The Beginning of the End of the Kashmir Problem
Dost Mittar May 13, 2003
#206 Posted by sarwar on July 30, 2003 9:43:33 pm
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#205 Posted by bbabu on June 13, 2003 7:14:30 am
Greatest nuclear threat is Pakistan
Thursday, June 12, 2003
By TED VAN DYK
NEW YORK -- An annual two-week reconnaissance on the Eastern seaboard among present and past policy-makers and analysts causes me to send this message to the home folks: Although the Cold War is over, it is time again to start worrying about the threat of nuclear weapons.
Nukes and their dangerous cousins, biological and chemical weapons, could be used or used as blackmail to kill us in large numbers or to make us more vulnerable in the world.
This fact makes second-guessing about homeland- or airport-security ground rules seem so much childish whining. A recent New Yorker article mocked homeland-security measures in light of the fact that further 9/11s had not taken place. Our own Seattle police chief complained that federal directives sometimes confused him -- as if he did not know, without federal help, which transportation, communications and other facilities in Seattle were obvious terrorist targets requiring his protection.
The most immediate nuclear threat does not lie in North Korea, in Iran or in leakage of weapons and materials from the former Soviet Union. It is in Pakistan.
Pakistan, a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism and a country in which Osama bin Laden most likely is hiding and being protected, has a stockpile of nuclear weapons and materials. It soon could be controlled by forces allied with al-Qaida and other groups.
The Pakistani finance minister was shouted down in parliament last weekend when he tried to present his government`s budget. For many months Islamic hard-liners in the parliament have disrupted proceedings, staged walkouts and paralyzed governance. Imagine if you will some 40 percent of the U.S. Congress utilizing `60s` Students for a Democratic Society tactics to stop legislative business.
It is hard to cry for Pakistan`s president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in a coup four years ago. But beyond him might lay the abyss. Using time-tested tactics, fundamentalists are trying to cause enough chaos to force Musharraf to rule by decree. That could polarize Pakistani politics, make a peace deal with India impossible and bring to power an Osama-friendly regime.
North Korea has said it will sell nukes, technology and materials to other countries. Its conventional forces and capabilities already are strong enough to destroy Seoul in a few days and kill thousands of U.S. troops in South Korea.
Oil-rich Iran, using the same specious argument as North Korea -- that it required nuclear reactors for energy purposes -- has with Russian help come to the verge of a nuclear capability.
These countries pose a lethal threat. But the Pakistani threat is greater because it could put the same weapons in the hands of a government tied to terrorist networks. If al-Qaida allies were to come to power in Pakistan and then in Saudi Arabia, Osama`s home country, the world`s strategic balance would tip dangerously.
We went to war to remove the threat of special weapons in the hands of Saddam Hussein. But we cannot repeat Iraq in Pakistan, North Korea or Iran. We must trust diplomacy, mobilization of neighboring countries to isolate the threats and, in the end, luck.
Now, a word about the existence/non-existence of nuclear and others weapons programs in Iraq.
Many partisan and media voices have been raised charging President Bush with lying about the existence of such programs in order to justify the Iraq war. My own reaction to these challenges is about the same as to the second-guessing about homeland- and airport-security measures.
A small group of neoconservatives in and around the administration pushed war against Iraq long before Bush took office. In persuading Bush to undertake it, their weapons-of-mass-destruction argument was the clincher.
Despite its source, I felt that argument did justify an Iraq intervention -- but only after U.N. weapons inspections had run their course and a broad international coalition had been assembled in support.
Thus far, U.S. and British troops have not found the weapons they expected to find. Yet, if you watch and listen closely, you will not find many knowledgeable people charging Bush with lying about the weapons. Among those who in the past cited the probable existence of the weapons and/or their development programs have been President Clinton, his former CIA directors, defense secretary and national security adviser, senior members of congressional intelligence committees, French President Jacques Chirac, U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix and the intelligence agencies of several countries, including Germany.
My own conversations over the past two years with analysts I trust have led me to the conclusion that, yes, Iraqi chemical and biological weapons existed and were hidden and that Saddam also was seeking to develop a nuclear capability.
We`re talking life and death here. So casual charges of presidential lying or treachery are not in order. Bush went to war on the basis of an assessment about Saddam`s weapons shared by just about every knowledgeable source.
For now, keep watching developments in Pakistan, most of which are beyond U.S. control.
Thursday, June 12, 2003
By TED VAN DYK
NEW YORK -- An annual two-week reconnaissance on the Eastern seaboard among present and past policy-makers and analysts causes me to send this message to the home folks: Although the Cold War is over, it is time again to start worrying about the threat of nuclear weapons.
Nukes and their dangerous cousins, biological and chemical weapons, could be used or used as blackmail to kill us in large numbers or to make us more vulnerable in the world.
This fact makes second-guessing about homeland- or airport-security ground rules seem so much childish whining. A recent New Yorker article mocked homeland-security measures in light of the fact that further 9/11s had not taken place. Our own Seattle police chief complained that federal directives sometimes confused him -- as if he did not know, without federal help, which transportation, communications and other facilities in Seattle were obvious terrorist targets requiring his protection.
The most immediate nuclear threat does not lie in North Korea, in Iran or in leakage of weapons and materials from the former Soviet Union. It is in Pakistan.
Pakistan, a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism and a country in which Osama bin Laden most likely is hiding and being protected, has a stockpile of nuclear weapons and materials. It soon could be controlled by forces allied with al-Qaida and other groups.
The Pakistani finance minister was shouted down in parliament last weekend when he tried to present his government`s budget. For many months Islamic hard-liners in the parliament have disrupted proceedings, staged walkouts and paralyzed governance. Imagine if you will some 40 percent of the U.S. Congress utilizing `60s` Students for a Democratic Society tactics to stop legislative business.
It is hard to cry for Pakistan`s president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in a coup four years ago. But beyond him might lay the abyss. Using time-tested tactics, fundamentalists are trying to cause enough chaos to force Musharraf to rule by decree. That could polarize Pakistani politics, make a peace deal with India impossible and bring to power an Osama-friendly regime.
North Korea has said it will sell nukes, technology and materials to other countries. Its conventional forces and capabilities already are strong enough to destroy Seoul in a few days and kill thousands of U.S. troops in South Korea.
Oil-rich Iran, using the same specious argument as North Korea -- that it required nuclear reactors for energy purposes -- has with Russian help come to the verge of a nuclear capability.
These countries pose a lethal threat. But the Pakistani threat is greater because it could put the same weapons in the hands of a government tied to terrorist networks. If al-Qaida allies were to come to power in Pakistan and then in Saudi Arabia, Osama`s home country, the world`s strategic balance would tip dangerously.
We went to war to remove the threat of special weapons in the hands of Saddam Hussein. But we cannot repeat Iraq in Pakistan, North Korea or Iran. We must trust diplomacy, mobilization of neighboring countries to isolate the threats and, in the end, luck.
Now, a word about the existence/non-existence of nuclear and others weapons programs in Iraq.
Many partisan and media voices have been raised charging President Bush with lying about the existence of such programs in order to justify the Iraq war. My own reaction to these challenges is about the same as to the second-guessing about homeland- and airport-security measures.
A small group of neoconservatives in and around the administration pushed war against Iraq long before Bush took office. In persuading Bush to undertake it, their weapons-of-mass-destruction argument was the clincher.
Despite its source, I felt that argument did justify an Iraq intervention -- but only after U.N. weapons inspections had run their course and a broad international coalition had been assembled in support.
Thus far, U.S. and British troops have not found the weapons they expected to find. Yet, if you watch and listen closely, you will not find many knowledgeable people charging Bush with lying about the weapons. Among those who in the past cited the probable existence of the weapons and/or their development programs have been President Clinton, his former CIA directors, defense secretary and national security adviser, senior members of congressional intelligence committees, French President Jacques Chirac, U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix and the intelligence agencies of several countries, including Germany.
My own conversations over the past two years with analysts I trust have led me to the conclusion that, yes, Iraqi chemical and biological weapons existed and were hidden and that Saddam also was seeking to develop a nuclear capability.
We`re talking life and death here. So casual charges of presidential lying or treachery are not in order. Bush went to war on the basis of an assessment about Saddam`s weapons shared by just about every knowledgeable source.
For now, keep watching developments in Pakistan, most of which are beyond U.S. control.
#204 Posted by bbabu on June 13, 2003 7:14:29 am
Greatest nuclear threat is Pakistan
Thursday, June 12, 2003
By TED VAN DYK
NEW YORK -- An annual two-week reconnaissance on the Eastern seaboard among present and past policy-makers and analysts causes me to send this message to the home folks: Although the Cold War is over, it is time again to start worrying about the threat of nuclear weapons.
Nukes and their dangerous cousins, biological and chemical weapons, could be used or used as blackmail to kill us in large numbers or to make us more vulnerable in the world.
This fact makes second-guessing about homeland- or airport-security ground rules seem so much childish whining. A recent New Yorker article mocked homeland-security measures in light of the fact that further 9/11s had not taken place. Our own Seattle police chief complained that federal directives sometimes confused him -- as if he did not know, without federal help, which transportation, communications and other facilities in Seattle were obvious terrorist targets requiring his protection.
The most immediate nuclear threat does not lie in North Korea, in Iran or in leakage of weapons and materials from the former Soviet Union. It is in Pakistan.
Pakistan, a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism and a country in which Osama bin Laden most likely is hiding and being protected, has a stockpile of nuclear weapons and materials. It soon could be controlled by forces allied with al-Qaida and other groups.
The Pakistani finance minister was shouted down in parliament last weekend when he tried to present his government`s budget. For many months Islamic hard-liners in the parliament have disrupted proceedings, staged walkouts and paralyzed governance. Imagine if you will some 40 percent of the U.S. Congress utilizing `60s` Students for a Democratic Society tactics to stop legislative business.
It is hard to cry for Pakistan`s president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in a coup four years ago. But beyond him might lay the abyss. Using time-tested tactics, fundamentalists are trying to cause enough chaos to force Musharraf to rule by decree. That could polarize Pakistani politics, make a peace deal with India impossible and bring to power an Osama-friendly regime.
North Korea has said it will sell nukes, technology and materials to other countries. Its conventional forces and capabilities already are strong enough to destroy Seoul in a few days and kill thousands of U.S. troops in South Korea.
Oil-rich Iran, using the same specious argument as North Korea -- that it required nuclear reactors for energy purposes -- has with Russian help come to the verge of a nuclear capability.
These countries pose a lethal threat. But the Pakistani threat is greater because it could put the same weapons in the hands of a government tied to terrorist networks. If al-Qaida allies were to come to power in Pakistan and then in Saudi Arabia, Osama`s home country, the world`s strategic balance would tip dangerously.
We went to war to remove the threat of special weapons in the hands of Saddam Hussein. But we cannot repeat Iraq in Pakistan, North Korea or Iran. We must trust diplomacy, mobilization of neighboring countries to isolate the threats and, in the end, luck.
Now, a word about the existence/non-existence of nuclear and others weapons programs in Iraq.
Many partisan and media voices have been raised charging President Bush with lying about the existence of such programs in order to justify the Iraq war. My own reaction to these challenges is about the same as to the second-guessing about homeland- and airport-security measures.
A small group of neoconservatives in and around the administration pushed war against Iraq long before Bush took office. In persuading Bush to undertake it, their weapons-of-mass-destruction argument was the clincher.
Despite its source, I felt that argument did justify an Iraq intervention -- but only after U.N. weapons inspections had run their course and a broad international coalition had been assembled in support.
Thus far, U.S. and British troops have not found the weapons they expected to find. Yet, if you watch and listen closely, you will not find many knowledgeable people charging Bush with lying about the weapons. Among those who in the past cited the probable existence of the weapons and/or their development programs have been President Clinton, his former CIA directors, defense secretary and national security adviser, senior members of congressional intelligence committees, French President Jacques Chirac, U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix and the intelligence agencies of several countries, including Germany.
My own conversations over the past two years with analysts I trust have led me to the conclusion that, yes, Iraqi chemical and biological weapons existed and were hidden and that Saddam also was seeking to develop a nuclear capability.
We`re talking life and death here. So casual charges of presidential lying or treachery are not in order. Bush went to war on the basis of an assessment about Saddam`s weapons shared by just about every knowledgeable source.
For now, keep watching developments in Pakistan, most of which are beyond U.S. control.
Thursday, June 12, 2003
By TED VAN DYK
NEW YORK -- An annual two-week reconnaissance on the Eastern seaboard among present and past policy-makers and analysts causes me to send this message to the home folks: Although the Cold War is over, it is time again to start worrying about the threat of nuclear weapons.
Nukes and their dangerous cousins, biological and chemical weapons, could be used or used as blackmail to kill us in large numbers or to make us more vulnerable in the world.
This fact makes second-guessing about homeland- or airport-security ground rules seem so much childish whining. A recent New Yorker article mocked homeland-security measures in light of the fact that further 9/11s had not taken place. Our own Seattle police chief complained that federal directives sometimes confused him -- as if he did not know, without federal help, which transportation, communications and other facilities in Seattle were obvious terrorist targets requiring his protection.
The most immediate nuclear threat does not lie in North Korea, in Iran or in leakage of weapons and materials from the former Soviet Union. It is in Pakistan.
Pakistan, a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism and a country in which Osama bin Laden most likely is hiding and being protected, has a stockpile of nuclear weapons and materials. It soon could be controlled by forces allied with al-Qaida and other groups.
The Pakistani finance minister was shouted down in parliament last weekend when he tried to present his government`s budget. For many months Islamic hard-liners in the parliament have disrupted proceedings, staged walkouts and paralyzed governance. Imagine if you will some 40 percent of the U.S. Congress utilizing `60s` Students for a Democratic Society tactics to stop legislative business.
It is hard to cry for Pakistan`s president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in a coup four years ago. But beyond him might lay the abyss. Using time-tested tactics, fundamentalists are trying to cause enough chaos to force Musharraf to rule by decree. That could polarize Pakistani politics, make a peace deal with India impossible and bring to power an Osama-friendly regime.
North Korea has said it will sell nukes, technology and materials to other countries. Its conventional forces and capabilities already are strong enough to destroy Seoul in a few days and kill thousands of U.S. troops in South Korea.
Oil-rich Iran, using the same specious argument as North Korea -- that it required nuclear reactors for energy purposes -- has with Russian help come to the verge of a nuclear capability.
These countries pose a lethal threat. But the Pakistani threat is greater because it could put the same weapons in the hands of a government tied to terrorist networks. If al-Qaida allies were to come to power in Pakistan and then in Saudi Arabia, Osama`s home country, the world`s strategic balance would tip dangerously.
We went to war to remove the threat of special weapons in the hands of Saddam Hussein. But we cannot repeat Iraq in Pakistan, North Korea or Iran. We must trust diplomacy, mobilization of neighboring countries to isolate the threats and, in the end, luck.
Now, a word about the existence/non-existence of nuclear and others weapons programs in Iraq.
Many partisan and media voices have been raised charging President Bush with lying about the existence of such programs in order to justify the Iraq war. My own reaction to these challenges is about the same as to the second-guessing about homeland- and airport-security measures.
A small group of neoconservatives in and around the administration pushed war against Iraq long before Bush took office. In persuading Bush to undertake it, their weapons-of-mass-destruction argument was the clincher.
Despite its source, I felt that argument did justify an Iraq intervention -- but only after U.N. weapons inspections had run their course and a broad international coalition had been assembled in support.
Thus far, U.S. and British troops have not found the weapons they expected to find. Yet, if you watch and listen closely, you will not find many knowledgeable people charging Bush with lying about the weapons. Among those who in the past cited the probable existence of the weapons and/or their development programs have been President Clinton, his former CIA directors, defense secretary and national security adviser, senior members of congressional intelligence committees, French President Jacques Chirac, U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix and the intelligence agencies of several countries, including Germany.
My own conversations over the past two years with analysts I trust have led me to the conclusion that, yes, Iraqi chemical and biological weapons existed and were hidden and that Saddam also was seeking to develop a nuclear capability.
We`re talking life and death here. So casual charges of presidential lying or treachery are not in order. Bush went to war on the basis of an assessment about Saddam`s weapons shared by just about every knowledgeable source.
For now, keep watching developments in Pakistan, most of which are beyond U.S. control.
#203 Posted by bbabu on May 25, 2003 3:57:28 pm
Pakistani Islamists tear down ``obscene`` billboards
PESHAWAR, Pakistan, May 23 — Around 50 activists of Pakistan`s hardline Islamic alliance tore down dozens of advertising billboards depicting women in this northwestern city on Friday as part of a campaign to stamp out ``obscenity.``
The young protestors, chanting ``Allahu Akbar`` (God is Great), also tore down several neon signs advertising Western products, including soft drinks giant Pepsi, in several parts of the city close to the border with Afghanistan.
