A Decision to Regret

Re: Zabed

Thanks for the correction. Manstein was indeed the author of the ``Manstein Plan,`` the blitzkreig into France. However, I thought that the plan was vetoed initially by Hitler, on the advice of the OKH, but that Hitler OKed a modified version of it later on over the opposition of many of the senior generals? Weren`t most of the Germans as convinced as the French that the Ardennes forest was impervious to tanks?
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Re: Shammi

General Heinz Gaedcke would not disagree with you that the current Bundeswehr is far too rigid in its tactical doctrine. Gaedcke was one of the youngest German division commanders in the last few months of WWII, who then later joined the West German Army and retired as a Lt. Gen. He calls it the Americanization of the Germans Army and fought a losing battle against adopting US military tactics and methods. Are your colleagues referring to the planning leading up to the actual maneuvers/attacks or are they referring to the actual behaviour of the German troops once they were actually in action? If the latter, it sounds very unGerman to me!

Regards.

Oops, Germany actually surrendered on May 7th, 1945. Hitler killed himself on April 30th, I believe.

Heres an excellent example of German fighting power. Germany surrendered in April, so by now its absolutely clear that all is lost.

THE LAST PANZER BATTLE

On 22nd March, 1945, the Russians had launched an attack along the Kustrin-Berlin Highway. In their path a scratch Panzer division of no name or number prepared a last stand. It consisted of a reconnaissance platoon with five Panther tanks, a tank company with 22 Panthers and two further companies with 14 Tigers apiece - by comparison a formidable German tank concentration at that late stage of the war and indeed, just about the only worthwhile mobile forces standing between the Russians and Berlin.

The forthcoming Russian attack, preceded by a 90 minute artillery barrage, followed by massed infantry assault, had many tanks in attendance, but almost at once the German counterfire drove the Russian infantry to ground, leaving some 50 tanks, moving in two columns, to take up the lead and run head-on against two of the German tank companies where they covered the approaches on either side of the highway. Picking their targets, the Tiger and Panther gunners hit and destroyed one attacker after the other until both prongs melted away. By now the Russians were in some confusion and ripe for counterthrusts launched by the Germans against their southern flank. So far everything had gone in the German`s favour, aided by the inept way in which the Russians advanced along the most obvious approaches against an unshaken opponent whose tank gunnery dominated the open landscape.

However, a fresh Russian effort to the north now took gratuitous advantage of the effects of their artillery fire which, by playing on a village where the Germans had kept their Command Post and reserve company, had thrown the reserve into confusion and dislocated control at a critical moment. Laying smoke to cover their assembly and assault, the Russians moved round the flank for the kill, but, in a way, the use of smoke also helped the Germans who managed to reassemble outside the shelled village in the nick of time and open fire on their assailants as they emerged, well silhouetted, from the midst of the smoke screen. The sharp exchange of fire that followed ended, once more, entirely in the Germans favour and the Russians departed, leaving no less than 60 wrecks upon the field.

This battle at Kustrin may not have been quite the last fought by a Panzer division, but it was certainly one of the last in which a tank force of suitably operational density could be assembled and used with the verve of old. As a reprise, it is a fitting climax to the story of the Panzer divisions and their part in a war dominated by
armour and themselves.

K. Macksey

source: http://www.wargame.com/articles/wwtwo/lastpz.html
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Kenneth Macksey is one of the best known armour historians around and is not given to exaggeration or excessive praise.

Re: Fuzair #540

``BTW, Hitler for all his later follies, did have flashes of strategic brilliance. The entire blitzkrieg through France was his doing. The German High Command was convinced that it was going to be a slaughter--for them, not the French.``

That was Manstein`s brainchild not Hitler`s....

Re: US Army/Germany Army training debate

I met two former US forces officers today who work in the same firm as I do. I asked them what they thought of the German army training. One was a retired Colonel of an artillery unit and served in Germany till the mid `80s, spend 5+ years in former W. Germany, and regularly trained with the Bundeswehr in NATO exercises. This is the gist of what he had to say:

a) US NCOs/JCOs have a lot more leeway than their German counterparts, and certainly a lot more than their Soviet/Russian counterparts

b) The Germans are fanatical about detailed planning, whereas the Americans are not. This leads to tremendous frustration amongst German officers in joint training exercises -- Americans do not work to a predefined plan and can do unpredictable things. Drives the Germans nuts. However, it seems to work well for the Americans and may even give them an advantage in the `fog of war`. This appears to counter what Fuzair(?)/Ferozk(?) said.

c) A former Bundeswehr General who had also served in WWII had this to say -- you Americans are relentless in attacks, and turned what was a gentlemanly war in 1940 in the Western theater into uncivilized conflict after `41. He seemed to corroborate Fuzair(?)/Ferozk(?) thesis that the Americans use overwhelming force. This made the US into a much feared enemy.

d) A master`s degree is a must for advancement beyond the rank of a Major/Lt. Col in today`s US Army.

