Taliban : An Analysis

SameerJB,

Just read your post; I had a poli. sci prof. who once insisted that Communism is dead-he was a brooding German Marxist on top of that...Cuba, China, Kerala; he predicted were not pukka Communists because they were to some extent dependent on the capitalist hegemonies...

regards

semi,rsax,hari,sadna

Apparently you guys missed the post in which the hydra claimed to have worn the burqa on the subcontinent. Really. ``It was uncomfortable`` the hydra wrote. Will the lies ever end?

Rajanjua

There are so many ideas and themes to discuss in the works below - I am surprised that you cannot rise above your ideological commitment and simply discuss issues - instead you reduce me to ridicule - OK- I am ridiculed, don’t I feel silly for respecting you enough to engage you seriously? Yet, I will respond to the points you have raised in the hope that you will engage more seriously:

“The learned ayatollah hobbyty (ra) thinks that ‘objective secularism’ under the guidance of a revamped shariah has the answers for the Islamic Ummah. His premise is that religion is divine and eternal and reasonable arguments should be based on this one absolute truth. The ayatollah is a shining example of enlightenment and, for him Sai baba’s lingam has the same divinity as the koran.

You misrepresent or misunderstand – The Divine, the Eternal and the reasonable are two separate sets of argument – There is no exclusivity here. read with care. With regard to the “absolute truth” – yes, to its adherents. It seems in your zeal, you overlook the components: pluralism, tolerance and the freedom of conscience and democracy. Secularism without these components is but totalitarianism. Just as the Koran is divine to me, The lingam to Sai Baba’s adherents may be divine to them (pluralism and tolerance) Ayatollah Hobbyty, Maulana hobbyty, Prof. Hobbs, what do these have to do with the material? Have I or anyone else, used your name to define the content of your thinking?

“Maybe the learned scholar is trying to sell the Iranian version of theocracy to Pakistanis disgruntled by the Sunni nonsense of Qazis and Fazloos and Sami-ul-haqs. One can say for sure that he wants us to know that he has read Weber and knows how to spell bourgeois.”

Historically a defining feature of communists has been their willingness to change facts, but not ideology – not only am I not calling for Iranian style Clergiocracy, rather am actually rejecting it - Reading Weber or using a spell checker are not social evils. Ignorance is a certainly an evil – Had your reading and comprehension skills been exceeded by your fear and ideological commitment, you may have ventured to ask, “which work of Weber?” – This would be an indication that you at follow the postion and seek to understand my position in relation to the discussion of Rejection and Rebellion. please refer to “The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism” – you may also want to refer to “Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism” Daniel Bell.

“ The answer lies in a Shura (that means assembly we are informed by the learned scholar) and he is kind enough to include anyone in it (unlike the Fazloos and Qazis) but the decision-making is reserved for “informed Muslims” – what information these special Muslims should have? That probably has something to do with Tareeqah and Haqeeqah and Aqeedah, etc. (reading Marx and Weber is optional) – his intellect can be fully expressed in his own words, “This you suggest is as it should be. So why are you mistaken in taking such a position: indeed, your position can be both right and wrong, depending on the interpretation one adopts”.

Decision making for “informed Muslims”? – You either choose to deliberately misrepresent my position or misunderstand it – Ijetehad is not merely decision making, but the process of debate, to arrive at decisions– Decisions arrived at by Ijma (consensus) institutionalized in Shura (assembly) - DEMOCRACY, at the very least persons who are required to make decisions should be informed, Muslims or not.

I find it curious that among the many proponents of “secularism” on Chowk– there exists a strong, expressed desire for a single all embracing idea –I think this is the outward expression of the authoritarian instinct, so powerful among certain persons at Chowk, and in my opinion, your thinking thus far have shown an affinity for that group.

“And then there are gems like “In fact, in order to make the intellectual and emotional journey to Objective secularism (which you describe accurately) the conscious Muslim one must first traverse this territory - that is, he or she must first bring their ethics and morality in tune”, i.e., only true Muslims and Muslimahs who have gone through the extensive literature of different ayatollahs will be able to appreciate “objective secularism” (which is his fancy way of saying secularism - for definition please consult the scholar).”

Can there be a better example of Rejection and Rebellion? Ranjanjua, did someone not train you? Your teachers, your university instructors, your co-workers, supervisors? If you are a business manager, did you not train; do you not refer to the work of others? Do you not seek to learn from others? Of course you do – this in itself is negation of your position here, that there is no need to consult scholars, academics and specialists.

If you train to be an engineer, are you not required to gain learning and understanding in the field? Similarly, if an educated and informed Muslim is an individual and public good, why should one not train to be a Muslim? – This is what I am referring to in “intellectual and emotional journey”.

hobbyt #234 #235

Souroush says
``Religion, however, never judges a situation independently; the judgement is refracted through the interpretation of religious texts, a task that falls within the domain of reason, which always harmonizes its comprehension of religion with its other precepts.``

Interpreting religious texts doesnot fall within the domain of reason. There is a religious text and there are precedents and neither are necessarily `reasonable`, the text for instance is likely to be `revelatory`.

Reason and objectivity can play a role only at the last step, namely that of logically and reasonably extending the content and intent of the texts and precedents to judge the current situation.

Moreover, what if some donot believe in the relevance of revelation in the current situation. How would one decide `objectively` between points of view who do consider revelation to be relevant in judging a situation and those who donot consider revelation to be relevant ?

And how would one decide `objectively` between Souroush and one who disagrees with him?
------

You say #234
``Diversity of religions is not a problem, the definition is decided by the adherents and by general or normative understanding of the religions, NOT by the STATE!``

Yes, but to for these definitions to be `publicly` applicable, they would have to have the approval of the state, no? If the state is not directly involved, then the state would have to approve the existence of autonoumous legal systems for each set of adherents, is it not? Theres your definition by the state then.

``To say that ?religion is a matter of the private sphere? is to say nothing; equivalent to saying that, light illuminates a dark room but it becomes meaningful only in relation to the premise: That all that is public is the sphere of the State``

No `All that is public is the sphere of the state` is not the premise of `religion is a matter of private sphere`.

`Religion is a matter of the private sphere` just means the state has no stated position either way in matters of religion and that individuals, groups, organisations are free to do as they please in this respect within the framework of the state.

If one says about privately-owned businesses `Individuals are free to engage in private enterprise`, it means individuals are free to engage in private enterprise, not that the state owns all public enterprises.

``Why would anyone willingly become a slave of the state?``
Noone does. One doesnot become a slave of the state by asserting that he has individual unimpeachable spheres of influence too.

the learned ayatollah hobbyty (ra) thinks that ‘objective secularism’ under the guidance of a revamped shariah has the answers for the islamic ummah. his premise is that religion is divine and eternal and reasonable arguments should be based on this one absolute truth. The ayatollah is a shining example of enlightenment and, for him sai baba’s lingam has the same divinity as the koran.

maybe the learned scholar is trying to sell the iranian version of theocracy to pakistanis disgruntled by the sunni nonsense of qazis and fazloos and sami-ul-haqs. one can say for sure that he wants us to know that he has read Weber and knows how to spell bourgeois. The answer lies in a shura (that means assembly we are informed by the learned scholar) and he is kind enough to include anyone in it (unlike the fazloos and qazis) but the decision-making is reserved for “informed muslims” – what information these special muslims should have? That probably has something to do with tareeqah and haqeeqah and aqeedah, etc. (reading Marx and Weber is optional) – his intellect can be fully expressed in his own words, “This you suggest is as it should be. So why are you mistaken in taking such a position: indeed, your position can be both right and wrong, depending on the interpretation one adopts”. And then there are gems like “In fact, in order to make the intellectual and emotional journey to Objective secularism (which you describe accurately) the conscious Muslim one must first traverse this territory - that is, he or she must first bring their ethics and morality in tune”, i.e., only true muslims and muslimahs who have gone through the extensive literature of different ayatollahs will be able to appreciate “objective secularism” (which is his fancy way of saying secularism - for definition please consult the scholar).

re: aamir 12-head retard

{Chuteye}

...i guess you picked that up at home, while growing up as a child...did your parents use that term frequently?...

Rajanjua, Sadna, Drumz, Prem, Sameerjb - Everybody at Chowk

``Let the occasional chalice break:

Abdolkarim Soroush and Islamic liberation theology

Dr. Mahmoud Sadri

Abdolkarim Soroush has emerged as the foremost Iranian and Islamic political philosopher and theologian. His sprawling intellectual project, aimed at reconciling reason and faith, spiritual authority and political liberty, ranges authoritatively over comparative religion, social science, and theology. However, it is only by understanding the local context of his intellectual endeavors that one can appreciate the universal significance of his thought.

