Of Violent Birth and Peaceful Death

RE: Reply #: 106 Urstruly

``I think it is time that Pakistanis should thank Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan for what he has done for us. Personally, I would kiss the feet of the janitors who haul garbage out of Kahuta Research Labs. Hadn`t we had nuclear capability, the Hindu religious nuts would have eaten us alive.``

Looks like Pakistani leaders are experts at kissing feet and bending over, so I`m not surprised that you want to do the same. And with countries from Germany to New Zealand laying out the red carpet for Indian professionals and trade delegations visiting India almost daily, you think Indians have some sort of death wish to covet the medieval sewer that Pakistan has become?

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Road map is clear

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Najam Sethi`s





E d i t o r i a l











ndia’s prime minister says the “time for a final war” with Pakistan has come. But India’s defense minister claims India will not attack Pakistan until after the Kashmir elections in September. This can be construed as breathing space or deliberate deception. Meanwhile, India is marshalling its forces along our border. Worse, in an unprecedented exhortation full of religious symbolism, India’s leaders are urging their “Hindu” troops to “crush the Islamic menace”. India’s rhetoric is clearly in step with its physical capability on the ground; hence conditions are ripe for war by India. But will India actually launch war?

Pundits argue that war must have a compelling objective. In India’s case, it is to stop Pakistan from fueling the insurgency in Kashmir that is bleeding half a million Indian troops in the valley. But war is also not without heavy costs. In India’s case, these could range from a fatal loss of political face by the BJP government in the event of a military stalemate or setback in a limited war — which is most likely since Pakistan is capable of giving as good as it gets in a short, swift conventional war in a small theatre like Kashmir where the force-ratios favour it. Or, in the event of a wider conflict that leads to nuclear holocaust, the losses can be multiplied a hundred times over without any clear winner emerging. Thus India must think a hundred times before embarking on a war with Pakistan.

But pundits will also note that there is a better strategy than war in pursuit of given objectives. And that is to push the adversary into compliance by a credible threat of war without actually going to war. It’s like holding a person at gunpoint and asking him/her to hand over the wallet rather than shooting him/her for it and risking a murder charge. Is India trying to do that with Pakistan?

Certainly, India has managed to create the perception abroad that it means business like never before. That is why the international community is asking Pakistan to dismantle the Kashmiri training camps and stop infiltrating men and materials across the LoC before India’s patience runs out. Our generals have also noted that India’s political intentions and military capabilities have never synchronized so menacingly before. Thus, in Pakistan’s reckoning, the chances of India launching a limited or unlimited war are about fifty-fifty. What should Islamabad do?

One option is to prepare for war, tell India to go fly a kite and face the political and military consequences that flow from war. That would be stupid. No government or nation can afford to miscalculate the consequences of war, let alone ignore them. In our case, these could range from the worst-case nuclear holocaust scenario to the best-case military stalemate scenario. But the latter case would probably exact the same political cost from General Musharraf as the military stalemate (even victory) in Kargil did of Nawaz Sharif in 1999. Why is that?

There is one basic reason for this. The international community, especially the United States, is now sympathetic to India’s view that our Kashmiri “freedom-fighters” are their common “jihadi terrorists” in the same manner as the Al-Qaeda terrorists who are motivated by religious rage. Indeed, where our hawks are inclined to separate our “freedom fighters” from our sectarian extremists and Al-Qaeda terrorists, the world is convinced that they are of the same ilk with a shared hatred for the United States, Israel, India and the West. Thus India’s demand that General Musharraf crack down on “cross-border terrorists” finds a strong echo in Washington and elsewhere where this is seen as part and parcel of the crackdown promised by General Musharraf on all forms of terrorism last January. Therefore in the event of a conflict with India, however limited, there will be at least one casualty at the very top in Islamabad.

Another option is to call India’s bluff and do nothing. This is problematic too because India’s BJP is continuing to beef up its arsenal and shrilling its rhetoric, thereby painting itself into a corner from where it can only extract itself by lashing out at Pakistan.

At the heart of the matter is the Kashmir conflict. What lessons, should we have learnt from our experience so far?

First, that infiltrating men and materials into the valley will not yield the forbidden fruit. It didn’t in 1947-48; it didn’t in 1965; and it hasn’t since 1990. And second, that “Islamising” a liberation struggle as in Kashmir since 1990 or supporting an “Islamic” cause as in the Taliban’s Afghanistan from 1994-2001 does great harm to us since it alienates and angers the world against Pakistan and also sows the seeds of instability, violence and division within our own homeland.

