A Decision to Regret

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ISI Chief`s Parleys continue in Washington

by Amir Mateen



The News (Pakistan), 10 September 2001

Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG), Montréal, 19 November 2001



ISI Chief Lt-Gen Mahmood`s week-long presence in Washington has triggered speculation about the agenda of his mysterious meetings at the Pentagon and National Security Council. Officially, State Department sources say he is on a routine visit in return to CIA Director George Tenet`s earlier visit to Islamabad. Official sources confirm that he met Tenet this week. He also held long parleys with unspecified officials at the White House and the Pentagon. But the most important meeting was with Mark Grossman, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. US sources would not furnish any details beyond saying that the two discussed `matters of mutual interests.`

What those matters could be is a matter of pure conjecture. One can safely guess that the discussions must have centred around Afghanistan, relations with India and China, disarmament of civilian outfits, country`s nuclear and missiles programme and, of course, Osama Bin Laden.

What added interest to his visit is the history of such visits. Last time Ziauddin Butt, Mahmood`s predecessor, was here during Nawaz Sharif`s government the domestic politics turned topsy-turvy within days. That this is not the first visit by Mahmood in the last three months shows the urgency of the ongoing parleys.

Mahmood`s visit comes close to General Musharraf`s scheduled meeting with Vajpayee in New York. It is not clear what role the US would play in bringing about any breakthrough. What does it expect from Pakistan to do in the countdown to the historic meeting? It is obvious that the US officials would like to discuss these issues with somebody they know is `in the know` and being a trusted colleague of Musharraf, capable of `delivering`. He is not like the foreign minister who did not know whether he was pleading the case of his president or chief executive.

Interestingly, his visit also saw two CIA reports expressing concern on issues related to Pakistan this week. One of them was about the effects of demographic explosion and Pakistan`s continued build up in its nuclear and missiles programme. General Mahmood must have been the right person to shed light on such things.



The URL of this article is:

http://globalresearch.ca/articles/MAT111A.html

http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO111A.html

http://www.mqm.org/ISI/ISI_State_Within_A_State.htm

November 16, 2001

Terrorist Sponsors: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China

by Ted Galen Carpenter

http://www.cato.org/dailys/11-16-01.html

Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and is the author or editor of 13 books on international affairs.

The United States has assembled a superficially impressive international coalition against the threat of terrorism. Many countries in that coalition, however, contribute little of significance to the fight. Even worse, the willingness of some members of the coalition to actually combat terrorism is doubtful. Indeed, given their record, some of those countries appear to be part of the problem, not part of the solution. That concern is especially acute with respect to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and China.

Saudi Arabia enlisted in the fight against terrorism only in response to intense pressure from the United States following the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Even then, its cooperation has been minimal and grudging. For example, Riyadh has resisted Washington`s requests to use its bases in Saudi Arabia for military operations against Osama bin Laden`s terrorist facilities in Afghanistan.

Even that belated, tepid participation is an improvement on Saudi Arabia`s previous conduct. The U.S. government has warned that it will treat regimes that harbor or assist terrorist organizations the same way that it treats the organizations themselves. Yet if Washington is serious about that policy, it ought to regard Saudi Arabia as a prime sponsor of international terrorism. Indeed, that country should have been included for years on the U.S. State Department`s annual list of governments guilty of sponsoring terrorism.

The Saudi government has been the principal financial backer of Afghanistan` s odious Taliban movement since at least 1996. It has also channeled funds to Hamas and other groups that have committed terrorist acts in Israel and other portions of the Middle East.

Worst of all, the Saudi monarchy has funded dubious schools and ``charities`` throughout the Islamic world. Those organizations have been hotbeds of anti-Western, and especially, anti-American, indoctrination. The schools, for example, not only indoctrinate students in a virulent and extreme form of Islam, but also teach them to hate secular Western values.

They are also taught that the United States is the center of infidel power in the world and is the enemy of Islam. Graduates of those schools are frequently recruits for Bin Laden`s Al-Qaeda terror network as well as other extremist groups.

Pakistan`s guilt is nearly as great as Saudi Arabia`s. Without the active support of the government in Islamabad, it is doubtful whether the Taliban could ever have come to power in Afghanistan. Pakistani authorities helped fund the militia and equip it with military hardware during the mid-1990s when the Taliban was merely one of several competing factions in Afghanistan`s civil war. Only when the United States exerted enormous diplomatic pressure after the Sept. 11 attacks did Islamabad begin to sever its political and financial ties with the Taliban. Even now it is not certain that key members of Pakistan`s intelligence service have repudiated their Taliban clients.

Afghanistan is not the only place where Pakistani leaders have flirted with terrorist clients. Pakistan has also assisted rebel forces in Kashmir even though those groups have committed terrorist acts against civilians. And it should be noted that a disproportionate number of the extremist madrasas schools funded by the Saudis operate in Pakistan.

China`s offenses have been milder and more indirect than those of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Nevertheless, Beijing`s actions raise serious questions about whether its professed commitment to the campaign against international terrorism is genuine. For years, China has exported sensitive military technology to countries that have been sponsors of terrorism. Recipients of such sales include Iran, Iraq and Syria.

Even though Chinese leaders now say that they support the U.S.-led effort against terrorism, there is no evidence that Beijing is prepared to end its inappropriate exports. At the recent APEC summit, China`s President Jiang Zemin was notably noncommittal when President Bush sought such a commitment. Whenever the United States has brought up the exports issue, Chinese officials have sought to link a cutoff to a similar cutoff of U.S. military sales to Taiwan -- something that is unacceptable to Washington.

It is time for China, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia to prove by their deeds, not just their words, that they are serious about contributing to the campaign against international terrorism. In China`s case, that means ending all militarily relevant exports to regimes that have sponsored terrorism. In the cases of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, it means defunding terrorist organizations and the extremist ``schools`` that provide them with recruits. It also means severing ties with such terrorist movements as the Taliban and the Kashmiri insurgents. The world is watching the actions of all three countries.

Re: Fuzair

I forgot to mention that the IMA will accept non-NDA graduates, but only if they have a Bachelor`s degree from somewhere else.

I think that the 4.5 year course of study is roughly equivalent to what Western armies also expect their officers to undergo.

Shammi:

Interesting about the NDA and the Indian Army. I knew that the Indians had extended the cadet period to try to overcome persistent quality problems in the junior officers but had no idea that it was that long a period!

Our armed forces, basically the Army, have had persistent quality/education problems with its junior officers as well. You go straight to PMA after doing your Intermediate (12th Class) or your `O` levels and pass out after 2 years there. There also used to be an Officers Training School at Mangla which took cadets who already had a BA and trained them for just one year. During Zia`s days they started the Junior Cadet Battalion which took cadets after Matriculation (10th class) and they stayed at PMA for 4 years. As a general rule, these officers tend to be the most religious and most reactionary/conservative in the Army. I don`t know if this is because of the 4 years of rigorous indoctrination at PMA or because the intake was mainly the sons of JCOs/ORs, i.e., cadets who had the poorest and narrowest academic background. Incidentally, the JCB cadets also tend to be the most professionally competent ones at the junior officer level.

Back in the late 1970s there was a proposal to extend the PMA course to three years--bascially to improve the quality of education, esp English, of the cadets--and some people actually spent 5 terms (2 1/2 years) at PMA as a pilot program but this was dropped as being too unwieldy and OTS was instituted instead.

I don`t know what the current situation is but could certainly find out if anyone is interested.

Our officers also get the same type of study leave as do the Indians and attending the War Course (or the National Defence Course as a substitute) is a must for promotion beyond Brigadier and Staff College is an absolute must to go beyond Lt. Col./Col. in the Army.

Regards.

Re: Dost-Mittar

I didn`t fully answer your question, ``Then how do they complete advanced degree, I mean is there a provision in the army for education leave?``

I think that there is a provision for education leave, taking classes from the various services training schools, correspondence schools, as well as regular civilian schools.

This is the plug from the Army web-site:

``...NDA cadets are awarded Bachelor’s degrees in Arts, Science or Computer Science on completion of training. If you join the technical stream, you will acquire Graduate and Post-Graduate degree in Engineering at some of the finest institutes of technology with all expenses taken care of...``

``...Selection for the prestigious Defence Services Staff College course results in the awards of an M.Sc. in Defence and Strategic Studies. What’s more, you can also get study leave for two years to further upgrade your professional skills...You could even get into Research and Development, if you have the aptitude. The Army runs some of the country’s most prestigious academies and institutes. These cover a wide range...From Engineering to Medicine. From Administration to Strategy. From Armament Technology to Management...``

http://mod.nic.in/aforces/welcome.html

Anecdotally speaking, one of my distant cousins wanted to get out of the Navy to apply his technical skills in the commercial sector. He finally was let go after much pleading, and is now the #2 guy in Hughes Networks (India), subsidiary of the US giant.

Re: Dost-Mittar

``...don`t Indians go to Khadagvasla generally without completing their university degree?...``

National Defence Academy, Kharakvasala accepts cadets straight out of high school (age limit for admissions is 17?). After 3 years, successful cadets receive a Bachelor`s degree in their chosen fields (science, arts, etc.) from Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi. 3 years of NDA qualifies them to be called `gentlemen-cadets`.

