The Perfect Murder

Beat! Beat! Drums!

Beat! beat! drums! -- blow! bugles! blow!

Through the windows -- through doors -- burst like a ruthless force,

Into the solemn church, and scatter the congregation,

Into the school where the scholar is studying;

Leave not the bridegroom quiet -- no happiness must he have now with his bride,

Nor the peaceful farmer any peace, ploughing his field or gathering his grain,

So fierce you whirr and pound you drums -- so shrill you bugles blow.

Beat! beat! drums! -- blow! bugles! blow!

Over the traffic of cities -- over the rumble of wheels in the streets;

Are beds prepared for sleepers at night in the houses?

no sleepers must sleep in those beds,

No bargainers bargains by day -- no brokers or speculators - would they continue?

Would the talkers be talking? would the singer attempt to sing?

Would the lawyer rise in the court to state his case before the judge?

Then rattle quicker, heavier drums -- you bugles wilder blow.

Beat! beat! drums! -- blow! bugles! blow!

Make no parley -- stop for no expostulation,

Mind not the timid -- mind not the weeper or prayer,

Mind not the old man beseeching the young man,

Let not the child`s voice be heard, nor the mother`s entreaties,

Make even the trestles to shake the dead where they lie awaiting the hearses,

So strong you thump O terrible drums -- so loud you bugles blow.

-- Walt Whitman

Bro Urstruly,

Well said. I was really impressed by General Sayyid Pervez Musharraf`s speech yesterday. The reason the chooray are so upset by it is because he drew attention to the atrocities which these but-parast are commiting in Kashmir and other parts of India each day. And, as they say, the truth hurts.

Farzana ji: good analysis; to me it was obvious that it is the indian government which has made Lone sahib a shaheed; a question: if, as the leader of the idol-worshippers (al khunthaa vajpayee) keeps on repeating, most kashmiris want to be with india why are there 750, 000 soldiers in kashmir?! after all, even if there were 10, 000 mujahideen in kashmir surely the brave hindu army would not need that many people to deal with them! Why not admit it and say that you are there to oppress the kashmiri people but you will never be able to do it.

Islam zindah hota hai har Karbala kay baad.

* * * * * *

i really hope tho that the idol worshippers are not stupid enough to launch an attack on pakistan because IF this goes nuclear too many innocent people will die and it will be horrific. so i am praying that they see sense and realise that muslims cannot be cowered or brow-beaten into submission and that the sooner they realise that the only solution to kashmir is to let the kashmiris have a fair referundum the better for them.

Tahmed321 and India promoting democracy in Pakistan:

Why should India be promoting democracy in Pakistan?

Does India owes Pakistan`s baap anything that makes it obligated to do that?

Is that the duty of every country to promote democracy in their neighbouring countries?

Does the UN charter say so?

Since you dont have anything to say about what Pakistan SHOULD be doing, here is what Pakistan IS doing:

1. Disputing an integral part of India J&K

2. Arming, training and recruiting terrorists in Pakistan, which includes some Kashmiris but also lots of Pakistanis and others from assorted Muslim countries, and sending them across to Indian Kashmir.

3. Those terrorists supported and sent by Pakistan kill Kashmiri and other Indian civilians and military personnel.

4. Those Pakistani sponsored terrorist attack the Indian parliament and try to eliminate India`s leadership.

5. Those Paki-spon. terrorists kill Abdul Ghani Lone because he doesnot toe the Paki line completely in Kashmir. This is all in the grand Pakistani tradition, which in its earlier manifestations saw the sidelining of JKLF,once the mainstay of Kashmiri insurgency.

6. Pakistan harbors known Indian criminals including Dawood Ibrahim responsible for the killing of hundreds of Indians.

7. Pakistan itself is invloved through its army in planning the terrorist Bombay blasts of `93 (Ask for Pakistani references if you need any).

[And this is ofcourse a random, incomplete list]

So the Indian response of all this should be to promote democracy in Pakistan? So that Pakistan can keep on sending killers in India while India tries to promote democracy in Pakistan? Its unreasonable for India to threaten retaliation if Pakistan doesnot stop these killing activities? And its reasonable for Pakistani generals and ministers to keep threatening nuking India all the while?

How disingenuous can you get? Or better still, do you think the Indians on this site are fools?

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Sadhana

It were not the posts. All your posts in this board show another aspect of reality, that Ms FV did not mention knowingly or unknowingly. I just referred to your usage of the word ``sacrifice`` . If it comes to that, little sacrifices would be made by everybody; but all this need not be announced on a public forum. Just my subjective thoughts ;)

Harpreet: ``My idea, vacate a space in the Thar desert and let them fight it out between themselves. Including throwing in Veggiepie and Musharaff Advani and Hamid Gul.``

This is near brilliant. It is similar to my idea. Give every one on chowk a rifle and form ``india and pakistan`` teams. Then allow them to kill eachother, while it is filmed in black and white with beethoven`s 9th playing in the background. That would be so hype.