Under the circumstances, General Pervez Musharraf’s road map is laid out for him just as clearly as it was last September vis a vis the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. He should implement his January promise to root out all imported, homegrown or exported forms of extremism, violence and terrorism. If he does that, he will be seen as having served the cause of Pakistan rather than succumbing to the demands of India or the United States

Rein In Pakistan or Lose India

Los Angeles Times

By RAY TAKEYH and NIKOLAS K. GVOSDEV

U.S. must focus on a resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

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Zafar Al-Talib/ Sattar II/ ``P.M.``

Comforting to know you folks are in the world raising families, etc., interacting in such a great way. Maybe the Sufis are coming back

through `old souls`. Of what I know of physics, I`ve a suspicion that it`s the meditations of a few keeping this crazy old world from flying apart...

#110 Harpreet

Very eloquent! Don`t expect Syed Ahmed to counter any of the points you raised. He`s afraid to examine his cherished beliefs.

That said, your post presents a very sunny side of indian politics. That`s nothing new. It`s what the optimists always said. When Indira was defeated they said the enlightened masses despised the dictator and when she came back less than 2 years later, it was because they were tired of a ragtag assemblage of 20-odd coalition partners. The sikhs were butchered by the congresswallahs and the muslims by the sanghis but indians are secular, and on and on. There`s an explanation for everything just like they try to explain the daily vagaries of the stock market but just the same, the explanations don`t add up.

Let`s accept your thesis that the indian voters rejected BJP`s call to war. What then of the almost uncontested view that BJP stood to gain in gujarat after the pogrom? Is gujarat, which is one of the most prosperous indian states, simply less enlightened than other parts of india?

There`s an american aphorism that all politics is local. BJP campaigned for war (& lost) because it could not deliver the goods in terms of improved living conditions, less corruption, etc. They were rejected because the diversion ploy didn`t work.

NOw the real reason for wanting kashmir comes out. Us pakistanis real pieces of sh *te. It is for kashmiris, or islam we want kashmir. The NATION came out with the truth, and SENT A SPINE CHILLING THREAT.

Here it is

It is precisely for the waters flowing from Kashmir into Pakistan that the state has been regarded as its jugular vein. Any attempt at playing with it would obviously lead to a veritable conflagration. Mr Chakroborty should not lose sight of the fact that much before his dream of seeing `drought in Pakistan` and its people `begging for a drop of water` could come true there would be a catastrophic upheaval in the Subcontinent.

AND WE WANT THE WORLD TO BELIEVE US. WE olnly give threats and more threats. We are a bunch of incompetent fools.

Terror trail leads from Kabul to Kashmir

By Navnita Chadha Behera

With India and Pakistan poised on the dangerous precipice of a fourth war, global attention is shifting from Kabul to Kashmir. The first targets of the United State-led war on terrorism in Southern Asia were al-Qaeda and its host, the Taliban regime in Kabul. Operation Enduring Freedom sought to achieve three objectives: the overthrow of the Taliban regime; the capture or elimination of the Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership; and the dismantling of terrorist bases and networks in the region.

Kashmir was not in the picture. Although there was an appreciation of India`s problem of cross-border terrorism in Kashmir, it was perceived to be an ``Indian problem``, at best a secondary issue. The US ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, did assure that terrorism against India would be addressed in the second phase of war against terrorism.

However, when India, in the aftermath of the suicide attack on its parliament on December 13, raised the military ante and threatened Pakistan with war unless it stopped cross-border terrorism, the George W Bush administration was forced to take notice. Washington banned the Lashkar-e-Toiba (Soldiers of God) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of Mohammed), the two groups blamed for the parliament attack, and also put enormous pressure on the regime of President General Pervez Musharraf to crack down on terrorist groups operating from Pakistan.

The primary objective was to avert a fourth war between India and Pakistan which, many in the Bush team believed, held the danger of nuclear cataclysm. Equally important, the US was keen to de-escalate the crisis on the Kashmir front because it posed an immediate threat to its critical interests in Afghanistan. First, Washington did not want Pakistan to divert its forces deployed on its Afghan border for mopping up operations against the fleeing Taliban or al-Qaeda leaders into Pakistan. Second, a war between India and Pakistan could directly threaten the lives of thousands of US soldiers on the Pakistani borders. Third, it would have put the international coalition against terrorism in jeopardy, in which both India and Pakistan are the US`s partners.

However, once the war clouds dissipated, the US returned its full attention to its primary goal of pursuing al-Qaeda`s remnants. The task of pursuing the Pakistan-based jihadi groups had, once again, become a secondary consideration entrusted primarily to the routine counter-terrorism groups in Islamabad and New Delhi. The bottom line had not changed. Kashmir was still viewed from the lens of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and hence appeared to be on the periphery.

