The Last Crusade

All of us know that LONE WAS MURDERED BY ISI `COZ HE WANTED TO PARTICIPATE IN J&K ELECTIONS. TAP does not want normalcy to retun to Kashmir. Bloody bloodsuckers can go to any extent to prevent J&K people from participating in the democratic process. How can their 98% referendum eunuch General want fair elections in Kashmir.

http://www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=10620

ISI is responsible, says son; mourners heckle hardliner Geelani

Muzamil Jaleel & Mufti Islah

Srinagar, May 21: Senior Hurriyat leader Abdul Gani Lone, considered the most moderate voice in the separatist camp and who barely weeks ago had said that time had come for jihad to end in the Valley, was assassinated here on Tuesday by unidentified militants.

Lone was shot soon after attending a rally—attended by about 15,000 people—at Martyrs` graveyard in the Idgah locality of downtown Srinagar to mark the 12th death anniversary of Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq. Lone`s family blamed Pakistan, its ISI and hardline Hurriyat leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani for the killing.

As Lone`s body reached his Sant Nagar residence, hundreds of his supporters and relatives assembled there shouting slogans in favour of independence of Kashmir. Said Lone`s son Sajjad Lone: ``I want to tell the world who did it. It is ISI, Pakistan and Geelani. We will definitely ask them. They will have to pay for it,` he shouted as relatives tried to calm him down.

When Geelani showed up, he had to beat a hasty retreat after a group of Lone supporters, agitated and angry, abused at him. ``We want nothing. What do you have to do here?`` they shouted.

Lone`s driver Abdul Rasheed and one of the few eyewitnesses, described the scene: ``I was walking ahead of him. He was accompanied by his body guards (J-K policemen) when a man appeared and shot at him. He first threw something, perhaps a grenade, which did not explode and dropped in a drain.``

``Within seconds he opened fire at Lone sahib,`` he said. ``We tried to rush towards Lone sahib`s body but he fired at us too. I escaped bullets but another bodyguard was injured.``

Hurriyat chairman Abdul Gani Bhat and JKLF leader Javed Mir were just a few dozen metres behind Lone. ``We had left the rally together. As we were walking, somebody from the crowd shook my hand but while doing so he tripped, this incident made us stop for a few minutes by which time Lone had moved ahead,`` he said. ``Then there was firing and we could not understand what was going on.``

Said Javed Mir said: ``I heard a few gunshots and then people started running. There was utter confusion and somebody fell down. When we came closer, it was Lone sahib and his guards.``

India has blamed Pakistan for the killing of Mr. Lone also. Why in the world would Pakistan want Mr. Lone killed, when he and the APHC are strong allies of Pakistan? He is one of the strongest separatist leaders in Kashmir. His agenda has always been self-determination for Kashmiris, through various means. His son is married to the daughter of the head of a similar organization in Pakistan`s Kashmir.

Any killing that takes place in Kashmir is apparently instigated by Pakistan. The APHC has rejected any election in Kashmir which is not held under neutral administrations, like the UN. India is bent upon holding elections under its own administration. Such rigged elections are what started the recent uprisings in Kashmir to begin with, in 1989.

Pakistan has now offered to have joint international observors on both side of the LOC, to monitor cross-border movements. India has rejected that, as well.

I think all this war talk is based more on India`s local politics than anything else. And it is slowly getting out of control. Any sane person should now agree for third party intervention in this conflict. Any person who is convinced of his/her stance, at least, would agree to it. Anyone who has something to hide would oppose it.

tahmed321

Thanks for your plainspeaking.

Are there any persons who can see as clearly in any position of power in Pakistan ? Any hope there will be leadership that will show wisdom and long term vision instead of opportunism in the coming days, weeks and months ?

Vajpayee (and believe me I am not blind to his huge failings in Gujarat) is still the man who took a Bus to Lahore with his creaky knees and read his ``Jang na hone Denge`` to Pakistanis.

General Musharaf is the man (to most Indians)who torpedoed the Lahore peace process with Kargil - which tells us something about his long range vision - how many of you would like to go back to the bus days and start over ?

I know a lot of you here are admirers of the man but so far he has shown the spine of a jellyfish and the vision of an bug in dealing with the jihadis who may ANY MOMENT trigger a no-winners nuclear war. He CAN stop them. He is NOT stopping them. Does he WANT war ?

More Quotes..

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Chennai sex workers make Rs 3.33 crore a month

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

By our Chennai Correspondent

Mobile brothels manned by cell-phone toting operators are proving to be a hit in Chennai, according to a new study.

For those in the trade, running a mobile unit makes sound business sense as it cuts down on operational costs of renting a building and bribing the cops.

As for the client, it promises `pick and drop` facility of sex workers at a place of his choice.

