The Beginning of the End of the Kashmir Problem

Studebaker:
What you say has an element of truth. But what an irony that the Muslim League was run by Muslim feudals, the same community leaders who had kept their co-religionists down for centuries.

I dare say that in a socio-economic sense, Nehru was more pro-Muslim Awaam than Jinnah.

His Excellency / Friend: Keep in mind that Patel had offered Kkashmir to Jinnah as a tradeoff for Pakistan dropping it`s demand on Hyderabad where the exact opposite situation existed. Jinnah turned that down and Patel gave the green signal for ``Police Action`` some time later.

#186 studebaker

Your position is that muslim grievance entitles them to carry out ethnic cleansing of minorities at any time. I guess this is why muslims are mired in their victim culture. This is why we have the crazy spectacle of Pakistanis who have completely ethically cleansed their hindu and Sikh minorities, lecturing indians on secularism !

Good luck in your lunatic asylum. Fortunately outside Pakistan, most people consider your attitudes hateful and shortsighted.

His Excellency # various
Sorry for a short absence. Sometimes it becomes difficult to steal time from regular job.

You have given a good reference. However, and a big ``however``, all the cut-and-paste done by you is from Noorani`s article. Noorani has quoted little from Nehru`s work and most of the stuff is his own conjectures and opinion. Passeges quoted by you may have different impact when seen in original context. I do not yet have copy of original work and will comment on Nehru later. Till that time, I will conditionally assume that Nehru may have been at fault.

However, and again a big ``however``, considering history of that period and browsing through sequence of events, it appears that for Pakistani leadership, all this talk of timetables & UN resolutions was just a game of real politik. Afterall, when Raja was still undecided, there was no cause for Jinnah to bless Kashmiri`s invasion and push Raja in India`s lap(period - August-Sept 1947 - details can be found in Defence Journal - in an article by first commandant of PMA - I will post exact reference later). This talk of time table started only after Pakistani leadership realised that 1 muslim=10 hindus no longer holds good and they can not win Kashmir by force.
Time and again, military approach has been tried by Pakistan and after each failure we again hear a chorus about UN resolutions and timetable.

You will find in ``Frontline``, your original reference, an article about Jinnah which says that he wanted plebiscite to be done either under British or under Pakistan as he had no faith in ``indian`` leadship. My opinion is that this feeling of distrust of ``hindus`` was/is so deep that whatever roapmap is created, it will not satisfy Pakistani leadership.

This feeling is also reflected in your argument of ``pakistan can not withdraw before a roadmap is decided for plebiscite``. Perhaps this issue of Kashmir would not have happened had there not been an invasion of Kashmir by tribals in first place.

more later

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Nice article from Dawn that exposes some of the ``real`` motivations behind the Pakistan movement and its intimate connection with Hindu and Sikh ethnic cleansing.

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G.M. Syed and Indian Muslims


By Prof Sharif al-Mujahid

It is surprising that G.M. Syed, who once invited the Indian Muslims to come and settle in Sindh, would one day become so dead set against them.

The All-India Muslim League (AIML)`s 31st session at Karachi, in late December 1943, was the last AIML session to be held before its bifurcation into the Pakistan Muslim League and the Indian Union Muslim League at the AIML Council meeting at Karachi on December 14-15, 1947. At this session, G.M. Syed gave a welcome address as chairman of the reception committee, wherein he had held out an open invitation to Indian Muslims to come over to Sind and extend to Sindhi Muslims their ``helping hand``.

In an impassioned appeal to the Muslim Diaspora in the subcontinent, Syed had argued, inter alia, ``...the non-Muslims of this land (of Sindhu), in spite of the fact that they share common interests with us, are joining hands with the non-Muslims of Hind (India) and want to make the inhabitants of this land slaves, only for the reason that the majority of inhabitants are Muslims. Under the circumstances, it is the duty of every Muslim of Hind to help us to make our native land free and independent. I, of course, greatly appreciate the efforts that the Muslims of Hind have put forth in furtherance the Pakistan Movement, but I think these are not enough.... The people of this land are prepared to make sacrifices, and the conditions here are favourable; all we need is sincere workers and capital... You can help us greatly in meeting these two needs.... If people from Gujarat and Bombay could go out to the Frontier to establish Hindu dominance there, could we, too, not repose some hope in your friends? Our future is interwoven with your future. Whatever high stations in Hind you may occupy, I ain`t sure they will not be permanent without the stability of our homeland. Your integrity in India will mainly depend upon the stability of our National State.