What the Bush team appears not to have understood is that Kashmir and Kabul are closely knitted together, partly through the tangled web of terrorist networks in the region and partly due to Pakistan`s - its frontline ally - vital national interests at stake in Kashmir, which it seeks to protect precisely through the instrument of jihadi groups.

Washington`s al-Qaeda-first policy overlooks the ground reality that al-Qaeda thrives on a vast, deeply entrenched and integrated jihadi infrastructure that straddles the Afghanistan and Pakistan borders. This network includes more than 50 Pakistan-based radical groups who share deep bonds of an Islamic ideology, common political targets - the United States, India and Israel - training facilities and resources. These groups, unlike states, operate from a radically different frame of reference and are not predisposed to making rational calculations of the kind the West understands. They are unlikely to emulate the Musharraf regime and abandon al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

It was in the aftermath of Operation Anaconda in March that the realization first dawned on the US forces that al-Qaeda, in that instance led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, a mujahideen commander who had joined the Taliban, was able to mount military attacks and then melt away in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. With a growing perception that there were significant pockets of al-Qaeda and Taliban elements on the Pakistani side of the border, especially in Waziristan, Washington started putting pressure for joint military operations. The Musharraf regime was very reluctant to undertake any military operations on the grounds that the population of those areas was hostile to Americans and very well armed. Some openly acknowledged that Pakistan`s administrative writ does not run there. Pakistan subsequently yielded and Operation Mountain Lion was jointly carried out with over 1,000 US and British troops on the Afghan side of the border, and nearly 8,000 Pakistani troops were deployed in the Waziristan area. But there is little information in the public domain to indicate that this operation was successful.

More important, this line of thinking rests on a key albeit flawed assumption that Musharraf is committed, sincere and willing to crack down on the terrorists on his home front, but only needs more time to do so. Musharraf`s regime, it is argued, has alienated many jihadi groups by severing its ties with al-Qaeda and the Taliban; helping the US forces destroy their bases in Afghanistan; and expelling, arresting and handing over the Arab jihadis within Pakistan to US, and thus fears a backlash from them. This is true, but not the whole truth.

The other half of the story lies in understanding why Musharraf has held back from launching a concerted drive against the domestic jihadi network, which has been the chosen instrument of the Pakistan army`s in securing its critical foreign-policy goals of liberating Kashmir. This is where the crunch lies. The centerpiece of Pakistan`s Kashmir strategy has been to engage India militarily through a low-cost and increasingly privatized proxy war by arming and training militant groups in Kashmir. Before September 11, Musharraf insisted on distinguishing jihad from terrorism, and justified jihad as a legitimate instrument of the ``freedom struggle`` of the Kashmiris. Even after joining the international coalition against terrorism, Musharraf`s public justification of helping the US military campaign against a neighboring Muslim country, Afghanistan, rested mainly on protecting its stakes in Kashmir.

During the first Afghan war in 1980s, the US had turned a blind eye to Pakistan`s nuclear program. If Pakistan`s unstated assumption based on this experience was that the reward at the end of the Afghanistan campaign would be a license to light the fires again in Kashmir, it was quickly buried after the December attack on the Indian parliament. The fundamental logic of the war on terrorism dismisses the fine distinction being drawn between jihad and terrorism. Musharraf grudgingly acknowledged it in his January 12 speech to the nation and conceded that Pakistan would not allow jihad in the name of Kashmir.

However, there is mounting evidence in the past eight months that it was a ``tactical retreat`` and not the harbinger of a paradigm shift. Consider the facts. Approximately 1,800 out of 2,000 persons arrested as part of the crackdown in October have been released. Hafiz Mohammed Sayeed, the leader of the Lashkar-e-Toiba, was released on the orders of the High Court, though he was again arrested last week. Maulana Masood Azhar, the leader of the Jaish-e-Mohammed (a group Bush listed only next to al-Qaeda in his State of the Union address and is suspected of involvement in the murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl) is under house arrest and is receiving a government allowance. According to Fortune magazine, the Pakistan government`s decision to freeze the bank accounts of these groups yielded paltry sums, including US$323.65 from the Taliban consulate in Quetta and $1.50 hauled off from an account of the Jaish-e-Mohammed. They continue to operate under different names and have shifted some of their bases to Azad Kashmir. As the snows melt, the infiltration patterns and terrorist-related deaths in the Kashmir Valley have shown a rising curve.

