The Day Of All Days

``You seem to have a knee jerk hatred towards Musharraf``(ferozk)

thanks feroz --I take it as a compliment -- the anti democratic army man is indeed without any redeemable value whatsoever:-)

May be if your post would have been a little shorter.

my dear friend -- you don`t have to use so many words to say that Musharraf is going to harm Pakistan -- he already has.

Re: Hobbes # 7

The article, from Dawn, makes many good points about the institutional nature of the army and a lack of a corresponding institution in the civil-political life of the nation.

My disagreement with the article is that it seeks in a way to justify the military`s actions. I am not sure why the Ayaz Amir is suggesting this line of thought. The cynic in me would suggest that he is doing the obvivious, because he is contesting a national assembly seat, on the ``ticket`` of PML, and needs to pay the required sum to the piper...

Other than, having friends and the relatives in the armed forces, I still hold the believe that the military, among all Pakistani institutions, is the most open to a serious exchange of ideas and the only institution in Pakistan, where desicions are arrived on the basis of consensus.

Yes; the military is really misunderstood by the majority of Pakistan`s pseudo-intellectual classes and the blame for that is not the people`s but the military`s, which has always assumed that its actions were lauded by the people. If the military had presented its side of the agruments instead of dictating its vision of Pakistan to the Pakistanis, then the situation might have been different.

What I really disagree with the article is that democracy has to be allowed to evolve, just like the military`s institutions were allowed to evolve amid the change from a British tradition mixed with an Islamic identity. Keeping its own history in mind, the military should allow the civilan institutions to develop, mature and evolve and let them define the nature and scope and limits of a Pakistani democractic tradition instead of engineering their political-democratic evolution. Just because the military has well developed institutions, does not mean that it can belittle the civilian institutions, but should ask the reason they were not able to develop?

Re: nasah #13

Thanks for answering...

To pose a follow up to you...

Is your suggestion that it is the religious minority in Pakistan, who is not willing to tolerate dissent instead of civilian society?

If that is your contention, I would agree that there is vocal minority in Pakistan, which is extermely averse to dissent.

Ciao

Shahid Javed Burki is one of the few writers who understands the civilian-military dynamics in Pakistan quite well, without having been on both sides of the fence (in the military and a civilian). Most of the others, who in my opinion understand it, like Ayaz Amir, were themesleves in the military.

``Bridging the polarity
By Shahid Javed Burki
General Pervez Musharraf`s much anticipated constitutional package was made public at a press conference held on the evening of Wednesday, August 21. The general used an unusual format for letting the people of Pakistan - and the people outside Pakistan interested in that country`s trials and tribulations - know how he planned to govern the country for the next several years. That the conference was held in a hall named Chaghai must not have been lost on the people who attended it or watched the proceedings on national television.

It was in the hills of Chaghai in Balochistan that Pakistan exploded half a dozen nuclear devices in May 1998 and joined the club of seven nations who admit to the possession of nuclear weapons. Although Pakistan`s nuclear programme relied on the expertise of civilian scientists, it answered a military objective. Pakistan`s armed forces have been focused on the threat - both real and perceived - offered by India, a much larger and stronger nation that shares a long border on the country`s south and east. The Chaghai explosions signalled the arrival of a deterrence against possible Indian aggression.

The tremor caused by Chaghai was heard around the world. So was the case with the constitutional changes announced by General Musharraf on August 21. Much of the reaction to the changes proposed by the general was negative. Most political parties in Pakistan - especially the parties that held power in the 1990s - were bitterly opposed to the changes in the Constitution. Most of the press commentary - editorials as well as articles on the op-ed pages - did not like the suggestion that for the foreseeable future the military will have the constitutional right to watch over the workings of the political system.