Those headed towards the Army go to the Indian Military Academy (for another 1-1.5? year course), while the naval and airforce cadets head for similar training schools elsewhere. It is not until they finish IMA (or equivalent for navy/air force) that they get commissioned as officers.

IMA also accepts trainees who have not been through NDA, but these individuals are at somewhat of a career disadvantage later on. Most of these guys are short-service commission types with technical specialties (electronics, computers, etc.). Its only at the IMA that Army corps assignments are made, e.g. armored, infantry, signals, etc.

I know all this because some of my high school friends underwent the above regimen (and would drive me absolutely nuts with their new-found propensity to use forces`-jargon and acronyms even when simple explanations would suffice), and I `had` to show up for the passing out parades. Fairly impressive show, I must say.

PS: Shammi, I was referring to US versus Bundeswehr in NATO war games or maneuvers, not in some sort of a hypothetical war.

Shammi:

Germany surrendered on 7th May. I`ve reproduced the actual surrendered document signed by Col. Gen. Jodl. The surrender took effect on May 8th, as is specified in the instrument of surrender.

ACT OF MILITARY SURRENDER


1. We the undersigned, acting by authority of the German High Command, hereby surrender unconditionally to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces and simultaneously to the Soviet High Command all forces on land, sea and in the air who are at this date under German control.
2. The German High Command will at once issue orders to all German military, naval and air authorties and to all forces under German control to cease active operations at =2301= hours Central European time on = 8 May = and to remain in the positions occupied at that time. No ship, vessel, or aircraft is to be scuttled, or any damage done to their hull, machinery or equipment.
3. The German High Command will at once issue to the appropriate commander, and ensure the carrying out of any further orders issued by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and by the Soviet High Command.
4. This act of military surrender is without prejudice to, and will be superseded by any general instrument of surrender imposed by, or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable to GERMANY and the German armed forces as a whole.
5. In the event of the German High Command or any of the forces under their control failing to act in accordance with this Act of Surrender, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and the Soviet High Command will take such punitive or other action as they deem appropriate.

Signed at RHEIMS at 0241 on the 7th day of May, 1945.

France

On behalf of the German High Command.

JODL
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Tahmed:

GSG-9 (Grenzschutzgruppe 9 or Border Police Group 9) is not a part of the Bundeswehr (Federal Army) but of the Bundesgrenzschutz (Federal Border Police). I was aware of the Mogadishu operation and the persistent reports that the men who actually killed the hijackers were the two SAS ``advisors`` who went along with the GSG men.

The Bundeswehr is in the Kosovo operation but, as far as I know, has never actually fired a shot in anger. The East German Army, on the other hand, was used in putting down Prague Spring and had advisors in Angola in the 1970s and 1980s as well.

Regards.

Fuzair #553 1977: You write ``The Bundeswehr has never fired a shot in anger so no one can say how well or how badly it would fight. I would guess that it would do extremely well``

In 1977, German commandos (who would be ``special forces`` of the German army) stormed ``a Lufthansa airliner in Mogadishu, Somalia, after a five-day stand-off during which Palestinian guerrillas have killed the plane`s pilot; three hijackers die in the raid, while 86 hostages are freed``. (I am quoting from a BBC write up on the internet). As I recall it, they threw some stun grenades (which make plenty of flash and sound to disorient the targets long enough for troops to overcome them), shouted in German to the passengers to keep their heads down, ``hinlegen`` were the words, per my photographic memory :-). However, my image of the German soldier is that of a chap I saw at Frankfurt Airport - tall and slim enough to make Hitler proud, carrying a compact machine gun, with one Paki shabby looking middle-aged gentleman (obviously a hopeful but visa-less immigrant) in front of him all the way into the plane. For some reason, the scene reminded me of the movie ``Life is Beautiful`` where you have the Italian bloke doing a mock goose-step while being led off to his execution by a Nazi.

Re: Fuzair

I have no idea on how the Bundeswehr would perform against the US Army. I do think that the Bundeswehr would ultimately lose (regardless of how well they fight). Anything beyond that would be speculative.

BTW, the German surrender took place on May 8, 1945:

http://www.law.ou.edu/hist/germsurr.html

Shammi:

Col. Gen. Jodl signed the unconditional surrender, authorized by Fuehrer Donitz, on May 7th. The news broadcast of it was made on May 8th, I believe.

You and Feroz are correct about a difference between the Wehrmacht and the Bundeswehr. In spite of the fact that there was considerable personnel continuity between the Bundeswehr and the Wehrmacht, the former was pretty thoroughly Americanized in the 1950s and 1960s, much to the dismay of many Wehrmacht old-timers.

The Bundeswehr has never fired a shot in anger so no one can say how well or how badly it would fight. I would guess that it would do extremely well, even if its not up to the old Wehrmacht`s standards! However, I am not aware of any reports /accounts of American forces consistently beating Bundeswehr forces in NATO wargames/maneuvers. Presumably, the Bundeswehr with its emphasis on detailed planning and sticking to its plan would be at a disadvantage then against the freewheeling Americans. I`d be amazed if this was the case and would love to hear any info you might have on this.

Feroz:

While I agree with you as to Goering`s desire to earn the laurels for himself and the Luftwaffe, I thought that general consensus was that the Wehrmacht spearheads at Dunkirk had outrun their supply lines--which happened more than once with, e.g., Rommel in France--and would not have been able to mount an assault on Dunkirk until fresh supplies and fresh troops had been brought up. Also, as the Germans and Russians found out the hard way on the Eastern Front, a full-scale assault on a town held by a determined enemy is a fundamentally different proposition from blitzing across the countryside. While the French had more or less collapsed completely, the British still had sufficient fight left in them and Dunkirk would not have fallen without a very long and very bloody fight. I`d like to hear your views on this.

Regards to all.

sameersaab

sorry i took so long geting back. my finals start in less than a week :(

i agree with you- no need for me to apologize at all. my intention certainly wasnt to entice you into anything as was being implied by that imp scoutie, i have an honest problem with ladies shaving (im cringing at writing those two words in such close proximity)as for zahra, i quite enjoy her nutty posts :)

but chowk like you say, is not our grandfathers. i often forget and write like its my own little tea party...must desist :0)

love,

anNy

Re: Fuzair

``...Are your colleagues referring to the planning leading up to the actual maneuvers/attacks or are they referring to the actual behaviour of the German troops once they were actually in action?...``

When I asked the question, I made no distinction between phases, ie planning or action. However, the answers that I received (and posted earlier) indicate that (today) the Americans fight in a loosely structured manner, whereas the Germans (today) prefer more structure/planning. The fact that during training, the Germans tend to get frustrated with Americans when a departure from plan is made, is indicative of how each side might also fight.

``...If the latter, it sounds very unGerman to me!...``

That depends upon whether you are referring to the Wehrmacht or the Bundeswehr. The modern German Army (as Ferozk indicates) has been `Americanized` and appears to prefer greater planning in exercises (based upon my colleague`s response), and if exercises simulate war, would also prefer greater planning in war.

Re: Fuzair

``...Germany surrendered in April...``

Wrong. Germany surrendered on May 8, 1945.

Re: Dost-Mittar on junior Indian officers killed in combat

I do not have any statistics on officer-to-men-killed ratios. Without any statistics, the debate can go on ad nauseum with no end in sight.

I do know this, however, that of the unusually high number (11!) of boys from my high school class who joined the armed forces, almost all of them would tell later me about how it was drilled into them at the National Defence Academy (Kharakvasla), and later at the Indian Military Academy (Dehradun) that it was important for officers to lead from the front. I remember these young cadets (who could not have been older than 21) regaling me with stories of past officers who had fallen in battle, and how various buildings in Kharakvasla were named after them. I got the distinct impression that these guys were full of admiration for the fallen, and held the view that officers need to lead from the front.

PS: A friend also told me that it is virtually impossible to advance beyond Lt. Col. in the Indiam Army without an advanced degree (Master`s or higher).

Re: Shammi (?)

Yes, the Americans` assessement of the German armed forces were correct. The German general staff is maniacial about operational planning. There used to be a joke in the German army, which said that the best minds in the German army went into the planning section and eneded up in lunatic wards!

There is marked difference between the German army of the Second World War and the post-1945 German army. Still, the German army`s greatest strenght is in its combat resilence and willingness to recoup from set-backs and still maintain their operational coherence. The tale of the German arms in the WWII is all about this fact and the article by Fuzair proves this quality of the German army.

Secondly, the blitzkreig was not the brainchild of Hitler, but Heinz Guderian who perfected the doctrine, when he was the commandant of the German tank school in the early 1930s. Infact, Hitler got ``cold feet`` during the German onslaught in France in 1940 and ordered, against the advice of Guderian and others, to stop the German advance. Hitler thought that Germans were advancing too fast and could be counter-attacked by the French and the British. What Guderian, Rommel and Manstein tried to convince him was that there would be no allied counter-attack, because the German advance was so fast and fluid that the Allies could not even identify where the German flanks were - let alone attack them! According to them, flanks only became visable when you stopped and as long as you kept moving, there would be no flanks.