``We will wipe out vulgarity and obscenity from Peshawar, then from North West Frontier Province and then finally from the whole of Pakistan,`` said Jamsheed Munir, local leader of Shabab-e-Milli, youth wing of Pakistan`s largest religious party, Jamaat-e-Islami.
Jamaat-e-Islami is a key component of the six-party Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) alliance that rules North West Frontier Province of which Peshawar is the capital.
Munir threatened similar action against cinemas and hotels running ``liquor and gambling dens.``
Rights activists have expressed alarm at what they call the ``Talibanisation`` of society in North West Frontier and neighbouring Baluchistan since the MMA swept to power in the provinces bordering Afghanistan in October elections.
Since then, the MMA has banned music on public transport, medical examinations of women by male doctors, male coaches for women athletes and male journalists from covering women`s sports.
It has also cancelled licences for the sale of liquor to non-Muslim foreigners and one lawmaker has called for veils to be made compulsory for women, although it appears unlikely the provincial government will attempt to implement this.
On Thursday, the provincial Cabinet approved a draft law to set up a body to promote religious observance reminiscent of that established by the fundamentalist Taliban regime ousted from power in Afghanistan by a U.S.-led military coalition in late 2001.
Critics say the MMA has done little to improve living standards since coming to power in the provinces and is using strict Islamic laws in an attempt to placate its more fervent supporters.
Copyright 2003 Reuters Limited. All rights reserved. Republication or redistribution of Reuters content is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Reuters
#202 Posted by Paigham on May 23, 2003 11:13:42 pm
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#201 Posted by pmishra2 on May 23, 2003 8:07:33 am
Tipu #199 (and about 10 other messages)
Here is the link from Dawn:
http://www.dawn.com/weekly/dmag/dmag14.htm
Isn`t it amusing that Pakis always attribute insightful articles about paki identity and history etc. always to the RSS? My own impression of the RSS is a bunch of tired old men with ZERO new ideas and an obsession about the past. But I guess in Pakistan they are considered an intellectual powerhouse. Hmmm....
PS: Tipu-sahib, we always enjoy your fine writing style. But I do have one comment to make. In India we consider terms like ``Bhangi`` ``Brahmin`` ``Chamar`` ``Baniya`` ``Mussala`` etc. to be ugly forms of speech. Generally, civilzed people aspire to rise above these categories. I realize this will come as a shock to you but please try to spare us your obsession with caste and religion.
Here is the link from Dawn:
http://www.dawn.com/weekly/dmag/dmag14.htm
Isn`t it amusing that Pakis always attribute insightful articles about paki identity and history etc. always to the RSS? My own impression of the RSS is a bunch of tired old men with ZERO new ideas and an obsession about the past. But I guess in Pakistan they are considered an intellectual powerhouse. Hmmm....
PS: Tipu-sahib, we always enjoy your fine writing style. But I do have one comment to make. In India we consider terms like ``Bhangi`` ``Brahmin`` ``Chamar`` ``Baniya`` ``Mussala`` etc. to be ugly forms of speech. Generally, civilzed people aspire to rise above these categories. I realize this will come as a shock to you but please try to spare us your obsession with caste and religion.
#200 Posted by arjun_m on May 23, 2003 7:00:42 am
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#199 Posted by Tipu on May 22, 2003 10:25:58 pm
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#198 Posted by Tipu on May 22, 2003 10:25:58 pm
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#197 Posted by Tipu on May 22, 2003 10:25:58 pm
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#196 Posted by Tipu on May 22, 2003 9:34:19 pm
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#195 Posted by Tipu on May 22, 2003 9:34:19 pm
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#194 Posted by Tipu on May 22, 2003 9:34:19 pm
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#193 Posted by nasah on May 22, 2003 8:12:22 pm
blunders and blunders by Mr. Jinnah --
arrogant underestimation of the then powerful National Conference -- overestimation of a weakling Muslim Conference -- refusal to sit with the freedom fighter ( against the Dogra regime) Abdullah --
and THE mother of all blunders -- the inexplicably mysteious decision to unleash the maraudig hordes of tribal looters and rapists on the gentle nonviolent Kashmiris populace.
Diplomacy -- not Violence -- could have resolved the issue -- but then it wouldn`t have been the Muslim Way of resolving issues -- would it?
arrogant underestimation of the then powerful National Conference -- overestimation of a weakling Muslim Conference -- refusal to sit with the freedom fighter ( against the Dogra regime) Abdullah --
and THE mother of all blunders -- the inexplicably mysteious decision to unleash the maraudig hordes of tribal looters and rapists on the gentle nonviolent Kashmiris populace.
Diplomacy -- not Violence -- could have resolved the issue -- but then it wouldn`t have been the Muslim Way of resolving issues -- would it?
#192 Posted by friend on May 22, 2003 4:31:36 pm
stuka #189
Frontline article quoted by HE does raise some questions about why Nehru changed his stance. However picture is not complete till we examine conduct of all the political leaders during that period.
If appears that Maharaja of Kashmir was undecided till end. Gilgit revolt in Sept 1947 and Jinnah`s order to Gracey in 1948 may have pushed him in Sardar Patel`s lap.
Read following text from one of Pakistan military historian
http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/apr/war-lost.htm
``It was remarkable that as a very sick 71-year-old man in 1947, Mr Jinnah possessed the tremendous Coup d Oeil (unusual strategic insight) and resolution to order Gracey in October 1947 to employ two brigades of Pakistan Army to attack Kashmir; The Maharaja of Kashmir had been requesting the Indian government for military aid since 24th October and on 26th October signed the Instrument of Accession joining India. ``
While Noorani`s article raises question about Nehru, Jinnah will share equal blame for never wanting to acknowledge any competing leader. Mistrust between Jinnah on one hand and regional stalwarts like G M Syed, Khan Abul Gaffar Khan and Sheikh Abdulla is well known. Sheikh Abdulla was most well-respected Kashmiri leader in 1947. Maharaja had him in jail. Jinnah`s willingness to talk to Abdhulla would have perhaps tilted picture in favor of Pakistan. However that didn`t happened and Pakistani leadership instead attempted to use military might to achieve this goal.
Nehru alleged going back on plebiscite, when seen in this context, makes some sense.
In fact, if we look at statements made by other members of Pakistani establishment, it appears that these ``sermons`` of self-right for Kashmir`s are nothing more than hogwash.
Read following
http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/oct/kashmir.htm
When the Quaid declared Kashmir to be ‘the jugular vein of Pakistan’, he was stating a geographical fact of strategic dimension. Having lost control of three rivers of the Punjab in the Partition, Kashmir with sources of the remaining three rivers (Indus included) assumes vital importance for our economic survival. This was and remains the main reason why India aggressed into Kashmir and maintains its stranglehold. The oft-propagated bogey of Nehru’s homesickness is nothing but hogwash. For India it is a simple matter of territorial advantage over Pakistan’s northern flank and the control of its water sources. We simply cannot allow these lifelines in hostile hands that reached there and are being sustained by a series of fraudulent and deceitful practices. In this respect, Kashmir after all and much to the dislike of many is a territorial concern of vital importance.
Frontline article quoted by HE does raise some questions about why Nehru changed his stance. However picture is not complete till we examine conduct of all the political leaders during that period.
If appears that Maharaja of Kashmir was undecided till end. Gilgit revolt in Sept 1947 and Jinnah`s order to Gracey in 1948 may have pushed him in Sardar Patel`s lap.
Read following text from one of Pakistan military historian
http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/apr/war-lost.htm
``It was remarkable that as a very sick 71-year-old man in 1947, Mr Jinnah possessed the tremendous Coup d Oeil (unusual strategic insight) and resolution to order Gracey in October 1947 to employ two brigades of Pakistan Army to attack Kashmir; The Maharaja of Kashmir had been requesting the Indian government for military aid since 24th October and on 26th October signed the Instrument of Accession joining India. ``
While Noorani`s article raises question about Nehru, Jinnah will share equal blame for never wanting to acknowledge any competing leader. Mistrust between Jinnah on one hand and regional stalwarts like G M Syed, Khan Abul Gaffar Khan and Sheikh Abdulla is well known. Sheikh Abdulla was most well-respected Kashmiri leader in 1947. Maharaja had him in jail. Jinnah`s willingness to talk to Abdhulla would have perhaps tilted picture in favor of Pakistan. However that didn`t happened and Pakistani leadership instead attempted to use military might to achieve this goal.
Nehru alleged going back on plebiscite, when seen in this context, makes some sense.
In fact, if we look at statements made by other members of Pakistani establishment, it appears that these ``sermons`` of self-right for Kashmir`s are nothing more than hogwash.
Read following
http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/oct/kashmir.htm
When the Quaid declared Kashmir to be ‘the jugular vein of Pakistan’, he was stating a geographical fact of strategic dimension. Having lost control of three rivers of the Punjab in the Partition, Kashmir with sources of the remaining three rivers (Indus included) assumes vital importance for our economic survival. This was and remains the main reason why India aggressed into Kashmir and maintains its stranglehold. The oft-propagated bogey of Nehru’s homesickness is nothing but hogwash. For India it is a simple matter of territorial advantage over Pakistan’s northern flank and the control of its water sources. We simply cannot allow these lifelines in hostile hands that reached there and are being sustained by a series of fraudulent and deceitful practices. In this respect, Kashmir after all and much to the dislike of many is a territorial concern of vital importance.
#191 Posted by arjun_m on May 22, 2003 4:31:35 pm
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#190 Posted by stuka on May 22, 2003 8:07:17 am
Studebaker:
What you say has an element of truth. But what an irony that the Muslim League was run by Muslim feudals, the same community leaders who had kept their co-religionists down for centuries.
I dare say that in a socio-economic sense, Nehru was more pro-Muslim Awaam than Jinnah.
What you say has an element of truth. But what an irony that the Muslim League was run by Muslim feudals, the same community leaders who had kept their co-religionists down for centuries.
I dare say that in a socio-economic sense, Nehru was more pro-Muslim Awaam than Jinnah.
#189 Posted by stuka on May 22, 2003 8:07:17 am
His Excellency / Friend: Keep in mind that Patel had offered Kkashmir to Jinnah as a tradeoff for Pakistan dropping it`s demand on Hyderabad where the exact opposite situation existed. Jinnah turned that down and Patel gave the green signal for ``Police Action`` some time later.
#188 Posted by pmishra2 on May 22, 2003 8:07:17 am
#186 studebaker
Your position is that muslim grievance entitles them to carry out ethnic cleansing of minorities at any time. I guess this is why muslims are mired in their victim culture. This is why we have the crazy spectacle of Pakistanis who have completely ethically cleansed their hindu and Sikh minorities, lecturing indians on secularism !
Good luck in your lunatic asylum. Fortunately outside Pakistan, most people consider your attitudes hateful and shortsighted.
Your position is that muslim grievance entitles them to carry out ethnic cleansing of minorities at any time. I guess this is why muslims are mired in their victim culture. This is why we have the crazy spectacle of Pakistanis who have completely ethically cleansed their hindu and Sikh minorities, lecturing indians on secularism !
Good luck in your lunatic asylum. Fortunately outside Pakistan, most people consider your attitudes hateful and shortsighted.
#187 Posted by friend on May 21, 2003 8:07:29 pm
His Excellency # various
Sorry for a short absence. Sometimes it becomes difficult to steal time from regular job.
You have given a good reference. However, and a big ``however``, all the cut-and-paste done by you is from Noorani`s article. Noorani has quoted little from Nehru`s work and most of the stuff is his own conjectures and opinion. Passeges quoted by you may have different impact when seen in original context. I do not yet have copy of original work and will comment on Nehru later. Till that time, I will conditionally assume that Nehru may have been at fault.
However, and again a big ``however``, considering history of that period and browsing through sequence of events, it appears that for Pakistani leadership, all this talk of timetables & UN resolutions was just a game of real politik. Afterall, when Raja was still undecided, there was no cause for Jinnah to bless Kashmiri`s invasion and push Raja in India`s lap(period - August-Sept 1947 - details can be found in Defence Journal - in an article by first commandant of PMA - I will post exact reference later). This talk of time table started only after Pakistani leadership realised that 1 muslim=10 hindus no longer holds good and they can not win Kashmir by force.
Time and again, military approach has been tried by Pakistan and after each failure we again hear a chorus about UN resolutions and timetable.
You will find in ``Frontline``, your original reference, an article about Jinnah which says that he wanted plebiscite to be done either under British or under Pakistan as he had no faith in ``indian`` leadship. My opinion is that this feeling of distrust of ``hindus`` was/is so deep that whatever roapmap is created, it will not satisfy Pakistani leadership.
This feeling is also reflected in your argument of ``pakistan can not withdraw before a roadmap is decided for plebiscite``. Perhaps this issue of Kashmir would not have happened had there not been an invasion of Kashmir by tribals in first place.
more later
Sorry for a short absence. Sometimes it becomes difficult to steal time from regular job.
You have given a good reference. However, and a big ``however``, all the cut-and-paste done by you is from Noorani`s article. Noorani has quoted little from Nehru`s work and most of the stuff is his own conjectures and opinion. Passeges quoted by you may have different impact when seen in original context. I do not yet have copy of original work and will comment on Nehru later. Till that time, I will conditionally assume that Nehru may have been at fault.
However, and again a big ``however``, considering history of that period and browsing through sequence of events, it appears that for Pakistani leadership, all this talk of timetables & UN resolutions was just a game of real politik. Afterall, when Raja was still undecided, there was no cause for Jinnah to bless Kashmiri`s invasion and push Raja in India`s lap(period - August-Sept 1947 - details can be found in Defence Journal - in an article by first commandant of PMA - I will post exact reference later). This talk of time table started only after Pakistani leadership realised that 1 muslim=10 hindus no longer holds good and they can not win Kashmir by force.
Time and again, military approach has been tried by Pakistan and after each failure we again hear a chorus about UN resolutions and timetable.
You will find in ``Frontline``, your original reference, an article about Jinnah which says that he wanted plebiscite to be done either under British or under Pakistan as he had no faith in ``indian`` leadship. My opinion is that this feeling of distrust of ``hindus`` was/is so deep that whatever roapmap is created, it will not satisfy Pakistani leadership.
This feeling is also reflected in your argument of ``pakistan can not withdraw before a roadmap is decided for plebiscite``. Perhaps this issue of Kashmir would not have happened had there not been an invasion of Kashmir by tribals in first place.
more later
#186 Posted by Studebaker on May 21, 2003 6:22:24 pm
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#185 Posted by pmishra2 on May 21, 2003 4:26:50 pm
Nice article from Dawn that exposes some of the ``real`` motivations behind the Pakistan movement and its intimate connection with Hindu and Sikh ethnic cleansing.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
G.M. Syed and Indian Muslims
By Prof Sharif al-Mujahid
It is surprising that G.M. Syed, who once invited the Indian Muslims to come and settle in Sindh, would one day become so dead set against them.
The All-India Muslim League (AIML)`s 31st session at Karachi, in late December 1943, was the last AIML session to be held before its bifurcation into the Pakistan Muslim League and the Indian Union Muslim League at the AIML Council meeting at Karachi on December 14-15, 1947. At this session, G.M. Syed gave a welcome address as chairman of the reception committee, wherein he had held out an open invitation to Indian Muslims to come over to Sind and extend to Sindhi Muslims their ``helping hand``.
In an impassioned appeal to the Muslim Diaspora in the subcontinent, Syed had argued, inter alia, ``...the non-Muslims of this land (of Sindhu), in spite of the fact that they share common interests with us, are joining hands with the non-Muslims of Hind (India) and want to make the inhabitants of this land slaves, only for the reason that the majority of inhabitants are Muslims. Under the circumstances, it is the duty of every Muslim of Hind to help us to make our native land free and independent. I, of course, greatly appreciate the efforts that the Muslims of Hind have put forth in furtherance the Pakistan Movement, but I think these are not enough.... The people of this land are prepared to make sacrifices, and the conditions here are favourable; all we need is sincere workers and capital... You can help us greatly in meeting these two needs.... If people from Gujarat and Bombay could go out to the Frontier to establish Hindu dominance there, could we, too, not repose some hope in your friends? Our future is interwoven with your future. Whatever high stations in Hind you may occupy, I ain`t sure they will not be permanent without the stability of our homeland. Your integrity in India will mainly depend upon the stability of our National State.
