Another One Bites The Dust

PM

``why is it that you keep suggesting that it is not for males to comment on the methods and persuasions of feminism? I would have thought that ANY worthy philosophy would be complelty to critique from ANY quarters``

..... you are right if you are talking about the feminist movement in the west.... but i think saminashah is referring to pakistan where men alone dictate what women should or shouldn`t do, and the poor woman is quickly branded as gashti, or traitor, if she dares to question them ...... as a matter of fact, it seems that muslim men in general seem to be pre-occupied with this whole woman thing ... somehow, somewhere along the line, women have become the defining issue in islam .... women, wine and pork - these are the three pillars of modern islam...

..... as for ylh, i do think the young man is out of line in his silly diatribe against ms kirmani .... it doesn`t matter if there is no law in the penal code against dancing, it is still considered a crime and there are many out there who will ``enforce`` it ......they are the same people who enforce the ``law`` on new year`s eve and beat up on young couples who can`t prove they are married ...... the laws on the books don`t matter .........

POLICY PAPER SERIES 2002

American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House

BRUCE RIEDEL

http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi/reports/RiedelPaper051302.htm



Center for the Advanced Study of India

Professor Francine R. Frankel, Director

University of Pennsylvania

3833 Chestnut Street, Suite 130

Philadelphia, PA 19104-3106

Tel: 215-898-6247

Fax: 215-573-2595

URL: http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi



Introduction

July 4th, 1999 was probably the most unusual July 4th in American diplomatic history, certainly among the most eventful. President Clinton engaged in one of the most sensitive diplomatic high wire acts of any administration, successfully persuading Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to pull back Pakistani backed fighters from a confrontation with India that could threaten to escalate into a nuclear war between the world`s two newest nuclear powers. The events of that 4th accelerated the road to a fundamental reconciliation between the world`s two largest democracies, India and the United States, but also set the scene for another in the series of military coups that have marred Pakistani democracy. As the President`s Special Assistant for Near Eastern and South Asia Affairs at the National Security Council I had the honor of a unique seat at the table and the privilege of being a key adviser for the day`s events.

Kargil and Kashmir

For fifty years Pakistan and India have quarreled over the fate of Kashmir. The dispute is not a cold confrontation like that between the two superpowers over Germany in the Cold War. Rather it is a hot confrontation, which has been punctuated by three wars. Since the early 1990s it has been particularly violent with almost daily firefights along the Line of Control (LOC) that divides the state and within the valley between the Indian security forces and the Muslim insurgency. Both India and Pakistan deploy hundreds of thousands of troops in the area.

In the spring of 1999 the Pakistanis sought to gain a strategic advantage in the northern front of the LOC in a remote part of the Himalayas called Kargil. Traditionally the Indian and Pakistani armies had withdrawn each fall from their most advanced positions in the mountains to avoid the difficulties of manning them during the winter and then returned to them in the spring. The two armies respected each other`s deployment pattern and did not try to take advantage of this seasonal change.

In the winter of 1999, however, Pakistani backed Kashmir militants and regular army units moved early into evacuated positions of the Indians, cheating on the tradition. The Pakistani backed forces thus gained a significant tactical advantage over the only ground supply route Indian forces can use to bring in supplies to the most remote eastern third of Kashmir. By advancing onto these mountaintops overlooking the Kargil highway, Pakistan was threatening to weaken Indian control over a significant (yet barren) part of the contested province.

What was all the more alarming for Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee`s hard-line Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government was that the Pakistani military incursion came after the Prime Minister had made a bold effort in early 1999 at reconciliation with Pakistan by traveling by bus to the Pakistani city of Lahore for a summit with Sharif. The spirit of Lahore was intended to be the mechanism for breaking the two giants of south Asia out of their half century of violence and fear and moving the subcontinent to a better future. Instead, the Indians felt betrayed, deceived and misled by Sharif and were determined to recover their lost territory.

By late May and early June 1999 a serious military conflict was underway along a hundred fifty kilometer front in the mountains above Kargil (some of which rise to a height of 17,000 feet above sea level), including furious artillery clashes, air battles and costly infantry assaults by Indian troops against well dug in Pakistani forces. Pakistan denied its troops were involved, claiming that only Kashmiri militants were doing the fighting -- a claim not taken seriously anywhere.

The situation was further clouded because it was not altogether clear who was calling the shots in Islamabad. Prime Minister Sharif had seemed genuinely interested in pursuing the Lahore process when he met with Vajpayee and he had argued eloquently with a series of American guests, including U.S.UN Ambassador Bill Richardson, that he wanted an end to the fifty year old quarrel with India. His military chief, General Pervez Musharraf, seemed to be in a different mold. Musharraf was a refugee from New Delhi, one of the millions sent into exile in the 1947 catastrophe that split British India and the subcontinent. He was said to be a hardliner on Kashmir, a man some feared was determined to humble India once and for all.