The foreign press and commentators were equally critical. The New York Times, in an editorial that appeared on August 23 under the title of ``Power Grab in Pakistan`` advised Washington to deliver Pakistan a strong rebuke. ``For years, Washington has condoned anti-democratic behaviour by pro-American dictators... Washington should never again be so uncritical of the undemocratic company it sometimes feels compelled to keep,`` said the newspaper. A similar sentiment was expressed by the novelist, Salmaan Rushdie, in an article contributed by him to a recent issue of The Washington Post.

Is all this hand-wringing justified? There is no doubt that the announced changes in the Constitution are significant not only for Pakistan and its political and economic future. They were also of tremendous import for the world since Pakistan today is America`s most valued ally in its war against global terrorism. General Musharraf`s reflections on Pakistan`s political problems and prospects were offered amid cacophonous debate over strategy between, inter alia, the military and civilian politicians.

The general took some pride in the fact that he had allowed open debate on the set of proposals on constitutional change. The discourse he permitted lasted for a month and was, it would appear, followed carefully by the military strategists. This, the general proclaimed, was a much more democratic process than the one followed by the government headed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in getting the National Assembly to pass the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

As General Musharraf leafed through his notes while addressing those assembled in the Chaghai hall, he explained why some of the changes contemplated in the initial draft were dropped and why some other, although not popular with most of the commentators, were retained. It was clear that he and his associates were not prepared to compromise on their right to oversee the working of the civilian government in a number of strategic areas. It was for this reason that the provision for establishing a National Security Council, although strongly resisted by those who commented on the proposed changes, was not abandoned. The only concession made was to shift the weight of membership towards the civilians by including the chairman of the Senate and the Speaker of the National Assembly.

According to my count, this will be a 12-member body if the president is also the chief of staff of the army or a 13-member entity when the presidency is finally claimed by the civilians. But in this game numbers don`t matter since, in all probability, decisions will not be enforced on the basis of a majority emerging from the exercise of one vote per participant. In the Turkish NSC, the military prevails on issues that it holds dear to its heart - the defence of the country`s secular constitution.

Let me now take a look at the debate that preceded as well as that followed General Musharraf`s announcement of the changes in the Constitution. As already indicated, a great deal was said and written - and, undoubtedly, a great deal more will be written and said - as Pakistan marches on towards the holding of yet another general election. I have followed the debate with some care and diligence. My main conclusion is that it has missed by a wide mark the main issues concerning the nature of our political structure.

The most important of these, of course, is the lack of confidence on the part of the military establishment in the ability of the politicians to manage the affairs of the state. Since the military - rightly or wrongly - is supremely confident of its ability to first confront and then solve all kinds of problems, it feels that it must keep the politicians on a short leash and watch over them with great care. What has made the military so confident and why does it regard the politicians so poorly?

It is said that in the ultimate analysis, power flows out of the barrel of a gun. This is no doubt also true of the power the military has wielded in Pakistan. But to ascribe the military`s ability to intervene in politics to its artillery is to seriously misunderstand Pakistan`s political evolution. If military power meant political ascendancy, democracies in the West would never have flourished. What could be a stronger military than the one possessed by the United States. And yet there has never been any serious doubt about the supremacy of the civilians in the way ultimate power is exercised in America. It is not a secret that the military resents the way Donald Rumsfeld, America`s current secretary of defence, exercises authority over them. But his decisions are followed without being questioned.

To stay with the American example a bit longer, what has given strength to its political system is not that the country`s founding fathers gave it a written constitution. What has really mattered is that the institutions developed by the civilian side of the power-sharing equation came to be much stronger than those developed by the military.

There is a belief - highly mistaken, I maintain - that what matters in a country in Pakistan`s situation is respect for the constitution and periodic elections. That is, at best, only one half of the story. The other half has to be seen in terms of a battle between institutions.

I believe the civilians in Pakistan don`t understand the military. They view its repeated incursions into their domain as a sign of perfidy: the military, according to the conventional civilian view, is always out to protect its rights and privileges. There is no doubt that the military rewards its senior officers very well. They draw not only salaries comparable to those given to the highest echelons of the civil service. Those holding senior ranks in the military also receive generous awards of land in military cantonments and in Pakistan`s ample countryside. By now the military has also built an elaborate business empire to serve its pensioners and provide welfare to its personnel. According to this line of thinking, the military is fearful that it may lose control of this significant economic asset if the civilian authority manages to assert its authority over military matters.