``...you Muslims of India can help us a lot. The inhabitants of this land mostly belong to the agricultural profession, and are very backward in trade and industry. Your money and experience could remove this drawback. We are prepared to afford every facility for this with a view to making your way easier. We have already started the campaign of `Buy from Muslims` so that Muslims may be encouraged to take to trade. Thanks to Almighty God, this movement has produced good results, and now only experience and capital can perfect this scheme. It is hoped you would be good enough to extend to us your helping hand in this direction.``
But, then, why this appeal at this juncture? Because, despite Sind`s separation from Bombay in 1936, and despite all the premiers being Muslim since 1937, the Muslims continued to groan under Hindu domination in the economic, commercial and academic fields as well as in administration. Though constituting 75 per cent of the population, the Muslims comprised but two per cent among the upper classes. The Hindus owned 50pc of the land and paid nearly 80pc of the total income tax contributions (Vazirani, Sindh Assembly, March 7, 1944). Equally disquieting 87pc of Muslim families were indebted to moneylenders (Sindh Agricultural Commission, 1936). In the administration as well, Muslim presence was dismally low (only 27pc). Even minimally qualified Muslims were not available to fill in the posts, despite the introduction of a quota system (27 March 1947). Muslims filled in less than 17pc of posts in the junior clerks category, not to speak of higher categories, in the Sindh PWD in March 1947. Suhail Lari (An Illustrated History of Sindh) has laboriously documented numerous facts and figures which index Muslim Sindh`s plight, and which got exacerbated with time.
The population ratio, the only edge the Muslims had over the Hindus, had also come to be seriously disturbed by the large Hindus influx from Rajasthan, Kutch and Gujarat. The Hindus had already come to dominate, even population-wise, the urban areas in Sindh (e.g. Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukkur). To quote Maneck Pithawala, a Parsi scholar, in 1936, ``there is now a Hindu majority, instead of a Muslim one, in Karachi. Similarly, the proportion of Muslims to the total population in Sindh had also declined, whereas that of Hindus had increased. It is quite likely that in future years Sindh, like Karachi, may turn into a Hindu majority province at this rate (ours)``. And their discriminatory policies had begun to hurt the Muslims all the more grievously.
In Karachi, for instance, Lyari, inhabited by the poor Muslims, was given on a year-to-year lease so that the KMC was not obliged to provide them with basic amenities such as water, electricity and the construction of roads. Shikarpur Colony, Jamshed Road and adjacent areas, inhabited by affluent non-Muslims, were given on a 99-year lease which required the KMC to provide such amenities. If only because of the growing agitation of the Muslim League, Muslims were allowed to use the ``Eidgah Maidan`` on Bunder Road for two hours for mass Friday prayers for the first time in late 1945, and according to Sindh Police Intelligence reports, agitation for the acquisition of the Maidan was continuing during September-October 1945. Entry to higher educational institutions, manned by Hindu, was difficult, obliging the affluent ones to go all the way to Aligarh.Out of 130 successful Sindhi candidates in various Engineering examinations of the University of Bombay in 1935, only 9 were Muslims.
This was the background to Syed`s passionate appeal. The response came four years later, coinciding with the en masse migration of Hindus and Sikhs, shortly after Pakistan`s emergence. This exodus was deliberately engineered by the Congress President, Acharya J.B. Kripalani, who was of Sindhi origin, to turn Pakistan into a failed state, soon after her birth. The Hindus were told that Pakistan was bound to collapse in six months` time, eventuating in their triumphant return, to reclaim their lands and belongings, and even supreme political power.
The Muslims that came in at this juncture represented the cream of the Muslim Diaspora. Later they were joined in by industrialists, entrepreneurs and businessmen of all categories, a considerable number of them on an appeal by Jinnah, and the Aga Khan to invest in, and build, Pakistan. A vacuum had been caused by the en masse migration, from not only Sindh but the entire West Pakistan, of Hindu and Sikh entrepreneurs, bankers, businessmen, traders, shopkeepers, officials, university, college and school teachers, artisans, construction workers and others, which was sought to be filled in by the immigrants. Not only in Sindh, but, also in Punjab and NWFP. And but for the capital, the expertise and the talent made readily available at this critical juncture, Pakistan might well have collapsed. To quote Shahid Javed Burki (State and Society in Pakistan, 1971-77): ``The great in-migration of talent and skills formed the critical mass for Pakistan`s first great leap forward.``
As G.M. Syed had said, a considerable number of ``Hind`` Muslims had occupied ``high stations`` in India. Likewise, Adamjees, Ispahanis, Bawanys, Valikas, Dawoods, Habibs, Rahimtoolas, Laris, Fancys, Hyesons, Delhi Saudagaran and others had flourishing businesses in India. Nor were they in any immediate danger of being dislodged either. (For that matter, some of the divided families still run over there some of their residue enterprises, though on a smaller scale.) Thus, they came in, along with other immigrants, to build fledgling Pakistan, laboriously and with dedication, just as the Jews in the Diaspora streamed into Israel soon after its establishment on May 15, 1948. Chaim Weirmann (d. 1952), David Ben Gurion, Moshe Sharette, Gdda Myers, Aruba Eban, Moshe Dayan and a host of others who had built fledgling Israel into the most formidable state in the Middle East, even outdistancing the entrenched Egypt - they had all come from the Jewish Diaspora.
Just like the in-coming Diaspora Jews, the Muslins immigrants who had flocked to Pakistan during 1947-48 were not impelled by any profit motive. Alter all, what resources and economic infrastructure did Pakistan have at the time to get them impelled by such a motive? Rather, they were impelled by what David McClelland calls ``achievement motivation``. They brought with them capital, talent and skills, and helped to create resources and infrastructure and institutions, wherever they got themselves settled. Indeed, by the early 1950s, the mohajirs were able to bring about an industrial revolution in Pakistan which in 1947 accounted for less than five per cent of the subcontinent`s total industrial units. No wonder, Shahid Javed Burki of the World Bank considers their contribution in the building of Pakistan both substantial and significant. The immigrants served as agents of modernization in the Daniel Lerner sense, causing, above all, social mobility, a lessening of stratification, an opening up of class structure and social change.
As Lerner has shown in the Passing of the Traditional Society (1958), modernization and urbanization go together. In Pakistan as well, the immigrants flocked to the urban centres, not only in Sindh, but throughout East and West Pakistan. Unfortunately, the Sindhi rural population, failed to take advantage of the new avenues offered by industrialization around Karachi and other urban areas till the early 1970s, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto`s Sindhi-card politics made it too tempting for them. Even now, there are more Punjabi and Pathan workers, artisans, etc, in Karachi than Sindhis. Punjabi and Pushto-speaking population has registered an increase of 0.88pc and 2.95pc respectively, in Karachi, between 1951 and 1981, while Sindhi and Urdu-speaking population had decreased by 2.34pc and 6.21pc respectively, during the same period. Together, the Punjabi and Pakhtuns comprised 22.35pc - i.e. almost one-quarter - of Karachi`s population in 1981.
This sociological process G.M. Syed could not fathom for some obvious reasons. Nursed and nurtured in a feudal climate and being inherently ethnocentric and supremely oblivious of the dynamics of the urbanization and modernization processes, he simplistically, if not deliberately, attributed the inundation of the urban centres by non-Sindhis to the coming of Pakistan. And he conveniently and deliberately opted for a spell of amnesia, ignoring the stark fact that he had himself invited the Indian Muslims in the first place - first in December 1943 and then in October 1945. He had then pleaded with them to come over and rescue the Sindhi Muslims from the suffocating clutches of Hindu domination.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
G.M. Syed and Indian Muslims
By Prof Sharif al-Mujahid
It is surprising that G.M. Syed, who once invited the Indian Muslims to come and settle in Sindh, would one day become so dead set against them.
The All-India Muslim League (AIML)`s 31st session at Karachi, in late December 1943, was the last AIML session to be held before its bifurcation into the Pakistan Muslim League and the Indian Union Muslim League at the AIML Council meeting at Karachi on December 14-15, 1947. At this session, G.M. Syed gave a welcome address as chairman of the reception committee, wherein he had held out an open invitation to Indian Muslims to come over to Sind and extend to Sindhi Muslims their ``helping hand``.
In an impassioned appeal to the Muslim Diaspora in the subcontinent, Syed had argued, inter alia, ``...the non-Muslims of this land (of Sindhu), in spite of the fact that they share common interests with us, are joining hands with the non-Muslims of Hind (India) and want to make the inhabitants of this land slaves, only for the reason that the majority of inhabitants are Muslims. Under the circumstances, it is the duty of every Muslim of Hind to help us to make our native land free and independent. I, of course, greatly appreciate the efforts that the Muslims of Hind have put forth in furtherance the Pakistan Movement, but I think these are not enough.... The people of this land are prepared to make sacrifices, and the conditions here are favourable; all we need is sincere workers and capital... You can help us greatly in meeting these two needs.... If people from Gujarat and Bombay could go out to the Frontier to establish Hindu dominance there, could we, too, not repose some hope in your friends? Our future is interwoven with your future. Whatever high stations in Hind you may occupy, I ain`t sure they will not be permanent without the stability of our homeland. Your integrity in India will mainly depend upon the stability of our National State.
``...you Muslims of India can help us a lot. The inhabitants of this land mostly belong to the agricultural profession, and are very backward in trade and industry. Your money and experience could remove this drawback. We are prepared to afford every facility for this with a view to making your way easier. We have already started the campaign of `Buy from Muslims` so that Muslims may be encouraged to take to trade. Thanks to Almighty God, this movement has produced good results, and now only experience and capital can perfect this scheme. It is hoped you would be good enough to extend to us your helping hand in this direction.``
But, then, why this appeal at this juncture? Because, despite Sind`s separation from Bombay in 1936, and despite all the premiers being Muslim since 1937, the Muslims continued to groan under Hindu domination in the economic, commercial and academic fields as well as in administration. Though constituting 75 per cent of the population, the Muslims comprised but two per cent among the upper classes. The Hindus owned 50pc of the land and paid nearly 80pc of the total income tax contributions (Vazirani, Sindh Assembly, March 7, 1944). Equally disquieting 87pc of Muslim families were indebted to moneylenders (Sindh Agricultural Commission, 1936). In the administration as well, Muslim presence was dismally low (only 27pc). Even minimally qualified Muslims were not available to fill in the posts, despite the introduction of a quota system (27 March 1947). Muslims filled in less than 17pc of posts in the junior clerks category, not to speak of higher categories, in the Sindh PWD in March 1947. Suhail Lari (An Illustrated History of Sindh) has laboriously documented numerous facts and figures which index Muslim Sindh`s plight, and which got exacerbated with time.
The population ratio, the only edge the Muslims had over the Hindus, had also come to be seriously disturbed by the large Hindus influx from Rajasthan, Kutch and Gujarat. The Hindus had already come to dominate, even population-wise, the urban areas in Sindh (e.g. Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukkur). To quote Maneck Pithawala, a Parsi scholar, in 1936, ``there is now a Hindu majority, instead of a Muslim one, in Karachi. Similarly, the proportion of Muslims to the total population in Sindh had also declined, whereas that of Hindus had increased. It is quite likely that in future years Sindh, like Karachi, may turn into a Hindu majority province at this rate (ours)``. And their discriminatory policies had begun to hurt the Muslims all the more grievously.
In Karachi, for instance, Lyari, inhabited by the poor Muslims, was given on a year-to-year lease so that the KMC was not obliged to provide them with basic amenities such as water, electricity and the construction of roads. Shikarpur Colony, Jamshed Road and adjacent areas, inhabited by affluent non-Muslims, were given on a 99-year lease which required the KMC to provide such amenities. If only because of the growing agitation of the Muslim League, Muslims were allowed to use the ``Eidgah Maidan`` on Bunder Road for two hours for mass Friday prayers for the first time in late 1945, and according to Sindh Police Intelligence reports, agitation for the acquisition of the Maidan was continuing during September-October 1945. Entry to higher educational institutions, manned by Hindu, was difficult, obliging the affluent ones to go all the way to Aligarh.Out of 130 successful Sindhi candidates in various Engineering examinations of the University of Bombay in 1935, only 9 were Muslims.
This was the background to Syed`s passionate appeal. The response came four years later, coinciding with the en masse migration of Hindus and Sikhs, shortly after Pakistan`s emergence. This exodus was deliberately engineered by the Congress President, Acharya J.B. Kripalani, who was of Sindhi origin, to turn Pakistan into a failed state, soon after her birth. The Hindus were told that Pakistan was bound to collapse in six months` time, eventuating in their triumphant return, to reclaim their lands and belongings, and even supreme political power.
The Muslims that came in at this juncture represented the cream of the Muslim Diaspora. Later they were joined in by industrialists, entrepreneurs and businessmen of all categories, a considerable number of them on an appeal by Jinnah, and the Aga Khan to invest in, and build, Pakistan. A vacuum had been caused by the en masse migration, from not only Sindh but the entire West Pakistan, of Hindu and Sikh entrepreneurs, bankers, businessmen, traders, shopkeepers, officials, university, college and school teachers, artisans, construction workers and others, which was sought to be filled in by the immigrants. Not only in Sindh, but, also in Punjab and NWFP. And but for the capital, the expertise and the talent made readily available at this critical juncture, Pakistan might well have collapsed. To quote Shahid Javed Burki (State and Society in Pakistan, 1971-77): ``The great in-migration of talent and skills formed the critical mass for Pakistan`s first great leap forward.``
As G.M. Syed had said, a considerable number of ``Hind`` Muslims had occupied ``high stations`` in India. Likewise, Adamjees, Ispahanis, Bawanys, Valikas, Dawoods, Habibs, Rahimtoolas, Laris, Fancys, Hyesons, Delhi Saudagaran and others had flourishing businesses in India. Nor were they in any immediate danger of being dislodged either. (For that matter, some of the divided families still run over there some of their residue enterprises, though on a smaller scale.) Thus, they came in, along with other immigrants, to build fledgling Pakistan, laboriously and with dedication, just as the Jews in the Diaspora streamed into Israel soon after its establishment on May 15, 1948. Chaim Weirmann (d. 1952), David Ben Gurion, Moshe Sharette, Gdda Myers, Aruba Eban, Moshe Dayan and a host of others who had built fledgling Israel into the most formidable state in the Middle East, even outdistancing the entrenched Egypt - they had all come from the Jewish Diaspora.
Just like the in-coming Diaspora Jews, the Muslins immigrants who had flocked to Pakistan during 1947-48 were not impelled by any profit motive. Alter all, what resources and economic infrastructure did Pakistan have at the time to get them impelled by such a motive? Rather, they were impelled by what David McClelland calls ``achievement motivation``. They brought with them capital, talent and skills, and helped to create resources and infrastructure and institutions, wherever they got themselves settled. Indeed, by the early 1950s, the mohajirs were able to bring about an industrial revolution in Pakistan which in 1947 accounted for less than five per cent of the subcontinent`s total industrial units. No wonder, Shahid Javed Burki of the World Bank considers their contribution in the building of Pakistan both substantial and significant. The immigrants served as agents of modernization in the Daniel Lerner sense, causing, above all, social mobility, a lessening of stratification, an opening up of class structure and social change.
As Lerner has shown in the Passing of the Traditional Society (1958), modernization and urbanization go together. In Pakistan as well, the immigrants flocked to the urban centres, not only in Sindh, but throughout East and West Pakistan. Unfortunately, the Sindhi rural population, failed to take advantage of the new avenues offered by industrialization around Karachi and other urban areas till the early 1970s, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto`s Sindhi-card politics made it too tempting for them. Even now, there are more Punjabi and Pathan workers, artisans, etc, in Karachi than Sindhis. Punjabi and Pushto-speaking population has registered an increase of 0.88pc and 2.95pc respectively, in Karachi, between 1951 and 1981, while Sindhi and Urdu-speaking population had decreased by 2.34pc and 6.21pc respectively, during the same period. Together, the Punjabi and Pakhtuns comprised 22.35pc - i.e. almost one-quarter - of Karachi`s population in 1981.
This sociological process G.M. Syed could not fathom for some obvious reasons. Nursed and nurtured in a feudal climate and being inherently ethnocentric and supremely oblivious of the dynamics of the urbanization and modernization processes, he simplistically, if not deliberately, attributed the inundation of the urban centres by non-Sindhis to the coming of Pakistan. And he conveniently and deliberately opted for a spell of amnesia, ignoring the stark fact that he had himself invited the Indian Muslims in the first place - first in December 1943 and then in October 1945. He had then pleaded with them to come over and rescue the Sindhi Muslims from the suffocating clutches of Hindu domination.
#184 Posted by stuka on May 21, 2003 3:25:44 pm
Arjun M / His Excellency:
On the flip side, Advani is no threat to Pakistan if the Kashmir issue is to be frozen. No Indian in power (including BJP) has the appetite or the inclination to launch an offensive on Pakistan or their portion of Kashmir.
After all, India has dealt with China and trade between the two countries has boomed following the freezing of the border.
On the flip side, Advani is no threat to Pakistan if the Kashmir issue is to be frozen. No Indian in power (including BJP) has the appetite or the inclination to launch an offensive on Pakistan or their portion of Kashmir.
After all, India has dealt with China and trade between the two countries has boomed following the freezing of the border.
#183 Posted by arjun_m on May 21, 2003 1:42:25 pm
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#182 Posted by HisExcellency on May 21, 2003 11:33:33 am
re: #180 by stuka
There was an ideological struggle within the Congress even before partition. Stanley Wolpert mentions it in Nehru: India`s Tryst With Destiny. Nehru had socialist leanings whereas several other members of the Congress believed in capitalism. Nevertheless, Nehru`s political stature dwarfed that of his ideological opponent within Congress. Since Nehru was expected to accede to power after independence, an understanding of sorts was already developing between USSR and India in 1945/46.