Dunkirk and the stop in German army operations was a political mistake compounded by a military inability. Goering did promise to destroy the British forces through the use of Luftwaffe only, but the bigger fault lies with der Fuhrer, because he stopped the operations to give the British an offer of peace. Hitler considered the British empire and the Great Britain was an ``associate nordic country`` and did not wish to destroy the British empire, if the British would let have him political dominance in Europe.

What he forget and what his foreign minster von Ribbentrop failed to tell him was that the British European foreign policy was designed to prevent the emergence of a single European power. It was this policy, which prompted the British to fight the Spanish armada in 1588; France`s Louis XIV ``Sun King`` in the late 1680s; Napoleon from 1793-1815; the German Kaiser Welhelm II in 1914-18 and Hitler from 1939-45.

Where Tahmed321 is correct is that it was Hitler`s insistence upon holding territory, which mitigated the effectivness of the German military doctrine of blitzkreig. Had Hitler not placed political symbolism on Leningrad, Stalingrad, Moscow, the results might have been different. The irony of the German experince in the Second World War was that Hitler was a political genius, but a medicore military strategist. The German army`s general staff was a brilliant organization of military minds with no political understanding.

Ciao

Re: Zabed

Thanks for the correction. Manstein was indeed the author of the ``Manstein Plan,`` the blitzkreig into France. However, I thought that the plan was vetoed initially by Hitler, on the advice of the OKH, but that Hitler OKed a modified version of it later on over the opposition of many of the senior generals? Weren`t most of the Germans as convinced as the French that the Ardennes forest was impervious to tanks?
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Re: Shammi

General Heinz Gaedcke would not disagree with you that the current Bundeswehr is far too rigid in its tactical doctrine. Gaedcke was one of the youngest German division commanders in the last few months of WWII, who then later joined the West German Army and retired as a Lt. Gen. He calls it the Americanization of the Germans Army and fought a losing battle against adopting US military tactics and methods. Are your colleagues referring to the planning leading up to the actual maneuvers/attacks or are they referring to the actual behaviour of the German troops once they were actually in action? If the latter, it sounds very unGerman to me!

Regards.

Oops, Germany actually surrendered on May 7th, 1945. Hitler killed himself on April 30th, I believe.

Heres an excellent example of German fighting power. Germany surrendered in April, so by now its absolutely clear that all is lost.

THE LAST PANZER BATTLE

On 22nd March, 1945, the Russians had launched an attack along the Kustrin-Berlin Highway. In their path a scratch Panzer division of no name or number prepared a last stand. It consisted of a reconnaissance platoon with five Panther tanks, a tank company with 22 Panthers and two further companies with 14 Tigers apiece - by comparison a formidable German tank concentration at that late stage of the war and indeed, just about the only worthwhile mobile forces standing between the Russians and Berlin.

The forthcoming Russian attack, preceded by a 90 minute artillery barrage, followed by massed infantry assault, had many tanks in attendance, but almost at once the German counterfire drove the Russian infantry to ground, leaving some 50 tanks, moving in two columns, to take up the lead and run head-on against two of the German tank companies where they covered the approaches on either side of the highway. Picking their targets, the Tiger and Panther gunners hit and destroyed one attacker after the other until both prongs melted away. By now the Russians were in some confusion and ripe for counterthrusts launched by the Germans against their southern flank. So far everything had gone in the German`s favour, aided by the inept way in which the Russians advanced along the most obvious approaches against an unshaken opponent whose tank gunnery dominated the open landscape.

However, a fresh Russian effort to the north now took gratuitous advantage of the effects of their artillery fire which, by playing on a village where the Germans had kept their Command Post and reserve company, had thrown the reserve into confusion and dislocated control at a critical moment. Laying smoke to cover their assembly and assault, the Russians moved round the flank for the kill, but, in a way, the use of smoke also helped the Germans who managed to reassemble outside the shelled village in the nick of time and open fire on their assailants as they emerged, well silhouetted, from the midst of the smoke screen. The sharp exchange of fire that followed ended, once more, entirely in the Germans favour and the Russians departed, leaving no less than 60 wrecks upon the field.

This battle at Kustrin may not have been quite the last fought by a Panzer division, but it was certainly one of the last in which a tank force of suitably operational density could be assembled and used with the verve of old. As a reprise, it is a fitting climax to the story of the Panzer divisions and their part in a war dominated by
armour and themselves.

K. Macksey

source: http://www.wargame.com/articles/wwtwo/lastpz.html
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Kenneth Macksey is one of the best known armour historians around and is not given to exaggeration or excessive praise.

Re: Fuzair #540

``BTW, Hitler for all his later follies, did have flashes of strategic brilliance. The entire blitzkrieg through France was his doing. The German High Command was convinced that it was going to be a slaughter--for them, not the French.``

That was Manstein`s brainchild not Hitler`s....

Re: US Army/Germany Army training debate

I met two former US forces officers today who work in the same firm as I do. I asked them what they thought of the German army training. One was a retired Colonel of an artillery unit and served in Germany till the mid `80s, spend 5+ years in former W. Germany, and regularly trained with the Bundeswehr in NATO exercises. This is the gist of what he had to say:

a) US NCOs/JCOs have a lot more leeway than their German counterparts, and certainly a lot more than their Soviet/Russian counterparts

b) The Germans are fanatical about detailed planning, whereas the Americans are not. This leads to tremendous frustration amongst German officers in joint training exercises -- Americans do not work to a predefined plan and can do unpredictable things. Drives the Germans nuts. However, it seems to work well for the Americans and may even give them an advantage in the `fog of war`. This appears to counter what Fuzair(?)/Ferozk(?) said.

c) A former Bundeswehr General who had also served in WWII had this to say -- you Americans are relentless in attacks, and turned what was a gentlemanly war in 1940 in the Western theater into uncivilized conflict after `41. He seemed to corroborate Fuzair(?)/Ferozk(?) thesis that the Americans use overwhelming force. This made the US into a much feared enemy.

d) A master`s degree is a must for advancement beyond the rank of a Major/Lt. Col in today`s US Army.

The other guy was retired US Navy Captain who had served on virtually every carrier. He did not have any direct experience with the Germans, but seemed to agree that US forces have tremendous leeway in operational/tactical details.

``Arnhem was a tactical couter-attack by the German, whereas Ardennes was a strategic counter-attack``

Sorry I didnt read your response carefully. Yes, that would be the right way to put it.

btw, that reminds me I remember reading a book called ``Zeno`` about Market Gardens (I read it as a kid). It was written by a guy who served with the 1st Independent Parachute Company.

Ferozk,

I did mean Arnhem. I thought it was not a counter-attack as it was essentially an Allied initiated battle (as opposed to ``the Bulge``) but Urquart(sp?) was unfortunate to drop on top of 2 SS Panzer divisions. Anyway its a minor point.

(btw I once went to see the Market Garden`s museum in Arnhem at what was the Hartenstein Hotel, it was a bit of a dissapointment :-))

(disclaimer: I have no pretensions to military expertise, my ``research`` comes from Cornelius Ryan, ``Commando`` comics and Hollywood movies :-))

Re: Fuzair

``...The Germans were never obsessed with capturing and holding terrain the same way that the Americans were and still are...``

I was going to say Stalingrad, Moscow, but Ferozk already did. Ferozk could also have mentioned Leningrad. In any case, the scale of the operations in the above mentioned was so large (and eventually led to defeat) that it overshadows any German doctrine regarding capturing/holding terrain.

Re: the `sacred` oath bit, the best I can say is that if even the German high command could delude themselves by switching allegiance from a Constitution to a person, then lesser armies all over the 3rd world have little chance.

Re: Romair - my family background

Mother`s side - Peshawar, NWFP (my great grandfather was a Khudai Khidmatgar, a close associate of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and established a newspaper called The Frontier Mail, still published from Dehradun, India). He was imprisoned by the British in Multan and Peshawar jails (1921-24) during the first Civil Disobedience Movement (specifically, 3 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 40 Frontier Crimes Regulation)

Father`s side - from various parts of W. Punjab -- Jhelum, Pind Dadan Khan, Bhera, Potohar, etc.

I have a family tree going back about 16 generations (complete w/ names, etc.) on my father`s side. One of my ancestor`s was a general in Ranjit Singh`s army, another was the 2nd highest ranking police officer in undivided Punjab at the turn of the century. He was a very close friend of former President Leghari`s grandfather (they once exchanged `pagris` -- a sign of mutual respect).

Herman Goering was indeed an obese, drug-addicted screwup by the late 1930s but in WWI he was a superb fighter pilot and an excellent leader of the Red Baron`s Flying Circus (Geschwader). He was awarded the Pour le Merite, Germany`s highest military decoration, not something that was handed out lightly by the Kaiser.

Goering certainly did cost the German war effort plenty, both at Dunkirk and then in not insistin that the Me262 be developed as a fighter interceptor and put into mass production macht schnell! However, we must be grateful for the fact that the Nazi party leadership/higher command was indeed composed of incompetent screwups all fighting to gain Hitler`s ear and increase their own little fiefdoms. Can you imagine what things would have been like if they were all as competent as Reinhard Heidrich or Albert Speer! We`d all be speaking Japanese or German by now!

