A Decision to Regret

Fundamentally, in this debate, the entire notion of picking the best parts, and hoping for the `ideal fighting force`, is flawed. An army (like any organization) is only as strong as its weakest link. It is the sum of the parts that counts, not the parts themselves.

Also, the notion that certain provincial/regional factors influence the `fighting` or the `martial` spirit is pure bunk. Training, discipline, motivation, leadership and equipment are far more important factors. Romair`s bravado reminds me of a former professor who happened to be Greek, and now teaches engineering at MIT. He told me that when he was growing up in Greece, he was led to believe that Greeks and their `ancient civilization` are the best thing since sliced bread (And perhaps with some reason, since Greece has influence the Western world more than any other civilization). But, one trip outside of Greece quickly disabused him of that notion, since he saw so many things that were better in other countries in the contemporary world. Romair`s belief in the fighting abilities of the Pakistani jawan is rooted in the same logic, and he honestly admits it too. Romair states that he happens to know most about the Pakistani and the US militaries. But, the fact that one`s vantage point gives limited visibility, is not reason enough to assume that the Gurkhas, the Nagas, or the Tamils (as the LTTE keeps demonstrating with sickening frequency) are not any better (or worse).

Re: Ferozk #447

`` The German army and its officer class, the Junkers, were professional soldiers who maintained a clear division between politics and military professionalism….``

Perhaps. But, if there is any spectacular example of supposedly highly professional senior military officers who kow-towed to a dictator with little or no strategic military sense, and led a nation to a devastating defeat (thankfully), it must be the German Wehmacht of WWII. In accepting and following often-impossible orders of a former corporal, the Wehrmacht demonstrated that even a fine fighting machine couldn`t redeem itself if it is poorly led. Indeed, the senior officers were derelict in their duty to knowingly follow orders that would lead to the destruction of their command, and ultimately their nation.

Re: Romair #451

``…Military capablities should be judged in the context of battles. Not how good Generals are in politics. That is the job of politicians…``

Oh really? Then how come your vaunted generals insist, nay demand with your full endorsement, a role in Pakistan`s politics?

Re: Fuzair #487

``…safeguarding the ideology of Pakistan…``

Fuzair, I have never seen any document/speech that encapsulates the `ideology of Pakistan`. I have, however, heard of it being alluded to in indirect or vague terms.

``… The Henderson-Brooks (BTW, was he Anglo-Indian or actually English? Anyone know?)…``

Henderson Brooks was an Anglo Indian. He was a Colonel (Brigadier?) at the time he was asked to write the report, and retired as a Major General. Even though the terms of reference of the inquiry were limited strictly to matters of military tactics and strategy, he recognized (as did many other officers) that the failure was rooted in political strategy, not military. He skillfully skirted around the restraints imposed upon him by shedding light on how political objectives were out of sync with military means necessary to enforce them. BTW, his report saved the skins of many other senior officers whose progress up the ranks would have been stalled by the political intrigues of Defence Minister Menon and Gen. Kaul. One such officer who got a reprieve thanks to Henderson Brooks was (then) Maj. General Sam Maneckshaw who had coined the phrase `Kaul boys`.

Eklavya #488

[[re: AeishA # 484

``Non Muslim writers like Arundhati Roy.They dont start writing about Kalis blood dripping ghastly scene or Shiv out of proportion DICK being grotesque.``

You find a big dick grotesque? Some of my lady colleagues will strongly object.]]

Eklavya, You made good observations. Perhaps lady in discussion finds all dicks grotesque. Perhaps she is of kind that are more interested in Yoni on which Shiva`s linga is normally installed. (I wonder what Zahara will comment on all this discussion).

hobbyty #417:

``Voting a Hindu fundamentalist party into power and keeping in power a man who as premier has said that the destruction of the Babri was an expression of national will, to me suggests a general antipathy towards Islam. then of course there is the matter of captive Kashmir.``

Not that I like to defend ABV, but to keep the record straight, he said that construction of the Ram temple was the will of the nation. He has always condemned the destruction of the Babri Masjid. Now you can say how can one support the construction of the temple, without destruction of the Masjid in the first place, I cannot answer that. I condemn the destruction of the Masjid, and I think the construction of a temple there would be the final blow to our secular principles.