It is interesting to note that Indian alignment with USSR was so absolute that in 1948, Nehru refused to join the American bloc. America only courted friendship with Liaqat Ali Khan after India`s snub.History of subcontinent would perhaps have been different if India had aligned itself with USA in 1947 instead of USSR. (Perhaps Pakistan would have joined the USSR camp in a knee-jerk reaction).
re: #179 by nazarhayatkhan
++
A very good and an informative debate. But at the end of day, the resolutions and statements do no mean anything.
++
You are bang on target. Despite Pakistan`s solid legal and political position in Kashmir, the reality is that India has a stronger economic and military position.
Pakistan should should continue to raise the Kashmir issue but through diplomacy, instead of infiltration. After all, diplomacy costs just a few thousand dollars (air tickets, lodging of foreign officials). In contrast, the cost of infiltration is incessant tension, fall in investment, continuous arms race and risk of nuclear annihiliation for over 1 billion people.
Trade, socioeconomic development, education and job creation should not be sacrificed at the altar of political & legal issues.
Pakistan has several advantages viz-a-viz India. India has a huge population that needs tonnes of investment per year for job creation. In contrast, Pakistan needs 1/10th of the same amount to create jobs and increase GDP per capita. Moreover, Indian officialdom is the biggest barrier to economic reform. It has a reputation for dragging its feet. Pakistan on the other hand, downsized its bureacracy considerably from 1996 onwards.
To achieve Jinnah`s ideal of a thriving, progressive society at peace with the rest of the world, Pakistan needs to emancipate its foreign and economic policies from Jihad. Instead of becoming the ``Godfather`` of International Jihad, Pakistan needs to establish itself as a responsible, nuclear weapons state that is capable of taking care of its citizens. IMHO, Pakistan is already 60% there. Freezing Kashmir issue will take care of the other hurdles.
There was an ideological struggle within the Congress even before partition. Stanley Wolpert mentions it in Nehru: India`s Tryst With Destiny. Nehru had socialist leanings whereas several other members of the Congress believed in capitalism. Nevertheless, Nehru`s political stature dwarfed that of his ideological opponent within Congress. Since Nehru was expected to accede to power after independence, an understanding of sorts was already developing between USSR and India in 1945/46.
It is interesting to note that Indian alignment with USSR was so absolute that in 1948, Nehru refused to join the American bloc. America only courted friendship with Liaqat Ali Khan after India`s snub.History of subcontinent would perhaps have been different if India had aligned itself with USA in 1947 instead of USSR. (Perhaps Pakistan would have joined the USSR camp in a knee-jerk reaction).
re: #179 by nazarhayatkhan
++
A very good and an informative debate. But at the end of day, the resolutions and statements do no mean anything.
++
You are bang on target. Despite Pakistan`s solid legal and political position in Kashmir, the reality is that India has a stronger economic and military position.
Pakistan should should continue to raise the Kashmir issue but through diplomacy, instead of infiltration. After all, diplomacy costs just a few thousand dollars (air tickets, lodging of foreign officials). In contrast, the cost of infiltration is incessant tension, fall in investment, continuous arms race and risk of nuclear annihiliation for over 1 billion people.
Trade, socioeconomic development, education and job creation should not be sacrificed at the altar of political & legal issues.
Pakistan has several advantages viz-a-viz India. India has a huge population that needs tonnes of investment per year for job creation. In contrast, Pakistan needs 1/10th of the same amount to create jobs and increase GDP per capita. Moreover, Indian officialdom is the biggest barrier to economic reform. It has a reputation for dragging its feet. Pakistan on the other hand, downsized its bureacracy considerably from 1996 onwards.
To achieve Jinnah`s ideal of a thriving, progressive society at peace with the rest of the world, Pakistan needs to emancipate its foreign and economic policies from Jihad. Instead of becoming the ``Godfather`` of International Jihad, Pakistan needs to establish itself as a responsible, nuclear weapons state that is capable of taking care of its citizens. IMHO, Pakistan is already 60% there. Freezing Kashmir issue will take care of the other hurdles.
#181 Posted by HisExcellency on May 21, 2003 11:33:33 am
re: #179 by nazarhayatkhan
++
The spoil sport are Advani & Company, Pak army and Mullas.
++
With Vajpayee slated to quite politics next year, Advani is sure to become PM of India. This could be a big blow for peace as well as the future of secularism in India.
IMHO, Musharraf is the best man to make peace with. He is the only one who can make hard compromises because he is a military man. And above all, he can`t be accused of being a traitor.
He can tell the Mullahs: If there was a military solution to Kashmir, I would be the first one to try it. I tried Kargil, didn`t I? But it didn`t succeed. So now let`s try a peaceful settlement instead.
++
The spoil sport are Advani & Company, Pak army and Mullas.
++
With Vajpayee slated to quite politics next year, Advani is sure to become PM of India. This could be a big blow for peace as well as the future of secularism in India.
IMHO, Musharraf is the best man to make peace with. He is the only one who can make hard compromises because he is a military man. And above all, he can`t be accused of being a traitor.
He can tell the Mullahs: If there was a military solution to Kashmir, I would be the first one to try it. I tried Kargil, didn`t I? But it didn`t succeed. So now let`s try a peaceful settlement instead.
#180 Posted by stuka on May 21, 2003 8:54:11 am
His Excellency:
Wow!! The world has really changed. Ii didn`t think India had joined the soviet bloc that early.
Wow!! The world has really changed. Ii didn`t think India had joined the soviet bloc that early.
#179 Posted by nazarhayatkhan on May 21, 2003 6:40:30 am
A very good and an informative debate.
But at the end of day, the resolutions and statements do no mean anything.
It requires statesmen who can look into a few centuries in the past and a few centuries into the future who can pick up the courage to compromise and bring about a solution.
Frankly, I see none on both sides.
Vajpaee has some shades of it. Benazir has a few germs of it.
The spoil sport are Advani & Company, Pak army and Mullas.
#178 Posted by HisExcellency on May 20, 2003 4:43:45 pm
re: #176 by stuka
++
Also, I have never come across any American or British statement explicitely supporting Pakistan`s stand in principle.
++
Incorrect again. The Owen-Dixon Mission in 1950s had the complete backing of US and UK. These two gentlmen recommended a plan, that was essentially a roadmap for implementing UN SC 47. India rejected the plan. A catalog of US/UK press statements from 1947 in support of Pakistani position is too large to post here. You can just get a summarized picture by referring to UN SC resolutions on Kashmir at http://www.kashmiri-cc.ca/un/
* UN SC 38: US, UK in favor. Ukraine, USSR abstained
* UN SC 39: US, UK in favor. Ukraine, USSR abstained
* UN SC 47: US, UK in favor. Ukraine, USSR abstained
* UN SC 51: US, UK in favor. China, Ukraine, USSR abstained
* UN SC 80: US, UK, China in favor. India, Yugoslavia abstained
* UN SC 91: US, UK, China in favor. India, USSR abstained
* UN SC 96: US, UK, China in favor. India, USSR abstained
* UN SC 98: US, UK, China in favor. USSR abstained
* UN SC 122: US, UK, China in favor. USSR abstained
* UN SC 123: US, UK, China in favor. USSR abstained
* UN SC 126: US, UK, China in favor. USSR abstained
See a pattern here? USSR, Yugoslavia and other Communist block countries were supporting India. Rest of the world include US and UK were supporting the Pakistani position.
++
Also, I have never come across any American or British statement explicitely supporting Pakistan`s stand in principle.
++
Incorrect again. The Owen-Dixon Mission in 1950s had the complete backing of US and UK. These two gentlmen recommended a plan, that was essentially a roadmap for implementing UN SC 47. India rejected the plan. A catalog of US/UK press statements from 1947 in support of Pakistani position is too large to post here. You can just get a summarized picture by referring to UN SC resolutions on Kashmir at http://www.kashmiri-cc.ca/un/
* UN SC 38: US, UK in favor. Ukraine, USSR abstained
* UN SC 39: US, UK in favor. Ukraine, USSR abstained
* UN SC 47: US, UK in favor. Ukraine, USSR abstained
* UN SC 51: US, UK in favor. China, Ukraine, USSR abstained
* UN SC 80: US, UK, China in favor. India, Yugoslavia abstained
* UN SC 91: US, UK, China in favor. India, USSR abstained
* UN SC 96: US, UK, China in favor. India, USSR abstained
* UN SC 98: US, UK, China in favor. USSR abstained
* UN SC 122: US, UK, China in favor. USSR abstained
* UN SC 123: US, UK, China in favor. USSR abstained
* UN SC 126: US, UK, China in favor. USSR abstained
See a pattern here? USSR, Yugoslavia and other Communist block countries were supporting India. Rest of the world include US and UK were supporting the Pakistani position.
#177 Posted by HisExcellency on May 20, 2003 4:07:45 pm
re: #176 by stuka
++
The UN resolution in it`s entirety may be considered a legal basis as well, but then if Pakistan does not fulfill it`s bargain (and there is no timeframe as per you) India is not obligated to do so either.
++
Pakistan does not expect India to announce a plebiscite unilaterally. That would not be acceptable anyway, because the plebiscite administration and its monitoring has to be done with mutual agreement.
Pakistan expects India to discuss the road map under which Pakistani withdrawal and subsequent plebiscite will take place. The Pakistani position is that the timeframe and modalities for Plebiscite must be settled BEFORE Pakistani withdrawal, not AFTER it. After all, it is quite possible that India backtracks/stalls the Plebiscite process despite a Pakistani withdrawal from PoK. Or India may militarily occupy the Kashmiri lands vacated by Pakistan.
This is a routine precautionary measure in international relations, not a breach. You could only accuse Pakistan of breaching UN SC 47 if Pakistan refused to withdraw from PoK in principle (which is not true). Pakistan has already agreed in principle to withdraw from PoK once a roadmap for plebiscite is settled.
In contrast, India not only refuses to discuss a roadmap, it also refuses to acknowledge the Plebiscite principle by calling Kashmir its ``integral part``. Therefore, India is in breach of UN SC 47, not Pakistan.
++
There is also no mention of a road map in the resolution
++
Re-read clauses 2-a, 2-b, 3, 7, 10, 16, 17 of UN SC 47. There is mention of formation of a Commission (UNCIP), posting observers, appointment of Plebiscite Administrator, announcement of withdrawal of Pakistani tribesmen, announcement of withdrawal of Indian troops, announcement of withdrawal of Indian nationals, invitation to political representatives to canvass.. and of course the annoucement of a date for Plebiscite.
These clauses clearly mention the need for a roadmap to implement the withdrawal and all the actions above. But the details (dates, specifics, verification process) have been left for India and Pakistan to iron out mutually.
2. The Government of India should:
(a) When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the Council`s Resolution 39 (1948) that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective, put into operation in consultation with the
Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order;
b) Make known that the withdrawal is taking place in stages and announce the completion of each stage; When the Indian forces shall have been reduced to the minimum strength mentioned in (a) above, arrange in consultation with the Commission for the stationing of the remaining forces to be carried out in accordance with the following principles:
...
3. The Government of India should agree that until such time as the plebiscite administration referred to below finds it necessary to exercise the powers of direction and supervision over the State forces and policy provided for in paragraph 8, they will be held in areas to be agreed upon with the Plebiscite Administrator
7. The Government of India should undertake that there will be established in Jammu and Kashmir a Plebiscite Administration to hold a Plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan.
...
16. The Governments of India and Pakistan should each be invited to nominate a representative to be attached to the Commission for such assistance as it may require in the performance of its task.
17. The Commission should establish in Jammu and Kashmir such observers as it may require of any of the proceedings in pursuance of the measures indicated in the foregoing paragraphs.
++
The UN resolution in it`s entirety may be considered a legal basis as well, but then if Pakistan does not fulfill it`s bargain (and there is no timeframe as per you) India is not obligated to do so either.
++
Pakistan does not expect India to announce a plebiscite unilaterally. That would not be acceptable anyway, because the plebiscite administration and its monitoring has to be done with mutual agreement.
Pakistan expects India to discuss the road map under which Pakistani withdrawal and subsequent plebiscite will take place. The Pakistani position is that the timeframe and modalities for Plebiscite must be settled BEFORE Pakistani withdrawal, not AFTER it. After all, it is quite possible that India backtracks/stalls the Plebiscite process despite a Pakistani withdrawal from PoK. Or India may militarily occupy the Kashmiri lands vacated by Pakistan.
This is a routine precautionary measure in international relations, not a breach. You could only accuse Pakistan of breaching UN SC 47 if Pakistan refused to withdraw from PoK in principle (which is not true). Pakistan has already agreed in principle to withdraw from PoK once a roadmap for plebiscite is settled.
In contrast, India not only refuses to discuss a roadmap, it also refuses to acknowledge the Plebiscite principle by calling Kashmir its ``integral part``. Therefore, India is in breach of UN SC 47, not Pakistan.
++
There is also no mention of a road map in the resolution
++
Re-read clauses 2-a, 2-b, 3, 7, 10, 16, 17 of UN SC 47. There is mention of formation of a Commission (UNCIP), posting observers, appointment of Plebiscite Administrator, announcement of withdrawal of Pakistani tribesmen, announcement of withdrawal of Indian troops, announcement of withdrawal of Indian nationals, invitation to political representatives to canvass.. and of course the annoucement of a date for Plebiscite.
These clauses clearly mention the need for a roadmap to implement the withdrawal and all the actions above. But the details (dates, specifics, verification process) have been left for India and Pakistan to iron out mutually.
2. The Government of India should:
(a) When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the Council`s Resolution 39 (1948) that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective, put into operation in consultation with the
Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order;
b) Make known that the withdrawal is taking place in stages and announce the completion of each stage; When the Indian forces shall have been reduced to the minimum strength mentioned in (a) above, arrange in consultation with the Commission for the stationing of the remaining forces to be carried out in accordance with the following principles:
...
3. The Government of India should agree that until such time as the plebiscite administration referred to below finds it necessary to exercise the powers of direction and supervision over the State forces and policy provided for in paragraph 8, they will be held in areas to be agreed upon with the Plebiscite Administrator
7. The Government of India should undertake that there will be established in Jammu and Kashmir a Plebiscite Administration to hold a Plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan.
...
16. The Governments of India and Pakistan should each be invited to nominate a representative to be attached to the Commission for such assistance as it may require in the performance of its task.
17. The Commission should establish in Jammu and Kashmir such observers as it may require of any of the proceedings in pursuance of the measures indicated in the foregoing paragraphs.
#176 Posted by stuka on May 20, 2003 3:10:35 pm
Pakistan`s legal case on Kashmir is further bolstered by Jawaharlal Nehru`s own statement in UN Security Council in January 1948:
``We have declared that he fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja has supported it, not only to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, but also to the world. We will not and cannot back out of it``.
It is precisely because of these political, legal and moral realities that the US, UK and UN in particular have always agreed with Pakistan`s stand in principle. Their disagreement is with the modus operandi (i.e. Jihadi infiltration) of Pakistan`s Kashmir policy, not its basis. ``
I didn`t get a chance to see this earlier. This statement by Nehru is the political basis of Pakistan`s stand, not the legal basis. As per the law, Kashmir acceded to Iindia due to the action taken by the Maharaja of Kashmir.
The UN resolution in it`s entirety may be considered a legal basis as well, but then if Pakistan does not fulfill it`s bargain (and there is no timeframe as per you) India is not obligated to do so either. In fact the letter of the law makes it mandatory for Pakistan to revert the situation in POK as it existed before 1948. Since that cannot be done because Ppakistan ceded a portion of it`s territory to China, India has no reason to hold a referendum. There is also no mention of a road map in the resolution.
Also, I have never come across any American or British statement explicitely supporting Pakistan`s stand in principle.
``We have declared that he fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja has supported it, not only to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, but also to the world. We will not and cannot back out of it``.
It is precisely because of these political, legal and moral realities that the US, UK and UN in particular have always agreed with Pakistan`s stand in principle. Their disagreement is with the modus operandi (i.e. Jihadi infiltration) of Pakistan`s Kashmir policy, not its basis. ``
I didn`t get a chance to see this earlier. This statement by Nehru is the political basis of Pakistan`s stand, not the legal basis. As per the law, Kashmir acceded to Iindia due to the action taken by the Maharaja of Kashmir.
The UN resolution in it`s entirety may be considered a legal basis as well, but then if Pakistan does not fulfill it`s bargain (and there is no timeframe as per you) India is not obligated to do so either. In fact the letter of the law makes it mandatory for Pakistan to revert the situation in POK as it existed before 1948. Since that cannot be done because Ppakistan ceded a portion of it`s territory to China, India has no reason to hold a referendum. There is also no mention of a road map in the resolution.
Also, I have never come across any American or British statement explicitely supporting Pakistan`s stand in principle.
