Chowk Staff February 4, 2002
#220 Posted by soysauce on February 11, 2002 1:23:42 pm
#198 nasah
Hasanji, either Musharraf is an idiot who thinks the world will buy into his crazy idea that Sheik Omar is an indian agent (who was released when a set of rogue RAW agents hijacked the IA plane), or is totally clueless about what`s going on behind his back. What is he basing his suspicion on? That calls were made to india. Of course, what with the extensive jihadi network it is perfectly normal that calls were made to india.
If Mushy is indeed clueless, he won`t last more than a few months and india should start thinking about how to deal with whoever shows him the door (to the prison)..
Hasanji, either Musharraf is an idiot who thinks the world will buy into his crazy idea that Sheik Omar is an indian agent (who was released when a set of rogue RAW agents hijacked the IA plane), or is totally clueless about what`s going on behind his back. What is he basing his suspicion on? That calls were made to india. Of course, what with the extensive jihadi network it is perfectly normal that calls were made to india.
If Mushy is indeed clueless, he won`t last more than a few months and india should start thinking about how to deal with whoever shows him the door (to the prison)..
#219 Posted by cutandpaste on February 11, 2002 1:23:42 pm
My lost country
Muzamil Jaleel grew up in the meadows and mountains of Kashmir. Then he saw friends and family die in its pursuit of independence. His country has become a battlefield - and he knows it can never be the same.
Online debate: what hope is there for Kashmir?.
Observer Worldview
Sunday February 10, 2002
The Observer
Not long ago, somebody asked me what kind of stories I wrote. Obituaries came to mind. As a reporter in Kashmir I have been literally writing obituaries for the past 10 years; only the characters and places change, the stories are always the same, full of misery and tears.
And when in October last year I got a chance to leave Kashmir, I hoped for a change. Every human being has a threshold for pain and agony. I felt mine had been reached. I wanted to escape. But within days, Kashmir was in the headlines and although I was thousands of miles away, I found myself in the middle of it all again.
I was born in Kashmir. I grew up in its apple orchards and lush green meadows, dreamed on the banks of its freshwater streams. I went to school there, sitting on straw mats and memorising tables by heart. After school my friends and I would rush half-way home, tear off our uniforms and dive into the cold water. Then we would quickly dry our hair, so our parents would not find out what we had done. Sometimes, when we felt especially daring, we would skip an entire day of school to play cricket.
My village lies in the foothills of the Himalayas. During summer breaks, we would trek to the meadows high in the mountains carrying salt slates for the family cattle, sit around a campfire and play the flute for hours. The chilling winter would turn the boys and girls of our small village into one huge family - huddled together in a big room, we would listen to stories till late into the night. Sipping hot cups of the traditional salt tea, the village elder who had inherited the art of storytelling would transport us to the era of his tales. He had never been to school but he remembered hundreds of beautiful stories by heart. Kashmir was like a big party, full of love and life. Today death and fear dominate everything.
I was in Kashmir too when the first bomb exploded in 1988. People first thought it was the outcome of a small political feud, although everybody knew the pot was boiling after years of political discontent. Then that September a young man, Ajaz Dar, died in a violent encounter with the police. Disgruntled by the farce of decades of ostensible democracy under Indian rule, a group of Kashmiri young men had decided to fight. They had dreamt of an independent Kashmir free from both India and Pakistan. Although this young man was not the first Kashmiri to die fighting for this cause, his death was the beginning of an era of tragedy.
Separatist sentiment had been dominant among Kashmiris since 1947, when Kashmir was divided between India and Pakistan during partition, and the two countries fought over it. But it was not until 40 years later that most of the youngsters opted for guns against Indian rule, in reaction to the government-sponsored rigging of the assembly polls, aimed at crushing dissent.
It is not a surprise that India`s most wanted Kashmiri militant leader, Syed Salahudin, contested that assembly election from Srinagar, nor that, unofficially, he was winning by a good margin. When the elections were rigged, he lost not only the election but faith in the process as well. His polling agents and supporters were arrested and tortured; most of them later became militants.
Neighbouring Pakistan, which occupies a third of Kashmir, also smelled the changing mood in Kashmir and offered a helping hand by providing arms training and AK-47 rifles. Violence was introduced amid growing dissent against India and hundreds of young people joined the armed movement. Kashmir was changing.
I had just completed secondary school then and was enrolled in a college - a perfect potential recruit: the entire militant movement belonged to my generation. The movement was the only topic of discussion on the street, in the classroom and at home. Soon people started coming out onto the streets, thousands would march to the famous Sufi shrines or to the United Nations office, shouting slogans in favour of ` Azadi !` (freedom). These mass protests became an everyday affair, frustrating the authorities, who began to use force to counter them. Dozens of protesters were killed by police fire.
Many of my close friends and classmates began to join. One day, half of our class was missing. They never returned to school again, and nobody even looked for them, because it was understood.
Although the reasons for joining the militant movement varied from person to person, the majority of Kashmiris never felt that they belonged to India. What had been a relatively dormant separatist sentiment was finally exploding into a fully-fledged separatist uprising.
I too wanted to join, though I didn`t know exactly why or what it would lead to. Most of us were teenagers and had not seriously thought about the consequences. Perhaps the rebel image was subconsciously attracting us all.
I also prepared for the dangerous journey from our village in north Kashmir to Pakistan-controlled Kashmir where all the training camps were. One didn`t just have to avoid being sighted by the Indian soldiers who guarded the border round the clock, but also defeat the fierce cold and the difficulties of hiking over the snow-clad Himalayan peaks that stood in the way. I acquired the standard militant`s gear: I bought the Wellington boots, prepared a polythene jacket and trousers to wear over my warm clothes, and found some woollen cloth to wrap around my calves as protection from frostbite.
Fortunately, I failed. Three times a group of us returned from the border. Each time something happened that forced our guide to take us back. The third time, 23 of us had started our journey on foot from Malangam, not far away from my village, only to be abandoned in a dense jungle. It was night, and the group had scattered after hearing gunshots nearby, sensing the presence of Indian army men. In the morning, when we gathered again, our guide was missing. Most of the others decided to continue on their own, but a few of us turned back. We had nothing to eat but leaves for three days. We followed the flight of crows, hoping to reach a human settlement. I was lucky. I reached home and survived.
As the days and months passed, and as the routes the militants took to cross the border became known to Indian security forces, the bodies began to arrive. Lines of young men would disappear on a ridge as they tried to cross over or return home. The stadiums where we had played cricket and football, the beautiful green parks where we had gone on school excursions as children, were turned into martyrs` graveyards. One after another, those who had played in those places were buried there, with huge marble epitaphs detailing their sacrifice. Many had never fired a single bullet from their Kalashnikovs.
One day, I counted my friends and classmates in the martyrs` graveyards near our village. There were 21 of them. I could feel the smiling face of Mushtaq, whom I had known since our schooldays. He would have been 31 this January, but the ninth anniversary of his death is just two months away. He was killed in April 1993. His mother could not bear the pain and lost her mental balance. For all these years, she has been wandering around the villages carrying the shirt he wore on the day of his death.
Another friend, Javaid, was his parents` only son. Extremely handsome, he was obsessed with seeing change in Kashmir. The day he died, he was wearing my clothes. He had come to our house in the morning and changed there. He was 23, and even six hours after his death, when they took him for burial, blood still oozed out of his bullet wounds. I will never forget the moment when I lifted the coffin lid away from his face: there was that usual grin. For a moment, he seemed alive to me.
Javaid`s sister was to have been married 15 days later but the shock of his death gave her a heart attack. She died a few days before what would have been her wedding day.
Today, there are more than 500 martyrs` graveyards dotting Kashmir, and every epitaph standing on a grave tells a story - a tragic story of my generation. Engraving epitaphs has become a lucrative business.
As the death toll of Kashmiris mounted, the world saw the violent movement only as the outcome of a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan which had its roots in the 1947 partition. India always called the rebellion a Pakistan-sponsored terrorist movement, while Pakistan projected it as a jihad - a Kashmiri struggle to join Pakistan just because they shared a common faith.
For India, the future of Kashmir is non-negotiable - it is an `integral part` of the country, the only Muslim majority state in the union and thus a cornerstone of its democracy and secular credentials. For Pakistan, Kashmir is also important because the majority of its population is Muslim - it is Pakistan`s `jugular vein`, and an unfinished task from the subcontinent`s partition in which Pakistan was born as a home for Indian Muslims.
With these claims on Kashmir, both countries have choked the voice of Kashmiris. The Indian government has reacted with an iron fist, deployed large numbers of security men and turned Kashmir into one massive jail.
Pakistan`s hands are not clean either. When hundreds of thousands of Kashmiris came out in support of the separatist movement in 1990, Pakistan`s lust for Kashmir`s land was exposed. It hijacked the separatist movement, painted it with religious fundamentalism and introduced pro-Pakistan, and later jihadi groups to ensure it enjoyed absolute control.
Within years, Kashmir turned into yet another battlefield in the pan-Islamic jihad and its warriors as well as its leaders were now made up of non-Kashmiris whose agendas transcend the demand for self-determination. In the process, the genuine political struggle for the unification of Kashmir and the demand of the people that they should be allowed to decide their own future was forgotten.
Whatever attention Kashmir was given was because it was a flashpoint between two nuclear neighbours and not because Kashmiris were suffering. India and Pakistan seem to share one common policy on Kashmir - to force Kashmiris to toe their respective lines. In fact, it seems that both countries want to fight to the last Kashmiri.
The Indian government held state elections in 1996 apparently aimed at ensuring a representative government in Kashmir. But actually it was nothing more than a farce. The security forces herded people to polling stations and even conducted `nail parades` to check - by the indelible ink pasted on the nail of the forefinger - that people had voted.
The man who represents Kashmir - not only in New Delhi, but across the world as India`s junior Foreign Minister - is Omar Abdullah, the son of Kashmir`s Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah. He received just 5 per cent of votes in his constituency - after coercion by the police and the security forces - and he won the elections. Who he does actually represent, nobody knows.
I have been a witness to all this. I have seen Kashmir change. I still remember my grandmother worrying whenever the sky turned red. `Murder has been committed somewhere,` she would say. Now that suspicion can no longer be reserved for red skies: the daily death toll is 20.
Kashmir used to be known as a crime-free state. One of my neighbours was a senior police officer in the mid-Eighties; he once told me that the average yearly murder rate in Kashmir was three or four. Today, if three people perish in a day, itis considered peaceful.
I have been fortunate enough to be safe, but my family and relatives have not been that lucky. My younger brother Mudabir was picked up in 1994 on suspicion of militancy, and it took us a month just to trace his whereabouts. We divided up the entire Kashmir valley among our family members. Every morning, each one of us would do the rounds of the security force camps to look for him.
My mother had never been to a police station in her entire life, but by the time she finally located my brother, she knew almost every military camp around Srinagar.
And by the time the security forces were convinced of his innocence and released him, he had already been tortured so much that he spent the next two months in bed.
It is now seven years since his release, but he still has nightmares and the mere sight of a soldier sends shivers down his spine. A late-night knock at the door still gives him goose pimples, and sends his heart rate soaring. But this is not exceptional any more in Kashmir.
A cousin`s husband bled to death after he was caught in the crossfire while coming out of mosque one evening. He could have been saved had he reached the hospital in time. But the security forces did not allow the family to come out of their house and take him to the hospital, and there was no other way to seek medical help. He bled to death crying for help, and his wife, mother and younger brother could do nothing but watch their own helplessness. A boy was born in the family four months after his death.
By 1992, there were hardly any young men left in the few villages in north Kashmir around my home. Many had joined the militant movement. Some had died, while others had gone underground; some had surrendered and become counter-insurgents and were part of the pro-government militias. Many had migrated to the urban area of Srinagar city, which was then deemed comparatively safe.
The complexion of the separatist movement was changing fast, and it no longer represented the genuine political aspirations of the people. The pro-Pakistan jihadi groups who dominated the movement tried to impose their radical religious, social and cultural agendas, ignoring the fact that their extremism was alien to the very ethos of Kashmir.
Kashmir has a history of composite culture and religious tolerance. In fact, Islam did not arrive in Kashmir through the clatter of the sword. It was introduced by mystics and Sufis who conquered the hearts of the people. In the centuries that followed, Kashmir turned into a melting pot of ideas and a meeting ground for Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam; there was no place for religious extremism.
Now, as fanaticism started to dominate, using the power of the gun, the militant movement was rendered a mere tool in Pakistan`s plan to bleed its arch-rival India with a thousand cuts.
I decided to leave my village to move to Srinagar and join Kashmir University. I was so desperate to leave that I applied to almost all the departments. It was mere chance that I got into journalism. And when I started writing about the war later that year, I felt that I had been part of this tragic story from the beginning. I knew the militants and the mukhbirs (the police informers); those who surrendered and those who did not; those who faced death because they had a dream and those who were sacrificed by mere chance, neither knowing nor understanding the issues at stake; those who believed they were fighting a holy war and those who joined for unholy reasons. But, as it turned out, there was more to the story.
My first assignment as a reporter was to visit a city police station and collect information regarding some corpses lying there. I accompanied a few local photographers, who began taking pictures as I stared at the six bullet-riddled bodies. They were in terrible condition: blood-soaked clothes, entrails exposed, faces unrecognisable.
That evening, I was haunted by the picture of bodies lying in a pool of blood - even a drink of water reminded me of blood. I couldn`t sleep for days; corpses haunted my dreams.
A few months later I arrived at the site of a massacre to find wailing women and unshaven men sitting in huddles. Bodies lay scattered, like rag dolls discarded by careless children. I felt a lump growing in my throat, my legs felt heavy. I felt incredibly tired and wanted to throw down my notebook and sit silently with the mourners. The noise of the camera shutters invaded my private thoughts, forcing me to think about the story I had to write.
Over the years, writing obituaries became a routine. When violence rules the day, there is nothing but tears to jerk out of the reader`s soul. If I avoided writing about the gory details of death, I would end up writing about orphans or widows. In the process, my reactions to such incidents also began to change. I could no longer relate to these tragedies. Now killings meant stories and bylines, and there was satisfaction to be found in penning them, even if I knew the victims personally.
The continuous interaction with death and destruction was providing a necessary thrill, and the killing fields of Kashmir were becoming nothing but news pastures for me. Every evening, I would wait for the police bulletin that provides the statistics of the daily deaths. Much as a shopkeeper counts his cash before calling it a day, I would count the dead before leaving the office. I once used a calculator to count the 105 men and women dead across the 12 districts in 24 hours. My newspaper wanted a breakdown and I found myself lost in numbers.
I belong to Kashmir`s cursed generation - the youth of the Nineties. I have lived all these troubled years in Kashmir and am still well and alive. But in the process my tears have dried up. I have lost normal human feelings to the adventures of reporting day-to-day violence in my country. I am immune to the death of my own people; I have developed an inability to mourn.
And it seems that the outside world too is unable to feel the pain of Kashmir. After more than 50,000 deaths, there still appears to be no headway towards peace. The international community needs to resolve issues between India and Pakistan. It is not only important in order to avoid a nuclear conflict: it is imperative to end the suffering of the Kashmiri people.
muzamiljaleel@yahoo.com
Prose poem by Agha Shahid Ali
Dear Shahid, I am writing to you from your far-off country. Far even from us who live here. Where you no longer are. Everyone carries his address in his pocket so that at least his body will reach home.
Rumours break on their way to us in the city. But word still reaches us from border towns: Men are forced to stand barefoot in snow waters all night. The women are alone inside. Soldiers smash radios and televisions. With bare hands they tear our houses to pieces.
You must have heard Rizwan was killed. Rizwan: Guardian of the Gates of Paradise. Only eighteen years old. Yesterday at Hideout Café (everyone there asks about you), a doctor - who had just treated a sixteen-year-old boy released from an interrogation centre - said: I want to ask the fortune-tellers: Did anything in his line of Fate reveal that the webs of his hands would be cut with a knife?
This letter, insh`Allah, will reach you for my brother goes south tomorrow where he shall post it. Here one can`t even manage postage stamps. Today I went to the post office. Across the river. Bags and bags - hundreds of canvas bags - all undelivered mail. By chance I looked down and there on the floor I saw this letter addressed to you. So I am enclosing it. I hope it`s from someone you are longing for news of.
Things here are as usual though we always talk about you. Will you come home soon? Waiting for you is like waiting for spring. We are waiting for the almond blossoms. And, if God wills, O! those days of peace when we all were in love and the rain was in our hands wherever we went.
A prose poem taken from The Country Without a Post Office by Agha Shahid Ali (WW Norton, £8.50). Ali was an award-winning Kashmiri poet praised by, amongst others, John Ashbery and Edward Said. He died last December.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/kashmir/Story/0,2763,647840,00.html
Muzamil Jaleel grew up in the meadows and mountains of Kashmir. Then he saw friends and family die in its pursuit of independence. His country has become a battlefield - and he knows it can never be the same.
Online debate: what hope is there for Kashmir?.
Observer Worldview
Sunday February 10, 2002
The Observer
Not long ago, somebody asked me what kind of stories I wrote. Obituaries came to mind. As a reporter in Kashmir I have been literally writing obituaries for the past 10 years; only the characters and places change, the stories are always the same, full of misery and tears.
And when in October last year I got a chance to leave Kashmir, I hoped for a change. Every human being has a threshold for pain and agony. I felt mine had been reached. I wanted to escape. But within days, Kashmir was in the headlines and although I was thousands of miles away, I found myself in the middle of it all again.
I was born in Kashmir. I grew up in its apple orchards and lush green meadows, dreamed on the banks of its freshwater streams. I went to school there, sitting on straw mats and memorising tables by heart. After school my friends and I would rush half-way home, tear off our uniforms and dive into the cold water. Then we would quickly dry our hair, so our parents would not find out what we had done. Sometimes, when we felt especially daring, we would skip an entire day of school to play cricket.
