Muslims and The West After 11th September

rajanjua #445 ``The number of Slavs butchered by the Nazis is much greater than that of Jews. ``

The number of Chinese killed by Japanese is even greater than Slavs killed by Nazis: 50 million! And the Slavs (i.e. Russian army) raped over 3 million German women. Were those German women any less innocent than the Slavs who were killed, or the Chinese who were killed? Were the subcontinent soldiers who were used for bayonet practice by the Japanese (I have seen pictures of this gruesome activity) any less innocent than the German women of being so brutalized? Were the Chinese and Western prisoners who were used for brutal ``medical`` experiments (e.g. dying a slow death in cold water as a spectacled little ``scientist`` takes notes) any less innocent than the Indian soldiers who were used for bayonet practice? I could go on ranting and wailing and howling and crying (and thanking the Lord I aint one of these victims of war), but I will stop here...

Only those who dont care about the terrible things that take place in a war think that war (in any form: conventional, guerilla, civil) is a solution. And the reason they dont care is because they think they will not find themselves personally at the wrong end (or any end) of the bayonet.

hobbyty #437 I used google to look up the internet on ``secular humanism``, and I have cut and paste below how the term is described in the first website on the list that came up. NOWHERE in the description below do I see calls for sexual perversion or atheism which you had included among the key features of this doctrine. Nor have (as I mentioned before) heard of any ``Secular Humanist Terrorists``, or of ``Secular Humanist Sexual Perverts``.

So what is your problem with secular humanism? It seems to me you are simply defaming a viewpoint that seems perfectly reasonable and consistent with the Quran.

``Secular Humanism is a term which has come into use in the last thirty years to describe a world view with the following elements and principles:

- A conviction that dogmas, ideologies and traditions, whether religious, political or social, must be weighed and tested by each individual and not simply accepted on faith.

- Commitment to the use of critical reason, factual evidence, and scientific methods of inquiry, rather than faith and mysticism, in seeking solutions to human problems and answers to important human questions.

- A primary concern with fulfillment, growth, and creativity for both the individual and humankind in general.

- A constant search for objective truth, with the understanding that new knowledge and experience constantly alter our imperfect perception of it.

- A concern for this life and a commitment to making it meaningful through better understanding of ourselves, our history, our intellectual and artistic achievements, and the outlooks of those who differ from us.

- A search for viable individual, social and political principles of ethical conduct, judging them on their ability to enhance human well-being and individual responsibility.

- A conviction that with reason, an open marketplace of ideas, good will, and tolerance, progress can be made in building a better world for ourselves and our children. ``

Re:narain#434

The answer lies in two words - nuclear weapons. India may have military superiority over Pakistan, but any overt action will lead to a nuclear exchange. If there is an uncontrolled collapse of the Pak government, as you seem to propose, there is no guarantee who will end up with those weapons. For e.g. if there is chaos and the LeT or Jaish gets hold of a couple of nukes, they will not hesitate to launch a fidayeen attack on India with those nukes.

We can sit and pray for a democratic transformation in Pakistan but it will take at least 50 years for democratic institutions to take root, assuming they start tomorrow. There is really no other political alternative except for the moderate, liberal elements of the Pak establishment i.e. the army. In the mean time, we can adopt a carrot and stick policy. The carrot is to negotiate and talk on all issues including Kashmir. The stick is that if they continue with proxy wars, we also launch proxy wars and covert actions. There are enough disgruntled communities in Pakistan as there are in India. At the same time, we can take as many measures necessary for our internal security and focus on extending our lead in the economic arena. India`s recent economic strides have not gone unnoticed in Islamabad. If that continues, it will force Pakistan to concentrate on economics rather than conflicts.

FK,Urstruly,YLh,what do you think of this perceptionamong westerners about pakistan_Afghanistan

Afghanistan

Pakistan`s Policies and Misperceptions



Such distortions in perception were shared by Pakistani officials. Their policies were based on an assumption of Pushtun dominance in postwar Afghanistan. The Pushtunistan issue had dominated relations between the two countries since Pakistan had become a nation. Harboring Afghanistan`s potential future leadership offered insurance that once a Pushtun dominated mujahidin government was installed it would drop the issue. This goal was linked to Pakistan`s heavy military investment in the Ghilzai region adjacent to its border. Pakistan`s involvement in liberating the region was intended to improve future relations.