The other guy was retired US Navy Captain who had served on virtually every carrier. He did not have any direct experience with the Germans, but seemed to agree that US forces have tremendous leeway in operational/tactical details.

``Arnhem was a tactical couter-attack by the German, whereas Ardennes was a strategic counter-attack``

Sorry I didnt read your response carefully. Yes, that would be the right way to put it.

btw, that reminds me I remember reading a book called ``Zeno`` about Market Gardens (I read it as a kid). It was written by a guy who served with the 1st Independent Parachute Company.

Ferozk,

I did mean Arnhem. I thought it was not a counter-attack as it was essentially an Allied initiated battle (as opposed to ``the Bulge``) but Urquart(sp?) was unfortunate to drop on top of 2 SS Panzer divisions. Anyway its a minor point.

(btw I once went to see the Market Garden`s museum in Arnhem at what was the Hartenstein Hotel, it was a bit of a dissapointment :-))

(disclaimer: I have no pretensions to military expertise, my ``research`` comes from Cornelius Ryan, ``Commando`` comics and Hollywood movies :-))

Re: Fuzair

``...The Germans were never obsessed with capturing and holding terrain the same way that the Americans were and still are...``

I was going to say Stalingrad, Moscow, but Ferozk already did. Ferozk could also have mentioned Leningrad. In any case, the scale of the operations in the above mentioned was so large (and eventually led to defeat) that it overshadows any German doctrine regarding capturing/holding terrain.

Re: the `sacred` oath bit, the best I can say is that if even the German high command could delude themselves by switching allegiance from a Constitution to a person, then lesser armies all over the 3rd world have little chance.

Re: Romair - my family background

Mother`s side - Peshawar, NWFP (my great grandfather was a Khudai Khidmatgar, a close associate of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and established a newspaper called The Frontier Mail, still published from Dehradun, India). He was imprisoned by the British in Multan and Peshawar jails (1921-24) during the first Civil Disobedience Movement (specifically, 3 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 40 Frontier Crimes Regulation)

Father`s side - from various parts of W. Punjab -- Jhelum, Pind Dadan Khan, Bhera, Potohar, etc.

I have a family tree going back about 16 generations (complete w/ names, etc.) on my father`s side. One of my ancestor`s was a general in Ranjit Singh`s army, another was the 2nd highest ranking police officer in undivided Punjab at the turn of the century. He was a very close friend of former President Leghari`s grandfather (they once exchanged `pagris` -- a sign of mutual respect).

Herman Goering was indeed an obese, drug-addicted screwup by the late 1930s but in WWI he was a superb fighter pilot and an excellent leader of the Red Baron`s Flying Circus (Geschwader). He was awarded the Pour le Merite, Germany`s highest military decoration, not something that was handed out lightly by the Kaiser.

Goering certainly did cost the German war effort plenty, both at Dunkirk and then in not insistin that the Me262 be developed as a fighter interceptor and put into mass production macht schnell! However, we must be grateful for the fact that the Nazi party leadership/higher command was indeed composed of incompetent screwups all fighting to gain Hitler`s ear and increase their own little fiefdoms. Can you imagine what things would have been like if they were all as competent as Reinhard Heidrich or Albert Speer! We`d all be speaking Japanese or German by now!

BTW, Hitler for all his later follies, did have flashes of strategic brilliance. The entire blitzkrieg through France was his doing. The German High Command was convinced that it was going to be a slaughter--for them, not the French.

Regards.

Fuzair #534 This summer I was in Germany for a few days, and was shown a fine collection of ancient postcards and magazines that had been collecting dust in an attic. There was a German magazine from pre-WWII days full of Nazi propoganda. There was Hitler chatting amiably with an attractive young couple whose car supposedly broke down and he stopped his entourage to give them a lift!! Then there were pictures of Hitler as a nameless face in a couple of crowds listening to speeches after WWII (someone had painstakingly located his face, and it was marked with a circle). Then there was 10-ton Goering, dressed up in a different fancy outfit in every picture - including a shiny all-white suit and matching hat and shoes walking on some beach in Monaco. And so forth.