More than 17 mobile units operate from cars in the city, according to Chennai-based NGO Indian Community Welfare Organisation (ICWO), which works with Commercial Sex Workers (CSWs).

The ICWO estimates the volume of sex business in the city at Rs 3.33 crore per month in its latest study.

According to the study, there are 6,300 women sex workers operating from all over the city, around the year. ``They are spread over in all parts of the city,`` says A J Hariharan, secretary, ICWO.

The sex workers have been broadly classified as family girl, street worker, brothel based, and mobile. Family girls form the majority of the lot, numbering 4500. There are 350 street workers, and 90 mobile workers, according to the study.

It was found that 55 percent of the sex workers came from Andhra Pradesh, 24 percent from Tamil Nadu and 11 percent from Kerala. The study identified 150 full time brokers and an estimated 4500 part time brokers.

It has been found that clients are serviced at `normal houses`, besides brothels, hotels and lodges. These houses are used for short-term stay and rent is paid for the hours used. At least 91 such houses exist in the city.

According to the study, an estimated 11,111 paid sexual encounters take place in the city.

It was found that 93 percent of the CSWs were into the trade out of compulsions and not out of choice. 78 percent of the respondents said they would not allow their children to enter the profession.

It was found that 68 percent of the respondents used condoms regularly during sex. The 32 percent who did not use condoms on a regular basis gave different reasons for not using them.

Thirty percent said they couldn`t use condoms with regular clients. Another 30 percent said they would forget to wear it at times and 10 percent felt that condom usage would prolong sexual activity.

Another 10 percent said some clients would object to it. About 20 percent said they knew better techniques to avoid infection!

As for reasons why they chose to be sex workers, 31 percent respondents said they entered the profession due to family debts and 29 percent said their husbands deserted them. About 29 percent said their lovers had ditched them.

Clients were asked why they visited sex workers. 21 percent said their wives had health problems. At least 17 percent said they came for oral sex and 10 percent said their wives were not interested in sex.

Seven percent said they had grown up children at home and six percent said their wives refused to have sex with them. Eleven percent came for a change, for 22 percent it had become a regular practice, and for six percent, sex was a passion.

The objective of the study was to map areas in the city where commercial sex workers operated and to ``understand the sex industry`` in Chennai. The Tamil Nadu State AIDS Control Society supported the study with the intention of using the information to frame suitable strategy for HIV/AIDS intervention programs.

About 43 percent of the sex workers who were interviewed for the survey were in the 26-35 age group. 26 percent was in the 19-25 age group. About 20 percent was in the 36-40 age group and 10 percent was in the above-40 age group.

The team interviewed 300 women sex workers. Among the 300, 180 belonged to the family category, 80 street workers, 30 brothel based, and 10 from the mobile units. Twenty pimps, 20 lodge/house owners, and 20 hotel room boys were also interviewed.

hobbyty #275 you ask ``Would you like to be an Indian citizen in Gujjrat?`` It all depends what you are comparing this with. What are the chances of being killed while saying prayers in a mosque in Karachi vs. Gujrat? By all indications, it seems clear that even a godforsaken nest of religious fanaticism like Gujrat would be safer place to say prayers for a muslim than Karachi. This is the depth of shame and insanity to which the evil of religious fanaticism, the lust for power, the absence of reason and honesty and truth, have brought us.

I love Pakistan and our wonderful people, and will do so as long as I live. But I will not close my eyes to reality, even though it is painful.

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For ROmair who keeps pleading for the ``goras`` to come back and save his a..

A Review of Chandrashekhar Dasgupta`s War and Diplomacy in Kashmir,

1947-48 Sage Publications, New Delhi. 2002. ISBN: 0-7619-9588-9.

Price: US$17.75. 239 pages)

http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DE22Df01.html

May 21, 2002 atimes.com

By Sreeram Chaulia

Peace will come only if we have the strength to resist invasion and

make it clear that it will not pay.

- Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to Governor General Louis

Mountbatten, December 26, 1947

Having won accolades for more than 30 years as one of the brightest

and best Indian Foreign Service officers, the legendary

Chandrashekhar Dasgupta has once again proved his mettle by writing a

highly original, revelatory and myth-shattering book on the genesis

of the Kashmir imbroglio. No competent historian until now has been

able to portray the undeclared 1947-8 India-Pakistan war over Kashmir

from the standpoint of British strategic and diplomatic calculations.

It comes as no surprise that the Promethean ``CD`` (as Dasgupta is

admiringly called by the ``old boys`` of his St Stephen`s College,

Delhi, and in the diplomatic corps) decided to fill the gap with a

lucid and well-referenced treatise on the perfidies of Whitehall and

its representatives who remained in authoritative positions on the

subcontinent even after formal transfer of power to the domains of

India and Pakistan.