BTW, Hitler for all his later follies, did have flashes of strategic brilliance. The entire blitzkrieg through France was his doing. The German High Command was convinced that it was going to be a slaughter--for them, not the French.

Regards.

Fuzair #534 This summer I was in Germany for a few days, and was shown a fine collection of ancient postcards and magazines that had been collecting dust in an attic. There was a German magazine from pre-WWII days full of Nazi propoganda. There was Hitler chatting amiably with an attractive young couple whose car supposedly broke down and he stopped his entourage to give them a lift!! Then there were pictures of Hitler as a nameless face in a couple of crowds listening to speeches after WWII (someone had painstakingly located his face, and it was marked with a circle). Then there was 10-ton Goering, dressed up in a different fancy outfit in every picture - including a shiny all-white suit and matching hat and shoes walking on some beach in Monaco. And so forth.

One can only shudder at what the world would have been like if such an egomaniac had stayed in power. And whatever the fighting qualities of the German pilots, I dont see how a fat, self-absorbed dandy like him could be an inspiring leader or have time for any strategic thinking (Goering screwed up at Dunkirk, he screwed up in Russia).

Re: bong_dongs # 521

Contary to what you might be thinking, I meant Arnhem and not the Ardennes as a gegenangriff (counter-attack). Arnhem was the brainchild of Gen. Montgomery and Gen. Browning and that was to use both land and airborne troops to push 50km behind the German lines. The idea was that the airborne troops (US 82nd, 101st and the British 1 Airborne Divison would capture the bridges at Rhine at Eindhoven, Graf, Son and at Arnhem and hold them till the ground element, the Allied XXX Corps could link up with the airborne. The plan was to by-pass the German defences and strike at the Ruhr valley - the industrial center of Germany and capture it.

The 101st was tasked the bridge at Eindhoven and the 82nd got the bridge at Son and Graf. The British 2 Para battlion, the Red Devils, were given the prize bridge at Arnhem. The British were dropped 3kms from their drop zones, because the RAF did not want to risk the Horsha gliders to German AAA fire since the gliders were in short supply and could not be risked to German fire. The British landed near the Horstein Hotel, which was the HQ of Gen. Molders and where SS Panzer Divison of Gen. Bittrich was being rested after being pulled from the line near the Franco-Dutch border.

One of the gliders, which crashed landed had a map of the entire operation, code named Market-Garden, and these operational details fell into the hands of the Germans. Having realized the true aim of the operation, the German garrison at Arnhem was reinforced and the Germans attacked from the western end of the city towards the eastern end, which was being by Col. John Foster`s 2nd Para under the overall command of Gen. Roy Urquart. The Germans attacked the British end and in the process, Arnhem was flattened. The British went in with about 10K men and three weeks later, when they pulled out, only 3K men made across the Rhine after slipping past the German lines.

Arnhem was a tactical couter-attack by the German, whereas Ardennes was a strategic counter-attack. Arnhem is well known in UK but the not the USA since it was a tactical allied defeat. Another place where the Werhmacht counter-attacked was the Hurtingen Forest inside Germany, where the American advance was halted and the allies had to pull back to to redeploy and try to by-pass the forest.

Fuzair is correct. The German doctrine of Blitzkreig stressed mobility over intrenchment and holding cities was not important to the Germans and nor was taking them. The exception was Stalingrad and Moscow, where the political considerations by Hitler overrode the military strategy. Hitler wanted those Russian cities for their symbolic values and not their military utility.

