How Not to Reform Universities

syed ahmed,

I was about to echo temporal`s statement, but its a good thing you beat me to it. I didnt realise the staff here does pro bono work. If that is so, I`m sure glad I didnt write a scathing post, in support of temporal. I guess I still owe him couple of malts:)

I can understand time constraints, just as much as anyone else. I had just taken a ``vacation`` from work, just to complete a ``honey-do`` list:) On top of that if some Chowk staff people have to change diapers at 2AM..what can I say?..but thank you, Chowk staff for all you are doing!

I hereby nominate temporal mian & sadna bibi as volunteers for Chowk, to lighten your load. When it comes to being philanthropic with someone else`s time; I`m the best:)

According to this author the two nation theory proved wrong. He feels India should not have been partitioned on the basis of religion.

Fallacy of the basic idea

The two-nation theory is used as a form of social control by Pakistan’s elite.

http://www.himalmag.com/2002/july/perspective.htm

PERSPECTIVE

Fallacy of the basic idea

The two-nation theory is used as a form of social control by Pakistan’s elite.

by Aasim Akhtar

The `Islamic` general

The single most important event in Pakistani his tory is the secession of the eastern wing and the formation of Bangladesh in 1971. Yet, the imperative sentiment behind Pakistani nationhood remains the two-nation theory. The interest groups that comprise the Pakistani state are entirely reliant on this theory to justify the security paradigm that underlies decision-making, and allocation of resources. And yet, the single most important event in Pakistani history remains strangely peripheral and misunderstood, misrepresented as it is by the elite. To understand the concept of Pakistanhood that has been propagated over our 55-year history is to understand the political economy of this country.

All state structures that are fundamentally undemocratic rely on means of social control, whether they are coercive or subtle. This social control is usually founded on a basic idea, on a singular ideology that permeates all aspects of life. In Pakistan’s case, this ideology in its essence asserts that Muslims are unable to co-exist with Hindus. Created as a home for the Muslims of the Subcontinent, Pakistan today teeters on the brink of political bankruptcy. It is described by a ravaged economy, all-consuming societal ills, and a political culture that resembles a modern-day monarchy.

The assumption that Muslims were inherently a single nation separate from the nation of Hindus, India, was proven false by the events of 1971, when it became apparent that the Bengali identity was dearer to those who lived in East Pakistan than the Muslim identity. Today, there still are more Muslims in India than in Pakistan. And, have we forgotten that there are still over a hundred thousand Biharis in refugee camps in Bangladesh that the Pakistani state refuses to accept? Still, the two-nation theory continues to inform Pakistan’s polity in a profound way, by providing the energy for its Kashmir preoccupation: Kashmir continues to irk because it is symbolises a failure to fulfil the two-nation dream. The fallacy of the two-nation theory has been proven time and again, its contra-dictions undermining its credibility, but the tragedy for Pakistan is that the theory continues to be employed by the elite to perpetuate a system that has clearly failed to cater to even the basic needs of its citizens. The fact that the majority of Pakistanis still subscribe to this theory underlines how powerful a means of social control it is.

The Pakistani body politic was dysfunctional from the word go. At the time of partition, the Pakistani military was a marginal actor. Neither was the religious clergy a major player in the politics of the new nation; in fact, the Jamaat-e-Islami had been opposed to the break up of India. The Hindu intelligentsia and entrepreneurial class from entire regions, including the Siraiki belt and Sindh, had packed up and crossed the new border to India. At that stage then, it was the landed elite that had emerged as the most influential lobby within the Pakistan movement which held the reins of power. The rest was an unnatural amalgamation of different interest groups aspiring to state power. And from the outset, the Kashmir dispute defined the national psyche.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah is often quoted as having said that religion should not interfere in the affairs of the state. He is said to have asserted on numerous occasions that Pakistan would be a secular state, albeit with a Muslim majority. However, he also made it very clear that Kashmir was Pakistan’s “jugular” and the new nation was incomplete without it. Jawaharlal Nehru was similarly uncompromising, promising on the one hand to give Kashmiris the right to decide their own future, and on the other, initiating the militari-sation of the area by sending thousands of troops to fortify its frontiers. At the very outset, the leaders of the freedom movement made the Kashmir issue content-ious, and this has since weighed heavily on the entire region. A mentality that Kashmir must be made part of the country has dominated the public discourse in Pakistan, and as such, has given the military and the religious right an easy excuse to propagate their destructive ideologies. Meanwhile in India, the establishment continues to mandate gross violations of human rights in Kashmir, claiming it is a secular, democratic state at the same time.