Finally, the only captive Kashmir that exists is the portion occupied by your country, yet called `Azad` - a mockery if ever there was one.

tahmed:

``Show me one German general who conquered a country of 135 million and held on to it like a teddy bear, and I`ll show you Four (count em, 4!) Paki generals who have done that (happens to be their own country, but those are details).``

Minor crib - Pak population was not 135 million always. When the first General took over, it must have been way less.

Pak population is currently estimated at 140 million. I read recently that its ANNUAL growth rate is 2.8 percent! Rounding it up to 3% and allowing for compounded growth, it means in thirty years Pak population will be 280 million by 2030! That is more than the current population of the US. India`s growth rate is 1.6% a year and that itself is an explosive growth. Where will all the Pakis go? How many of them will be educated? I fear Pakland will become totally ungovernable by this time. How will that impact India? That is what Indians should worry about, not the nuclear bomb.

Romair #476``

``Fuzair #458: There is a simple rule about fighting massive civilian uprisings that have the following three characteristics:

- A large group of civilian willing to die for their cause.

- Military support from a third-party country

- A shared border of the area with the uprisings, with the third-party country that is providing the support.

``The rule is, ``Don`t`` i.e. don`t attempt to fight such fights. Solve the problem politically, regardless of how much you have to give up. In the long run, you will be better off. This has been proven again and again, yet military strategists never learn. Some examples are as follow:

``And India is now doing the same in Kashmir. It will sooner or later withdraw due to locals willing to die for their cause, military support through volunteer civilian insurgents from Pakistan coming through a shared border.``

Romair - your argument is flawed! In the case of America in Vietnam or Soviets in Afghanistan, they did not consider it a part of their own country, unlike India with Kashmir. Secondly, in the case of America in Vietnam and Pakistan in Bangladesh), there were no contiguous boundaries, while J&K is contiguous with the rest of India. Third, India is only in defensive mode in J&K, whereas America in Vietnam or Soviets in Afghanistan were the attackers. Defending involves less fatalities and less costs than attacking. We are not using airplanes and bombs, for example. Finally, contrary to your govt`s propaganda, Indian army is NOT killing civilians (unless caught in cross-fire etc). On the other hand, Pak in Bangladesh was killing millions, Vietnam and Afghanistan had lakhs of civilian deaths...

Re: Sherdil # 491

I think you have a indentified a very good point about the politics creating strange alliances. Benazir Bhutto may, once again, come to power and will, once again, disappointment many in this blighted nation. Like you, I too harbor doubts about the future, but being a cynic I know nothing good will come our way - so I ignore my doubts and hope for the best, while preparing for the worst knowing that nothing will change for the better. Pakistan has one year left, before the return of politicans and after that, Pakistan will revert back to what it was before October 12, 1999.

On the military front, the SAS are better option than the American spec ops forces.

The Americans are pinning their hopes on the United Front to break through the Taliban lines and end up in Kabul before the first snow fall of the season. The United Front is in no position to attain the military and political objectives mandated by the United States, because it is, in reality, a political alliance of neccessity - to dethrone the Taliban. Once, and if that aim is actualized, the question will be can the United Front maintain its political coherence, while it deals with the post-Taliban situation?

I personally disagree with everything that the Taliban stand for and nothing will please me more than to see them erdicated. Depsite my hatred for the Taliban, I have to admit that the Taliban believe in their cause and are willing to die for it. Judging from the experince of the United Front`s military experiences, it seems that the United Front does not believe that its cause, the overthrow of the Taliban, is worth dying for and hence, it has continually pleaded that the United States instensify its bombing missions targetting Taliban positions. The United Front wants a ``milk run`` into Kabul; it wants the reward without excerting the effort required for it.