I look at the continuing civil-military conflict through the glasses of an institutional economist. The structure of the military in Pakistan is built upon a series of interlocking institutions that reach into every aspect of what the armed forces do. These institutions include academies that train officers and soldiers; colleges that keep the commanders current on national, international and strategic issues; and think-tanks that ponder about the way the world is evolving around us. The institutions are run by professionals; they maintain well-stocked libraries; they publish journals that get widely read; and they invite people from outside their ranks to join the various debates in which the military`s senior officers are engaged.

And then there are formal institutions that are brought into play when important decisions are to be taken. We all know about the periodic meetings of the corps commanders and the GHQ`s principal staff officers in which important matters facing the military or the country are discussed. The man at the top - generally the chief of the army staff - calls the final shot but he tries to develop a consensus among his colleagues on whatever decisions get taken.

There are other well established institutions the military uses to conduct its business. The chain of command in which officers of different ranks and ages congregate on a regular basis provides a way for both discourse and passing on information. Army messes offer space where much informed dialog takes place among the attending officers. ``Bara khanas`` bring together on festive occasions the officers with the men they command.

My purpose for delving into all this is to underscore the point that the military, an entity with a rich institutional infrastructure, confronting a body of people who have no respect for institutional thinking, is not likely to develop a great deal of confidence in the latter. What the military has attempted to do in this round of constitutional changes is to create and strengthen the institutional system on which the political structure should be based. I don`t believe the politicians have fully grasped this point. The constitutional protection afforded the State Bank, the National Accountability Bureau, the Federal Service Commission, etc., falls squarely in this category.

By creating the National Security Council, the military is attempting to formalize its dialogue with the civilian authority. As General Pervez Musharraf disclosed in response to a question from one of the Chaghai hall audience, he must have visited the prime minister 50 or 100 times to discuss the various affairs of the state. That dialogue can now take place within the forum provided by the NSC.

The military leadership cannot be impressed with the way the politicians reacted to some of the institutional-making attempts of recent weeks. The way the political parties reacted to the demand to democratize their own operations by electing, inter alia, their own personnel could not have increased the military`s respect for the civilians` capacity to go beyond personal interests or the interest of the narrow group the politicians represent. That a politician defeated in the poll to elect the party`s president should walk out with his handful of supporters and found his own party cannot be viewed as a serious commitment to institution-building either. Without developing a robust set of institutions of their own, the politicians will not be able to keep the military at bay. Power comes from institutions, not necessarily from the barrel of a gun. (www.dawn.com)

``In a pluralitic, tolerant, can there be several versions or vision of what Democracy is? ``

Yes hobbes miaN -- there can be -- except the military vesion of democracy `democratic disctatorship` -- tha`s sheer nonsense.

As Haqqani aptly said -- Pakistan military (and you guys) -- are trying to REDEFINE democraCY -- INSTEAD OF PRACTICING IT.

And tha`s a TAAAALL order -- either for you guys or for the mighty Pakistan Army.

in 2002 it will never float -- why waste a poor country`s fortunes on esoteric than on the well tested methods of democratic governance -- inside or outside the subcontinent?

Re: Sadna

Thanks for the ``clip``. I tend to agree with that and I am also of the view that the present reforms by Musharraf will not solve the problem. The problem in Pakistan is too mutli-faceted for it to be bracketed as a solution within a constitutional reform - implying that it is the alpha and omega of democracy, something which Musharraf seems to be inclined towards.

Re: nasah

I hope that you do not mind if I suggest the following observation.

If you had read the article, you would have noticed, as Sadna did, that the article was not about supporting Musharraf, but instead arguing that the policies undertaken by him, will end up doing more harm to Pakistan`s politics than any good.