While the origins of the Kashmir conflict are highly contested by

both the claimant parties and this debated history has produced

several partisan as well as impartial accounts, Dasgupta`s work is

the first to unearth the complex military and diplomatic decision-

making in the crowded 15-month war that was influenced and distorted

by Britain.

British aces on the eve of the Kashmir crisis

Immediately after Indian and Pakistani independence, by a peculiar

quirk of circumstances, Britain had a number of ``men on the spot`` at

its disposal to protect and buttress its interests. First, the

governor-general and head of state in India was Lord Louis

Mountbatten of the British Royal Navy. True to his blue-blooded

lineage and decorated career rendering yeoman service to ``His

Majesty, the King of England``, Mountbatten took

regular ``appreciations`` and advice on his role in India from Clement

Attlee, Defense Minister Alexander Albert, the UK chiefs of staff,

British high commissioners in Delhi and Karachi, and the Secretary of

State for Commonwealth Relations, Noel Baker. In the words of

Mountbatten`s aide, Ismay, anything that brought the two dominions,

India and Pakistan, into a crisis ``was a matter in which the

instructions of His Majesty the King should be sought [by the

Governor-General]`` (p 21).

Second, Field Marshall Auchinleck remained supreme commander of the

British Indian army even after August 15 1947, and closely conferred

with Commanders-in-Chief Rob Lockhart and Roy Bucher, Air Chief

Marshall Thomas Elmherst and a host of other generals in both India

and Pakistan. Their importance as trump cards for guaranteeing

British strategic objectives was underlined by the Commonwealth

Affairs Committee in London, which proclaimed that in an emergency

involving India and Pakistan, ``the Minister of Defense, in

consultation with the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations,

should send instructions to the Supreme Commander`` (p 33). Throughout

the Kashmir war, Nehru and Patel had occasions to be furious with the

solicitation of external instructions by British commanders who owed

primary loyalties to London.

With nationals of a third country leading the opposing armies and top

executive structures of India and Pakistan, the Kashmir war of 1947-8

was unique in the annals of modern warfare, yet fell into the

predictable pattern of third world conflicts that were ``moderated``

or ``finessed`` by great power pressures. Without full national control

over respective armies, India and (to a lesser extent) Pakistan were

unable to determine the course and outcome of the war as their

political elites wished.

Twin British `instructions` and the fatal tilt

Two broad British interests, conveyed and acted out through

Mountbatten and other operatives, were at stake in an India-Pakistan

war. One was integrity of the commonwealth and avoidance of inter-

dominion warfare. Reduced to a ``half great power`` by 1945, London

foresaw immense prestige and economic and political merit in

retaining both India and Pakistan in its sphere of influence and knew

the dangers inherent in taking sides, irrespective of the legality or

morality of the Indian or Pakistani case. In July 1947, Whitehall

issued a ``Stand Down`` instruction to British authorities if

hostilities broke out between the two dominions ``since under no

circumstances could British officers be ranged on opposite sides`` (p

19). Averting open war thus became a sine qua non of British purpose,

regardless of the relative rectitude of the two sides.

``Stand Down`` was not, however, meant to be neutrality, leave alone

benevolent neutrality, for the larger geopolitical reassessment

conducted by British planners in 1946-7 was clear that ``our strategic

interests in the subcontinent lay primarily in Pakistan`` (p 17).

Hopes of a defense treaty with India were present but not deemed as

vital as the retention of Pakistan, ``particularly the North West``,

within the commonwealth. The bases, airfield and ports of the North

West were invaluable for commonwealth defense. Besides, the UK chiefs

of staff reasoned that Pakistan had to be kept on board to preserve

British ``strategic positions in the Middle East and North Africa``.

Employing typical communal logic, the former colonial masters also

felt that estranging Pakistan would harm Britain`s relations with

the ``whole Mussulman bloc``, a premise that would be fatal when the

Kashmir war came up before the UN Security Council. Briefed that

the ``area of Pakistan is strategically the most important in the

continent of India and the majority of our strategic requirements

could be met … by an agreement with Pakistan alone`` (p 17),

Mountbatten and the British personnel on the ground knew whom not to

displease if it really came to a choice between India and Pakistan.

Prelude in Junagadh

A curtain-raiser to this tilt came over the disputed accession of

Junagadh in September 1947, when British service chiefs tried to

falsely convince Nehru and Patel that the Indian army was ``in no

position to conduct large-scale operations`` to flush out the Nawab`s

private army from neighboring Mangrol. Patel rebutted bitterly to

Mountbatten, ``senior British officers owed loyalty to and took orders

from Auchinleck rather than the Indian government`` (p 26). The

governor-general, who constituted a defense committee of the cabinet

during the stand-off appointing himself, not Nehru, as the chairman,

backed off and allowed Junagadh`s incorporation into the Indian

union, not before cheekily suggesting ``lodging a complaint to the

United Nations against Junagadh`s act of aggression``. Kashmir would

be a different kettle of tea because Pakistan had a much greater

interest in it and the British were wary of the dangers of ``losing``

Pakistan from their grand strategic chessboard.