Unfortunately this will never happen cuz these clowns can only play with the lives of others.

Temporal:

``infant’s smile

jhonnpRRi, chaal

house, cottage, farm

town, city

wrinkles

worrying, smiling, sad

humanity.``

Jezus, just say it. I still dont get it and i doubt farzana does either. Here ill make one on the spot so that i can write ``poet`` next to `blunt head` on my resume...

mother`s cry

river, ocean

cloudy, reign

furry, rabbit

third, nipple

nibbled by rabbit.

(if u are too slow to get it, i was talking about tonights Leaf game).

Triangle of Tension: India, Pakistan and the United States

28 May 2002

Summary

Historical distrust and tensions between India and Pakistan have reached practically unsustainable levels. New Delhi cannot tolerate paramilitary attacks such as the one against its parliament in December, but the regime of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf simply may not be able to rein in the militants. Any concession on Islamabad`s part could set off a destabilizing political backlash, but this reality also moves the countries closer to a war footing. The United States, meanwhile, has willingly used the threat of war to pressure Islamabad for cooperation in its battle against al Qaeda. Washington realizes that actual war between India and Pakistan would harm its own interests, but for New Delhi there has never been a better time to act.

Analysis

Tension between India and Pakistan has been a feature of the international system since Britain withdrew from the subcontinent and its imperium was partitioned between predominantly Muslim Pakistan and predominantly Hindu India. The rhetoric has concerned Kashmir, but the reality is that each nation deeply distrusts the intentions of the other. As with other conflicts, the litanies of injustice on both sides are real but ultimately irrelevant. India and Pakistan are two nations that regard the very existence of the other as a threat to their fundamental interests.

From India`s viewpoint, Pakistan represents the only serious national security challenge. However bad Sino-Indian relations might become, China`s ability to sustain an invasion deep into India, with a supply line running over the Himalayas, is negligible. To the east, India is buffered by deep jungles and weak nations. To the south lies the Indian Ocean, which is militarily dominated by the United States, a country whose interests frequently have diverged from India`s but which never has threatened India`s existence. In other words, India is effectively an island except on its western frontier. There lies Pakistan: insecure, fragmented and therefore unpredictable.

If Pakistan were to cease to exist, India`s strategic situation would shift to invulnerability on land, thus opening up strategic opportunities at sea.

On a deeper level, the Pakistani-Indian frontier represents the borderland between the Islamic and Hindu worlds. Whatever the current condition of India, the broad historical threat is that the Islamic world one day might unite. In that case, the manageable threat posed by Pakistan would become a potentially unmanageable situation, in which the weight of re-emergent Islamic power would thrust up against an India that might not be able to resist. These are hypothetical fears, far in the future, but they are not trivial.

Islamabad is acutely aware of India`s hopes and fears. Given India`s enormously greater size and military potential, logic would dictate that it would be in Pakistan`s strategic interest to reach a stable accommodation with its neighbor, but two problems prevent this.

First, Islamabad perceives -- not irrationally -- that India`s ultimate goal is the dismemberment of Pakistan. Rather than stabilizing the situation, any concession to India would simply increase the disadvantage at which Pakistan is already operating.

Second, Pakistan as a nation is fragile. It is divided by ethnic group as well as by worldviews. The essentially secular Pakistan of the founders and their heirs collides with the profoundly religious Pakistan that has re-emerged. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for a Pakistani government to make substantial concessions to India. Any concession -- in Kashmir, for example -- would come at the expense of an ethnic group and a religious perspective that has the potential to destabilize the entire regime if displeased, thereby increasing the danger to national survival.

Under these conditions, it has been Pakistan`s historical imperative to avoid engaging India in any negotiations that might lead to a comprehensive settlement. This is because of both reasonable fears of India`s long-term intentions and even more reasonable fears of the domestic response to any concession. For instance, if Pakistan were to accept the current Line of Control in Kashmir, the consequences would be destabilizing.

Pakistan has therefore adopted a three-part strategy that is essentially military in nature.

First, it has created a military force designed to impose heavy costs on any Indian offensive. While this has strained Pakistan`s economy in comparison with India`s, the country has had, as force multipliers, the advantages both of terrain and of being on the defensive.

Second, it has developed nuclear weapons -- not only to counter India`s nuclear force but also to deter India from threatening its existence. In the central region of the front, where terrain is less defensible, Islamabad is aware that India potentially could launch an attack that would split the country in half. Pakistan`s nuclear force, like that of Israel, is designed to prevent conventional defeat by making the risk of success too high for its foe.

Third and most risky, Islamabad has adopted a strategy of permitting paramilitary operations by various groups against Indian installations, such as that against its parliament in December. It might be overstating it to say this is part of a strategy. Rather, these well may be groups whose operations the government can`t control or, alternatively, whose operations it chooses not to control for domestic reasons. Clamping down on these groups might pose political challenges at home.