#175 Posted by HisExcellency on May 20, 2003 1:41:05 pm
Nehru had already made up his mind not to hold a plebiscite. He just was not saying it out loud yet, for diplomatic and political reasons. The following letter offers a glimpse of his thinking.
NEHRU`S LETTER TO C.C.DESAI (Feb 27, 1955)
http://www.flonnet.com/fl1815/18150730.htm
Nehru wrote .... to India`s High Commissioner in Karachi, C. C. Desai, in strict confidence: ``I recognise and feel that Ghulam Mohammed is anxious to have a settlement and is prepared to go some distance for it. That is a welcome approach. But to suggest that a plebiscite should be held in Jammu and Kashmir state in the autumn of this year is manifestly not possible... Personally I really see no way out except a recognition by both parties of the status quo, subject to minor modifications. Also of course, if there is an agreement, many mutual privileges might follow. At the same time, I am very reluctant naturally to say that we will not have a plebiscite. That might appear as a breach of faith and I do not want to be guilty of that.`` This counsel of discretion was a constant refrain, as we shall see, whether in his letters to Sheikh Abdullah or other confidants. Nehru played with his cards close to his chest.
NEHRU`S LETTER TO C.C.DESAI (Feb 27, 1955)
http://www.flonnet.com/fl1815/18150730.htm
Nehru wrote .... to India`s High Commissioner in Karachi, C. C. Desai, in strict confidence: ``I recognise and feel that Ghulam Mohammed is anxious to have a settlement and is prepared to go some distance for it. That is a welcome approach. But to suggest that a plebiscite should be held in Jammu and Kashmir state in the autumn of this year is manifestly not possible... Personally I really see no way out except a recognition by both parties of the status quo, subject to minor modifications. Also of course, if there is an agreement, many mutual privileges might follow. At the same time, I am very reluctant naturally to say that we will not have a plebiscite. That might appear as a breach of faith and I do not want to be guilty of that.`` This counsel of discretion was a constant refrain, as we shall see, whether in his letters to Sheikh Abdullah or other confidants. Nehru played with his cards close to his chest.
#174 Posted by HisExcellency on May 20, 2003 1:41:05 pm
SOME MORE EXCERPTS FROM Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 28 (February 1-May 31, 1955)
...in this very volume there is a document which, in turn, leads to another that contains the clue to Nehru`s change of policy. From prison, Sheikh Abdullah had asked Nehru to explain precisely what were the mistakes he had committed as Nehru had alleged in the Lok Sabha. In his reply (April 8, 1955), Nehru referred him to a confidential Note dated August 25, 1952 which he had sent to the Sheikh from Sonemarg (SWJN; Vol. 19; pp. 322-330). It is a document of cardinal importance. As mentioned earlier (``Kashmir: History and Politics``, Frontline, July 31, 1988), it virtually admitted that he had set his face against a plebiscite ``towards the end of December 1948``. He was resolved to maintain by force ``the status quo then existing``.
Nehru wrote: ``We are superior to Pakistan in military and industrial power. But that superiority is not so great as to produce results quickly either in war or by fear of war. Therefore, our national interest demands that we should adopt a peaceful policy towards Pakistan and, at the same time, add to our strength. Strength ultimately comes not from the defence forces, but the industrial and economic background behind them. As we grow in strength, and we are likely to do so, Pakistan will feel less and less inclined to threaten or harass us, and a time will come when, through sheer force of circumstances, it will be in a mood to accept a settlement which we consider fair, whether in Kashmir or elsewhere.``
He wanted the Sheikh and his colleagues to have ``a firm and clear outlook, and no debate about basic issues. If we have that outlook, it just does not matter what the United Nations thinks or what Pakistan does.``
Nehru made three mistakes. Pakistan, aggrieved, could not acquiesce in a status quo established by force. Sheikh Abdullah would not continue with his support to Nehru if it cost him popular support in the State. Nehru`s third and gravest mistake was in underestimating the assertiveness of the people if not, indeed, of their relevance. ``It must be remembered that the people of the Kashmir Valley and round-about, though highly gifted in many ways - in intelligence, in artisanship, etc. - are not what are called a virile people. They are soft and addicted to easy living.``
Events were to prove him wrong on all three points. Yet, this is the disastrous policy which won national acceptance and has been followed to this day. Forgotten was his repeated public pledges of a plebiscite, from 1947 to 1954; ``not merely a pledge to your (Pakistan`s) Government, but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world`` (Vol. 4; p. 298; his wire to Liaquat Ali Khan on October 31, 1947).
Why the volte-face in 1948? On May 14, Indira Gandhi wrote to Nehru: ``They say that only Sheikh Saheb is confident of winning the plebiscite... Personally, I feel that all this political talk will count for nothing if the economic situation can be dealt with. Because after all the people are concerned with only (one) thing - they want to settle their goods and to have food and salt.`` They had no soul or mind, evidently. (Sonia Gandhi; Two Alone, Two Together: Letters Exchanged between Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru 1940-1964; p. 551.)
Had he lost the plebiscite, Nehru feared he might lose his job as well. Men of such stature tend to combine in their person personal interests with national interests. He feared that the right wing, within and outside the Congress, might become powerful. These very fears prompted him to reject Zhou En-lai`s proposals for a border settlement. He said as much in private as Neville Maxwell revealed. (India`s China War; p. 166: ``If I give them that, I shall no longer be Prime Minister of India. I will not do it``). There were bigger stakes in Kashmir. Pakistan did not make matters easy by adopting a non-confrontationist stance. Conciliation came belatedly in 1953.
On August 7, 1948, at his very first meeting with the UNCIP, a body mandated to hold a plebiscite, Nehru hinted at alternatives. One of the members, Joseph Korbel, replied that the Commission ``had no right to submit a solution on which the parties had not agreed. He said that the commission believed it possible that a solution different from that envisaged in the Security Council resolution might be worked out and that the commission would be quite willing to help in this respect`` (The UNCIP`s First Interim Report; S/1100, p. 107).
No wonder that on January 12, 1949, a week after the UNCIP`s plebiscite resolution of January 5, Nehru wrote reassuringly to Sheikh Abdullah: ``You know well that this business of plebiscite is still far away and there is a possibility of the plebiscite not taking place at all. I would suggest however that this should not be said in public, as our bona fides will then be challenged`` (V. 9; p. 198).
Mountbatten also began working for partition. ``The partition maps were all marked up, and discussed between Pandit Nehru and the Chief of Army Staff`` (H.V. Hodson; The Great Divide; p. 472). Now the bits fall into place. Nehru accepted on December 23, 1948 the UNCIP`s proposals for a plebiscite; not because he was willing to hold one, but to secure a ceasefire. A recent offensive had pushed Pakistan`s troops to a line beyond which neither he nor Abdullah wished to go or could have gone without triggering a war.
...in this very volume there is a document which, in turn, leads to another that contains the clue to Nehru`s change of policy. From prison, Sheikh Abdullah had asked Nehru to explain precisely what were the mistakes he had committed as Nehru had alleged in the Lok Sabha. In his reply (April 8, 1955), Nehru referred him to a confidential Note dated August 25, 1952 which he had sent to the Sheikh from Sonemarg (SWJN; Vol. 19; pp. 322-330). It is a document of cardinal importance. As mentioned earlier (``Kashmir: History and Politics``, Frontline, July 31, 1988), it virtually admitted that he had set his face against a plebiscite ``towards the end of December 1948``. He was resolved to maintain by force ``the status quo then existing``.
Nehru wrote: ``We are superior to Pakistan in military and industrial power. But that superiority is not so great as to produce results quickly either in war or by fear of war. Therefore, our national interest demands that we should adopt a peaceful policy towards Pakistan and, at the same time, add to our strength. Strength ultimately comes not from the defence forces, but the industrial and economic background behind them. As we grow in strength, and we are likely to do so, Pakistan will feel less and less inclined to threaten or harass us, and a time will come when, through sheer force of circumstances, it will be in a mood to accept a settlement which we consider fair, whether in Kashmir or elsewhere.``
He wanted the Sheikh and his colleagues to have ``a firm and clear outlook, and no debate about basic issues. If we have that outlook, it just does not matter what the United Nations thinks or what Pakistan does.``
Nehru made three mistakes. Pakistan, aggrieved, could not acquiesce in a status quo established by force. Sheikh Abdullah would not continue with his support to Nehru if it cost him popular support in the State. Nehru`s third and gravest mistake was in underestimating the assertiveness of the people if not, indeed, of their relevance. ``It must be remembered that the people of the Kashmir Valley and round-about, though highly gifted in many ways - in intelligence, in artisanship, etc. - are not what are called a virile people. They are soft and addicted to easy living.``
Events were to prove him wrong on all three points. Yet, this is the disastrous policy which won national acceptance and has been followed to this day. Forgotten was his repeated public pledges of a plebiscite, from 1947 to 1954; ``not merely a pledge to your (Pakistan`s) Government, but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world`` (Vol. 4; p. 298; his wire to Liaquat Ali Khan on October 31, 1947).
Why the volte-face in 1948? On May 14, Indira Gandhi wrote to Nehru: ``They say that only Sheikh Saheb is confident of winning the plebiscite... Personally, I feel that all this political talk will count for nothing if the economic situation can be dealt with. Because after all the people are concerned with only (one) thing - they want to settle their goods and to have food and salt.`` They had no soul or mind, evidently. (Sonia Gandhi; Two Alone, Two Together: Letters Exchanged between Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru 1940-1964; p. 551.)
Had he lost the plebiscite, Nehru feared he might lose his job as well. Men of such stature tend to combine in their person personal interests with national interests. He feared that the right wing, within and outside the Congress, might become powerful. These very fears prompted him to reject Zhou En-lai`s proposals for a border settlement. He said as much in private as Neville Maxwell revealed. (India`s China War; p. 166: ``If I give them that, I shall no longer be Prime Minister of India. I will not do it``). There were bigger stakes in Kashmir. Pakistan did not make matters easy by adopting a non-confrontationist stance. Conciliation came belatedly in 1953.
On August 7, 1948, at his very first meeting with the UNCIP, a body mandated to hold a plebiscite, Nehru hinted at alternatives. One of the members, Joseph Korbel, replied that the Commission ``had no right to submit a solution on which the parties had not agreed. He said that the commission believed it possible that a solution different from that envisaged in the Security Council resolution might be worked out and that the commission would be quite willing to help in this respect`` (The UNCIP`s First Interim Report; S/1100, p. 107).
No wonder that on January 12, 1949, a week after the UNCIP`s plebiscite resolution of January 5, Nehru wrote reassuringly to Sheikh Abdullah: ``You know well that this business of plebiscite is still far away and there is a possibility of the plebiscite not taking place at all. I would suggest however that this should not be said in public, as our bona fides will then be challenged`` (V. 9; p. 198).
Mountbatten also began working for partition. ``The partition maps were all marked up, and discussed between Pandit Nehru and the Chief of Army Staff`` (H.V. Hodson; The Great Divide; p. 472). Now the bits fall into place. Nehru accepted on December 23, 1948 the UNCIP`s proposals for a plebiscite; not because he was willing to hold one, but to secure a ceasefire. A recent offensive had pushed Pakistan`s troops to a line beyond which neither he nor Abdullah wished to go or could have gone without triggering a war.
#173 Posted by HisExcellency on May 20, 2003 1:41:05 pm
EXCERPTS FROM Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 28 (February 1-May 31, 1955)
... in 1947 Nehru was confident of winning the plebiscite. Earlier volumes in the series record Nehru`s retreat from plebiscite and moves for partition. One would suspect that when it concerned Kashmir, Nehru had reservations on a plebiscite even in 1947. Thus, he wrote to Abdullah on November 21, 1947: ``Dwarkanath writes to me that there is strong feeling in the leadership of the National Conference against a referendum. I know this and quite understand it. In fact I share the feeling myself. But you will appreciate that it is not easy for us to back out of the stand we have taken before the world. That would create a very bad impression abroad and especially in U.N. circles. I feel, however, that this question of referendum is rather an academic one at present... If we said to the UNO that we no longer stand by a referendum in Kashmir, Pakistan would score a strong point and that would be harmful to our cause. On the other hand, if circumstances continue as they are and the referendum is out of the question during these next few months, then why worry about it now?... It is all a question of the best tactical approach. I would personally suggest to you not to say anything rejecting the idea of a referendum...`` (V. 4, pp. 336-7).
Nehru pleaded with the Maharaja of Kashmir (December 1, 1947): ``If the average Muslim (in Kashmir) feels that he has no safe or secure place in the Union, then obviously he will look elsewhere... The present position is that in Kashmir proper, the mass of the population Muslim and Hindu is no doubt in favour of the Indian Union. In the Jammu area, all the non-Muslims and some Muslims are likely to be in favour of the Union. But this depends entirely on the policy to be pursued during the next few months`` (V. 4; p. 351).
Another consideration weighed with Nehru. He knew that a pro-Pakistan constituency existed in Kashmir. It has to be defeated or marginalised by winning over the people - through the plebiscite offer. Hence his wise counsel to the Sheikh on November 1, 1947: ``The people must be made to feel that the question of accession will have to be decided finally according to their own wishes. How this is to be done can be determined later. As far as I can see, it should be done under the auspices of the United Nations`` (V. 4; p. 300). Mountbatten`s suggestion for reference to the U.N. came later, on December 8.
With Lord Ismay`s help V. P. Menon and Chaudhry Mohammed Ali, Secretary-General of Pakistan`s Cabinet, arrived at a Draft Kashmir Agreement in November which Ismay discussed with Nehru and Liaquat in detail on December 28, 1947. It had no chance of success given Nehru`s attitude despite Liaquat`s concessions (V.4; pp. 408-9).
Once the debates in the U.N. Security Council began in January 1948, Nehru became increasingly uneasy and confused. To Krishna Menon he mentioned two alternatives: ``One is the possibility of Kashmir being considered more or less independent and guaranteed as such by India, Pakistan and possibly the U.N. The other is the possibility of some kind of partition either by previous agreement or as a result of the vote. I do not fancy either of these; but I do not wish to rule them out altogether`` (February 20, 1949; V. 5; p. 222).
On February 26, Mountbatten proposed that ``a vote for independence should be included in the plebiscite`` (V. 5; p. 232).
The Sheikh was warned on November 29, 1948 that while Nehru had ``refused to discuss any details of the plebiscite at this stage, it is not easy in the circumstances just to say no to the commission so far as the plebiscite is concerned. We have to remember that an adverse decision of the Commission may prove harmful to us; so we tried to avoid this while at the same time maintaining a stiff attitude`` (V. 8; p. 62). He was rightly confident that time ran in India`s favour, a fact to which Pakistan was utterly oblivious (V. 11; p. 367).
Towards the end of 1949, the certitude of 1947 gave way to gnawing doubt which he confided to the British High Commissioner, Archibald Nye, on September 9, 1949: ``Whilst he (Nehru) did not accept for one moment the suggestion that the majority of Muslims, because they were Muslims, would vote for Pakistan, he thought that it was true to say that the result of a free and impartial plebiscite, if one could be held, would be for the Poonch area to go to Pakistan and for the Jammu area to go to India, whilst it was doubtful which way the valley would vote. He thought further that a solution on the lines of Western Kashmir going to Pakistan, Jammu and possibly Ladakh to India and a plebiscite being confined to the valley and the area north of it (excluding Gilgit) was worthy of consideration. I (Nye) said that from India`s point of view this may well be so but did he really think there was any prospect of getting Pakistan to agree to any such proposal. I pointed out that Pakistan believed, and has good reason to believe, that there was a very good chance that an overall plebiscite would give a majority to Pakistan which would justify their claiming the whole country. He admitted that Pakistan might not be prepared to agree but thought there was a possibility that a solution could be found on some such line`` (V. 13; p. 225).
Which is why his Note of December 4, 1949 to Vallabhbhai Patel urged ``broader`` terms of reference for the single mediator from the U.N. freed from resolutions on plebiscite; one would consider ``the present situation in all its aspects, and the basic facts of history, geography, language and culture of the State`` (V. 14 (i); p. 198). Patel wrote on July 3, 1950: ``I agree with you that a plebiscite is unreal`` (Sardar Patel`s Correspondence; Vol. 1; p. 317).
The best mediator to come, Sir Owen Dixon, later Chief Justice of Australia, proposed a plebiscite confined to areas where the wishes of the inhabitants were uncertain - the Kashmir Valley. The rest could be assigned to either State, as the case may be. The plan fell through because Nehru rejected his suggestion of an impartial administration in the Valley. The Sheikh must not be removed.
At an informal conference in London of Commonwealth Prime Ministers on January 9, 1951, Nehru firmly stood by the status quo (V. 15 (ii); p. 280). However, at a press conference in New Delhi on November 3, 1951, he said ``I welcome a plebiscite`` (V. 17; p. 424), though he had ruled it out three years earlier.