I. The Local Context:

The Icon

The persona of Abdolkarim Soroush must be examined in light of the iconic tradition of modern Iranian intellectuals. The ``iconic intellectuals`` are the producers as well as embodiments of ideas and ideals, and as such they are held in semi-religious veneration. The main contours of this tradition emerged in the decades preceding the Constitutional Revolution of Iran (1905-1909.) The multiple roots of this tradition account for its unique mixture of what Max Weber called emissary and exemplary prophecy. In both respects, this tradition marks a radical departure from the intellectual traditions before Iran`s turn-of-the-century exposure to the West.

Iran has had a rich legacy of traditional intellectuality anchored in religious seminaries (Ulama), the patrimonial state (Ommal), the rural nobility (Ashraaf), and the traditional bourgeoisie (Bazaar). Because of its marginal status and growing numbers, this last group was able to appreciate the new ideas and ideals that were being imported, along with Samovar and guns, from the Russian and Transcaucasian frontiers. Thus it is not surprising that the lower layers of lay intelligentsia (especially in the northern regions of Iran) quickly absorbed the new ideas and became the carriers of a ``mission`` strikingly similar to that claimed by the Russian ``intelligentsia`` (a Russian coinage, incidently).

Increasingly, modern Transcaucasian, Azeri, and later, Iranian intellectuals emulated their Russian counterparts in their breathless and tenacious quest to Westernize, modernize, and lead the struggle to catch up with the more advanced countries of Europe. Besides the Russian brand of missionary intellectual zeal, the ideal typical Persian iconic super-intellectual evinces an exemplary trait that is French in origin. The postconstitutional generations of Iranian students, who received their higher education in France, were profoundly influenced by the ideals of personal commitment, individual valor and moral courage that shaped the idealized self-image of the post-Dreyfusard French ``engaged intellectuals,`` a term coined during the Dreyfus affair in the 1890s.

It was the convergence of the models of the French exemplary and Russian missionary heroic intellectuality in Iran`s thriving middle-class imagination that produced the hybrid form of the nineteenth-century monavvarolfekr, and later, the twentieth-century ``roushanfekr`` intellectuality. The new self-proclaimed ``enlightened`` leaders laid claim to, and soon acquired a patina of native charisma because of their alleged mastery of modern erudition. Taking as their intellectual heroes such archetypes as Tolstoy and Zola, the intellectual leaders of modern Iran demanded of themselves nothing less than an unswerving missionary activism aimed at national progress and an exemplary ``j`accuse`` - heroism in proclaiming socially relevant truths against entrenched authoritarian regimes. This certainly holds true for the radical Shiite version of ``liberation theology`` elaborated and personified by Ali Shariati in the 1970s. In their various manifestos, the contemporary flamboyant leaders of the Marxist, Maoist, and Guevarist movements of the last quarter of the current century (e.g., the Toudeh party, the Fadaian e Khalgh, and, the Mojahedin e Khalgh guerrillas) consider themselves, among other things, heirs to the mantel of leading super-intellectuality as well.

Iconic intellectuality implies not only the role of the heroic producers of ideas, but also the equally heroic selflessness required of the consumers of ideas. By the same token, mere professionals, scholars, academics, seminarians and literati are excluded from the ranks of iconic roushanfekr intellectuals. Indeed, the roushanfekr is the opposite of Kierkegaard`s ``scholar,`` who builds public conceptual palaces but might live in a private existential doghouse. Private and public lives of iconic intellectuals are expected to merge to allow a clear view of their calling: leading the way toward reform and setting an example for the rest of the society. The iconic intellectuals are by definition at least equal to, perhaps, in the case of some laic thinkers, even better than their principles.

The appeal to a common mission and ideal life style did not imply the uniformity of instruments of achieving the designated goals which depended on individual predilections and intellectual traditions. We will argue that three paths emerged in Iran as the nineteenth century drew to a close. Some advocates, notably, Akhoundzadeh and Taghizadeh, chose the path of total surrender and assimilation, which we designate as ``radical laic modernism,`` while others, such as Aqayev and Talebof chose an accommodative but culturally and ideationally preservationist agenda, thus anticipating the contemporary movement that encompasses Soroush`s position, that is, ``reflexive revivalism.`` Both groups found themselves confronted with a third front: the ``rejectionist revivalism``of nativist, antimodern, and anticonsitutionalist Islamists. This turn-of-the century debate is by no means resolved; indeed, in the current cacophony of Tehran`s burgeoning free media, the continuing currency of such enlightenment ideals as progress, development, and religious reform underscores the abiding relevance of this trilateral debate in fin-de-siecle Iran. Abdolkarim Soroush is an iconic intellectual who represents reflexive revivalism in this dialogue. Understanding this context is critical for the observers in the United States, and some European countries, where the public intellectual is an endangered species.

Let us remember that Soroush started his public career as the highest-ranking ideologue of the Islamic Republic. He was later appointed to the steering committee of the Cultural Revolution by Ayatollah Khomeini. In the last decade, however, he has emerged as the regime`s enfant terrible and, more recently, as its bete noire because of his trenchant criticism of the theological, philosophical, and political underpinnings of the regime. He has been since summarily fired from his job, barred from teaching, discouraged from speaking in public, and periodically prevented from publishing and traveling abroad. He is routinely threatened with assassination and is occasionally roughed up by organized gangs of extremists known as Ansar e Hezbollah. Yet, Soroush`s defiance is not regarded as particularly heroic in Iran. Selflessness and unbending commitment to the socially relevant truth is par for the course of Soroush`s career as a super-intellectual. When he went abroad for a few months in 1996, after a series of violent disturbances in his public lectures and in the wake of persistent official harassment, there were no signs that his public would countenance his permanent departure.

The Iconoclast

To say that someone like Soroush fits into a pattern is not to imply that he is just the latest product of a cultural assembly line. He is an original, by any standard. But his uniqueness has as much to do with his prodigious talents and extraordinary education as it does with the unique stage of the Iranian and Islamic civilization that he represents.

To demonstrate the above it is enough to compare Soroush to some of the earlier links in the chain of Iranian iconic intellectuals. Soroush belongs to the genre of the ``religious intellectuals.`` The Charisma of the first generation of post coup d`etat super-intellectuals like Mehdi Bazargan and Yadollah Sahabi emanated from their mastery of modern exact sciences while maintaining and revising their lay piety in the light of modern science. ``Yes,`` they would aver in words and deeds ``it is possible to be religious, modern, and nationalistic all at once.`` The immense popularity of Ali Shariati, who was Iran`s most celebrated iconic intellectual before Soroush, was due to his powerful fusion of the Shiite tradition of resistance with the revolutionary ethos of the French left in the sixties. Shariati`s elegant and ebullient style of writing and speech was unprecedented and remains unsurpassed in Iran. His nearly hermetic and heroic lifestyle is also in line with that of an iconic intellectual. Although Shariati, like Bazargan and Sahabi before him, was at home with Islamic learning, he was routinely dismissed by the clergy (especially after he challenged their toleration of the vulgarities of mass religiosity) as unschooled in scholastics of the seminary, and when they finally locked horns, he was excoriated as a Western-educated heretic.

Unlike all of his predecessors in the line of religious super-intellectuals, Soroush, thanks to his firm grounding in both traditional and modern learning, cannot be ignored by the clerical establishment. On the contrary, he occasionally uses his mastery of the seminarian language of critical discourse to win followers among scholars at the holy cities of Qum and Mashad. Besides his undisputed claim to the mantle of a roushanfekr intellectual, Soroush wears the charismatic halo of a serious traditional scholar. Even the ideologically correct scholars of the establishment no longer challenge his scholastic credentials.

The Opus

Like Shariati before him, Soroush is quite prolific. The development of his ideas in the past few years can be traced in a succession of articles that he regularly publishes in Tehran`s monthly literary and critical journal Kiyan. He also remains close to the pulse of social developments through polemical duels, addressing university students on religious and national occasions and even delivering occasional funeral orations. The currents of Soroush`s revisionist Islam flow in three fields: the epistemology and sociology of knowledge; philosophical anthropology and political theory; and ethics and social criticism.

Soroush`s magnum opus, is a tome entitled The Hermeneutical Expansion and Contraction of the Theory of Shari`a. It reevaluates the Islamic Shari`a in the light of insights garnered from the fields of jurisprudence, history of ideas, hermeneutics, epistemology, philosophy of science, and sociology of knowledge. In this book and in his other writings, Soroush poses such question as, ``What can we as mortals hope to know about the mind of God, and to what extent ought we take the edicts deduced by Islamic Juristconsults as literal and immediate divine commandments?`` The clergy who have posed similar quandaries, do not object to these discussions as such. They are, however, outraged by Soroush`s recklessness for exposing the laity to such sensitive subjects. But this issue is itself a bone of contention between Soroush and the seminarian establishment. Soroush criticizes the practice of protecting humanly developed dogma by forbidding ``scandalous questions`` (Shobheh).