The paradox is that the domestic benefits of permitting these operations inevitably increase the risk of Indian military action. It has been Pakistan`s strategy to present a substantial defense along the frontier while using the nuclear threat as the final deterrent. If India were to penetrate the frontier to any depth, it is not clear whether Pakistani forces would fall back, regroup and allow guerrillas to operate to the rear of the Indian forces or whether they would rapidly grow nuclear. This is precisely the indeterminacy Islamabad wants to create.

The situation was fairly stable, if noisy, until the United States entered the picture after Sept. 11. For Washington, the essential strategic problem in the region has been Pakistan, not Afghanistan. After the defeat of the Taliban regime, al Qaeda redeployed into Pakistan, joining forces that were already there. In the same way that Islamabad found it less risky to permit paramilitary operations against India than to prevent them, it found it less risky to permit al Qaeda forces sanctuary than to close them down -- not to mention permitting U.S. forces to take on al Qaeda in Pakistani territory.

Following the attack on India`s Parliament, New Delhi created the first post-Sept. 11 crisis. The United States used that crisis to back the government of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf into a corner: While publicly seeking to defuse the crisis, Washington used the Indian threat to change the equation for Pakistan. Officials made it clear that, in fact, permitting al Qaeda to operate in Pakistan is a greater threat to regime survival than permitting U.S. forces to operate against al Qaeda. If India attacked Pakistan and the United States remained neutral or actively participated, the consequences for Pakistan would be catastrophic.

Musharraf publicly conceded, and U.S. forces entered Pakistan. Obviously, with India and the United States involved, Musharraf had to re-evaluate the value of his nuclear capability. The United States clearly had the ability to destroy Pakistan`s nuclear facilities more effectively than India might. When Washington announced a shift in its nuclear policy to permit first strikes, Pakistan was the unmentioned audience. Musharraf clearly heard and understood. Unconfirmed rumors have persisted in the region for several months that Pakistan`s nuclear arsenals already are in U.S. hands or that U.S. observers are at least positioned at various facilities. The Times of India recently published an article to this effect, without providing evidence.

Musharraf, however, has limited control, whatever his desires might be. Operations against al Qaeda in Pakistan clearly have been less than successful because of limits on Pakistani cooperation. Musharraf`s ability to control anti-Indian groups is similarly limited. Thus, the recent attack on an Indian facility by Pakistan-based paramilitaries has reignited the crisis with India -- at the same time that the United States is revisiting the issue of Pakistan`s support for U.S. operations against al Qaeda.

Washington has been moving steadily closer to India, particularly in the area of military cooperation. This is partly out of recognition that the two countries have similar interests in combating Islamic groups in Pakistan. It also is because the United States wants to replicate its maneuvers of earlier this year, using India as the lever to compel cooperation from Pakistan.

Washington expects it can manage the India-Pakistan confrontation effectively, but there are two reasons this might not be the case this time. First, Musharraf simply may have reached the limits of his power. He just may not be able to provide the United States and India with the degree of control over Islamic factions that they seek.

Indeed, Musharraf has known his limits all along and has been playing for time, hoping the crisis can be defused. The Islamic groups do not want to see the crisis defused, since their goal is to create a cauldron that draws in U.S. forces on the ground, sucking them into a war of attrition that will, in the long run, enhance their own position. Since Musharraf cannot deliver what is demanded, he is being forced to consider alternative solutions to the crisis. The solution is to increase the fearsomeness of his military -- in short, brush aside U.S. threats and brandish Pakistan`s nuclear capability.

The second problem is India. New Delhi understands that there will never be a better time to deal with Pakistan. Paramilitary attacks are genuinely intolerable to India. They also provide an excuse for war to which the United States cannot ultimately object, given its views on al Qaeda and its support for Israel. Washington is neither politically nor militarily in a position to block New Delhi. Therefore, if India ever intends to deal with Pakistan, now is the time to act.

There are two problems with action. First, from the Indian standpoint, the Pakistani nuclear threat must be treated as real and likely to be used in the event of war. This leaves New Delhi with two options. One is a non-regime threatening strategy of special operations against Islamic groups in Pakistan, but this would not solve the core problem. The second option is a broader attack into Pakistan, designed to shatter the country. That attack could be carried out only with a pre-emptive strike against Pakistani nuclear facilities. The issue is the degree of confidence India has in its own surgical nuclear capabilities -- or the United States` willingness to take out Pakistani weapons in order to prevent nuclear escalation.

This brings us to the second problem. The dismemberment of Pakistan would compound rather than solve the United States` problem. The chaos that would follow would create precisely the conditions al Qaeda needs for its own security. Entire areas of the country, in the least hospitable terrain, would become more secure for al Qaeda than before. Therefore, from the U.S. standpoint, using the threat of an Indian attack is ideal; a successful Indian attack would be harmful.

India`s calculus is not the same, however. If it is accepted that Pakistan represents a permanent strategic threat to India, the question of war is not whether but when. Given the current political situation and correlation of forces, if this isn`t the perfect time, what is?