My village lies in the foothills of the Himalayas. During summer breaks, we would trek to the meadows high in the mountains carrying salt slates for the family cattle, sit around a campfire and play the flute for hours. The chilling winter would turn the boys and girls of our small village into one huge family - huddled together in a big room, we would listen to stories till late into the night. Sipping hot cups of the traditional salt tea, the village elder who had inherited the art of storytelling would transport us to the era of his tales. He had never been to school but he remembered hundreds of beautiful stories by heart. Kashmir was like a big party, full of love and life. Today death and fear dominate everything.
I was in Kashmir too when the first bomb exploded in 1988. People first thought it was the outcome of a small political feud, although everybody knew the pot was boiling after years of political discontent. Then that September a young man, Ajaz Dar, died in a violent encounter with the police. Disgruntled by the farce of decades of ostensible democracy under Indian rule, a group of Kashmiri young men had decided to fight. They had dreamt of an independent Kashmir free from both India and Pakistan. Although this young man was not the first Kashmiri to die fighting for this cause, his death was the beginning of an era of tragedy.
Separatist sentiment had been dominant among Kashmiris since 1947, when Kashmir was divided between India and Pakistan during partition, and the two countries fought over it. But it was not until 40 years later that most of the youngsters opted for guns against Indian rule, in reaction to the government-sponsored rigging of the assembly polls, aimed at crushing dissent.
It is not a surprise that India`s most wanted Kashmiri militant leader, Syed Salahudin, contested that assembly election from Srinagar, nor that, unofficially, he was winning by a good margin. When the elections were rigged, he lost not only the election but faith in the process as well. His polling agents and supporters were arrested and tortured; most of them later became militants.
Neighbouring Pakistan, which occupies a third of Kashmir, also smelled the changing mood in Kashmir and offered a helping hand by providing arms training and AK-47 rifles. Violence was introduced amid growing dissent against India and hundreds of young people joined the armed movement. Kashmir was changing.
I had just completed secondary school then and was enrolled in a college - a perfect potential recruit: the entire militant movement belonged to my generation. The movement was the only topic of discussion on the street, in the classroom and at home. Soon people started coming out onto the streets, thousands would march to the famous Sufi shrines or to the United Nations office, shouting slogans in favour of ` Azadi !` (freedom). These mass protests became an everyday affair, frustrating the authorities, who began to use force to counter them. Dozens of protesters were killed by police fire.
Many of my close friends and classmates began to join. One day, half of our class was missing. They never returned to school again, and nobody even looked for them, because it was understood.
Although the reasons for joining the militant movement varied from person to person, the majority of Kashmiris never felt that they belonged to India. What had been a relatively dormant separatist sentiment was finally exploding into a fully-fledged separatist uprising.
I too wanted to join, though I didn`t know exactly why or what it would lead to. Most of us were teenagers and had not seriously thought about the consequences. Perhaps the rebel image was subconsciously attracting us all.
I also prepared for the dangerous journey from our village in north Kashmir to Pakistan-controlled Kashmir where all the training camps were. One didn`t just have to avoid being sighted by the Indian soldiers who guarded the border round the clock, but also defeat the fierce cold and the difficulties of hiking over the snow-clad Himalayan peaks that stood in the way. I acquired the standard militant`s gear: I bought the Wellington boots, prepared a polythene jacket and trousers to wear over my warm clothes, and found some woollen cloth to wrap around my calves as protection from frostbite.
Fortunately, I failed. Three times a group of us returned from the border. Each time something happened that forced our guide to take us back. The third time, 23 of us had started our journey on foot from Malangam, not far away from my village, only to be abandoned in a dense jungle. It was night, and the group had scattered after hearing gunshots nearby, sensing the presence of Indian army men. In the morning, when we gathered again, our guide was missing. Most of the others decided to continue on their own, but a few of us turned back. We had nothing to eat but leaves for three days. We followed the flight of crows, hoping to reach a human settlement. I was lucky. I reached home and survived.
As the days and months passed, and as the routes the militants took to cross the border became known to Indian security forces, the bodies began to arrive. Lines of young men would disappear on a ridge as they tried to cross over or return home. The stadiums where we had played cricket and football, the beautiful green parks where we had gone on school excursions as children, were turned into martyrs` graveyards. One after another, those who had played in those places were buried there, with huge marble epitaphs detailing their sacrifice. Many had never fired a single bullet from their Kalashnikovs.
One day, I counted my friends and classmates in the martyrs` graveyards near our village. There were 21 of them. I could feel the smiling face of Mushtaq, whom I had known since our schooldays. He would have been 31 this January, but the ninth anniversary of his death is just two months away. He was killed in April 1993. His mother could not bear the pain and lost her mental balance. For all these years, she has been wandering around the villages carrying the shirt he wore on the day of his death.
Another friend, Javaid, was his parents` only son. Extremely handsome, he was obsessed with seeing change in Kashmir. The day he died, he was wearing my clothes. He had come to our house in the morning and changed there. He was 23, and even six hours after his death, when they took him for burial, blood still oozed out of his bullet wounds. I will never forget the moment when I lifted the coffin lid away from his face: there was that usual grin. For a moment, he seemed alive to me.
Javaid`s sister was to have been married 15 days later but the shock of his death gave her a heart attack. She died a few days before what would have been her wedding day.
Today, there are more than 500 martyrs` graveyards dotting Kashmir, and every epitaph standing on a grave tells a story - a tragic story of my generation. Engraving epitaphs has become a lucrative business.
As the death toll of Kashmiris mounted, the world saw the violent movement only as the outcome of a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan which had its roots in the 1947 partition. India always called the rebellion a Pakistan-sponsored terrorist movement, while Pakistan projected it as a jihad - a Kashmiri struggle to join Pakistan just because they shared a common faith.
For India, the future of Kashmir is non-negotiable - it is an `integral part` of the country, the only Muslim majority state in the union and thus a cornerstone of its democracy and secular credentials. For Pakistan, Kashmir is also important because the majority of its population is Muslim - it is Pakistan`s `jugular vein`, and an unfinished task from the subcontinent`s partition in which Pakistan was born as a home for Indian Muslims.
With these claims on Kashmir, both countries have choked the voice of Kashmiris. The Indian government has reacted with an iron fist, deployed large numbers of security men and turned Kashmir into one massive jail.
Pakistan`s hands are not clean either. When hundreds of thousands of Kashmiris came out in support of the separatist movement in 1990, Pakistan`s lust for Kashmir`s land was exposed. It hijacked the separatist movement, painted it with religious fundamentalism and introduced pro-Pakistan, and later jihadi groups to ensure it enjoyed absolute control.
Within years, Kashmir turned into yet another battlefield in the pan-Islamic jihad and its warriors as well as its leaders were now made up of non-Kashmiris whose agendas transcend the demand for self-determination. In the process, the genuine political struggle for the unification of Kashmir and the demand of the people that they should be allowed to decide their own future was forgotten.
Whatever attention Kashmir was given was because it was a flashpoint between two nuclear neighbours and not because Kashmiris were suffering. India and Pakistan seem to share one common policy on Kashmir - to force Kashmiris to toe their respective lines. In fact, it seems that both countries want to fight to the last Kashmiri.
The Indian government held state elections in 1996 apparently aimed at ensuring a representative government in Kashmir. But actually it was nothing more than a farce. The security forces herded people to polling stations and even conducted `nail parades` to check - by the indelible ink pasted on the nail of the forefinger - that people had voted.
The man who represents Kashmir - not only in New Delhi, but across the world as India`s junior Foreign Minister - is Omar Abdullah, the son of Kashmir`s Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah. He received just 5 per cent of votes in his constituency - after coercion by the police and the security forces - and he won the elections. Who he does actually represent, nobody knows.
I have been a witness to all this. I have seen Kashmir change. I still remember my grandmother worrying whenever the sky turned red. `Murder has been committed somewhere,` she would say. Now that suspicion can no longer be reserved for red skies: the daily death toll is 20.
Kashmir used to be known as a crime-free state. One of my neighbours was a senior police officer in the mid-Eighties; he once told me that the average yearly murder rate in Kashmir was three or four. Today, if three people perish in a day, itis considered peaceful.
I have been fortunate enough to be safe, but my family and relatives have not been that lucky. My younger brother Mudabir was picked up in 1994 on suspicion of militancy, and it took us a month just to trace his whereabouts. We divided up the entire Kashmir valley among our family members. Every morning, each one of us would do the rounds of the security force camps to look for him.
My mother had never been to a police station in her entire life, but by the time she finally located my brother, she knew almost every military camp around Srinagar.
And by the time the security forces were convinced of his innocence and released him, he had already been tortured so much that he spent the next two months in bed.
It is now seven years since his release, but he still has nightmares and the mere sight of a soldier sends shivers down his spine. A late-night knock at the door still gives him goose pimples, and sends his heart rate soaring. But this is not exceptional any more in Kashmir.
A cousin`s husband bled to death after he was caught in the crossfire while coming out of mosque one evening. He could have been saved had he reached the hospital in time. But the security forces did not allow the family to come out of their house and take him to the hospital, and there was no other way to seek medical help. He bled to death crying for help, and his wife, mother and younger brother could do nothing but watch their own helplessness. A boy was born in the family four months after his death.
By 1992, there were hardly any young men left in the few villages in north Kashmir around my home. Many had joined the militant movement. Some had died, while others had gone underground; some had surrendered and become counter-insurgents and were part of the pro-government militias. Many had migrated to the urban area of Srinagar city, which was then deemed comparatively safe.
The complexion of the separatist movement was changing fast, and it no longer represented the genuine political aspirations of the people. The pro-Pakistan jihadi groups who dominated the movement tried to impose their radical religious, social and cultural agendas, ignoring the fact that their extremism was alien to the very ethos of Kashmir.
Kashmir has a history of composite culture and religious tolerance. In fact, Islam did not arrive in Kashmir through the clatter of the sword. It was introduced by mystics and Sufis who conquered the hearts of the people. In the centuries that followed, Kashmir turned into a melting pot of ideas and a meeting ground for Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam; there was no place for religious extremism.
Now, as fanaticism started to dominate, using the power of the gun, the militant movement was rendered a mere tool in Pakistan`s plan to bleed its arch-rival India with a thousand cuts.
I decided to leave my village to move to Srinagar and join Kashmir University. I was so desperate to leave that I applied to almost all the departments. It was mere chance that I got into journalism. And when I started writing about the war later that year, I felt that I had been part of this tragic story from the beginning. I knew the militants and the mukhbirs (the police informers); those who surrendered and those who did not; those who faced death because they had a dream and those who were sacrificed by mere chance, neither knowing nor understanding the issues at stake; those who believed they were fighting a holy war and those who joined for unholy reasons. But, as it turned out, there was more to the story.
My first assignment as a reporter was to visit a city police station and collect information regarding some corpses lying there. I accompanied a few local photographers, who began taking pictures as I stared at the six bullet-riddled bodies. They were in terrible condition: blood-soaked clothes, entrails exposed, faces unrecognisable.
That evening, I was haunted by the picture of bodies lying in a pool of blood - even a drink of water reminded me of blood. I couldn`t sleep for days; corpses haunted my dreams.
A few months later I arrived at the site of a massacre to find wailing women and unshaven men sitting in huddles. Bodies lay scattered, like rag dolls discarded by careless children. I felt a lump growing in my throat, my legs felt heavy. I felt incredibly tired and wanted to throw down my notebook and sit silently with the mourners. The noise of the camera shutters invaded my private thoughts, forcing me to think about the story I had to write.
Over the years, writing obituaries became a routine. When violence rules the day, there is nothing but tears to jerk out of the reader`s soul. If I avoided writing about the gory details of death, I would end up writing about orphans or widows. In the process, my reactions to such incidents also began to change. I could no longer relate to these tragedies. Now killings meant stories and bylines, and there was satisfaction to be found in penning them, even if I knew the victims personally.
The continuous interaction with death and destruction was providing a necessary thrill, and the killing fields of Kashmir were becoming nothing but news pastures for me. Every evening, I would wait for the police bulletin that provides the statistics of the daily deaths. Much as a shopkeeper counts his cash before calling it a day, I would count the dead before leaving the office. I once used a calculator to count the 105 men and women dead across the 12 districts in 24 hours. My newspaper wanted a breakdown and I found myself lost in numbers.
I belong to Kashmir`s cursed generation - the youth of the Nineties. I have lived all these troubled years in Kashmir and am still well and alive. But in the process my tears have dried up. I have lost normal human feelings to the adventures of reporting day-to-day violence in my country. I am immune to the death of my own people; I have developed an inability to mourn.
And it seems that the outside world too is unable to feel the pain of Kashmir. After more than 50,000 deaths, there still appears to be no headway towards peace. The international community needs to resolve issues between India and Pakistan. It is not only important in order to avoid a nuclear conflict: it is imperative to end the suffering of the Kashmiri people.
muzamiljaleel@yahoo.com
Prose poem by Agha Shahid Ali
Dear Shahid, I am writing to you from your far-off country. Far even from us who live here. Where you no longer are. Everyone carries his address in his pocket so that at least his body will reach home.
Rumours break on their way to us in the city. But word still reaches us from border towns: Men are forced to stand barefoot in snow waters all night. The women are alone inside. Soldiers smash radios and televisions. With bare hands they tear our houses to pieces.
You must have heard Rizwan was killed. Rizwan: Guardian of the Gates of Paradise. Only eighteen years old. Yesterday at Hideout Café (everyone there asks about you), a doctor - who had just treated a sixteen-year-old boy released from an interrogation centre - said: I want to ask the fortune-tellers: Did anything in his line of Fate reveal that the webs of his hands would be cut with a knife?
This letter, insh`Allah, will reach you for my brother goes south tomorrow where he shall post it. Here one can`t even manage postage stamps. Today I went to the post office. Across the river. Bags and bags - hundreds of canvas bags - all undelivered mail. By chance I looked down and there on the floor I saw this letter addressed to you. So I am enclosing it. I hope it`s from someone you are longing for news of.
Things here are as usual though we always talk about you. Will you come home soon? Waiting for you is like waiting for spring. We are waiting for the almond blossoms. And, if God wills, O! those days of peace when we all were in love and the rain was in our hands wherever we went.
A prose poem taken from The Country Without a Post Office by Agha Shahid Ali (WW Norton, £8.50). Ali was an award-winning Kashmiri poet praised by, amongst others, John Ashbery and Edward Said. He died last December.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/kashmir/Story/0,2763,647840,00.html
#218 Posted by nameless on February 11, 2002 1:23:42 pm
Here is another pice from Dawn (mag). It is an excerpt of Prof Aziz`s book. It is interesting and makes similar points to the previous peice I posted.
http://www.dawn.com/weekly/books/books1.htm
EXCERPTS: Crisis of identity
By Prof K.K. Aziz
The ordinary citizens ask agonizing questions. Prof K.K. Aziz explains the reasons behind the contradictions in Pakistani society.
A section of the Pakistani intelligentsia began to talk about a thing it called ``the crisis of identity`` in the late 1950s, that is within a decade of attaining freedom. Seminars on it were held under official auspices at which historians, ulema, politicians and generals expounded their views on the phenomenon. The proceedings were then issued as booklets. Since then there has been a spate of references to the malady in the hundreds of articles carried by the Urdu and English press. However, no one has addressed the issue seriously....
Those who raise the topic in their writings or in private conversations always consider it a problem which appeared with or after the creation of Pakistan. That is a grave mistake. The discussion begins on the wrong note, because they disregard history and literature as the determinants of the social framework, and concentrate on the existing political situation. The debate is aborted by the falsity and irrelevance of the first premiss.
The problem of self-identity began when Muslim imperial rule ended. Till 1857 the Indian Muslim who was capable of thinking seriously looked upon himself as a ``ruler``, a member of the elite, a part (even a cog is a part) of the imperial machine. This feeling was indefinable, vaguely comprehended, imperfectly conceived, and not commonly expressed in writing or speech. But it formed a major dimension of his psyche. It also had great advantages. It brought self-confidence. It offered a sense of superiority. It gave stability to the society and a poise to the individual. It sustained an interest in Muslim, particularly Persian, tradition and literature. It acted as a shield against the fear of the Hindus. It was a source of self-satisfaction. It served as a balancing force in the welter of the complexities, character, nature, variety and tendencies of human relationships. It defined Islam in uncontroversial terms and thus retained it as the central pillar of the empire and the unifying element of the society.
The failure of the Mutiny destroyed for all times to come this comfortable, comforting, cosy, pleasurable, safe, exhilarant world (though, strictly speaking, the work of destruction had begun with Aurungzeb`s death a century and a half earlier; but illusions do not die a quick death). A new cycle of history began. Every old value, public and private, became either a problem or a burden. Standards of behaviour altered. The language of ``national`` discourse changed, literally and philosophically: Urdu and English replacing Persian, and politics supplanting imperial despotism. The unfamiliar British became the arbiters of our fate. The grandeur of Muslim sovereignty, which the Muslim had taken to be an eternal factor of his existence, was swept away and thrown into the dustbin of historical refuse (the inevitable end of empires throughout the length of time). The British had arrived. The Hindus had arisen. The Muslims had been dispossessed. The world had changed.
With this loss of the illusion of permanence came the search for new bearings. The crisis of identity was born. The Muslim lost his self-respect. That was a tragedy, but not a disaster. He did not know how to go about regaining it. That was the disaster. He was surrounded by a horde of advisers and teachers and leaders, each of them pointing to a different direction, each prescribing his own patent medicine which could cure all ailments (the Muslim amritdhara), each claiming to be the standard-bearer of true Islam, each asserting that he was the voice of the time, each presenting himself as the saviour, the good old Khizr leading to the elixir of eternal life. The poor Muslim was confused. He walked through a tunnel, narrow and long and unlit, the end of which he could not see. The Muslim Pakistani still walks the tunnel.