We will probably never know for sure the exact calculus of decision making in Islamabad. Each of the players has his own reasons for selling a particular version of the process. Musharraf and Sharif have already put out different versions of who said what to whom. Others like former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto have also given their views. What is clear is that the civil-military dynamic between Sharif in Islamabad and Musharraf in Rawalpindi was confused and tense.

The United States was alarmed from the beginning of the conflict because of its potential for escalation. We could all too easily imagine the two parties beginning to mobilize for war, seeking third party support (Pakistan from China and the Arabs, India from Russia and Israel) and a deadly descent into full scale conflict all along the border with a danger of nuclear cataclysm.

The nuclear scenario was obviously very much on our minds. Since the surprise Indian tests in May 1998 the danger of a nuclear exchange had dominated American nightmares about South Asia. Clinton had spent days trying to argue Sharif out of testing in response and had offered him everything from a State dinner to billions in new U.S. assistance. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Central Command chief General Tony Zinni, Assistant Secretary for South Asia Rick Inderfurth and I had traveled to Islamabad to try to persuade him, but all to no avail.

After a few weeks of agonizing, Sharif had gone forward with his own tests citing as a flimsy excuse an alleged Israel plot to destroy Pakistan`s nuclear facilities in collusion with India. (I had the Israeli Chief of Staff deny categorically to the Pakistani Ambassador in Washington any such plan the night before the tests but that fact mattered little to Islamabad). In the new post-May era we confronted the reality of two nuclear tested states whose missiles could be fired with flight times of three to five minutes from launch to impact. One well-informed assessment concluded that a Pakistani strike on just one Indian city, Bombay, with a small bomb would kill between 150,000 and 850,000 alone.

Given these consequences for escalation, the U.S. was quick to make known our view that Pakistan should withdraw its forces back behind the Line of Control immediately. At first Rick Inderfurth and Undersecretary Thomas Pickering conveyed this view privately to the Pakistani and Indian ambassadors in Washington in late May. Secretary Albright then called Sharif two days later and General Tony Zinni, who had a very close relationship with his Pakistani counterparts, also called Chief of Army Staff General Musharraf. These messages did not work. So we went public and called upon Pakistan to respect the LOC. I laid out our position in an on the record interview at the Foreign Press Center in Washington. The President then called both leaders in mid-June and sent letters to each pressing for a Pakistani withdrawal and Indian restraint.

The Pakistanis and Indians were both surprised by the U.S. position: Pakistan because Islamabad assumed the U.S. would always back them against India and India because they could not believe the U.S. would judge the crisis on its merits, rather than side automatically with its long time Pakistani ally. Both protagonists were rooted in the history of their half-century conflict and astounded that the U.S. was not bound by the past.

For the previous fifty years, with a few exceptions, the United States had been tied to Pakistan, while India had been aligned with the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Pakistan had been the take off point for U2s flying over Russia and for Henry Kissinger`s trip to China. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s Pakistan had been the U.S.` critical ally in aiding the mujahedin freedom fighters against communism, along with Saudi Arabia. In 1971 the Nixon Administration had ``tilted`` toward Pakistan and against India during the war that led to Bangladesh`s freedom. Although U.S.-Pakistani relations had cooled significantly after 1990 when the U.S. determined Islamabad was building a nuclear arsenal (leading to an aid suspension), the popular and elite perception in both countries was that the U.S. was more pro-Pakistani than pro-Indian. The imposition of tough sanctions on both countries in 1998 (so-called Glenn sanctions) after they tested nuclear weapons had not altered the perception of American bias for Pakistan.

Nawaz Calls for Help

By late June the situation was deteriorating fast. The two parties were engaged in an intense conflict along the Kargil front and both were mobilizing their forces for larger conflict. Casualties were mounting on both sides. Our intelligence assessments were pointing toward the danger of full-scale war becoming a real possibility.

The danger was that the Indians would grow weary of attacking uphill (actually up-mountain) into well dug in Pakistani positions. The casualties the Indian forces were taking were mounting. New Delhi could easily decide to open another front elsewhere along the LOC to ease its burden and force the Pakistanis to fight on territory favorable to India. Even if the conflict remained confined solely to Kargil, the danger of escalation was high. While the Indian forces were making some progress against the Pakistanis and their militant allies, it was slow and both sides were mobilizing more and more of their regular forces.

Sharif became increasingly desperate as he saw how isolated Pakistan was in the world. He urgently requested American intervention to stop the Indian counterattack. Washington was clear — the solution required a Pakistani withdrawal behind the LOC, nothing else would do. In the last days of June Sharif began to ask to see President Clinton directly to plead his case. Sharif had met the President several times earlier, in New York and Washington and at the funeral of King Hussein in Amman. They had also spoken extensively in the spring of 1998 when the President had pleaded with Sharif not to follow India`s example and test its nuclear weapons. Although that effort failed (despite promises of enormous U.S. aid to Pakistan), the two leaders had developed a genuine personal bond and felt comfortable talking to each other.