Soroush`s philosophical anthropology starts with the question of human nature. In his rather pessimistic view of human nature Soroush appears to have been inspired by a modern tradition that starts with Hobbes and finds expression in the ideas of the framers of the American constitution. But his treatment of this tradition is quite refreshing. In his essay Let Us Learn From History, instead of engaging in philosophical guesswork about human nature or dismissing the question as hopelessly abstract, he takes a direct and empirical rout: there is nothing mysterious or abstract about human nature. It is revealed to us in history:

``We must warn against the false belief that human history could have been more or less virtuous than it has turned out to be . . . Our definitions of humanity need to be soberly and somberly reexamined in view of the amount of greed, cruelty, wickedness, and ingratitude that they have caused - all of which they have done willingly and by their nature, not because they have been coerced or perverted.``

Here Soroush gives the sober liberal view of human nature an empirical, collective basis. Combining the bare-knuckle realism of liberal philosophers with mystical, theological, and theosophical arguments, he softens the pessimistic edge of this view with verses from The Koran and the poetics from Hafez:

``At the dawn of creation, the angels accurately divined that human society could not be devoid of depravity and bloodshed. Nor did God fault them for this judgment, only advising them that their knowledge is incomplete. Hafez restates the protestation of the angels but meekly and with infinite grace.

``How can we not lose our way in the midst of so many harvests of creed

When Adam was led astray by a single seed!

There is no escape from blasphemy in love`s bower

If `Bu Lahab` is absent, whom can the hell`s fire devour?

Where the Chosen Adam was struck by the thunderbolt of insolence

How would it behoove us to profess our innocence?``

Soroush believes that the Rousseauesque idealism (shared by anarchists, radical Marxists, and Islamic fundamentalists), based on the assumption of the innate goodness of mankind, has the potential of underestimating the staying power of social evil and of fostering the false hope that it can be extinguished. This miscalculation could lead to disastrous projects of social engineering of the kind undertaken by the socialist regimes.

Soroush`s political philosophy remains close to the heart of the liberal tradition, ever championing the basic values of reason, liberty, freedom, and democracy. The main challenge is not to establish their value but to promote them as ``primary values,`` as independent virtues, not handmaidens of political maxims and religious dogma. In his Reason and Freedom, Soroush is at pains to demonstrate that freedom is itself a truth, regardless of its performance as an instrument of attaining the truth:

Those who shun freedom as the enemy of truth and as a possible breeding ground for wrong ideas do not realize that freedom is itself a ``truth`` . . . The world is the marketplace for the exchange of ideas. We give and take, and we trust that the ascendance of the nobler truths is worth the sacrifice of an occasional minor truth: ``As the barrel of wine shall last, let the occasional chalice break.``

Abdolkarim Soroush is also one of the boldest social critics of the post-revolutionary Iran. As such, he has not minced words about the questionable office of the clergy (rouhaniat) within the Islamic tradition where they perform no sacraments nor mediate the relationship between man and God. He has also criticized the hegemony of the clerocracy in general and also in so far as it threatens the autonomy of the academia in Iran. Some of these points are quite evident in his What ``University Expects from the Hozeh.`` In another essay, ``The Three Cultures,`` Soroush denounces utopian reconstructions of the ``true identity`` of Iran at the expense of its Islamic, Iranian or Western components. In yet another treatise, ``Life and Virtue: the Relationship between Socioeconomic Development and Ethics,`` Soroush launches a Weberian study of the link between economic development and traditional religious ethos.

Soroush sees contemporary Iran as a society in the grip of massive disenchantment. Twenty years ago masses of enchanted Iranians ratified the constitution of the first Islamic republic in the hopes of realizing earthly perfection in government. Those hopes have now turned into despair. The resurgence of Iran`s turn-of-the-century varieties of revivalism and modernism could be attributed to these circumstances. They were exacerbated by the disappointing end of the Iran-Iraq war, hailed at the time by the leaders as a do-or-die crusade. Soroush is the intellectual face of reflexive revivalism in Iran. Its social and political face can be seen in the sweeping victory of president Khatami in 1997 (now hailed by the liberal newspapers such as Jame`eh and Salam as the ``Epic of the May 23) and in the massive turning away of the new generation of Iranians from revolutionary rhetoric.

II. The Global Context

The Luther of Islam?

The American journalist Robin Wright and many after her have referred to Abdolkarim Soroush as the Luther of Islam. Whatever the aptness of such analogies, they are notable not so much for their historical accuracy but rather for their power of historical imagination and intercultural understanding, otherwise woefully lacking in the Western media`s voyeuristic and orientalist interest in the Islamic world. The point is that neither theocratic rule nor the modernizing movements aimed at religious revival, reform, and secularization should be considered novel phenomena by the heirs of the Western Christianity. The Christian West, has, after all, lived through the imperial papacy of Gregory VI through Innocent III (eleventh and twelfth centuries;) and has tasted the religious politics of Cromwell and Calvin (sixteenth century). Thus, the upheavals in the Islamic politics in Iran and elsewhere should seem less like exotic spectacles and more like familiar scenes from Western Civilization`s recent history. If, as the Christian West has shown, the establishment of, and disenchantment with, a visible ``City of God`` leads the way toward the ``Secular City,`` then Islamic civilization is on the verge of a decisive, and more importantly, familiar, breakthrough.

Indeed, in terms of his politics, Soroush is unlike the reformists of the sixteenth century Europe, even though his writings are replete with explicit borrowings from European theology and philosophy from Schleiermacher and Kierkegaard to Locke and Popper. Here we must take issue with the neo-Orientalists who dismiss Islamic liberalism as an alien and untenable epiphenomenon. Their argument takes Moslem liberals` borrowing from the West as evidence that they are less authentic than the anti-Western fundamentalists. But it should be borne in mind that in opposing such liberal ideals as democracy in favor of an Islamic ``republic of virtue,`` fundamentalism also follows a long antidemocratic Western tradition, expressed across the centuries from Thrasymachus`s debate with Socrates to Marx`s rejection of ``bourgeois democracy.`` The antidemocratic stance of the 1960s Islamic revivalists was less influenced by Islamic theology and jurisprudence than by the French leftist rhetoric against the failings of docile bourgeois democracies. The right-wing clerical ideal of a true Islamic community of virtue is profoundly influenced by authoritarian interpretations of Platonic and Aristotelian thought. The elites who took over the reigns of power in Iran conceived of themselves more as ``enlightened despots`` than as Shiite vice regents of the ``occulted Imam.`` Those who have been quick to point out that in its internal theoretical civil wars, Islamic liberalism has borrowed from mainstream Western liberal theories forget that the Islamic fundamentalists have also borrowed from Western countercurrents of populism, fascism, anarchism, Jacobism, and Marxism.

Global Secularization and the Work of Soroush

Let us now turn to a comparison of Soroush`s project with the social-scientific efforts to identify the nature and role of religion in the posttraditional world. For the purposes of this discussion and in order to better understand the universal relevance of Soroush`s position, it is useful to distinguish three interrelated concepts: modernization, secularization and reformation.

We understand modernization (or, alternatively, ``rationalization``) as a process of progressive complexity and differentiation of institutions and spheres of life under the influence of economic and technological advances associated with the advent of capitalism. Secularization is an instance of modernization involving the differentiation of religion from economic and political institutions, namely separation of church and state. Secularization can also imply a separation of religion from culture and conscience. The two meanings of secularization can be expressed in the dichotomy of objective vs subjective secularization (profanation). Reformation (or, alternatively, revivalism) refers to attempts, on behalf of the religious, to anticipate, adjust, or respond to the changes associated with objective and subjective secularization. Thus, according to our sociological definition, not every religious innovation would qualify as reformation or revivalism.

Secularization from Within

Modernization, secularization, and reformation have been indigenous to Western Christianity. Social thinkers did not expect religion to survive the ineluctable forces of modernization and secularization. The founders of the sociology of religion, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim (in his early career), and Georg Simmel, expected secularization to succeed not only in separating religion from the state (that is, objective secularization) but also in eradicating it from culture and conscience altogether (subjective secularization or profanation). The world, in their vision, would become increasingly and inescapably more rationalized, intellectualized, demystified, and disenchanted. They failed to anticipate religion`s resilience and its ability to retrench and reinvent itself. A statement in a recent Newsweek article (March 16, 1998) sums up the consensus of the contemporary exegetes of the classical sociology of religion: ``Human nature,`` argued the author of an essay on the new forms of religiosity, ``is afraid of spiritual vacuum.`` Contemporary sociologists have acknowledged the fact of the continued existence of religion and have tried to explain the meaning, function, and reach of the new religiosity.

