is mounting because the resource generation drive stopped. Now there is no retrieval of properties or auctions. Even the shops built at the Jail Road underpass and at Chowk Shahalami have not been sold. The will to deliver, a Shahbaz specialty, is nonexistent now.

3. Shahbaz Sharif inducted the NLC and FWO in building urban road infrastructure. It had varied objectives: eliminating a corrupt contractor mafia, ensuring high quality work, and making projects credible by time-bound performance. The then Chief Secretary wrote a lengthy note opposing the induction of the Army. However, the CM overruled him in the public interest. For such acts some labelled his style despotic. But, for many, this was popular needed the most at this juncture. Had the Army not been so involved in civilian matters the 12 October action may not have been so easy. But he who kept aloft the national interest is not where he deserves to be.

4. Anything not inspected is neglected. This was his favorite principle, which he invoked within a rotten bureaucratic framework. He introduced third-party monitoring and independent post-audit over all civil works in Punjab, to thwart corruption, uproot inefficiency and maintain financial discipline. He and his personal staff became a ‘fourth party’ to monitor random projects. He supervised monsoon relief operations standing in waist-deep stinking water. Due to his personal interest, people like the Commissioner, MD WASA and the Lord Mayor were out on roads for the first time during the monsoons.

5. After firming up this model in Lahore, it was replicated in the other major cities. Road networks were re-laid in Faisalabad, Rawalpindi and Sialkot. A flyover in Multan, a water supply scheme in Yazman and pollution control project in Kasur were other major projects. Some were nearing completion when 12 October came. Since then, the pulse of these projects and others in embryonic stages died down.

6. Major headway was made in every sphere, where there was either total neglect or mismanagement. The focus of each initiative was public welfare and relief to a common man. One example is inflation. He started by forming a Task Force, with the late Prof Sajjad Haider, a man of impeccable integrity as chairman. The CM’s helicopter was at the disposal of the Task Force for random raids on far-flung districts. All DCs and SPs were made personally answerable to the CM, and ministers and secretaries were asked to remain in the field in Ramazan. (The Punjab Governor took a leaf out of his book by doing the same). The Food Stamp scheme provided a subsidy of over Rs 1 billion a year to keep atta prices at Rs 6-7 a kg. This dismayed the bureaucracy for budget reasons. But every time the CM put his foot down that it was the only way left for direct relief to the poor. The present regime ended this subsidy as soon as it took over. However, after a year, they introduced it, but only as a Ramadan package.

7. He waged a war against spurious and substandard medicines. New drug testing labs were established, their standards were improved and corrupt staff replaced throughout Punjab. Drug Courts were empowered by drug law amendments. Medical stores went on strike but could not dent Shahbaz’s determination. These lines cannot explain the effort he made to fight this mafia.

He legislated to give ‘autonomy’ to major hospitals as a first step towards District Health Governments. Chief Executives of hospitals were selected on merit and freed from the shackles of Health, Finance and C&W departments, to bureacratic dismay. There were initial hiccups, but while the plan was still embryonic the government was sent home. The present regime is highly critical of this policy. One fails to understand that while moving ahead with a devolution plan it is withdrawing autonomy from hospitals.

8. If there is any IT pioneer in Pakistan, it is Shahbaz. He was went to the USA, and personally ensured technical assistance from Microsoft and Oracle. When most of our politicians were even unaware of IT jargon he introduced classes in UET, formed IT Board in Punjab with main emphasis to produce more and more IT experts so that they can impart proper training to youngsters. His aim was to one day compete with India.

9. He relished fighting against vested interests without succumbing to political exigencies. Disbandment of PRTC, a white elephant eating Rs 400 million a year, with only 20 buses on the road, was only one example. He did not stop there. He introduced franchised urban bus service in Lahore. Even now, New Khan and Daewoo buses are plying. After the arrival of first batch of 30 Daewoo buses, the government was toppled and with it everything stopped. The actual plan of 700 buses suffered from bureaucratic inertia.

10. In past, Zakat funds of billions were doled out in the shape of Rs 200-500 a month, raising an army of beggars. Shahbaz, after finally getting clearance from the ulema, ordered these funds to go to establishing modern Vocational Training Institutes for poor and needy, so that a skilled force could be produced who could with dignity contribute to the economy. He also envisaged a plan that these skilled hands would be recruited in the private sector as soon as they passed out. What is the fate of this policy?

11. Reforming police is the favorite exercise of virtually all rulers, but only in redtaped files. For the first time in the province, all DCs and SPs were posted on merit. He recruited police inspectors directly through PPSC on merit. As CM he did not relax any rule for anyone. Best officers were deputed to train these youngsters with a redrawn syllabus. He raised constables’ pays Rs 1000 a month. He gave exemplary punishments to the corrupt and inefficient. Elite police training was started by Army commandos. Many plans were on the anvil, including change in Police Act, but he didn’t get the chance.

12. In agriculture, he strived to watch the small farmers’ interest. During his tenure he influenced everybody, from APTMA to the Commerce and Finance Ministries to increase the cotton price from Rs 600 per maund to Rs 820. One-window facility for small farm loans was ensured. Adulteration in pesticides was virtually done away with. To attract investment in agro-based industry he achieved an agreement with China.

13. His tenure as Chief Minister is a marvelous exhibition of good governance. There was no erratic posting. All recruitments, postings and transfers were on merit. Austerity was the key. He never used an official car. At CM House, only tea and biscuits were served in meetings. If they extended to late evenings, only daal-chawal was served. Not a single new vehicle was purchased for politicians or bureaucrats.

14. He eliminated ‘booti mafia‘ from examinations, personally raiding centres at random. Each Education Board was purged of corrupt officials. He got thousands of ghost schools identified by the Army. Entry Test system for admission in professional colleges was introduced. What is happening now?

An old man remembers him for doing away with the menace of open death traps, that are manholes, in which kids used to drown, but no one ever took a rap on knuckles. Shahbaz took such stringent measures that it never happened again. How? Special Branch was asked not to monitor the activities of Nawab saheb, but to identify death wells so that WASA’s misreporting could be counterchecked.

A poor woman in Bahawalpur prays for him because her son was selected as police inspector on sheer merit. A disabled kid loves him because he got a lifetime opportunity along with hundreds of others to see an international cricket match in the CM’s enclosure.

Shahbaz stands heads and shoulders above his political contemporaries. He has qualities that must be used for national betterment. One hopes those at the helm of affairs don’t let political expediency overtake the national interest.

Shahbaz Sharif for Prime Minister

Shahbaz Sharif Zindabad

Welcome to another innovative form of corruption in Pakistan.

From The News:

Is this not a scandal?

By Ansar Abbasi

ISLAMABAD: While there are no big corruption scandals of the Musharraf Government so far, one that would come precariously close is the huge party going on in all the ministries to appoint friends and favourites as consultants, over 210 already identified, and the count goes on.

The redeeming factor, though, may be that President and Chief Executive Pervez Musharraf is not fully aware of the complete picture as yet as his secretariat was still trying to gather, at least until a few weeks back, the details of how many ministries had appointed how many consultants and at what cost. But his test would lie in what he does about the situation.

The 211 consultants, mostly getting huge salaries, counted so far were all engaged by various ministries and divisions. Those employed by the NRB, NAB, the Chief Executive`s Secretariat itself and the Presidency are yet to be accounted for.