Look at the predicament of the post-1857 Indian Muslim standing amidst the plethora of guide posts and direction-finders, each promising the sure path to salvation. He was asked to learn English and adopt the British ways to enter the modern age. He was told to cooperate with the new rulers so that loyalty to the throne could protect him against the Hindu majority. He was warned that Westernization led to heresy, and a knowledge of the English language to Christianity. He was ordered to fight against the foreign imperial occupation in the interest of an Indian nationalism. He was instructed to follow the medieval Islamic curriculum and the classical religious decisions and precedents. He was directed to study science and European literature to reinterpret the Quran, and to reconcile the past and the present.
He was asked to live in the past, for that was the country of his glory. He was asked to live in the present, for that was the demand of dire necessity. He was asked to live both in the past and the present, for his religion was immutable and valid for all ages. He was told so many things that he learnt nothing. He found himself hanging from a rope stretched over an abyss whose two cliffs were his yesterdays and his todays, and he did not know whether to try to move towards his yesteryears or towards the current times. He could not distinguish between his yesterday and his today. How could he look forward to his tomorrow? His perplexity was complete.
The confusion created by the variety and divergence of the counsels offered was compounded by the diversities of his surroundings. He spoke many languages (notwithstanding, and refuting, the claim of Urdu as the language of Muslim India), belonged to many races, and lived in many provinces. He was the descendant of an Arab, Afghan, Central Asia, Iranian or some other Muslim migrant. He was the progeny of a local convert to Islam. He was a foreigner from distant lands. He was a native of long standing. He was a venerable member of the ashraf, the old aristocracy of a ruling and conquering race. He was a despicable timeserver, a low caste Hindu who had embraced Islam out of fear or lack of principle. He was so many things at the same time that he did not know what he was.
The wind which fanned the flame of these uncertainties and bafflements was ignorance. The Muslim had lost his way because he did not know his history, and because he did not know what his literature was. Without these two foundations he could not stand as an entity, a distinctive group, a people, or a nation. He was like a pile of bricks heaped on the roadside. The mortar to bond them and make a wall was not available. He could not identify himself because he had neither read his history (what he had done in the past) nor studied his traditions (what he had thought and written).
The coming of independence in 1947 made this confusion more confounded by adding a new depth to the mystery - politics. And the road travelled by this politics took the people into ravines and gullies and valleys covered with thick mists of doubt and incertitude. The nation (if that it ever was or now is) which had been innocent on the social level before 1947 was now made into a political simpleton.
The search for identity became even more pressing, more urgent, more desperate. A long line of episodes marking the post-Independence history made the task maddening. The failure of the politicians, long spells of military supremacy (even when there was a civilian government in office), many constitutions, political violence, three wars with India, governmental instability, sectarian bloodshed, and the secession of East Pakistan, raised so many issues that it was difficult to see where the nation and the State were going.
The quest was made more difficult by the ways in which individuals interacted with the society, and the state regimented the society. The mind of the ordinary citizens was crowded with searching and agonizing questions...
* * * * *
General Ayub Khan abolished history from the school system, and got official textbooks prepared for history students at the university level. Between 1960 and 1980 the students read no history at all for the first 12 years of their studies. Instead, they were taught a newly invented subject called ``Social Studies``, which was an uneven and coarse amalgam of bits of civics, geography, religion, economics and history. During the 13th and 14th years (undergraduate period) they read a history book prepared by the government. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto`s regime did not make any change in this scheme.
General Ziaul Haq promoted the destruction of history with unswerving determination. In the name of a debatable patriotism and a supposititious ideology he made his control over history writing and teaching complete, arbitrary, coercive and totalitarian. He (1) subjected all textbooks of Social Studies to the scrutiny and approval of the Federal Ministry of Education, i.e., a group of civil servants, (2) created a new subject of ``Pakistan Studies``; made it compulsory for all undergraduates in arts, sciences, medicine and engineering, and all graduates in law; and got a special textbook prepared for it by several committees and panels of experts working in close collaboration (the result was not even bad history), and (3) dictated that all these books must meet the requirements of an ideology (he did not call it Islam), of which he was the sole definer, judge and perpetrator.
Official history, whether prepared by the German Nazis or the Italian Fascists or the Soviet Communists, or Zia`s professors, is by definition a distortion of facts and a vehicle of brainwashing. Political propaganda abuses the mind of one generation. State-dictated history perverts many generations on all levels. It is a salutary thought to remember that State-defined history was one of the major causes of the ruin of the Soviet Union. Honest history writing is discouraged, sometimes punished. As the professors who write this rubbish also supervise and guide the work of research students, the Pakistani degree of the doctor of philosophy has lost all value.
There are similar distortions in the teaching of literature. The Pathan or the Punjabi school student is asked to study Ghalib and Iqbal, though he was born in the tradition of Khushhal Khan Khattak and Sayyid Waris Shah, and in his folk culture has heard of Yusuf Zulaikha and Saif-ul-Muluk. How can he relate what he is taught with his birthright and culture? While the political leaders of the Muslim community were encouraging their followers to treat the Hindus as their enemies or reacting to the Hindu hatred for the Muslim, Iqbal, in his Javidnama, was praising Hindu thinkers like Bhartari Hari, presenting Buddhism as a noble religion, and admiring the Babi ``heretic`` Qurrat-ul-`Ain Tahira. The student is once again torn between his literature and his history.
The bulk of Punjabi poetry is a message of Sufi tolerance, universal humanism, and social protest against all exploitation and inequalities. In the village the Punjabi boy and girl grow up with Sultan Bahu and Bulleh Shah and Shah Husain ringing in their ears. In their schools they are told to view the invasions of Ahmad Shah Abdali and the Afghan spoliation of the Punjab as victories of Islam. In the land of the Pathans children who have heard their parents and elders reciting Khushhal Khan Khattak with energy and devotion are taught in the school that the poet was a rebel against the Mughal Empire.
By compelling the young students to swallow these contradictions as their daily intellectual diet, we are forcing them to view their literature and history as two different sources of information which refute and rebut each other.
With the disappearance of the Persian language from our educational and cultural scene, a vital and humanistic element of our literature and culture and an important source of our history have been rubbed off our life. Here, literature and history suffer equally.
K.K. Aziz (born 1927) has taught politics, history, Islam and Asian Studies for 50 years at various institutions in Pakistan and abroad. He has also served as the deputy official historian to the federal government and chairman of the national commission on historical and cultural research.
http://www.dawn.com/weekly/books/books1.htm
EXCERPTS: Crisis of identity
By Prof K.K. Aziz
The ordinary citizens ask agonizing questions. Prof K.K. Aziz explains the reasons behind the contradictions in Pakistani society.
A section of the Pakistani intelligentsia began to talk about a thing it called ``the crisis of identity`` in the late 1950s, that is within a decade of attaining freedom. Seminars on it were held under official auspices at which historians, ulema, politicians and generals expounded their views on the phenomenon. The proceedings were then issued as booklets. Since then there has been a spate of references to the malady in the hundreds of articles carried by the Urdu and English press. However, no one has addressed the issue seriously....
Those who raise the topic in their writings or in private conversations always consider it a problem which appeared with or after the creation of Pakistan. That is a grave mistake. The discussion begins on the wrong note, because they disregard history and literature as the determinants of the social framework, and concentrate on the existing political situation. The debate is aborted by the falsity and irrelevance of the first premiss.
The problem of self-identity began when Muslim imperial rule ended. Till 1857 the Indian Muslim who was capable of thinking seriously looked upon himself as a ``ruler``, a member of the elite, a part (even a cog is a part) of the imperial machine. This feeling was indefinable, vaguely comprehended, imperfectly conceived, and not commonly expressed in writing or speech. But it formed a major dimension of his psyche. It also had great advantages. It brought self-confidence. It offered a sense of superiority. It gave stability to the society and a poise to the individual. It sustained an interest in Muslim, particularly Persian, tradition and literature. It acted as a shield against the fear of the Hindus. It was a source of self-satisfaction. It served as a balancing force in the welter of the complexities, character, nature, variety and tendencies of human relationships. It defined Islam in uncontroversial terms and thus retained it as the central pillar of the empire and the unifying element of the society.
The failure of the Mutiny destroyed for all times to come this comfortable, comforting, cosy, pleasurable, safe, exhilarant world (though, strictly speaking, the work of destruction had begun with Aurungzeb`s death a century and a half earlier; but illusions do not die a quick death). A new cycle of history began. Every old value, public and private, became either a problem or a burden. Standards of behaviour altered. The language of ``national`` discourse changed, literally and philosophically: Urdu and English replacing Persian, and politics supplanting imperial despotism. The unfamiliar British became the arbiters of our fate. The grandeur of Muslim sovereignty, which the Muslim had taken to be an eternal factor of his existence, was swept away and thrown into the dustbin of historical refuse (the inevitable end of empires throughout the length of time). The British had arrived. The Hindus had arisen. The Muslims had been dispossessed. The world had changed.
With this loss of the illusion of permanence came the search for new bearings. The crisis of identity was born. The Muslim lost his self-respect. That was a tragedy, but not a disaster. He did not know how to go about regaining it. That was the disaster. He was surrounded by a horde of advisers and teachers and leaders, each of them pointing to a different direction, each prescribing his own patent medicine which could cure all ailments (the Muslim amritdhara), each claiming to be the standard-bearer of true Islam, each asserting that he was the voice of the time, each presenting himself as the saviour, the good old Khizr leading to the elixir of eternal life. The poor Muslim was confused. He walked through a tunnel, narrow and long and unlit, the end of which he could not see. The Muslim Pakistani still walks the tunnel.
Look at the predicament of the post-1857 Indian Muslim standing amidst the plethora of guide posts and direction-finders, each promising the sure path to salvation. He was asked to learn English and adopt the British ways to enter the modern age. He was told to cooperate with the new rulers so that loyalty to the throne could protect him against the Hindu majority. He was warned that Westernization led to heresy, and a knowledge of the English language to Christianity. He was ordered to fight against the foreign imperial occupation in the interest of an Indian nationalism. He was instructed to follow the medieval Islamic curriculum and the classical religious decisions and precedents. He was directed to study science and European literature to reinterpret the Quran, and to reconcile the past and the present.
He was asked to live in the past, for that was the country of his glory. He was asked to live in the present, for that was the demand of dire necessity. He was asked to live both in the past and the present, for his religion was immutable and valid for all ages. He was told so many things that he learnt nothing. He found himself hanging from a rope stretched over an abyss whose two cliffs were his yesterdays and his todays, and he did not know whether to try to move towards his yesteryears or towards the current times. He could not distinguish between his yesterday and his today. How could he look forward to his tomorrow? His perplexity was complete.
The confusion created by the variety and divergence of the counsels offered was compounded by the diversities of his surroundings. He spoke many languages (notwithstanding, and refuting, the claim of Urdu as the language of Muslim India), belonged to many races, and lived in many provinces. He was the descendant of an Arab, Afghan, Central Asia, Iranian or some other Muslim migrant. He was the progeny of a local convert to Islam. He was a foreigner from distant lands. He was a native of long standing. He was a venerable member of the ashraf, the old aristocracy of a ruling and conquering race. He was a despicable timeserver, a low caste Hindu who had embraced Islam out of fear or lack of principle. He was so many things at the same time that he did not know what he was.
The wind which fanned the flame of these uncertainties and bafflements was ignorance. The Muslim had lost his way because he did not know his history, and because he did not know what his literature was. Without these two foundations he could not stand as an entity, a distinctive group, a people, or a nation. He was like a pile of bricks heaped on the roadside. The mortar to bond them and make a wall was not available. He could not identify himself because he had neither read his history (what he had done in the past) nor studied his traditions (what he had thought and written).
The coming of independence in 1947 made this confusion more confounded by adding a new depth to the mystery - politics. And the road travelled by this politics took the people into ravines and gullies and valleys covered with thick mists of doubt and incertitude. The nation (if that it ever was or now is) which had been innocent on the social level before 1947 was now made into a political simpleton.
The search for identity became even more pressing, more urgent, more desperate. A long line of episodes marking the post-Independence history made the task maddening. The failure of the politicians, long spells of military supremacy (even when there was a civilian government in office), many constitutions, political violence, three wars with India, governmental instability, sectarian bloodshed, and the secession of East Pakistan, raised so many issues that it was difficult to see where the nation and the State were going.
The quest was made more difficult by the ways in which individuals interacted with the society, and the state regimented the society. The mind of the ordinary citizens was crowded with searching and agonizing questions...
* * * * *
General Ayub Khan abolished history from the school system, and got official textbooks prepared for history students at the university level. Between 1960 and 1980 the students read no history at all for the first 12 years of their studies. Instead, they were taught a newly invented subject called ``Social Studies``, which was an uneven and coarse amalgam of bits of civics, geography, religion, economics and history. During the 13th and 14th years (undergraduate period) they read a history book prepared by the government. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto`s regime did not make any change in this scheme.
General Ziaul Haq promoted the destruction of history with unswerving determination. In the name of a debatable patriotism and a supposititious ideology he made his control over history writing and teaching complete, arbitrary, coercive and totalitarian. He (1) subjected all textbooks of Social Studies to the scrutiny and approval of the Federal Ministry of Education, i.e., a group of civil servants, (2) created a new subject of ``Pakistan Studies``; made it compulsory for all undergraduates in arts, sciences, medicine and engineering, and all graduates in law; and got a special textbook prepared for it by several committees and panels of experts working in close collaboration (the result was not even bad history), and (3) dictated that all these books must meet the requirements of an ideology (he did not call it Islam), of which he was the sole definer, judge and perpetrator.
Official history, whether prepared by the German Nazis or the Italian Fascists or the Soviet Communists, or Zia`s professors, is by definition a distortion of facts and a vehicle of brainwashing. Political propaganda abuses the mind of one generation. State-dictated history perverts many generations on all levels. It is a salutary thought to remember that State-defined history was one of the major causes of the ruin of the Soviet Union. Honest history writing is discouraged, sometimes punished. As the professors who write this rubbish also supervise and guide the work of research students, the Pakistani degree of the doctor of philosophy has lost all value.
There are similar distortions in the teaching of literature. The Pathan or the Punjabi school student is asked to study Ghalib and Iqbal, though he was born in the tradition of Khushhal Khan Khattak and Sayyid Waris Shah, and in his folk culture has heard of Yusuf Zulaikha and Saif-ul-Muluk. How can he relate what he is taught with his birthright and culture? While the political leaders of the Muslim community were encouraging their followers to treat the Hindus as their enemies or reacting to the Hindu hatred for the Muslim, Iqbal, in his Javidnama, was praising Hindu thinkers like Bhartari Hari, presenting Buddhism as a noble religion, and admiring the Babi ``heretic`` Qurrat-ul-`Ain Tahira. The student is once again torn between his literature and his history.
The bulk of Punjabi poetry is a message of Sufi tolerance, universal humanism, and social protest against all exploitation and inequalities. In the village the Punjabi boy and girl grow up with Sultan Bahu and Bulleh Shah and Shah Husain ringing in their ears. In their schools they are told to view the invasions of Ahmad Shah Abdali and the Afghan spoliation of the Punjab as victories of Islam. In the land of the Pathans children who have heard their parents and elders reciting Khushhal Khan Khattak with energy and devotion are taught in the school that the poet was a rebel against the Mughal Empire.
By compelling the young students to swallow these contradictions as their daily intellectual diet, we are forcing them to view their literature and history as two different sources of information which refute and rebut each other.
With the disappearance of the Persian language from our educational and cultural scene, a vital and humanistic element of our literature and culture and an important source of our history have been rubbed off our life. Here, literature and history suffer equally.
K.K. Aziz (born 1927) has taught politics, history, Islam and Asian Studies for 50 years at various institutions in Pakistan and abroad. He has also served as the deputy official historian to the federal government and chairman of the national commission on historical and cultural research.
#217 Posted by nameless on February 11, 2002 1:23:42 pm
A very long article. But worth reading in its entirity. Please read it fully and completely before hitting that reply/respond button. And please donot jump up and down burning your calories (do it in the gym). It has a long list of references at the end. It is well nuanced - and for one it shows the mind of the Indian as ooposed to the lalaji image many pakistanis have. Unfortunately such a nuanced piece of work is a raity amongst our intelligentia (Romair and few others are coming to it), but generally it is all bluster like that of YLH. Anyway read the article.
The Root of India-Pakistan Conflict
It is commonly accepted as an article of faith that Kashmir is the root cause of all problems between India and Pakistan. I disagree with this premise, and wish to demonstrate that the `Kashmir issue` is itself the result of a deeper root cause, which is a clash of two worldviews: pluralism versus exclusivism.
(It must be clarified that neither pluralism nor exclusivism is the same as secularism, because secularism denies the legitimacy of religion, seeing it at best as exotic culture, and at worst, as a scourge. On the other hand, pluralism and exclusivism both recognize and celebrate religion, but in entirely different ways.)
Most people fail to recognize that this clash between pluralism and exclusivism does indeed exist. This exposes an intellectual failing and lack of preparation in getting to the root cause of the India-Pakistan conflict. This has repressed the real problem, pushing it into the intellectual basement of the global subconscious, and turning it into the shadow side of humanity.
Any genuine attempt to address geopolitical problems must look deeper than examining merely the symptoms of conflict. This essay calls for a paradigm shift in the understanding of the root cause, without which attempts to resolve the `Kashmir issue` shall fail, or at best bring temporary relief. It concludes by defining the `hard question` that must be tackled by the world community.
Religion and Conflict
All religions have two dimensions: theological beliefs that pertain to one`s relationship with a Supreme Reality of whatever kind; and sociological beliefs that pertain to dealings with human society. Often, people compare only the theologies, finding common ground across many diverse religions, and declare them all be the `same` or `equivalent`. Hence, they naively conclude that the present global problems are not about religion.
However, one must pay special attention to the second dimension of religions, namely, the social theories mandated by different religions. It is here where the root of much conflict is to be located.
Christianity`s onerous social demands became the subject of intense fighting after 1500 C.E., leading to the Reformation of Christianity. Both sides -- orthodoxy and the reformers -- agreed that the social space should allow critical thinking, independent inquiry, and separation of church and state. This clipped the wings of Christianity from its control over the public space. Consequently, contemporary Western religion is largely a private affair and focuses less on control over society.