Ciao

Dost-mitter to Prem:

````Prem, I simply believe in looking at what works best to achieve certain objectives````

Hold it there -- my dear friend dost-mitter saheb -- that`s a litte slippery ground.

Are you implying MEANS are not THAT important -- as long GOALS are achievable.

Don`t you think -- in a democracy with the RULE of LAW -- MEANS should be/are as important as the OBJECTIVES?

Should pragmatism allow breaking the law?

#532 Omar1974

I`m not sure what point you`re trying to make. Yes the conduct of kargil war was a shame for indians. Even more shameful is the shabby treatment of the ordinary soldiers who fought there after the war. I wish people like Gen. Malik could be court martialled but i don`t think that`s legally possible since there can be no charges of poor performance. Be that as these may, Bhatnagar was discharged from duty and Malik was not even invited to the republic day parade, an official slight of great degree. All said, i am glad that there is a procedure whereby those charged could be tried in the open.

Speaking not as a partisan, i note that it should be a matter of great shame to pakistanis that their war dead have not even been officially recognized and the other loser of that war (kargil was lost by both sides, imo) is El Presidente of pakistan.

Sorry, it should read:

``Certainly officers in MES, ASC local purchase, Def Procurement and some generals have become extremely wealthy but that is the exact opposite of the norm for the average PA officer, even relatively senior ones.``

Arnhem is, I think, the infamous ``A Bridge Too Far`` military operation near the end of WWII when the British Paratroopers got a very bad bloody nose. If I remember correctly, the operation was meant to capture a series of bridges across various rivers (Rhine also?) into Germany proper and hold them until the bulk of the Allied Army under Lt. Gen. ``Boy`` Browning could move up. Unfortunately, the Allied advance was too slow and the Red Devils had the misfortune to land in the middle of a German SS Panzer (or PanzerLehr, cant` remember for sure) Division that had been pulled out from the front for R&R and some rebuilding. Anyway, Allies took massive casualties, the Red Devils finally surrendered, after a heroic resistance, and the war did not end early.

Feroz was correct. It was a German counterattack against an Allied attack. The fighting power of the German Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS was indeed tremendous. There is an excellent book by an Israeli military historian, Martin van Creveld, called ``Fighting Power`` that I read a long time ago which is an analysis of the German and US armies in WWII. The Germans compare extremely favorably to the Americans.

Armies with average quality junior officers and ORs tend to fixate on physical objectives/terrain in tactics and maneuvers since it is relatively easy for such officers and men to comprehend and execute the mission. For example, orders will be something like take hill X or assault position Y, followed by very detailed instructions for how to do this. Extremely well trained junior officers and troops, ones that have been taught to use their own initiative, will be given orders such as `destroy enemy forces in Area Z` and then be left to their own devices as to how to do so. At one level, this was the differnce between the Germans and the Americans. The Germans were never obsessed with capturing and holding terrain the same way that the Americans were and still are. The primary misson, for the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS, was to destroy enemy forces. Once the enemy has been destroyed, the terrain is all yours anyway.

The American way of warfare is to make up for in massive firepower and technology what its soldiers (esp armour and infantry) lack in training and initiative. However, you can`t fault US artillery or the Air Force and troops under Gen. Patton showed that they could fight as well as the Wehrmacht--given complete US air superiority. Incidentally, in WWII, all US soldiers, including officer candidates, were given an IQ test and the lowest scoring ones were sent to the infantry. Perhaps there is a reason that the US infantry (with the exception of elite formations) performed relatively badly. For example, US OCS turned out a 2nd Lieutenant in 3 months (the ``ninety day wonders``). In the Wehrmacht, that wasn`t even considered a long enough training time for sergeants and every German division had its own special sergeant`s training school and it was required that every unit send its best seargeants and officers to act as instructors. In your extra-regimental duties, it was considerd a plum posting to be sent as an instructor there. There is a very good reason why the Germans fought so well for so long even after the war was obviously lost.

Re: the German officers loyalty oath to Hitler.

Feroz is correct that Hitler made the German officer corp swear an oath of personal loyalty to him. It was basically the same oath that the officers had sworn to the German Emperor and, for an essentially feudally structured officer corp, to give your word of honor as an officer was a very big thing. We may not understand it now but for them it meant something sacred.


Re: dost-mittar

I don`t think that is true. I`ve read Indian propaganda accounts about the luxurious lifestyle enjoyed by the ``average`` Pakistani officer and how they make their men fight and die for them. I know for a fact that is absolute nonsense. Certainly officers in MES, ASC local purchase, Def Procurement and some generals have become extremely wealthy but that is the exact opposite.

In Kargil, I can tell you for a fact, that Pakistani junior officer:jawan casulaty ratios were much higher than the Indian because proportionately we use many more junior officers in mountain operations than do you Indians. In the Northern Areas--the only active battle zone for the Army other than arillery shelling across the LOC in Kashmir--the rule is to use a very heavy proportion of junior officers, much more so than in the plains, since the extreme battle conditions there require troops with a much higher level of training, education and adaptability and we achieve this by very greatly increasing the number of junior officers assigned to each battalion. It used to be the case in the 1980s and early 1990s that EVERY officer had to serve at least one tour at Siachen and the best ones were called back for a second one. One of my relatives is now serving his third combat tour beyond Skardu, although this is very rare.

Your propaganda is as bad as ours. We`ve had more than one Brigadier and Major General killed at the front. How many have the Indians had?

Regards.

tahmed321 #524
sadna #522 You forgot your spelling of Pakistan: ``Pukistan``. Now, let`s see what is the scholarly and objective point you are trying to make...

tahmed, I wasn`t trying to make a point to you. I was making the point to bong_dongs because I trust bong_dongs to look up the article or do a google on ``Mesquida AND Wiener`` to find a reference to the original paper if he is indeed interested in the scholarly point. btw, its an interesting one and ties up the WWars and many other wars with the percentage of young males in the population at the time.

shammi #518: Your interest in my family background is interesting, and perhaps a bit odd. But here goes. If everything told to me by my elders is correct, then this is how it all panned out:

I always used to wonder why everyone at our family weddings wore those funny stubby pink pagris, and carried out strange traditions, that had nothing to do with the places the weddings were carried out, like Muzzafarabad, Islamabad, and New York. I couldn`t find anything related to these customs in Islamic history, either. A lot of outside influences.

Three out of four of my grandparents are from Indian Kashmir, i.e. they were born there, grew up there, played there, worked there, etc. They migrated to Azad Kashmir a few years after the partition. The remaining one is a Punjabi from Pakistan`s Punjab. Ironically, that one (with Kashmiri spouse) had to migrate the longest distance, since this one was somewhere deep in India at the time of partition.

Thus, three-fourth of my parent`s family, is from Srinagar. And from what I have heard, I would have inherited a hell of a lot of property there, had it become a part of Pakistan.

However, no one in my family speaks Kashmiri. A pretty good indication, they ended up in Kashmir from somewhere else, a few generations ago. Not to mention the funny looking pagris at weddings. And my last name. And the color of their skin, which is quite a bit more tan than the shining white skins of Kashmiris like Nawaz Sharif. This explains the Rajput part.

Ethnically, I consider myself to be 1/4th Punjabi and 3/4th from Kashmir (although not from the Kashmiri speaking Kashmiri lot). And because Muzzafarabad is where the family reunions are carried out, and where many of us live and end up getting buried. If however, I keep going back, when people want to get into a historical discussion, most of the roots end up somewhere in Rajput lands (perhaps Rajastan) via Muzzafarabad-Srinigar highway. And partially to somewhere in Central Asia from a highway passing through Potohar and Tehran.

So great.....great grand-dad was a Hindu Rajput, perhaps somewhere in Rajastan. One of his descendants, either saw the light, or was forced to convert, to Islam. Somewhere after converting, him and his family (or their descendants) ended up in Srinagar. Perhaps, they were kicked out of Rajastan, or they got an H-1 visa to Kashmir. They liked it so much there, they decided to settle down, and never went back to their Rajput lands. They did keep there customs, their skin color, their last names, etc. intact. And of course, the caste system is there, as well. They rarely marry anyone without similar last names. After a couple of generations in Srinagar, partition occured. And they moved to Muzzafarabad. Somewhere in between, one was married to a fair skinned Punjabi from across the Punjab border. From Muzzafarabad, some of them, moved onto bigger places like Lahore, Islamabad and New York. While a great percentage remained in Muzzafarabad, because it made it very easy for their kids to get into Pakistani engr. and medical colleges through affirmative action.

I myself, live in the outskirts of San Francisco, and after a lot of effort, have found a shop that sells those funny looking pink pagris. I hope that satisfies your curiosity. Now, if you could return the favor, and give me a detailed family history of your own, I would appreciate it.

sadna #522 You forgot your spelling of Pakistan: ``Pukistan``. Now, let`s see what is the scholarly and objective point you are trying to make...

July 8, 2001, Sunday

Agony Over Kashmir Echoes in Indian Courtroom

By JOHN F. BURNS

For one of its most controversial courts-martial in 50 years, the Indian Army has chosen a setting that seems like a stage set from the colonial past.

Inside the decaying single-story courtroom in the barracks in this sweltering Punjab town, the roof leaks and witnesses` testimony competes with creaking ceiling fans and parrots chirping in mangrove trees outside. Army tailors pedal past on rusting bicycles, and officers` wives stroll beneath brightly colored parasols, chatting languidly as they go.

Over all, a strict protocol prevails. A general testifying for the prosecution gets a red carpet, a ``V.I.P.`` water cooler and snappy salutes from lower-ranking officers serving as judges. Even the bathrooms have a hierarchy -- a neatly signposted urinal for officers, while all others fend for themselves.

The archaisms seem starkly out of step with the modernizing India beyond the barracks` gates. But the issues at the trial of Maj. Manish Bhatnagar, a 29-year-old paratrooper from Bhopal, in central India, are sharply contemporary, and they go to the heart of India`s pride.

The major is charged with refusing an order to attack Pakistani troops holding a Himalayan height inside Indian territory two summers ago. Pakistani Army infiltrators had set off a small-scale war in the Kargil area of Kashmir after penetrating along a 150-mile front, at heights up to 18,000 feet.

After eight weeks of fighting in which Indian troops ascended glaciers, snowfields and rocky crags to attack Pakistani bunkers under heavy fire, the Pakistanis were driven out, but not before more than 850 Indian soldiers and at least 700 Pakistanis had lost their lives.