``These appointments depict a very sorry picture of financial discipline and show the generosity of those at the helm of affairs with which the public money is distributed amongst favourites as bounty,`` an observer of the situation commented.

A vast majority of the consultants have been appointed purely on personal liking, pick and choose basis and without advertising the consultancies. Mostly the ministers and the top bureaucrats offered the ``bounty`` to their friends, acquaintances and relatives. In some cases commissions and kickbacks are also alleged.

One of the ministers even recently publicly admitted to offering consultancies to her friends. A few ministries have gone so deep into this trend that they are engaging consultant after consultant. Communications ministry tops the list but is ironically followed by the finance division, which professes to teach financial discipline to others.

Figures available with the Chief Executive Secretariat show that the communication ministry alone engaged 61 consultants followed by 29 by the finance division. The other ministries/divisions that have engaged a large number of consultants include education division 18; revenue division 17; privatisation 14; commerce division 13; industries and production 13; cabinet division 11; water and power 8.

Perturbed over the situation, the Chief Executive Secretariat recently inquired as to how such a huge number of consultants were engaged, that too without seeking prior approval of the chief executive. The Chief Executive Secretariat also set up a high-level committee to review these appointments besides streamlining them in the future. Analysts say by hiring such a huge number of consultants, it appears the Musharraf Government has sub-let the process of governance to paid experts, some of whom may not even be qualified for the big bucks they are receiving.

The following is the horrifying picture of these friends and favourites hired by the government: Ministry of Housing and Works: Legal consultant Sheikh Saeed Ahmed offered Rs 50,000 per month.

Finance Division: M/S Princewaterhouse Coopers offered US $3.9 million; Khalid Siraj offered US $4,000 per month; MA Jabbar, Rs 60,000 p/m; Ms Zia Batool, 60,000 p/m; Asad Aleem, 60,000 p/m; Rashid Nadeem, Rs 60,000 p/m; Dr Ehsanul Haq, Rs 4,875,000; Dr Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Rs 4,415,000; Dr Anjum Nasim, Rs 4,507,000; Dr Ali Cheema, Rs 4,766,000; Masood Aziz, Rs 4,000,000; Sidat Hyder Murshed, Rs 2,500,000; Syed Haroon Rashid, 57150 p/m; Imran Inayat Butt, Rs 45,000 p/m; Ashraf Awan, Rs 33,000 p/m; Nasim Malik, Rs 75,000 p/m; Saquib Mohyuddin, Rs 125,000 p/m; Bakhtiar A Sayyed, Rs 65,000 p/m; Ms Alyia Agha, Rs 100,000 p/m; SM Masood and Co, Rs 75,000 p/m; Khurshid A Khair, Rs 150,000; Sultan Ahmad Khan, Rs 125,000; M/S Communications Research Strategies, Rs 150,000 p/m; Dr Tariq Hassan offered maximum MP-I package; and Syed Shahid Hussain, Javed Ahmad Noel, Fateh M Chaudhry, Saeed Hamad Qureshi and Dr Pervaiz Hasan all apparently working on honorary basis.

(Those working on honorary basis have been a burden on government finances for many reasons like Syed Shahid Hussain who have been offered more than six club class US return tickets)

Ministry of Industries: John Hagestdat US$ 20,183 per month; Dr Peter Brimble, $19,910 p/m; Douglas Lucius, $ 10,465 p/m; Miss Lim Pao Li, $14,950 p/m; Mumtaz Abdullah, $ 1,955 p/m; Ghulam Mustafa, $ 1,955 p/m; Syed Javed Iqbal, $ 2,128 p/m; Hafeezur Rehman, $ 2,300 p/m; Akbar Khan, $2,300 p/m; Abdul Hafeez Sheikh, $ 2,128 p/m; Basharat Qadir, $2,300; Sultan Muhammad Tanoli (package not indicated) and MA Jabbar, pay equivalent to BS 20.

Cabinet Division: Syed Javed Naseem, Rs 86,000 p/m; Ahmed Attaur Rehman, Rs 103,680; Abdur Rashid Kakar, Rs 4000 per day; Bashir Ahmad Abbasi, Rs 4000 per day; Muhammad Aslam Ch, Rs 4000 per day; Faryad H Malik, Rs 4000 per day; Dr SM Bhutta, Rs 118,627; Hussain Zaigham Alvi, Rs 97,055; Dr Khaqan A Khan, Rs 67,710; M Ali Saif, Rs 75,000; and Insaf Ahmed, Rs 60,000.

Ministry of Commerce: KK Suri, Rs 40,000 per month; Rashid Salahuddin, Rs 50,000 p/m; Mamnoon Hassan, Rs 20,000 p/m; Jamil Erickrada (not indicated); Javed H Agha, Rs 375,000; M/s System Nine Thousand Pvt Ltd, Rs 30,000 p/m; M/s Abbas F Pota and Associates, on case to case basis; Yousaf Adil Salim & Co, Rs 30,000 p/m; Dr Zubair Khan, UK £ 13,455 p/m; David Mueller, £ 12,334 p/m; Akhtar Mahmood, £ 3,160 p/m; Zahir Riaz, £ 3,020 p/m; and Sami Saggu, £ 2,810 p/m.

Ministry of Privatisation: Dr Mateen Tohbani, Rs 210,000 p/m; M Asghar, Rs 135,000 p/m; Aamir Qawi, Rs 100,000 p/m; Karim Nayani, Rs 100,000 p/m; Shahid Akbar, Rs 90,000 p/m; Syed Mansoor Hussain, Rs 80,000 p/m; Abdul Ahad Effendi, Rs 65,000 p/m; Manzoor A Malik, Rs 65,000 p/m; Farhan Malik, Rs 60,000 p/m; M Umar Shereef, Rs 60,000 p/m; Haroon Ahmed Malik, Rs 450,000 p/m; Abdul Hafeez Rana, Rs 42,000 p/m; Javed Hussain, Rs 40,000 p/m; Kalim Ilyas, Rs 35,000 p/m; and M Sadiq, Rs 30,000 p/m.

Revenue Division: Sultanul Haq Safavi, Mushtaq Ahmad and Akhtar Ali have been offered MP-III while the division did not indicate as to what does it offer to its foreign and local consultants including Roy Jackson, Adrian Strain, Alan Morely, Vivienne Davies, Roy Lloyed, Ashir Ahmad, SM Khan, SM Sadiq, Javed H Agha, Imtiaz Ahmad Khan, Shahab Mumtaz; Muhammad Muzammil, Abrar Hussain Naqvi and Mubin Ahsan.

Ministry of Education: Prof. Laeeq Ahmed Khan, Rs 30,000 p/m; Col (retired) M Sadiq, Rs 30,000 p/m; Mehboob Elahi, Rs 30,000 p/m; Dr MSK Shibli, Rs 25,000 p/m; M Ahmad Zaidi, Rs 12,000 p/m; Dr M Mian Siddiqi, Rs 15,000; Dr Mehmoodur Rehman, Rs 12,000 p/m; Dr Khalilur Rehman, Rs 20,000 p/m; Harold Jonathan, Rs 18,000 p/m; Prof Fateh M Malik, Rs 25,000 p/m; Anwarul Haq, Rs 12,000 p/m; Abdul Karim, Rs 6812 p/m; Ms Dareema Rehman, Rs 6000 p/m; Peter Howe, Aus$ 259875; Munir Ahmad, M Hashim Abbasi and Mrs Razia Abbas were offered Rs 112,218 respectively.