... in 1947 Nehru was confident of winning the plebiscite. Earlier volumes in the series record Nehru`s retreat from plebiscite and moves for partition. One would suspect that when it concerned Kashmir, Nehru had reservations on a plebiscite even in 1947. Thus, he wrote to Abdullah on November 21, 1947: ``Dwarkanath writes to me that there is strong feeling in the leadership of the National Conference against a referendum. I know this and quite understand it. In fact I share the feeling myself. But you will appreciate that it is not easy for us to back out of the stand we have taken before the world. That would create a very bad impression abroad and especially in U.N. circles. I feel, however, that this question of referendum is rather an academic one at present... If we said to the UNO that we no longer stand by a referendum in Kashmir, Pakistan would score a strong point and that would be harmful to our cause. On the other hand, if circumstances continue as they are and the referendum is out of the question during these next few months, then why worry about it now?... It is all a question of the best tactical approach. I would personally suggest to you not to say anything rejecting the idea of a referendum...`` (V. 4, pp. 336-7).
Nehru pleaded with the Maharaja of Kashmir (December 1, 1947): ``If the average Muslim (in Kashmir) feels that he has no safe or secure place in the Union, then obviously he will look elsewhere... The present position is that in Kashmir proper, the mass of the population Muslim and Hindu is no doubt in favour of the Indian Union. In the Jammu area, all the non-Muslims and some Muslims are likely to be in favour of the Union. But this depends entirely on the policy to be pursued during the next few months`` (V. 4; p. 351).
Another consideration weighed with Nehru. He knew that a pro-Pakistan constituency existed in Kashmir. It has to be defeated or marginalised by winning over the people - through the plebiscite offer. Hence his wise counsel to the Sheikh on November 1, 1947: ``The people must be made to feel that the question of accession will have to be decided finally according to their own wishes. How this is to be done can be determined later. As far as I can see, it should be done under the auspices of the United Nations`` (V. 4; p. 300). Mountbatten`s suggestion for reference to the U.N. came later, on December 8.
With Lord Ismay`s help V. P. Menon and Chaudhry Mohammed Ali, Secretary-General of Pakistan`s Cabinet, arrived at a Draft Kashmir Agreement in November which Ismay discussed with Nehru and Liaquat in detail on December 28, 1947. It had no chance of success given Nehru`s attitude despite Liaquat`s concessions (V.4; pp. 408-9).
Once the debates in the U.N. Security Council began in January 1948, Nehru became increasingly uneasy and confused. To Krishna Menon he mentioned two alternatives: ``One is the possibility of Kashmir being considered more or less independent and guaranteed as such by India, Pakistan and possibly the U.N. The other is the possibility of some kind of partition either by previous agreement or as a result of the vote. I do not fancy either of these; but I do not wish to rule them out altogether`` (February 20, 1949; V. 5; p. 222).
On February 26, Mountbatten proposed that ``a vote for independence should be included in the plebiscite`` (V. 5; p. 232).
The Sheikh was warned on November 29, 1948 that while Nehru had ``refused to discuss any details of the plebiscite at this stage, it is not easy in the circumstances just to say no to the commission so far as the plebiscite is concerned. We have to remember that an adverse decision of the Commission may prove harmful to us; so we tried to avoid this while at the same time maintaining a stiff attitude`` (V. 8; p. 62). He was rightly confident that time ran in India`s favour, a fact to which Pakistan was utterly oblivious (V. 11; p. 367).
Towards the end of 1949, the certitude of 1947 gave way to gnawing doubt which he confided to the British High Commissioner, Archibald Nye, on September 9, 1949: ``Whilst he (Nehru) did not accept for one moment the suggestion that the majority of Muslims, because they were Muslims, would vote for Pakistan, he thought that it was true to say that the result of a free and impartial plebiscite, if one could be held, would be for the Poonch area to go to Pakistan and for the Jammu area to go to India, whilst it was doubtful which way the valley would vote. He thought further that a solution on the lines of Western Kashmir going to Pakistan, Jammu and possibly Ladakh to India and a plebiscite being confined to the valley and the area north of it (excluding Gilgit) was worthy of consideration. I (Nye) said that from India`s point of view this may well be so but did he really think there was any prospect of getting Pakistan to agree to any such proposal. I pointed out that Pakistan believed, and has good reason to believe, that there was a very good chance that an overall plebiscite would give a majority to Pakistan which would justify their claiming the whole country. He admitted that Pakistan might not be prepared to agree but thought there was a possibility that a solution could be found on some such line`` (V. 13; p. 225).
Which is why his Note of December 4, 1949 to Vallabhbhai Patel urged ``broader`` terms of reference for the single mediator from the U.N. freed from resolutions on plebiscite; one would consider ``the present situation in all its aspects, and the basic facts of history, geography, language and culture of the State`` (V. 14 (i); p. 198). Patel wrote on July 3, 1950: ``I agree with you that a plebiscite is unreal`` (Sardar Patel`s Correspondence; Vol. 1; p. 317).
The best mediator to come, Sir Owen Dixon, later Chief Justice of Australia, proposed a plebiscite confined to areas where the wishes of the inhabitants were uncertain - the Kashmir Valley. The rest could be assigned to either State, as the case may be. The plan fell through because Nehru rejected his suggestion of an impartial administration in the Valley. The Sheikh must not be removed.
At an informal conference in London of Commonwealth Prime Ministers on January 9, 1951, Nehru firmly stood by the status quo (V. 15 (ii); p. 280). However, at a press conference in New Delhi on November 3, 1951, he said ``I welcome a plebiscite`` (V. 17; p. 424), though he had ruled it out three years earlier.
#172 Posted by HisExcellency on May 20, 2003 1:41:05 pm
re: #165 by friend
I am afraid you have misunderstood my comments. I have not changed my position on UN SC 47, plebiscite, roadmap and Nehru.
I stand by my position that
* UN SC Resolution 47 spelled out a principle (i.e plebiscite) for resolving the Kashmir issue, leaving the roadmap and timeframe to be mutually decided by both the parties (India and Pakistan).
* However, Nehru soon realized that a Plebiscite would certainly go in Pakistan`s favour, especially in Kashmir Valley. To avoid international embarrassment, he didn`t rule out plebiscite immediately. But in Indo-Pak summit talks between 1949 and 1955, he avoided discussions on the roadmap for Plebiscite. Instead he wanted Pakistan to accept the status quo.
* Pakistan was ready to discuss the modalities and roadmap for implementing UN SC 47. In fact, Pakistan insisted on the roadmap during Liaqat-Nehru talks, Bogra-Nehru talks and Ghulam Muhammad-Nehru talks. It was Nehru who insisted on ``other options``, instead of discussing the roadmap necessary to implement UN SC 47
I am afraid you have misunderstood my comments. I have not changed my position on UN SC 47, plebiscite, roadmap and Nehru.
I stand by my position that
* UN SC Resolution 47 spelled out a principle (i.e plebiscite) for resolving the Kashmir issue, leaving the roadmap and timeframe to be mutually decided by both the parties (India and Pakistan).
* However, Nehru soon realized that a Plebiscite would certainly go in Pakistan`s favour, especially in Kashmir Valley. To avoid international embarrassment, he didn`t rule out plebiscite immediately. But in Indo-Pak summit talks between 1949 and 1955, he avoided discussions on the roadmap for Plebiscite. Instead he wanted Pakistan to accept the status quo.
* Pakistan was ready to discuss the modalities and roadmap for implementing UN SC 47. In fact, Pakistan insisted on the roadmap during Liaqat-Nehru talks, Bogra-Nehru talks and Ghulam Muhammad-Nehru talks. It was Nehru who insisted on ``other options``, instead of discussing the roadmap necessary to implement UN SC 47
#171 Posted by sadna on May 20, 2003 7:06:16 am
ahmedzai #whichever
You may find this inspiring:
http://www.jamatdawa.org/data2/jihad.html
http://www.jamatdawa.org/english/articles/jihad/index.htm
You may find this inspiring:
http://www.jamatdawa.org/data2/jihad.html
http://www.jamatdawa.org/english/articles/jihad/index.htm
#170 Posted by friend on May 20, 2003 7:06:16 am
HE #164
the fact that Nehru was conspiring to get Kashmir incorporated into Indian Union under the Constitution underscores his mala fide intentions.
You keep referring to so many facts about Nehru without ever giving any reference. Would you be kind enough to provide a solid reference to your facts.
After harping on ``India not honoring UN resolutions``, now your stand appears to be that UN resolution need to be followed by a roadmap. Am I incorrect to understand this?
Now coming to your questions
1. When should Pakistan start its withdrawl - It is first condition of UN resolutions. If Pakistan wants UN resolutions to be honored, it has to meet the first condition. Either one is very dumb, or very innocent, to ask when should be start first step.
Read further in *RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN ON 13 AUGUST 1948. (DOCUMENT NO.S/1100, PARA 75, DATED 9 NOVEMBER 1948)
PART II
TRUCE AGREEMENT
Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their Representatives and the Commission.
A. (1) As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.
UN resolution state very clearly what ``material change`` happened between first UN resolution and resolution adopted in November.
You only logic seems to be Pakistan did it due to some ``pre-conceived`` ideas about Indian intentions.
Note that Pakistani invasion started in Kashmir when no merger had taken place. India was patiently waiting. Details of invasion can be found in many articles in ``The defence journal`` published by Pakistani Army.
These so called intentions of India and Nehru is just a bogey that is raised by Pakistan to justify all its actions.
If you take time to read the UN resolutions, you will find answers to many of your questions about ``roadmap``
1. Who monitors withdrawl has been addressed in ``When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the Council`s Resolution 39 (1948) that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective`` in resolution dated April 21st.
2. Plebiscite administrator - who appoints him/her is addressed in ``The Government of India should agree that a nominee of the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be appointed to be the Plebiscite Administrator. `` in resolution dated April 21st.
If your case is that UN resolutions do not carry sufficient instructions, than Pakistan should have gone to UN to get more clear instuctions. Blaming India will not help.
Now over to you.
the fact that Nehru was conspiring to get Kashmir incorporated into Indian Union under the Constitution underscores his mala fide intentions.
You keep referring to so many facts about Nehru without ever giving any reference. Would you be kind enough to provide a solid reference to your facts.
After harping on ``India not honoring UN resolutions``, now your stand appears to be that UN resolution need to be followed by a roadmap. Am I incorrect to understand this?
Now coming to your questions
1. When should Pakistan start its withdrawl - It is first condition of UN resolutions. If Pakistan wants UN resolutions to be honored, it has to meet the first condition. Either one is very dumb, or very innocent, to ask when should be start first step.
Read further in *RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN ON 13 AUGUST 1948. (DOCUMENT NO.S/1100, PARA 75, DATED 9 NOVEMBER 1948)
PART II
TRUCE AGREEMENT
Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their Representatives and the Commission.
A. (1) As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.
UN resolution state very clearly what ``material change`` happened between first UN resolution and resolution adopted in November.
You only logic seems to be Pakistan did it due to some ``pre-conceived`` ideas about Indian intentions.
Note that Pakistani invasion started in Kashmir when no merger had taken place. India was patiently waiting. Details of invasion can be found in many articles in ``The defence journal`` published by Pakistani Army.
These so called intentions of India and Nehru is just a bogey that is raised by Pakistan to justify all its actions.
If you take time to read the UN resolutions, you will find answers to many of your questions about ``roadmap``
1. Who monitors withdrawl has been addressed in ``When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the Council`s Resolution 39 (1948) that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective`` in resolution dated April 21st.
2. Plebiscite administrator - who appoints him/her is addressed in ``The Government of India should agree that a nominee of the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be appointed to be the Plebiscite Administrator. `` in resolution dated April 21st.
If your case is that UN resolutions do not carry sufficient instructions, than Pakistan should have gone to UN to get more clear instuctions. Blaming India will not help.
Now over to you.
#169 Posted by nazarhayatkhan on May 20, 2003 4:25:35 am
Reply #160 Ironman
Yes. My cultural history and soul begins from Moenjodaro.
My soul has an element of Hindue in it. I never deny it. I have no problems with holy or temples.
My soul also has a strong Punjabi ethos to it.
I like Bengali songs and music. Persioa and French sounds very good to me.
I find the church hymes very soothing. In fact, I find the arabic language sounds somewhat rough.
South Asia is a cultural and linguistic one distinct zone. Whether one likes it or not.
All political boundaries within it are artificial.
Just wait for another 10 years before the outside pressures bring it close to the realization of these historical and geographical facts.
#168 Posted by harish_hyd on May 20, 2003 4:25:35 am
#147 by ahmadzai on May 19, 2003 10:20am PT
[Why should we believe that those killed in Kashmir are by Freedom Fighters? They may have been killed by terrorists alright.]
This is the standard GoP line. But the world, prominently the US, has come to accept the fact that Pakistan does sponsor the insurgency in Kashmir. That is the reason why every visiting US/British and other US leader over the past 18 months has stressed upon Pakistan the need for an end to infiltration from across the LoC. You need to weigh in every word you type in lest you become the laughing stock. Amnesty International in the past has apportioned blame on the Indian security forces for excesses. But nowhere has the agency ever said that they resort to killings just so the terrorists could be blamed for it. This argument is well past its sell-by date. You need to look for a fresh one.
[1. Not a single terrorist has been caught alive to-date who could provide a hard evidence in favor of Indian accusations. Police is trained in shooting at legs in such a way that culprits can be caught red-handed. However, all those accused of terrorism have been shot dead.]
What a load of bull dust! If that were indeed the issue, there are any number of unemployed Pakistani youth who could be bought off and confessions manufactured by the dozen.
Dawood Ibrahim, India`s most-wanted underworld don, implicated in a series of blasts that rocked Bombay in the early nineties apparently lives a charmed life in Karachi protected by the ISI and other Pakistani agencies. Ghulam Hasnain, in a scoop for the magazine Newsline brought into light Dawood`s life in Pakistan last year, for which he had to pay by being assaulted by the ISI.
And what about Maulana Masood Azhar and Omar Saeed Sheikh? Weren`t these two exchanged in return for the hostages aboard the IA flight hijacked to Kandahar? Masood Azhar is the founder of the Jaish-e-Muhammad, an outfit very active in Kashmir and recently designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the US State Department. Omar Saeed Sheikh is being held for the Daniel Pearl murder.
[2. It has been confirmed that many Pakhtoon youth from Pakistan`s tribal areas (not NWFP) were caught by the Northern Alliance during anti-Taliban war and handed over to India. They are still languishing in Indian jails. The point to note is that these youth may be shot in fake encounters and accused to be actively involved in terrorism.]
You have been going on and on without furnishing any shred of evidence to support your statements. Where is the evidence that these youth were handed over to India? How do you know that these Pakhtoon youth are not from the NWFP? Are they known to you by any chance?
Also see para.1 of my response to your point No. 1.
[Why should we believe that those killed in Kashmir are by Freedom Fighters? They may have been killed by terrorists alright.]
This is the standard GoP line. But the world, prominently the US, has come to accept the fact that Pakistan does sponsor the insurgency in Kashmir. That is the reason why every visiting US/British and other US leader over the past 18 months has stressed upon Pakistan the need for an end to infiltration from across the LoC. You need to weigh in every word you type in lest you become the laughing stock. Amnesty International in the past has apportioned blame on the Indian security forces for excesses. But nowhere has the agency ever said that they resort to killings just so the terrorists could be blamed for it. This argument is well past its sell-by date. You need to look for a fresh one.
[1. Not a single terrorist has been caught alive to-date who could provide a hard evidence in favor of Indian accusations. Police is trained in shooting at legs in such a way that culprits can be caught red-handed. However, all those accused of terrorism have been shot dead.]
What a load of bull dust! If that were indeed the issue, there are any number of unemployed Pakistani youth who could be bought off and confessions manufactured by the dozen.
Dawood Ibrahim, India`s most-wanted underworld don, implicated in a series of blasts that rocked Bombay in the early nineties apparently lives a charmed life in Karachi protected by the ISI and other Pakistani agencies. Ghulam Hasnain, in a scoop for the magazine Newsline brought into light Dawood`s life in Pakistan last year, for which he had to pay by being assaulted by the ISI.
And what about Maulana Masood Azhar and Omar Saeed Sheikh? Weren`t these two exchanged in return for the hostages aboard the IA flight hijacked to Kandahar? Masood Azhar is the founder of the Jaish-e-Muhammad, an outfit very active in Kashmir and recently designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the US State Department. Omar Saeed Sheikh is being held for the Daniel Pearl murder.
[2. It has been confirmed that many Pakhtoon youth from Pakistan`s tribal areas (not NWFP) were caught by the Northern Alliance during anti-Taliban war and handed over to India. They are still languishing in Indian jails. The point to note is that these youth may be shot in fake encounters and accused to be actively involved in terrorism.]
You have been going on and on without furnishing any shred of evidence to support your statements. Where is the evidence that these youth were handed over to India? How do you know that these Pakhtoon youth are not from the NWFP? Are they known to you by any chance?