While Christianity does remain very active socially today, and has strong positions on abortion, euthanasia, and many other ethical matters, it is not the final legal authority to resolve sociological disputes. It has a position on these, but this is only `a` position and does not automatically become `the` position in Western society.
The situation in Islam is entirely different. A comparable Reformation has never been accomplished successfully, and those who have tried such amendments have been killed as heretics. Hence, in many ways, the sociological dictates of orthodox Islam today are comparable to those of pre-Reformation Christianity. For instance, during the Middle Ages, Catholic bishops had fatwa-like powers to give death sentences. They had police powers, and controlled the definition and enforcement of public law. (The greatest gift that the West could give to Muslims is guidance in bringing about such a Reformation, as that watershed event was the beginning of the rise of the West. The only losers would be the Islamic clergy.)
Furthermore, sociological mandates of a religion are also of two kinds: internal ones, such as the varna system, marriage customs, gender relations, and so forth, that only impact the internal society within a particular religion; and external ones, such as the requirement to proselytize or to kill or ill-treat outsiders, that impact those who are outsiders to a given faith.
In my view the theological and internal, sociological, aspects of a religion are not the primary causes of global conflict. Rather, the external, sociological, aspects of religion are the direct causes of global conflict.
It logically follows that it is the business of the world at large to interpret, question, and challenge those aspects of a religion that take a position concerning outsiders. If I am the subject of some other religion`s doctrine, and such a doctrine states how I am to be treated, what is to be done to me, what I may or may not do freely, then, even though I am not a member of that religion, it does become my business to probe these doctrines and even to demand a change. On the other hand, if a religion minds its own business, and has little to say pertaining to me as an outsider, then I should respect its right to be left alone.
In other words, a given religion`s right to be left alone by outsiders should be reciprocal and contingent upon its responsibility to leave outsiders alone.
Islam`s socio-political strategies in dealing with the non-Muslim world are now at the crossroads and under the world`s microscope. The positions adopted by Islamic leaders will have long-term consequences for the entire world, including both Muslims and non-Muslims.
Pakistan`s Islamic Foundations
The three important social demands that dominate the Islamic orthodoxy as adopted by Pakistan`s government and many other Islamic States (as opposed to alternative liberal interpretations that are subverted) are: (1) the 2-nation theory, (2) global loyalty to Islam superceding sovereignty of man-made countries, and (3) Islamic triumphalism. These are summarized below:
1. The 2-nation theory: Pakistan was carved out of India based on the theory that Muslims require their own separate nation in order to live in compliance with Islamic Law. This theory is equivalent to: (a) segregation (neo-apartheid) by demanding a separation of socio-political jurisdiction for Muslims; and (b) Islamic exclusiveness and imposition of Islamic “Law” upon the public sphere. This is the exact opposite of both pluralism and secularism. The traumatic event that resulted from this, in India, is commonly called “The Partition.” Once the population of Muslims in a given region crosses a threshold in numbers and/or assertiveness, such demands begin. Once this ball is set in motion, the euphoria builds up into a frenzy, and galvanizes the Pan-Islamic “global loyalty” discussed in #2 below. The temperature is made to boil until Muslims worldwide see the expansion of their territory as God`s work. The US will have this experience at some point during the next few decades.
2. Pan-Islamic loyalty superceding local sovereignty: Islamic doctrine divides humanity into two nations that transcend all boundaries of man-made countries: All Muslims in the world are deemed to be part of one single nation called dar-ul-islam (Nation-of-Islam). All non-Muslims are deemed to belong to dar-ul-harb (the enemy, or Nation-of-War). This bi-polar definition cuts across all sovereignty, because sovereignty is man-made and hence inferior and subservient to God`s political and social bifurcation. Islamic doctrine demands loyalty only to Islamic Law and not to the man-made laws of nations and states, such as USA, India, etc. Among the consequences of this doctrine is that a Muslim is required to fight on the side of a Muslim brother against any non-Muslim. This has often been invoked by Muslims to supercede the merits of a given dispute at hand. Orthodox Islam calls for a worldwide “network” of economic, political, social, and other alliances amongst the 1.2 billion Muslims of the world. Pakistan invokes this doctrine to claim Indian Muslims as part of dar-ul-islam, with Pakistan designated as caretaker of their interests. The Al Qaeda global network of terror is simply the extreme case of such a “network” mentality turning violent against the dar-ul-harb.
3. Islamic Triumphalism: A central tenet of Islam is that God`s “nation” -- i.e. the dar-ul-islam -- must sooner or later take over the world. Others, especially those who are in the crosshairs, as prey at a given moment, see this as religious imperialism. Pakistan`s official account of history honors Aurungzeb because he plundered and oppressed the infidels, i.e. Hindus and Buddhists. Likewise, many other conquerors, such as Mohammed of Ghazni, are portrayed as great heroes of Islamic triumphalism. (Even Pakistan`s missile is named after an Islamic conqueror of India in the Medieval Period.) Given this divine mandate, the ethos of aggressiveness and predatory behavior is promoted and celebrated in social life, which non-Muslims see as Islamic chauvinism. September 11 was a misjudgment of timing and dar-ul-islam`s ability to take over. But any orthodox Mullah or Imam would confirm God`s edict that eventually Islam absolutely must take over the world.
Socio-Political Consequences
Once ingrained, these ideological essences become the contexts that define all thinking concerning society, politics, ethics, and even militancy. A sort of closed universe develops and rigidifies, and assumes a life of its own, with its internal logic and legitimacy.
An intense identity is often programmed from childhood. For instance, history gets rewritten to fit the requirement that anything pre-Islamic is to be seen as inferior and false. In India, this legitimized the destruction of Hindu-Buddhist institutions. The past is still a threat, because it is too obviously Hindu-Buddhist. In Arabia, it caused the virtual erasure of rich pre-Islamic cultures. Indigenous art got re-branded as `Islamic art`, even though it was done by non-Muslims who were employed by the conquerors.
Indian contributions in math, science, medicine, art, literature, etc. were translated by Arab and Persian scholars in the Middle Ages with explicit acknowledgment and great respect for the Indian sources, and were later re-transmitted to Europe. However, since Islam now no longer has exclusive control over India, it now claims these as “Islamic” sciences. This version of a triumphant Islamic history is promoted heavily by Arab sponsored television shows, and even on public television in the US.
The education system of such societies brainwashes and hypnotizes young boys into dogma that either includes hatred, or can easily be turned into hatred, by pushing a few buttons. It denies them job skills for the modern era, thereby expanding the available pool of jihad mercenaries for hire.
When Islam is in a minority and brute force power is not advisable, the Al-taqiyah doctrine legitimizes deception, if done for the larger cause of dar-ul-islam.
All this has built a neurosis and hatred for others. There is also hatred for modernity, seeing it as evil. When the infidels start to win economically or politically, the orthodoxy preaches that Islamic people are not doing a good enough job on behalf of Allah, and must get re-energized to fight the dar-ul-harb. Such a powder keg blows up under the right conditions of stress.
This thinking led to the creation of Pakistan in 1947.
History of the Two-Nation Theory
Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1876-1938), the leading Muslim philosopher of his time, was an Indian nationalist in his early writings. But by 1930, in his poem, The Millat, his thoughts had crystallized on Muslim separatism. He explained the concept of partition in his presidential address to the Muslim League in Allahabad in 1930: that a unitary form of government was inconceivable, and that religious community had to be the basis for identification. His argument was that communalism in its highest sense brought harmony.
Iqbal demanded the establishment of a confederated India to include a Muslim state consisting of Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh, and Baluchistan. In subsequent speeches and writings, Iqbal reiterated the Muslim claim to nationhood “based on unity of language, race, history, religion, and identity of economic interests.”
The name `Pakistan` originated in 1933, when some Muslim students in Cambridge (UK) issued a pamphlet titled Now or Never. The pamphlet denied that India was a single country, and demanded partition. It explained the term `Pakistan` as follows: “Pakistan… is… composed of letters taken from the names of our homelands: that is, Punjab, Afghania [North-West Frontier Province], Kashmir, Iran, Sindh, Tukharistan, Afghanistan, and Balochistan. It means the land of the Paks, the spiritually pure and clean.”
In the 1937 elections to the provincial legislative assemblies, the Indian Congress party gained majorities in seven of the eleven provinces. Congress refused to form coalition governments with the Muslim League, even in Uttar Pradesh, which had a substantial Muslim minority, and vigorously denied the Muslim League`s claim to be the only true representative of Indian Muslims. This permanently alienated the Muslim League from the Congress.
By 1939, the Aligarh Muslim group`s resolution reflected the hardening of the Muslim leadership`s thinking: “Neither the fear of the British bayonets nor the prospects of a bloody civil war can discourage (the Muslims) in their will to achieve free Muslim states in those parts of India where they are in majority.”
To rally political support, Jinnah used `Pakistan` as the unifying cause. His famous 1940 Presidential address to the Muslim League`s annual convention in Lahore was a watershed event to segregate dar-ul-islam in the Indian subcontinent. He said:
“It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders. It is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits, and is the cause of most of our troubles, and will lead India to destruction, if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literature. They neither intermarry, nor inter-dine together, and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different, and they have different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a State.”
(Americans should visualize a future American Jinnah substituting “Christianity” in place of “Hinduism” and adopting similar positions.)
Jinnah`s theory was partially rationalized by his understanding of history according to which segregation was normal and natural across the world. In his above speech, Jinnah went on to say:
“History has also shown to us many geographical tracts, much smaller than the Subcontinent of India, which otherwise might have been called one country, but which have been divided into as many states as there are nations inhabiting them. The Balkan Peninsula comprises as many as seven or eight sovereign States. Likewise, the Portuguese and the Spanish stand divided in the Iberian Peninsula.”
This was a false theory of history on Jinnah`s part. Recent events demonstrate the trend towards European unification as opposed to subdivision, because the common interests greatly outweigh what divides the various diverse peoples of Europe.
However, having once made up his mind, Jinnah politicized his two-nation theory successfully, using fear tactics with the British:
“The present artificial unity of India dates back only to the British conquest and is maintained by the British bayonet; but the termination of the British regime, which is implicit in the recent declaration of His Majesty`s Government, will be the herald of an entire break up, with worse disaster than has ever taken place during the last one thousand years under the Muslims. Surely that is not the legacy which Britain would bequeath to India after 150 years of her rule, nor would the Hindu and Muslim India risk such a sure catastrophe.”
At the 1940 Lahore convention, the Muslim League resolved that the areas of Muslim majority in northwestern and eastern India should be grouped together to constitute independent states - autonomous and sovereign - and that any independence plan without this provision was unacceptable to Muslims. The Lahore Resolution was often referred to as the `Pakistan Resolution`.
Without any concrete `dispute` between Hindus and Muslims, the logic that prevailed was that Muslims require segregation of political and social life in order to be in compliance with the demands of sharia. The Two-Nation Theory was a manifestation of the doctrine of dar-ul-islam versus dar-ul-harb.
Divergent Post-Independence Directions
India was built on an entirely different worldview, inspired by the same ideals as the United States, as is evident from the Preamble to its Constitution:
“WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens:
* JUSTICE, social, economic and political;
* LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;
* EQUALITY of status and of opportunity;
* and to promote among them all
* FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the [unity and integrity of the Nation]; …”
In sharp contrast, the Constitution of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan has the following Preamble:
“Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust; …”
After Jinnah, Pakistan became increasingly radicalized and Islamicized, in many ways more extreme than the founder`s vision. For instance, the Ninth Amendment in 1985 caused Article 227 to read:
“All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, in this Part referred to as the Injunctions of Islam, …”
The Ninth Amendment explains that the “objects and reasons” for this Islamicization are “so as to provide that the Injunctions of Islam shall be the supreme law and source of guidance for legislation and policy making and to empower the Federal Shariat Court to make recommendations for bringing the fiscal laws and laws relating to the levy and collection of taxes in conformity with the said injunctions.”
Once there is a State religion that has a strong orthodoxy, the State must also interpret the religion. For example, the Ahmadiyya sect of Muslims is considered heretical, because it recognizes a 19th century man born in India to be the new Prophet of Islam. In order to preserve the purity of the interpretation of Islam, the Pakistan Federal Government has constitutionally prohibited the group from calling themselves Muslim, even in the use of everyday Islamic greetings. This was implemented in the Second Amendment of Pakistan`s Constitution in 1974, which reads:
“A person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of The Prophethood of MUHAMMAD (Peace be upon him), the last of the Prophets or claims to be a Prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever , after MUHAMMAD (Peace be upon him), or recognizes such a claimant as a Prophet or religious reformer, is not a Muslim for the purposes of the Constitution or law.”
This Constitutional provision is now enforced in various application forms of the Pakistani government, such as the following passport form on the home page of its embassy in Washington, DC. In item 14, the form asks for the following Declaration:
a. “I am a Muslim and believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him) the last of the prophets.
b. `I do not recognize any person who claims to he prophet in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever after Muhammad (peace be upon him) or recognize such a claimant as prophet or a religious reformer as a Muslim.
c. “I consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Quadiani to be an impostor nabi and also consider his followers whether belonging to the Lahori or Quadiani group, to be NON-MUSLIM.”
As further examples of Islamization, the Law of Pakistan calls for amputation of hands or feet for many property crimes. Consumption of alcohol by Muslims in any quantity whatsoever is punishable by flogging.
Under Pakistan`s Islamic laws, adultery and fornication are punishable by stoning to death. The law on rape (zina-bil-jabr) has a very chilling effect on women who are raped because: The crime is rarely proven because it requires that four adult Muslim males of `good reputation` must appear as witnesses to the act. (One is left wondering why four men `of good reputation` would be watching a rape.) If the charge fails, then the woman who has brought it can be punished for false accusation (qazf) or, more commonly, for adultery (zina) herself because through her charge she has admitted her own involvement in an illicit sexual act. For instance, in 1991, around two-thirds of the 3,000 women imprisoned in Pakistan were being held on such charges -- the victims of rape prosecuted for illicit sex!
Islamic texts are being introduced into Pakistani military training. Middle ranking officers must take courses and examinations on Islam. There are even serious attempts under way to define an Islamic military doctrine, as distinct from the international military doctrines, so as to fight in accordance with the Koran.
An eminent Pakistani writer, Mubarak Ali, explains the chronology of Islamization:
“The tragedy of 1971 [when Bangladesh separated] brought a shock to the people and also a heavy blow to the ideology of Pakistan… More or less convinced of their Islamic heritage and identity, Pakistan`s government and intelligentsia consciously attempted to Islamize the country… The history of Islamization can be traced to the Bhutto era…”
“General Zia-ul-Haq [another great friend and ally of the US] furthered the process to buy legitimacy for his military regime. The element of communal and sectarian hatred in today`s society are a direct consequence of the laws that the dictator had put in place… He made all secular and liberal-minded people enemies of the country. They were warned again and again of severe consequences in case of any violation of the [Islamic] Ideology of Pakistan.”
“Nawaz Sharif added his own bit, like mandating death penalty to the Blasphemy Law… With the failure of the ruling classes to deliver the goods to the people, religion was exploited to cover up corruption and bad governance… The process of Islamization not only supports but protects the fundamentalists in their attempts to terrorize and harass society in the name of religion. There are published accounts of the kind of menace that is spread by religious schools run by these fundamentalists…”
Khaled Ahmed describes how this radicalization of Pakistan is continuing even today:
“In Pakistan… every time it is felt that the ideology is not delivering there are prescriptions for further strengthening of the shariah… Needless to say, anyone recommending that the ideological state be undone is committing heresy and could be punished under law… The Council for Islamic Ideology (CII) is busy on a daily basis to put forth its proposals for the conversion of the Pakistani state into a utopia of Islamic dreams. The Ministry for Religious Affairs has already sent to the cabinet of General Musharraf a full-fledged programme for converting Pakistan into an ideal state… We have reached this stage in a gradual fashion, where these state institutions have become directly responsible for encouraging extremism…”
This hole is so deep that General Musharraf, while promising to de-radicalize Pakistan, must reassure his people not to fear the `threat` of secularism. He recently clarified it as follows:
``No-one should even think this is a secular state. It was founded as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan…”
While America still has enormous racial inequality 150 years after the abolishing of slavery, the important point is that it is committed to racial equality. Similarly, despite many flaws in India`s pluralism, the State is committed to it. What counts is a commitment to steady improvement. India has had one of the most aggressive and ambitious affirmative action programs in the world. The results, while far from perfect, have produced many top level Muslim leaders in various capacities in India, and a growth of Muslims as a percentage of total population. But in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Hindu population has decreased from 11% in 1947 to around 1% today, as a result of ethnic cleansing.
Pakistan`s Identity Crisis
The problem for an educated Pakistani is to figure out when and where his history started. If it is to be 1947 in the geographical area that is now Pakistan, then there is very little past for him to build an identity. If it is to be from the time of Mohammed, then his history is outside his land. If it is prior to that, then his history is largely a Hindu-Buddhist history, a past he wants to deny.
He must invent history to answer the question: Why was Pakistan created? Mubarak Ali, a prominent Pakistani scholar, explains the predicament:
“Since its inception Pakistan has faced the monumental task of formulating its national identity separate from India. Partitioned from the ancient civilization of India, Pakistan has struggled to construct its own culture; a culture not just different and unique from India, but one appreciable by the rest of the world. The overshadowing image of the Indian civilization also haunted the founders of Pakistan, who channeled their efforts in making the differences between India and Pakistan more tangible and obvious.
“The fundamental difference between India and Pakistan was based on the Two Nation theory, strengthening Pakistan`s Islamic identity.
“…The University Grants Commission of Pakistan made Islamic Studies and Pakistan Study compulsory subjects at all levels of the education system, even for the professional students. … This gave the government an opportunity to teach the students its own version of history, especially the Pakistan ideology, which is described as something like this: ``The struggle was for the establishment of a new Islamic state and for the attainment of independence. It was the outcome of the sincere desire of the Muslims of the subcontinent who wanted Islam to be accepted as the ideal pattern for an individual`s life, and also as the law to bind the Muslims into a single community.