Economic Affairs Division: Makhdoom H Chaudhry, Rs 35,000 per month; Kashif Zafar, Rs 276,000; while package of Mrs Kasuar Iqbal and Eaba Abdul Rahim is not indicated.

Kashmir Affairs Division has only one consultant, namely Brig (retired) Bashir Hussain whose package is not indicated. Defence Production Division: Lt Col (retired) Sajid Majeed Bhatti, consultant in BS 19; Sardar M Anwar, BS-19; and M/s JBA Karachi, Rs 500,000 as consultancy fee and Rs 350,000 as boarding/lodging.

Ministry of Water and Power: The ministry has engaged eight consultancy firms for its different projects but did not indicate the amount offered to them. Ministry of Communication: In the National Highway Authority the consultants are Farrukh Karim Qureshi, Rs 65,000 per month; packages of Pakistan Motorway consultant, M/S EGC/ACE and M/S NESPAK not indicated;

M/S Riaz Ahmad & Co, Rs 3,500,660; M/S Ford Rhode Robson Morrow, Rs 2,000,000; M/S Ford Rhode Robson Morrow, on hourly basis at rates prescribed by ICAP; M/S Citibank, on fee of US$ 48,000 and a man hour schedule with the lowest being $ 600 and highest $1000; M/S Citibank, on fee of US$ 22,500 and a man hour schedule with the lowest being $ 600 and highest $ 1000; M/S S Zafar Shah, hourly rate ranging from Rs 100-2000; M/S ABN-Amro, Rs 12,000 per hour with a cap of Rs 1,000,000; NESPAK, Rs 30,645,602; REMCO JV EA, Rs 2,055,275; NESPAK, Rs 4,080,000; Loya Associates, Rs 4,210,000; NESPAK, Rs 30,847,480; ACC, Rs 31,749,917; LRA Group, Rs 63,060,500; Technoconsultants, Rs 6,306,700; EGC, Rs 8,064,563; Iqbal Haq associates, Rs 2,340,000; ACC, Rs 131,880; NESPAK, Rs 1,800,000; REC, Rs 390,000; REC, Rs 400,000; Engineering consultant, Rs 315,000; DD&C, Rs 531,030; ACC, Rs 296,807; SAMPAK, Rs 705,000; Lt Col (retired) M Iqbal, Rs 2,610,000; ACE Transportation, Rs 844,964; NESPAK, Rs 2,692,000; ACC, Rs 224,400; PEAL, Rs 2,761,640; ACE Transportation, Rs 2,535,000; AA Associates, Rs 1,300,000; ESS Associates, Rs 42,250; EGC, Rs 295,000; DD&C, Rs 1,733,750; Loya Associates, Rs 984,000; PRAL, Rs 14,000,000; PIN, Rs 145,000; NUST, Rs 2,000,000; PRC, Rs 75,886; Freeman Fox, Rs 96,689; DCIL, Rs 35,543; Kamsax, Rs 28,741; Mc KEE Associates, Rs 12,612; Engg. Consultants, Rs 39,494; ACC, Rs 34, 450; Kamsax international, Rs 21,851; NESPAK, Rs 17,334; Loya Associates, Rs 17,334; AA Associates, Rs 26,928; Kamsax international, Rs 19,145; Louis Berger, Rs 4,464; Wilbersmith, Rs 4,569; and Riaz & Co, Rs 5,232.

The consultants engaged by Port Qasim Authority of the communication ministry include M/s Posford Decevivier etc, Rs 17.4 million; M/s Engineering consultants etc., Rs 17.6 million; M/s National Engineering Services, Rs 8.437 million, Rs 0.15 million, Rs 1.5 million, Rs 0.456 million and Rs 597 million respectively for different projects; M/s Loya Associates, Rs 0.37 million; M/S AA Associates, Rs 1.976 million; M/S Associated consulting engineers, Rs 1.347 million; M/s Techno consult, Rs 1.552 million; and M/s Marine consultant, Rs 0.019 million.

Ministry of Information and Media Development: Sohail Hashmi, Rs 80,000 p/m; Burhanuddin Hassan, Rs 50,000 p/m; Nisar Ahmad, Rs 460 per day; and M Hanif, Rs 12,000 p/m.

Population Ministry: Aurangzeb Khan offered Rs 45,000 pm.

Statistic Division: Only consultant Ludo Vico Karraro is not indicated.

Establishment Division: Consultant Justice (retired) Shah Abdur Rashid gets Rs 5000 per month.

Petroleum Ministry: SM Zafarullah and Abdur Razzak is also not indicated.

Interior Division: SAM Wahidi, Rs 14,000 per month; M Rafiq Ahmed, Rs 15,000 p/m; and companies hired by NADRA (package not indicated).

Defence Division: Only consultant is Khalid Butt whose package is not indicated.

Science and Technology: Dr Manzoor Hussain Soomro, Rs 7000 per month; Dr Azra Sultana, Rs 25,000 p/m; Sheikh Mehmood Ahmed, Rs 30,000 p/m plus 3,583 as conveyance allowance; and Tariq Mustafa, Rs 100,000 p/m and TA/DA for a BS 22 officer under government rules.

Re:Reply #: 350

hobbyty,

Thanks for your post.

Unfortunately, the path to real democracy passes through some dark alleys. I am by no means implying India is a perfect democracy. India still elects a person convicted of corruption charges as a C.M. Some P.Ms have been accused of large scale corruptions. The ills of democracy can be solved only by more democracy.

``I would agrue that representative governmemt is what a majority of persons hold, represents democracy. Do you agree?``.

Agreed. But then what kind of representative govt are we talking about. Now,i am not familiar with the details of Musharraf`s devolution plan but i heard reports of some people being allowed to participate and others denied such rights. This is against the very spirit of democracy. Yes, BB and Nawaz Sharief were corrupt but surely if people dislike them so much they can teach them a lesson by voting them out in a fair election. By letting the Army (actually this is a false argument as Army calls shots in Pak) decide on who stands for elections, who does not (this is usually a job of Election Commission), You are giving away one important right that people in a democracy have ie right to choose a person of their choice. Here, the choice is being determined by the Army. They tell you: O.K guys, you have X,Y, Z on the voting list and you have to vote one of them. They assure you all 3 are good candidates. You say: No, i want a wider choice or i want to vote for a, b, or c. Tough luck, they tell you. a, b or c or not allowed to contest. So, Army takes away one most important right that every person in a democracy is proud of.

Today, in India, a lot of bad things happen in politics. Politicians are notoriously corrupt. People are fed up with their lot. Still, they regularly punish them and vote them in and out of office. As long as they can do this they have some hope. Still, i am hopeful. Let us see how this devolution scheme in Pak shapes up and if Paks really returns to democracy as per the timeframe promised.

Sridhar

Rsridhar

Have Benazir or NS been accountable to the people?

In the case BB, she is president for live of her party? Is this the democracy you want to see? and want imposwed upon the Pakistani people? What about the $1.5 Billion fortune she has amassed?

In the case NS, is it OK to have an elected dictator? is it OK to storm the supreme court of the Nation, sack 2 Chiefs of army staff? Is this democracy? or lunacy? - it`s fun engaing with you, but you rarely show circumspection to the facts.