On the 2nd of July the Prime Minister put in a call to the President. He appealed for American intervention immediately to stop the fighting and to resolve the Kashmir issue. The President was very clear -- he could help only if Pakistan first withdrew to the LOC. The President also consulted with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee on the phone. The Indians were adamant -- withdrawal to the LOC was essential, Vajpayee would not negotiate under the threat of aggression. The President sought to reassure Vajpayee that we would not countenance Pakistani aggression, not reward them for violating the LOC and that we stood by our commitment to the Lahore process, i.e. direct talks between India and Pakistan were the only solution to Kashmir, not third party intervention.

On the 3rd, Sharif was more desperate and told the President he was ready to come immediately to Washington to seek our help. The President repeated his caution -- come only if you are ready to withdraw, I can`t help you if you are not ready to pull back. He urged Sharif to consider carefully the wisdom of a trip to Washington under these constraints. Sharif said he was coming and would be there on the 4th.

The White House and State Department spent much of the rest of the 3rd preparing. Logistics were one problem. Blair House had to be made available for the Pakistanis and the Secret Service needed to secure Pennsylvania Avenue. As any visitor to the Mall on a 4th of July knows, tens of thousands of Americans come down to the Mall to see the fireworks, many come via the area around the White House and would be inconvenienced by a shut down of Pennsylvania Avenue.

A small group also prepared for the substance of the encounter. I led the effort at the NSC to prepare the President, National Security Advisor Samuel R. (Sandy) Berger and Chief of Staff John Podesta. The State effort was led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the senior point man on South Asian issues in the Department and Karl (Rick) Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs at State, whose bureau had the strongest expertise on the Subcontinent in the U.S. government. Strobe, Rick and I had already logged many hours traveling to South Asia to work to advance the President`s agenda of improving our relations with this too long neglected part of the world.

The product of this work was two pieces of paper. The first was a draft statement the President would issue if Sharif agreed to pulling back his forces to the LOC, the second a statement which would be used if Sharif refused. The latter would make clear that the blame for the crisis in South Asia lay solely with Pakistan.

On the third, more information developed about the escalating military situation in the area -- disturbing evidence that the Pakistanis were preparing their nuclear arsenals for possible deployment. Sharif`s intentions also became clearer. He was bringing his wife and children with him to Washington, a possible indication that he was afraid he might not be able to go home if the summit failed or that the military was telling him to leave. At a minimum, Sharif seemed to be hedging his bet on whether this would be a round trip.

Sharif would be met at Dulles Airport, where his commercial PIA flight was being diverted to from JFK, by the Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Bandar had a long history of helping assist key American diplomatic initiatives and also had worked with Pakistan extensively in the past during the Afghan war against the Soviets. Bandar asked for a briefing on what the President needed from Sharif. I met with him in his McLean home and gave him our sense of the crisis. Bandar promised to weigh in forcefully with Sharif on the ride from Dulles to Blair House, and he secured Crown Prince Abdallah`s support for our position.

British Prime Minister Blair also contacted Sharif to weigh in as well on the need for withdrawal. Like us, the British were increasingly worried over the direction the crisis was headed and the danger of escalation to full- scale war. Other governments, including Pakistan`s ally China, shared these concerns as well and we asked Beijing to weigh in with Islamabad. We concluded that the Chinese played a constructive role in trying to defuse the crisis.

The 4th Dawns

The President`s advisers gathered early on the 4th to brief him on the meeting ahead and provide advice. The mood was somber. Sandy Berger opened the session by telling the President that this could be the most important foreign policy meeting of his Presidency because the stakes could include nuclear war. He had to press Sharif to withdraw while also giving him enough cover to keep him in office to deliver the retreat. Strobe noted the importance of being very clear with Nawaz and not letting the Prime Minister be alone with the President so that he could later claim commitments not made. A record of who said what was critical. Rick and I briefed the President on the latest information we had.

There was more disturbing information about Pakistan preparing its nuclear arsenal for possible use. I recommended that he use this only when Sharif was without his aides, particularly not when the Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmad, who was known to be very close to Pakistani military intelligence (ISI) was in earshot.

Bandar called and told me the results of his discussion with Sharif. The PM was distraught, deeply worried about the direction the crisis was going toward disaster, but equally worried about his own hold on power and the threat from his military chiefs who were pressing for a tough stand. I briefed the President and the team. He said he was ready to go and we crossed Pennsylvania Avenue to Blair House.

Sharif had a couple of hours to rest and refresh himself since his arrival early in the morning. The President`s meeting opened at around 1:30 in the afternoon with a plenary session with their teams. The President began by noting he had to travel on the 5th to America`s poorest states, a long planned event to help eradicate poverty in America and thus was glad the PM could be available on the 4th. He then framed the day`s discussion by handing the PM a cartoon from the day`s Chicago Tribune newspaper that showed Pakistan and India as nuclear bombs fighting with each other. Clinton said this is what worried him.

Sharif opened by thanking the President for resolving the long outstanding quarrel between the two countries over the suspended delivery of F16 fighters — suspended when sanctions were imposed in 1990. Clinton had secured a sizable cash payment to Pakistan that compensated Islamabad for the cost of the never delivered fighters.