If war is inevitable, it is difficult to see how India can act without taking out Pakistan`s nuclear capability. It is unclear how India could take those out without nuclear weapons, or without U.S. precision-guided munitions, Special Operations and other covert forces. But at the end of the day, the United States does not want Pakistan in chaos, it does not want an Indian nuclear strike and it certainly doesn`t want Pakistan -- facing a use-it-or-lose-it scenario -- to launch its own nuclear strike.

The United States probably could paralyze Pakistan`s nuclear force. That, however, would open the door to Indian attack, since the United States could not prevent paramilitary operations and cannot permit India to achieve its historical goal -- at least not until al Qaeda has been dealt with. On the other hand, India cannot afford to miss this historic opportunity.

We are therefore in an extraordinarily difficult crisis. The three players each have strategic interests that simply don`t mesh. If Washington convinces New Delhi to wait, it will have to convince Islamabad to stay in India`s crosshairs and India to put up with intolerable attacks. If India proceeds, it essentially would save al Qaeda by shattering Pakistan. In the event of complete mismanagement, a nuclear exchange costing millions of lives is a genuine possibility.

India has given Pakistan a small window of opportunity to solve the problem it cannot solve. It gives the United States a period of time to defuse a situation that, in STRATFOR`s view, could suddenly and catastrophically get out of hand.



STRATFOR.com

http://www.stratfor.com

tahmed and others. Here is the stark reality.

from stratfor.com

it has been Pakistan`s historical imperative to avoid engaging India in any negotiations that might lead to a comprehensive settlement. This is because of both reasonable fears of India`s long-term intentions and even more reasonable fears of the domestic response to any concession. For instance, if Pakistan were to accept the current Line of Control in Kashmir, the consequences would be destabilizing.

Pakistan has therefore adopted a three-part strategy that is essentially military in nature.

First, it has created a military force designed to impose heavy costs on any Indian offensive. While this has strained Pakistan`s economy in comparison with India`s, the country has had, as force multipliers, the advantages both of terrain and of being on the defensive.

Second, it has developed nuclear weapons -- not only to counter India`s nuclear force but also to deter India from threatening its existence. In the central region of the front, where terrain is less defensible, Islamabad is aware that India potentially could launch an attack that would split the country in half. Pakistan`s nuclear force, like that of Israel, is designed to prevent conventional defeat by making the risk of success too high for its foe.

Third and most risky, Islamabad has adopted a strategy of permitting paramilitary operations by various groups against Indian installations, such as that against its parliament in December. It might be overstating it to say this is part of a strategy. Rather, these well may be groups whose operations the government can`t control or, alternatively, whose operations it chooses not to control for domestic reasons. Clamping down on these groups might pose political challenges at home.

Covering events from January - December 2001

INDIA

Republic of India

Head of state: Kocheril Raman Narayanan

Head of government: Atal Bihari Vajpayee

Capital: New Delhi

Population: over 1 billion

Official language: Hindi

Death penalty: retentionist



People from socially and economically marginalized sections of society continued to be particularly vulnerable to torture and ill-treatment by both the police and non-state actors. The numbers of deaths in custody among members of these groups remained high, while their access to redress continued to be difficult despite the existence of progressive legislation. Human rights defenders continued to be harassed by both the police and non-state actors, and some of their activities were labelled ``anti-national``by the government. Excessive force was often used by law enforcement officers while policing peaceful demonstrations. Inter-caste and inter-religious tensions were often politically exploited, leading to several violent incidents throughout the country in which the police were believed to have taken a partisan role. Security concerns were addressed by the government through proposals for new and particularly stringent special legislation intended to grant wide powers of arrest and detention to law enforcement personnel. The criminal justice system continued to be extremely slow, under-resourced and to provide weak safeguards for the accused. Law enforcement officers were allowed de facto impunity both inside and outside areas of armed conflict. Impunity was encouraged by provisions in most existing security legislation, by political protection and by slow judicial proceedings and lack of implementation of findings by commissions of inquiry.

Background

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance continued in office throughout the year, despite recurring tensions between the BJP and some of its allies. State elections were held in five states in May. Their results reflected a growing importance in state-level politics of caste and regional parties respectively in the northern and in the southern states. Tensions between the Hindu and Muslim communities continued to be fuelled by different political groups, and clashes between the police and some Muslim groups intensified after the government declared its support for the bombing campaign in Afghanistan which followed the attacks in the USA on 11 September. In Kashmir, human rights abuses continued to be committed both by armed groups, and police and security forces on a large scale. An average of 100 civilians were killed there each month. Tensions between India and Pakistan on the issue of the support to armed groups in Kashmir became a subject of international debate in the context of the bombing campaign in Afghanistan by the USA and its allies. These tensions further increased, leading to a military build-up on the border between the two countries, following an attack on the Union Parliament on 13 December by members of an armed group. In the northeast, a cease-fire between the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Issac-Muivah) and the central government was extended in July for one year. Violent protests led by non-Naga organizations in the neighbouring state of Manipur prevented the cease-fire being extended beyond Nagaland, as initially proposed.