``...you Muslims of India can help us a lot. The inhabitants of this land mostly belong to the agricultural profession, and are very backward in trade and industry. Your money and experience could remove this drawback. We are prepared to afford every facility for this with a view to making your way easier. We have already started the campaign of `Buy from Muslims` so that Muslims may be encouraged to take to trade. Thanks to Almighty God, this movement has produced good results, and now only experience and capital can perfect this scheme. It is hoped you would be good enough to extend to us your helping hand in this direction.``

But, then, why this appeal at this juncture? Because, despite Sind`s separation from Bombay in 1936, and despite all the premiers being Muslim since 1937, the Muslims continued to groan under Hindu domination in the economic, commercial and academic fields as well as in administration. Though constituting 75 per cent of the population, the Muslims comprised but two per cent among the upper classes. The Hindus owned 50pc of the land and paid nearly 80pc of the total income tax contributions (Vazirani, Sindh Assembly, March 7, 1944). Equally disquieting 87pc of Muslim families were indebted to moneylenders (Sindh Agricultural Commission, 1936). In the administration as well, Muslim presence was dismally low (only 27pc). Even minimally qualified Muslims were not available to fill in the posts, despite the introduction of a quota system (27 March 1947). Muslims filled in less than 17pc of posts in the junior clerks category, not to speak of higher categories, in the Sindh PWD in March 1947. Suhail Lari (An Illustrated History of Sindh) has laboriously documented numerous facts and figures which index Muslim Sindh`s plight, and which got exacerbated with time.

The population ratio, the only edge the Muslims had over the Hindus, had also come to be seriously disturbed by the large Hindus influx from Rajasthan, Kutch and Gujarat. The Hindus had already come to dominate, even population-wise, the urban areas in Sindh (e.g. Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukkur). To quote Maneck Pithawala, a Parsi scholar, in 1936, ``there is now a Hindu majority, instead of a Muslim one, in Karachi. Similarly, the proportion of Muslims to the total population in Sindh had also declined, whereas that of Hindus had increased. It is quite likely that in future years Sindh, like Karachi, may turn into a Hindu majority province at this rate (ours)``. And their discriminatory policies had begun to hurt the Muslims all the more grievously.

In Karachi, for instance, Lyari, inhabited by the poor Muslims, was given on a year-to-year lease so that the KMC was not obliged to provide them with basic amenities such as water, electricity and the construction of roads. Shikarpur Colony, Jamshed Road and adjacent areas, inhabited by affluent non-Muslims, were given on a 99-year lease which required the KMC to provide such amenities. If only because of the growing agitation of the Muslim League, Muslims were allowed to use the ``Eidgah Maidan`` on Bunder Road for two hours for mass Friday prayers for the first time in late 1945, and according to Sindh Police Intelligence reports, agitation for the acquisition of the Maidan was continuing during September-October 1945. Entry to higher educational institutions, manned by Hindu, was difficult, obliging the affluent ones to go all the way to Aligarh.Out of 130 successful Sindhi candidates in various Engineering examinations of the University of Bombay in 1935, only 9 were Muslims.

This was the background to Syed`s passionate appeal. The response came four years later, coinciding with the en masse migration of Hindus and Sikhs, shortly after Pakistan`s emergence. This exodus was deliberately engineered by the Congress President, Acharya J.B. Kripalani, who was of Sindhi origin, to turn Pakistan into a failed state, soon after her birth. The Hindus were told that Pakistan was bound to collapse in six months` time, eventuating in their triumphant return, to reclaim their lands and belongings, and even supreme political power.

The Muslims that came in at this juncture represented the cream of the Muslim Diaspora. Later they were joined in by industrialists, entrepreneurs and businessmen of all categories, a considerable number of them on an appeal by Jinnah, and the Aga Khan to invest in, and build, Pakistan. A vacuum had been caused by the en masse migration, from not only Sindh but the entire West Pakistan, of Hindu and Sikh entrepreneurs, bankers, businessmen, traders, shopkeepers, officials, university, college and school teachers, artisans, construction workers and others, which was sought to be filled in by the immigrants. Not only in Sindh, but, also in Punjab and NWFP. And but for the capital, the expertise and the talent made readily available at this critical juncture, Pakistan might well have collapsed. To quote Shahid Javed Burki (State and Society in Pakistan, 1971-77): ``The great in-migration of talent and skills formed the critical mass for Pakistan`s first great leap forward.``