In addition to ingrained cultural traits, resistance politics were shaped by situational factors. The institutional and operational development of the Peshawar parties was stunted by circumstances they could not control. Pakistan`s fear of Soviet reprisal induced it to oppose the establishment of an Afghan government in exile. It also discouraged the emergence of one party or a union of parties which could have made the resistance less dependent. Pakistan`s influence over the parties was enhanced by compelling them to compete for support. In walking a tightrope between partiality and caution, Pakistan`s policies stunted the growth of the parties.

The weakness of the parties was acutely evident in their failure to create a credible shadow government in anticipation of Kabul`s fall. Anticipating the capture of a major city (Jalalabad or, perhaps, Khost) in the wake of the Soviet pullback from the eastern border provinces in the summer of 1988, the parties created a ``provisional government`` based on a constitution that would establish an Islamic Republic. The government was stillborn. No suitable seat to place it was captured, no prominent leader was placed in charge of it, it was not funded, and the parties, themselves, ignored it.

Once it became certain that the Soviets were leaving, the creation of an authority capable of taking control of Afghanistan was more urgent. This situation led to initiatives by Pakistan and the United States, with Saudi support, to create an interim government which could politically offset its rival in Kabul, coordinate the final military effort and prepare for the establishment of a postwar government. A shura (council) of resistance leaders met on February 10, 1989. Token participation was permitted from expatriates abroad, but Shia representatives were not seated due to a dispute over representation. The prospect of transferring power to a separate authority paralyzed the leadership. It feared political eclipse. An interim government might connect with the commanders who already exercised control over much of Afghanistan. Only Gailani made an effort to have major commanders participate in the shura.

After considerable pressure from the ISI--and allegedly some bribing with Saudi money--the Afghanistan Interim Government (AIG) was created. In essence, it was a cabinet consisting of the seven party leaders and their senior deputies and a few technocrats. The voting was arranged in a manner which assured that the weakest parties would get the highest posts. Mujaddidi was named Prime Minister and Sayyaf, his deputy. The AIG was given the task of creating a permanent government acceptable to popular will. Whether that process would be based on a jirgah or elections was left open. An effort was made also to centralize budgeting, but the parties continued to operate as they had before, with little attention being paid the AIG by early 1990.

Data as of 1997



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Sadna

First of all correction to my 437 - ``unrestrainted self`` instead of ``unrestricted self``

Hello Sadna:

For some it seems gender is religion. I am not sure I am following your line of reasoning:

A ``dispensation meant for all`` - what does this mean? Christians may argue that the Church is meant for, that a church based dispensation is meant for ``all``? ``All`` whom? Is that a valid question to ask?

For instance in the case of ``secular humanism`` traditional religious beliefs are seen as a ``detriment`` to the ``progress`` of man and ``believers`` are described as God-intoxicated -Can a political/social dispensation hostile to traditional religion be accepted as ``meant for all``? - again, ``all`` whom?

Or do you mean to vector the position away from ``secular humanism`` and concentrate on ``secular`` as in the specialization of the institutions of religion and State?

In either case or in any case, both positions are ``value laden`` are they not? perhaps the focus should be on values and morality - rights and obligations would fall under this rubric - we might find ourselves discussing, what does individual freedom(s) mean? freedom to commit suicide?, for instance. and Why not? Why not tenneage pregnant unwed mothers? Because they are a burden on the state and their families? then why not be rid of them and reduce the burden? The rest of society will ``progress`` will it not, with out the burden?

I may be taking the discussion in an area you may not want to take the discussion to - so I await, clarification from you.