You seem to have a knee jerk hatred towards Musharraf and you assumed that the aricle was supporting Musharraf. It did not advocate any such hypothesis. It merely said that Musharraf`s policies are not going to bring about the results he hopes.

Could you please tell how you came to the conclusion that the article was supporting Musharraf?

Ciao

``state should be willing to tolerate dissent, it is specifically refering towards the tolerance of religious dissent``(Ferozk)

I don`t see that the state had any problem in tolerating religious dissent -- it is the religious disssenters who are not able to `tolerate` each other without Klashnikoves.

the real problem -- it is the democratic dissent the Musharraf military state is unwilling to tolerate -- for coming 5 years.

Ferozk
An Indian activist for political reform talking about Indian aam janata`s contempt for politicians in an NY Times article on the Indian CEC:

``If you are always saying nonpoliticians are right, and politicians are wrong, that`s very dangerous; you`re looking for a Musharraf,`` he said, referring to Pakistan`s military dictator, Gen. Pervez Musharraf. ``The solution must come through the reform of politics as well.``


By reform of politics IMO, this person meant reform in the way in which Indian political parties seek power, a reform of the ideas, issues, terms and language they use to win public support and later stay in power.

IMO, Musharraf is not interested in such political reform in the Pakistani system, all the reform required is that he will exercise personal control over all civilian institutions because he alone is a sincere patriot. His rivals are not talking of any such reform of politics either, which lends weight to his arguments about constitutional amendments to keep them in check.

He projects himself better than his political rivals on two fronts, partly the result of changed times.

-giving a perception of articulating a broader vision of national interest over personal interest than they did/do. In reality his army constituency severely limits his articulations while politicians have an advantage in that the entire public is their constituency.

-giving a perception of greater transparency in government and honest intentions.

His political opponents not only have to debunk these perceptions but have to project themselves to the public as better than him at least in the vision department. How easy or difficult it that?

Now here is finally someone who believes -- General Musharraf is `extremely democratic` -- who on October 10 will ‘shepherd ` Pakistan -- by his baton to the blissful corral of `sustainable` democracy!