The inordinate amounts of money spent on defence, the extraordinary and unnatural rise of the religious right in the last 25 years, and the degeneration of political parties in Pakistan all have something to do with the security paradigm of the state. Essentially, it is the threat perception from a bigger and stronger India (and therefore, the argument goes, the ten times as many Hindus on that side of the border who thirst for Muslim blood) that gives license to the establishment to accord special privileges to itself in the name of protecting Pakistan and its Muslim population. The rise of the religious right (and the proliferation of jehadi elements) and the thwarting of the political process are, then, outcomes of the inordinate power that the military establishment exercises. These trends have been reinforced by the whims of the United States both during the Cold War, and now.

Pakistan reached a critical point when General Zia- ul Haq took over the country in 1977. A year later, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and as the definitive conflict of the Cold War shaped up, Pakistan emerged as western capitalism’s point man on the Subcontinent. It is now common knowledge that the US supported the Afghan mujahideen and the many splinter jehadi groups that have since become the US’s primary enemy in the “war on terror”. Nevertheless, then it was the Islamisation of the country that made it possible for General Zia to pro-pagate the notion of jehad against communist Russia.

This process of Islamisation had actually begun with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Having come to power on the slogan of Islamic socialism, Bhutto proceeded to oversee the writing of the 1973 constitution in which Ahmadis were infamously declared non-Muslims. In 1974, the “peace-ful” nuclear test carried out by India provided impetus for a new wave of hysteria in Pakistan. Bhutto launch-ed the Pakistani nuclear programme, with the slogan ghaas khaenge (“we will eat grass” if we have to but we will make the bomb) to emphasise his commitment to the creation of an Islamic bomb. Once the need to combat the perceived Indian threat was re-established as the primary policy concern of the state, it was less important for Mr Bhutto to make good his populist election promises of roti, kapra, makan (food, clothing and shelter) than it was to stand toe to toe with India.

In many ways, Bhutto’s tenure was dominated by efforts to banish the disaster of 1971 from Pakistan’s collective memory. The nationalist movement had proved that not only did the Bengalis not have any allegiance to the Kashmir cause but that they also disputed the special privileges accorded to an army that was almost exclusively based in the western wing. Indeed, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman consistently and accurately alleged that East Pakistan’s export earnings from jute were being used to fund the army and an industrial complex in West Pakistan rather than to cater to the needs of the eastern wing.

So the security paradigm emerged with renewed vigour after General Zia came to power, courtesy the Afghan war. Along with it came the shocks that split the nation along religious, sectarian, and ethnic lines. The promulgation of “Islamic” laws such as the Hudood Ordinance which openly discriminate against women in cases of sexual abuse, the formation of the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) that disturbed the delicate ethnic balance in Karachi and fomented unrest, and the explosion of sectarian conflict, all took place during the Zia era. The de-politicisation of society was accompanied by the politicisation of the intelligence agencies. Political parties remained sidelined for almost a decade. By the time elections took place in 1988 by virtue of Zia-ul Haq’s mysterious death, state and society had been transformed.

The fallout of 12 years of unstable democracy was an intensification of the influence of the security apparatus in the affairs of the state. It is now common knowledge that Pakistan-based jehadis were at the forefront of the militarised resistance in Kashmir. As such, therefore, Kashmir policy dominated national politics through the 1990s and the military establishment in the post-Zia era has never released its stranglehold on power to any meaningful extent. Development expenditure fell from a high of 7.6 percent of GDP in 1991-92 to 2.8 percent in 2000-01. Meanwhile, ex-penditure on defence and debt ser-vicing was equivalent to 88 percent of total tax revenue in 1991 and increased to over 90 percent of total tax revenue in 2000.

The stranglehold that the military establishment has on resource allocation is at least partly due to the fact that it has such a massive influence on the political process. The intelligence agencies that had been made all-powerful during the covert US operation in Afghanistan in the Cold War era have maintained their grip on Pakistani politics. Meanwhile parochial sectarian, ethnic and jehadi groups have injected a new terror into Pakistani society. Unfortunately, these forces are not accountable to anyone – they have no insti-tutional history, and whether they flourish or wither away is a decision over which the Pakistani public has no control.

While the aftermath of 11 September has inadvertently led to the exposure of this nexus, it has not changed the way the Pakistani state is structured or the essential power dynamics that exist within Pakistani society. In fact, the military’s domination has been cemented over the past few months. All civilian agencies in the country are now headed by retired or serving army officials. Two out of four provincial governors are retired generals. Three federal ministers are retired army men. The list could go on. (See Himal, June 2002.)

Many political parties have been co-opted into this undemocratic system, which is a reflection not only of the degeneration of politics in the country, but also of the fact that political parties do not expect to ever exercise authority independent of the army’s wishes. Ultimately, the established political elite is aware that challenging the military’s consumption of a disproportionate share of the budget, or the fact that army men are given special privileges, offices, and rights, will only lead to its own demise. Of course there is the small matter of political parties being unrepresentative and self-interested. Groups with vested interests such as the landed elite, an industrial class which derives its competitive edge through state-sanctioned cronyism, and the civil bureaucracy, have all at one time or the other allied themselves with the military establishment to serve their own needs and wants. To invigorate political process in Pakistan the nature of the state will have to be fundamentally altered.