Hoodbhoy Rocks!

sattar2 # 405, 423 DRUMZ # 419

….not to sound corny or anything, but that was really enlightening ….

sattar2

“Ahmadi-Muslims believe that Mirza Ghulam of Qadian came in the spirit of Issa-ibne-Marriam, as prophecied by the Dear Prophet Mohammad (pbuh). He claimed to be the Mahdi of the 14th century, the long-awaited Messiah, and a prophet of God”

….so, can you tell me more about this mirza ghulam?…i think there are some signs to the coming of the messiah, right?…

These days when we are thinking in terms of rational foreign policy, an article written by Khaled Ahmed in early 2001 has a particular resonance. Many of the issues KA raised then remain unchanged, if not become worse by now. The longer Musharraf sweeps these matters under the carpet, the more impossible his task will become.

What is our strategic thinking?



Khaled Ahmed, March 2, 2001.

It is at times difficult to say who is formulating Pakistan`s strategy. Over the past ten years, the state has become so soft that strategic thinking seems to have become fragmented between the army, the leaders of jehad and the clergy. But roughly, it revolves around the threat of India, defence on the eastern border while securing the western border through political accommodation, and getting India to fulfill its pledges on Kashmir by using the leverage of international opinion. Another aspect of the strategy is maintenance of special relations with the Islamic world and creation of the possibility of moral and financial support of the Islamic world to its India policy.

The `threat of India` part of the strategy is ambivalent in the sense that it has evolved from a genuine fear of India as an early `undoer` of Pakistan to become a strategy of changing the status quo against a much superior adversary. The cold war strengthened this strategy and Pakistan got enough quality arms to force India to think in terms of a bilateral military symmetry. The wars were fought to change the status quo and were started by Pakistan because India as a status quo power did not need to start them. The apogee of this policy was the Afghan war in which `Pakistan defeated the Soviet Union`. After this victory, Pakistan took on India for the third time, through jehad. The question is who thought of the strategy of war in Kashmir? Was this task performed on internationally recognisable lines ?

Who thinks of strategy in Pakistan?George K. Tanham, a veteran ex-diplomat and a preeminent American writer on strategy, wrote in his Pakistan`s Strategic Thinking (Hicks & Associates Inc): `Conducting research in Pakistan on security has many restrictions and is not easy. The active duty military are forbidden to talk to foreigners about security matters; this also applies to many civilian officials. Retired personnel also have restrictions as to what they can discuss though they appear to have much more freedom in such matters, and are always careful of classified materials...A few academics and journalists are knowledgeable...`. Why should the military be expected to know security matters and the academics be consulted as an after-thought? In the US, strategic thinking is done by civilian scholars in the think tanks. A look at RAND`s history will tell you that `official` strategy evolved from the work of the non-military scholars.

As far as strategy is concerned, South Asia is still quite Byzantine. There is no White Paper on National Strategy. `Someone` is supposed to know what the strategy is. Why should he say what it is? Wouldn`t it be a violation of security to talk openly openly about it? The advantage of this is that when strategy goes wrong, no one becomes answerable for it. In 1965, we sent commandos into Kashmir thinking the Kashmiris would join us, but they did not. Our strategy definitely posited that India would not open a front across the international boundary. When it did, no one was supposed to be responsible for the failure of strategy. In fact, Pakistan covered up the issue by declaring the war a victory and celebrating 6th of September as Armed Forces Day.

India`s `lateral` response to Kargil:In 1999, the same strategy was employed on Kargil. This time it was more credible. Pakistan had the bomb and India simply could not cross the international boundary without risking a nuclear war. India did not cross the terrestrial international boundary, but it did something else: it moved its navy into the ocean in such a way that it scared the Pakistani prime minister into capitulating. Who had thought up the strategy without thinking of the sea? The international boundary becomes uncertain in the sea and stops being a boundary beyond the territorial waters. That the navy was not even consulted on the Kargil Operation proves that no one had thought of it.