Special legislation

Calls by the USA for a ``global campaign against terrorism`` following the attacks in the USA on 11 September provided a context for several initiatives by the Indian government to tighten security legislation in the country. A new Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) was promulgated in October, giving the police wide powers of arrest and providing for up to six months` detention without charge or trial for political suspects. As the Ordinance was not discussed in Parliament during the winter session, it was repromulgated in December. Human rights organizations were concerned that some provisions were not consistent with the rights to freedom of expression and association set out in international human rights standards. Similar ``anti-terrorism`` bills were adopted or under examination in several states, including West Bengal, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. In November the Foreign Contribution (Management and Control) Bill 2001 was drafted. The Bill was intended to replace the Foreign Contributions Regulation Act and to curb the flow of foreign funds to both ``terrorist`` groups and non-governmental organizations.

The authorities continued to use the lapsed Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) to detain people in Jammu and Kashmir by linking them to ongoing cases filed before 1995. Hundreds of people remained in detention under the TADA, despite Supreme Court orders for a review of all cases.

Impunity

In August, government officials proposed granting amnesties to police officers facing trial for committing human rights abuses in their official capacity during the period of militancy in Punjab between 1984 and 1994. These proposals were neither officially confirmed nor withdrawn by the end of the year.

The government failed to act on recommendations made by several commissions of inquiry after identifying the involvement of police and security forces in human rights violations. The recommendations of the Shrikrishna Commission, concerning the communal riots which took place in Mumbai in 1992 and 1993 following the destruction of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, were implemented extremely slowly. Seventeen police officers had been issued with charge-sheets by the end of the year for having taken sides with violent Hindu groups during the riots which claimed 1,788 lives. Similarly, the recommendations of the Pandian Commission on the unlawful killings in April 2000 of protesters at Barakpore, Jammu and Kashmir, were not implemented by the government. The report itself was not made public. Special security laws, including the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, the POTO and the National Security Act, as well as the Protection of Human Rights Act, continued to retain provisions granting virtual impunity for government officials and army officers committing abuses while acting in their official capacity.

Discrimination

Socially and economically marginalized sections of society such as women, dalits, adivasis (tribal people) and religious minorities continued to suffer abuses as a result of discrimination by both the police and non-state actors. Their access to justice remained limited, despite the existence of some progressive pieces of legislation, as the criminal justice system tended to reproduce in its functioning the gender, caste and class discrimination exisiting in the society.

Discrimination against members of dalit communities received international attention when the issue was discussed during the UN World Conference against Racism (WCAR), held in South Africa in September. However, the final declaration of the WCAR did not acknowledge discrimination based on ``work and descent`` as a form of racism.

Since the attacks in the USA of 11 September and on the Union Parliament in December, the Muslim community became increasingly vulnerable to victimization by both the state and some Hindu political groups. Tensions between the police and Muslim groups erupted into rioting in different parts of the country, including Lucknow and Malegaon. Tension also escalated in connection with the intensification of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad`s campaign for the reconstruction of the Ram temple in Ayodhya, at the site of a mosque destroyed by Hindu rioters in 1992.

Human rights defenders

Harassment of human rights defenders by both state officials and other groups and individuals remained a constant feature throughout the year. There were reports of beatings, shootings and the use of excessive force by the police to try to prevent human rights defenders organizing peaceful protests against the government and non-state actors. Organizations assisting tribal communities to prevent their land being taken for industrial projects were particularly targeted. Several activists had false charges brought against them in an attempt to discredit their work. The government initiated inquiries into cases of suspected abuses against human rights defenders, but charges were rarely brought and investigations were often little more than a formal exercise.

Four adivasis (tribal people) were killed in April when police opened fire on a peaceful meeting in Mehndikheda, Madhya Pradesh, held to discuss allegations of abuses of the rights of adivasis by local police and forest officials. An administrative inquiry set up to investigate the killings fell short of international standards for an independent and impartial inquiry. Its report had not been made public by the end of the year.

Azam Ali, District Secretary of the Nalgonda branch of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee (APCLC), was killed in February by unidentified gunmen while on his way to a meeting to commemorate the death of the Joint Secretary of the APCLC, who was killed in November 2000. Despite the immediate establishment of a judicial inquiry into the killing, its report was not made public by the end of the year. Harassment of other members of the APCLC, including death threats, continued unchecked.

The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Human Rights Defenders had not been invited to visit the country by the end of the year.

Torture and ill-treatment

Torture by both state agents and non-state actors remained widespread throughout the country. Members of marginalized sections of society were particularly vulnerable. The National Human Rights Commission reported that 127 people had died in police custody between April 2000 and March 2001.