Sharif then went into a long and predictable defense of the Kashmiri cause. He appealed to the President to intervene directly to settle the dispute by pressing India. Much of his argumentation we had heard before -- only the U.S. could save a billion and a half South Asians from war, if only the President would devote 1% of the effort he gave to the Arab-Israeli dispute to Kashmir it would be resolved, etc. The President pushed back by reminding Sharif that the U.S. played a role in the Arab-Israeli conflict because both sides invited it to mediate, that is not the case with Kashmir. The best approach was the road begun at Lahore, that is direct contact with India. Pakistan had completely undermined that opening by attacking at Kargil, it must now retreat before disaster set in.

Sharif noted that India had been the first to test nuclear weapons and refused to hold an election to determine the future of Kashmir. Again the President said that was all true but the fundamental reality of the day was the Pakistani army and its militant allies were on the wrong side of the LOC and must withdraw. Only if Pakistan withdrew completely and quickly could the U.S. help Islamabad. A full and complete withdrawal without pre-conditions would give the U.S. some leverage with India, money in the bank of showing America could help India.

The President urged Sharif to give him that money in the bank. But he warned there could be no quid pro quo, no hint that America was rewarding Pakistan for its aggression nor for threatening its nuclear arsenal at India. If the United States appeared to be acting under the gun of a nuclear threat its ability to restrain others from threatening use of their nuclear forces would be forever undermined. Sharif must act today.

The room was tense and Sharif visibly worried. The President told the Pakistani team that he had just read John Keegan`s new book on the first World War. The Kargil crisis seemed to be eerily like 1914, armies mobilizing and disaster looming. The President had sent Strobe and his team to South Asia a half dozen times in the last year to try to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ease Indo-Pakistani tensions and build confidence on both sides. Pakistan was threatening to undo all of that and plunge the world into its first nuclear exchange.

Sharif handed the President a document which he said was a non-paper provided to him early in the crisis by Vajpayee in which the two would agree to restore the sanctity of the LOC (a formula for Pakistani withdrawal) and resume the Lahore process. Sharif said at first India had agreed to this non-paper but then changed its mind. Sharif then asked that the meeting continue just with the two leaders.

Everyone left the room except Sharif, Clinton and myself. The President insisted he wanted a record of the event. Sharif asked again to be left alone, the President refused. The Prime Minister then briefed the President on his frantic efforts in the last month to engage Vajpayee and get a deal that would allow Pakistan to withdraw with some saving of face. He had flown to China to try to get their help to press India to agree to a fixed timetable for talks to resolve Kashmir. Sharif`s brief was confused and vague on many details but he seemed a man possessed with fear of war.

The Prime Minister told Clinton that he wanted desperately to find a solution that would allow Pakistan to withdraw with some cover. Without something to point to, Sharif warned ominously, the fundamentalists in Pakistan would move against him and this meeting would be his last with Clinton.

Clinton asked Sharif if he knew how advanced the threat of nuclear war really was? Did Sharif know his military was preparing their nuclear tipped missiles? Sharif seemed taken aback and said only that India was probably doing the same. The President reminded Sharif how close the U.S. and Soviet Union had come to nuclear war in 1962 over Cuba. Did Sharif realize that if even one bomb was dropped… Sharif finished his sentence and said it would be a catastrophe.

Sharif asked again to have me leave the room. The President dismissed this with a wave of his hand and then told Sharif that he warned him on the second not to come to Washington unless he was ready to withdraw without any precondition or quid pro quo. Sharif had been warned by others as well. The President said he had a draft statement ready to issue that would pin all the blame for the Kargil crisis on Pakistan tonight.

The President was getting angry. He told Sharif that he had asked repeatedly for Pakistani help to bring Usama bin Ladin to justice from Afghanistan. Sharif had promised often to do so but had done nothing. Instead the ISI worked with bin Ladin and the Taliban to foment terrorism. His draft statement would also mention Pakistan`s role in supporting terrorists in Afghanistan and India. Was that what Sharif wanted, Clinton asked? Did Sharif order the Pakistani nuclear missile force to prepare for action? Did he realize how crazy that was? You`ve put me in the middle today, set the U.S. up to fail and I won`t let it happen. Pakistan is messing with nuclear war.

Sharif was getting exhausted. He denied that he had ordered the preparation of their missile force, said he was against that but he was worried for his life now back in Pakistan. The President suggested a break to allow each leader to meet with his team and consider next steps. He would also call Prime Minister Vajpayee to brief him on the discussions. After ninety minutes of intense discussion the meeting broke up.

The President and I briefed the others in our room in Blair House while Sharif huddled with his team in another room. The President put through a short call to New Delhi just to tell Vajpayee that he was holding firm on demanding the withdrawal to the LOC. Vajpayee had little to say, even asking the President ``what do you want me to say?`` There was no give in New Delhi and none was asked for. After the intensity of the first round, the President lay down on a sofa to rest his eyes for a few minutes. We all were consumed by the tension of the moment and drama of the day.