Constraining India at war

Before the Pakistani ``tribal`` invasion of Kashmir in October 1947,

General Lockhart was secretly informed by his British counterpart in

Rawalpindi of the preparations underway for the raids. The commander-

in-chief shared the crucial information with his two other British

service chiefs but not with the Indian government (Nehru discovered

this delinquency only in December, leading to Lockhart`s dismissal).

After the invasion and the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India,

Lockhart and Mountbatten worked feverishly behind the scenes to

prevent inter-dominion war, which in fact meant restraining Indian

armed retaliation against the invading Pakistani irregulars.

Patel`s directive that arms be supplied urgently to reinforce the

Maharaja`s defences ``was simply derailed by the commander-in-chief

acting in collusion with Field Marshal Auchinleck``. (p 42).

Mountbatten, privately chastising Jinnah for actively abetting the

tribal invasion, publicly advised the Indian government that it would

be a folly to send munitions to a ``neutral`` state since Pakistan

could do the same and it would end up a full-scale war. Nehru and

Patel were certain than an informal state of war already existed and

urged an airlift of Indian armed forces to relieve Srinagar from the

rampaging Pathans. The service chiefs warned that an airlift

involved ``great risks and dangers``, but Nehru refused to be deterred.

In November, as the situation worsened in the Jammu-Poonch-Mirpur

sector and Nehru asked for immediate military relief, Mountbatten and

Lockhart painted somber pictures of the incapacity of the Indian

armed forces. When Nehru still insisted on action to ``rid Jammu of

raiders``, the British slyly changed the order to mean

merely ``evacuating garrisons``.

In the absence of Pakistani ``appeals`` to the raiders to withdraw and

with more evidence of invader brutalities in Kashmir, the Indian

cabinet exhorted more and more forceful policies - air interdiction

of Afridi invasion routes and even a counter-attack into West

Pakistan to ``strike at bases and nerve centres of the raiders``. A

desperate Moutbatten then mooted complaint against the tribal

invasion to the United Nations as the proper course of action and

simultaneously promised full military preparations for a counter-

attack. Nehru accepted this in good faith, hoping the British service

chiefs would keep their part of the agreement. ``This proved to be a

fatal error. The Governor-General was determined to thwart the

cabinet`` (p 101). General Bucher saw to it that no measures were made

for a lightning strike across the border and Britain also imposed a

sudden cut in oil supplies in early 1948, with serious implications

for India`s capacity to carry out military operations in Kashmir.

Ismay, Mountbatten`s chief of staff and British high commissioner to

India, Shone, reported to London that Pakistan was ``the guilty state

conniving in actual use of force in Kashmir`` (p 58). Attlee was, of

course, unprepared to alienate Pakistan and ``the whole of Islam`` and

accepted the latter`s contention that Karachi could appeal to the

tribal invaders only after a ``fair`` solution was reached in Kashmir.

Noel Baker marshalled this thinly veiled pro-Pakistan approach at the

Commonwealth Relations Office and then transferred his communal bias

to the UN Security Council (UNSC) in the early months of 1948.

British skullduggery at the UN

Around the same time, the partition of Palestine earned bitter Arab

recriminations against Britain and America, and the Foreign Office in

London decided, ``Arab opinion might be further aggravated if British

policy on Kashmir were seen as being unfriendly to a Muslim state`` (p

111). Aneurin Bevin`s pro-Pakistan line, shared by Noel Baker, meant

that British proposals in the Security Council were supportive of

Pakistan on every major point. Kashmir`s accession to India was

ignored and the problem of irregular invasion pushed under the

carpet. ``The only yardstick used by Bevin and Noel-Baker was

acceptability to Pakistan. Indian reactions, not to mention legal or

constitutional factors, were hardly taken into account`` (p 114).