On 26 October Raja Ram was reportedly arrested with his two brothers after a neighbour had called the police because of a dispute. The three men, belonging to the dalit community, were allegedly beaten with sticks and rods at the Mariyaon police station in Lucknow. Raja Ram was hung upside down and water was poured into his nose. The three were released on bail after the police reportedly filed the case under section 151 of the Indian Penal Code (preventive detention) in order to legalize the arrests. Raja Ram died on 29 October. A case was filed for murder against five police officers. However, the Lucknow police authorities allegedly denied any responsibility, arguing that Raja Ram died because of disease.

By the end of 2001 India had not ratified the UN Convention against Torture, which it had signed in October 1997, nor had national legislation been drafted to enable its ratification. Therefore, no code or law specifically forbids torture as a criminal offence. Several provisions introduced by the POTO were believed to facilitate the use of torture in police custody.

The UN Special Rapporteur on torture was not granted access to the country by the end of the year, despite repeated requests.

Human rights commissions

There were no indications of progress by the government in considering amendments recommended in 2000 by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to the Protection of Human Rights Act 1993. The NHRC thus continued to be unable to investigate allegations of human rights violations committed by members of the army or paramilitary forces, as well as incidents which took place more than a year before a complaint was made. In September, the NHRC attended the World Conference against Racism and took an independent view from the government, in favour of the inclusion of caste discrimination as a form of racism.

In November the NHRC announced its opposition to the enactment of the POTO, judging it to be ``draconian`` and superfluous, and considering the existing laws sufficient to deal with ``terrorism`` if properly enforced.

State human rights commissions (SHRCs) were created in Maharashtra and Chattisgarh in July, bringing to 12 the number of states having an SHRC. Difficult working conditions, including lack of resources, continued to be reported by some SHRCs.

Abuses by armed groups

There were continued reports of abuses by armed groups in many states, including torture and deliberate killings of civilians. In areas of armed conflict, such as Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast, hundreds of non-combatants, including children, were killed in indiscriminate violence. Conflicts in the states of Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and parts of Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal, involving different factions of the naxalite (armed left-wing) groups and the police, claimed many civilian lives.

Death penalty

At least 16 people were sentenced to death in 2001. It was not known if any executions were carried out, nor how many prisoners were held on death row. The government of India does not publish statistical information about the implementation of the death penalty.

Legislation to extend the use of the death penalty to crimes of rape remained pending. The Explosive Substances (Amendment) Bill 1999, which extends the scope of the death penalty by making the possession of lethal explosives a capital offence, was passed by parliament at the end of the year. The POTO provides for the death penalty for ``terrorist`` offences which result in death. The concern that this would lead to an increase in the number of death sentences was heightened by the fact that provisions of the Ordinance made unfair trials more likely.

AI country reports/visits

Reports

India: Words into action - recommendations for the prevention of torture (AI Index: ASA 20/003/2001)

India: The battle against fear and discrimination - the impact of violence against women in Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan (AI Index: ASA 20/016/2001)

India: Time to act to stop torture and impunity in West Bengal (AI Index: ASA 20/033/2001)

India: Briefing on the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (AI Index: ASA 20/049/2001)

http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2002.nsf/asa/india!Open

musharuff is history. Pakistan needs to come out of its paranoid state

Here is another paragraph from stratfor.com

http://www.stratfor.com/fib/topStory_view.php?ID=204614

For Washington, the essential strategic problem in the region has been Pakistan, not Afghanistan. After the defeat of the Taliban regime, al Qaeda redeployed into Pakistan, joining forces that were already there. In the same way that Islamabad found it less risky to permit paramilitary operations against India than to prevent them, it found it less risky to permit al Qaeda forces sanctuary than to close them down -- not to mention permitting U.S. forces to take on al Qaeda in Pakistani territory.

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Musharaf doesnt owe indian muslim nor indian muslim owe him BUT just as terrorism ,humanrights ,rascism is everybodies business as human ,HE HAS FULL RIGHT TO SPEAK IN HIS LAND, ON HIS OWN TIME & TO HIS LISTENERS.

Oh PLeeezzzz enough protest ``dont interefere in our internal affairs.

As ASHCROFT the Pink Panther Inspector CRUZO says ``in case of 9-11 tremendous tragedy ,all business become our business ``

What was Indian reporters employed by News Week & WSJ Tunku & Sanjeev Srinivasan was doing INSIDE pakistan spying for India when India is so touchy about PRIVACY !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

http://www.telegraphindia.com/national.htm

MUSHARRAF HITS DELHI WHERE IT HURTS

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FROM SEEMA GUHA New Delhi, May 27: It was Pervez Musharraf?s turn to raise the ante against India.

After hearing Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee blow hot and cold all through last week, the Pakistan President this evening delivered a hard-hitting speech where he questioned India?s treatment of its minorities, carrying the war of words right into the Indian heartland.

Not content to confine his attack to Kashmir, Musharraf, well aware that his speech was being closely watched around the globe, said Pakistan had noted atrocities by Hindu fundamentalists against Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, and scheduled castes.