After an hour break the President, Sharif and I returned to the discussion. The President put on the table a short statement to be issued to the press drawing from the non-paper Sharif had given us and the statement we had drafted before the meeting to announce agreement on withdrawal to the LOC. The key sentence read ``the Prime Minister has agreed to take concrete and immediate steps for the restoration of the LOC.`` Strobe, Sandy, Rick and I had drafted this key sentence during the break. The statement also called for a ceasefire once the withdrawal was completed and restoration of the Lahore process. Finally, the statement included a reaffirmation of the President`s long standing plans to visit South Asia.

The President was clear and firm. Sharif had a choice, withdraw behind the LOC and the moral compass would tilt back toward Pakistan or stay and fight a wider and dangerous war with India without American sympathy. Sharif read the statement several times quietly. He asked to talk with his team and we adjourned again.

After a few minutes Sharif returned with good news. The statement was acceptable with one addition. Sharif wanted a sentence added that would say ``the President would take personal interest to encourage an expeditious resumption and intensification of the bilateral efforts (i.e. Lahore) once the sanctity of the LOC had been fully restored.``

The President handed the sentence to me and asked my opinion. I said we could easily agree to this because the President already supported the Lahore process but we need a clear understanding on how we would portray the LOC issue -- we would need to explain to our press that this language meant a Pakistani withdrawal. Clinton agreed and told Sharif that was his intention. Reluctantly, the Prime Minister said yes.

The mood changed in a nano-second. Clinton told Sharif that they had tested their personal relationship hard that day but they had reached the right ending. Once the withdrawal from Kargil was done the U.S. would have more credibility with India and the President expressed his determination to do what he could on Kashmir. The President called Vajpayee to preview the statement.

As the U.S. delegation was exiting the door from Blair House, Sharif`s Foreign Secretary Ahmad, made a last minute effort to reopen the text. He approached Sandy Berger with a list of alterations in the text. Sandy dismissed him with a curt `your boss says it is ok as is.`

The press briefing by Rick and I was a tough event. The journalists were convinced there must be some quid for Pakistani withdrawal. We made clear there was none.

Aftermath: New Deal in New Delhi, Coup in Islamabad

Sharif came to the White House early the next morning for a photo op with his family and the President. His mood was glum, he was not looking forward to the trip home. The Prime Minister knew he had done the right thing for Pakistan and the world, but he was not sure his army would see it that way. He stopped in London and Riyadh on the way home. Both our allies gave him their support.

The Prime Minister was good to his word. He ordered his army to pull back its men and its allies and they did so. India was jubilant, Pakistan morose. The fighting had taken a toll. Estimates of the dead on both sides vary. Indians usually claim 1300 killed on both sides, Pakistanis cite around 1700.

The President also lived up to his word. As soon as the Pakistani forces were back across the LOC he pressed India for a cease-fire in the Kargil sector. After this occurred he privately invited Sharif to send a senior trusted official to Washington to begin discrete discussions on how to follow up on his ``personal commitment`` to the Lahore process.

It soon became apparent, however, that all was not well in Islamabad. For weeks the Prime Minister did not respond to our queries to send someone to discuss Kashmir. The only explanation offered was that it was difficult to decide whom the right person combining the PM`s trust and the background on Kashmir was. We concluded the Pakistani internal situation was not ripe for Sharif to take action.

Finally in September Sharif sent his brother, the governor of Lahore, to Washington for the long awaited discussions. Rick Inderfurth and I met with him for hours in his suite at the Willard Hotel. A day-long downpour of rain made the capital a wet and dreary place.

We tried to get a feel for how the Prime Minister wanted to pursue the Kashmir issue. Instead, Shahbaz Sharif only wanted to discuss what the U.S. could do to help his brother stay in power. He all but said that they knew a military coup was coming.

On October 12, 1999 it came. Ironically, it was Nawaz who provoked the coup`s timing by trying to exile Musharraf when he was on an official visit to Sri Lanka. His plane was denied permission to return to Karachi or anywhere in Pakistan. The military rebelled and forced open the airport. Within hours, Nawaz was in jail and the army was in control.

The President instructed the NSC to do all we could to convince the new Pakistani leadership not to execute Sharif as General Zia had executed Prime Minister Bhutto in 1978. That outcome would have been a horrible one for all Pakistanis and would have considerably set back the country`s already slim hope of a better future. The President urged Musharraf to let Sharif free. With our encouragement the Saudis pressed hard for Sharif`s freedom. Finally, in December 2000 Sharif was exiled to the Saudi Arabian Kingdom.

Why did Sharif agree to withdraw on the fourth? Only the former Prime Minister can answer this question authoritatively. What is clear is that President Clinton was direct and forceful with him at Blair House -- there were no options except withdrawal or isolation. Whatever hopes Sharif and the rest of the Pakistani leadership had of getting American support for their Kargil adventure vanished that afternoon in Washington.