Close British allies America, Canada, and France were brought around

to supporting the Pakistani stand, but not before US Secretary of

State George Marshall plainly stated that his government ``found it

difficult to deny the legal validity of Kashmir`s accession to India``

(p 121). But in the desire not to present a rival proposal and thus

convey to the USSR divisions in the ``Anglo-Saxon camp``, Washington

reluctantly followed the British agenda. American ambassador to

India, Grady, went on record saying the US ``would have adopted a more

sympathetic attitude to India, had it not been for the pressure

exerted by the British delegates``. Even as loyal a Briton as

Mountbatten had to record, ``power politics and not impartiality are

governing the attitude of the Security Council`` (p 123). Attlee

himself was disturbed at the undue discretion Noel Baker was

exercising in New York and wrote: ``all the concessions are being

asked from India, while Pakistan concedes little or nothing. The

attitude still seems to be that it is India which is at fault whereas

the complaint was rightly lodged against Pakistan`` (p 129). Following

a rethink by the major players, the April resolutions of the UNSC,

despite Noel Baker`s best efforts, called for withdrawal of the

invaders from ``Azad Kashmir`` for which ``Pakistan should use its best

endeavours``, to be followed by a plebiscite as Nehru had agreed. The

August 1948 UNCIP (United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan)

resolution restated the sequential de-escalation with greater

clarity.

The Bucher-Gracey deal

Baker`s pitch that ``stabilization`` of the situation required the

induction of regular Pakistani army soldiers into Jammu and Kashmir,

though not succeeding in the UNSC, found another votary in General

Roy Bucher, Lockhart`s replacement as commander-in-chief of the

Indian army. Behind the back of his government, Bucher had top-secret

confabulations with his British counterpart in Pakistan, Douglas

Gracey, in March 1948. An informal truce was agreed upon (with the

assent of Pakistan premier Liaqat Ali Khan) where Bucher promised not

to launch any offensive into territory controlled by the ``Azad

Kashmir`` forces and to withdraw Indian troops from Poonch town and

the environs of Rajouri. ``Each side would remain in undisputed

military occupation of what are roughly their present positions … and

it will be essential for some Pakistan Army troops to be employed in

the Uri sector`` (p 139). Upon learning of this scheme, Nehru and

Patel flatly rejected it as unauthorized contradiction of their aim

of expelling occupants from the entire territory of Jammu and

Kashmir.

The Bucher-Gracey deal never materialized, but it presaged Pakistan`s

unilateral push of its regular battalions into raider-held areas in

May, a crucial movement known to Bucher in advance but conveniently

hidden from Nehru until it was too late. Noel Baker hush-hushed the

violation of ``Stand Down`` when Gracey personally ordered the influx

of the Pakistani army with British officers into Kashmir, citing

threats to British interests: ``Pakistan might leave the Commonwealth;

the hostility of the Muslim population of the world to the UK might

be increased`` (p 160).

A `very secret` alliance

In September 1948, as an Indian advance into Mirpur looked imminent,

Pakistan sent its deputy army chief to London on a ``very secret

mission`` to negotiate a defense treaty with Britain. Attlee welcomed

Liaqat`s demarche and the preliminary discussions ``served to enhance

the pro-Pakistan tilt in British policy`` (p 170). As a reward for

Pakistan`s eagerness to join the West, London offered the Pakistan

army ``hints``, ``tips`` and ``assurances`` about Indian army plans in the

last three months of the Kashmir war. Most appallingly, while

maintaining the fa?ade of neutrality, the UK High Commission in

Karachi noted, ``from London, assurance had now been given by H M G

that an attack by India on west Punjab would not be tolerated`` (p

171, emphasis original). Bucher restricted Indian offensive action to

the utmost and relayed all vital intelligence to his opposing number

in Pakistan, allowing the latter to relocate forces in most

vulnerable sectors. Attlee also bent the rules of ``Stand Down`` in

favor of Pakistan, what with British officers planning and

executing ``Operation Venus`` in Naoshera.

Besides military aid, Pakistan`s offer of a defense pact elicited

Noel Baker`s promise to return the Kashmir question to the UNSC

before India evacuated invaders from the whole of Jammu and Kashmir.

In November, Britain tried mobilizing support in the UNSC for

an ``unconditional ceasefire``, freezing the trench lines but

permitting Pakistan to retain troops in Jammu and Kashmir. America

turned it down as ``inappropriate`` and inconsistent with UNCIP and

UNSC resolutions. John Foster Dulles complained, ``the present UK

approach to Kashmir appears extremely pro-Pakistan as against the

middle ground`` (p 195). The final UNCIP proposals, reaffirming the

earlier resolutions, fell short of Indian expectations, but Nehru had

no other option than accepting them since Bucher and his cohorts had

convinced the cabinet with their ``superior expertise`` that India

was ``militarily impotent``.

Conclusions

Drawing upon recently declassified British Foreign Office

archives, ``CD`` has dug out some of the most telltale and hermetically

sealed secrets of Whitehall malfeasance during the first Kashmir war.