Herein lies the dilemma. The United Front is not, militarily, capable of taking on the Taliban in a sustained manner and on the scale, which the United States would like to see it engage the Taliban. If the United States wants to achieve its objectives, it will have to get involved in the land campaign inside Afghanistan. The United States is already helping the United Front by providing military logistical help. As the United Front appears more and more incapable of mounting a serious military offensive, the United States will have to shoulder more and more responsibility in this war.

This will, eventually, cause ``mission creep`` in the American military plans and set the stage for an indefinate American involvment in the war. Indefinate in the sense that the United States has no political objective clarified, which can be attained by the application of its military power. The danger, for the United States, is that it has failed to rationalize the political aims for, which it is fighting this war. The United States claims that it is a war against terrorism, but so far it has not given a crediable defination of the word ``terrorism`` and what it means.

The United States, also, claims that this military campaign is to destroy the Taliban and replace them with a ``multi-ethnic government``. It has not articulated, as of yet, how it will seek to implement this aim. It seems that the United States entered this war with no objective in mind other than to satisfy the blood lust of the American people for the acts of Nine Elevan and to prove to them that the United States government was doing something.

If the domestic political perception of doing something is better than doing nothing, the United States` government is more concerned about the public opinion than the actual aims and intentions of this war and how to realize them.

The United States has, so far, not shown a political will to commit its ground forces despite all its rhetoric on the subject. The hidden sub-textual message of this could be that the United States` government realizes, and fears, that once American ground troops are commited and they incur casualities, the public opinion will wane and the support for the war may diminish. There is nothing empherical to suggest this possibility, but it seems to be a consideration in the minds of the American military planners.

The danger from this is that political considerations will change over time and with it, the military objectives will also change. Since the political objectives are not clear, the military objectives will remain opaque and war will end in a stalemated status quo ante.

Once this happens, then the overarching consideration will be the political will of the participants to sustain this war. Hence, the political aim of this war will end up being the political will of the combatants, which they will try to attain via their military power and the political objective of this war would be the sustainment of their political will to prosecute this war.

This is a recipe for disaster in a multi-pluralistic society like the United States, which has a finate limit to its political will; a will based on the popular opinion of its populace.

Ciao

Interesting talk from Chomsky:

http://www.dawn.com/2001/11/06/top3.htm

``Authorities last night filed sedition charges against the nation`s leading Muslim cleric, stepping up a crackdown on anti-government and anti-U.S. protests...



The charges against Qazi Hussain Ahmad, leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami party, stemmed from a speech on Friday in which he urged the army to overthrow the government of President Pervez Musharraf...``

It was about time. Lock him up and throw the keys in the Chenab.

It looks like our very own Benazir is set to make a return. The reports are that with the PML making their alliance with the religious parties, President Musharraf will allow Benazir to come back. Will this give President Musharraf some counterweight to offset the protests from the religious parties, and at what cost will this come? Will President Musharraf keep Benazir`s hands from dipping into the many millions promised to Pakistan for its support against terrorism?

Until a week ago I had real hopes for Pakistan. I have real doubts now.