F. R. Khan
below are excerpts from Shahid Javid Burki`s artilce printed in the Opinion section of todays` ``DAWN``, I would be interested in your take, for instance, ``Ought Pakistani politicians also have an institutional view of themselves, or what does legislator mean, what ought it mean`` and what might this mean for the way political parties organize in Pakistan, please also comment on the contrat between the way the armed forces explore and arrive at a decision with very broad participation and the manner in which Pakistani politicians explore issues and arrive at decisions :
``...To stay with the American example a bit longer, what has given strength to its political system is not that the country`s founding fathers gave it a written constitution. What has really mattered is that the institutions developed by the civilian side of the power-sharing equation came to be much stronger than those developed by the military.
There is a belief - highly mistaken, I maintain - that what matters in a country in Pakistan`s situation is respect for the constitution and periodic elections. That is, at best, only one half of the story. The other half has to be seen in terms of a battle between institutions.
I believe the civilians in Pakistan don`t understand the military. They view its repeated incursions into their domain as a sign of perfidy: the military, according to the conventional civilian view, is always out to protect its rights and privileges. There is no doubt that the military rewards its senior officers very well. They draw not only salaries comparable to those given to the highest echelons of the civil service. Those holding senior ranks in the military also receive generous awards of land in military cantonments and in Pakistan`s ample countryside. By now the military has also built an elaborate business empire to serve its pensioners and provide welfare to its personnel. According to this line of thinking, the military is fearful that it may lose control of this significant economic asset if the civilian authority manages to assert its authority over military matters.
I look at the continuing civil-military conflict through the glasses of an institutional economist. The structure of the military in Pakistan is built upon a series of interlocking institutions that reach into every aspect of what the armed forces do. These institutions include academies that train officers and soldiers; colleges that keep the commanders current on national, international and strategic issues; and think-tanks that ponder about the way the world is evolving around us. The institutions are run by professionals; they maintain well-stocked libraries; they publish journals that get widely read; and they invite people from outside their ranks to join the various debates in which the military`s senior officers are engaged.
And then there are formal institutions that are brought into play when important decisions are to be taken. We all know about the periodic meetings of the corps commanders and the GHQ`s principal staff officers in which important matters facing the military or the country are discussed. The man at the top - generally the chief of the army staff - calls the final shot but he tries to develop a consensus among his colleagues on whatever decisions get taken.
There are other well established institutions the military uses to conduct its business. The chain of command in which officers of different ranks and ages congregate on a regular basis provides a way for both discourse and passing on information. Army messes offer space where much informed dialog takes place among the attending officers. ``Bara khanas`` bring together on festive occasions the officers with the men they command.
My purpose for delving into all this is to underscore the point that the military, an entity with a rich institutional infrastructure, confronting a body of people who have no respect for institutional thinking, is not likely to develop a great deal of confidence in the latter. What the military has attempted to do in this round of constitutional changes is to create and strengthen the institutional system on which the political structure should be based. I don`t believe the politicians have fully grasped this point. The constitutional protection afforded the State Bank, the National Accountability Bureau, the Federal Service Commission, etc., falls squarely in this category.
By creating the National Security Council, the military is attempting to formalize its dialogue with the civilian authority. As General Pervez Musharraf disclosed in response to a question from one of the Chaghai hall audience, he must have visited the prime minister 50 or 100 times to discuss the various affairs of the state. That dialogue can now take place within the forum provided by the NSC.
The military leadership cannot be impressed with the way the politicians reacted to some of the institutional-making attempts of recent weeks. The way the political parties reacted to the demand to democratize their own operations by electing, inter alia, their own personnel could not have increased the military`s respect for the civilians` capacity to go beyond personal interests or the interest of the narrow group the politicians represent. That a politician defeated in the poll to elect the party`s president should walk out with his handful of supporters and found his own party cannot be viewed as a serious commitment to institution-building either. Without developing a robust set of institutions of their own, the politicians will not be able to keep the military at bay. Power comes from institutions, not necessarily from the barrel of a gun. ``

FR:
Ok, you win my vote for Longest article really saying nothing on the chowk. :) Is there a Most U-Turns in an Article award, too?
FR sahib, methinks you have probably spent a few too many years in grad school!
rgds,
PM

The problem of religion in Pakistani politics is too obvivious and it is in this sense that the term ``plurality of opinions`` must be reviewed and when the article mentions that state should be willing to tolerate dissent, it is specifically refering towards the tolerance of religious dissent.

In Pakistan, there is a confusion between what consitutes as workable defination of secularism and that, to an extent is also responsible for the political problems in the nation.

Is secularism....

A) The seperation of religion from politics
B) The absence of religion from politics
C) The tolerance of all religions in politics

These questions needed to be diecided before Pakistan can really deal with the religious problem in the country, which has to be tackled.

Ciao

... blah, blah, blah, blah!

....... i could not read past the first two sentences of this self-serving, spineless, meaningless, idiotic and really quite silly tripe and recycled kaka that is being fed to us by the clowns in khaki and their apologists and ordoriferous camp followers ............ i have no idea which camp fr khan belongs to, but i certainly don`t want to get down wind from him !

........... nonsense! ...... the military never gave the politicians half a chance to set up shop and now thay want to set up a puppet government ...... the elections being held by the horrible hindoos in occupied kashmir are more meaningful than this farce .......... october 10, 2002 will be remembered as another comical event in the tragic saga of Pakistani politics....................