Also see para.1 of my response to your point No. 1.
#167 Posted by jay on May 20, 2003 4:25:34 am
KASHMIR JIHAD
There are fools every where who refuse to see the reality and prominant among them are the ones who talk of having peace with pakistan. Last week witnessed the highest number of killings in kasjmir including that of a whole family. The same is true for israel, saudi and morocco.
The fools cannot see the link, cannot accept who is calling the shots, i mean the real shots, and how i tis coordinated.
Kashmir is a requirement for the children of TNT to attain heaven, and peace with india is a after of life in hell only for the millions who rush out of the 200000 madrassas of pakistan.
There are fools every where who refuse to see the reality and prominant among them are the ones who talk of having peace with pakistan. Last week witnessed the highest number of killings in kasjmir including that of a whole family. The same is true for israel, saudi and morocco.
The fools cannot see the link, cannot accept who is calling the shots, i mean the real shots, and how i tis coordinated.
Kashmir is a requirement for the children of TNT to attain heaven, and peace with india is a after of life in hell only for the millions who rush out of the 200000 madrassas of pakistan.
#166 Posted by Dilshad on May 19, 2003 9:05:13 pm
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#165 Posted by HisExcellency on May 19, 2003 8:19:15 pm
re: #158 by friend
As you can clearly read in the sections titled ``PLEBISCITE``, the Resolution 47 passed in April 1948 established the principle of plebiscite.
Regardless of Pakistan`s troubled constitutional history and India`s stable one, the fact that Nehru was conspiring to get Kashmir incorporated into Indian Union under the Constitution underscores his mala fide intentions. Having agreed to the Plebiscite under Resolution 47, he was now trying to circumvent the Plebiscite through the back-door.
I stand by my comments in post#98 in which I explained why Pakistan did not withdraw the tribesmen. I will summarize those comments for your benefit. In essence, Pakistan could not withdraw its tribesmen without a mutually agreed roadmap. A roadmap would establish the following:
a) When would the Pakistanis begin their withdrawal?
b) How will the progress of this withdrawal be monitored? Will this be done by UN? By Pakistan? By India? Or Both?
c) After the withdrawal, when will India form a Plebiscite Administration? Will this Administration be staff with Indian officials only? Or will there be Pakistani and/or UN officials as well to verify its transparency & neutrality?
d) Will Pakistani and Indian politicians be allowed to canvass the Kashmiris? What will be the modalities of the Plebiscite?
e) And finally, how and when will the Plebiscite be held? Will there be one plebiscite for Jammu & Kashmir? Or will there be separate Plebiscites in Jammu, Ladakh and Kashmir?
f) How will the results of Plebiscite be interpreted? Should Pakistan get Kashmir if 51% or more people voted for Pak? Or should Pakistan get Kashmir only if 66% or more people voted for Pak?
It had become clear by Spring of 1948, that Nehru was not serious about the Plebiscite. In such a scenario, you can`t expect Mr. Jinnah to unilaterally withdraw without a reciprocal, specific and timebound commitment from Mr. Nehru.
All this makes sense if you remind yourself of the extreme suspicion and scorn Pakistanis and Indians have for each other. Nothing short of a formal roadmap (preferably supervised by a third-party) should be expected in Indo-Pak relations.
As you can clearly read in the sections titled ``PLEBISCITE``, the Resolution 47 passed in April 1948 established the principle of plebiscite.
Regardless of Pakistan`s troubled constitutional history and India`s stable one, the fact that Nehru was conspiring to get Kashmir incorporated into Indian Union under the Constitution underscores his mala fide intentions. Having agreed to the Plebiscite under Resolution 47, he was now trying to circumvent the Plebiscite through the back-door.
I stand by my comments in post#98 in which I explained why Pakistan did not withdraw the tribesmen. I will summarize those comments for your benefit. In essence, Pakistan could not withdraw its tribesmen without a mutually agreed roadmap. A roadmap would establish the following:
a) When would the Pakistanis begin their withdrawal?
b) How will the progress of this withdrawal be monitored? Will this be done by UN? By Pakistan? By India? Or Both?
c) After the withdrawal, when will India form a Plebiscite Administration? Will this Administration be staff with Indian officials only? Or will there be Pakistani and/or UN officials as well to verify its transparency & neutrality?
d) Will Pakistani and Indian politicians be allowed to canvass the Kashmiris? What will be the modalities of the Plebiscite?
e) And finally, how and when will the Plebiscite be held? Will there be one plebiscite for Jammu & Kashmir? Or will there be separate Plebiscites in Jammu, Ladakh and Kashmir?
f) How will the results of Plebiscite be interpreted? Should Pakistan get Kashmir if 51% or more people voted for Pak? Or should Pakistan get Kashmir only if 66% or more people voted for Pak?
It had become clear by Spring of 1948, that Nehru was not serious about the Plebiscite. In such a scenario, you can`t expect Mr. Jinnah to unilaterally withdraw without a reciprocal, specific and timebound commitment from Mr. Nehru.
All this makes sense if you remind yourself of the extreme suspicion and scorn Pakistanis and Indians have for each other. Nothing short of a formal roadmap (preferably supervised by a third-party) should be expected in Indo-Pak relations.
#164 Posted by friend on May 19, 2003 8:19:15 pm
HE #159,
It is good that you acknowledged part of your confusion.
You can help everyone further by clarifying very aparent contradiction in your stand.
1. You justify Pakistan`s non-compliance to UN resolutions by stating that no time-frame has been stipulated. On the other hand, you want India/Nehru to honor same resolutions - even though every clear pre-conditions, to be met by Pakistan, are stated in resolutions.
2. You raised a very interesting and ingenious argument of ``no time frame stipulated``. So if Pakistan decides to meet pre-conditions after 100 years, you want India to just keep waiting for that event!!!!
2. You didn`t answer my question on why you are ok with Pakistan not honoring rights of people of nothern areas?
3. Both India and Pakistan decided on similar deadlines for themselves for creating a constitution. India met its deadline. Pakistan didn`t. Why India being able to create its constitution in time is an issue for you. Kashmir was given a special status and Sheikh Abdulha himself decided in favor of India. If there was acrimony between Jinnah and Seikh Abdulha, than why it was India`s/Nehru`s fault?
4. Even after 56 years, no non-Kashmiri can own property in J&K. Is there any such law in Pakistan? On what ground Pakistan agreed to scede part of J&K to China? If Kashmir is treated as an independent entity by Pakistan than why president of Pakistan-held Kasmir is an ex-army general.
5. Even after 56 years, nothern areas have not been integrated with Pakistan-held Kashmir. Why is that so? You go by resolutions and written documents. How do you justify that?
6. You also stated in #98
``We are all aware of the letter Nehru wrote to Sardar Patel and later admitted to by V.K. Krishna Menon in which Nehru expressed his fear that given a plebiscite, Kashmiris will overwhelmingly vote for Pakistan. ``
No, I am not part of ``we`` and am not aware of any such letter. Kindly educate me and provide a solid reference on this information.
It is good that you acknowledged part of your confusion.
You can help everyone further by clarifying very aparent contradiction in your stand.
1. You justify Pakistan`s non-compliance to UN resolutions by stating that no time-frame has been stipulated. On the other hand, you want India/Nehru to honor same resolutions - even though every clear pre-conditions, to be met by Pakistan, are stated in resolutions.
2. You raised a very interesting and ingenious argument of ``no time frame stipulated``. So if Pakistan decides to meet pre-conditions after 100 years, you want India to just keep waiting for that event!!!!
2. You didn`t answer my question on why you are ok with Pakistan not honoring rights of people of nothern areas?
3. Both India and Pakistan decided on similar deadlines for themselves for creating a constitution. India met its deadline. Pakistan didn`t. Why India being able to create its constitution in time is an issue for you. Kashmir was given a special status and Sheikh Abdulha himself decided in favor of India. If there was acrimony between Jinnah and Seikh Abdulha, than why it was India`s/Nehru`s fault?
4. Even after 56 years, no non-Kashmiri can own property in J&K. Is there any such law in Pakistan? On what ground Pakistan agreed to scede part of J&K to China? If Kashmir is treated as an independent entity by Pakistan than why president of Pakistan-held Kasmir is an ex-army general.
5. Even after 56 years, nothern areas have not been integrated with Pakistan-held Kashmir. Why is that so? You go by resolutions and written documents. How do you justify that?
6. You also stated in #98
``We are all aware of the letter Nehru wrote to Sardar Patel and later admitted to by V.K. Krishna Menon in which Nehru expressed his fear that given a plebiscite, Kashmiris will overwhelmingly vote for Pakistan. ``
No, I am not part of ``we`` and am not aware of any such letter. Kindly educate me and provide a solid reference on this information.
#163 Posted by ironman on May 19, 2003 8:19:14 pm
--- #125 by nazarhayatkhan ---
I am a South Asian for last 5000 years.
Muslim for last 1400 years.
And Pakistani for last 55 years.
Wah! Wah! Goodsounding reply!
So you were a south asian for 5000 years.
What the hell does that mean.
Do you mean your cultural roots began in Mohenjodaro ?
Well in that case, you were a hindu for 4000 years before you became a muslim in 1000 AD. correct me if my history is wrong.
I suppose (every now and then) you introduce yourself as a hindu also , do you!
South asian indeed!
I am a South Asian for last 5000 years.
Muslim for last 1400 years.
And Pakistani for last 55 years.
Wah! Wah! Goodsounding reply!
So you were a south asian for 5000 years.
What the hell does that mean.
Do you mean your cultural roots began in Mohenjodaro ?
Well in that case, you were a hindu for 4000 years before you became a muslim in 1000 AD. correct me if my history is wrong.
I suppose (every now and then) you introduce yourself as a hindu also , do you!
South asian indeed!
#162 Posted by arjun_m on May 19, 2003 8:19:14 pm
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#161 Posted by arjun_m on May 19, 2003 8:19:14 pm
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#160 Posted by arjun_m on May 19, 2003 8:19:14 pm
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#159 Posted by friend on May 19, 2003 3:55:26 pm
HisExcellency #153
I do hope that you read my earlier post on this subject and yourself re-read resolution 654. As very humbly stated, it does not articulate any principle of plebiscite and noninterference in Kashmir`s right to self-determination.
Now let me take you back to your post #98 where you state..
The UN Security Council Resolution 654 stipulated that Pakistani invaders will withdraw from Kashmir and Indian administration will hold a plebiscite at an appropriate time that will be mutually decided by Pakistan and India. No time frame was stipulated by the UN SC about withdrawal of Pakistani invaders.
This resolution was passed in January 1948. Next month, Nehru started pressuring Sheikh Abdullah to participate in the Constituent Assembly for framing Indian Constitution. Since Kashmir was not part of the Dominion of India yet, how could Kashmiris participate in framing the Indian constitution? Nehru got around this by offering ``Special Status`` to Sheikh Abdullah under Article 370 of the new Indian Constitution. Under this article, Kashmir would have its own President and Constitution. Sheikh Abdullah was promised power and what not.
Less than 7 weeks after promising a plebiscite in the UN, Nehru was playing Machiavellian tricks to circumvent the plebiscite.Pakistan realized that Nehru had only promised a plebiscite in the UN to gain time. Nehru had no intention of holding the plebiscite and was conspiring to get Kashmir incorporated into Indian Dominion through the back door of political wheeling and dealing.
In Nov 1948, India passed its constitution and Sheikh Abdullah became Sadr-e-Riyasat of Kashmir under Article 370. Later when Sheikh Abdullah wanted to preserve Kashmir`s special status, he was imprisoned by Nehru. Another lackey was imposed.
I have posted your complete post so that you can examine your arguments while reading UN resolution 654. There is nothing in UN resolutions that stops India from passing its own constitution. Kashmir was kept out of reach of that constitution and got special status. Pakistan, who couldn`t decide its own constitution for many years and even after making one, kept changing it, is certainly in no position to give sermons on constitution to India. If you have such a high regard for constitution, human rights and non-interference than make a plea for constitutional rights for northern regions and free elections for president of pakistan-held. Pakistan does not believe in upholding its own constitution. Does that mean that India and Kashmir should also remain without constitution?
You later state in your post #98
``Since India was clearly not interested in holding a plebiscite, Pakistan could not withdraw the tribesmen without an understanding that India would honor its part of the promise in a given timeframe. We are all aware of the letter Nehru wrote to Sardar Patel and later admitted to by V.K. Krishna Menon in which Nehru expressed his fear that given a plebiscite, Kashmiris will overwhelmingly vote for Pakistan. ``
And than claim in #153 (btw, do print this so called letter from Nehru. That will be another hole in your story)
It does not say that the withdrawal will be done in one week, one month, one year or one decade. Contrast this with the UN SC resolutions passed in 1990 requiring Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait within a specific timeframe
Can`t you see contradiction in your own arguments? As per UN resolutions, Pakistan is to first withdraw its forces. You think it proper for Pakistan to not do so because resolution do not say that withdrawal is to be done in one week, one month or one decade.
And you want Nehru/India to do its part without waiting for pre-conditions to be satisfied!!
Do read these resolutions. If you are still confused do ask me for further help.
I do hope that you read my earlier post on this subject and yourself re-read resolution 654. As very humbly stated, it does not articulate any principle of plebiscite and noninterference in Kashmir`s right to self-determination.
Now let me take you back to your post #98 where you state..
The UN Security Council Resolution 654 stipulated that Pakistani invaders will withdraw from Kashmir and Indian administration will hold a plebiscite at an appropriate time that will be mutually decided by Pakistan and India. No time frame was stipulated by the UN SC about withdrawal of Pakistani invaders.
This resolution was passed in January 1948. Next month, Nehru started pressuring Sheikh Abdullah to participate in the Constituent Assembly for framing Indian Constitution. Since Kashmir was not part of the Dominion of India yet, how could Kashmiris participate in framing the Indian constitution? Nehru got around this by offering ``Special Status`` to Sheikh Abdullah under Article 370 of the new Indian Constitution. Under this article, Kashmir would have its own President and Constitution. Sheikh Abdullah was promised power and what not.
Less than 7 weeks after promising a plebiscite in the UN, Nehru was playing Machiavellian tricks to circumvent the plebiscite.Pakistan realized that Nehru had only promised a plebiscite in the UN to gain time. Nehru had no intention of holding the plebiscite and was conspiring to get Kashmir incorporated into Indian Dominion through the back door of political wheeling and dealing.
In Nov 1948, India passed its constitution and Sheikh Abdullah became Sadr-e-Riyasat of Kashmir under Article 370. Later when Sheikh Abdullah wanted to preserve Kashmir`s special status, he was imprisoned by Nehru. Another lackey was imposed.
I have posted your complete post so that you can examine your arguments while reading UN resolution 654. There is nothing in UN resolutions that stops India from passing its own constitution. Kashmir was kept out of reach of that constitution and got special status. Pakistan, who couldn`t decide its own constitution for many years and even after making one, kept changing it, is certainly in no position to give sermons on constitution to India. If you have such a high regard for constitution, human rights and non-interference than make a plea for constitutional rights for northern regions and free elections for president of pakistan-held. Pakistan does not believe in upholding its own constitution. Does that mean that India and Kashmir should also remain without constitution?
You later state in your post #98
``Since India was clearly not interested in holding a plebiscite, Pakistan could not withdraw the tribesmen without an understanding that India would honor its part of the promise in a given timeframe. We are all aware of the letter Nehru wrote to Sardar Patel and later admitted to by V.K. Krishna Menon in which Nehru expressed his fear that given a plebiscite, Kashmiris will overwhelmingly vote for Pakistan. ``
And than claim in #153 (btw, do print this so called letter from Nehru. That will be another hole in your story)
It does not say that the withdrawal will be done in one week, one month, one year or one decade. Contrast this with the UN SC resolutions passed in 1990 requiring Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait within a specific timeframe
Can`t you see contradiction in your own arguments? As per UN resolutions, Pakistan is to first withdraw its forces. You think it proper for Pakistan to not do so because resolution do not say that withdrawal is to be done in one week, one month or one decade.
And you want Nehru/India to do its part without waiting for pre-conditions to be satisfied!!
Do read these resolutions. If you are still confused do ask me for further help.