Is there a free press in Pakistan?, Is it freeer than it was during BB or NS regimes? What does this way about the inclinations of the present regime? Didi BB or NS have the courage to tell extremeist religious leaders to shape up? Did they take any action against sectarian or ethnic violence in Pakistan? Did BB or NS attempt restructuring of the State and the Economy of Pakistan? Were BB or NS ever trusted by international institutions?

``I will be most happy if real democracy comes to Pak as it will mean a friendly relationship with India can be forged. Democracies do not wage war. Politicians are ultimately answerable to the people. Army brass is answerable only to itself. Therein lies a big difference.``

Nobody wants to defent the lack of democracy in any place, but we must be clear about what we mean. Do we mean by democracy the right to steal from the public treasury? Do we mean the right hold personal interests above national interests? or do we simply mean representative government? I would agrue that representative governmemt is what a majority of persons hold, represents democracy. Do you agree?

If this is so can we argue that the devolution of power plan is an undemocractic exercise? If yes, on what basis? After all voter turn out was high, the by a vast majority, election engineering was avoided and Pakistanis for the first time in their

history have local representation. Do they not?

But ofcourse representative government is more than local representation, what about elctions to other offices? A timeframe for these elections has been annouced - can we still argue that democracy is not being instituted? Clearly such a claim would be unfair.

Democracies do not wage war upon one another? Do you actually read to inform yourself as to the meaning of events?

Peace with India will come when the Indian leadership is prepared to make peace, and not anytime before that. As a Pakistani, I tell you, many Indians simply to not have the courage or gumption or whatever, to accept their responsiblity for the state of affairs in Kashmir or with regard to the quality of relations with Pakistan. While blaming Pakistan is easy and in the present environment a cause celebre - such an attitude is counter productive - these problems will be diminished in the next two to three years, and Indians will still have ponder, ``what is their responsibility in the quality of relations between India and Pakistan. There is no such a thing as one hand clapping.

Re:Reply #: 348

hobbyty,

I am amazed and amused at the spectacle of Army stagemanaging democracy in Pakistan even as the people watch on. I wonder what goes on in the minds of common folks in Pakistan. Do they really believe that real democracy (where people can elect who they like)can come this way? Whatever Army does, one thing is sure. It will always see to it that its power structure is not disturbed or challenged. If real democracy comes to Pakistan it may do just that. Who was responsible for 1965 war? Who started the 1971 war resulting in dismemberment of Pak? Who was responsible for carnage in Bangladesh? Army, right. Now, if people were allowed to ask some tough questions like:

1. Why no Armymen responsible for 1971 debacle and carnage were punished?

2. Why the Army higher ups are not asked to account for the lavish lifestyles they indulge in?

3. How do they justify all the military expenses? Why not make peace with India and decrease the expenses so the nation can progress?

These are tough questions that need to be asked. Army top brass do not want to hear them. They will ensure that democracy in Pakistan is only cosmetic. Real power will still be with Army. If you do not believe me, wait and see. As they say, the proof of pudding is in eating. I will be most happy if real democracy comes to Pak as it will mean a friendly relationship with India can be forged. Democracies do not wage war. Politicians are ultimately answerable to the people. Army brass is answerable only to itself. Therein lies a big difference.

Sridhar

An interesting analysis of the local goverment elections - from ``The News International``

``Flawed analysis of LG polls

Dr Farzana Bari and Sarwar Bari

During the last one week, a number of articles have appeared in newspapers that analysed the result of recently held indirect election of district councils. One is struck by the political dogma and obsession in the political analysis of pseudo elite intellectuals. They have lost touch with ground realities as they hardly go outside their offices to be able to feel the realities and the potential for a change created by the recent local government election in the country.

The local government election has been declared a failure by some of them due to the return of old faces in the position of nazims and naib nazims at the district level. In the present socio-economic and political context to expect the results of local election any different then what we got, can only be attributed to their political naivety. The trend was eminent even at the union council election where the seats for nazim and naib nazim were mostly captured by local influentials of the areas. The findings of the only national level field based study of the phase one conducted by Pattan Development Organisation clearly highlighted the fact that, ``majority of nazims/naib nazims belonged to local influential families.`` The study also pointed out the threat, ``as the nazims and naib nazims of the union councils will automatically become members of the district and tehsil councils, and if the district and tehsil nazims are also elected from an elite background, which is more likely as the election rules allow anyone to contest for the seat of district nazim then the political and administrative control of the elite class will be further strengthened in the districts.`` (Local Government Election December, 2000:3). The result of district election was already predicted by action oriented research study of Pattan in December 2000.

However, our analysis of the political situation is radically different from the elite intellectuals` whose political analysis cannot go beyond the political elite. Elite intellectuals do not even consider it worth to include the role or potential role of nearly 50 percent councillors in their analysis who belong to disadvantageous section of the society ie women, peasants and workers. The majority of them have come into formal politics for the first time due to reservation of seat at all three tiers of local government. The elite brand of intellectuals are particularly contemptuous towards a large number of new faces from low-income groups who have entered politics for the first time. They exclude them in their analysis as they do not exist. They do not have faith in the agency of the marginalised.

Feudal lords, tribal chiefs and capitalist class have always dominated the political scene, whether there was a party or non-party based election in the country. Even when there was military rule, they joined hands with dictatorships and retained their political power by becoming the junior partners with the military. The political process in the country has never facilitated or paved way for the marginalised section of the society to enter the formal political processes and structures to voice their concerns. The only difference in the post-election scenario of the past and the present lies in the fact that in recently held local government election along with old local power brokers (as in the past), nearly 50 percent women, peasants and workers have also won their right to participate in the decision-making processes that will have direct impact over their lives. This gives tremendous hope to the people and opens windows of opportunities for the civil society to work with councillors from the marginalised sections and mobilised their power base to act on behalf of their interest groups. The shift from uni-class to multi-class composition in the local government structures brought through the reservation of seats is a landmark in the political history of the country. Now it depends on each one of us how we determine our role to contribute toward turning the potential of this opportunity into actuality. There is a serious risk that if political scientists continue to focus on the class background of nazims and naib nazims only and ignored the potential role of a large number of new entrants from low income class, they can be left without any support. Under such circumstances it will be more likely that they will be manipulated by local influentials and we will lose another opportunity to assume some control over our lives.

Given the non-democratic and opportunistic character of political parties in the country, it becomes even more critical for the civil society to provide support to the newly elected representatives on reserved seats. It is ironic that some of our political scientists are so rigid, dogmatic and inflexible in their approach that they still argue for the political parties as the most `potent symbol of civil society`. The elitist political parties that never allowed democracy within party structures have been instrumental in stifling the democratic space in the country. Since the time of independence, political parties have been busy in power struggle rather than investing time and energy in building their popular base. Due to lack of popular base, political parties tend to be involved in secret deals with establishment (civil and military bureaucracy) in order to come into power. As mentioned by Ahmed Saleem political parties are amorphous groups tied together by those who have become leaders either through wealth or inheritance. That is why no political government of the past was serious about land reform.