Pakistanis have after long granted to themselves that they, their ideas or lack of them, has been at root for pakistani political instability. The blame can be spread generously to just about every portion of society. A key player that has yet to acknowledge that it`s skewed, obscuritanist understanding of Islam has been a curse upon Pakistan, is the Ulema. These reckless and power humgry opportunitists risk the populations religious faith on the alter of their ambition.
Beyond this I find little to agree with in your work. You assume that the only understanding of Democracy is one fashioned by the radical majoritarians of the English and European parliaments. If indeed a pluralistic environment is what you decry, why do you choose to deny that Democracy is not majoritarianism, that Democracy is itself born of the distrust of power and it`s accumulation in any particular office and that checks and balances are representative of this ethic? In a pluralitic, tolerant, can there be several versions or vision of what Democracy is?
As for the concentration of power in the presidency - this is an absurd notion - Do political considerations not work as a check on the use of by the Presidentr of power to dismiss the premier or the assembly? Doesn`t the same political consideration apply to the NSC?

This ``hekmatyar`` dude still in Pakistan? I have seen reports that prior to Taliban he was the favorite of ISI. Why is Pakistan still even ``supporting`` him, let alone harboring him somewhere in Peshawar?

Take a look at this report.

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1020910/asp/frontpage/story_1185341.asp

It`s one thing to be an optimist, but ground reality, however, is a whole different ball game. As long as your military is involved, real democracy just wont happen. Sure, you can call it a democracy or whatever, but the rest of the world wont just see it your way.

This version of democracy is going to be different in some ways than the earier versions of democracy that were offered to you, but in the end, it won`t make a difference. If mushy had actually done what he promised in terms of reigning in the religious nutcases, things might actually be different, and there could be grounds for optimism. Instead, you have the beardos running around [and continuing to provide sanctuary for Al-Qaeda luminaries such as Binshalb and that other 9/11 planner, and not to mention, Bin Laden and the others] as if nothing ever changed.

In a word, your problem is religion and the blurring of lines between church, oops, mosque and state.

For all the comparisons with Turkey and holding it as a role model, things worked in Turkey because it was essentially a single cultural entity. It managed to wipe out its Armenian and other minorities earlier on, and what was left when Attaturk was a disorganized Turkish state and he was able to lay his will on his people. On the other hand, even though you are Islamic, and you have managed to get rid of your non-muslim minorities rather successfully, a la Turkey, you still have enthic/linguistic differences and not to mention, the not-too-friendly sibling rivalry between the shias and the sunnis. In other words, a recipe for chaos. If there is a similarity with Turkey, it has to do with an ethnic problem that hasn`t been resolved to its liking, the Kurds. Over here, it`s Kashmir.

India is not a perfect democracy. It borders on chaos, yet there is some semblance of order beneath the surface, and the good thing is that governments do get kicked out on a regular basis. Best of all, the army has been put in its place, the cantonments.

The junta is taking exactly the opposite steps that are necessary for true, institutions building and good governance. They are absolutely relying on lotas whereas they are the first group of politicians that need sidelining. In today`s Dawn, Mumtaz Ali Bhutto said it straight.
[What has been labelled as the King`s Party is only a conglomeration of losers and rejects who line up for any government that is in power and abandon it when the going gets rough. This is exactly the lot that should have been removed from the field in the process of cleaning up politics.]

It is not difficult to forcast the expectations from this group of politicians - Chaudhrys, Sherpaos, Imtiaz Sheikh et al. Musharraf`s excuse of relying on this group of lotas - unpopularity at personal level - in itself speaks of desire to cling on to power above all else. Why has he failed to popularize himself, if his ``accomplishments`` are so remarkable?

Therefore this page of history, the October 10, 2002 will go down in history as rigged election, an exercise conducted just to meet the deadline set by the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

The SCP directed government to conduct elections within three years. Once a regime waits for the last day of three year period speaks of half-heartedly meeting of obligation and not a desire to set Pakistan on a democratic path.

To predict the outcome of hypothetical question, [The question posed, which the October elections will seek to settle, is not whether democracy can thrive in Pakistan, but whether this political “experiment” by the military government will be ranked as just another landmark failure in the history of Pakistan.] it is safe bet to opt for ``another landmark failure in the history of Pakistan``.