#158 Posted by HisExcellency on May 19, 2003 3:55:26 pm
re: #156 by friend
Apologies for confusion over Resolution numbers here. The resolution passed by Security Council on Jan 20, 1948 was Resolution 39, (and not 654). In this resolution, the decision to form a committee was made. The Plebiscite decision was made in Resolution 47 that can be referenced at:
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kashun47.htm
It is reproduced here. And as I had already stated in post #153, this resolution established the principle of self-determination by plebiscite but no timeframe.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Having considered the complaint of the Government of India concerning the dispute over the State
of Jammu and Kashmir, having heard the representative of India in support of that complaint and the
reply and counter complaints of the representative of Pakistan. Being strongly of opinion that the
early restoration of peace and order in Jammu and Kashmir is essential and that India and Pakistan
should do their utmost to bring about cessation of all fighting. Noting with satisfaction that both India
and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan
should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite, Considering that
the continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger international peace and security,
Reaffirms its resolution 38 (1948) of 17 January 1948;
Resolves that the membership of the Commission established by its resolution 39 (1948) of 20
January 1948, shall be increased to five and shall include, in addition to the membership mentioned
in that Resolution, representatives of... and ..., and that if the membership of the Commission has not
been completed within ten days from the date the adoption of this resolution the President of the
Council may designate such other Member or Members of the United Nations as are required to
complete the membership of five;
Instructs the Commission to proceed at once to the Indian subcontinent and there place its good
offices and mediation at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan with a view to
facilitating the taking of the necessary measures, both with respect to the restoration of peace and
order and to the holding of a plebiscite by the two (Governments, acting in co-operation with one
another and with the Commission, and further instructs the Commission to keep the Council
informed of the action taken under the resolution; and, to this end.
Recommends to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following measures as those which in the
opinion of the Council and appropriate to bring about a cessation of the lighting and to create proper
conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to
accede to India or Pakistan.
A - RESTORATION OF PEACE AND ORDER
1. The Government of Pakistan should undertake to use its best endeavours:
(a) To secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and
Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purposes
of fighting, and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such elements and any furnishing of
material aid to those fighting in the State;
(b) To make known to all concerned that the measures indicated in this and the following
paragraphs provide full freedom to all subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste, or
party, to express their views and to vote on the question of the accession of the State, and
that therefore they should co-operate in the maintenance of peace and order.
2. The Government of India should:
(a) When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the
Council`s Resolution 39 (1948) that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for
the cessation of the fighting have become effective, put into operation in consultation with the
Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing
them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the
maintenance of law and order;
(b) Make known that the withdrawal is taking place in stages and announce the completion of
each stage; When the Indian forces shall have been reduced to the minimum strength
mentioned in (a) above, arrange in consultation with the Commission for the stationing of the
remaining forces to be carried out in accordance with the following principles:
(i) That the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation or appearance of
intimidation to the inhabitants of the State;
(ii) That as small a number as possible should be retained in forward areas;
(iii) That any reserve of troops which may be included in the total strength should be located
within their present base area.
3. The Government of India should agree that until such time as the plebiscite administration referred
to below finds it necessary to exercise the powers of direction and supervision over the State forces
and policy provided for in paragraph 8, they will be held in areas to be agreed upon with the
Plebiscite Administrator.
4. After the plan referred to in paragraph 2 (a) above has been put into operation, personnel
recruited locally in each district should so far as possible be utilised for the re-establishment and
maintenance of law and order with due regard to protection )t minorities, subject to such additional
requirements as may be specified by the Plebiscite Administration referred to in paragraph 7.
5. If these local forces should be found to be inadequate, the Commission, subject to the agreement
of both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, should arrange for the use of such
forces of either Dominion as it deems t(effective for the purpose of pacification.
B - PLEBISCITE
6. The Government of India should undertake to ensure that the Government of the State invite the
major political groups to designate responsible representatives to share equitably and fully in the
conduct of the administration at the ministerial level, while the plebiscite is being prepared and
carried out.
7. The Government of India should undertake that there will be established in Jammu and Kashmir a
Plebiscite Administration to hold a Plebiscite as soon as possible ()n the question of the accession of
the State to India or Pakistan.
8. The Government of India should undertake that there will be delegated by the State to the
Plebiscite Administration such powers as the latter considers necessary for holding a fair and
impartial plebiscite including, for that purpose only, the direction and supervision of the State forces
and police.
9. The Government of India should at the request of the Plebiscite Administration, make available
from the Indian forces such assistance as the Plebiscite Administration may require for the
performance of its functions.
10. (a) The Government of India should agree that a nominee of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations will be appointed to be the Plebiscite Administrator. The Plebiscite Administrator, acting as
an officer of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, should have authority to nominate the assistants and
other subordinates and to draft regulations governing the Plebiscite. Such nominees should be
formally appointed and such draft regulations should be formally promulgated by the State of Jammu
and Kashmir.
The Government of India should undertake that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir will appoint
fully qualified persons nominated by the Plebiscite Administrator to act as special magistrates within
the State judicial system to hear cases which in the opinion of the Plebiscite Administrator have a
serious bearing on the preparation and the conduct of a free and impartial plebiscite. The terms of
service of the Administrator should form the subject of a separate negotiation between the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Government of India. The Administrator should fix
the terms of service for his assistants and subordinates.
The Administrator should have the right to communicate directly, with the Government of the State
and with the Commission of the Security Council and, through the Commission, with the Security
Council, with the Governments of India and Pakistan and with their representatives with the
Commission. It would be his duty to bring to the notice of any or all of the foregoing (as he in his
discretion may decide) any circumstances arising which may tend, in his opinion, to interfere with the
freedom of the Plebiscite.
11. The Government of India should undertake to prevent to give full support to the Administrator
and his staff in preventing any threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence on the
voters in the plebiscite, and the Government of India should publicly announce and should cause the
Government of the State to announce this undertaking as an international obligation binding on all
public authorities and officials in Jammu and Kashmir.
12. The Government of India should themselves and through the Government of the State declare
and make known that all subjects of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, regardless of creed, caste or
party, will be safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of the accession of
the State and that there will be freedom of the Press, speech and assembly and freedom of travel in
the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit.
13. The Government of India should use and should ensure that the Government of the State also
use their best endeavour to effect the withdrawal from the State of all Indian nationals other than
those who are normally resident therein or who on or since 15th August 1947 have entered it for a
lawful purpose.
14. The Government of India should ensure that the Government of the State releases all political
prisoners and take all possible steps so that:
(a) all citizens of the State who have left it on account of disturbances are invited and are free
to return to their homes and to exercise their rights as such citizens;
(b) there is no victimisation; minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate
protection.
15. The Commission of the Security Council should at the end of the plebiscite certify to the Council
whether the plebiscite has or has not been really free and impartial.
C - GENERAL PROVISIONS
16. The Governments of India and Pakistan should each be invited to nominate a representative to
be attached to the Commission for such assistance as it may require in the performance of its task.
17. The Commission should establish in Jammu and Kashmir such observers as it may require of any
of the proceedings in pursuance of the measures indicated in the foregoing paragraphs.
18. The Security Council Commission should carry out the tasks assigned to it herein.
The Security Council voted on this Resolution on 21-41948 with the following result:
In favour: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Syria, U.K. and U.S.A.
Against: None
Abstaining: Belgium, Colombia, Ukrainian S.S.R. and U.S.S.R.
Apologies for confusion over Resolution numbers here. The resolution passed by Security Council on Jan 20, 1948 was Resolution 39, (and not 654). In this resolution, the decision to form a committee was made. The Plebiscite decision was made in Resolution 47 that can be referenced at:
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kashun47.htm
It is reproduced here. And as I had already stated in post #153, this resolution established the principle of self-determination by plebiscite but no timeframe.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Having considered the complaint of the Government of India concerning the dispute over the State
of Jammu and Kashmir, having heard the representative of India in support of that complaint and the
reply and counter complaints of the representative of Pakistan. Being strongly of opinion that the
early restoration of peace and order in Jammu and Kashmir is essential and that India and Pakistan
should do their utmost to bring about cessation of all fighting. Noting with satisfaction that both India
and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan
should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite, Considering that
the continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger international peace and security,
Reaffirms its resolution 38 (1948) of 17 January 1948;
Resolves that the membership of the Commission established by its resolution 39 (1948) of 20
January 1948, shall be increased to five and shall include, in addition to the membership mentioned
in that Resolution, representatives of... and ..., and that if the membership of the Commission has not
been completed within ten days from the date the adoption of this resolution the President of the
Council may designate such other Member or Members of the United Nations as are required to
complete the membership of five;
Instructs the Commission to proceed at once to the Indian subcontinent and there place its good
offices and mediation at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan with a view to
facilitating the taking of the necessary measures, both with respect to the restoration of peace and
order and to the holding of a plebiscite by the two (Governments, acting in co-operation with one
another and with the Commission, and further instructs the Commission to keep the Council
informed of the action taken under the resolution; and, to this end.
Recommends to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following measures as those which in the
opinion of the Council and appropriate to bring about a cessation of the lighting and to create proper
conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to
accede to India or Pakistan.
A - RESTORATION OF PEACE AND ORDER
1. The Government of Pakistan should undertake to use its best endeavours:
(a) To secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and
Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purposes
of fighting, and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such elements and any furnishing of
material aid to those fighting in the State;
(b) To make known to all concerned that the measures indicated in this and the following
paragraphs provide full freedom to all subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste, or
party, to express their views and to vote on the question of the accession of the State, and
that therefore they should co-operate in the maintenance of peace and order.
2. The Government of India should:
(a) When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the
Council`s Resolution 39 (1948) that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for
the cessation of the fighting have become effective, put into operation in consultation with the
Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing
them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the
maintenance of law and order;
(b) Make known that the withdrawal is taking place in stages and announce the completion of
each stage; When the Indian forces shall have been reduced to the minimum strength
mentioned in (a) above, arrange in consultation with the Commission for the stationing of the
remaining forces to be carried out in accordance with the following principles:
(i) That the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation or appearance of
intimidation to the inhabitants of the State;
(ii) That as small a number as possible should be retained in forward areas;
(iii) That any reserve of troops which may be included in the total strength should be located
within their present base area.
3. The Government of India should agree that until such time as the plebiscite administration referred
to below finds it necessary to exercise the powers of direction and supervision over the State forces
and policy provided for in paragraph 8, they will be held in areas to be agreed upon with the
Plebiscite Administrator.
4. After the plan referred to in paragraph 2 (a) above has been put into operation, personnel
recruited locally in each district should so far as possible be utilised for the re-establishment and
maintenance of law and order with due regard to protection )t minorities, subject to such additional
requirements as may be specified by the Plebiscite Administration referred to in paragraph 7.
5. If these local forces should be found to be inadequate, the Commission, subject to the agreement
of both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, should arrange for the use of such
forces of either Dominion as it deems t(effective for the purpose of pacification.
B - PLEBISCITE
6. The Government of India should undertake to ensure that the Government of the State invite the
major political groups to designate responsible representatives to share equitably and fully in the
conduct of the administration at the ministerial level, while the plebiscite is being prepared and
carried out.
7. The Government of India should undertake that there will be established in Jammu and Kashmir a
Plebiscite Administration to hold a Plebiscite as soon as possible ()n the question of the accession of
the State to India or Pakistan.
8. The Government of India should undertake that there will be delegated by the State to the
Plebiscite Administration such powers as the latter considers necessary for holding a fair and
impartial plebiscite including, for that purpose only, the direction and supervision of the State forces
and police.
9. The Government of India should at the request of the Plebiscite Administration, make available
from the Indian forces such assistance as the Plebiscite Administration may require for the
performance of its functions.
10. (a) The Government of India should agree that a nominee of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations will be appointed to be the Plebiscite Administrator. The Plebiscite Administrator, acting as
an officer of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, should have authority to nominate the assistants and
other subordinates and to draft regulations governing the Plebiscite. Such nominees should be
formally appointed and such draft regulations should be formally promulgated by the State of Jammu
and Kashmir.
The Government of India should undertake that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir will appoint
fully qualified persons nominated by the Plebiscite Administrator to act as special magistrates within
the State judicial system to hear cases which in the opinion of the Plebiscite Administrator have a
serious bearing on the preparation and the conduct of a free and impartial plebiscite. The terms of
service of the Administrator should form the subject of a separate negotiation between the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Government of India. The Administrator should fix
the terms of service for his assistants and subordinates.
The Administrator should have the right to communicate directly, with the Government of the State
and with the Commission of the Security Council and, through the Commission, with the Security
Council, with the Governments of India and Pakistan and with their representatives with the
Commission. It would be his duty to bring to the notice of any or all of the foregoing (as he in his
discretion may decide) any circumstances arising which may tend, in his opinion, to interfere with the
freedom of the Plebiscite.
11. The Government of India should undertake to prevent to give full support to the Administrator
and his staff in preventing any threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence on the
voters in the plebiscite, and the Government of India should publicly announce and should cause the
Government of the State to announce this undertaking as an international obligation binding on all
public authorities and officials in Jammu and Kashmir.
12. The Government of India should themselves and through the Government of the State declare
and make known that all subjects of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, regardless of creed, caste or
party, will be safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of the accession of
the State and that there will be freedom of the Press, speech and assembly and freedom of travel in
the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit.
13. The Government of India should use and should ensure that the Government of the State also
use their best endeavour to effect the withdrawal from the State of all Indian nationals other than
those who are normally resident therein or who on or since 15th August 1947 have entered it for a
lawful purpose.
14. The Government of India should ensure that the Government of the State releases all political
prisoners and take all possible steps so that:
(a) all citizens of the State who have left it on account of disturbances are invited and are free
to return to their homes and to exercise their rights as such citizens;
(b) there is no victimisation; minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate
protection.
15. The Commission of the Security Council should at the end of the plebiscite certify to the Council
whether the plebiscite has or has not been really free and impartial.
C - GENERAL PROVISIONS
16. The Governments of India and Pakistan should each be invited to nominate a representative to
be attached to the Commission for such assistance as it may require in the performance of its task.
17. The Commission should establish in Jammu and Kashmir such observers as it may require of any
of the proceedings in pursuance of the measures indicated in the foregoing paragraphs.
18. The Security Council Commission should carry out the tasks assigned to it herein.
The Security Council voted on this Resolution on 21-41948 with the following result:
In favour: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Syria, U.K. and U.S.A.
Against: None
Abstaining: Belgium, Colombia, Ukrainian S.S.R. and U.S.S.R.
#157 Posted by friend on May 19, 2003 3:13:31 pm
HE #153
``UN SC resolution 654 just establishes the principle of plebiscite and noninterference in Kashmiri`s right to self-determination without stipulating when this noninterference would take place. ``
My dear HE, reproduced below is your so called security council resolution number 654. In case you do not understand it, summary of this resolution is ``Let us make a committee``. It does not discuss or makes assumptions about any principle of plebiscite.
--------------------------------------------------------------
KASHMIR RESOLUTION
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*RESOLUTION 39 (1948) SUBMITTED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF BELGIUM AND ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 230TH MEETING HELD ON 20 JANUARY 1948. (DOCUMENT NO. S 654 DATED THE 20TH JANUARY 1948).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Considering that it may investigate any dispute or any situation which might, by its continuance, endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and that, in the existing state of affairs between India and Pakistan, such an investigation is a matter of urgency,
Adopts the following resolution:
A. A Commission of the Security Council is hereby established, composed of representatives of three Members of the United Nations, one to be selected by India, one to be selected by Pakistan, and the third to be designated by the two so selected. Each representative on the Commission shall be entitled to select his alternates and assistants.
B. The Commission shall proceed to the spot as quickly as possible. It shall act under the authority of the Security Council and in accordance with the directions it may receive from it. It shall keep the Security Council currently informed of its activities and of the development of the situation. It shall report to the Security Council regularly, submitting its conclusions and proposals.
C. The Commission is invested with a dual function; (1) to investigate the facts pursuant to Article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations; (2) to exercise, without interrupting the work of the Security Council, any mediatory influence likely to smooth away difficulties, to carry out the directions given to it by the Security Council; and to report how far the advic
``UN SC resolution 654 just establishes the principle of plebiscite and noninterference in Kashmiri`s right to self-determination without stipulating when this noninterference would take place. ``
My dear HE, reproduced below is your so called security council resolution number 654. In case you do not understand it, summary of this resolution is ``Let us make a committee``. It does not discuss or makes assumptions about any principle of plebiscite.
--------------------------------------------------------------
KASHMIR RESOLUTION
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*RESOLUTION 39 (1948) SUBMITTED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF BELGIUM AND ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 230TH MEETING HELD ON 20 JANUARY 1948. (DOCUMENT NO. S 654 DATED THE 20TH JANUARY 1948).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Considering that it may investigate any dispute or any situation which might, by its continuance, endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and that, in the existing state of affairs between India and Pakistan, such an investigation is a matter of urgency,
Adopts the following resolution:
A. A Commission of the Security Council is hereby established, composed of representatives of three Members of the United Nations, one to be selected by India, one to be selected by Pakistan, and the third to be designated by the two so selected. Each representative on the Commission shall be entitled to select his alternates and assistants.
B. The Commission shall proceed to the spot as quickly as possible. It shall act under the authority of the Security Council and in accordance with the directions it may receive from it. It shall keep the Security Council currently informed of its activities and of the development of the situation. It shall report to the Security Council regularly, submitting its conclusions and proposals.
C. The Commission is invested with a dual function; (1) to investigate the facts pursuant to Article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations; (2) to exercise, without interrupting the work of the Security Council, any mediatory influence likely to smooth away difficulties, to carry out the directions given to it by the Security Council; and to report how far the advic