The present local government election has fully exposed the popular base of political parties. In the direct election of union council, the role of political parties was extremely limited due to absence of their party structures at the village and mohalla level. Local elite determined the electoral process in the union council election. In the district election again it was the local power holders, feudals, tribal chiefs, industrialist and moneyed classes who were the main actors. Politics has always been their prerogative as their presence in political structures ensures the protection of their vested interests. So it is in the interest of the local elite to be affiliated with political parties. In the last round of election of local government these influentials contested with their own wealth and mobilised their own vote bank based on baradri and patronage. Since district is a bigger administrative unit and difficult to reach out to all the population, so their political affiliations become handy. Like at the union council where joint panel was formed across baradri, caste or sect to bag maximum votes, in district council the identity marker changed from narrow parochial identity to political identity and joint panels were formed across party. Once again the nature of alliance has exposed the ideological bankruptcy of political parties. The alliance of PPP with Jama`at-e-Islami in Peshawar and Lahore, ANP, PPP vs Jama`at-e-Islami and like-minded in Karachi clearly shows that political parties are committed to their own agenda of grabbing power rather than reflecting the ideological struggles and concerns of the people.

This is high time for political scientists to reassess their theoretical position on the role of political parties and military in the evolution of democracy against the backdrop of ground realities of Pakistan. There is no doubt that political theory has taught us that political parties are necessary for the democracy. However, it is equally important for us to critically examine the nature of mainstream political parties in Pakistan which do not even qualify to be called as political organisations. For people of Pakistan both army and political parties are the two sides of the same coin. Therefore, the ethical or moral ground to support authoritarian military institution or authoritarian political parties for the rule of the country has diminished for many in Pakistan. People`s support to either military or political rule is dependent on their own assessment that at a particular juncture of history which one can serve them best within the parameters of their own vested interest as the main priority. Since the present military regime needed a liberal face, they chose to be benevolent towards women, peasants and workers.

It is also in the prime interest of the army to stabilise economy and check corruption through involving people in governance. After paying 50 percent of the annual budget in debt servicing, 35 percent is spent on army; therefore, an efficient growing economy is essential for the very survival of the army as an institution. Devolution of power is seen as a way of stabilising economy by the present military regime. It is too obvious that the objectives of devolution of power cannot be fully achieved within the existing power structures of the society. The government is not willing to undertake much demanded structural initiatives such as land reform or electoral reforms which are necessary steps towards breaking the power base of the traditional elite and for the real success of devolution of power plan. Nevertheless, the half-hearted attempt of the present regime to bring people in governance has created some space for the disadvantaged section of the society. Now fifty percent of councillors in the local government from the marginalised section, in theory, can become a political force to promote people`s concern. This can only happen if we come out of our obsession with the elite and provide moral, intellectual and technical support to the newly elected councillors from the marginalised section to become a political force in the country.

The author is Acting Director, Centre for Women‚s Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University

The author is National Coordinator of Pattan Development Organisation

pattan@comsats.net.pk``

Another viewpoint about democracy-Musharraf style. From Dawn daily:

Make-believe transfer of power

On August 16 our journey into the unknown which began on October 12, 1999 is expected to take a new turn. Though the destination would remain the same - attainment of what is called `genuine` democracy - but the officially certified definition of the term `genuine` would perhaps acquire on that day an overwhelmingly strong hue of `khaki`.

The officially-certified truth has already established that Pakistan`s elected representatives cannot be trusted with either the destiny of the country or its cash or even its so-called national objectives set by nobody knows who. So, these unknown authors of our national objectives would, perhaps, feel much safer if the elected representatives from the grass-roots up to the highest level were to leave the actual job of governance to the Army and take up instead the residual democratic obligations!

To put the things in the right perspective, had it not been for the fact that the country at the moment is in dire need of emergency aid and also for the fact that many bilateral donors whose votes are also very crucial in the board meetings of the multilateral aid agencies are bound by their laws not to help non-democratic countries, General Musharraf would have perhaps taken the simple road that General Ayub took in 1958, General Yahya in 1969 and General Zia in 1979. However, since the times have changed General Musharraf needed a new route to reach the same destination and the NRB of General Naqvi has obliged him with a highly innovative idea which creates a democratic make- believe without the Army losing its grip on the actual levers of power.

The world has seemingly been taken in by this process of make-believe transfer of power. A representative of the Commonwealth was here last week for a peep preview of the yet-to-be announced road-map for transfer of power. Some of those who met this gentleman said that he seemed completely convinced that the road-map had all the ingredients to set Pakistan back on the road to `genuine` democracy. A world which lives comfortably with oil-rich kingdoms can hardly have any objections to friendly military dictators who appear as manageable as the oil-rich kings. So, what is new!

The question is what are this country`s national objectives as defined by the unknown authors? This is the question which is agitating the minds of Islamabad`s chattering classes these days. Would not it be in the fitness of things if the military government were to go to the people with its answer to this question and ask for their opinion on it through a referendum - not the kind which was held by General Ziaul Haq, but a genuine one? This is important for the Army as well because the results of such a referendum would enable the institution to understand why is it that every ten years it has to go to Islamabad to remind the people at large that they had lost sight of the `national` objectives. So far these so-called national objectives have been kept camouflaged in what is known as Pakistan ideology which has a different meaning for different people. In fact every individual Pakistani has his or her own perception of Pakistan`s ideology.

Interestingly, those Western diplomats, who subscribe to the idea that Pakistan`s elected representatives need to be guided by the Army when challenged, quickly try to hide behind the argument that since most political parties in the country, specially the mainstream ones, do not even hold genuine elections within their organizations, how could they be expected to run a government democratically without proper guidance. But what about the guides themselves? Don`t they undermine the interests of their own institution and its credibility by awarding themselves extensions in service on the grounds of indispensability and continuity. And if the guides themselves indulge in such practices, would not their pupils - the elected representatives - also feel, once they come to the top, that they too are indispensable and for continuity`s sake they must keep the leadership of the party in their hands for life or continue to rule the country for life?

Take for example the cases of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, both of whom have become chiefs of their respective parties for life. Nawaz learnt this lesson of indispensability and continuity from his mentor and guide, the redoubtable Gen Ziaul Haq. Benazir simply followed in the foot-step of his father who learnt this `democratic lessons` from his mentor and guide, Field Marshal Gen Ayub Khan who kept on giving himself extensions after extensions and then promoted himself to the post of field marshal and supreme commander. Would not the new crop of `genuine` democrats, which Gen Musharraf is trying to cultivate and harvest, follow the course which he has taken by awarding himself a one-year extension which seems very likely to be extended indefinitely once the facade of his `genuine` democracy is finally bought by the world and the democracy-related sanctions are lifted?-Chatterbox

Following is an intelligent critique of devolution plan and democracy Musharraf style. From Dawn daily:

Democracy of a blind date

By A.B.S. Jafri

Let us return to the question but in a slightly inverted form: If there is a winner, there must be a loser, too. Who has lost? These elections notwithstanding, the loser still is our political democracy. In genuine political life, the energy is provided by political generators that the political parties are. We claim to have come through to the inauguration of the promised return to true political democracy. But democracy without its political compliment, the political parties, sounds rather unusual, if not odd, hollow, incredible.

We are promised that in the elections to the next tiers political parties will have free and full play. Why political parties are tonic for the next elections and were a health hazard in the initial stages has not been explained. So, who are the winners as of August 9, 2001? At best the elected ones are honourable individuals, with no established persona; no declared identity beyond a name and a face. These two signs do not a political person make. Period.

Thus, with these captains at the helm, where does the boat go? It could be anywhere, more likely, nowhere in particular. Not one of those elected to positions of state power has a declared programme with the voter`s endorsement. Few, if any, have any experience of running a public administration. This is not necessarily a handicap. A blank record can be a clean record.