The security paradigm and the accompanying forms of social control that allow the military to continue its domination of state and society are intact. Textbooks used in schools propagate untruths about the atrocities of the independence movement; they also promote intolerance toward religious minorities. State-run television and radio spew out long propaganda programmes highlighting India’s evil designs and the need for combat-ready armed forces and modern weapons to repel Indian aggression. PTV often shows a short programme called Kashmir File after its 9 pm Khabarnama, showcasing graphic footage of Kashmiris being abused by Indian soldiers, calling for their freedom from oppression. As an example of how such condi-tioning begets itself, newspapers covering, say, a natural disaster in India will phrase headlines almost as if the disaster were divine punishment: “Heat wave kills 300 Indians”.

Nevertheless, cracks are emerging. The military establishment has been forced to re-evaluate its role in facilitating conflicts on its western and north-eastern borders. The most recent stand-off with India seems to have been averted, and US pressure has seen Pakistan acknowledge, and make moves to arrest, “cross-border infiltration”. Still, one feels that so long as it is US persuasions that compel the army to make a retreat, any retreat is only temporary.

Nation-states peripheral to the global system such as Pakistan have almost completely surrendered sovereignty in crucial affairs, and so perhaps even a US-imposed change could negate the original US-created extremist threat. But US interests do not include forcing a fundamental reorientation of Pakistan’s state ideology. The US military-industrial complex reaps many profits from Pakistan’s hunger for military technology and infrastructure, and very much wants to maintain its market share in South Asia.

Any genuine change in Pakistan must be organic and based on public recognition within Pakistan that the prevailing state ideology is untenable. Only once this happens will there be any fundamental compulsion for the military to retreat to the barracks. So far political parties have failed to play the role of challenger to the state, public frustration is ever on the rise, poverty is rampant and growing, and post-referendum, resent-ment towards the army is widespread. There is talk now about how much the conflict over Kashmir has cost Pakistan and its people. And there are livelihood movements that are beginning to come into direct conflict with the state.

As the latest budget is released, Pakistani policy-makers are once again hard put to explain away the low growth and the poor level of poverty-related expenditure. They point to a 14 percent increase in defence spending over the past year by way of excuse. They will continue to do so until the global hegemon, international financial institutions or some other influential actor challenges their policies and the wisdom of the imperatives that guide them. The Pakistani people can hardly afford to entrust their destinies and the destiny of their political culture to a verifiably fickle international community. If anything is to really change, the will to reshape the Pakistani state must be generated by the Pakistani people themselves.

Dear Urstruly chaar number . . . why you are dreading `orrible `indoos then, sirji?

sincerely in anticipation,

veeresh

RE # 4 ``I dread the day when a hindu starts owning it``

According to unreliable reports the Chowk ownership is being taken over by the jews. Plans are in the offing to rename the site to Kibbutz.

Shalom

Subroto

osted on Tue, Jul. 09, 2002 f

Muslim leaders denounce terrorism



BY JOYCE M. DAVIS

Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON ? Some of the Muslim world`s most powerful religious leaders were in Washington on Monday to publicly denounce violence in the name of Islam and to warn against demonizing Muslims, an estimated 8 million to 10 million of whom live in the United States.

``The events of Sept. 11 have aroused some fear and mistrust between people in the Muslim World and the West,`` said Dr. Abdullah al Turki, secretary general of the Muslim World League, a nongovernmental organization based in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, that has wide influence in the Islamic world. ``We are all confronting a world crisis.``

The decision by this group of prominent Muslim scholars to travel to the United States to counter the perceived anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States is highly unusual and is a measure of that sense of crisis.

Al Turki said the tension was pitting the Islamic world against the West, especially as the Bush administration has targeted many militant Islamic groups in its war against terrorism.

Much of the hostility between Muslims and the West stems from false stereotypes that equate Islam with terrorism, al Turki said.

``Today we have more than a billion Muslims throughout the world,`` al Turki said. ``Many of them, like any other people, make mistakes; they commit sins; they become extremists. ? It is unfair to take such individuals as representatives of Islam and Muslims.``

The leaders said the vast majority of Muslims are peace-loving people who share many common values with people of the West, including love of family, freedom and democracy.

``We are concerned that the voices of moderation are not being heard, but these other voices are being heard,`` said al Shieck Ahmad Lemo, president of the Islamic Educational Endowment in Nigeria.

While the scholars denounced militants who ``abuse religion,`` they also criticized aspects of U.S. foreign policy, which they said were at the root of anti-American feelings in the Muslim world. Muslim leaders often accuse the United States of being biased toward Israel to the detriment of Palestinians, who are predominantly Muslim.