“In asserting this identity, Pakistan is in a state of dilemma…”
If Pakistanis were seen merely as Indians who converted to Islam, then they would seem no different than the Indian Muslims, who are equal in number to Pakistan`s total population, who are better educated and economically placed, and who enjoy greater social freedom than their counterparts in Pakistan. Hence, the very existence of Pakistan as a separate nation rests upon constructing an identity for itself that is radically different from India`s. But you cannot build a nation on a negative identity.
One might say that a birth defect of Pakistan was its lack of a self-sufficient positive identity. Such a positive identity would neither be a negation of India, nor be an imperialistic claim of authority over all dar-ul-islam of the subcontinent. Kamal Azfar, a Pakistani writer, explains the dilemma:
“There are two concepts of Pakistan: the first empirical and the second utopian. The empirical concept is based on solid foundations of history and geography while the utopian concept is based on shifting sands. Utopia is not an oasis but a mirage… Samarqand and Bukhara and the splendors of the Arab world are closely related to us but we do not possess them. Our possessions are Moenjodaro and Sehwan Sharif, Taxila and Lahore, Multan and the Khyber. We should own up to all that is present here in the Indus Valley and cease to long for realities not our own for that is false-consciousness.”
This obsession to be seen as neo-Arabs has reached ridiculous extremes, such as Pakistani scholars` attempts to show that Sanskrit was derived from Arabic. Even Persian influence on Indian culture is considered impure as compared to Arabic.
Pakistan`s un-Indian identity easily gets turned into anti-Indian rhetoric. In short, hatred for India has been required to keep Pakistan together, because Allah has not done so. Pakistan is largely a garrison state, created and sustained using the Hindu-Muslim divide.
A secure Hindu seems to be incompatible with what the Pakistani thinks a Hindu should be. Especially any `Hindu` success feeds its Hindu-phobia.
Pakistan`s positive identity building projects are using multiple strategies. The following are three of the major historical myths being spun by Pakistan, to secure legitimacy for its separate existence.
Myth 1: Pakistanis = Descendents of the Indus Valley Civilization
The most aggressive identity engineering project is the theory of Pakistanis depicted as the 8,000-year-old people of the Indus Valley. This civilization is presented as different from the Ganges Valley civilization. The Indus and Ganges are depicted as the ancestral homelands of Pakistanis and Indians, respectively. Hence, they have always been separate people. Given this model, Pakistan`s Indus Valley researchers are encouraged to show the links to the Middle East civilizations of Mesopotamia, so as to bring Pakistan and the Arab-Persian worlds into a single continuous historical-geographical identity since the beginnings of recorded history.
The following article titled, Separating Urdu from Sanskrit, published in the Urdu newspaper Jang, explains the construction of this theory of an 8,000-year-old Pakistan:
“Pakistani intellectuals have been looking for the roots of their separate identity in the remote past for the last two decades. They are not satisfied with the two-nation theory propounded by Iqbal, according to which religion was the basis of nationhood… They want to show that… the Indus and the Gangetic valleys have always been home to separate civilizations. Being the heir to the Indus valley civilization, Pakistan is a geographic entity whose roots go back to time immemorial…
“Hitherto, the generally held belief has been that Urdu came into being as a result of social contacts between the Muslims who came to India during the middle ages and the native population. So the language was taken to be a crossbreed of Turko-Persian-Arabic vocables with the local dialects. This is, in a nutshell, the view held by such eminent linguists as G.A. Griesson and Sir Charles Lyall, to mention only two. This theory presupposed that these dialects themselves were based upon, or rather were a by-product of Sanskrit.
“Khalid Hasan Qadiri [a new identity developer]… reaches the conclusion that Urdu has its roots in the languages of the Munda tribes who were the inhabitants of the Indus Valley in pre-Dravidian periods…. In this way we are led to believe that the Urdu language has a very well-defined and clear-cut grammar, absolutely different from Sanskrit in every respect. The very basic philosophy governing the grammatical structure of these two languages is totally different. And by any stretch of imagination one cannot state Urdu to have emanated from the sacred language of the Hindus. Grammatically speaking Urdu owes nothing to Sanskrit. Hence it cannot be grouped with the Aryan language either. It clearly belongs to some non-Aryan group of languages. And this view is supposed to give us some solace.”
Myth 2: Pakistanis = West Asian Races
Using a more recent beginning point, there is a popular construction of Pakistanis as Arab-Persian-Turk `immigrants` (with a few occasional `jihads` against the infidels). Here, Pakistanis get racially differentiated from the `native` Indian Muslims. (A different version of this scenario says that Pakistanis are Aryans originally from lands around Turkey.)
These theories encourage rampant Arabization of Pakistani culture. Arabization is to Pakistanis what Macaulayism is to many Indians. The difference is that Macaulayism has afflicted only the top tier of Indian elitists, whereas Arabization of Pakistan pervades all strata of Pakistani identity. For instance:
* Girls are discouraged from wearing mehndi, because it is seen as a Hindu tradition, even though it has nothing to do with one`s religion per se.
* The kite flying tradition during the festival of Baisakhi, celebrated for centuries in Punjab as the harvest season, is now under the microscope of Pakistan`s identity engineers for being too Sikh and Hindu in character, and not Arab enough.
* Emphasis is placed on being un-Indian so as to assert this new identity wherever possible.
Pakistan has these internal conflicts between its Middle Eastern religious values on the one hand, and its Indian cultural values on the other. In this internal struggle, the Islamic values based on Middle East culture are conquering the indigenous values of the people. Much of the neurosis is about this destruction of one`s past identity.
Myth 3: Pakistan = Successor to Mughal Empire
This is the most ominous model of all from Indians` perspective: Pakistan is depicted as the successor to the Mughal Empire. The post-Mughal two-century British rule is seen as a dark period of interruption that is now to be reversed by returning to the glory of the Mughals. Under this return of the Mughals, Hindus would be second-class citizens, in the same manner as they were under the Mughals.
Many Pakistanis would like Mughal Emperor Akbar`s model, under which Hindus were tolerated and even respected, although Muslims enjoyed higher status.
But most Pakistanis are said to prefer Emperor Aurungzeb`s model, under which Hindus were oppressed and forced to convert, and Islam was asserted in ways that were not different from the Taliban`s policies. This glorifies aggressiveness and Islamic chauvinism. Such an imperialistic identity has also led to a leadership claim over India`s Muslims, even though they outnumber Pakistan`s entire population and enjoy greater prosperity, freedom and culture.
Neurosis
This schizophrenia makes Pakistanis very insecure. To avoid this quandary, they quickly slip into talk of a pan-Islamic identity, hoping to escape the irrational construct with which they find themselves burdened.
It is relevant to point out that Muslims are required to point towards Mecca five times daily in prayer. Psychologists would call this “creative visualization,” a form of subconscious programming. Are loyalties taking shape deep within one`s psyche, towards the Arabs, the owners of Mecca?
What is the effect of being told since childhood, in chauvinistic and triumphant terms, of Islam`s heroic plunder of infidels, and its inevitable conquest of the entire world? What is the consequence of glorifying Ghazni and Aurungzeb as is done in Pakistan`s public school textbooks?
Khaled Ahmed explains the neurosis resulting from such dogma:
“The difficulty lies in the inability of the Muslims to mould their original revealed message to modern times by applying logic and rationality to the ancient case law. There was a time when this was done but the era of taqleed (imitation) has been upon us since the medieval period. Under colonial rule, many Muslims thought of introducing reason in the science of understanding the Holy Writ, but today no one in the Islamic world tolerates any deviation from taqleed even when this taqleed varies in practice from state to state. All Muslim states are unstable either because they have enforced the shariah and are unhappy with it, like Pakistan, or have not enforced it and are unhappy that it has not been enforced. For Muslims the question, `What kind of state do we want?` is a rhetorical one, because for them it has already been answered.”
Most shocking is the prevalent Hindu-bashing on Pakistani state television and in state school textbooks. A common theme is to depict Brahmins as cunning and wicked, and to mock at Hindu beliefs. By contrast, the state run media in India is extra careful to be sensitive. Private Bollywood has many Muslims in dominant positions and a pluralistic ethos is very much projected.
One of the most popular songs sung by Hindus is Ishvar, Allah tere nam, meaning Ishvar and Allah are God`s names. I have not come across Hindus being concerned or even conscious that they are giving Allah recognition as equal to Ishvar. But most Muslim friends refuse to participate in any such song, as it would violate the injunction against respecting other deities.
A friend recently told me that in her corporate office on Wall Street, she has been a close friend of a Pakistani woman executive for many years. They bring lunch from home, and have shared each other`s food regularly. But one day, my friend casually remarked that the lunch she brings is after doing puja and offering some as prasadam. The Pakistani woman refused to accept her food ever since. She had no qualms about saying that eating such a meal would be a violation of her Islamic faith.
Pakistan, assuming the leadership of dar-ul-islam, is trying to expand the territory of Islam. Militancy is a relatively recent export of Pakistan, a sort of last resort out of desperation. The `Kashmir issue` is Pakistan`s identity crisis externalized towards an outside enemy, so as to find a meaning for itself. The citizens of Pakistan have been galvanized into a neurosis to Islamize Kashmir on behalf of Allah.
The Need to Decouple
The economic directions of India and Pakistan are entirely different: the technology education emphasis in India, as compared to the madrassas in Pakistan where Islamic identity is the primary curriculum.
India is one-sixth of all humanity. It deserves its own space in the world`s mind, and should not be reduced to one of eight countries lumped into a single `South Asian region` just for simplicity and convenience. Pakistan should be let loose to discover who it wants to be, without being bothered about India.
The Garland Making Worldview
“Be like a garland maker, O king; not like a charcoal burner.” --Mahabharata, XII.72.20
This famous statement from the Mahabharata contrasts two worldviews. It asks the king to preserve and protect diversity, in a coherent way. The metaphor used is that of a garland, in which flowers of many colors and forms are strung together for a pleasing effect. The contrast is given against charcoal, which is the result of burning all kinds of wood and reducing diversity to homogeneous dead matter. The charcoal burner is reductionist and destroys diversity, whereas the garland maker celebrates diversity.
Garland making and charcoal burning represent two divergent worldviews in terms of socio-political ideology. The former leads to pluralism and diversity of thought, whereas the latter strives for a homogenized and fossilized society in which dogma runs supreme.
India represents a long and continuous history of experimentation with garland making. A central tenet of dharma is that one`s social duty is individualistic and dependent upon the context:
* To illustrate the context-sensitive nature of dharma, a text by Baudhayana lists practices that would be normal in one region of India but not appropriate in another, and advises that learned men of the traditions should follow the customs of their respective districts.
* Furthermore, the ethical views applicable also depend upon one`s stage in life (asramadharma).
* One`s particular position in society determines one`s personal dharma (svadharma).
* The dharma has to be based upon one`s personal inner nature (svabhava).
* There is even special dharma that is appropriate in times of distress or emergency (apaddharma).
Hence, anything resembling a universal or absolute social law (sadharama) is characterized as a last resort and not as a first resort - a fallback if no context can be found applicable.
Combine this with the fact that social theories (called Smritis) were not divine revelations as was the case in the Abrahamic religions, but were constructed by human lawmakers who were analogous to today`s public officials. Hence, all Smritis are amendable, and indeed are intended to be modified for each era and by each society. This is a very progressive social mandate, and to freeze Indian social norms is, in fact, a travesty based on ignorance.
This pluralistic social theory is deeply rooted in indigenous religions. In the Bhagavadagita (IX. 23-25), Krishna proclaims that the devotees who worship other deities are in fact worshipping Him; and that those who offer worship to various other deities or natural powers also reach the goals they desire.
Dr. P. V. Kane has researched ancient India`s pluralism, and concluded emphatically that there was no state sponsored religious exclusivism. In particular, Kashmir`s history of garland making spans several millennia. Its identity was not based on any religion. Kashmiris of all religions lived in harmony, and Kashmir was the incubator of Kashmir Shaivism, much of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, and Sufism. Kashmir`s survival as a garland making culture is a crucial challenge to the future of pluralism in the world.
The `Kashmir Issue`
No fruitful discussion can begin with `the Kashmir issue` as though it were a stand-alone real estate dispute. The root problem between India and Pakistan is not `Kashmir`. Neither is it about Islam`s theology nor its internal social practices. Rather, it is the clash between worldviews resulting from the external projection of Islam -- dar-ul-islam versus dar-ul-harb. This manifests as Pakistan`s two-nation worldview versus India`s pluralistic worldview.
The validity and success of either worldview necessitates the defeat of the other:
* For, if Pakistan`s worldview were right, then Muslims everywhere require their own country in order to live as good Muslims. This would mean that Indian pluralism would have to fail, and Indian Muslims would need their own separate nation as well.
* On the other hand, if India`s worldview were right, and Indian Muslims lived happily in a pluralistic society, then the very foundation of Pakistan`s existence would become unglued and there would be a call for re-unification.
If both India and Pakistan were to adopt a common worldview, there could be a stable peace, regardless of which worldview it was:
* If both adopted the two-nation theory, there would be exclusive and separate nations for Muslims and Hindus, respectively. The practicalities of implementation would be horrendous, given the massive and dispersed Indian Muslim population. But each would eventually become homogeneous internally.
* If both adopted the one-nation theory, they would re-unify.
I disfavor the first choice, because it would set a horrible precedence for humanity at large: If India were to fail as the world`s oldest surviving garland making civilization, it would mean that any geographical region of the world with a significant Muslim minority, even with a small population (such as Kashmir`s), would eventually demand separation from the dar-ul-harb. Given the empirical fact of a faster birth rate than the rest of the population, Muslims everywhere would sooner or later have the same kinds of fights with dar-ul-harb as in Bosnia, pre-partition India, Philippines, Kashmir, and so forth.
Partitions into Muslim nations could never be complete until there were no others left. Such a theocracy would be the ultimate charcoal burning social structure.
This would eventually become the biggest nightmare for the United States, China and other countries, given their own demographic trends.
The second scenario may not be politically acceptable to Pakistan. This leads us to the hard question of reformation.
The Hard Question
Rather than pretending that these problems have “nothing to do with religion,” or fearing that it would be politically incorrect to address this issue, non-Muslim thinkers and liberal Islamic leaders should brainstorm the following question:
Under what socio-political mutual understandings could it become attractive for Muslims to live in integrated harmony with non-Muslims, even where the Muslims are a majority or a significant minority?
In other words, let`s negotiate a framework for Islamic pluralism, separation of mosque and state, and democracy.
The West`s failure to understand this clash of worldviews, and its continued approach to Kashmir as the problem in isolation, could end up creating another Palestine-like unsolvable crisis. This crisis would be worse, and involve massive populations and nukes.
There needs to be a paradigm shift in defining the problem. India should take the moral, intellectual and diplomatic high ground to debate: one nation (pluralism) versus two nation (exclusivism) theories. In other words, the real issue is garland making versus charcoal burning.
References:
1. See http://alfa.nic.in/const/preamble.html Also, note that Article 15 explicitly prohibits “discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.”
2. See http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part9.html
3. Jinnah did have a vision as a moderate, although in an overall Islamic context. In his presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, August 11, 1947, Jinnah said: “Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.” Contemporary Pakistanis are often trying to deny this secularist call by Jinnah.
4. See http://www.pakistan-embassy.com/pages/formA.htm This url is to Pak Embassy in DC, giving the official government form to get a passport.
5. In search of identity by Mubarak Ali. Dawn, Karachi. May 7, 2000.
6. What kind of state do we want? by Khaled Ahmed. The Friday Times. January 25, 2002.
7. Pakistan not meant to be secular. BBC., 30 January, 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_1792000/1792252.stm
8. In search of identity by Mubarak Ali. Dawn, Karachi. May 7, 2000.
9. The concept of Pakistan by Kamal Azfar. The Friday Times.
10. See the article titled, Separating Urdu from Sanskrit at: http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2001-weekly/nos-23-12-2001/lit.htm#4
11. This term is named after Lord Macaulay, who pioneered the British program to replace Indian languages with English, to remove respect for indigenous ideas and values, so as to create intellectual dependence and reverence for the colonizers. This was a very essential part of the colonizing process, and its crushing impact is still being felt.
12. What kind of state do we want? by Khaled Ahmed. The Friday Times. January 25, 2002.
13. Dr. P. V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra. Volume III, second edition, 1973, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. p.883.
The Root of India-Pakistan Conflict
It is commonly accepted as an article of faith that Kashmir is the root cause of all problems between India and Pakistan. I disagree with this premise, and wish to demonstrate that the `Kashmir issue` is itself the result of a deeper root cause, which is a clash of two worldviews: pluralism versus exclusivism.
(It must be clarified that neither pluralism nor exclusivism is the same as secularism, because secularism denies the legitimacy of religion, seeing it at best as exotic culture, and at worst, as a scourge. On the other hand, pluralism and exclusivism both recognize and celebrate religion, but in entirely different ways.)
Most people fail to recognize that this clash between pluralism and exclusivism does indeed exist. This exposes an intellectual failing and lack of preparation in getting to the root cause of the India-Pakistan conflict. This has repressed the real problem, pushing it into the intellectual basement of the global subconscious, and turning it into the shadow side of humanity.
Any genuine attempt to address geopolitical problems must look deeper than examining merely the symptoms of conflict. This essay calls for a paradigm shift in the understanding of the root cause, without which attempts to resolve the `Kashmir issue` shall fail, or at best bring temporary relief. It concludes by defining the `hard question` that must be tackled by the world community.
Religion and Conflict
All religions have two dimensions: theological beliefs that pertain to one`s relationship with a Supreme Reality of whatever kind; and sociological beliefs that pertain to dealings with human society. Often, people compare only the theologies, finding common ground across many diverse religions, and declare them all be the `same` or `equivalent`. Hence, they naively conclude that the present global problems are not about religion.