The reference to Gujarat was also meant to politely tell the rest of the world that India, despite railing against Pakistan and Islamic fundamentalism, had its own brand of religious bigots. At the same time, the address was meant to dispel doubts of Kashmiris about Pakistan?s support for their ?liberation struggle? and shore the flagging morale of those in the Valley who have turned to Islamabad for support in the fight against Delhi.

Describing Abdul Gani Lone as a martyr, Musharraf denied that Pakistan was behind the assassination of the moderate Hurriyat leader last week. Though Delhi had not officially blamed Islamabad, merely saying that militants had killed the voice of moderation in the Valley, privately there was no hesitation in saying that Pakistan?s Inter-Services Intelligence was behind the murder.

Indian intelligence agencies said the plan to kill Lone was hatched at a meeting of the Islamic Jehadi Council, in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, just 10 days before the murder. The meeting was attended by ISI officers in Muzaffarabad, Indian agencies said. They believe Lone?s statements asking foreign militants to leave Kashmir was seen as a dangerous step by the ISI.

The agencies said the ISI was scared, especially after the Dubai meeting last month with Abdul Kayoom that the track two diplomacy, encouraged by the US think-tanks and Kashmiris living in the UK and the US, could prove dangerous to Islamabad?s interest. There was the genuine fear that given the mood against violence in Kashmir, Lone could upset Pakistan?s calculations. The fear of free and fair elections in Kashmir was also another factor that went against Lone, the agencies said.

Musharraf today asked India why Lone?s killers were not apprehended. He said there were enough police, security forces and soldiers stationed in Kashmir. How did they escape when the shootout took place in front of a crowd of onlookers, he asked.

The President left the question unanswered to raise doubts among Kashmiris about the identity of Lone?s murderers. This line could be later taken up by the hardliners to rouse people?s anger against Delhi.

For some time after September 11, and especially since the attacks on the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly and the Indian Parliament and India?s aggressive diplomacy, Musharraf had been on the defensive. At best, Islamabad had been content to deny India?s charges that it was abetting terrorism.

Today, the general shed all pretence of a defensive strategy and counter-attacked. He spoke of India?s human rights record in Kashmir and said Delhi should allow rights groups and other international organisations to investigate. The government has repeatedly refused requests from organisations like Amnesty International to send teams to Kashmir, saying India had an active human rights commission, an independent judiciary and a vibrant press, all of which acted as watchdogs.

Today?s speech was also meant to embarrass the Vajpayee government. By remarking on India?s treatment of its Muslim population, Musharraf hit Delhi where it hurt most. In the past, whenever Islamabad had tried to play the Islamic card, Delhi countered it by saying that India had the world?s second-largest population of Muslims, next only to Indonesia, living side by side with Hindus and Christia

Army believes Kashmir freedom is near

India seeks face-saving for resolution of crisis

By Kamran Khan

KARACHI: Pakistani military leadership under President General Musharraf is ``absolutely confident`` that the freedom struggle in Kashmir has entered a crucial phase where an Indian military adventurism along the Line of Control or the working boundary would trap the Indian army in a Vietnam or Afghanistan-like situation and hasten the freedom process for the Kashmiri Muslims.

Interviews with officials, familiar with the current thinking at the General Headquarters (GHQ), revealed the government of Pakistan has also determined that the recent international efforts for mediation, particularly from Russia, represent an implicit Indian desire to extricate itself from an untenable diplomatic and military posture.

``In such a situation when the much awaited phase of international diplomacy is just beginning, how can we give India a head start,`` says a senior official, explaining the logic behind General Musharraf`s hard-line address to the nation on Monday. ``Actual concessions to India can only be part of give and take during bilateral negotiations.``

Relevant Pakistani officials believe that the robust military preparedness by the Pakistani Army, Navy, Air Force -- all three forces now equipped with tactical nuclear weapons -- and an expected ``impetus`` to anti-military guerrilla activities by the freedom fighters may turn the Indians` dream for a decisive war in Kashmir into a nightmare for the Indian military.

This military perception, enunciated very recently by the Military Operations Directorate, Commander Corps 10, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and other relevant military formations, contributed to the General Musharraf`s address to the nation during which he resolutely refused to give further concessions to the Indian military on Monday.

General Musharraf, a veteran of 1965 and 1971 wars with India, is also considered to be one of the most important architects of the military`s Kashmir strategy. The general had gained a rare insight into India`s military capabilities, while serving as Pakistan Army`s Director-General Military Operations (DGMO) in the early 1990s.