As G.M. Syed had said, a considerable number of ``Hind`` Muslims had occupied ``high stations`` in India. Likewise, Adamjees, Ispahanis, Bawanys, Valikas, Dawoods, Habibs, Rahimtoolas, Laris, Fancys, Hyesons, Delhi Saudagaran and others had flourishing businesses in India. Nor were they in any immediate danger of being dislodged either. (For that matter, some of the divided families still run over there some of their residue enterprises, though on a smaller scale.) Thus, they came in, along with other immigrants, to build fledgling Pakistan, laboriously and with dedication, just as the Jews in the Diaspora streamed into Israel soon after its establishment on May 15, 1948. Chaim Weirmann (d. 1952), David Ben Gurion, Moshe Sharette, Gdda Myers, Aruba Eban, Moshe Dayan and a host of others who had built fledgling Israel into the most formidable state in the Middle East, even outdistancing the entrenched Egypt - they had all come from the Jewish Diaspora.

Just like the in-coming Diaspora Jews, the Muslins immigrants who had flocked to Pakistan during 1947-48 were not impelled by any profit motive. Alter all, what resources and economic infrastructure did Pakistan have at the time to get them impelled by such a motive? Rather, they were impelled by what David McClelland calls ``achievement motivation``. They brought with them capital, talent and skills, and helped to create resources and infrastructure and institutions, wherever they got themselves settled. Indeed, by the early 1950s, the mohajirs were able to bring about an industrial revolution in Pakistan which in 1947 accounted for less than five per cent of the subcontinent`s total industrial units. No wonder, Shahid Javed Burki of the World Bank considers their contribution in the building of Pakistan both substantial and significant. The immigrants served as agents of modernization in the Daniel Lerner sense, causing, above all, social mobility, a lessening of stratification, an opening up of class structure and social change.

As Lerner has shown in the Passing of the Traditional Society (1958), modernization and urbanization go together. In Pakistan as well, the immigrants flocked to the urban centres, not only in Sindh, but throughout East and West Pakistan. Unfortunately, the Sindhi rural population, failed to take advantage of the new avenues offered by industrialization around Karachi and other urban areas till the early 1970s, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto`s Sindhi-card politics made it too tempting for them. Even now, there are more Punjabi and Pathan workers, artisans, etc, in Karachi than Sindhis. Punjabi and Pushto-speaking population has registered an increase of 0.88pc and 2.95pc respectively, in Karachi, between 1951 and 1981, while Sindhi and Urdu-speaking population had decreased by 2.34pc and 6.21pc respectively, during the same period. Together, the Punjabi and Pakhtuns comprised 22.35pc - i.e. almost one-quarter - of Karachi`s population in 1981.

This sociological process G.M. Syed could not fathom for some obvious reasons. Nursed and nurtured in a feudal climate and being inherently ethnocentric and supremely oblivious of the dynamics of the urbanization and modernization processes, he simplistically, if not deliberately, attributed the inundation of the urban centres by non-Sindhis to the coming of Pakistan. And he conveniently and deliberately opted for a spell of amnesia, ignoring the stark fact that he had himself invited the Indian Muslims in the first place - first in December 1943 and then in October 1945. He had then pleaded with them to come over and rescue the Sindhi Muslims from the suffocating clutches of Hindu domination.

Arjun M / His Excellency:

On the flip side, Advani is no threat to Pakistan if the Kashmir issue is to be frozen. No Indian in power (including BJP) has the appetite or the inclination to launch an offensive on Pakistan or their portion of Kashmir.

After all, India has dealt with China and trade between the two countries has boomed following the freezing of the border.

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re: #180 by stuka

There was an ideological struggle within the Congress even before partition. Stanley Wolpert mentions it in Nehru: India`s Tryst With Destiny. Nehru had socialist leanings whereas several other members of the Congress believed in capitalism. Nevertheless, Nehru`s political stature dwarfed that of his ideological opponent within Congress. Since Nehru was expected to accede to power after independence, an understanding of sorts was already developing between USSR and India in 1945/46.

It is interesting to note that Indian alignment with USSR was so absolute that in 1948, Nehru refused to join the American bloc. America only courted friendship with Liaqat Ali Khan after India`s snub.History of subcontinent would perhaps have been different if India had aligned itself with USA in 1947 instead of USSR. (Perhaps Pakistan would have joined the USSR camp in a knee-jerk reaction).

re: #179 by nazarhayatkhan

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A very good and an informative debate. But at the end of day, the resolutions and statements do no mean anything.
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You are bang on target. Despite Pakistan`s solid legal and political position in Kashmir, the reality is that India has a stronger economic and military position.