If convicted, Major Bhatnagar could get 14 years of ``rigorous imprisonment,`` and a lifetime`s disgrace. But in the defiant, explosive defense he has mounted over 50 days of hearings, he has won broad support from fellow officers, military analysts and influential sections of the Indian press.

Supporters see him as a scapegoat for a government and army brass responsible for a slow-starting, inefficiently run campaign that many in India regard as the worst military debacle since India`s humiliating defeat by China in a 1962 border war.

The court-martial, expected to produce a verdict sometime this month, has come at a sensitive time. The Indian prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, will be the host of a summit meeting with Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan`s military ruler, from July 14 to 16, when the dispute over Kashmir, which dates to the inception of India and Pakistan as independent nations, is expected to top the agenda.

Mr. Vajpayee headed the government at the time of the Kargil conflict, and won re-election afterward in a campaign buoyed by celebrations in virtually every Indian village and town after India repelled the incursion.

General Musharraf was the Pakistani Army commander who devised the plan to seize the Kargil heights, and felt betrayed by what many in his military saw as their government`s failure to give them full backing at Kargil. Three months later, the general overthrew the civilian government that ordered the Pakistani withdrawal after most of the Himalayan strongholds were lost.

Now, both men have committed themselves to seek a compromise on Kashmir that will reduce the risk of major military confrontations, and satisfy the rest of the world that the possibility of either side using nuclear weapons in a future flare-up has been defused. But at the summit meeting, both leaders will be under pressure from wary domestic constituencies and will need to be seen as bargaining from a position of strength.

For Mr. Vajpayee, who heads the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, which has traditionally presented itself as the most vigilant of all Indian parties on Pakistan, a conviction here would be a step toward bolstering the government`s record on Kashmir. An acquittal would be an invitation to more damaging post-mortems about the alleged Kargil bungling.

Even before the court-martial, the government`s self-congratulatory posture after the conflict had taken a battering. Though the infiltrators were eventually expelled, that they had ensconced themselves at all in such a sensitive territory was cause for serious political embarrassment.

Indian press accounts since the Kargil fighting have told of intelligence reports of the Pakistani intrusions going unattended for months in the Defense Ministry`s files, and of soldiers being sent into battle without the lightweight rifles the army had acquired for high-altitude warfare, and with such inadequate supplies of winter clothing and snowshoes that secondhand supplies designated for surplus sales were pulled from warehouses and transferred urgently to the front.

An official inquiry, reporting in December 1999, came to similar conclusions. Citing India`s casualties, it said, ``The best tribute to their supreme dedication and example will be to ensure that `Kargils` of any description are never repeated.``

At the court-martial, Major Bhatnagar has seen to it that none of this is forgotten. Assessed as an outstanding officer by his commanders before the Kargil fighting, he has earned front-page coverage in Indian newspapers with his performances at the trial.

Armed with a suitcase bursting with files assembled during months in custody, he has stalked the courtroom, thrusting papers at the officers serving as judges, demanding silence from prosecution lawyers and refusing demands that he sit down until the presiding officer, Col. Vinod Malik, raises his hand above a bell that summons armed guards.

The word scapegoat has never been far away. ``Have some conscience!`` he told Maj. Vipin Chakrawati, an army lawyer advising the judges, at a recent morning`s hearing. ``You are a very lowly man, lacking moral fiber.``

At another point, he said his concern was for India, not for himself. ``I`m not worried about myself; I`m worried about the truth,`` he said. Moments later, risking expulsion from the courtroom for contempt, he said, ``It`s a conspiracy; this whole trial is to fix me.``

The major`s defense lawyer, Rajneesh Bansal, sweating in a pinstripe suit, has restricted himself to points of law. But outside he has been vociferous. ``This is a farce trial going on,`` he said. ``The generals are making him a scapegoat, when they should be in the dock themselves.``

Vikram Jit Singh, a reporter for The Indian Express who covered Kargil at the front and is now covering the trial, agreed. ``What`s really stirring resentment in all this is the role of the generals,`` he said. ``They`ve all got off the hook, getting plum postings and awards. It`s a V.I.P. system of justice.``

Like the courtroom itself, the testimony has been rich with Victorian echoes. The prosecution has targeted Major Bhatnagar`s character, suggesting that the order to attack at Kargil had found, in the major, that ``all lofty feelings to serve the nation had subsided and become lull.``

The court listened solemnly as an army lawyer read a 19th-century poem by ``the great English poet,`` Alfred Lord Tennyson, celebrating a doomed attack by British cavalrymen in the Crimean War -- ``Theirs not to make reply,/Theirs not to reason why,/Theirs but to do and die.``

After a pause, the prosecutor drove the point home. ``What we find here,`` he said, ``is most precisely the reverse.``

On the key point in the court-martial, the army`s case has been badly shaken. Major Bhatnagar has said he never refused an order to attack a Pakistani bunker at a position known as Point 5203, at a height of 17,700 feet and above a strategic road. What he did, he has said, was to ask that the 80 men under his command be given a month`s rest to recover from joint pains, blisters and bruises after a grueling three-day truck journey, and a further day`s march, from another Himalayan confrontation zone with Pakistan at Siachen, hundreds of miles to the east.

Brig. Devinder Singh, one of the top Indian commanders at Kargil, has testified that he discussed the attack with Major Bhatnagar, but gave no order. Another major who was present has said that he, too, heard a discussion of an attack, but no order. The prosecution, closing its case, sought to finesse the point by saying that since an assault had been planned, any discussion about it would have amounted, ``to all practical purposes,`` to an order.

Less helpful to the major`s case, the prosecution has established that an earlier, failed assault on the height produced heavy casualties, and that Major Bhatnagar discussed the miseries endured with the surviving troops before taking up the matter with Brigadier Singh. Six days after the discussion, with Major Bhatnagar transferred away from the front, another officer led his men into battle, only to find the Pakistani bunker abandoned.

Months later, as inquiries into the Kargil failures began, army prosecutors began focusing on Major Bhatnagar`s actions, and eventually charged him with cowardice, only to move to the lesser offense now being tried: refusing an order to attack.

Only two other officers involved in the campaign, both majors, have faced courts-martial, with one winning acquittal and the other being convicted, for faking a knee injury. But it is the Bhatnagar trial that army commanders who led the Kargil campaign have watched most closely, perhaps few more so than Gen. V. P. Malik, army chief of staff at the time. Now retired in Chandigarh, the 63-year-old general has been given a rough ride by Indian newspapers, which have recounted how he continued with a tour of Poland for 10 days after the Pakistani intrusions began stirring alarm in New Delhi.

A remark he is said to have made at the time -- ``I can`t stop going to the toilet every time a militant crosses the line of control`` -- has entered Indian folklore as has a report that the general with overall responsibility for Indian defenses in the Kargil area was off building a zoo in Leh, the capital of Ladakh, in the eastern reaches of Kashmir, at the time of the Pakistani buildup.

In an interview at his home, General Malik scoffed at suggestions that the army had taken a black eye at Kargil similar to the one it took against China in 1962, when the general, then an infantry lieutenant, was at the front.

``If the Pakistanis see it as a disaster, and they do,`` he said, reaching for a book at his bedside quoting Pakistani generals on their debacle at Kargil, ``I don`t see why we should see it otherwise. Both sides can`t have lost.``

As for the allegations of scapegoating, he was similarly dismissive. ``I don`t think it`s worth talking about,`` he said. ``We`ve looked at all these events with the greatest transparency, and what more do people want?``

July 8, 2001, Sunday

Agony Over Kashmir Echoes in Indian Courtroom

By JOHN F. BURNS

For one of its most controversial courts-martial in 50 years, the Indian Army has chosen a setting that seems like a stage set from the colonial past.

Inside the decaying single-story courtroom in the barracks in this sweltering Punjab town, the roof leaks and witnesses` testimony competes with creaking ceiling fans and parrots chirping in mangrove trees outside. Army tailors pedal past on rusting bicycles, and officers` wives stroll beneath brightly colored parasols, chatting languidly as they go.

Over all, a strict protocol prevails. A general testifying for the prosecution gets a red carpet, a ``V.I.P.`` water cooler and snappy salutes from lower-ranking officers serving as judges. Even the bathrooms have a hierarchy -- a neatly signposted urinal for officers, while all others fend for themselves.

The archaisms seem starkly out of step with the modernizing India beyond the barracks` gates. But the issues at the trial of Maj. Manish Bhatnagar, a 29-year-old paratrooper from Bhopal, in central India, are sharply contemporary, and they go to the heart of India`s pride.

The major is charged with refusing an order to attack Pakistani troops holding a Himalayan height inside Indian territory two summers ago. Pakistani Army infiltrators had set off a small-scale war in the Kargil area of Kashmir after penetrating along a 150-mile front, at heights up to 18,000 feet.

After eight weeks of fighting in which Indian troops ascended glaciers, snowfields and rocky crags to attack Pakistani bunkers under heavy fire, the Pakistanis were driven out, but not before more than 850 Indian soldiers and at least 700 Pakistanis had lost their lives.

If convicted, Major Bhatnagar could get 14 years of ``rigorous imprisonment,`` and a lifetime`s disgrace. But in the defiant, explosive defense he has mounted over 50 days of hearings, he has won broad support from fellow officers, military analysts and influential sections of the Indian press.

Supporters see him as a scapegoat for a government and army brass responsible for a slow-starting, inefficiently run campaign that many in India regard as the worst military debacle since India`s humiliating defeat by China in a 1962 border war.

The court-martial, expected to produce a verdict sometime this month, has come at a sensitive time. The Indian prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, will be the host of a summit meeting with Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan`s military ruler, from July 14 to 16, when the dispute over Kashmir, which dates to the inception of India and Pakistan as independent nations, is expected to top the agenda.

Mr. Vajpayee headed the government at the time of the Kargil conflict, and won re-election afterward in a campaign buoyed by celebrations in virtually every Indian village and town after India repelled the incursion.

General Musharraf was the Pakistani Army commander who devised the plan to seize the Kargil heights, and felt betrayed by what many in his military saw as their government`s failure to give them full backing at Kargil. Three months later, the general overthrew the civilian government that ordered the Pakistani withdrawal after most of the Himalayan strongholds were lost.

Now, both men have committed themselves to seek a compromise on Kashmir that will reduce the risk of major military confrontations, and satisfy the rest of the world that the possibility of either side using nuclear weapons in a future flare-up has been defused. But at the summit meeting, both leaders will be under pressure from wary domestic constituencies and will need to be seen as bargaining from a position of strength.