The theoretical convergence of three prominent sociologists of religion, Daniel Bell, Peter Berger, and Robert Bellah, on the nature and future of religion in the post traditional world, which is indicative of a broader agreement among sociologists, provides a social-scientific perspective from which the views of Abdolkarim Soroush can be better understood. For these theories hold not only for the Western societies but also for all societies that confront modernization and secularization. The general sociological consensus concerning the contours of the new religiosity may be summarized as follows:

First: The increasing compartmentalization of religion in the modern world as a result of secularization is a foregone conclusion. Religion, in other words, has clearly lost its monopoly on public perception, morality, and conscience. Modernization and secularization have made religious exclusion or absorption of competing ways of life and belief nearly impossible. Hence the inevitable and simultaneous emergence of tolerance and pluralism on the outside and ecumenism and voluntarism on the inside of the religious sphere. Religion has become ``deobjectified``; it has become a matter of preference in the contemporary ``faith market.``

Second: Secularization has socio-political and cultural-psychological aspects. The original meaning of the term secularization, that is, ``removal of territory from control of ecclesiastic authorities,`` signifies the institutional separation of church and state. Social and political functions of the church are thus relegated to other institutions. This stage of the process is understood as objective secularization. Subjective secularization or ``profanation`` involves an infiltration of the cultural practices and personal perceptions by the profane. While the pioneers of the sociology of religion found this latter and more thoroughgoing evisceration of religion to be the inevitable result of secularization, contemporary sociologists of religion have concluded that the continued presence and bourgeoning of religion does not support such a strong theory of secularization. Few dispute, either doctrinally or sociologically, the reality and, indeed, desirability of objective secularization in the sense of a separation of church and state. Some thinkers have even gone so far as to claim that secularization is an integral part of the historical mission of religion. It is the scope and depth of subjective secularization or profanation that is in question. It is clear, for example, that the degree of profanation varies with locations, classes, genders, and cultures. There is, then, an asymmetry between secularization of structures and secularization of conscience. Although subjective secularization or profanation has succeeded in the West more than in any other part of the world, its advance, even in the West, has been checked -- even reversed -- in the recent past.

Third: the new definitions of religion take seriously the desire of human beings for order, purpose, justice, and salvation. These are issues that the founders of the sociology of religion neglected. Daniel Bell attributes the continued success of ``camp-fire evangelism`` in the United States, (and similar movements elsewhere) to a universal ``existential need.`` Religion is anchored, not in the need for social control and social integration (per Marx and Durkheim) nor in the innate requirements of human nature (Schleiermacher and Otto). Rather, it is rooted in ``the awareness of men of their finiteness and the inexorable limits of their power, and the consequent effort to find a coherent answer to reconcile them to human condition.`` Contemporary sociology perceives religion as a set of coherent answers to the core existential questions that confront every human group. Thus, the social function of religion is no longer its sole explanation.

Is there a future for religion? Contemporary sociologists agree that religion as the sole organizer and arbiter of human society and consciousness has vanished forever. The solid ``sacred canopy`` has dissolved. It has been replaced by a patchwork of local faiths. The sacred seems irreversibly divorced from the secular. However, the demise of the supernatural in the public sphere is counteracted by its upsurge in the individual and group quest for transcendence. Religion in this sense is not only alive and well; it is thriving.

The foregoing views or the relationship between modernity and religion, their Western provenance notwithstanding, dovetail with those of Abdolkarim Soroush. But there is a significant and instructive difference: for modern sociologists of religion the above conclusions are ``descriptive:`` Secularization is firmly in place but profanation has not followed suit. Religion has survived in new forms, and sociology seeks to explain this phenomenon. Soroush`s work, however, is ``prescriptive.`` He envisions the possibility and the desirability of secularization of an Islamic society without a concomitant profanation of its culture. It is not hard to imagine that in the Iranian intellectual milieu such a doctrine would come under attack not only by radical laic modernists but also by rejectionist revivalists. Neither can envisage separation of secularization and profanation, as we shall argue in the final part of this essay.

Secularization from Without

Wherever modernization and secularization are (or are perceived as) foreign elements, we can expect three distinct reactions. First, there will be crusades to ``overcome the modern`` in the name of the preservation of traditional identity and truth. Modernization and secularization are thus vilified, even demonized, as unnatural, conspiratorial, and alien intrusions upon indigenous beliefs. Antimodern movements tend to advocate an authoritarian society and culture in the name of preserving the eternal and the sacred tradition. We have identified these, for lack of a better term, as varieties of ``rejectionist revivalism.`` They have frequently turned into nativist, purist, and militantly romantic movements with religious or traditionalist overtones. A second reaction to modernism and secularism may be described as ``reflexive revivalism`` which aims not so much at overcoming the modern as to accommodating it. Reflexive revivalism acknowledges the force and sweep of modernization and secularization and shows a willingness to cast it as a desirable and divinely preordained destiny. It thus tries to separate the universal, inevitable, and beneficial aspects of modernization and secularization from its culturally specific, imperialist, and ``degenerate`` properties. The third reaction is ``radical laic modernism`` that favors the wholesale surrender of the native culture and values to modernity.

Inevitably, the pioneers of reflexive revivalism, come under attack both by the guardians of rejectionist revivalism and the advocates of radical laic modernism. Neither of the last two groups believe in the possibility of secularization without profanation. Both consider profanation inevitable once secularization sets in. The rejectionists, fearing the demise of religion reject the project of secularization without profanation. The laic modernists for reasons of their own agree that the two should not be decoupled.

Soroush belongs to a relatively new and sophisticated brand of reflexive revivalism within Islam that has its origin in the works of the late Mohammad Iqbal Lahori. Soroush`s views, cognizant of the forces of modernization and secularization, informed by Western history and theology, and influenced by revolutionary and reform movements in the Islamic world, are not only illustrative and instructive from an academic point of view; they are also capable of revolutionizing Muslim theology and mass religiosity. It is no secret that neither the laic modernism of militaristic elites (for whom the Algerian junta presiding over a tragic civil war sets a poignant example) nor the rejectionist populism of traditional leaders (exemplified in certain elements of the Iranian and Sudanese experiences) have been able to offer a viable, durable, or desirable course for the future of the Islamic world. We believe that Soroush`s bold synthesis points to an alternative and increasingly popular path.``

Rajanjua, Sadna, Drumz, Sameerjb, prem, Saminashah, anybody who cares to comment

``Reason and revelation

Reason defines truth, justice, public interest, and humanity

By AbdolKarim Soroush

A Chapter from “Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam: The Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Sorush” – Translated, Edited by Dr. Mahmoud Sadri and Dr. Ahmad Sadri

Modern science explains the world as if it were not created by a god, not denying his existence, but rather finding no need to postulate it. In other words, it is assumed that even if there were a god, science would nonetheless be able to explain the world without relying on his existence. Nowadays science seems to have left its imprint on the behavior of the individual and the conduct of government as well.

In political culture of liberal secular societies, governments and individuals act as if there is no god, proceeding in utter indifference to His existence or nonexistence, never weighing His approval or disapproval of their policies and behavior. Political struggles and deliberations are designed to satisfy human beings alone. In this respect modern liberal democratic governments stand in sharp contrast to the religious governments of the past.

The religious governments of yore (in the age of the Catholic popes and Muslim khalifs) supposedly attended exclusively to divine, not human, mandates. At most, they saw people`s satisfaction as contingent upon, and as a natural byproduct of God`s satisfaction. Conversely, today`s liberal democratic governments pursue people`s happiness to the exclusion of God`s approval. Yet perhaps we can enjoy the freedoms of modern democratic government without ignoring the existence of God.

The problem of religious democratic governments is threefold: to reconcile people`s satisfaction with God`s approval; to strike a balance between the religious and the nonreligious; and to do right by both the people and by God, acknowledging at once the integrity of human beings and that of religion.

The task of democratic religious governments is, obviously much harder than that of democratic or religious regimes. It is immediately evident that we are faced with the problem of God. The central and fundamental questions are:

1) Does God exist?

2) If God exists, does He have any rights?

3) If God exists and has rights, must those rights be upheld?

Surely, those who are mindful of human rights cannot be indifferent to God`s rights, if such exist, nor can they neglect His existence and rights in the conduct of human life. It is by no means less significant to be concerned with the rights of God than with those of human beings. Although secular thinkers may not be oblivious to these concerns, they seldom if ever raise the question of God`s rights in discussing human rights, preferring to concentrate instead on securing people`s contentment to the exclusion of God.

One may summarize modern secular arguments about God`s rights as follows:

A. God, assuming He exists, and assuming He has specific rights, can defend or petition for His own rights with utmost might. Unlike weak and helpless humanity, He needs no recourse to others` patronage.

B. It is impossible to do injustice by God. Even if human beings do not observe His rights, still they cannot be said to have harmed Him. Defending human rights has a moral dimension -- the defense of the oppressed and the deprived whose rights are violated -- that does not enter into the defense of God`s rights.

C. Believers and nonbelievers still argue over the existence or nonexistence, attributes, and deeds of God. These controversies have undermined traditional certainties about Gods` existence. But this is a contest of faiths, not of intellects. Neither side judges the other`s arguments according to purely rational criteria, and this alone renders the problem unresolvable. It therefore, seems unjust and unfair to impose one side of the argument on all parties, as if it were a certainty, and to force everyone to observe all its consequences.