However, one must pay special attention to the second dimension of religions, namely, the social theories mandated by different religions. It is here where the root of much conflict is to be located.
Christianity`s onerous social demands became the subject of intense fighting after 1500 C.E., leading to the Reformation of Christianity. Both sides -- orthodoxy and the reformers -- agreed that the social space should allow critical thinking, independent inquiry, and separation of church and state. This clipped the wings of Christianity from its control over the public space. Consequently, contemporary Western religion is largely a private affair and focuses less on control over society.
While Christianity does remain very active socially today, and has strong positions on abortion, euthanasia, and many other ethical matters, it is not the final legal authority to resolve sociological disputes. It has a position on these, but this is only `a` position and does not automatically become `the` position in Western society.
The situation in Islam is entirely different. A comparable Reformation has never been accomplished successfully, and those who have tried such amendments have been killed as heretics. Hence, in many ways, the sociological dictates of orthodox Islam today are comparable to those of pre-Reformation Christianity. For instance, during the Middle Ages, Catholic bishops had fatwa-like powers to give death sentences. They had police powers, and controlled the definition and enforcement of public law. (The greatest gift that the West could give to Muslims is guidance in bringing about such a Reformation, as that watershed event was the beginning of the rise of the West. The only losers would be the Islamic clergy.)
Furthermore, sociological mandates of a religion are also of two kinds: internal ones, such as the varna system, marriage customs, gender relations, and so forth, that only impact the internal society within a particular religion; and external ones, such as the requirement to proselytize or to kill or ill-treat outsiders, that impact those who are outsiders to a given faith.
In my view the theological and internal, sociological, aspects of a religion are not the primary causes of global conflict. Rather, the external, sociological, aspects of religion are the direct causes of global conflict.
It logically follows that it is the business of the world at large to interpret, question, and challenge those aspects of a religion that take a position concerning outsiders. If I am the subject of some other religion`s doctrine, and such a doctrine states how I am to be treated, what is to be done to me, what I may or may not do freely, then, even though I am not a member of that religion, it does become my business to probe these doctrines and even to demand a change. On the other hand, if a religion minds its own business, and has little to say pertaining to me as an outsider, then I should respect its right to be left alone.
In other words, a given religion`s right to be left alone by outsiders should be reciprocal and contingent upon its responsibility to leave outsiders alone.
Islam`s socio-political strategies in dealing with the non-Muslim world are now at the crossroads and under the world`s microscope. The positions adopted by Islamic leaders will have long-term consequences for the entire world, including both Muslims and non-Muslims.
Pakistan`s Islamic Foundations
The three important social demands that dominate the Islamic orthodoxy as adopted by Pakistan`s government and many other Islamic States (as opposed to alternative liberal interpretations that are subverted) are: (1) the 2-nation theory, (2) global loyalty to Islam superceding sovereignty of man-made countries, and (3) Islamic triumphalism. These are summarized below:
1. The 2-nation theory: Pakistan was carved out of India based on the theory that Muslims require their own separate nation in order to live in compliance with Islamic Law. This theory is equivalent to: (a) segregation (neo-apartheid) by demanding a separation of socio-political jurisdiction for Muslims; and (b) Islamic exclusiveness and imposition of Islamic “Law” upon the public sphere. This is the exact opposite of both pluralism and secularism. The traumatic event that resulted from this, in India, is commonly called “The Partition.” Once the population of Muslims in a given region crosses a threshold in numbers and/or assertiveness, such demands begin. Once this ball is set in motion, the euphoria builds up into a frenzy, and galvanizes the Pan-Islamic “global loyalty” discussed in #2 below. The temperature is made to boil until Muslims worldwide see the expansion of their territory as God`s work. The US will have this experience at some point during the next few decades.
2. Pan-Islamic loyalty superceding local sovereignty: Islamic doctrine divides humanity into two nations that transcend all boundaries of man-made countries: All Muslims in the world are deemed to be part of one single nation called dar-ul-islam (Nation-of-Islam). All non-Muslims are deemed to belong to dar-ul-harb (the enemy, or Nation-of-War). This bi-polar definition cuts across all sovereignty, because sovereignty is man-made and hence inferior and subservient to God`s political and social bifurcation. Islamic doctrine demands loyalty only to Islamic Law and not to the man-made laws of nations and states, such as USA, India, etc. Among the consequences of this doctrine is that a Muslim is required to fight on the side of a Muslim brother against any non-Muslim. This has often been invoked by Muslims to supercede the merits of a given dispute at hand. Orthodox Islam calls for a worldwide “network” of economic, political, social, and other alliances amongst the 1.2 billion Muslims of the world. Pakistan invokes this doctrine to claim Indian Muslims as part of dar-ul-islam, with Pakistan designated as caretaker of their interests. The Al Qaeda global network of terror is simply the extreme case of such a “network” mentality turning violent against the dar-ul-harb.
3. Islamic Triumphalism: A central tenet of Islam is that God`s “nation” -- i.e. the dar-ul-islam -- must sooner or later take over the world. Others, especially those who are in the crosshairs, as prey at a given moment, see this as religious imperialism. Pakistan`s official account of history honors Aurungzeb because he plundered and oppressed the infidels, i.e. Hindus and Buddhists. Likewise, many other conquerors, such as Mohammed of Ghazni, are portrayed as great heroes of Islamic triumphalism. (Even Pakistan`s missile is named after an Islamic conqueror of India in the Medieval Period.) Given this divine mandate, the ethos of aggressiveness and predatory behavior is promoted and celebrated in social life, which non-Muslims see as Islamic chauvinism. September 11 was a misjudgment of timing and dar-ul-islam`s ability to take over. But any orthodox Mullah or Imam would confirm God`s edict that eventually Islam absolutely must take over the world.
Socio-Political Consequences
Once ingrained, these ideological essences become the contexts that define all thinking concerning society, politics, ethics, and even militancy. A sort of closed universe develops and rigidifies, and assumes a life of its own, with its internal logic and legitimacy.
An intense identity is often programmed from childhood. For instance, history gets rewritten to fit the requirement that anything pre-Islamic is to be seen as inferior and false. In India, this legitimized the destruction of Hindu-Buddhist institutions. The past is still a threat, because it is too obviously Hindu-Buddhist. In Arabia, it caused the virtual erasure of rich pre-Islamic cultures. Indigenous art got re-branded as `Islamic art`, even though it was done by non-Muslims who were employed by the conquerors.
Indian contributions in math, science, medicine, art, literature, etc. were translated by Arab and Persian scholars in the Middle Ages with explicit acknowledgment and great respect for the Indian sources, and were later re-transmitted to Europe. However, since Islam now no longer has exclusive control over India, it now claims these as “Islamic” sciences. This version of a triumphant Islamic history is promoted heavily by Arab sponsored television shows, and even on public television in the US.
The education system of such societies brainwashes and hypnotizes young boys into dogma that either includes hatred, or can easily be turned into hatred, by pushing a few buttons. It denies them job skills for the modern era, thereby expanding the available pool of jihad mercenaries for hire.
When Islam is in a minority and brute force power is not advisable, the Al-taqiyah doctrine legitimizes deception, if done for the larger cause of dar-ul-islam.
All this has built a neurosis and hatred for others. There is also hatred for modernity, seeing it as evil. When the infidels start to win economically or politically, the orthodoxy preaches that Islamic people are not doing a good enough job on behalf of Allah, and must get re-energized to fight the dar-ul-harb. Such a powder keg blows up under the right conditions of stress.
This thinking led to the creation of Pakistan in 1947.
History of the Two-Nation Theory
Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1876-1938), the leading Muslim philosopher of his time, was an Indian nationalist in his early writings. But by 1930, in his poem, The Millat, his thoughts had crystallized on Muslim separatism. He explained the concept of partition in his presidential address to the Muslim League in Allahabad in 1930: that a unitary form of government was inconceivable, and that religious community had to be the basis for identification. His argument was that communalism in its highest sense brought harmony.
Iqbal demanded the establishment of a confederated India to include a Muslim state consisting of Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh, and Baluchistan. In subsequent speeches and writings, Iqbal reiterated the Muslim claim to nationhood “based on unity of language, race, history, religion, and identity of economic interests.”
The name `Pakistan` originated in 1933, when some Muslim students in Cambridge (UK) issued a pamphlet titled Now or Never. The pamphlet denied that India was a single country, and demanded partition. It explained the term `Pakistan` as follows: “Pakistan… is… composed of letters taken from the names of our homelands: that is, Punjab, Afghania [North-West Frontier Province], Kashmir, Iran, Sindh, Tukharistan, Afghanistan, and Balochistan. It means the land of the Paks, the spiritually pure and clean.”
In the 1937 elections to the provincial legislative assemblies, the Indian Congress party gained majorities in seven of the eleven provinces. Congress refused to form coalition governments with the Muslim League, even in Uttar Pradesh, which had a substantial Muslim minority, and vigorously denied the Muslim League`s claim to be the only true representative of Indian Muslims. This permanently alienated the Muslim League from the Congress.
By 1939, the Aligarh Muslim group`s resolution reflected the hardening of the Muslim leadership`s thinking: “Neither the fear of the British bayonets nor the prospects of a bloody civil war can discourage (the Muslims) in their will to achieve free Muslim states in those parts of India where they are in majority.”
To rally political support, Jinnah used `Pakistan` as the unifying cause. His famous 1940 Presidential address to the Muslim League`s annual convention in Lahore was a watershed event to segregate dar-ul-islam in the Indian subcontinent. He said:
“It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders. It is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits, and is the cause of most of our troubles, and will lead India to destruction, if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literature. They neither intermarry, nor inter-dine together, and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different, and they have different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a State.”
(Americans should visualize a future American Jinnah substituting “Christianity” in place of “Hinduism” and adopting similar positions.)
Jinnah`s theory was partially rationalized by his understanding of history according to which segregation was normal and natural across the world. In his above speech, Jinnah went on to say:
“History has also shown to us many geographical tracts, much smaller than the Subcontinent of India, which otherwise might have been called one country, but which have been divided into as many states as there are nations inhabiting them. The Balkan Peninsula comprises as many as seven or eight sovereign States. Likewise, the Portuguese and the Spanish stand divided in the Iberian Peninsula.”
This was a false theory of history on Jinnah`s part. Recent events demonstrate the trend towards European unification as opposed to subdivision, because the common interests greatly outweigh what divides the various diverse peoples of Europe.
However, having once made up his mind, Jinnah politicized his two-nation theory successfully, using fear tactics with the British:
“The present artificial unity of India dates back only to the British conquest and is maintained by the British bayonet; but the termination of the British regime, which is implicit in the recent declaration of His Majesty`s Government, will be the herald of an entire break up, with worse disaster than has ever taken place during the last one thousand years under the Muslims. Surely that is not the legacy which Britain would bequeath to India after 150 years of her rule, nor would the Hindu and Muslim India risk such a sure catastrophe.”
At the 1940 Lahore convention, the Muslim League resolved that the areas of Muslim majority in northwestern and eastern India should be grouped together to constitute independent states - autonomous and sovereign - and that any independence plan without this provision was unacceptable to Muslims. The Lahore Resolution was often referred to as the `Pakistan Resolution`.
Without any concrete `dispute` between Hindus and Muslims, the logic that prevailed was that Muslims require segregation of political and social life in order to be in compliance with the demands of sharia. The Two-Nation Theory was a manifestation of the doctrine of dar-ul-islam versus dar-ul-harb.
Divergent Post-Independence Directions
India was built on an entirely different worldview, inspired by the same ideals as the United States, as is evident from the Preamble to its Constitution:
“WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens:
* JUSTICE, social, economic and political;
* LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;
* EQUALITY of status and of opportunity;
* and to promote among them all
* FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the [unity and integrity of the Nation]; …”
In sharp contrast, the Constitution of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan has the following Preamble:
“Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust; …”
After Jinnah, Pakistan became increasingly radicalized and Islamicized, in many ways more extreme than the founder`s vision. For instance, the Ninth Amendment in 1985 caused Article 227 to read:
“All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, in this Part referred to as the Injunctions of Islam, …”
The Ninth Amendment explains that the “objects and reasons” for this Islamicization are “so as to provide that the Injunctions of Islam shall be the supreme law and source of guidance for legislation and policy making and to empower the Federal Shariat Court to make recommendations for bringing the fiscal laws and laws relating to the levy and collection of taxes in conformity with the said injunctions.”
Once there is a State religion that has a strong orthodoxy, the State must also interpret the religion. For example, the Ahmadiyya sect of Muslims is considered heretical, because it recognizes a 19th century man born in India to be the new Prophet of Islam. In order to preserve the purity of the interpretation of Islam, the Pakistan Federal Government has constitutionally prohibited the group from calling themselves Muslim, even in the use of everyday Islamic greetings. This was implemented in the Second Amendment of Pakistan`s Constitution in 1974, which reads:
“A person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of The Prophethood of MUHAMMAD (Peace be upon him), the last of the Prophets or claims to be a Prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever , after MUHAMMAD (Peace be upon him), or recognizes such a claimant as a Prophet or religious reformer, is not a Muslim for the purposes of the Constitution or law.”
This Constitutional provision is now enforced in various application forms of the Pakistani government, such as the following passport form on the home page of its embassy in Washington, DC. In item 14, the form asks for the following Declaration:
a. “I am a Muslim and believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him) the last of the prophets.
b. `I do not recognize any person who claims to he prophet in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever after Muhammad (peace be upon him) or recognize such a claimant as prophet or a religious reformer as a Muslim.
c. “I consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Quadiani to be an impostor nabi and also consider his followers whether belonging to the Lahori or Quadiani group, to be NON-MUSLIM.”
As further examples of Islamization, the Law of Pakistan calls for amputation of hands or feet for many property crimes. Consumption of alcohol by Muslims in any quantity whatsoever is punishable by flogging.
Under Pakistan`s Islamic laws, adultery and fornication are punishable by stoning to death. The law on rape (zina-bil-jabr) has a very chilling effect on women who are raped because: The crime is rarely proven because it requires that four adult Muslim males of `good reputation` must appear as witnesses to the act. (One is left wondering why four men `of good reputation` would be watching a rape.) If the charge fails, then the woman who has brought it can be punished for false accusation (qazf) or, more commonly, for adultery (zina) herself because through her charge she has admitted her own involvement in an illicit sexual act. For instance, in 1991, around two-thirds of the 3,000 women imprisoned in Pakistan were being held on such charges -- the victims of rape prosecuted for illicit sex!
Islamic texts are being introduced into Pakistani military training. Middle ranking officers must take courses and examinations on Islam. There are even serious attempts under way to define an Islamic military doctrine, as distinct from the international military doctrines, so as to fight in accordance with the Koran.
An eminent Pakistani writer, Mubarak Ali, explains the chronology of Islamization:
“The tragedy of 1971 [when Bangladesh separated] brought a shock to the people and also a heavy blow to the ideology of Pakistan… More or less convinced of their Islamic heritage and identity, Pakistan`s government and intelligentsia consciously attempted to Islamize the country… The history of Islamization can be traced to the Bhutto era…”
“General Zia-ul-Haq [another great friend and ally of the US] furthered the process to buy legitimacy for his military regime. The element of communal and sectarian hatred in today`s society are a direct consequence of the laws that the dictator had put in place… He made all secular and liberal-minded people enemies of the country. They were warned again and again of severe consequences in case of any violation of the [Islamic] Ideology of Pakistan.”
“Nawaz Sharif added his own bit, like mandating death penalty to the Blasphemy Law… With the failure of the ruling classes to deliver the goods to the people, religion was exploited to cover up corruption and bad governance… The process of Islamization not only supports but protects the fundamentalists in their attempts to terrorize and harass society in the name of religion. There are published accounts of the kind of menace that is spread by religious schools run by these fundamentalists…”
Khaled Ahmed describes how this radicalization of Pakistan is continuing even today:
“In Pakistan… every time it is felt that the ideology is not delivering there are prescriptions for further strengthening of the shariah… Needless to say, anyone recommending that the ideological state be undone is committing heresy and could be punished under law… The Council for Islamic Ideology (CII) is busy on a daily basis to put forth its proposals for the conversion of the Pakistani state into a utopia of Islamic dreams. The Ministry for Religious Affairs has already sent to the cabinet of General Musharraf a full-fledged programme for converting Pakistan into an ideal state… We have reached this stage in a gradual fashion, where these state institutions have become directly responsible for encouraging extremism…”
This hole is so deep that General Musharraf, while promising to de-radicalize Pakistan, must reassure his people not to fear the `threat` of secularism. He recently clarified it as follows:
``No-one should even think this is a secular state. It was founded as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan…”
While America still has enormous racial inequality 150 years after the abolishing of slavery, the important point is that it is committed to racial equality. Similarly, despite many flaws in India`s pluralism, the State is committed to it. What counts is a commitment to steady improvement. India has had one of the most aggressive and ambitious affirmative action programs in the world. The results, while far from perfect, have produced many top level Muslim leaders in various capacities in India, and a growth of Muslims as a percentage of total population. But in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Hindu population has decreased from 11% in 1947 to around 1% today, as a result of ethnic cleansing.
Pakistan`s Identity Crisis
The problem for an educated Pakistani is to figure out when and where his history started. If it is to be 1947 in the geographical area that is now Pakistan, then there is very little past for him to build an identity. If it is to be from the time of Mohammed, then his history is outside his land. If it is prior to that, then his history is largely a Hindu-Buddhist history, a past he wants to deny.
He must invent history to answer the question: Why was Pakistan created? Mubarak Ali, a prominent Pakistani scholar, explains the predicament:
“Since its inception Pakistan has faced the monumental task of formulating its national identity separate from India. Partitioned from the ancient civilization of India, Pakistan has struggled to construct its own culture; a culture not just different and unique from India, but one appreciable by the rest of the world. The overshadowing image of the Indian civilization also haunted the founders of Pakistan, who channeled their efforts in making the differences between India and Pakistan more tangible and obvious.
“The fundamental difference between India and Pakistan was based on the Two Nation theory, strengthening Pakistan`s Islamic identity.