For Mr. Vajpayee, who heads the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, which has traditionally presented itself as the most vigilant of all Indian parties on Pakistan, a conviction here would be a step toward bolstering the government`s record on Kashmir. An acquittal would be an invitation to more damaging post-mortems about the alleged Kargil bungling.

Even before the court-martial, the government`s self-congratulatory posture after the conflict had taken a battering. Though the infiltrators were eventually expelled, that they had ensconced themselves at all in such a sensitive territory was cause for serious political embarrassment.

Indian press accounts since the Kargil fighting have told of intelligence reports of the Pakistani intrusions going unattended for months in the Defense Ministry`s files, and of soldiers being sent into battle without the lightweight rifles the army had acquired for high-altitude warfare, and with such inadequate supplies of winter clothing and snowshoes that secondhand supplies designated for surplus sales were pulled from warehouses and transferred urgently to the front.

An official inquiry, reporting in December 1999, came to similar conclusions. Citing India`s casualties, it said, ``The best tribute to their supreme dedication and example will be to ensure that `Kargils` of any description are never repeated.``

At the court-martial, Major Bhatnagar has seen to it that none of this is forgotten. Assessed as an outstanding officer by his commanders before the Kargil fighting, he has earned front-page coverage in Indian newspapers with his performances at the trial.

Armed with a suitcase bursting with files assembled during months in custody, he has stalked the courtroom, thrusting papers at the officers serving as judges, demanding silence from prosecution lawyers and refusing demands that he sit down until the presiding officer, Col. Vinod Malik, raises his hand above a bell that summons armed guards.

The word scapegoat has never been far away. ``Have some conscience!`` he told Maj. Vipin Chakrawati, an army lawyer advising the judges, at a recent morning`s hearing. ``You are a very lowly man, lacking moral fiber.``

At another point, he said his concern was for India, not for himself. ``I`m not worried about myself; I`m worried about the truth,`` he said. Moments later, risking expulsion from the courtroom for contempt, he said, ``It`s a conspiracy; this whole trial is to fix me.``

The major`s defense lawyer, Rajneesh Bansal, sweating in a pinstripe suit, has restricted himself to points of law. But outside he has been vociferous. ``This is a farce trial going on,`` he said. ``The generals are making him a scapegoat, when they should be in the dock themselves.``

Vikram Jit Singh, a reporter for The Indian Express who covered Kargil at the front and is now covering the trial, agreed. ``What`s really stirring resentment in all this is the role of the generals,`` he said. ``They`ve all got off the hook, getting plum postings and awards. It`s a V.I.P. system of justice.``

Like the courtroom itself, the testimony has been rich with Victorian echoes. The prosecution has targeted Major Bhatnagar`s character, suggesting that the order to attack at Kargil had found, in the major, that ``all lofty feelings to serve the nation had subsided and become lull.``

The court listened solemnly as an army lawyer read a 19th-century poem by ``the great English poet,`` Alfred Lord Tennyson, celebrating a doomed attack by British cavalrymen in the Crimean War -- ``Theirs not to make reply,/Theirs not to reason why,/Theirs but to do and die.``

After a pause, the prosecutor drove the point home. ``What we find here,`` he said, ``is most precisely the reverse.``

On the key point in the court-martial, the army`s case has been badly shaken. Major Bhatnagar has said he never refused an order to attack a Pakistani bunker at a position known as Point 5203, at a height of 17,700 feet and above a strategic road. What he did, he has said, was to ask that the 80 men under his command be given a month`s rest to recover from joint pains, blisters and bruises after a grueling three-day truck journey, and a further day`s march, from another Himalayan confrontation zone with Pakistan at Siachen, hundreds of miles to the east.

Brig. Devinder Singh, one of the top Indian commanders at Kargil, has testified that he discussed the attack with Major Bhatnagar, but gave no order. Another major who was present has said that he, too, heard a discussion of an attack, but no order. The prosecution, closing its case, sought to finesse the point by saying that since an assault had been planned, any discussion about it would have amounted, ``to all practical purposes,`` to an order.

Less helpful to the major`s case, the prosecution has established that an earlier, failed assault on the height produced heavy casualties, and that Major Bhatnagar discussed the miseries endured with the surviving troops before taking up the matter with Brigadier Singh. Six days after the discussion, with Major Bhatnagar transferred away from the front, another officer led his men into battle, only to find the Pakistani bunker abandoned.

Months later, as inquiries into the Kargil failures began, army prosecutors began focusing on Major Bhatnagar`s actions, and eventually charged him with cowardice, only to move to the lesser offense now being tried: refusing an order to attack.

Only two other officers involved in the campaign, both majors, have faced courts-martial, with one winning acquittal and the other being convicted, for faking a knee injury. But it is the Bhatnagar trial that army commanders who led the Kargil campaign have watched most closely, perhaps few more so than Gen. V. P. Malik, army chief of staff at the time. Now retired in Chandigarh, the 63-year-old general has been given a rough ride by Indian newspapers, which have recounted how he continued with a tour of Poland for 10 days after the Pakistani intrusions began stirring alarm in New Delhi.

A remark he is said to have made at the time -- ``I can`t stop going to the toilet every time a militant crosses the line of control`` -- has entered Indian folklore as has a report that the general with overall responsibility for Indian defenses in the Kargil area was off building a zoo in Leh, the capital of Ladakh, in the eastern reaches of Kashmir, at the time of the Pakistani buildup.

In an interview at his home, General Malik scoffed at suggestions that the army had taken a black eye at Kargil similar to the one it took against China in 1962, when the general, then an infantry lieutenant, was at the front.

``If the Pakistanis see it as a disaster, and they do,`` he said, reaching for a book at his bedside quoting Pakistani generals on their debacle at Kargil, ``I don`t see why we should see it otherwise. Both sides can`t have lost.``

As for the allegations of scapegoating, he was similarly dismissive. ``I don`t think it`s worth talking about,`` he said. ``We`ve looked at all these events with the greatest transparency, and what more do people want?``

A glimse of the future?

From CSMonitor:

In Jakarta, countering American culture without violence

You wouldn`t catch Rizky ``Jimmy`` Nur Zamzamy justifying violence that way, though he professes just as deep an attachment to Islam as Abu Hamza.

Mr. Zamzamy, a rangy young Indonesian advertising executive in a pink shirt, is sitting in a Western-style cafe in Jakarta, his cellphone at the ready, and his fried chicken growing cold as he explains how he tries to be a good Muslim by right action, not fighting.

That, he feels, is the best way of countering what he sees as the corrupting influence of American culture and morals on traditional Indonesian ways of life in the largest Muslim country in the world.

Until a few years ago, Zamzamy led a regular secular life, hanging out in bars and dating women. Then he met a Muslim teacher who became his spiritual guide. Now he follows Islamic teachings and donates most of his $1,300 monthly salary to his ``guru`` to be spent on building mosques and helping the poor.

He says he has made sure that none of the money goes to extremist groups that use violence in the name of Islam, such as the Laskar Jihad group, locked in bloody battle with Christians in the Maluku region of Indonesia.

Two years ago, in line with his growing religious beliefs, he quit the advertising agency he had worked for and set up his own company along Islamic lines: He won`t take banks or alcoholic-beverage producers as clients, for example, and he does no business on Friday, the Muslim holy day.

But he is relaxed about those who don`t share his beliefs: He does not insist that his wife wear a headscarf, for example, and he is not uncomfortable sitting alongside the rich young Jakartans in the cafe who are flirting and drinking. They must make their own choices, he says.

And though he does not like the sexual overtones of American pop culture, he knows that ``you can`t hide from American culture.`` By living his life according to Islamic precepts, he says, ``I am fighting America in my own way. But I don`t agree with violence.``

For how long will our `elite` continue to offer its people as a collateral to beg,borrow,& steal so as to maintain a Dollarish-lifestyle for themselves & their progeny.



How the US `rewards` its agents

On Wednesday 19th of September an extremely nervous President Musharraf addressed the nation to justify Pakistan`s support for America`s new crusade against the Muslims in Afghanistan, saying that it will not compromise Pakistan`s interests. He said, ``Trust me. I will not disappoint you and there will be no compromise on Pakistan`s security and our defence is our first priority``.

Such a policy of co-operation with America is provided with a logic by its protagonists. It is reasoned that Pakistan is a lamb between the lions on the world stage. It is too weak to go it alone. Therefore it requires satellite-ship of the US to make its mark and way in the jungle of global politics. It is reasoned that in exchange for concessions to the US, Pakistan will secure its own interests such as; security against India and economic prosperity. Though we do question elsewhere whether Muslims are in fact lambs, at this time let us consider the results of this policy over the last fifty-four years of Pakistan`s existence.

This policy is flawed as a review of the years, elaborated below, will show. The history of Pak-US satelliteship shows ably that what drives the US is greed. All lions rewards a lamb in one way ultimately. Even if that lamb was in fact a lion, presenting itself as a lamb. Repeatedly, by the type of relationship that Musharraf proposes, Pakistan has been mauled in reward for major concessions to the US. This is because fundamentally no two nations can ever have the same interests in all matters. There is constant collision. By forming an alliance with a superpower in this way is indeed perilous as such a dependency becomes a handicap, where concessions are rewarded by betrayal. Also, swings and roundabouts that occur from a fickle relationship are an impediment to long term building and strategy. In such a scenario, we argue that it is in fact less dangerous to walk amongst lions as a lion.

Allah (swt) revealed,

``How then when a catastrophe befalls them because of what their hands have sent forth, they come to you swearing by Allah, we meant no more than goodwill and conciliation.`` [TMQ 4:62]

1946 US against division of India

Liaquat Ali Khan cautioned by American Mission that a continued hard line attitude by the Muslim League would cost US sympathy.

[Reference: Mission New Delhi dispatch to US State Department June 7, 1946, 845.00/6-746, DSR, NA.]

1949 US policies anger Pakistanis

``Our Palestine policy occasioned widespread press criticism and demonstrations in Pakistan. We have been criticised for too great leniency towards India in the Kashmir dispute and for favouring India at the expense of Kashmir.``

[Reference: State Department background memoranda on visit to US of Liaquat Ali Khan, April 14, 1949, President`s Secretary File, HSTL.]

1957 Pakistan concedes bases to US

During his July 1957, Prime Minister Suhrawardy`s informed President Eisenhower of his governments agreement for the US to establish a secret US intelligence facility in Pakistan and permission for the U2 spyplane to fly from Pakistan. After Suhrawardy`s term of office concluded a facility was established in Badaber, 10 miles from Peshawar. This was a cover for a major communications intercept operation run by the American NSA (National Security Agency). Badaber was an excellent choice because of its proximity to Soviet Central Asia. This enabled monitoring of missile test sites and other comms. U2 ``spy-in-the-sky`` was allowed to use the Pakistan Air Forces portion of the Peshawar airport to gain vital photo intelligence in an era before satellite observation.