One cannot ask everyone to believe, to the same degree and in the same sense, in the same omnipotent God. Consequently, one may not ask everyone to observe the rights of such a God. Tolerance (Tasamoh) is the best solution in this situation. The public sphere should be expansive enough to allow a coexistence of religious and secular people, free from antagonisms that result from unequal rights and the imposition of one side`s belief on the other.

D. Assuming God exists, ascertaining His rights is impossible. Each religion invokes a different god and each claims a monopoly on the truth. How is the knowledge concerning their truth or falsehood to be obtained? How can we establish what God exactly expects from us? Once again, governments should be neutral toward various religions. Governments as regulators of public affairs, ought to concentrate on preserving people`s common rights; and leave theological issues to the citizens` private and inner lives.

Thus even if governments are still concerned with the questions of truth or falsehood of different religions and the supposed rights of God, they should remain impartial, guaranteeing the freedom and security of the contest of opinions, while scrupulously maintaining the separation of politics and religion.

E. Religion should, above all, be humane. Just as the people serve their religion, religion should serve its followers. Justice can not be religious, but religion should claim justice, truthfulness, and humanity among its attributes. Hence, in order to become acceptable to the modern humanity, the intrinsic imperatives of every religion must be harmonious with these extrinsic characteristics.

No one should be compelled to tolerate inhumanity, mendacity, and injustice in the name of God, history, patriotism, or any other shibboleth. Mining the humanitarian resources of a religion is more important than ascertaining its privileged divinity. In fact, it is humanity`s right to reject inhumane religions and even to contest their claim to true religiosity.

F. Since there is no way to derive ``ought`` from ``is``, people`s rights should not be decided on the basis of their actual aptitudes and talents. Such a policy could easily foster racism and other assorted biases. Human rights should be based either on humanity`s ultimate ends as revealed by the Creator (an impractical alternative for the above mentioned reasons;) or on people`s autonomous determination of their achievable objectives, combined with governmental respect for certain rights and obligations that facilitate the attainment of those objectives.

Natural rights simply mean principles whose observance promotes a more humane, rational, secure, prosperous, and fulfilling life. Rational ends such as justice, order, and welfare, and deliverance from discrimination, strife, prejudice, fratricide, ignorance, hunger, and oppression are the results of the long historical experience of humanity and a matter of consensus among all reasonable people. It is not as though any of these principles could be set aside for the sake of some religious dogma.

Human beings have suffered long enough at the hands of sectarian obstinacy, bloody religious wars, bitter clashes over beliefs, and futile battles over turf. They are now increasingly inclined to recognize one another as brothers and sisters as equals; to acknowledge common rights for all; and to refrain from relegating anyone to a subhuman status with lesser rights solely on the basis of his or her color, language, nationality, or beliefs. Being human is the only prerequisite for participation in such universal rights, irrespective of race, color, ethnicity, beliefs, language, nationality, or social class.

G. In the eyes of justice, inequality is an acquired state that precludes no religion, family, nationality, or ethnicity from eligibility for certain universal rights. In contrast, arrogating certain a priori rights to themselves, some racists, religious bigots, or ethnocentrists fancy themselves superior, and justify social inequalities and dogmatic restrictions in matters of religious freedom, marriage, citizenship, and free expression.

H. History testifies that religious beliefs and rules have undergone substantial changes at the hands of religious leaders and the clergy. For example, church authorities used to burn heretics and skeptics at the stake, and Muslims used to resist the presence of women in legislative assemblies. These practices have undergone fundamental transformation. Such constantly shifting ideas can not serve as the foundation of the rights of God and man; nor is it wise to coerce or invite all people to observe them.

These are the arguments of today`s secular thinkers, who are, indeed, blameless in their skepticism. Western science, philosophy, and technology have so shaken the foundations of human reason and mind; historicism has raised such a storm; and scientific and philosophical theories advanced so swiftly that no latitude has been left for stability and certitude. Tolerance in the domain of beliefs is the correlative of a fallibility in the domain of cognition that has encroached upon traditional dogmas.

The difference between the old and the new worlds is the difference between certainty and uncertainty, a distinction that accounts for the modern tendency to value human lives more than beliefs; in the old world beliefs always superseded respect for human life. People used to kill and be killed for their beliefs. Nowadays, killing people for their beliefs is deemed unacceptable and a breach of human rights.

None of the foregoing arguments deprive anyone of his or her right to believe.

Nevertheless, many people are troubled by an implicitly lackadaisical attitude toward the question of God, His approval, and His rights among three groups of people: those who consider religion from without; those who are still inquiring but are not yet committed to a specific religious outlook; and those who lead a secular life in a religious society.

However, members of religious communities who seem immune to the relentless inquiries of those outside their faiths and who fastidiously pursue their own religious way of life, find such arguments unpersuasive. Thus, the truly committed religious people take issue with two aspects of secular human rights:

1. Freedom of opinion is considered one of the primary human rights. Now, conviction can breed the kind of certitude that fosters decisive action. It is such decisiveness that manifests itself, at times, in holy wars and other such crusades born of unshakable belief. Such attitudes, of course, offend the sensibilities of the advocates of human rights. Secular antipathy toward religious zeal is, in turn, bewildering to religious people.

One may, of course, propose that the universal declaration of human rights advocates a particular form of freedom of opinion: the freedom of flexible opinion, not of absolute conviction. This may be an intriguing interpretation of the principle. It is doubtful, however, that it would find favor among ardent believers.

2. If democratization of religious government means washing one`s hands of convictions and surrendering to skeptical or secular ideas and to people`s demands, to the exclusion of God, this would be tantamount to abandoning the very idea of religious government in favor of an unreligious and secular government. An unthinkable alternative for the ardently religious.

How can one expect the people of strong conviction to retain their belief only inwardly, without honoring them in practice? Hence the dilemma of a religious government: it must confront a universal declaration of human rights that is oblivious to religion and the rights of the Creator; and must contend with the demands of an increasingly a secular society.

Thus religious governments cannot easily adopt all the principles and precepts of the declaration of human rights. Discord between the secular advocates of human rights and religious leaders stems from the suspicion of the latter that the invitation to democratization of the religious government will ineluctable eviscerate any religious content, rendering society utterly secular and reconstructing a faithless foundation. That is why religious regimes are willing to sacrifice democracy in order to retain their identity.

Considering the above secular arguments, the suspicions of the faithful do not seem altogether baseless. For its followers religion yields a definition of humanity and a description of human rights that are compatible. Changing human rights requires changing the definition of humanity, not a trivial and easy affair.

One definition of humanity makes religion necessary and another dispensable. Therefore, religiosity is compatible only with a particular definition of humanity and its rights. The slightest breach in this definition will destroy the edifice of traditional religion -- hence the understandable resistance of religious scholars and leaders to the new definitions of humanity and its rights.

But the debate does not end here. It is valid to argue that in a secular society a democratic religious government is impossible because religious governments are not answerable to the people. In such a society the best form of government would be a secular democratic regime. However, it is not valid to argue that nowhere and under no conditions may one perceive the desirability of a religious democracy, even in a religious society.

The truth of the matter is that a religious government can be an appropriate reflection of a religious society. Indeed, in such a society any purely secular government would be undemocratic. Whether religious regimes are democratic or undemocratic, though, depends on two conditions:

1. The extent to which governments partake of collective wisdom

2. The extent to which governments respect human rights

A combination of democracy and religion would entail the convergence of reason (Aghl) and revelation (Shar`). Every theoretical achievement will have to become practically viable.

Of Concordance of Reason and Revelation

Religious scholars cannot afford to be oblivious to extra religious knowledge. Nor can they shirk the responsibility of balancing the knowledge inside and outside religion since, many basic religious values such as truth, justice, humanity, public interest, and so on are integral to nonreligious value systems as well. If religious justifications are invoked in this context, then a circularity or a tautology will result.

On the other hand, arguments that are adduced for the truth and justice of religion are generally rational, human, and nonreligious in nature, yet they are influential in understanding religion. Therefore, disregard of rational criteria and of the necessity for the harmony of religious understanding and rational findings is a breach of religious responsibility.

It is reason that defines the truth, justice, public interest, and humanity; that attributes these properties to a particular religion (or else it would not become a rationally acceptable religion) and that undertakes the task of understanding the teachings of religion.

In these tasks reason would be undermining itself if, eschewing its general principles concerning truth, justice, and humanity, it assigns a different set of interpretations of those principles for religion; this would be analogous to pulling the carpet from underneath one`s own feet. Thus, one may state the following: preconditions for democratizing religious government is historicizing and energizing the religious understanding by underscoring the role of reason in it.

By reason I do not mean a form of isolated individual reason, but a collective reason arising from the kind of public participation and human experience that are available only through democratic methods. For democratic governments ``common sense`` is the arbiter of society`s antagonisms and difficulties; religious governments assign this arbitration to religion; while dictatorships leave it in the hand of one powerful individual.