Tanham writes of the Kargil Operation: `Pakistan once again has not engaged in careful, well thought out strategic planning. There has been a tendency to think about a first step only, and then to proceed to action or reaction. Rarely have the Pakistanis considered what the enemy might do after their first step, and they have been caught by surprise several times. Pakistan seldom states clear objectives of what it wants to achieve, only very general ones, such as ``to take Kashmir``.` The truth of matter is that any well thought out strategy would take into account the long view, which doesn`t go in favour of Pakistan. The writer of this article had heard that one `objective` of the Kashmir jehad was to keep the Indian army engaged internally so that it doesn`t put pressure on Pakistan on the Indo-Pak frontier, but was shocked to hear it from Pakistan`s ex-foreign minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan during a private dinner.

The long view is negative for Pakistan:The long view is supplied from the other sectors: the ulema connected with jehad, the Urdu press, and the retired army officers. The leaders of jehad frequently bolster the Kashmir strategy by saying that the Indian army is breaking under pressure and will capitulate soon provided Pakistan did not succumb to international peace initiatives. The Urdu press reiterates the textbook view of India as an inherently inferior polytheist state unequally matched with the superior moral and physical might of the Muslims. The retired general explains how India is breaking up from within and would soon be many states instead of one, and that Pakistan has to keep it under pressure to assist the process of break-up. This goes to make up the minimally coherent strategy of Pakistan.

The pillar of international support in national strategy is associated with Kashmir policy: that while deniable war goes on with the help of the militias, Pakistan would abstain from formal war and lean instead on the strategy of enlisting international support. This presupposes that India is on a morally weak ground because of its violation of human rights in Kashmir. But when Pakistan went abroad to enlist this `international support` after 1990, it got very little of it. No one went into why the world did not come to the help of Pakistan even though it was offended with India. Had someone in the establishment done any cold-blooded analysis, he would have discovered that the reluctance related to Pakistan`s internal developments. In 1999, the Kargil Operation was staged with the idea that the world will come to the help of Pakistan. If someone thought that Pakistan would get international support under duress because of its nuclear might, he was indulging in a dangerous low-IQ exercise.

The fragmented strategy-making on Islam and India: The fragmented strategic thinking supplies the next bit. The ulema and the retired generals posit that since the West is Christian and since Christianity cannot be in favour of Pakistan, the West cannot be expected to assist Pakistan in its just struggle against India. They enhance this insight by further positing that the West, led by the US, is in collusion with India to inflict harm on the Islamic state of Pakistan. The US in particular wants to see Pakistan subordinated to the regional hegemony of India. In an even higher flight of strategic fancy, the clergy and the retired army generals, frantically supported by the intelligence agencies, will posit a tripartite alliance between the US, India and Israel, to harm Pakistan in particular and the world of Islam in general. An `intelligence` general recently put the `final` definition on strategy by telling a scared envoys` conference in Islamabad that `not fighting with India would be tantamount to living as shudras in South Asia`.

The army and the jehadi clergy seem therefore to think that a permanent state of war would suit Pakistan. Both are armed and have a vested interest in conflict. What might bother the army today is that it has also to run the country`s economy and may be under the same `heretical` pressure as the elected prime ministers were when they tried to `cool down` the jehad. This dilemma has not taken the army in the right direction, but split it, the jehadis siding with the dissident Islamists in the army. Conflict suits the jehadis as an eternal choice. What would damage their cause is victory. A defeat would hurt the Pakistani people but will actually make the jehadi clergy paramount in Pakistan.

Can isolationism be a strategy? If the strategy was to nurse good relations with the Islamic world, it has become seriously dented by contradictions with Iran and Central Asia, both located in close proximity. The rest of the Islamic world has lost most of its leverage in the strategy because of war and economic decline. Iran and Central Asia are offended because of the operation of another aspect of Pakistan`s strategy: keeping Afghanistan under Islamabad`s influence to avoid having a two-front situation. This has plunged Pakistan into deep international isolation and rendered the original strategy quite useless. Afghanistan which started as a paradigm of disorder in the region has passed some of its disorder on to Pakistan. The fragmented strategists of course interpret it as a positive development in the context of Islamic purity. The real strategy expert, Samina Ahmed from Islamabad`s Institute of Regional Studies, expresses the following fears about what passes for strategy in Pakistan (Asian Security Practice, Stanford University Press, 1998):