The most important strategic result of the Blair House summit was its impact on Indo-U.S. relations. The clarity of the American position on Kargil and its refusal to give Pakistan any reward for its aggression had an immediate and dynamic impact on the relationship. Doors opened in New Delhi to Americans that had been shut for years. The Indian elite -- including the military -- and the Indian public began to shed long held negative perceptions of the U.S.

The stage was set for the unprecedented back to back summits between President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee in 2000. After a quarter century gap in Presidential visits to India, Clinton`s spring visit symbolized a new level of maturity in the relationship between the world`s two largest democracies. Vajpayee`s return visit formalized the commitment.

President Bush has accelerated and intensified the process of U.S.-India rapprochement. After the September 11th attacks on America, he lifted the Glenn sanctions imposed after the 1998 tests and welcomed Vajpayee to the Oval Office. U.S. relations with Pakistan have substantially improved as well thanks to the Musharraf`s government`s role in the war against the Taliban and Usama bin Ladin, a striking reversal of earlier Pakistani policy. But the tensions following the attack on the Indian Parliament show the Kashmir issue remains as dangerous today, however, as it was in 1999, a time bomb capable of exploding upon the subcontinent with little or no warning.

References

There is a large library on the India-Pakistan conflict. A few pieces are particularly notable as they apply to the Kargil episode. The best discussion of the background to Pakistan`s incursion into Kargil and the strategic significance of the territory I have seen is by India`s former Foreign Secretary, J.N. Dixit, ``A Defining Moment,`` in Guns and Yellow Roses: Essays on the Kargil War (Harpers, 1999). Also useful is Gaurav Sawant`s Dateline Kargil (Macmillan, 2000) for descriptions of the fighting by a journalist who was there. A recent useful update on the nuclear dimension of the India-Pakistan conflict is the essay by M.V. Ramana and A.H. Nayyar, ``India, Pakistan and the Bomb,`` in Scientific American December 2001.



(c) All Rights Reserved

Center for the Advanced Study of India

Professor Francine R. Frankel, Director

University of Pennsylvania

3833 Chestnut Street, Suite 130

Philadelphia, PA 19104-3106

Tel: 215-898-6247

Fax: 215-573-2595

URL: http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi

Aisha,

re: your last post

1. ``Sheema Kirmani`s claim `Dancing is prohibited by law in Pakistan` was absolutely wrong.``

Kirmani`s statement may be looked in in several contexts. If she says that dancing has been outlawed in Pakistani and it there is indeed no law in writing that has passed through Pakistani legal channels, my hazard is that she means that has gained such a social, (dancing/performance dance is not integrated into and accepted in public spheres) cultural,(dancing becomes an activity and art of identity contention in terms of disciplines defined as ``Indian`` and ``Pakistani``) economic (class stigma attached to those who learn/practice dance, lack of employment of dancers and economical difficulty for dance schools suffering from unspoken stigmas) and gendered (men who dance are effeminate, women who dance have questionable or ``low class`` morals , or bluntly put, as some sad interactors maintain, part of sex work). If these social attitudes contribute toward a climate that is hostile to interrogating and accepting its fluidity and reality of Indian identities, among other factors, then an actual law prohibiting dance is in essence,a technicality. The reality that Kirmani and other dancers experience speaks more than the textual proof of a written law. In other words, if dance performances are stigmatised and closed down, there might as well be a social/religious censorship of certain kinds of dance that are enforced by police institutions.

2. ``I wonder why Pakistanis do this to their own country? Why are we so eager to please everyone. Vis a vis Pakistani Nationalism, why is there the need of myths?``

I think the goal of any nation (and I don`t necessarily approve of the idea of a nation-state) is to encourage a diversity of thought within and outside its borders. Pakistan can of course remain hostage to terrible religious and

military strongholds; but ultimately we all want a Pakistan that ylh envisions, with some fine tuning, of course. And the welcome and function of dissent and plurality is an extremely important part of that. As for myths, perhaps you might want to answer that question.

`` Aren`t we Pakistani? Why is it a crime on chowk to identify ourselves as Pakistanis? I am sorry but your rampage against `dysfunctional nationalism` is without basis.``

Well, yes some of us on Chowk are Pakistani and some of us are both Pakistani and South Asian. I have nothing against the self definition of Pakistani as long as that definition is fluid and honest enough to engage with the diversities of their peoples and that it was part of India. It seems some interactors would really like to pretend that it never was.

Dysfunctional nationalism is interesting. I don`t agree with the idea of nationalisms because it has been used to justify millions of destructive and questionable actions and movements. Dys. nationalism begins when differing opinions and perspectives are villified and termed in pejorative adjectives because it does not adhere to a mythology that contain several fantasies or falsehoods.