Pakistan should should continue to raise the Kashmir issue but through diplomacy, instead of infiltration. After all, diplomacy costs just a few thousand dollars (air tickets, lodging of foreign officials). In contrast, the cost of infiltration is incessant tension, fall in investment, continuous arms race and risk of nuclear annihiliation for over 1 billion people.

Trade, socioeconomic development, education and job creation should not be sacrificed at the altar of political & legal issues.

Pakistan has several advantages viz-a-viz India. India has a huge population that needs tonnes of investment per year for job creation. In contrast, Pakistan needs 1/10th of the same amount to create jobs and increase GDP per capita. Moreover, Indian officialdom is the biggest barrier to economic reform. It has a reputation for dragging its feet. Pakistan on the other hand, downsized its bureacracy considerably from 1996 onwards.

To achieve Jinnah`s ideal of a thriving, progressive society at peace with the rest of the world, Pakistan needs to emancipate its foreign and economic policies from Jihad. Instead of becoming the ``Godfather`` of International Jihad, Pakistan needs to establish itself as a responsible, nuclear weapons state that is capable of taking care of its citizens. IMHO, Pakistan is already 60% there. Freezing Kashmir issue will take care of the other hurdles.

re: #179 by nazarhayatkhan

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The spoil sport are Advani & Company, Pak army and Mullas.
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With Vajpayee slated to quite politics next year, Advani is sure to become PM of India. This could be a big blow for peace as well as the future of secularism in India.

IMHO, Musharraf is the best man to make peace with. He is the only one who can make hard compromises because he is a military man. And above all, he can`t be accused of being a traitor.

He can tell the Mullahs: If there was a military solution to Kashmir, I would be the first one to try it. I tried Kargil, didn`t I? But it didn`t succeed. So now let`s try a peaceful settlement instead.

His Excellency:

Wow!! The world has really changed. Ii didn`t think India had joined the soviet bloc that early.

A very good and an informative debate.

But at the end of day, the resolutions and statements do no mean anything.

It requires statesmen who can look into a few centuries in the past and a few centuries into the future who can pick up the courage to compromise and bring about a solution.

Frankly, I see none on both sides.
Vajpaee has some shades of it. Benazir has a few germs of it.

The spoil sport are Advani & Company, Pak army and Mullas.

re: #176 by stuka

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Also, I have never come across any American or British statement explicitely supporting Pakistan`s stand in principle.
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Incorrect again. The Owen-Dixon Mission in 1950s had the complete backing of US and UK. These two gentlmen recommended a plan, that was essentially a roadmap for implementing UN SC 47. India rejected the plan. A catalog of US/UK press statements from 1947 in support of Pakistani position is too large to post here. You can just get a summarized picture by referring to UN SC resolutions on Kashmir at http://www.kashmiri-cc.ca/un/
* UN SC 38: US, UK in favor. Ukraine, USSR abstained
* UN SC 39: US, UK in favor. Ukraine, USSR abstained
* UN SC 47: US, UK in favor. Ukraine, USSR abstained
* UN SC 51: US, UK in favor. China, Ukraine, USSR abstained
* UN SC 80: US, UK, China in favor. India, Yugoslavia abstained
* UN SC 91: US, UK, China in favor. India, USSR abstained
* UN SC 96: US, UK, China in favor. India, USSR abstained
* UN SC 98: US, UK, China in favor. USSR abstained
* UN SC 122: US, UK, China in favor. USSR abstained
* UN SC 123: US, UK, China in favor. USSR abstained
* UN SC 126: US, UK, China in favor. USSR abstained

See a pattern here? USSR, Yugoslavia and other Communist block countries were supporting India. Rest of the world include US and UK were supporting the Pakistani position.

re: #176 by stuka

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The UN resolution in it`s entirety may be considered a legal basis as well, but then if Pakistan does not fulfill it`s bargain (and there is no timeframe as per you) India is not obligated to do so either.
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Pakistan does not expect India to announce a plebiscite unilaterally. That would not be acceptable anyway, because the plebiscite administration and its monitoring has to be done with mutual agreement.

Pakistan expects India to discuss the road map under which Pakistani withdrawal and subsequent plebiscite will take place. The Pakistani position is that the timeframe and modalities for Plebiscite must be settled BEFORE Pakistani withdrawal, not AFTER it. After all, it is quite possible that India backtracks/stalls the Plebiscite process despite a Pakistani withdrawal from PoK. Or India may militarily occupy the Kashmiri lands vacated by Pakistan.