A military source said: ``Operational plans on Kashmir made under Musharraf at the MO (Military Operations Directorate) still form the core of the current strategy of the Pakistan Army in Kashmir.``

He added: ``As far as the military strategy and planning is concerned, Gen Musharraf is far ahead than the ageing Indian prime minister.`` Last week, General Musharraf and the top brass of Pakistani military establishment decided to stand firm on Kashmir policy after unanimously agreeing that the recent military posturing by India may ultimately push the Indian military into an even deeper strategic quagmire in Kashmir. ``Which army of the world can wage war when it is being attacked by its own people from right, left, front and the back,`` asked a senior Pakistani military source. ``Once the hostilities break out, can anyone perceive any other scenario for the Indian army in Kashmir.``

To meet the likely military scenario in Kashmir, one of the most important military moves made recently by the GHQ was to deploy a major chunk of Pakistani Special Services Groups (SSG) commandos all along the Line of Control for penetration -- in case of Indian military strike -- into held Kashmir, where friendly population and battle-hardened Kashmiri guerrillas are desperate to embrace them for a decisive military push, leading to complete liberation.

Sources close to two banned Jihadi groups have, meanwhile, disclosed in separate interviews in Karachi that they were ``not bothered`` by the recent decision of the military government to take new measures to block the traffic of freedom fighters from Pakistan into held Kashmir.

Responding to suggestions from the US government, the Pakistani military leaders had decided last week to introduce new security measures to stop the movement of Kashmiri militants from Azad Kashmir to held Kashmir. ``Three layers of security positions manned round the clock by the heavily armed Indian troops can`t stop us from reaching destinations well inside Kashmir Valley,`` vowed a Jihadi, who gave his name as Abu Hamza. ``How can Pakistani troops do something that 12 divisions of Indian army so grossly failed to achieve,`` he adds.

Other Jihadi sources said that because of favourable weather condition hundreds of fresh militants had entered Kashmir in April and in the first three weeks of the current month, until a few days before the military government announced fresh measures to stop infiltration into held Kashmir.

Local Jihadi sources have revealed that in the past few weeks they received numerous calls for help from various Muslim groups in Indian state of Gujarat and Maharashtra, where thousands of Muslims were killed and their properties were destroyed in the worst anti-Muslim riots that had erupted in March this year. ``In the wake of a war with Pakistan, Indian Muslims would give the biggest surprise to Indian security forces all over mainland India,`` Abu Hamza remarked.

President Musharraf`s Monday`s speech in general and his remarks about attacks on Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and scheduled caste by ``extremist Hindu terrorists`` appear to have won him a rare appreciation from the Pakistani militant religious quarters. ``The freedom struggle in Kashmir has primed to a point where the final push for liberation seems to be the logical next phase,`` says (retd) Colonel Salman Ahmed, one of the most reputed special forces officer of the Pakistan Army. ``Neither can we nor the Indian army forget what happened in the former East Pakistan, where the Indian army has timed its military intervention with the full bloom insurgency,`` says Col Salman, who thought that the Indian leadership would commit a Himalayan blunder by igniting a military confrontation in Kashmir. ``Kashmir is going to repeat the scenes of insurgency and the final acts of a liberation struggle seen in the last days of former East Pakistan, but now the key actors have changed sides,`` declared Col Salman.

Pakistan military sources also draw some comfort from the fact that an unprecedented concentration of Indian military resources in Kashmir has stripped India of numerical superiority of its troops deployed along the international borders. ``For a conventional military ground offensive, a numerical superiority of 3:1 is usually desired but because of heavy concentration in Kashmir, Indian military can hardly maintain that kind of numerical strength along the international borders,`` says an official source. For its part, Pakistani official sources said, a favourable situation on ground in Kashmir allows complete strategic manoeuvrability for the strike corps of the Pakistan Army positioned at Mangla and Multan.

Informed sources said that to meet an all-out war situation with India, the Strategic Command Force -- the central military organisation that control Pakistan`s nuclear assets -- was reviewing the recent reported movement of tactical nuclear weapons by the Indian forces. ``All the money, research and energy spent on developing tactical and strategic assets would go waste if we do not meet this great threat to the security of Pakistan by keeping these assets wrapped somewhere in lock and key,`` commented a senior Pakistani official.

As the Pakistan Navy successfully test-fired a medium range ship-to-ship missile, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead on Tuesday, flotilla of Pakistan Navy frigates and submarines was engaged in aggressive patrolling of the sea, senior Pakistani officials said. The Pakistan Navy has also commissioned its surveillance aircraft such as P-3 Orion and Atlantique to collect real-time maritime intelligence on Indian naval patrolling.

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Triangle of Tension: India, Pakistan and the United States

28 May 2002

Summary

Historical distrust and tensions between India and Pakistan have reached practically unsustainable levels. New Delhi cannot tolerate paramilitary attacks such as the one against its parliament in December, but the regime of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf simply may not be able to rein in the militants. Any concession on Islamabad`s part could set off a destabilizing political backlash, but this reality also moves the countries closer to a war footing. The United States, meanwhile, has willingly used the threat of war to pressure Islamabad for cooperation in its battle against al Qaeda. Washington realizes that actual war between India and Pakistan would harm its own interests, but for New Delhi there has never been a better time to act.