Reports say the US led forces are getting in place to launch their ground. The Northern Alliance is going through what may be a crash course in tactics, but to win against the Taliban, the forces best trained are the British SAS. They`ve had actual experience in Afghanistan, for one thing. And more importantly, they are better at this kind of fighting than the US soldiers, whose emphasis is more on upper body strength (their reliance on technology requires more equipment which is part of the packs they carry). The SAS is more reliant on stamina, body and mental deprivation training and regularly trains under harsher condition for days and weeks. These are the conditions the Taliban fighters are adapted to, especially during the winter months. If the British forces are going to play a larger role, then perhaps the Gurkhas are a major component of this force, for very obvious reasons (not the least of which is their adaptation to combat in low oxygen, mountain terrain). The physical demands of fighting in Afghanistan are not easily envisioned outside the environment. The Pathans will run up the mountain carrying heavy guns and launchers on their shoulder, the weight of which staggers a donkey, and then they will still have the energy to engage in a wrestling match with each other. To wade across a muddy, icy river, instantly freezing the clothes stiff on your back that already has shrapnel wounds in it - that is hardened person. It is a harsh land, hardened like the people that inhabit it. For all the talk of similarities and dis-similarities between the Afghans and others, this is what sets them apart physically. The mental ``khwar` quality of the Pathan is something else altogether. Is every Pathan like this? Of course not. But they have a much larger percentage of individuals like this than any other group.

re: AeishA # 484

``Non Muslim writers like Arundhati Roy.They dont start writing about Kalis blood dripping ghastly scene or Shiv out of proportion DICK being grotesque.``

You find a big dick grotesque? Some of my lady colleagues will strongly object.

AeishA, we don`t obsess over these things. Big dick, small dick, big c, small c, the good Lord made them all. If you cant take a big dick, go for a small one. That`s called choice. My preference in things feminine tends to be a bit on the meaty side.

Re: Tahmed #474

I think that the reason why our generals are usually not as good as their generals is fairly straightforward in the sense that in our army, more than in most other ``professional`` armies, our generals are as often as not promoted on criteria other than strict ``merit.`` I`m sure that you`ve heard of the ``Goof Selection Syndrome`` that afflicts our officer corp at the highest levels. Well, our red tabbers on up have it to the utmost.

However, this is an affliction that affects all peacetime armies. Officers are promoted who have all the right holes punched (to use a US Army phrase denoting the right courses attended, the right appointments held, etc.) rather than ones who are truly innovative, willing to take risks, speak up, etc. This is of course actually true of all bureaucracies, especially highly authoritarian, hierarchical ones. The problem is particularly acute in our Army for several reasons:

1 Military rulers and civilian autocrats prize loyal but stupid generals (e.g. Musa or Tikka Khan) over more intelligent and capable but possibly more ambitious and hence more dangerous ones (e.g. Akhtar Hussain Malik? or Gul Hasan).

2 Armies that have an overwhelming ideological orientation (e.g., ours with Islam and safeguarding the ideology of Pakistan) are more willing to sweep stuff under the carpet and pretend that nothing happened because to do otherwise is to risk perhaps irreparable damage to the ideology. A contrast to this is India after the 1962 Sino-Indian War fiasco. The Henderson-Brooks (BTW, was he Anglo-Indian or actually English? Anyone know?) report on the state of the Indian Army cost Kaul and Menon their jobs and almost took Nehru as well. In contrast, we after the E. Pakistan disaster carried out a half-hearted attempt (HamoodurRehman commission) whose job was more to exonerate Bhutto and affix the blame on Yahya rather than actually try to get at the truth and punish the guilty parties.

It is a telling commentary on how pathetically unprofessional GHQ is that neither at Staff College nor the AFWC have we ever actually studied what went wrong in 1965 and 1971. In contrast to this, the Germans after WWI (actually the blitzkrieg concept was developed in a basic form during 1918) analyzed in minute detail what they did wrong and how to not make the same mistakes again.

3 Especially in our Army at the Staff College level but also at the War Course level, minimal emphasis is placed on originality of thought and any attempt to look at a problem in a new way. This is some sort of a cultural bias with us in the sense that a pupil (Staff College student) who tries to think originally is seen as a threat to the instructors (Directing Staff). After all, if a DS is not smarter than a student, than he is actually stupid and should not be promoted, should he? So the emphasis is on rutta and producing a ditto-copy of a previous solution to the tactical exercise. The best solution is of course the one prepared by the syndicate that your current DS was a member of. You KNOW that he must give that one full marks! After all, its HIS solution!