Religion, however, never judges a situation independently; the judgement is refracted through the interpretation of religious texts, a task that falls within the domain of reason, which always harmonizes its comprehension of religion with its other precepts.

The debates concerning slavery epitomize this process. Contemporary Islamic scholars attempt, through various means, to bleach the blemish of the approval of slavery from the face of Islam. They explain that slavery was specific to a particular epoch; that its radical abolition was impossible at that time; or that its approval must have been a reactive measure imposed on Islam by the practice of other nations.

All these explanations have but one purpose: these thinkers have correctly understood that slavery is incompatible with human rights and dignity. These thinkers then, through rational deliberations, have helped bestow a more comprehensive and accurate understanding of matters divine upon the religious society, an understanding that will affect its overall way of life and government. Because an autocratic God is the best patron of an autocratic government and vice versa.

We may conclude that the appeal to mere religious convention cannot forestall the renewal of religious understanding or innovative adjudication (Ijtihad) in religion. Such renewal requires extra religious data. Therefore, democratic religious regimes need not wash their hands of religiosity nor turn their backs on God`s approval. In order to remain religious, they, of course, need to establish religion as the guide and arbiter of their problems and conflicts.

But, in order to remain democratic, they need to draw in dynamic the adjudicative understanding of religion, in accordance with the dictates of collective ``reason.`` Securing the Creator`s approval entails religious awareness that is leavened by a more authentic and humane understanding of religiosity, and that endeavors to guide the people in accordance with these ideals. In thus averting a radically relativistic version of liberalism rational and informed religiosity can thrive in conjunction with a democracy sheltered by common sense, thereby fulfilling one of the prerequisites of democratic religious government.

Of Respect For Human Rights

The first issue concerning human rights is that it is not a solely legal (Figh`hi) intra religious argument. Discussion of human rights belongs to the domain of philosophical theology (Kalam) and philosophy in general. Furthermore, it is an extra religious area of discourse. Like other debates on matters that are prior to -- yet influential in -- religious understanding and acceptance, such as the objectivity of ethical values, the problem of the free choice, the existence of God, and the election of prophets , it lies outside of the domain of religion.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with this argument, the discussion of it takes place in the extra religious area of discourse. It is noteworthy that Islamic theologians (Motakallemin) never hesitated to apply philosophical theories (e.g., concerning goodness or evil, predetermination, or the autonomy of human destiny) to their understanding of religion, even where such an exercise resulted in bizarre theologies.

As we have stated before, a religion that is oblivious to human rights (including the need of humanity for freedom and justice) is not tenable in the modern world. In other words, religion needs to be right not only logically but also ethically. The discussion of human rights is hardly a cosmetic, superfluous, blasphemous, or easily dismissed. Nor is it merely grist for scholastic and casuistic discussions within seminary walls.

Simply put, we cannot evade rational, moral, and extra religious principles and reasoning about human rights, myopically focusing nothing but the primary texts and maxims of religion in formulating our jurisprudential edicts. Because religious jurisprudence (Figh`) is nourished by theology, the extra religious foundations of these rules must be clearly critiqued and scrutinized; mere derivation from within cannot yield sufficient stability and lucidity. Such an inward gaze will hinder the outside discussion.

The second issue concerning human rights is that every democratic religious government, must be mindful of both the inside and the outside of the religion in order to remain faithful to both of its foundations. Of course, mindfulness is not necessarily tantamount to utter acquiescence. To be sure, contemporary advocates of human rights can claim no monopoly on truth and justice; nevertheless, religious societies, precisely because of their religious nature, need to seriously engage in discussion of the issues they pose.

Not only did our predecessors passionately debate such extra religious issues as the question of free choice and the question of the limits of God`s rights to overburden the faithful with religious obligations, but Islamic society felt a religious obligation to allow such debates to spread and prosper. By the same token, the extra religious debates of our day, which happen to concern human rights, must be viewed as worthy and useful exchanges of opinions in Islamic society.

The partisans in these debates deserve a blessed respect, and the outcome of such discussions should be heeded and implemented by the governments. Just as being humane is the condition of the truth of religion, so it will have to be the condition of the legitimacy of the government as well. Observing the rights of man (such as justice, freedom, and so on.) guarantees not only the democratic character of a government, but also its religious character.

The third issue concerning human rights is the false assumption that sensitivity to human rights is a surrender to relativistic liberalism. Such an assumption is at once ignorant of the nature of liberalism and an insult to religion; it gives liberalism more credit than it deserves and religion less: liberalism is not the fount of all of human rights, nor is religion their antithesis.

To be sure, human rights in its modern form was first formulated by Enlightenment thinkers with no explicit allegiance to religion, no concern with God`s approval, no feeling for religion as a source of discovery and justification, and thus entirely secular in outlook. It is equally true that only belatedly, as a response to the secular challenge, did the religious thinkers address this issue.

There were two reasons for this delayed reaction: first, religious thinkers, already possessing a rich body of knowledge concerning ethics, rights, and obligations, felt no internal impetus to address such problems and thus felt no motivation to join the modern debate begun by secular thinkers. Second, because the language of religion and religious law is the language of duties, not rights, religious people habitually think more about their obligations than about their rights.They concentrate more on what God expects from them than on what they themselves desire; they look among their duties to find their rights, not vice versa.

However, a greater sensitivity to duties than to rights is not necessarily an antagonism to right; it is, rather, a valuable perspective that can enrich the distance of rights and challenge liberalism`s putative monopoly of this issue. In any event, religious governments that are based on religious societies will be democratic only when they seek to combine the satisfaction of the Creator and that of the created; when they are true both to the religious and extra religious concerns; and when they equally respect pre religious and post religious reason and morality.

In the elusive and delicate balance between the two realms lies the rare elixir that the contemporary world, because of its neglect, finds unattainable or undesirable.``

Ranjanjua

``Man, you are like sadna in your interacts. `objective secularism` - what in the hell is that - secularism simply means separation of state and religion - it means that you don`t run to some retard (read religious scholar) for approval every time you frame a law.``

See a reading list is not necessarily a bad thing. With a reading list you don`t have to rely on my definition of it or my understanding of it -you can develop your own.

``State should not be the gaurdian of your faith - that`s the point - You need to take care of all those khatras by yourself.``

Agreed - that`s just what I said isn`t it?

``Are you suggesting that humans did`nt have concept of laws/rules before Musa`s chat with God? If yes then goto post#167.``

OK if the Ten commandments bother you – Egyptians derived their laws from their religions – Why the militancy in refusing to acknowledge the normative?

``On Shariah - a beef of mine with its present understanding in Pakistan, is the equation of Shariah with Islam itself``

``There are very few explicit laws defined in the Quran - You can`t build a goddam legal system out of it. Shariah is the Islamic Law. You ought to know the difference between the two - No one is equating them.``

How does one build a legal system?

You may not be equating the two and I did not suggest that you were - but significant numbers of Muslims do - Why all this hostility? Can you not phrase a position without recourse to anger?

Many Muslims are becoming aware that in order to oppose Obscuritanism, the very first thing to do is to challenge their understanding of Islam and making what was obscured, clear. Shariah or the understanding of Shariah is relevant to the lives of significant numbers of Muslims, in that it embodies laws and rituals and methods of discourse and intellectual exploration. Obscuritanists have capitalized on the lack of education - indeed has been central in keeping a majority of Muslims illiterate - to keep a understanding of Islam and Shariah that indeed is 1000 plus years old in stasis, in an effort to keep their power and legitimacy. Would you imagine that a Maulana Fazlu, or Samiul Haq would have any legitimacy if the majority of Muslims were literate and aware of multitude of scholarship that have repeatedly attempted to awaken Muslims to the dangers inherent in demagogues gaining legitimacy? - Any attempt that will bring Shariah out of stasis and assign to it a proper role as a branch, as peripheral to Tariqqah (the way or true path) and Haqqiqah (the inner dimension), is a worthy effort. I am not advocating that Shariah be the law of the land, on the other hand I am not willing to accept an authoritarian position that would deny such a possibility if that were the free and reasoned will of a majority. Shura means assembly and anyone can be a part of the assembly.



``Again this eternal and divine thingy is according to you - A vast majority of the people on this planet don`t agree with you.``

What about ``(to its adherents)`` do you not understand? As a matter of fact you have your facts wrong - a majority of persons are adherents (granted by degree) of religions whose core is the eternal, the unchanging. Christianity, Islam and Judaism, Hinduism are but four prominent, proponents of the Eternal and between them represent a majority of persons.

``Just for the sake of argument who will do the Ijtehad and what`s the requirement for membership in Shura. Define ``rejection`` and ``rebellion`` - of what and against whom.``

Do you understand ijtehad? (Innovative religious adjudication) By Definition it applies to educated, informed Muslims who seek to debate issue that pertain to the ethical and moral, yet it does not exclude that adherents of other religions do not or will not engage in the same, or not at all; they may not call it Ijtehad, but all conscious adherents do register and do discuss and debate issues and positions to arrive to ethical and moral positions with regard to issues that effect their lives.