At their respective levels, the nazims land in seats of power without any recognizable political credentials. The votes that have brought them in were cast in a culture where the candidates were not required (or allowed) to talk, nor the voters enabled (or permitted) to listen. If there can be a blind date in the political life of a people, this electoral extravangaza has been just it.

This kind of restoration of democracy has less to be said for it than an arranged marriage which is an alliance that has the wisdom and goodwill of the parents, elders and friends. A blind date is a blind leap. It is rather hard to feel very confident of this kind of situation becoming the foundation of a new sustainable democracy in its fullness.

So, who is the real and effective winner so far in this rather exotic adventure? As of this moment, the real winner appears to be the permanent factor - the bureaucrat. He remains the irremovable behemoth. He has been there since the East India Company won the Battle of Plassey in 1757. History has seen so many come and go. He has remained unmoved. If governments did well (which has been so rare), he took the credit. If they did badly, he was the first to give them the fatal nudge out.

In a democracy, the public representative is the bird of passage, the public servant is a permanent presence. Yet, the beauty is that the transient incumbent issues orders, the ageless dinosaur obeys. What sustains the unquestionable authority of the elected element is the strength of his political party out in the field. In the case of the nazims, there is no political base or support. The sovereign factor is conspicuous by its total absence.

Our established tradition is that when it comes to the nitty-gritty of public administration, the bureaucrat tends to give the slip to the elected superior. It is a part of our national experience that more often than not, the bureaucrat has pulled a fast one on his elected boss. Take a look at the NAB record. The largest single element in this parade of the tainted has its origins traceable to the class of bureaucrats. The winner at this particular post in the race is the bureaucrat. Such prognostication may be morbid but it is rooted in long experience.

Do not fail to note a crucial deficiency in the devolution philosophy. You are taking the government to the people, not the government servant. He remains aloof, a federally controlled (or pampered) automaton. The government is to belong to the village, but the government servant must remain an Islamabadi imposition. What about devolution here?

Local self-governance without local public administration is a case of putting the pony right on top of the cart. This is a profound inconsistency. Give it a thought. It is never too late to correct your errors, even if pointed out by others. If the civil and police functionaries are not local, local government is a self-induced illusion. Think it over. Take a look at local governance in better politically governed communities.

As elsewhere, in Pakistan too, there should be life beyond the DC and the SP.

Just curious, where does the money for district goverments to spend come from and who next signs on a district`s budget proposals after the district`s elected head does so?

Another intelligent writer writes about the pitfalls of devolution fraud. From The News daily:

Pros and cons of district governments

Dr Tariq Rahman

The writer is a Professor of Linguistics and South Asian Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad

trahman@sat.net.pk

In short, the idea was never to empower the people but to make governance from the top easier by cutting at the root of the political parties. So, the first ground for skepticism about the idea of district governments, and elected ones at that, is that it comes from the military which has never had any real respect for the principle of election. Political analysts suspect that this step might take away the powers of provincial governments and thus make it easier for the Centre to manipulate politics. Moreover, those who believe that the mobilisation of large groups, such as ethnic nationalities, will secure a more just share in goods and services (and power) from the Centre feel that this arrangement will cut at the root of ethnic power. Moreover, there are reports of the military having influenced the outcome of elections for the nazims. One does not know whether it is true or not and, if so, to what extent. However, the general feeling is that the nazims will be dependent upon the goodwill and patronage of the army. This means that they will never become independent, deeply rooted, institutions of society as are mayors in England. These are the problems of the new system having been created by the army.

Secondly, ours is a quasi-feudal society with power vested in a pre-modern sector (the zamindar, peer or tribal chief) and a modern sector (the civil bureaucracy, the courts, the military). The East India Company merely substituted, as far as possible, the Mughal system to rule over the masses. The Mughal system was based upon power not upon local votes. The Company too ruled by force and not by votes. The Aitchison Commission (1886-67) created the Indian Civil Service but it became a cadre of privileged mandarins who ruled according to law in theory but very much in the despotic tradition as far as the common people were concerned. Thus, the government could best be described as paternal despotism and in no sense either a public service or a democracy. The message the people got was not that they were paying for administrators who were supposed facilitate them. They felt that they had rulers, called deputy commissioners or political agents, who were just as indifferent to them as were their own zamindars, maliks, khans and chiefs. If the latter were good, and they sometimes were, they at least understood their language. The officials did not and, what was worse, had a cold contempt for them. Independence in 1947 did not change matters though it did change the colour of the skin of the officials. Another change which occurred slowly was that some of the feudal lords got so powerful, mostly as members of governments, that they could overrule the officials. Now, if there was a good official - and sometimes this miracle also occurred - he was at the mercy of the feudal lord. So, the villager was lucky only if both the feudal lord and the official were good - a somewhat rare occurrence and hence the perpetual misery of the masses.

The second major doubt which arises, then, is because of this quasi-feudal cum colonial setup in which only power is important. Will the nazims give good governance or will they too join the officials to tyrannise over the people. Some people think that now that the bureaucracy cannot overrule the nazims the chances of their (the feudal people`s) lording it over the people will increase. Others feel that the reduction in the power of the colonial style deputy commissioner is welcome even if the new nazims misuse their authority initially. Personally I feel that unless there are very strong checks and balances such as a strong, independent system of ombudsmen and very active presence of the press and organisations for human rights, it would be pointless to expect good governance. After all, the nazims are not very different from the kind of political leadership we have always had. If such leadership cannot be trusted at the provincial and national levels, how can it be trusted at the district level? So, though I feel that separation of power and devolution are both good in principle, I also feel that a system of checks and balances - and not by the military but by viable civilian institution - is necessary to make district governments work.

Another problem is whether the bureaucracy, which is much better educated and better connected at the Centre, will really be as subordinate as is envisaged. It seems to me that it will be a case of personal power and personality. No matter what the letter of the law says, in practice strong officials will make puppets of weak nazims while strong nazims will hound out the weak officials. In short, the district will replicate what has always happened in Pakistan right at the top. When the presidency is occupied by a strong man our system becomes almost presidential. When it is occupied by a puppet, the prime minister becomes a tyrant. In between there is military rule which is non-democratic anyway.

The third important reservation is that the new system will not be applied to the cantonments and Islamabad ie the areas where the elite lives in Pakistan. This means that the system is not good enough for the elite which will live on according to its own established norms. Why? Either the system is good enough for all or for none. How can it be good for the common people but for nobody else. Experiments conducted only on the masses lose whatever validity they might possess in theory. To be really tried out in the country it must be tried out in all cities, all areas, for all classes of people and without exception. Our cantonments and defence colonies are posh residential areas. They are not only military camps as air force bases still are. As such their special status should be abolished and they must be run by elected nazims like other areas. Such a step will send the message that the government means to bring about a real change and is not merely playing with words.

Lastly, I see no justification for training the 65,000 nazims at a cost of millions of rupees. It is reported (News August6, 2001) that the Federal Supporting Unit will spend Rs200 million, the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung around 42 million and the NRB itself would put in 1.2 million to train them. One cannot learn even drafting, what to say of finance and other matters, when one is running an office and knows that one has to go through the motions of participating in a course. All really relevant training comes in the field and if a nazim is sincere and has the resources, he or she can make a difference for the better in the life of the people. And now comes the crunch - where will the money come from? Just raising local taxes will create resentment and if the federal government will dole out more money, as it should, what about its other expenditures? It is hoped, if nothing then in order to prove their experiment a success, the military reduces its own expenditure and starts putting in more money in the districts. Will the district governments spend it wisely? Will they work? These are questions which no one can answer just yet

hobbyty 339

You have finally said it. Islamists are good. Hindutva vadis are bad.