I don`t know what things are like now but I`ve read a couple of reports written by Allied Officers (Canadians and Australians and some others) who attended Staff College at Quetta and they described the syllabus as being very sterile and extremely rigid. A large part of this is of course British military doctrine (not the most innovative in the world) but a large part of this is our own doing. One Canadian officer who was there in the 1980s described Staff College as being in a time-warp because he learnt everything there was to know about how to handle a WWII British Indian Army Infantry Divison! That is, nothing that might conceivably be useful in a modern war environment.

4 Finally, every General (at every level) we get HAS to make his own mark and try to prove how much better he was than his predecessor. So all plans, training regimes, institutionalized procedures, etc, are thrown out the window and all new ones instituted. Now, throwing out bad SOPs is a good thing but too much of this means that there is no institutional memory worth talking about and we revert back to the highly personalized style of leadership that has been the hallmark and downfall of all South Asian armies since time immemorial.

Sorry, end of lecture. I could go on but I`ll get off my soapbox now!

Brilliantly written...finally I can I can clearly see both sides...

Omar 1974:

The Indian Army admitted that it lost at Kargil.

Um, where and when??

Fuzair #479: ``However, neither we nor the Indians have excelled at handling divisons or corps the way that the Israelis or Americans or even I suppose Egyptians have since WWII.``

I don`t know about the Israelis and Egyptians (the one or two Egyptian colonels I have met were idiots), but I do know that it is extremely, if not phenomenally difficult, to become a senior General in the US. As difficult as becoming the Vice President of IBM or Micorsoft or GE, etc. The educational standard alone is phenomenal (Colin Powell being the exception). The entrance standard of US militaries are higher than those of Harvard. Officers have to get a Master`s degrees to go beyond Major. And many Generals have Ph.Ds. During their careers, they have to learn how to do all kinds of different things (manage, teach, fly, special ops, run gigantic IT depts. etc.). So it is quite easy to understand why their corps would move well. Their only drawback is like most Americans, they have very little knowledge of things outside their culture.

Pakistan`s military traditions are extremely strong and old. They are decades, if not over a century or older. It is these traditions that drive the military. That is why I cannot imagine corps commanders overthrowing their Chief, even if they hate him. Or the military turning into a Taliban force. Different officers will obviously have different points of views on different issues, and will make different policies when they are in command, but insubordination is equivalent to suicide. I cannot recall once when an NCO, airmen, petty officer, jawan etc. disobeyed anything I asked him to do. Not bad for 5 to 10 years of officership. Drinking, not drinking, religion, ethncity, pro-Taliban, anti-Taliban etc. are all secondary issues in front of seniority of rank. That is how it should be.

In this regard, I have to say the Pakistan military (like it or hate it) is not a banana republic like the Pakistan judiciary or beaurecracy. That is why politicians, rightly or wrongly, are sh *t scared of Generals. Not because of the firepower under the General`s thumbs, but because politicians know that their subordinates could turn against them, but the General`s subordinates will never disobey the General. This is much like the US political system. People may hate the person who is president, but they respect the office of the President.

Re: reply #480 KARGIL

My dear fellow you are misinformed if you think the Pakistan army `ran away` at Kargil! Please read the New York Times article by John F. Burns this past summer `Agony over Kashmir Echoes in an Indian Courtroom`. Also read `A History of the Pakistan Army` by Brian Cloughley, 2nd edition.

The Indian Army admitted that it lost at Kargil. The only reason Pakistan army left was U.S diplomatic pressure. The Indian army had only taken a dozen key points back at high cost. The Pakistan army still held over 120.

Incidently, within Pakistan itself there has been a concerted attempt by the army to dub Kargil a defeat. Why? Because If it was known they won militarily, (they lost politically) it would reduce animosity for India within Pakistan, sort of seem to even the score for Dec 1971. The Pakistan army does not want that. Not now. Trust me. Thats why Pakistani generals all say they lost in their books.

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