[References: 1. Amjad Ali, the Pak ambassador to the US at the time, narrated in his book ``Glimpses`` (Lahore: Jang Publisher`s, 1992) that the personal assistant of Suhrawardy advised embassy staff of the PMs agreement to the US facility on Pakistan soil. 2. Editorial note, FRUS, 1958-60, Volume 15, 615]

1958 Pak concerns over satellite-ship

Foreign Minister, Manzur Qadir, told US Chargee d`Affaires, Ridgway Knight, that he was concerned about Pakistani public opinion which ``was deeply opposed to Pakistan `satelliteship` to [the] US, while an uncommitted India receives favours from the US.``

[Reference: US Embassy Karachi telegram to the US State Department, January 14, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, Volume 15, 693-95]

1959 US Pak co-operation agreement

March 5: US-Pakistan bilateral executive security agreement. Article I committed the US to respond to aggression upon Pakistan. The manner of assistance would be ``to take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon.`` The US maintains to this day that this pledge was limited only to Communist aggression, as envisaged by the Joint Congressional Resolution on the Middle East, 1957, and did not include Indian aggression. Pakistanis at the time and since feel they were led to believe otherwise.

[Reference: Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 40 (1959), 416-17]

1964 US agents attack US agency

President Johnson gave go-ahead for five year military programmes to both Pakistan and India. Pakistanis are outraged as to how the US rewards Pakistani favours to her by support to her enemy. President Ayub in the face of anti-US public opinion stated, ``Today American policy is based on opportunism and is devoid of moral quality…Pakistan deeply regrets that although she has fulfilled all her commitments, she has been let down by politicians she regards as friends.``

[Reference: Interview with Ayub Khan published London`s Daily Mail June 23, 1964.]

1965 Pakistan tries to cash in her services rendered

September 6: Pakistan at war with India. Ayub and Bhutto met the US envoy, MacConnaughy. The President invoked the 1959 bilateral executive agreement and the aide-memoir of November 5, 1962. The communication stated, ``As Pakistan has become a victim of naked aggression by armed attack on the part of India, the Government of Pakistan requests the Government of the United States to act immediately to suppress and vacate the aggression.``

[Reference: Text of Embassy Office Rawalpindi telegram to US State Department, September 6, 1965.]

1965 US `rewards` Pakistan

September 8: It was not in US interests to assist Pakistan in this matter. Not only did America elect to leave Pakistan high and dry, in return for its servitude, President Lyndon B Johnson announced before Congress the cutting off military aid to Pakistan. In the words of Bhutto, ``…[The] decision [was] not the act of an ally and not even that of a neutral…``

[Reference: US State Department telegram to Embassy Karachi, September 8, 1965]

1971 Pak helps US with China

President Nixon asked President Yahya to tell Pakistan`s friends in Beijing that Nixon did not believe that Asia could ``move forward`` without China and would not be a party to Soviet attempts to isolate China. Pakistan arranged for Kissinger`s secret trip to Beijing. June 15, 1971 Nixon caught the world by surprise by announcing this trip and his own planned visit there.

[Henry Kissinger White House Years pages 180-181]

1971 US `rewards` Pakistan

August 3: During the crisis of Pakistan`s dismemberment, the House of Representatives voted to suspend all assistance to Pakistan. American interests lay elsewhere. Nixon felt that an Indian Pakistan conflict ``could disrupt…our policy towards China.``

[Memorandum for the President`s file on meeting with Ambassador Farland, July 18, 1971, President`s Office File, NPMP, NA]

1977 Bhutto speaks of his `reward`

April 28: ``The party`s over, the party`s over. He`s gone,`` the Prime Minister referred to a tapped conversation between Robert Moore, US Consul General in Karachi and Political Counselor Howard Schaffer in a speech before the National Assembly. Indeed, on July 15 Bhutto`s party was over.

1979-88 The fickleness of US assistance

April 6: US suspended aid to Pakistan because of the nuclear program. December 24: Russian invasion of Afghanistan changed the relationship. In the words of Thomas Thornton, US national Security Council staff member, US-Pak relations ``overnight, literally, ... changed dramatically``. December 29, Carter instructs CIA to covertly provide weapons to Afghan mujahideen. Later ISI become the conduit for such US assistance. January 4, 1980 Carter announces, ``We will provide military equipment, food and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and national security against the seriously increased threat from the north.`` From $60 million in 1981, US-Saudi funding for the covert operations ballooned to $400 million in 1984. April 14, 1988, the Geneva Accords are signed, marking the Soviet exit from Afghanistan. August 17, 1988, General Zia dies in plane crash, probably exited by the CIA.

1990 Pressler sanctions

October 1: As per the Pressler Amendment economic and military aid was frozen upon US intelligence informing President Clinton that Pakistan possessed a nuclear device. India suffered no similar penalties until its nuclear tests in May 1998, even though they were known to have nuclear capability since the time of Indira Ghandi.

1993 US brands mujahideen as terrorists

After the collapse of communism , the new major threat to Western hegmony is Islam. US changes tack with the Pakistani government, pressurising control on Islamic groups. Foreign Secretary, Shahryar Khan, speaks of changes in the US goal-posts, ``We fought the Afghan War for fourteen years and now the people who were committed to our side are suddenly seen as villains and branded as terrorists.``

[As quoted by Washington Post, ``After Cold War, US-Pakistani Ties Are Turning Sour`` April 21, 1993.]

1999 Betrayal in Kargil

May: The Pakistani army stood in jihad together with mujahideen groups, to a great and devastating effect upon the mushrikeen of India. Two weeks stood between them and victory, as expected snowfall would cut off supplies to India. President Clinto telephoned Sharif to urge him to have the forces withdrawn. Clinton sends General Anthony Zinni to Islamabad to second this message directly to Sharif and the new Chief Of Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf.

2001 Attacks on US exploited

September 11: Devastating attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon. US rapidly exploits situation to allow for military invasion in South Asia. A military presence is essential in order to keep watch on three matters of concern for America; China, oil in the Caspian Sea, Islamic revival in the Central Asian Republics and Pakistan.

2001 Decision time for Pakistan

Present day: Pakistan can still even now undo the damage done by decades of dependence upon the US. It is high time to walk as a lion amongst lions, rather than be led once again as a lamb to the slaughter.

Re: #521

bong_dongs,

``Sorry to step in, but surely you cant count Arnhem as a German counterattack.``

Perhaps Ferozk meant Ardennes, not Arnhem.

regards,

Fuzair: Incidentally, we now have the former Axis Powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) all announcing within a few days of one another their provision of military units to support the US. Italians are even prepared to do combat. How things have changed since the five years of WWII and the fifty years since of Movies About WWII!!! Seems like the USA has a knack for turning former enemies into good buddies: they fought the Revolutionary War and the 1812 war with brits, and the two nations then forged a friendship in the two world wars; they fought the Mexicans, and the Mexicans are now waiting for this crisis to be over so they can again become Buenos Amigos.

bong_dongs #520
Apparently, some researchers have found that the possibility of violence and war in a region is highly correlated to the percentage of young men in the population, and India and Pakistan have almost the highest possibility of conflict of all regions in the world for this reason.

Its archived now, but in Washington Post:
Boy Trouble
June 24, 2001
`` Wars are not caused by bad leaders or by bad ideas, but by bad demographics. At least that`s the provocative conclusion of two Canadian researchers. They contend that the relative number of young men in a country`s population is the best predictor of whether it is headed for war or peace. In fact, the greater the proportion of younger men to older men in a country, the deadlier the conflict is likely to be, claim Christian Mesquida and Neil Wiener of York ``

Dear Eklavya -- I was just kidding -:)

Ferozk

``Berlin fighting a retreating German army, which twiced counter-attacked the allies at Arnhem``

Sorry to step in, but surely you cant count Arnhem as a German counterattack.

tahmed #510

I havent read Druckers article yet but i dont think I am making too much of an extrapolation. The fertility rates in Pakistan are still very high even by S. Asian standards.

OTOH this finally disproves the theory that you cant be angry at the world if you are getting enough in the sack :-) (look at Mullah Omar for instance :-))

re: Romair #507

I have read you describe yourself variously as Rajput, Kashmiri (am I missing any?)? You could be one or the other, but not both. Who ARE you?

Re: tahmed321

A retreat is more difficult to manage than an advance, because the retreating army, if not managed, can easily break down and a retreat can turn into a rout.

Incidently, the retreating Germans did counter-attack at Kasserine Pass and it took the much vaunted Red Army 3 years to get to Berlin fighting a retreating German army and it took the British and the Americans almost a year to get to Berlin fighting a retreating German army, which twiced counter-attacked the allies at Arnhem and the Battle of Bulge! :)

Rommel and Giap cannot be compared, because one was fighting a classical conventional war and the other was fighting a classic guerrila war. In a tactical sense, yes; both can be credited for being innovative and brilliant.

Re: Shammi

The German generals obeyed Hitler, because the German army`s code of discipline did not allow disobedence of a superior`s orders and it was this act of the German officer corps, which saw most of the tried and convicted and executed at Nuremburg for following Hitler`s orders.

The German officer was naive politcally and he trusted Hitler and they could not disobey him, because, under Hitler`s orders, they had taken a personal loyality oath to him. I agree that this sounds really childless and simplistic in today`s cynical age, but the sad truth is that German officers sense of loyality and obedience prevented them for resisting Hitler.

``It boggles the imagination as to what the German army could have done to us, if Hitler had not been working so effectively for us``

Major-General Norman Cota
29 Infantry Division USA (United States Army)
Red Dog Sector, Omaha Beach Normandy
June 6, 1944

Ciao

Tahmed:

With all due respect to Giap, the French surrounded themselves at Dien Bien Phu. It is a bowl completely dominated by surrounding hills and Legion commanders had questioned the advisability of establishing a base in Viet Minh dominated territory that could only be resupplied by air and that was so vulnerable to artillery fire from the surrounding hills. The French artillery commander at Dien Bien Phu assured the Legionnaires that it was impossible to move heavy arillery through virgin jungle and that his counter-battery fire would destroy any light artillery or mortars that the Viet Minh could deploy. The Viet Minh, of course, dismantled their heavy Russian 105 mm howitzers (I think they might even have managed to bring up some 155s), carried them and the ammo, using thousands of coolies, up into the hills. This made Dien Bien Phu a giant killing ground and rendered the airstrip unusable. The rest is history. The Viet Minh achieved the seemingly impossible by positioning heavy artillery up in the hills and that meant that Dien Bien Phu was finished.

Incidentally, the French artillery commander, when he realized that he had condemned all the men at Di