The much-trumpeted British ``sense of fairness`` comes unstuck in this

damning book, inducing the reader to wonder what kind of neutrality

it was that caused General Cariappa to remark he was ``fighting two

enemies - army headquarters headed by Roy Bucher and the Pakistani

army headed by Messervy`` (p 137). What kind of impartiality was it

that the British high commissioner in India could upbraid the British

chief of the Indian Air Force for ``foolish, unnecessary and

provocative action`` (p 209)? The counter-factual conclusion one

gleans from War and Diplomacy in Kashmir is that the history of

Kashmir and of the subcontinent would have been a lot different had

Britain not toyed with facts and legality to serve its ulterior ends

through eminences grises in India and Pakistan or had America taken a

keener interest in the region and not left the nitty-gritty in the

hands of its ``Anglo-Saxon ally``.

Incidentally, ``CD```s research has also demythified Nehru`s alleged

pacifism, feebleness and ``softness`` towards Pakistan. The Indian

prime minister emerges from the narrative as, to use a term he

disapproved, a courageous ``realist`` who thoroughly understood the

geopolitical and military context of Kashmir. It has, of late, become

fashionable in Indian politics to demean Nehru as a dreamy utopian

who practiced appeasement and squandered Indian advantages in foreign

policy. ``CD`` has shown that whatever mistakes India made in 1947-8

had to do with the sabotage of external agents who kept Nehru in the

dark on several outstanding counts.

In terms of policy relevance, this book should be read by those who

currently advocate ``third party arbitration`` to solve South Asian

disharmony. It is useful to know from history that facilitators and

mediators had and have their own gooses to cook in Kashmir.

Sadna #300:

Very well said. Its time `pious` pacifists lost some of their `piety`.

Satyavadi

Of course this will be like water off a turtles back to ROmair, Hobbyty and their ilk anyway others may be interested:

ISI is responsible, says son; mourners heckle hardliner Geelani

Muzamil Jaleel & Mufti Islah

Srinagar, May 21: Senior Hurriyat leader Abdul Gani Lone, considered the most moderate voice in the separatist camp and who barely weeks ago had said that time had come for jihad to end in the Valley, was assassinated here on Tuesday by unidentified militants.

Lone was shot soon after attending a rally—attended by about 15,000 people—at Martyrs` graveyard in the Idgah locality of downtown Srinagar to mark the 12th death anniversary of Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq. Lone`s family blamed Pakistan, its ISI and hardline Hurriyat leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani for the killing.

As Lone`s body reached his Sant Nagar residence, hundreds of his supporters and relatives assembled there shouting slogans in favour of independence of Kashmir. Said Lone`s son Sajjad Lone: ``I want to tell the world who did it. It is ISI, Pakistan and Geelani. We will definitely ask them. They will have to pay for it,` he shouted as relatives tried to calm him down.

When Geelani showed up, he had to beat a hasty retreat after a group of Lone supporters, agitated and angry, abused at him. ``We want nothing. What do you have to do here?`` they shouted.

Lone`s driver Abdul Rasheed and one of the few eyewitnesses, described the scene: ``I was walking ahead of him. He was accompanied by his body guards (J-K policemen) when a man appeared and shot at him. He first threw something, perhaps a grenade, which did not explode and dropped in a drain.``

``Within seconds he opened fire at Lone sahib,`` he said. ``We tried to rush towards Lone sahib`s body but he fired at us too. I escaped bullets but another bodyguard was injured.``

Hurriyat chairman Abdul Gani Bhat and JKLF leader Javed Mir were just a few dozen metres behind Lone. ``We had left the rally together. As we were walking, somebody from the crowd shook my hand but while doing so he tripped, this incident made us stop for a few minutes by which time Lone had moved ahead,`` he said. ``Then there was firing and we could not understand what was going on.``

Said Javed Mir said: ``I heard a few gunshots and then people started running. There was utter confusion and somebody fell down. When we came closer, it was Lone sahib and his guards.``

Earlier, the rally had begun from the Razaykadal (downtown) headquarters of Mirwaiz`s Awami Action Committee after mid-day prayers. An estimated 15,000 people had assembled at the Idgah grounds to attend the rally. All through, people chanted slogans in favour of freedom and Pakistan. Incidentally, Jamat leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani was not present. Lone did not address the gathering.

Even as the Hurriyat leaders started addressing the rally, splinter groups from among the people tried to shout them down with slogans like Saudabazi nahin chalegi (No sell out will be allowed).

Clearly aimed at the moderate Hurriyat leadership, these groups--mostly young men--were showing their anger against recent overtures of Lone and Mirwaiz especially emanating for their Dubai conference with Pakistan`s Kashmir Committee chief Sardar Abdul Qayoom Khan and other Kashmiri leaders from Britain, USA and Canada.

The leaders there had sought an end to violence as a strategy and stressed on political and peaceful means to resolve the Kashmir conflict given the ``changing realities`` post-September 11.