Washington is learning that since Kashmir, as Musharraf insists, ``runs in our blood`` and jihadi groups are the Pakistani army`s only leverage against India, it is unlikely to backtrack on Kashmir. The Pakistani leadership`s attempts to create a firewall between Kabul and Kashmir are bound to fail, partly because the jihadi groups do not respect such boundaries, and unless Pakistan changes course it will also inevitably clash with the Bush administration`s immediate goal of dismantling the terror bases and networks in the region.

Dr Navnita Chadha Behera is a visiting fellow at the the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.

http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DE25Df03.html

#116 tahmed321

``Only thing different this time is: the people whose lives are at

stake are not just the ones in uniform (Indian or Pakistani, it does

not matter), but the decision makers as well who are no longer

safe in their comfortable offices in Delhi and Islamabad. While I

have no doubt that the men in uniform from both sides will do their

duty and fight with courage, and while I have no doubt that the

``chowk warriors`` will keep up their stream of ridicule and calls for

war, I also believe the decision makers wont have the guts to go to

war either. Since the fallen heroes may well be themselves, rather

than some poor man`s son. So sit back, relax, and enjoy the

charade. (and pray like hell that no one makes a mistake in the

process and triggers a nuclear exchange).``

Hear, hear!

The poor jawans who joined army as it offered them a livelihood will of course die in greatest numbers in a war. Think back to kargil when our brave warriors were sent to fight like sheep to a slaughter, with little preparation and poor strategy. They had measly rations, ill-suited clothing to fight a war in high altitudes and the cold, and the dead ones have long been forgotten. Turns out money was made even off the coffins bought to bury them. And yet many a widow (or parents) of a dead soldier has been stiffed off a pension or monetary awards announced, etc. It is obscene that elderly politicians (& politician generals) so readily sacrifice young people at the alter of their political ambitions.

I wonder how many of these mostly young and better-off cyber warriors spend half as much effort pressuring the politicians to take care of the soldiers as they do cheerleading them to their certain death.

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re: spout

...you`re barking at the wrong tree...i didn`t write that article, the washington post did...take the accela to dc and bark at them...

{it`s naive of you to say that Indians have done nothing wrong in Kashmir.}

...care to show me where i said that?...

Harpreet # 112

``And when they talk about sacrifices how about this: Vajpayee, Advani and Fernandes should each dress their youngest sons in uniform and put them on the front line of the first regiments out of the trenches and facing the first round of Pakistani bullets. That should concentrate their minds somewhat.``

Please correct me if I am wrong,but methinks both

Vajpayee and Fernandes never married,and if

married,never had a son,unless you are talking about the ones born out of wedlock:))

Harpeet,

Being that M`ashallahistan will contain people of all religious and non religious beliefs, what makes you think that you`ll have to go to Punjabistan for beer? I believe Shankar`s house will have plenty...

Kutchi Punjabi or not, Zafar is a pukka UPite. He`s ours and we will have him, even if it means a Micheal Jackson dance throw down to settle this, and I guarantee you, we will win.

anNy

Oops! Did I forget? Pringles with every meal!

http://www.globeandmail.com/servlet/GIS.Servlets.HTMLTemplate?tf=tgam/search/tgam/SearchFullStory.html&cf=tgam/search/tgam/SearchFullStory.cfg&configFileLoc=tgam/config&encoded_keywords=pakistan&option=&start_row=4¤t_row=4&start_row_offset1=&num_rows=1&search_results_start=1

Pakistan must act, Manley says

Real effort urged on curbing incursions as foes exchange threats over Kashmir

By JEFF SALLOT

With reports from Reuters and AP





Friday, May 24, 2002 – Print Edition, Page A15

OTTAWA -- Canada says Pakistan, one of its coalition partners in the war on terrorism, must do more to stop its own extremist groups from infiltrating into a disputed border region with India.

The military standoff in the Kashmir district between India and Pakistan, nuclear-armed rivals, is very serious, Deputy Prime Minister John Manley said yesterday, suggesting that Pakistan can do more to ease the tensions.

``The situation is becoming more grave. I think the recent incidents in the Kashmir district, which the Indians are very strongly arguing resulted from further incursions by Pakistan, really increases the heat,`` Mr. Manley said.

``We would urge both to try to cool tensions at the border. The Pakistanis must take serious efforts to prevent incursions from their territory into the district that is in dispute. Unless there is a reduction in tension the situation could become even more dangerous,`` Mr. Manley told reporters.

Canada has been trying to develop closer trade ties with India, but is also allied with Pakistan in the U.S.-led coalition trying to rout al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in Afghanistan.