Rejection and Rebellion are cultural and social themes in much of what has since the late 1700 been described as ``modern``. Rejection of the past and rebellion against values of the moral, which is again related to the past characterize the “modern” in art and in the social. I have discussed these themes in two post with Saminashah. If you will chose to read these posts, key to understanding them is that they are a discussion of intellectual movements in art and their representation in the social. To represent the ``modern`` and it’s rejection of the past, I have highlighted several influential thinkers - I have deliberately not included Marx, though he also fits the millenarian, utopian mold. Rebellion is also a theme in art and in the social. I point out that the word ``modern`` is itself an art word used to describe a derogation of the representation of reality in art and in the social. Rebellion is a significant theme in social in as much as; it seeks the ``autonomy`` of art and the artist. Autonomy from the moral, the ethical, the coherent. It is this intellectual foundation that enables both aestheticism and the culture of the ``Bohemian``. A comparison of this intellectual foundation with that of the bourgeois (best represented in the work of Weber) would be illuminating.

``I disagree - The Hudood Ordinance follows the Shariah to the letter. Its based on the Quran and follows precedants set by the Prophet and the Companions. Why is it a mockery of Islam according to you? Why is your definition of Islam different than some of the best scholars and saints, Islamic world has produced?``

Fine - lets explore your position: You suggest Shariah exemplifies a knowledge and understanding more than a 1000 years old that it`s based on the Quran and follows precedent set by the Prophet, even as you claim earlier that Quran has few laws. This you suggest is as it should be. So why are you mistaken in taking such a position: indeed, your position can be both right and wrong, depending on the interpretation one adopts.

Shariah is subject to change; it is human knowledge and human understanding of the Divine. It is not in itself Divine, nor was the Prophet Divine, he was, as Muslims are reminded repeatedly, human. It is based on an interpretation of the Quran - to suggest that it is based on the Quran and not it`s interpretation is to miss or delete a significant factor. As you are aware all texts are neutral, the presuppositions and knowledge and understanding one (any reader) brings to the text are pertinent in any understanding of the text. Similarly, it is important to see the text in context - otherwise one is left with error of a literal and shallow interpretation.

Your position would be valid, if we were to assume that Shariah is infallible, further we need not infallibility, we can posit that such is the current state of Shariah - your position would be wrong if we take the position that that your premises and the legitimacy they hold, are invalid. As you are no doubt aware, Shah Valliollah Dehlvi in his ``Hojjatollah al-Baleqeh`` has pointed to the error in assuming the Prophet`s governmental rulings, (which were appropriate for the culture of Arabia 1500 years ago, but not applicable to other times and places) and religions eternal rules. Indeed Dehlvi`s warning was to be aware of the universal in religion and to be attentive, not to generalizing and universalizing the ethnic and historical norms of a particular ethnic group.

Please be aware that especially Shariah law requires both the letter and the spirit of the law to be judged as ethical and moral and in keeping with the essence and universal in the religion. Obsessions with sexual power, with power in general, most Muslims would agree in neither in keeping the essence of the religion, nor the sense of ethics and morality derived from the religion.

If I have left you with the impression that Power is my concern, certainly I regret that. You may not have read a number of pieces of work of Dr. Abdolkarim Soroush, I have brought out in posts at Chowk. PLEASE READ THE ONES I WILL POST HERE SHORTLY - I will look forward to your thoughful and balanced critique. My intention remains to bring to the attention of Muslims and non-Muslims alike, scholarships within Islamia, which acknowledges Obscuritanism, a religiosity of sermons and edicts, of moralizing, of coercive political power, as gross errors. In fact, in order to make the intellectual and emotional journey to Objective secularism (which you describe accurately) the conscious Muslim one must first traverse this territory - that is, he or she must first bring their ethics and morality in tune. Understanding religious pluralism, the pluralism of salvation (to the adherent of any particular religion), freedom of conscience (particularly as it applies to the Muslim) and therefore Tolerance, are essential in coming to the understanding that secularism (the specialization of the institutions of religion and governance and the neutrality of institutions of governance towards the institutions of religion - you will note that there were and are secular regimes that are entirely hostile to any religion, save that of secular humanism and it`s hand maiden, totalitarianism) is a necessity. You have taken my position to be a rejection of secularism, whereas it is the rejection of subjective secularism, of a society in which the the word ``values`` has little bearing and which is hostile to the faithful. Evn as we seek an enlightened, just, therefore virtueous, Liberal republicy, we must remain vigilant that we do not end up with an illiberal, totalitarian republic.

As to the best scholars and saints and why my understanding is different? - I would argue that it is not different, but is representative of them and their work - but of course, that`s a matter of interpretation as well.

``Bad laws can and probably will be framed all the time in a secular society - but people don`t consider them ``divine`` - makes it a whole lot easier to change/discard them - they evolve as society evolves, as people learn from their mistakes - there`s no ``khatra`` to iman or perils of divine wrath involved. And that`s the difference.``

Precisely why Shariah has to be acknowledged as human, subject to change. Shariah is the circumference, not, the center of Islam.



Sadna

“There are two threats to the ``objectivity`` of traditional religion. Firstly there is the threat during the process of finding defination(s) of traditional religion over a large diverse population with diverse traditions.

Secondly, once such objective defination(s) of traditional religion has been arrived at, there is the ever-present threat of ``profanation`` of things outside its defined scope, due to ``value-loading``(your term?) of the state`s definations of traditional religion.

In constrast, saying ``religion is a matter of the private sphere and is not the business of the state`, sets both the individual and his religion free”

Interesting points: I have used the words “traditional religions” to designated and differentiate all religions, religious traditions prior to Marxism and the “modern”. Yet, I am open to deleting the word traditional, will that help or hurt the endeavor? Diversity of religions is not a problem, the definition is decided by the adherents and by general or normative understanding of the religions, NOT by the STATE!

Please explain ``Objectivity`` of religions - I don`t want to follow that line without understanding how you mean it.



A couple of points, yes, I agree completely that the threat of “profanation” is constant, yet is attenuated when the hostility towards religion is not institutionalized. Secondly, objective secularism is not the entirety of the paradigm. Virtue and “the good” remain the “ought” that motivate society. It is not the state that defines any religion, but it’s adherents.

To say that ”religion is a matter of the private sphere” is to say nothing; equivalent to saying that, light illuminates a dark room – but it becomes meaningful only in relation to the premise: That all that is public is the sphere of the State – a totalitarian position; a position worthy of rejection. Such a position imprisons the adherent and the religion, the very antithesis of the eternal, the universal, in religion and of liberty in society.

Consider: I have used this proposition before because it is stark and pertinent – The one child per family rule (given characterized by it’s breach) – what if an adherent should assert that life is God’s to give – what then is one but the slave of the state? Indeed would the term “individual” be meaningful? Other than to denote a number? How human is that?

Why would anyone willingly become a slave of the state?



Please comment on two posts on mine to follow –

Studebaker/Bharadwaj #227
``BUT STILL I CAN GENUINELY BE ALL OF THEM EXCEPT OF COURSE FEMALE``

``PROVE ONE LIE THAT I DID TO DUPE ANYONE``

I don`t know about you(since as I said I am not qualified) but I certainly get duped when you post as `Sadhna`.

rajanjua #231
``Man, you are like sadna in your interacts. `objective secularism` - what in the hell is that``

Let me confuse things here with a post I didnot post earlier( let us first pray to the Lord to protect you from the evil eye and cunning enemies posing as posters).

hobbyt back in #153

``the stake is the what kind of secular - should it be ``objective``, where in hostility towards traditional religions does not arise or is it to be ``subjective,`` wherein secularism will certainly lead to ``profanation`` and hostility towards a public role for religion?``

hobbyt, you pose a valid question, but you do realise, this is the same question those supporting `secularism` ask about `religion`.

If you go with traditional religion, then the question arises, what kind of religion?

``Objective`` wherein hostility towards rejection or demphasis of traditional religion doesnot arise or is it to be ``subjective``, where in adherance to traditional religion will certainly lead to ``profanation`` and hostility toward a public role for anything considered to be outside the scope of traditional religion?

There are two threats to the ``objectivity`` of traditional religion. Firstly there is the threat during the process of finding defination(s) of traditional religion over a large diverse population with diverse traditions.

Secondly, once such objective defination(s) of traditional religion has been arrived at, there is the ever-present threat of ``profanation`` of things outside its defined scope, due to ``value-loading``(your term?) of the state`s definations of traditional religion.

In constrast, saying ``religion is a matter of the private sphere and is not the business of the state`, sets both the individual and his religion free.