That is what you preach. That is why you have no credibility.

Yet another good article about the future of Pakistan as envisioned by Mr. Musharraf and his team:

The Nation Aug 12, 01

``Measured movement

Ikramullah

When asked last year at a Press conference what was the single biggest achievement of his regime, General Pervez Musharraf replied spontaneously, ``the devolution plan.`` He has lived up to his commitment. The final phase of the district government elections were completed on August 8. The Nazims, Naib Nazims at district and tehsil levels as well as union councils in 82 districts will take oath by the evening of August 11. On Independence Day morning, the Old Order changeth.

The Bara Sahibs of the Raj, the Commissioners and DCs will vanish from the administrative structure. The District Nazims and the elected district assembly will take over with far more administrative and financial powers than their predecessors. For the first time, elected representatives will plan, manage and administer their own affairs independently at local level. That the new rulers at district, tehsil and union levels have come to power through the ballot box is by itself a milestone towards genuine democratization in the genuine sense. The new system understandably has to go through birth pangs, so mistakes will be made and lapses occur here and there, either inadvertently, because of the new office-holders` lack of experience and qualifications, or due to the legacy of the past political culture. Nobody ever claimed that 100 percent angels will descend from heaven to run the new system. It is therefore hypocrisy by those clamouring that the process failed to throw up new leadership. Nationwide statistics show a third of new leadership has emerged whereas two thirds have direct or indirect links with the old political class. The amusing aspect of this condemnation is that in the forefront of such criticism are those so-called champions of democracy who never practiced what they are now preaching.

Another even more amusing aspect is that those condemning the new system when initiated by NRB have wholeheartedly participated in the new system. This is a blessing in disguise because it has moved forward the democratization process. No leader introducing a fundamental reform can escape criticism. How could General Musharraf be an exception? It would be a rare phenomenon if those deprived from power, convicted by the Supreme Court and now in exile would not use all available resources to discredit the present rulers and make every possible attempt to return to power. Therefore, the ousted leadership will no doubt try all methods of getting people on the streets in the name of agitation against rigged elections and indulge in media campaign against Musharraf within and outside Pakistan. However, such methods do not easily result in changing governments or bring back exiled leaders. Governments are changed either through internal foreign-supported subversion, massive popular resentment over a sustained period, or manipulations of foreign governments with the connivance of elements within the establishment. None of these is in sight against the government. On the contrary three major factors have enhanced his image abroad and raised his graph at home. First, from the brink of economic collapse, he has blocked the slide and is moving towards recovery. Second, his performance at Agra. Third, the successful establishment of the district governments.

This last is the first major step in a journey towards further democratization. In the next step, Musharraf is likely to take the nation into confidence in his Independence Day address. One hopes he will spell out more concretely than before his plans. Also, while he does a stocktaking, he should carry out a postmortem on all key aides, ministers and provincial administrations. It is now time to eliminate deadwood and form a vigorous and dedicated team for the difficult tasks ahead upto the general elections. The new district governments would play a pivotal role, if they gain popular support through their performance. The road towards democratization would meet more than half of its initial difficult targets.

A new scenario has emerged in Sindh. For the second time the Jamaat Islami supported by PML (QA) is due to play a major role in urban Sindh. The PPP has largely maintained its rural Sindh vote bank. The MQM has chosen to remain in the shadows till the general elections. The PML-N has met its Waterloo. In Balochistan and the NWFP the local bodies elections have yielded no surprise. Punjab remains the bastion of power and a symbol of stability for the federation. The polls produced a new political scenario. PML-Likeminded have captured 23 district Nazimships, the PPP six and the rest independents. This will have a far-reaching impact on the general elections from this province. Three conclusions emerge. (1) PML-N, has not been able to win a single district including Lahore, considered a fortress of the Sharifs. (2) The Jamaat has entered mainstream politics by contesting the Nazimship of Lahore. It could have won had it made an alliance with PML(QA) as in Karachi. The Jamaat may review their future strategy in Punjab, or reinforce failure by adhering to the democratic alliance. (3) The PPP has emerged as the second largest popular political party after the PML(QA). Will it maintain its position or suffer internal dissension as indicated by the desertions of its four zonal presidents? Quite a few out of the PPP Nazims are believed to be tilting against remaining in opposition. Finally the PML led by Azhar has gained two-thirds majority in Punjab. This has added luster to three PML leaders, Mian Azhar as President, Khurshid Kasuri for sweeping Kasur`s district and tehsil nazimships, and the Chaudhris of Gujrat, for winning their home district and influencing many other districts.

E-mail queries and comments to: ikramullah@nation.com.pk ``

A good article about the future of Pakistan as envisioned by Mr. Musharraf and his team, from the ``Nation`` Aug 12, 01:

``Devolution and national prosperity

Asif Khan Khattak

A patriotic leadership is the prerequisite for national prosperity. The dynamic leaders of the developed countries have revealed the fruits of patriotic behaviour towards the development of their respective nations and prosperity of the masses.

There is an adage; ``Rome was not built in a day``. In this context, the leadership of Pakistan may not be able to re-build the edifice of national prosperity in a day but the re-building measures and initiatives which the present regime has undertaken might pave the way to national prosperity in the near future and in the long run as well.

National prosperity is usually a result of national integration. The successive revolutionary steps of the government are conducive for national integration. It can be deduced that this will lead the country to prosperity. Among the significant constructive measures, one is the Devolution Plan. It can be envisaged that devolution will lead to national integration at the grass roots level, which will ultimately lead to national prosperity as a whole.

According to this plan, on August 2, 2001, the fourth phase of elections were held. These were held indirectly by the Electoral College comprising of Nazims, Naib Nazims and General Councilors of Union Councils, elected directly by the masses on the basis of adult franchise. Accordingly, in some districts, the Nazims were elected with an overwhelming majority while in others, where a single candidate was unable to secure a 50 percent majority; there were run-off elections on August 8, 2001. The first two candidates who had previously secured the highest voting ratio contested the run-off elections for a minimum 50 percent majority win. The changes that are being brought about for the restoration of democracy might prove fruitful. These changes are also expected to lead to national prosperity. So the major areas in the devolution scenario need to be addressed.

Firstly, the District Nazim will be head of the district government. This position will play a pivotal role in the district administration. Being in a powerful position does not entitle the District Nazim to be above all. There is a mechanism of checks and balances. Accordingly, illegitimate decisions can be challenged.

Secondly, according to the Devolution Plan, there is a three-tier structure. The district government would be at the lowest level, elections for which will be concluded in the near future. The provincial governments and national governments would be at the provincial and national level respectively, elections for which will be held in 2002. The national government will vest the powers on the provincial government, which will in turn delegate them on the District Councils. At the provincial level there will be provincial autonomy and at the district levels, the district councils will be autonomous. Hence, the provincial government will carry fewer burdens. The phenomenon of provincial autonomy will be materialized.