`Pakistan`s continuing to depend on military power, both conventional and nuclear, and ignore the geostrategic policy of its neighbourhood could bring serious repercussions, for Pakistan has a history of conflict with India and the balance of power obviously favours its much larger neighbour...The use of official propaganda, in both domestic and international forums, to create hostility towards India, for example, could make it extremely difficult to resort to diplomatic bargaining, even if such a course should become desirable for Pakistan`s over-all security. It is becoming apparent that the new directions of state policy in Pakistan are in fact creating new categories of threat, both external and internal, while they fail to address the present security risks to the Pakistani citizenry and the state.`

Reply #: 436 shammi

on terrorism:

[``This is an Indian problem to be solved by Indians primarily.``]

on sai baba # 438

[``I was a skeptic of the Baba (thinking about the Las Vegas performers, etc.), but the moment I read the above statement, I was converted``]

The solution to India`s terrorism problem is in Sai Baba`s hands. Since he can make things appear and disappear at will, he should be asked to make Mush. disappear into thin air. While he is at it, he may transform Masood Azhar of Jaish into a dumba and Hafiz Saeed of Lashkar into a bakra! (they are already close, so wouldnt be much of a miracle!) Is Sai baba a patriotic Indian? Can he do so much for the motherland?

And I should be awarded the highest civil award by India for proposing such a simple, risk free and effective soulution.

PILLOW TALK, AN INTERVIEW WITH MUSHERAFF

PT - what do you say about the delhi bombing.

M- I have already condemned it.

PT, does your govt or isi have any involvement in it.

M, no none at all.

PT , how about the kargill invasion, what was your rationale.

M, we act on the basis of facts on the ground.

PT, that means you dont believe in any strtegy.

M , no not at all. Take the example of the coupe that gave me all the powers. The local commanders decided and here I am. Sitting in the plane I could not have done anything.

PT , that is a very interesting view of life.

M, I am a kemalist fatalist.

PT, Now all of the people in india are wondering, could the govt of pakistan be involved in the attack in delhi. They are construcing reasoned arguments.

M, That is interesting, good to know there are fools in india also. One who planned kargill cannot have any iota of reason.

re rajanjua 445

``The number of Slavs butchered by the Nazis is much greater than that of Jews.``

`Just because it is repeated manifold, murder does not cease to be murder` Lord Shawcross, Chief Commonwealth Prosecutor, IMT, 1945-46

``Its a pity, they don`t have a Spielberg equivalent in Hollywood.``

What does Spielberg`s alleged religion has to do with guilt or innocence of the Nazis? Or do you buy into the `jews control everything` nonsense?

``That said, the Jewish Holocaust in itself was ofcourse quite horrific.``

It is sad that so many ifs and buts and nuances have to be negotiated before a simple truth can be admitted after sixty years of the most brutal religious genocide in recent history.

hobbyt #437

Suppose gender was religion. Must women live under a dispensation meant only for women and men live a dispensation meant only for men?

Can women still remain women if they live under a common dispensation meant for all ? Can they exercise their unique womanly perspective and pursue their own women-specific interests in an arena of both men and women? Or is it necessary for the true woman Self that women subscribe only to ideologies of separateness from men, join only women`s political parties and maintain their autonomy through a womens parliament and womens laws ?

Accepting that men and women have inextricably-linked lives, that men are fellow humans too and to engage in joint enterprises on terms of equality with men doesnot compromise womanhood. It enlarges womanhoods scope of influence and increases opportunity to enrich womanhood.

Unless one prefers a defensive safety-first argument namely that to protect womenhood women need to isolate themselves. Or another argument that women should rule solely on their own terms.

Maheshg #414 I am flattered by your interest in my worthless opinions. Anyway, as I wrote to Shammi earlier, I dont care what proof exists - there is no room in civilized society for non-government organizations that seek to impose their views through force. And jehadi organizations are among such organizations.