``This statement would only be true if you were talking about objective secularism - that is to say a separtion of the institution of religion and governance, with neutrality of the institutions of goverenance towards institutions of religion.``

Man, you are like sadna in your interacts. `objective secularism` - what in the hell is that - secularism simply means seperation of state and religion - it means that you don`t run to some retard (read religious scholar) for approval every time you frame a law.

``indeed, if it was not in ``Khatra`` could it be called ``faith? most certainly not.``

State should not be the gaurdian of your faith - that`s the point - You need to take care of all those khatras by yourself.

``Rajanjua, I understand you find reading lists threatening (it`s an irrational sentiment) but you must look into the philosophy of law - 10 commandments - basic law? What is the source of this?``

Are you suggesting that humans did`nt have concept of laws/rules before Musa`s chat with God? If yes then goto post#167.

``On Shariah - a beef of mine with it`s present understanding in Pakistan, is the equation of Shariah with Islam itself``

There are very few explicit laws defined in the Quran - You can`t build a goddam legal system out of it. Shariah is the Islamic Law. You ought to know the difference between the two - No one is equating them.

``Islam the religion by definition is divine, eternal not subject to change (to it`s adherents)``

Again this eternal and divine thingy is according to you - A vast majority of the people on this planet don`t agree with you.

``whereas Shariah is the human understanding, interpretation that evolves as does the knowledge applied to the effort to interpret, that is to say, that it is most certainly subject to change.``

It has`nt changed for more than a thousand year - The Muslim world is too far behind already - Why do you want to go and revamp an outdated medival legal code.

``Indeed, Ijtedhad, Ijama and Shura are essential, if we are counter the forces of Obscuritanism, rejection and rebellion.``

Just for the sake of argument who will do the Ijtehad and what`s the requirement for membership in Shura. Define ``rejection`` and ``rebellion`` - of what and against whom.

``I agree that such ordinances make a mockery of Islam and are in reality part of a political agenda against groups of persons who are seen as challengeing obscuritanist version of orthodoxy.``

I disagree - The Hudood Ordinance follows the Shariah to the letter. Its based on the Quran and follows precedants set by the Prophet and the Companions. Why is it a mockery of Islam according to you? Why is your definition of Islam different than some of the best scholars and saints, Islamic world has produced?

`` I would also suggest that we remain conscious that similar laws existed in secular humanist``

Bad laws can and probably will be framed all the time in a secular society - but people don`t consider them ``divine`` - makes it a whole lot easier to change/discard them - they evolve as society evolves, as people learn from their mistakes - there`s no ``khatra`` to iman or perils of divine wrath involved. And that`s the difference.

re:hydra

``CHALLENGE FOR SMP,SADNA ,HARAMI ..OU``

....thanks, but i have some ingrown toenails i have to take care of...

Rajanjua

``I didn`t say that you support Hudood ordinance - I asked you what`s reasonable about it``

I don`t support these ordinances but you insist that I explain what`s reasonable about it???

Taking lessons from our clever by half, head bobbing neighbors?

``And on the other hand, what are realistic options for militant secular authoritarians?? Imprison believers? afterall if 30 or 40 members of a religious tradition should decide to hold a meeting or protest or march, that would be religion in Public - what options then?``

``Secularists would not allow the imposition of particular religious beliefs on others.``

This statement would only be true if you were talking about objective secularism - that is to say a separtion of the institution of religion and governance, with neutrality of the institutions of goverenance towards institutions of religion. My posts consistently call for the understanding the distictions betwen the objective and subjective form of secularism and the awareness and rejection of the subjective.

``iman ko khatra paR jata hay`` - This is precisely the immature understanding of ``faith``, that I reject - ``Faith`` is characterized by devotion, love, commitment, submissiveness, vulnerablity and is subject to contraction and expansion, that is to say, degree. That is why being in ``khatra`` is part of it`s very definition - indeed, if it was not in ``Khatra`` could it be called ``faith? most certainly not.

``Sure, then why not derive the laws in Pakistan from Rigveda or Talmud. What`s so special about Shariah - It maybe divine for you but not for everyone.``

Rajanjua, I understand you find reading lists threatening (it`s an irrational sentiment) but you must look into the philosophy of law - 10 commandments - basic law? What is the source of this?

On Shariah - a beef of mine with it`s present understanding in Pakistan, is the equation of Shariah with Islam itself - Islam the religion by definition is divine, eternal not subject to change (to it`s adherents) whereas Shariah is the human understanding, interpretation that evolves as does the knowledge applied to the effort to interpret, that is to say, that it is most certainly subject to change.

the following crap would not exist:

Hudood Ordinance

Blasphemy Laws

Shariah Courts

Declaration of Ahmedis as non-Muslims

Indeed, Ijtedhad, Ijama and Shura are essential, if we are counter the forces of Obscuritanism, rejection and rebellion. I agree that such ordinances make a mockery of Islam and are in reality part of a political agenda against groups of persons who are seen as challengeing obscuritanist version of orthodoxy. I would also suggest that we remain conscious that similar laws existed in secular humanist, totalitarian regimes - counter revolutionary? revolutionary courts? reeducation camps?

``Jamatiyas and other illiterate religious deviants in Pakistan have been successful in equating secularism with athiesm (or rejection of religion) - This lie won`t last for long.``

I say to you that no lie, not just those of the Jamatiyas, will stand the test of time.

Also I would say to you that you have reacted in kneejerk fashion in responding to my original post, afterall, is there any option other than objective secularism? Yes, but only if polarization is your objective.

p.s. ``militant authoritarian secularist`` - that`s a good one.

``Further if you will read more of my posts, you will note that such ordinances and their intellectual foundations are held in contempt by me.``

I didn`t say that you support Hudood ordinance - I asked you what`s reasonable about it - Since, you find it reprehensible as most sane people would, can you tell us what`s wrong with it. Last I checked my Shariah 101 notes, its implementation in Pakistan is quite accurate and according to the Islamic Law.

``And on the other hand, what are realistic options for militant secular authoritarians?? Imprison believers? afterall if 30 or 40 members of a religious tradition should decide to hold a meeting or protest or march, that would be religion in Public - what options then?``

Nonsense and you know it - Secularists have no problem with religious gatherings - The difference is that secularists would allow a gathering of any faith. Secularists would not allow the imposition of particular religious beliefs on others. In Pakistan minorities and even certain sects of Muslims are treated as third class citizens, because of fundos. Under a secular govt., christian and hindu missionaries will have the same freedom of preaching/propagating their religion as the tableeghi jamat has. Fundos have such weak iman that they wet their pants at this idea (iman ko khatra paR jata hay).

``I have suggested that we acknowledge that the institution of religion and governance be specialized. I agree that religion in governance is the corruption of religion given the compromise of principle, ethics, morality, and intellectuality inherent in governance, however; I will not aboragate anothers right to suggest that religion does have a public role - and indeed I would support such a proposition to the degree that religious based ethics and morality do regulate society (ALL laws are derived from it - There is no religion that says it`s good to murdr, cheat, steal, disobey, etc) and are identified with developing an understanding of the ``good`` as a guidance for ciivil society.``

Sure, then why not derive the laws in Pakistan from Rigveda or Talmud. What`s so special about Shariah - It maybe divine for you but not for everyone.

Laws cannot be derived from scriptures - There`s nothing reasonable about religion - Its a matter of faith only - Under a truly secular govt. the following crap would not exist:

Hudood Ordinance

Blasphemy Laws

Shariah Courts

Declaration of Ahmedis as non-Muslims

Jamatiyas and other illiterate religious deviants in Pakistan have been successful in equating secularism with athiesm (or rejection of religion) - This lie won`t last for long.

p.s. ``militant authoritarian secularist`` - that`s a good one.

`` How many nicks do have now? Add Snoopy and Glen to them. You seem to know no bounds in taking advantage of the liberalism of the Chowk Staff and community. Your excuse for your behavior (which should be a category in the DSM IV) is that one nick cannot contain your multiple personalties. Therefore you pretend to be Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Indian, Hindu, Muslim, American, female, male, and a practioner of various professions. You also claim you are married and have children, but apparently deluged anNy`s e-mail with 25 messages a day. (as reported by another Chowkie). ``]]

#223HARAMI..OU

#222 SMP

#221 Sadna

Above is post of Samina Shah on one another thread.

SO WHAT ????????????????????????????????????????

IF FOR MY OWN PRIVACY I DONT LET YOU KNOW WHO I AM BUT STILL I CAN GENUINELY BE ALL OF THEM EXCEPT OF COURSE FEMALE .(my female nick never pretended to be female as i hate men coming on to me)

There is lie for privacy which is not giving FULL information & witholding information about me & there is a LIE TO DUPE SOMEONE .

PROVE ONE LIE THAT I DID TO DUPE ANYONE I LL THANK YOU & MORE

CHALLENGE FOR SMP,SADNA ,HARAMI ..OU

Ref wholly-precious-you #: 218

[harimau:

...never thought i`d say this:)...but thanks]

You`re welcome.