3. `` I really don`t understand why you are trying to make this a chauvinism vs feminism issue, because that is not what others are discussing here.``

The way she was cursed online, on these boards carries an ugly connotation. I really have a problem with the word b&tch when it is used pejoratively; if you notice on Chowk, women are usually called that by male interactors when they have communicated thoughts that are unpopular with chauvinistic males. The gendered aspect of this word cannot be denied, esp. when applied to a well known artist/professional who was merely stating an opinion. Has anyone gone around calling Mr. Musharraf a ``kuta`` because they disagreed with his policy? People who practice this need to understand what kind of gender dynamics they are perpetuating and are privelleged to perpetuate. Your calling a woman a b has very different connotations than ylh doing so, in the public realm of cyber space.

Hopefully, will be able to finish answering your post tom.

regards,

PM,

:) Let me predict again... blasphemy laws are about to go in a few months inshallah.

Urstruly,

I agree with your freedom of speech post as far as it concerns people like Samina Shah... but my dear Urstruly... the Blasphemy law in Pakistan can hardly be termed as Islamic.. Infact some Ulema have done Ijtehad and declared it unIslamic... so whats the big deal?

-YLH

Dear PM,

``, i must say there`s a strawman there. ``Liar`` may be harsh word in America, but pray tell how else you would describe the teller of a falsehood. Whether dance is prohibited by law in Pakistan or whether it`s allowed is not a matter of `opinion` at all. It`s pure fact, and I`m afraid, if Ms Kirmani made the statement Yasser says she did, she was LYING on that occassion. It is unimaginable that she is not aware of the law.``

Thankyou for pointing out to Samina Shah that Sheema Kirmani indeed did lie about the `Dancing being prohibited by Law. On the other issue : Undoubtedly there is a lot of abuse of power in Pakistan. Couples are stopped at night in Lahore by the police, who ask them for `nikah namas`, but is it part of the law to stop a couple and ask for Nikah nama. To declare in New York Times that there is active persecution of artists in Pakistan, and to declare that `Dancing is banned by Law` are two quite different things... don`t you agree? Well that is merely my point, and I really can`t stand liars like Sheema Kirmani.. Do you have any idea how this makes Pakistan look? I am sure you do, because you also have suffered the same pain as I while seeing the name of our nation being slandered in the US. Sadly on chowk, feeling this pain is termed as `belligerant Pakistani nationalism gone beserk`. Had Sheema Kirmani protested on the grounds that society is intolerant of her monkey dance, I would have been her biggest supporter .. whereas I personally don`t like her dance at all, but I would have gladly given my life to protect her right to dance.

In another post, Samina Shah posted something about me wanting to be associate Pakistan with the `Muslim Central Asia`... Can there be a bigger lie about my person and my character? All of sudden the debate of identity becomes the debate of history... since we were once part of India, we have to declare ourselves Indians... Kyoon bhai? Why this racial distinction of identity... Is it not enough that I, Yasser Latif Hamdani, was born and raised in Pakistan, that I hold a Pakistani passport and that I bear allegience to the nation my ancestors fought to build?

Why must a few history books define my identity? Why if I choose not to identify myself as a South Asian, but rather as a Pakistani, why should I be accused of being some sort of a Pan-Islamist, or Central Asian wannabe... Why can`t I be a Pakistani and a Human being simple?

And to imagine all of this arose from my condemnation of Sheema Kirmani`s obvious lie...

-YLH

Prem

RE. #480. I think you`re absolutely right. Well said!

ah now, Hobbyty,

you ask that I ``consider, exactly what reason do you have to not operate as if ``give the other the benefit of the doubt``.

Would ten expletives (interspersed with copiuos expectorating) be enough reason to take away any manner of doubt about the poster`s true intention, even as he pretends that the cut&pastes are being reposted only for a certain audience (who, of course almost NEVER engage in discussion with him-- yourself included)

I really am not inclined to post a point-by-point rebuttal to your post, but fortunately nasah has covered pretty much what I wanted to say-- and addressed your points.

Some questions you asked:

``[Is Chowk] More personal than the choices one makes with regard to which TV programs one will view in one`s own living room? Perhaps ``personal`` has other definitions I may not be familiar with.

Would interpersonal do it for you? get the point across better? I sure as hell would get annoyed tomorrow if West Wing were to turn Friends. (And remember, TV programming (content) is dictated by commercial considerations-- chowk content is not nearly-- or so we hope anyway). Frankly I am surprised that you should even suggest that TV programming has a more `personal` experiential value than this forum. Or does `personal` have other definitions I am not familiar with? Maybe I`ll ask the guy on the next commerical for help with this one, huh?

``In my opinion, copious amounts of anti-Islam posts appear on Chowk - some consider my post on Islam as anti-Islamic - though I agree, that there is no absolute right to anything and all ``rights`` or ``freedoms`` must have ``limits`` to be meaningful. I was posting some material and it was too long, Temporal and Hamidm, DRUMZ pointed out that the posts were so long that persons were not reading it and therefore the information I wanted people to discuss was simply being overlooked - that it was counter productive.``

Now you`ve lost me, bud... how does your first sentence up there connect with the second? Are you concuring with me or opposing? In any event, yes, when RABIDLY anti-Islam posts have appeared (not that they where anywhere near as frequent or as long as anything `progressive` reposts), interactors have indeed called for more chowk moderation.