In Pakistan, the United Jehad Council alleged that Indian agencies were behind Lone`s death. ``It is a big tragedy, we express our sorrow and grief,`` a UJC spokesman said in Muzaffarabad, capital of the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

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ISI ASSASINATED LONE- SAYS LONE`S SON

http://www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=10620

ISI behind my father’s killing, says Lone’s son

Press Trust of India

New Delhi, May 21: Sajjad Lone, son of the assassinated Hurriyat Conference leader Abdul Ghani Lone blamed Pakistan`s ISI for the killing of his father.

``ISI is behind the killing of my father,`` Sajjad said.

Meanwhile, Jammu Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party president Shabir Shah condemned the killing and said it was ``very unfortunate``.

Now the terrorists have struck again and this time assasinated Lone. Lone was a moderate in a party of extremists. He was also in favor of contesting the forthcomming elections in Jammu and Kashmir. The terrorists and their puppet masters sitting in Pakiland could not tolerate this. THE AIM OF TAP IS TO DISRUPT DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN KASHMIR SO THAT THEIR NEFARIOUS DESIGNS SUCCEED IN INDIA. Recently ISI also threw out some members of Hizbul who were in favour of elections. This shows just how mean can the TAP get. I have voiced before and I will voice again- there is NO FREEDOM MOVEMENT in Kashmir, just religion inspired Paki terrorism.

Ferozk
Very touching, but one wonders why the threat of nuclear war is felt by pious pacifists only AFTER a terrorist attack in India, not before. Concerned pacifist citizens who are not total HYPOCRITES should urge their military government and fellow-citizens not to perpetuate or preach violence inside a nuclear-armed country, if these pacifist citizens really want peace.

In fact, pious pacifists should note that India has a no-first-use policy, which is why Pakistan and Pakistanis dare to do so.

As far as Indians are concerned, we have been virtually at war for many years. The number of citizens and soldiers lost through terrorist attacks all over India over the last many years is higher than the Indian casualities in any single war(or perhaps all wars put together). In J&K itself, arms recovered are `enough for two mini-wars``.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/070402/dlnat66.asp

Sending people and arms into a nuclear-armed country to kill its citizens and soldiers and not to expect retaliation is unrealistic. To argue in calmer times that armed insurgency is a legitimate tool for one country to use against another nuclear-armed country and then to protest the dangers of nuclear war only when retaliation seems imminent is also irrational.

Pakistanis sincerely concerned about the horrors of nuclear war ought to be more proactive in pointing out to their government, the dangers of triggering nuclear war by armed jihad, no point in showing signs of life only 10 sec before oblivion.

Some articles on Lone from the Indian newspapers:

``J&K Shiv Sena chief attacks top Hurriyat leader Lone

AFP

Jammu, April 1

Showing little respect for law and order, Kashmir unit president of Shiv Sena Kalki Jimaharaj on Monday physically assaulted top Hurriyat leader Abdul Gani Lone in presence of armed policemen as he was talking to reporters in Jammu.

Jimaharaj declared: ``You are anti-Indian. Your people are responsible for killing Hindus in Jammu.``

The Hurriyat leaders was being interviewed in the lobby of a Jammu hotel when he was repeatedly slapped and pushed by Kashmir Shiv Sena chief Jimaharaj.

Lone responded to Jimaharaj`s attack by saying groups like the Shiv Sena were responsible for blocking peace moves in Kashmir.

Lone, an executive member of the All-Party Hurriyat Conference-- was in Jammu to highlight the plight of fellow Hurriyat leader Yasin Malik, who was arrested last week.

His visit coincided with a 48-hour general strike called to protest against an attack by Muslim terrorists on the Raghunath temple in Jammu that left at least 10 people dead.

The Hurriyat leader also reiterated his appeal for Malik`s release, saying the Hurriyat leader, who has a history of health problems, was in a serious condition in jail.

``The Prime Minister should intervene to have Yasin Malik released,`` he said.`` (http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/010402/dlnat63.asp)

``Hurriyat Conference leader Abdul Ghani Lone is shaken by the attempt on his life recently. Though the Indian government views him as the most moderate in the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference, Lone says he has reason to believe the attack was the handiwork of the state and central governments. In an interview with Onkar Singh in New Delhi, Lone said he would not participate in the forthcoming state assembly election. Excerpts:

You have alleged that an attempt was made on your life in Srinagar on November 1. Is that true?

Of course this is true. Shots were fired at my house in Srinagar on the night of November 1. The water tank of my house bears testimony to this attack. My security men returned the fire.

Where were you when the attack took place?

I was very much in the house. I was asleep.

Who do you think was behind these attacks?

I have been getting threats from across the border as well as from within the state. Al Barq, a militant group, has been threatening me. But I think this attack was engineered by the state and central governments.