“…The University Grants Commission of Pakistan made Islamic Studies and Pakistan Study compulsory subjects at all levels of the education system, even for the professional students. … This gave the government an opportunity to teach the students its own version of history, especially the Pakistan ideology, which is described as something like this: ``The struggle was for the establishment of a new Islamic state and for the attainment of independence. It was the outcome of the sincere desire of the Muslims of the subcontinent who wanted Islam to be accepted as the ideal pattern for an individual`s life, and also as the law to bind the Muslims into a single community.
“In asserting this identity, Pakistan is in a state of dilemma…”
If Pakistanis were seen merely as Indians who converted to Islam, then they would seem no different than the Indian Muslims, who are equal in number to Pakistan`s total population, who are better educated and economically placed, and who enjoy greater social freedom than their counterparts in Pakistan. Hence, the very existence of Pakistan as a separate nation rests upon constructing an identity for itself that is radically different from India`s. But you cannot build a nation on a negative identity.
One might say that a birth defect of Pakistan was its lack of a self-sufficient positive identity. Such a positive identity would neither be a negation of India, nor be an imperialistic claim of authority over all dar-ul-islam of the subcontinent. Kamal Azfar, a Pakistani writer, explains the dilemma:
“There are two concepts of Pakistan: the first empirical and the second utopian. The empirical concept is based on solid foundations of history and geography while the utopian concept is based on shifting sands. Utopia is not an oasis but a mirage… Samarqand and Bukhara and the splendors of the Arab world are closely related to us but we do not possess them. Our possessions are Moenjodaro and Sehwan Sharif, Taxila and Lahore, Multan and the Khyber. We should own up to all that is present here in the Indus Valley and cease to long for realities not our own for that is false-consciousness.”
This obsession to be seen as neo-Arabs has reached ridiculous extremes, such as Pakistani scholars` attempts to show that Sanskrit was derived from Arabic. Even Persian influence on Indian culture is considered impure as compared to Arabic.
Pakistan`s un-Indian identity easily gets turned into anti-Indian rhetoric. In short, hatred for India has been required to keep Pakistan together, because Allah has not done so. Pakistan is largely a garrison state, created and sustained using the Hindu-Muslim divide.
A secure Hindu seems to be incompatible with what the Pakistani thinks a Hindu should be. Especially any `Hindu` success feeds its Hindu-phobia.
Pakistan`s positive identity building projects are using multiple strategies. The following are three of the major historical myths being spun by Pakistan, to secure legitimacy for its separate existence.
Myth 1: Pakistanis = Descendents of the Indus Valley Civilization
The most aggressive identity engineering project is the theory of Pakistanis depicted as the 8,000-year-old people of the Indus Valley. This civilization is presented as different from the Ganges Valley civilization. The Indus and Ganges are depicted as the ancestral homelands of Pakistanis and Indians, respectively. Hence, they have always been separate people. Given this model, Pakistan`s Indus Valley researchers are encouraged to show the links to the Middle East civilizations of Mesopotamia, so as to bring Pakistan and the Arab-Persian worlds into a single continuous historical-geographical identity since the beginnings of recorded history.
The following article titled, Separating Urdu from Sanskrit, published in the Urdu newspaper Jang, explains the construction of this theory of an 8,000-year-old Pakistan:
“Pakistani intellectuals have been looking for the roots of their separate identity in the remote past for the last two decades. They are not satisfied with the two-nation theory propounded by Iqbal, according to which religion was the basis of nationhood… They want to show that… the Indus and the Gangetic valleys have always been home to separate civilizations. Being the heir to the Indus valley civilization, Pakistan is a geographic entity whose roots go back to time immemorial…
“Hitherto, the generally held belief has been that Urdu came into being as a result of social contacts between the Muslims who came to India during the middle ages and the native population. So the language was taken to be a crossbreed of Turko-Persian-Arabic vocables with the local dialects. This is, in a nutshell, the view held by such eminent linguists as G.A. Griesson and Sir Charles Lyall, to mention only two. This theory presupposed that these dialects themselves were based upon, or rather were a by-product of Sanskrit.
“Khalid Hasan Qadiri [a new identity developer]… reaches the conclusion that Urdu has its roots in the languages of the Munda tribes who were the inhabitants of the Indus Valley in pre-Dravidian periods…. In this way we are led to believe that the Urdu language has a very well-defined and clear-cut grammar, absolutely different from Sanskrit in every respect. The very basic philosophy governing the grammatical structure of these two languages is totally different. And by any stretch of imagination one cannot state Urdu to have emanated from the sacred language of the Hindus. Grammatically speaking Urdu owes nothing to Sanskrit. Hence it cannot be grouped with the Aryan language either. It clearly belongs to some non-Aryan group of languages. And this view is supposed to give us some solace.”
Myth 2: Pakistanis = West Asian Races
Using a more recent beginning point, there is a popular construction of Pakistanis as Arab-Persian-Turk `immigrants` (with a few occasional `jihads` against the infidels). Here, Pakistanis get racially differentiated from the `native` Indian Muslims. (A different version of this scenario says that Pakistanis are Aryans originally from lands around Turkey.)
These theories encourage rampant Arabization of Pakistani culture. Arabization is to Pakistanis what Macaulayism is to many Indians. The difference is that Macaulayism has afflicted only the top tier of Indian elitists, whereas Arabization of Pakistan pervades all strata of Pakistani identity. For instance:
* Girls are discouraged from wearing mehndi, because it is seen as a Hindu tradition, even though it has nothing to do with one`s religion per se.
* The kite flying tradition during the festival of Baisakhi, celebrated for centuries in Punjab as the harvest season, is now under the microscope of Pakistan`s identity engineers for being too Sikh and Hindu in character, and not Arab enough.
* Emphasis is placed on being un-Indian so as to assert this new identity wherever possible.
Pakistan has these internal conflicts between its Middle Eastern religious values on the one hand, and its Indian cultural values on the other. In this internal struggle, the Islamic values based on Middle East culture are conquering the indigenous values of the people. Much of the neurosis is about this destruction of one`s past identity.
Myth 3: Pakistan = Successor to Mughal Empire
This is the most ominous model of all from Indians` perspective: Pakistan is depicted as the successor to the Mughal Empire. The post-Mughal two-century British rule is seen as a dark period of interruption that is now to be reversed by returning to the glory of the Mughals. Under this return of the Mughals, Hindus would be second-class citizens, in the same manner as they were under the Mughals.
Many Pakistanis would like Mughal Emperor Akbar`s model, under which Hindus were tolerated and even respected, although Muslims enjoyed higher status.
But most Pakistanis are said to prefer Emperor Aurungzeb`s model, under which Hindus were oppressed and forced to convert, and Islam was asserted in ways that were not different from the Taliban`s policies. This glorifies aggressiveness and Islamic chauvinism. Such an imperialistic identity has also led to a leadership claim over India`s Muslims, even though they outnumber Pakistan`s entire population and enjoy greater prosperity, freedom and culture.
Neurosis
This schizophrenia makes Pakistanis very insecure. To avoid this quandary, they quickly slip into talk of a pan-Islamic identity, hoping to escape the irrational construct with which they find themselves burdened.
It is relevant to point out that Muslims are required to point towards Mecca five times daily in prayer. Psychologists would call this “creative visualization,” a form of subconscious programming. Are loyalties taking shape deep within one`s psyche, towards the Arabs, the owners of Mecca?
What is the effect of being told since childhood, in chauvinistic and triumphant terms, of Islam`s heroic plunder of infidels, and its inevitable conquest of the entire world? What is the consequence of glorifying Ghazni and Aurungzeb as is done in Pakistan`s public school textbooks?
Khaled Ahmed explains the neurosis resulting from such dogma:
“The difficulty lies in the inability of the Muslims to mould their original revealed message to modern times by applying logic and rationality to the ancient case law. There was a time when this was done but the era of taqleed (imitation) has been upon us since the medieval period. Under colonial rule, many Muslims thought of introducing reason in the science of understanding the Holy Writ, but today no one in the Islamic world tolerates any deviation from taqleed even when this taqleed varies in practice from state to state. All Muslim states are unstable either because they have enforced the shariah and are unhappy with it, like Pakistan, or have not enforced it and are unhappy that it has not been enforced. For Muslims the question, `What kind of state do we want?` is a rhetorical one, because for them it has already been answered.”
Most shocking is the prevalent Hindu-bashing on Pakistani state television and in state school textbooks. A common theme is to depict Brahmins as cunning and wicked, and to mock at Hindu beliefs. By contrast, the state run media in India is extra careful to be sensitive. Private Bollywood has many Muslims in dominant positions and a pluralistic ethos is very much projected.
One of the most popular songs sung by Hindus is Ishvar, Allah tere nam, meaning Ishvar and Allah are God`s names. I have not come across Hindus being concerned or even conscious that they are giving Allah recognition as equal to Ishvar. But most Muslim friends refuse to participate in any such song, as it would violate the injunction against respecting other deities.
A friend recently told me that in her corporate office on Wall Street, she has been a close friend of a Pakistani woman executive for many years. They bring lunch from home, and have shared each other`s food regularly. But one day, my friend casually remarked that the lunch she brings is after doing puja and offering some as prasadam. The Pakistani woman refused to accept her food ever since. She had no qualms about saying that eating such a meal would be a violation of her Islamic faith.
Pakistan, assuming the leadership of dar-ul-islam, is trying to expand the territory of Islam. Militancy is a relatively recent export of Pakistan, a sort of last resort out of desperation. The `Kashmir issue` is Pakistan`s identity crisis externalized towards an outside enemy, so as to find a meaning for itself. The citizens of Pakistan have been galvanized into a neurosis to Islamize Kashmir on behalf of Allah.
The Need to Decouple
The economic directions of India and Pakistan are entirely different: the technology education emphasis in India, as compared to the madrassas in Pakistan where Islamic identity is the primary curriculum.
India is one-sixth of all humanity. It deserves its own space in the world`s mind, and should not be reduced to one of eight countries lumped into a single `South Asian region` just for simplicity and convenience. Pakistan should be let loose to discover who it wants to be, without being bothered about India.
The Garland Making Worldview
“Be like a garland maker, O king; not like a charcoal burner.” --Mahabharata, XII.72.20
This famous statement from the Mahabharata contrasts two worldviews. It asks the king to preserve and protect diversity, in a coherent way. The metaphor used is that of a garland, in which flowers of many colors and forms are strung together for a pleasing effect. The contrast is given against charcoal, which is the result of burning all kinds of wood and reducing diversity to homogeneous dead matter. The charcoal burner is reductionist and destroys diversity, whereas the garland maker celebrates diversity.
Garland making and charcoal burning represent two divergent worldviews in terms of socio-political ideology. The former leads to pluralism and diversity of thought, whereas the latter strives for a homogenized and fossilized society in which dogma runs supreme.
India represents a long and continuous history of experimentation with garland making. A central tenet of dharma is that one`s social duty is individualistic and dependent upon the context:
* To illustrate the context-sensitive nature of dharma, a text by Baudhayana lists practices that would be normal in one region of India but not appropriate in another, and advises that learned men of the traditions should follow the customs of their respective districts.
* Furthermore, the ethical views applicable also depend upon one`s stage in life (asramadharma).
* One`s particular position in society determines one`s personal dharma (svadharma).
* The dharma has to be based upon one`s personal inner nature (svabhava).
* There is even special dharma that is appropriate in times of distress or emergency (apaddharma).
Hence, anything resembling a universal or absolute social law (sadharama) is characterized as a last resort and not as a first resort - a fallback if no context can be found applicable.
Combine this with the fact that social theories (called Smritis) were not divine revelations as was the case in the Abrahamic religions, but were constructed by human lawmakers who were analogous to today`s public officials. Hence, all Smritis are amendable, and indeed are intended to be modified for each era and by each society. This is a very progressive social mandate, and to freeze Indian social norms is, in fact, a travesty based on ignorance.
This pluralistic social theory is deeply rooted in indigenous religions. In the Bhagavadagita (IX. 23-25), Krishna proclaims that the devotees who worship other deities are in fact worshipping Him; and that those who offer worship to various other deities or natural powers also reach the goals they desire.
Dr. P. V. Kane has researched ancient India`s pluralism, and concluded emphatically that there was no state sponsored religious exclusivism. In particular, Kashmir`s history of garland making spans several millennia. Its identity was not based on any religion. Kashmiris of all religions lived in harmony, and Kashmir was the incubator of Kashmir Shaivism, much of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, and Sufism. Kashmir`s survival as a garland making culture is a crucial challenge to the future of pluralism in the world.
The `Kashmir Issue`
No fruitful discussion can begin with `the Kashmir issue` as though it were a stand-alone real estate dispute. The root problem between India and Pakistan is not `Kashmir`. Neither is it about Islam`s theology nor its internal social practices. Rather, it is the clash between worldviews resulting from the external projection of Islam -- dar-ul-islam versus dar-ul-harb. This manifests as Pakistan`s two-nation worldview versus India`s pluralistic worldview.
The validity and success of either worldview necessitates the defeat of the other:
* For, if Pakistan`s worldview were right, then Muslims everywhere require their own country in order to live as good Muslims. This would mean that Indian pluralism would have to fail, and Indian Muslims would need their own separate nation as well.
* On the other hand, if India`s worldview were right, and Indian Muslims lived happily in a pluralistic society, then the very foundation of Pakistan`s existence would become unglued and there would be a call for re-unification.
If both India and Pakistan were to adopt a common worldview, there could be a stable peace, regardless of which worldview it was:
* If both adopted the two-nation theory, there would be exclusive and separate nations for Muslims and Hindus, respectively. The practicalities of implementation would be horrendous, given the massive and dispersed Indian Muslim population. But each would eventually become homogeneous internally.
* If both adopted the one-nation theory, they would re-unify.
I disfavor the first choice, because it would set a horrible precedence for humanity at large: If India were to fail as the world`s oldest surviving garland making civilization, it would mean that any geographical region of the world with a significant Muslim minority, even with a small population (such as Kashmir`s), would eventually demand separation from the dar-ul-harb. Given the empirical fact of a faster birth rate than the rest of the population, Muslims everywhere would sooner or later have the same kinds of fights with dar-ul-harb as in Bosnia, pre-partition India, Philippines, Kashmir, and so forth.
Partitions into Muslim nations could never be complete until there were no others left. Such a theocracy would be the ultimate charcoal burning social structure.
This would eventually become the biggest nightmare for the United States, China and other countries, given their own demographic trends.
The second scenario may not be politically acceptable to Pakistan. This leads us to the hard question of reformation.
The Hard Question
Rather than pretending that these problems have “nothing to do with religion,” or fearing that it would be politically incorrect to address this issue, non-Muslim thinkers and liberal Islamic leaders should brainstorm the following question:
Under what socio-political mutual understandings could it become attractive for Muslims to live in integrated harmony with non-Muslims, even where the Muslims are a majority or a significant minority?
In other words, let`s negotiate a framework for Islamic pluralism, separation of mosque and state, and democracy.
The West`s failure to understand this clash of worldviews, and its continued approach to Kashmir as the problem in isolation, could end up creating another Palestine-like unsolvable crisis. This crisis would be worse, and involve massive populations and nukes.
There needs to be a paradigm shift in defining the problem. India should take the moral, intellectual and diplomatic high ground to debate: one nation (pluralism) versus two nation (exclusivism) theories. In other words, the real issue is garland making versus charcoal burning.
References:
1. See http://alfa.nic.in/const/preamble.html Also, note that Article 15 explicitly prohibits “discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.”
2. See http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part9.html
3. Jinnah did have a vision as a moderate, although in an overall Islamic context. In his presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, August 11, 1947, Jinnah said: “Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.” Contemporary Pakistanis are often trying to deny this secularist call by Jinnah.
4. See http://www.pakistan-embassy.com/pages/formA.htm This url is to Pak Embassy in DC, giving the official government form to get a passport.
5. In search of identity by Mubarak Ali. Dawn, Karachi. May 7, 2000.
6. What kind of state do we want? by Khaled Ahmed. The Friday Times. January 25, 2002.
7. Pakistan not meant to be secular. BBC., 30 January, 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_1792000/1792252.stm
8. In search of identity by Mubarak Ali. Dawn, Karachi. May 7, 2000.
9. The concept of Pakistan by Kamal Azfar. The Friday Times.
10. See the article titled, Separating Urdu from Sanskrit at: http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2001-weekly/nos-23-12-2001/lit.htm#4
11. This term is named after Lord Macaulay, who pioneered the British program to replace Indian languages with English, to remove respect for indigenous ideas and values, so as to create intellectual dependence and reverence for the colonizers. This was a very essential part of the colonizing process, and its crushing impact is still being felt.
12. What kind of state do we want? by Khaled Ahmed. The Friday Times. January 25, 2002.
13. Dr. P. V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra. Volume III, second edition, 1973, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. p.883.