Al Turki and the other Islamic leaders stressed that Islam opposes terrorism and suicide bombings. But he said Israel`s ``oppression`` of Palestinians provoked such actions.

``There is a difference between justifying something and understanding something,`` said Dr. Muzamil Sidiqi, former president of the Islamic Society of North America. ``The root of the problem is that people are hopeless. Who wants to kill themselves? Give them a way out.``

Representatives of the Muslim World League traveled from Nigeria, Jordan, India, Canada, Bosnia, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to express their concerns to American government, religious and academic officials throughout the country. They will meet with members of Congress in Washington at a reception today.

hoodbhoy has done another great service by writing this piece. most of it is stuff we all know about but to have it articulated by someone in the education sector is something else. just to add that the polytechnic approach that our Government is taking with these ``IT`` institutes. Unfortunately these kids go in thinking they`re actually going to learn something and their parents dish out serious money but except for maybe a handful these institutes are churning out data entry specialists at best. Given the talent in this country, it`s sad when one sees what`s being done...

regards,

shakir husain

While I admire Prof. Hoodbhoy`s courage in speaking out against the evils of militarism and Islamism in Pakistan, I am not sure if he is exactly right here. Thus, while the ``University of Malakand`` is almost a joke (at least today, and no offense to the fine people of Malakand), one must keep in mind that this article is from a professor of one of the universities that would benefit from his recommendations in terms of increased funding. Thus, one should read this article with a grain of salt, and keeping in mind that by limiting the number of universities we are also limiting opportunities for higher education - however poor it`s standard - for thousands of young people.

Chowk is getting quite lethargic. The speed with which interactions are (should be) posted is actually going down, instead of up.

If this whole process is scripted, then it could (should be) near real time.

If it is not scripted, then one would hope (assume), after three to four years, it is (should be) scripted by now.

Chowk had been slowing down on updates to about once a day recently. This time it has been out for 3 days and counting. I think this is chowk staff`s way of teaching us an important lesson: all politics, religion, socialization and so forth that goes on on chowk can be brought to an abrupt halt with a few clicks of the chowkmeister`s mouse. That would be the end of our little ``chowk community``. The lesson being that our little ``world community``, with all its politics and turmoil and good things and bad things can be similarly brought to an end. The earth after all is a teeny-tiny thing compared, e.g., to a single solar flair.

Having philosophized this one, it would be nice if chowk staff would advise on whether they plan to shut down, or whether they plan to improve their service, or whether they dont really care and we can expect chowk to gradually fizzle out due to slow postings. I second temporal`s suggestions as well.

Bahadur Shah zafar ki maazrat ke saath

Umre daraaz chowk pe laye tHey chaar dinn

do aarzoo meiN kut gaye do intezzar mein

Bahadur Shah zafar ki maazrat ke saath

Umre daraaz chowk pe laye tHey chaar dinn

do aarzoo meiN kut gaye do intezzar mein

The answer, to everything asked here, is ``42``.

I wonder if it would be possible to do away with
Batch Processing on CHOWK and free it from any filtering that goes on?
Unfortunately the downside of that can be found
on soc.culture.indian or soc.culture.pakistan
newsgroups which I had to abandon years ago.

Just some thoughts.

Ras

(The Professor is right on the money here as usual. The question is are Pakistanis listening?)

Dr. Hoodbhoy,

Very informative article. I spoke to my mother last night about this issue. She had attended University in Karachi. It seems that the education process she was a part of emphasised test taking; students studied to pass tests. Her take was that while profs. presented material, cautious students knew that there was material they might not cover, therefore many students studied material outside the reach of the class lectures. In one way, this system really gives students the responsibility for their own knowledge accumulation, in another, it weeded it out those who didn`t prepare. My mother also maintains that her edu. well prepared her for grad. studies in the US.

It seems as if the educational process has changed in those 30 years. What are your thoughts?

Also, it would be really exciting if liberal arts universities made links with other colleges around the world, esp. the US. This would mean that specific depts. would share curricula, faculty, programs and students, and would be ``sister schools``. This might be significant on many levels; uniting the South Asian diaspora, facilatating Pakistani-Pakistani, South Asian American dialogue and linkages, and allowing both institutions into each`s resources (scholarly, political, cultural and economic).

re: Chowk

Dear Chowk Staff and Chowkies,

Let me add my appreciation and support for you lovely pro bono workers. I`d offer my time and energies, but somehow I feel I would not be considered impartial...well, what can you do? However, if there is anything else I can do (besides working on Pinkyfeld with Zafar, which we are), please let me know. To Shandana; our love and best wishes for you, your husband and the wee one. :)

My vote is for Temp, Sameer, Tahmed and Sadna. And Drumz. Not!!!

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