Why should the Government of India or the Government of Jammu & Kashmir engineer an attack on you?

I am saying this on the basis of the statements made by two senior officials of the Jammu & Kashmir police. While Inspector General of Police Ashok Bhan said the attackers were after my gunmen, the deputy inspector general said the theory of the attack revolved around an accidental shot fired by a BSF man. I would like to point out that no BSF personnel is deputed within the vicinity of my house. That is why I say the attack seems to bear the signature of the state and central governments.

If the state government or the Centre wanted you killed, why would they give you security in the first place?

It might sound strange to you that after the attack the state government has removed my security. They also denied that any attack took place on my house.

Do you want security?

No.

If you do not want security, why did you agree to it?

When the state government sent security personnel some time back, I was in Delhi. My wife rang me up and told me about it. I told her not to send back the security, otherwise they would say I never wanted it. That is why I accepted the security cover. In 1996 also, a car bomb exploded outside my house. It was the handiwork of an officer posted in Srinagar.

Who is that officer?

I know his name, but I will not tell you.

Are you surprised by the stand taken by America on Kashmir?

No, in fact the stand taken by America is welcome. For the first time, America has said that the wishes and aspirations of the people of Kashmir should be kept in mind while resolving the dispute.

While leaders like Shabir Shah held talks with the government`s interlocutor K C Pant, the Hurriyat Conference did not respond to his invitation. Why?

Yes, Shabir Shah might have spoken to Pant, but now he is nowhere. He is regretting his decision. We had made it clear in the very beginning that the government should only talk to the Hurriyat Conference, but they started talking to everyone.

Are you planning to contest the assembly election?

The All-Parties Hurriyat Conference has decided not to participate in the election. We want the problem of Jammu & Kashmir to be resolved first. I am a part of the Hurriyat Conference. I will abide by the decision of the APHC.

When America can bomb Afghanistan to fight Osama bin Laden and his terrorist outfit Al Qaeda, why shouldn`t the Indian government try to contain terrorists in Kashmir?

India has been trying to contain terrorism for the last 54 years. India should now resolve this dispute by holding talks with Pakistan and the Hurriyat Conference.

Would you give the same advice to America -- to hold talks with Mullah Omar or Osama bin Laden?

Afghanistan and Kashmir are two different issues. Please do not equate the two.`` (http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/nov/13inter.htm)

This assasination is a major event. I am not sure how India will attempt to portray it. It will try to blame it on Pakistan again, is my guess. Not realizing that the APHC and Pakistan are strongly allied. To the point that the APHC members were refused passports by the Indian govt. to travel to Pakistan.

This even could result in even more unrest in Kashmir. APHC and Lone have been fighting for Kashmiri self-determination. They are always the first to condemn the terrorist attacks, while simultaneously highlighting the Indian human rights violations, as well.

India needs to realize that Kashmir is out of control. The Kashmiris will even hate India more now. India can continue stating that it is not at fault, but India at least needs to at least open up Kashmir and allow international mediation.

It should be obvious to the everyone that Pakistan and India cannot solve Kashmir between the two of them.

Leading Kashmiri separatist killed (Lone)



The APHC is perhaps the most balanced and sophisticated leadership in the Sub-Continent. I have always admired their fair and balanced statements, and consider them the true leadership of the Kashmiris. The following assasination is really going to upset things even more:

``A leading separatist has been shot dead in Indian-administered Kashmir, just as Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee landed in the disputed region.

Abdul Ghani Lone, a senior figure of Indian-administered Kashmir`s main separatist alliance, the All Party Hurriyat Conference, was shot while speaking at a rally in Srinagar, Indian Kashmir`s summer capital.``

I think it is about time that India opens up Kashmir, and allows an international inquiry into this event. Hopefully, it will not use this event to furthur its occupational stance. My own guess is that India will use this to try to wedge a separation in the independence movement, without allowing any kind of inquiry. The APHC leadership is considered the leadership of the Kashmiris by Pakistan also.

The events in Kashmir are completely out of control now. Its a mess, and India has been completely unable to create any stability there. It is about time that the international community is allowed to intervene, and help solve the problem. Even if Indians hate Pakistanis and Kashmiris, they need to at least agree to international intervention, before the whole Sub-Continent is blown up.

India could suggest a country of its own choice for intervention. The other option is to stick with this misguided game of chicken, until everyone is killed.

I think the assasination of the APHC leader is going to create massive chaos in an already chaotic area. I think the Indian population needs to convince their govt. to at least allow neutral parties to see what is going on in Kashmir. Open it up to the world, for heaven`s sake, if you are so sure that India is not the guilty party. And let the international organizations put the blame wherever it may fall.