#216 Posted by shammi on February 11, 2002 1:23:42 pm
Re: YLH
``...As for `missing the boat` thats why I have been beating the drum so much because I think this is the time to cease it and make Pakistan into what it was thought to be...``
And it is about time that you counsel your fellow `patriots` that it is time to bury the hatchet with India, and to normalize ties. You would also be advised to spend your considerable energies not defending Jinnah, but implementing plans for making his dreams a reality. Otherwise, you can wish goodbye to progress and to all your dreams. Meanwhile, here is news of another revolution brewing in Bangalore:
``India walks gingerly towards biotech dream (CNN)``
As software giant India shifts its focus to biotechnology, the next big thing in the knowledge economy, it is tempering its dreams with caution over the daunting risks involved...Experts have little doubt that India is poised to be a big player. ``Pharmaceutically speaking, I don`t think India is a developing country,`` Oppel Greeff, President for Africa, India and Latin America of Quintiles Transnational Corp, a U.S.-based clinical trials firm said.
http://asia.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/02/07/india.biotech.reut/index.html
``...As for `missing the boat` thats why I have been beating the drum so much because I think this is the time to cease it and make Pakistan into what it was thought to be...``
And it is about time that you counsel your fellow `patriots` that it is time to bury the hatchet with India, and to normalize ties. You would also be advised to spend your considerable energies not defending Jinnah, but implementing plans for making his dreams a reality. Otherwise, you can wish goodbye to progress and to all your dreams. Meanwhile, here is news of another revolution brewing in Bangalore:
``India walks gingerly towards biotech dream (CNN)``
As software giant India shifts its focus to biotechnology, the next big thing in the knowledge economy, it is tempering its dreams with caution over the daunting risks involved...Experts have little doubt that India is poised to be a big player. ``Pharmaceutically speaking, I don`t think India is a developing country,`` Oppel Greeff, President for Africa, India and Latin America of Quintiles Transnational Corp, a U.S.-based clinical trials firm said.
http://asia.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/02/07/india.biotech.reut/index.html
#215 Posted by Ansari on February 11, 2002 1:23:42 pm
Hamzad Afaqui;
Sorry you had to think so hard. I have exams coming up and the mind is whizzing with all sorts of permutations, everything but plain wholesome gestures (who wants to be simple when you can be brilliant?).
Jazak Allahu khairan,
Aamir
Sorry you had to think so hard. I have exams coming up and the mind is whizzing with all sorts of permutations, everything but plain wholesome gestures (who wants to be simple when you can be brilliant?).
Jazak Allahu khairan,
Aamir
#214 Posted by shankar on February 11, 2002 1:23:42 pm
Whats the deal about Mushy accusing India of a conspiracy behind Daniel Pearl`s kidnapping?! Apparently Mushy wants the world to think that India stage managed the IA hijacking, got a young man on his honeymoon killed, so that 2 double agents Maulana Azhar & Omar Sheikh get released--- so that they can go to Pakistan; make rabid anti-Indian statements---& then kidnap Americans, to make Pakistan look bad!!! This is a conspiracy organised by RAW!!
All this time Pakistanis have been deriding Indians about making stupid claims about blaming the ISI for everything! Yeah..they had a point there...
Now it seems like Pakistan has started emulating India`s stupidity...Heheh..of all the things to emulate India, does Mushy have to emulate stupidity?!!!
OK, now lets see who(other than Pakistanis) are going to believe this crap.
This is what happens when the Kashmir obssessed GoP harbors Indian criminals. They turn around & bite Pakistan in the butt. I think Mushy could do Pakistan a favor by sending the ``the list of 20`` packing to India!
Then the Pak Foreign minister says that Pakistan has a ``list of its own``. When India asks them to produce the list, all they can come up with is....drum roll, please...Advani!!
PLEASE PLEASE...Pakistan...request Advani`s repatriation. PLEASE PLEASE...India...give Advani back to Pakistan. The whole subcontinent will be better off...:))
All this time Pakistanis have been deriding Indians about making stupid claims about blaming the ISI for everything! Yeah..they had a point there...
Now it seems like Pakistan has started emulating India`s stupidity...Heheh..of all the things to emulate India, does Mushy have to emulate stupidity?!!!
OK, now lets see who(other than Pakistanis) are going to believe this crap.
This is what happens when the Kashmir obssessed GoP harbors Indian criminals. They turn around & bite Pakistan in the butt. I think Mushy could do Pakistan a favor by sending the ``the list of 20`` packing to India!
Then the Pak Foreign minister says that Pakistan has a ``list of its own``. When India asks them to produce the list, all they can come up with is....drum roll, please...Advani!!
PLEASE PLEASE...Pakistan...request Advani`s repatriation. PLEASE PLEASE...India...give Advani back to Pakistan. The whole subcontinent will be better off...:))
#213 Posted by Prem on February 11, 2002 1:23:42 pm
nasah # 214
Today, the interests of India and interests of Pakistan have coincided as NEVER before. Terrorism has become a COMMON threat. If only some people would understand that, and stop playing their silly and disgusting games.
But as they say, vinash Kale vipareet buddhih...
nasah # some other
hasan bhai, you mentioned somewhere that you were happy to see most Hindus here unambiguously oppose/denounce Thackeray. I am also hoping BJP will lose in my state of UP (though I absolutely shudder to think of the alternatives we have there).
But there has been something that has been on my mind for a while. It is this:
Islamists have their ideology of Islam humara hai. They are willing to fight ``in defence of oppressed Muslims/Muslim honor everywhere.``
Hindutva vadis have their ideology of Hindu humara hai. They are willing to fight ``in defence of oppressed Hindus/Hindu honor everywhere.``
Both get their emotional highs from their ``religions.``
But how do those who refuse to drink the cup of exclusivist bigotry from their religious books energize themselves? Specifically, for us Indians, as the legacy of Gandhi/Nehru recedes in time, how do we maintain the force of religious universalism, as against religous exclusivism, alive and strong?
True, the force resides embedded deep in Indian psyche. But can we take things for granted when Hindutva vadis and Islamists (and all other religious advocates) make blantatly religious appeals, pulling people - young and old - in opposite camps?
Anybody got any practical ideas?
Today, the interests of India and interests of Pakistan have coincided as NEVER before. Terrorism has become a COMMON threat. If only some people would understand that, and stop playing their silly and disgusting games.
But as they say, vinash Kale vipareet buddhih...
nasah # some other
hasan bhai, you mentioned somewhere that you were happy to see most Hindus here unambiguously oppose/denounce Thackeray. I am also hoping BJP will lose in my state of UP (though I absolutely shudder to think of the alternatives we have there).
But there has been something that has been on my mind for a while. It is this:
Islamists have their ideology of Islam humara hai. They are willing to fight ``in defence of oppressed Muslims/Muslim honor everywhere.``
Hindutva vadis have their ideology of Hindu humara hai. They are willing to fight ``in defence of oppressed Hindus/Hindu honor everywhere.``
Both get their emotional highs from their ``religions.``
But how do those who refuse to drink the cup of exclusivist bigotry from their religious books energize themselves? Specifically, for us Indians, as the legacy of Gandhi/Nehru recedes in time, how do we maintain the force of religious universalism, as against religous exclusivism, alive and strong?
True, the force resides embedded deep in Indian psyche. But can we take things for granted when Hindutva vadis and Islamists (and all other religious advocates) make blantatly religious appeals, pulling people - young and old - in opposite camps?
Anybody got any practical ideas?
#212 Posted by nasah on February 11, 2002 2:52:46 am
Terrorists vs Freedom Fighters.
They say that one man’s terrorist is another man`s freedom fighter.
Now that may be a truism everywhere else – but not on the subcontinent.
On the subcontinent one man’s terrorist is ALSO -- another man’s terrorist.
India’s terrorists are NOT Pakistan’s “freedom fighters” – despite Mian Musharraf mislabeling of the product.
They are Pakistan’s terrorists as well.
Case in point – “maulana” Azhar and “economist” Omar Shaikh – the two Pakistani “freedom fighters” -- (what an amusing name, better late than never, if not in 1942/1947, why not in 2002) -- were convicted as terrorist and jailed in India – they were released under duress by India.
If Pakistan would have treated the two jailbirds as terrorists as well -- and incarcerated them as terrorists – today Pakistan wouldn’t be getting black eyes after black eyes -- amidst its already tattered image as sponsors of another group of “freedom fighters -- the Talibans.
Of course now Mr. Musharraf is implying that the two gentlemen -- Azhar and Omar Shaikh -- are India’s “freedom fighters”!!
They say that one man’s terrorist is another man`s freedom fighter.
Now that may be a truism everywhere else – but not on the subcontinent.
On the subcontinent one man’s terrorist is ALSO -- another man’s terrorist.
India’s terrorists are NOT Pakistan’s “freedom fighters” – despite Mian Musharraf mislabeling of the product.
They are Pakistan’s terrorists as well.
Case in point – “maulana” Azhar and “economist” Omar Shaikh – the two Pakistani “freedom fighters” -- (what an amusing name, better late than never, if not in 1942/1947, why not in 2002) -- were convicted as terrorist and jailed in India – they were released under duress by India.
If Pakistan would have treated the two jailbirds as terrorists as well -- and incarcerated them as terrorists – today Pakistan wouldn’t be getting black eyes after black eyes -- amidst its already tattered image as sponsors of another group of “freedom fighters -- the Talibans.
Of course now Mr. Musharraf is implying that the two gentlemen -- Azhar and Omar Shaikh -- are India’s “freedom fighters”!!
#211 Posted by khokan on February 10, 2002 11:46:03 pm
Letter To The Editor
DAWN, Karachi, Pakistan
10 February 2002 Sunday 26 Ziqa`ad 1422
Ruttie Jinnah grove
by MOHAMMAD AZIZ HAJI DOSSA, Karachi
With reference to Ardeshir Cowasjee`s column ``Back to Jinnah`` (Feb 3), I would like to quote from the Memoirs of Isha`at Habibullah: ``Do you realize,`` said the Quaid to his lieutenant Raja Saheb of Mahmudabad, ``that there are over seventy sects and differences of opinion regarding the Islamic faith. We shall not be an Islamic state, but a liberal democratic Muslim state.`` Jinnah, therefore, desired a secular and not a theocratic Pakistan, for his people.
To translate Jinnah`s concept for a tolerant society, General Musharraf should instruct, the reallocation of Plot E, adjacent to the Quaid`s Mazar, for the proposed Ruttie Jinnah Grove (Tree Mazar-3: Dawn: July 30, 2000). This area for the Ruttie Jinnah Park was resumed but later shelved by the administration.
Donations for the work were arranged by Ardeshir Cowasjee, other members of the Parsi community and Muslims who desired to see the name of Ruttie Jinnah perpetuated. The government had second thoughts and the project of Ruttie Jinnah alcove was sidelined, because of the warped reasoning that Ruttie Jinnah, though a convert to Islam, was a non-practising Muslim.
February 20 marks the seventy-third death anniversary of Ruttie Jinnah. Jinnah`s junior, M.C. Chagla, describes the funeral scene, on the afternoon, of February 22, 1929. ``That was the only time when I found Jinnah betraying shadow of human weakness: there were actually, tears in his eyes.``
DAWN, Karachi, Pakistan
10 February 2002 Sunday 26 Ziqa`ad 1422
Ruttie Jinnah grove
by MOHAMMAD AZIZ HAJI DOSSA, Karachi
With reference to Ardeshir Cowasjee`s column ``Back to Jinnah`` (Feb 3), I would like to quote from the Memoirs of Isha`at Habibullah: ``Do you realize,`` said the Quaid to his lieutenant Raja Saheb of Mahmudabad, ``that there are over seventy sects and differences of opinion regarding the Islamic faith. We shall not be an Islamic state, but a liberal democratic Muslim state.`` Jinnah, therefore, desired a secular and not a theocratic Pakistan, for his people.
To translate Jinnah`s concept for a tolerant society, General Musharraf should instruct, the reallocation of Plot E, adjacent to the Quaid`s Mazar, for the proposed Ruttie Jinnah Grove (Tree Mazar-3: Dawn: July 30, 2000). This area for the Ruttie Jinnah Park was resumed but later shelved by the administration.
Donations for the work were arranged by Ardeshir Cowasjee, other members of the Parsi community and Muslims who desired to see the name of Ruttie Jinnah perpetuated. The government had second thoughts and the project of Ruttie Jinnah alcove was sidelined, because of the warped reasoning that Ruttie Jinnah, though a convert to Islam, was a non-practising Muslim.
February 20 marks the seventy-third death anniversary of Ruttie Jinnah. Jinnah`s junior, M.C. Chagla, describes the funeral scene, on the afternoon, of February 22, 1929. ``That was the only time when I found Jinnah betraying shadow of human weakness: there were actually, tears in his eyes.``
#210 Posted by stuka on February 10, 2002 11:46:03 pm
Romair:
I agree with the gist of your post, ie the need for the emergence of strong institutions in Pakistan, and the rejection of individualism as the anchor of a nation`s destiny. I also agree that the currently the Pakistan Army is pretty much the only institution which has retained it`s strength.
My question is (and no I don`t have an answer) that if the Army keeps taking power, then how are other institutions ever going to emerge? From what I have read, Shahbaz Sharif was doing a good job in Punjab. He was kicked out simply because he was Nawaz Sharif`s brother, not for any inherent misdeeds of his own. Assuming that Nawaz Sharif needed to be overthrown (which I doubt), why was the Chief Minister of Punjab overthrown as well. The only reason is that the all powerful Army decided that he had to. I therefore see the Pakistani Army as being a powerful institution, yes, but not one that is capable of nourishing other institutions, Musharraf`s good intentions notwithstanding.
I agree with the gist of your post, ie the need for the emergence of strong institutions in Pakistan, and the rejection of individualism as the anchor of a nation`s destiny. I also agree that the currently the Pakistan Army is pretty much the only institution which has retained it`s strength.
My question is (and no I don`t have an answer) that if the Army keeps taking power, then how are other institutions ever going to emerge? From what I have read, Shahbaz Sharif was doing a good job in Punjab. He was kicked out simply because he was Nawaz Sharif`s brother, not for any inherent misdeeds of his own. Assuming that Nawaz Sharif needed to be overthrown (which I doubt), why was the Chief Minister of Punjab overthrown as well. The only reason is that the all powerful Army decided that he had to. I therefore see the Pakistani Army as being a powerful institution, yes, but not one that is capable of nourishing other institutions, Musharraf`s good intentions notwithstanding.
#209 Posted by hamzadafaqui on February 10, 2002 11:46:03 pm
Ansari--207
[It`s been a long time; perhaps it`s time to go back home.]
``Aur jub shaam kaa jhutputaa hotaa hai tO musafir sochtaa hai keh manzil tO vaheen thhee jahaan sey safar shroo kiyaa thhaa``
Yousafi.
``Goree soyay saij pey aur mukh pey daarey kais,
Chuul Khusroe ghar aapnay,saanjh hui chau dais.``
Meer Khusroe
PS:I had to think hard, but then in the absence of any smily-icon, I concluded that it must be a compliment.Hence the gift above.
Was it?
[It`s been a long time; perhaps it`s time to go back home.]
``Aur jub shaam kaa jhutputaa hotaa hai tO musafir sochtaa hai keh manzil tO vaheen thhee jahaan sey safar shroo kiyaa thhaa``
Yousafi.
``Goree soyay saij pey aur mukh pey daarey kais,
Chuul Khusroe ghar aapnay,saanjh hui chau dais.``
Meer Khusroe
PS:I had to think hard, but then in the absence of any smily-icon, I concluded that it must be a compliment.Hence the gift above.
Was it?
#208 Posted by Aisha_Sarwari on February 10, 2002 11:46:03 pm
``Do you realize,`` said the Quaid to his lieutenant Raja Saheb of Mahmudabad, ``that there are over seventy sects and differences of opinion regarding the Islamic faith. We shall not be an Islamic state, but a liberal democratic Muslim state.`` Jinnah, therefore, desired a secular and not a theocratic Pakistan, for his people.
#207 Posted by ylh on February 10, 2002 11:46:03 pm
Rsaxena,
The purpose is to unleash a secular oops.. sorry egalitarian, democratic, non communal, impartial, pluralistic state in Pakistan. Zia`s re writing of History in the 1980s has made the Pakistan demand into some sort of an Islamic theocratic utopia which it was not. The purpose for mentioning Jinnah is to show Pakistanis that Pakistan demand was cultural, political and economic and not theological, and not to convince them of his greatness. Surely by quoting the `Pakistan is a going to be a modern democratic state` isn`t going to win points with the Islamists.
Sigalph,
Thanks for the compliment. Hindustan Times of 12th september 1948 was the most accurate in that respect when it said in the obituary of Quaid e Azam:
`Forget him, we can`t... he crossed swords with the best, and he won.`
Shankar
Thanks for the explanation. As for `missing the boat` thats why I have been beating the drum so much because I think this is the time to cease it and make Pakistan into what it was thought to be, and that approach seems to be working.
Sincerely
Yasser
#206 Posted by shammi on February 10, 2002 11:46:03 pm
Re: Shankar to YLH
Thanks -- maybe he will be saved after all.
``...There are many TYPES of intelligence...``
YLH, check out a book called `Emotional Intelligence` by Daniel Goleman. There is also another book called `The Anatomy of Intelligence` (I could not find the author name).
Re: RSaxena
``...Indians, including me, love deriving juvenile pleasure pushing your buttons and watching you go haywire...``
YLH, I told you long ago, that when certain posters on Chowk ask you to jump, you seem to ask, `How high?`. RSaxena`s post is further proof of that. If we all didn`t like you (despite some of your bad habits), nobody would be offering you this advice
Thanks -- maybe he will be saved after all.
``...There are many TYPES of intelligence...``
YLH, check out a book called `Emotional Intelligence` by Daniel Goleman. There is also another book called `The Anatomy of Intelligence` (I could not find the author name).
Re: RSaxena
``...Indians, including me, love deriving juvenile pleasure pushing your buttons and watching you go haywire...``
YLH, I told you long ago, that when certain posters on Chowk ask you to jump, you seem to ask, `How high?`. RSaxena`s post is further proof of that. If we all didn`t like you (despite some of your bad habits), nobody would be offering you this advice
#205 Posted by Ansari on February 10, 2002 3:18:52 pm
Hamzad Afaqui #202
``It may not occur to the athiest -- but he is remembering God, even if he is rejecting him...``
Subhan-Allah.
What a delightful memory you brought forth, of the early days of learning when truth would reveal itself in delightful little pulses (a heartbeat almost), like the one you shared with us, and freedom was simply sunshine warming us for these now days of bitter cold. It`s been a long time; perhaps it`s time to go back home.
``It may not occur to the athiest -- but he is remembering God, even if he is rejecting him...``
Subhan-Allah.
What a delightful memory you brought forth, of the early days of learning when truth would reveal itself in delightful little pulses (a heartbeat almost), like the one you shared with us, and freedom was simply sunshine warming us for these now days of bitter cold. It`s been a long time; perhaps it`s time to go back home.








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