This is a routine precautionary measure in international relations, not a breach. You could only accuse Pakistan of breaching UN SC 47 if Pakistan refused to withdraw from PoK in principle (which is not true). Pakistan has already agreed in principle to withdraw from PoK once a roadmap for plebiscite is settled.

In contrast, India not only refuses to discuss a roadmap, it also refuses to acknowledge the Plebiscite principle by calling Kashmir its ``integral part``. Therefore, India is in breach of UN SC 47, not Pakistan.

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There is also no mention of a road map in the resolution
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Re-read clauses 2-a, 2-b, 3, 7, 10, 16, 17 of UN SC 47. There is mention of formation of a Commission (UNCIP), posting observers, appointment of Plebiscite Administrator, announcement of withdrawal of Pakistani tribesmen, announcement of withdrawal of Indian troops, announcement of withdrawal of Indian nationals, invitation to political representatives to canvass.. and of course the annoucement of a date for Plebiscite.

These clauses clearly mention the need for a roadmap to implement the withdrawal and all the actions above. But the details (dates, specifics, verification process) have been left for India and Pakistan to iron out mutually.


2. The Government of India should:
(a) When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the Council`s Resolution 39 (1948) that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective, put into operation in consultation with the
Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order;

b) Make known that the withdrawal is taking place in stages and announce the completion of each stage; When the Indian forces shall have been reduced to the minimum strength mentioned in (a) above, arrange in consultation with the Commission for the stationing of the remaining forces to be carried out in accordance with the following principles:

...

3. The Government of India should agree that until such time as the plebiscite administration referred to below finds it necessary to exercise the powers of direction and supervision over the State forces and policy provided for in paragraph 8, they will be held in areas to be agreed upon with the Plebiscite Administrator

7. The Government of India should undertake that there will be established in Jammu and Kashmir a Plebiscite Administration to hold a Plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan.
...
16. The Governments of India and Pakistan should each be invited to nominate a representative to be attached to the Commission for such assistance as it may require in the performance of its task.

17. The Commission should establish in Jammu and Kashmir such observers as it may require of any of the proceedings in pursuance of the measures indicated in the foregoing paragraphs.

Pakistan`s legal case on Kashmir is further bolstered by Jawaharlal Nehru`s own statement in UN Security Council in January 1948:

``We have declared that he fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja has supported it, not only to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, but also to the world. We will not and cannot back out of it``.

It is precisely because of these political, legal and moral realities that the US, UK and UN in particular have always agreed with Pakistan`s stand in principle. Their disagreement is with the modus operandi (i.e. Jihadi infiltration) of Pakistan`s Kashmir policy, not its basis. ``

I didn`t get a chance to see this earlier. This statement by Nehru is the political basis of Pakistan`s stand, not the legal basis. As per the law, Kashmir acceded to Iindia due to the action taken by the Maharaja of Kashmir.

The UN resolution in it`s entirety may be considered a legal basis as well, but then if Pakistan does not fulfill it`s bargain (and there is no timeframe as per you) India is not obligated to do so either. In fact the letter of the law makes it mandatory for Pakistan to revert the situation in POK as it existed before 1948. Since that cannot be done because Ppakistan ceded a portion of it`s territory to China, India has no reason to hold a referendum. There is also no mention of a road map in the resolution.

Also, I have never come across any American or British statement explicitely supporting Pakistan`s stand in principle.

Nehru had already made up his mind not to hold a plebiscite. He just was not saying it out loud yet, for diplomatic and political reasons. The following letter offers a glimpse of his thinking.

NEHRU`S LETTER TO C.C.DESAI (Feb 27, 1955)
http://www.flonnet.com/fl1815/18150730.htm

Nehru wrote .... to India`s High Commissioner in Karachi, C. C. Desai, in strict confidence: ``I recognise and feel that Ghulam Mohammed is anxious to have a settlement and is prepared to go some distance for it. That is a welcome approach. But to suggest that a plebiscite should be held in Jammu and Kashmir state in the autumn of this year is manifestly not possible... Personally I really see no way out except a recognition by both parties of the status quo, subject to minor modifications. Also of course, if there is an agreement, many mutual privileges might follow. At the same time, I am very reluctant naturally to say that we will not have a plebiscite. That might appear as a breach of faith and I do not want to be guilty of that.`` This counsel of discretion was a constant refrain, as we shall see, whether in his letters to Sheikh Abdullah or other confidants. Nehru played with his cards close to his chest.