One can only shudder at what the world would have been like if such an egomaniac had stayed in power. And whatever the fighting qualities of the German pilots, I dont see how a fat, self-absorbed dandy like him could be an inspiring leader or have time for any strategic thinking (Goering screwed up at Dunkirk, he screwed up in Russia).

Re: bong_dongs # 521

Contary to what you might be thinking, I meant Arnhem and not the Ardennes as a gegenangriff (counter-attack). Arnhem was the brainchild of Gen. Montgomery and Gen. Browning and that was to use both land and airborne troops to push 50km behind the German lines. The idea was that the airborne troops (US 82nd, 101st and the British 1 Airborne Divison would capture the bridges at Rhine at Eindhoven, Graf, Son and at Arnhem and hold them till the ground element, the Allied XXX Corps could link up with the airborne. The plan was to by-pass the German defences and strike at the Ruhr valley - the industrial center of Germany and capture it.

The 101st was tasked the bridge at Eindhoven and the 82nd got the bridge at Son and Graf. The British 2 Para battlion, the Red Devils, were given the prize bridge at Arnhem. The British were dropped 3kms from their drop zones, because the RAF did not want to risk the Horsha gliders to German AAA fire since the gliders were in short supply and could not be risked to German fire. The British landed near the Horstein Hotel, which was the HQ of Gen. Molders and where SS Panzer Divison of Gen. Bittrich was being rested after being pulled from the line near the Franco-Dutch border.

One of the gliders, which crashed landed had a map of the entire operation, code named Market-Garden, and these operational details fell into the hands of the Germans. Having realized the true aim of the operation, the German garrison at Arnhem was reinforced and the Germans attacked from the western end of the city towards the eastern end, which was being by Col. John Foster`s 2nd Para under the overall command of Gen. Roy Urquart. The Germans attacked the British end and in the process, Arnhem was flattened. The British went in with about 10K men and three weeks later, when they pulled out, only 3K men made across the Rhine after slipping past the German lines.

Arnhem was a tactical couter-attack by the German, whereas Ardennes was a strategic counter-attack. Arnhem is well known in UK but the not the USA since it was a tactical allied defeat. Another place where the Werhmacht counter-attacked was the Hurtingen Forest inside Germany, where the American advance was halted and the allies had to pull back to to redeploy and try to by-pass the forest.

Fuzair is correct. The German doctrine of Blitzkreig stressed mobility over intrenchment and holding cities was not important to the Germans and nor was taking them. The exception was Stalingrad and Moscow, where the political considerations by Hitler overrode the military strategy. Hitler wanted those Russian cities for their symbolic values and not their military utility.