Shahid Malik, the Pakistani high commissioner in Ottawa, said his country keeps getting told by others to crack down on militants in Pakistan while failing to note that his government is trying to do exactly that.

General Pervez Musharraf, the President of Pakistan, has condemned terrorism and has said militant Kashmiri separatists will not be allowed to launch raids from Pakistani territory, Mr. Malik said in an interview.

Moreover, Pakistan has offered to allow international monitors to patrol the military line of control that divides Kashmir to ensure that terrorists don`t infiltrate from the Pakistani side, Mr. Malik added.

Both sides exchanged border fire yesterday, leaving at least six people dead. They exchanged threats of war, too, with New Delhi saying it ``accepted the challenge thrown by our neighbour`` and Islamabad warning of retaliation that ``would not be good for India.`` But both sides also said they favour peace.

Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee yesterday ruled out direct talks with Pakistan, saying he is disappointed with Pakistan`s failure to curb Muslim militants.

``Promises were made but they were not implemented. Words must be matched by deeds. That has not happened,`` the Indian leader said after meeting security officials in Kashmir.

Asked by reporters if India and Pakistan are close to nuclear war, Mr. Vajpayee did not respond directly. But he said the border situation is ``serious.``

On Wednesday, Mr. Vajpayee delivered a bellicose speech to front-line Indian troops in Jammu, telling them to ``be prepared for sacrifices.`` Yesterday, he was less strident and more cryptic. Asked if war clouds are gathering, he said ``the sky is clear. But sometimes lightning can strike even when the sky is clear. I hope there will be no lightning.``

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan offered to mediate the crisis, urging the countries to use the ``logic and language of peace`` rather than war. Pakistan accepted his offer. However, Mr. Annan will not go to the region unless asked by both sides, UN spokesman Fred Eckhard said.

Meanwhile, Pakistan has cancelled leaves for government officials and ordered civil defence volunteers to attend first-aid and firefighting courses.

Western analysts believe that, since December, India has deployed about 750,000 troops along the border in a standoff with about 250,000 Pakistani troops.





Rethinking Kashmir

The Globe and Mail





Wednesday, May 22, 2002 – Print Edition, Page A16

When Pakistan`s ambassador to Britain warns that war between his country and India over Kashmir is ``very close,`` as Abdul Kader Jaffer did yesterday, it might sound like business as usual. Disputed Kashmir has been the flashpoint for two of the three Indo-Pakistani wars since both countries secured independence in 1947, and tension along the ceasefire line that divides the Himalayan province has been bubbling for months.

That said, events of the past week have been sufficiently ominous that ignoring Kashmir`s troubles is becoming increasingly difficult. What to do? For the moment, the only useful response is to urge both sides, nuclear-armed as they are, to display some badly needed restraint.

Long term, the world needs to recognize that the upheaval will likely continue indefinitely until India tests in a plebiscite the views of the mostly Muslim nine million people who live in the Indian-controlled sector of Kashmir. Such a vote, simply asking Kashmiris whether they wish to remain part of India, was first recommended by the departing British in 1947 but for an array of reasons has never been held. Nor, given the current volatility, is it likely to be held soon.

The assassination yesterday of leading Kashmiri separatist Abdul Ghani Lone, a moderate pragmatist who urged dialogue with India and opposed violence, was just the latest in a string of destabilizing actions. Animosity between India and Pakistan has soared since last week, when 34 people, mostly soldiers` wives and children, were killed, allegedly by Muslim guerrillas, in an attack on an Indian army camp. Close to a million troops are now amassed on the two sides of the ceasefire line, where heavy shelling continued yesterday for the fifth straight day, sending thousands of villagers fleeing.

The United States, Britain and the European Union have all urged the two sides to talk to each other, but India is having none of it unless Pakistan intervenes forcefully to prevent cross-border rebel attacks in Kashmir. Pakistan, for its part, insists that while it shares the militants` goal of separating the only Muslim-majority state from mostly Hindu India, it neither controls nor assists them.

Caught squarely in the middle is the United States, an ally of both countries under the redrawn, post-Sept.-11 geopolitical map. Wary of the ease with which such a brushfire could spread, Washington is doubtless doing what it can to damp the flames.

But in the absence of a political solution, further turbulence for Kashmir is inevitable. Eventually the people need to be asked to choose between being part of India and being part of Pakistan. A plebiscite is always a messy business and in this case might prove particularly so, given that the so-called third option for Kashmir -- outright independence -- is rejected by both countries. But the other point on which the two sides might agree is that a half-century of this bloody, profitless conflict is more than enough.