Thirdly, according to this plan, there are District and Tehsil Councils but in populated four provincial capitals, a system of City Districts and within them Town Committees has been introduced. This has been implemented for smooth running of administrative affairs within the City Districts.

Fourthly, in case of FATA, a recommendation committee was established, called FATA Reforms Committee, which gave its recommendations that favoured and welcomed the Devolution Plan in the Tribal Areas. The committee is of the view that the present Colonial administrative set-up, safeguarding the powers of the Political Agent and Assistant Political Agent should be curtailed by the introduction of Devolution Plan in FATA. The masses of FATA should elect their own people and practice the right to vote, so as to ensure democratic values in the Tribal Areas as well. Fifthly, instead of dominance of a single unit, which has been prevalent since the Raj, there will be co-ordination among the three contributing administrative units, which are the elected District Nazim, the District Co-ordination Officer and the District Police Officer. These three units will be handling the state of affairs of the districts so as to ensure peace and stability.

In sum, these profound changes are of pivotal significance to remove the colonial district administrative set-up in the country. Instead of an elite group, the participation of public in the local affairs should be ensured which are the true roots of democracy. The elite-dominated political structure will be terminated.

According to this plan, there is a system of checks and balances, which ensures the right to use power in the respective jurisdictions. This system of checks and balances is the true soul of democracy. If the elected members manage the Devolution Plan in a constructive manner for the welfare of masses, then it can be hoped that national prosperity is just around the corner.``

A good article about the political future of Pakistan as envisioned by Musharraf. From Nation daily:

Road Map to Controlled Democracy

Husain Haqqani

The President, Chief Executive, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Chief of Army Staff, and Chairman National Security Council General Pervez Musharraf is scheduled to announce a road map for democracy on August 14. The centrepiece will probably be parliamentary elections some time next year. These will enable General Musharraf to meet the Supreme Court deadline for restoring constitutional rule. But will it really resolve any of the core issues in Pakistan`s troubled polity? If the attitude of General Musharraf and his colleagues is anything to go by, the answer seems `no`. Like his three predecessors, he feels he must stay in power to save the country from its destructive politicians. That has been ensured by his assuming the Presidency. To the extent that democracy means the right of the people to elect and remove their rulers, Pakistan will still not be a democracy afterwards. We the people will still not be given the opportunity to elect (or at least hypothetically replace) the head of state. Most of us would probably accept this aberration if the rest of the roadmap allowed things to take their natural course. Here, too, disappointment is in store. The rulers have already decided that certain politicians, notably Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif are unacceptable. While an overwhelming majority of Mr Sharif`s Leaguers have already deserted him to join the Like-minded, Benazir`s followers in the PPP are more loyal. This means the desire to keep her out cannot be fulfilled without influencing the electoral process to limit the PPP`s election success. The moment the state machinery takes it upon itself to influence an election, the prospect of creating a viable democracy fades.

The establishment has already completed its dress rehearsal for the latest experiment in controlled democracy in the local body elections. `Undesirable candidates` were selectively disqualified, unnatural alliances forged or encouraged, and where all else failed, officials got directly involved to intimidate voters into electing the officially chosen candidate for district Nazims. In many districts, the plan to bypass political parties and secure the election of apolitical or politically pliable Nazims was defeated. But someone, somewhere decided Rawalpindi and Lahore were politically too important to be allowed to fall to political parties. In Rawalpindi, officers at the highest level of the military formation `advised` candidates to withdraw. In Lahore, councillors were summoned by intelligence officers who intimidated them. The failure of GHQ to act against any of those whose names were published in the press confirms that these officers were obeying orders rather than acting individually. The consequence of micro-managing the Rawalpindi and Lahore district Nazim elections has been to erode the credibility of the regime`s commitment to democratic politics. General Musharraf`s protestations notwithstanding, he is clearly continuing the tradition of past military rulers. The present intervention is no longer a short, swift operation to clean up things and allow the country to go back to the democratic road. It is just another attempt to control the governing process and shape it according to the wishes of the military leadership. The military probably has legitimate concerns about the country`s security and political stability. Its stepping in as a last resort to prevent the country from becoming an elected dictatorship under Nawaz was welcomed. But most sensible people wanted the army to limit its role, given Pakistan`s past experience. The incompetence of some politicians is hardly a justification for winding up politics or subjugating it to the whims of the military. It makes about as much sense as demanding the Army hand its decision-making over to civilians because it allowed the likes of Gen Yahya Khan and Lt Gen AAK Niazi to reach the top.

General Musharraf and his colleagues wish to sort out everything, once and for all, and control the process. In doing so, they are ignoring the lessons of history. Military-controlled politics have failed everywhere, from Latin America to Indonesia. The road map to democracy about to be announced by General Musharraf should not seem another experiment in military control. It should be a reversion to constitutional rule. The Constitution provides sufficient checks and balances. In the past, these have been thwarted by an overwhelming executive, and under Nawaz, by an engineered `heavy mandate`. The failure of previous democratic regimes resulted from their tendency to bypass checks and balances and to allow invisible forces to interfere with open political processes. The focus of General Musharraf`s reform should be ensuring the constitutionally mandated checks and balances (free and independent judiciary, independent election commission, and parliamentary committees) are allowed to function by political governments. This can be done by inviting the major political parties to agree on future rules of the game. Manipulating the process, and maintaining the establishment`s upper hand, will only lead to another round of sham democracy.

If Pakistan`s military leadership feels its strategy of creating new control mechanisms will restore political stability, they should look at Turkey where a similar route was taken almost 15 years ago. The Turkish Army intervened several times, directly as well as indirectly, during the 1960s and 1970s to save the country from ``useless politicians``. In 1983, the generals disqualified all major political leaders from contesting elections and created a National Security Council to ensure that politicians take their views into account. But the Turkish military`s desire to control the direction of politics has not been fulfilled. In the first election held under Gen Kenan Evren`s constitution, only three newly formed political parties were allowed to participate. The party favoured by the military (the Turkish Like-minded) came in third. Each of the politicians disqualified by the military has returned to politics and each (Suleyman Demirel, Necmettin Erbakan and Bulent Ecevit) has been elected PM since then. The army even had to accept one of them (Demirel) as President. Its attempts to banish Turkey`s Islamists from the political system have also failed. Erbakan was disqualified again, but his followers still win close to one-fifth of parliamentary seats. The military`s intervention has failed to change Turkish politics, merely creating a new class of politicians who look towards the military and help destabilize the system.

The resulting instability has contributed to a culture of corruption. Politicians and businessmen, unsure of their future, try to make quick money and stash it abroad in case the system crashes again. Turkey remains IMF-dependent, its inflation rate astronomical, and its dreams of joining Europe unfulfilled. Recently, Turkey`s Deputy PM Mesut Yilmaz crossed swords with the Army. He said a narrow view of national security was the real reason for Turkey`s political problems and national security issues are used spuriously to block reforms. The Army responded with a scathing attack on Yilmaz, whose Motherland Party is one of the parties emerging in 1983 after the military`s last effort to change the system. Instead of bowing to the military`s will, this time his party has defended Yilmaz, saying ``political decision making rests with the nation and with elected organs.`` It further said, ``In a democratic country, the legitimate forum for such discussions is politics, therefore political parties are the legitimate interlocutors.`` The outcome of this latest military-politician stand-off remains to be seen. But it is a reminder of the failure of the paternalistic model of a modern state.

E-mail queries and comments to: hhaqqani@nation.com.pk