But in any case, which part of ``it is not about Freedom of Speech`` didn`t you get? I am happy to view any and all POV and angles, so long as it is not a load of clever lies, and nauseatingly in-your-face and long to boot. Or would you have no objection to a randy whore house next door, when you`re trying to keep the neighbourhood clean-- though pluralistic?

(Often enough I find progressives reposts quite interesting. But when you start seeing 2-3 on every page, each prefaced by wanton name-calling, you`d have to wonder about the guy`s intentions. Debate seems farthest from them.)

As for your own posts that ``some consider anti-Islamic`` (what did I misss?!?), ever wonder why no one ever called for their censorship? Hint: you didn`t feel you had to introduce it language and manner that would make Enimem proud.

``I don`t have a reason to think that Progressive has any reason other than to bring into discussion a point of view he or she thinks ought to be discussed by us. Could he do better? Could the same apply to all of us?``

hahahah! you ARE naive my friend. Every time anyone has tried debating with the guy, he`s either answered with a volley of insults (ask Saima Shah)-- completely coopting any discussion, or, as in the case of my most recent rebut, chosen to ignore. So please, spare us the looking-for-discourse argument. doesn`t wash for a sec.

sheesh-- promised myself not to write more than a hundred words!!

rgds,

PM

P.S. Pix of the bridges in the mail.

Urstruly - ``Monkey Brain``?

Monkey-See/Monkey-Do Dept.

``Eleven Europeans believed to be French, and two Pakistanis were killed in a suicide car bombing ...``

re. Hobbyty:

``Honestly - I don`t have a reason to think that Progressive has any reason other than to bring into discussion a point of view he or she thinks ought to be discussed by us. Could he do better?``

Hobbs, new offer: make that TWO bridges! :)

later...

PM

hellooo Chowkstaff

what happened to the post in which I riduculed a certain simian for equating the death penatly with a call for censorship?

Re Urstruly:

Your defense of blasphemy laws as protecting the “... ideals of the people which they hold dear …” is baseless. Ironically, such laws are in clear conflict with several Quranic verses that I quoted to you on several occasions … on which you remain conveniently silent.

So this is how it works … a person slanders the Prophet (pbuh) … and according to you this person should be killed!

Slandering a religious figure is a sign of jihalat … while laws designed to killing a jahil indicate barbarism and fanaticism of the lowest kind.

re: ylh

...bad press for pakistan about dancing laws should be the least of your worries...the american media is still not convinced that the leader of the islamic republic of pakistan is not a terrorist himself but actually wants to fight terrorism...the american people worry about this more than about if naach gaana is allowed in pakistan...

Washington Post

The General`s Broken Promise

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17470-2002May14.html

{In any case, his present course risks not only the ruin of his promise of reform but even greater disasters, including the resurgence of al Qaeda inside Pakistan, or war with India. The Bush administration embraced Mr. Musharraf last year after he pledged his support for the military campaign in Afghanistan; it showered him with economic aid and overlooked his bogus referendum. But it cannot continue to cling to him if he is to lead his regime over a cliff. Once again, as it did after Sept. 11, the administration must present the Pakistani president with a stark choice: Either he must act decisively against the extremists of al Qaeda and Kashmir, and implement the domestic reforms he promised, or lose the support of the United States.}

#494

and ``darbooz`` it is in atleast a couple of non-Hindi languages south of Vindhyas.

# 500

Some genuine activities with origins in Pakistan ,

Burning viharas and temples ,

looting temple jewels ,

and many more.

Banjara

How come you made a mistake about ``Kathak/Khatak``. So apparently it is not ``Khatak`` as you claimed but ``Kathak``.

YLH, Sarwari

Post #497 not mine - but ``Imposter``

Re your post to Fawad about ``ideological frontiers`` - actually ``ideological frontiers`` do exist in Pakistan and in many respects these frontiers need to be pushed forward and broadened. The very idea of Pakistan is a non-ethnic polity - it is a polity of ideas - thus far the ideas that have dominated, have been petty and miserly in scope - A homeland for Muslims of India? Perhaps it once was, and perhaps it once again be - but better we earn the admiration of ourselves and others by the ideas we formulate and promote. Chief among these ideas must be Liberty and the freedom of conscience. These two ideas are the well spring of freedom both of the indivdual and the society we must promote discussion and debate of these ideas within Pakistani society.

South Asian, Central Asian or Martian, Muslim, Hindu, Christian or Buddhist - we shall be slaves unless as a condition of our existence, Liberty and the freedom of conscience is not our birth right. All else flows from these two ideas; governance, economics and social interaction.

Reply #: 499

Godot

Re: Trillium, #350

``I posted that article on cousin-marriages for you as a food for thought. But you don`t appear to be smart enough to understand that.``

If the article you posted was meant to be a scientific and authorative treatise on genetics - ``food for thought`` - no wonder people are starving in the third world for western education.

P.S.I hope you and your sister will be very happy together.