Ciao

Dost-mitter to Prem:

````Prem, I simply believe in looking at what works best to achieve certain objectives````

Hold it there -- my dear friend dost-mitter saheb -- that`s a litte slippery ground.

Are you implying MEANS are not THAT important -- as long GOALS are achievable.

Don`t you think -- in a democracy with the RULE of LAW -- MEANS should be/are as important as the OBJECTIVES?

Should pragmatism allow breaking the law?

#532 Omar1974

I`m not sure what point you`re trying to make. Yes the conduct of kargil war was a shame for indians. Even more shameful is the shabby treatment of the ordinary soldiers who fought there after the war. I wish people like Gen. Malik could be court martialled but i don`t think that`s legally possible since there can be no charges of poor performance. Be that as these may, Bhatnagar was discharged from duty and Malik was not even invited to the republic day parade, an official slight of great degree. All said, i am glad that there is a procedure whereby those charged could be tried in the open.

Speaking not as a partisan, i note that it should be a matter of great shame to pakistanis that their war dead have not even been officially recognized and the other loser of that war (kargil was lost by both sides, imo) is El Presidente of pakistan.

Sorry, it should read:

``Certainly officers in MES, ASC local purchase, Def Procurement and some generals have become extremely wealthy but that is the exact opposite of the norm for the average PA officer, even relatively senior ones.``

Arnhem is, I think, the infamous ``A Bridge Too Far`` military operation near the end of WWII when the British Paratroopers got a very bad bloody nose. If I remember correctly, the operation was meant to capture a series of bridges across various rivers (Rhine also?) into Germany proper and hold them until the bulk of the Allied Army under Lt. Gen. ``Boy`` Browning could move up. Unfortunately, the Allied advance was too slow and the Red Devils had the misfortune to land in the middle of a German SS Panzer (or PanzerLehr, cant` remember for sure) Division that had been pulled out from the front for R&R and some rebuilding. Anyway, Allies took massive casualties, the Red Devils finally surrendered, after a heroic resistance, and the war did not end early.

Feroz was correct. It was a German counterattack against an Allied attack. The fighting power of the German Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS was indeed tremendous. There is an excellent book by an Israeli military historian, Martin van Creveld, called ``Fighting Power`` that I read a long time ago which is an analysis of the German and US armies in WWII. The Germans compare extremely favorably to the Americans.

Armies with average quality junior officers and ORs tend to fixate on physical objectives/terrain in tactics and maneuvers since it is relatively easy for such officers and men to comprehend and execute the mission. For example, orders will be something like take hill X or assault position Y, followed by very detailed instructions for how to do this. Extremely well trained junior officers and troops, ones that have been taught to use their own initiative, will be given orders such as `destroy enemy forces in Area Z` and then be left to their own devices as to how to do so. At one level, this was the differnce between the Germans and the Americans. The Germans were never obsessed with capturing and holding terrain the same way that the Americans were and still are. The primary misson, for the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS, was to destroy enemy forces. Once the enemy has been destroyed, the terrain is all yours anyway.

The American way of warfare is to make up for in massive firepower and technology what its soldiers (esp armour and infantry) lack in training and initiative. However, you can`t fault US artillery or the Air Force and troops under Gen. Patton showed that they could fight as well as the Wehrmacht--given complete US air superiority. Incidentally, in WWII, all US soldiers, including officer candidates, were given an IQ test and the lowest scoring ones were sent to the infantry. Perhaps there is a reason that the US infantry (with the exception of elite formations) performed relatively badly. For example, US OCS turned out a 2nd Lieutenant in 3 months (the ``ninety day wonders``). In the Wehrmacht, that wasn`t even considered a long enough training time for sergeants and every German division had its own special sergeant`s training school and it was required that every unit send its best seargeants and officers to act as instructors. In your extra-regimental duties, it was considerd a plum posting to be sent as an instructor there. There is a very good reason why the Germans fought so well for so long even after the war was obviously lost.

Re: the German officers loyalty oath to Hitler.

Feroz is correct that Hitler made the German officer corp swear an oath of personal loyalty to him. It was basically the same oath that the officers had sworn to the German Emperor and, for an essentially feudally structured officer corp, to give your word of honor as an officer was a very big thing. We may not understand it now but for them it meant something sacred.


Re: dost-mittar

I don`t think that is true. I`ve read Indian propaganda accounts about the luxurious lifestyle enjoyed by the ``average`` Pakistani officer and how they make their men fight and die for them. I know for a fact that is absolute nonsense. Certainly officers in MES, ASC local purchase, Def Procurement and some generals have become extremely wealthy but that is the exact opposite.

In Kargil, I can tell you for a fact, that Pakistani junior officer:jawan casulaty ratios were much higher than the Indian because proportionately we use many more junior officers in mountain operations than do you Indians. In the Northern Areas--the only active battle zone for the Army other than arillery shelling across the LOC in Kashmir--the rule is to use a very heavy proportion of junior officers, much more so than in the plains, since the extreme battle conditions there require troops with a much higher level of training, education and adaptability and we achieve this by very greatly increasing the number of junior officers assigned to each battalion. It used to be the case in the 1980s and early 1990s that EVERY officer had to serve at least one tour at Siachen and the best ones were called back for a second one. One of my relatives is now serving his third combat tour beyond Skardu, although this is very rare.

Your propaganda is as bad as ours. We`ve had more than one Brigadier and Major General killed at the front. How many have the Indians had?

Regards.

tahmed321 #524
sadna #522 You forgot your spelling of Pakistan: ``Pukistan``. Now, let`s see what is the scholarly and objective point you are trying to make...

tahmed, I wasn`t trying to make a point to you. I was making the point to bong_dongs because I trust bong_dongs to look up the article or do a google on ``Mesquida AND Wiener`` to find a reference to the original paper if he is indeed interested in the scholarly point. btw, its an interesting one and ties up the WWars and many other wars with the percentage of young males in the population at the time.