The Beginning of the End of the Kashmir Problem

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--- #125 by nazarhayatkhan ---

I am a South Asian for last 5000 years.
Muslim for last 1400 years.
And Pakistani for last 55 years.

Wah! Wah! Goodsounding reply!

So you were a south asian for 5000 years.
What the hell does that mean.

Do you mean your cultural roots began in Mohenjodaro ?

Well in that case, you were a hindu for 4000 years before you became a muslim in 1000 AD. correct me if my history is wrong.

I suppose (every now and then) you introduce yourself as a hindu also , do you!

South asian indeed!

HE #159,
It is good that you acknowledged part of your confusion.
You can help everyone further by clarifying very aparent contradiction in your stand.
1. You justify Pakistan`s non-compliance to UN resolutions by stating that no time-frame has been stipulated. On the other hand, you want India/Nehru to honor same resolutions - even though every clear pre-conditions, to be met by Pakistan, are stated in resolutions.

2. You raised a very interesting and ingenious argument of ``no time frame stipulated``. So if Pakistan decides to meet pre-conditions after 100 years, you want India to just keep waiting for that event!!!!

2. You didn`t answer my question on why you are ok with Pakistan not honoring rights of people of nothern areas?

3. Both India and Pakistan decided on similar deadlines for themselves for creating a constitution. India met its deadline. Pakistan didn`t. Why India being able to create its constitution in time is an issue for you. Kashmir was given a special status and Sheikh Abdulha himself decided in favor of India. If there was acrimony between Jinnah and Seikh Abdulha, than why it was India`s/Nehru`s fault?

4. Even after 56 years, no non-Kashmiri can own property in J&K. Is there any such law in Pakistan? On what ground Pakistan agreed to scede part of J&K to China? If Kashmir is treated as an independent entity by Pakistan than why president of Pakistan-held Kasmir is an ex-army general.

5. Even after 56 years, nothern areas have not been integrated with Pakistan-held Kashmir. Why is that so? You go by resolutions and written documents. How do you justify that?

6. You also stated in #98
``We are all aware of the letter Nehru wrote to Sardar Patel and later admitted to by V.K. Krishna Menon in which Nehru expressed his fear that given a plebiscite, Kashmiris will overwhelmingly vote for Pakistan. ``

No, I am not part of ``we`` and am not aware of any such letter. Kindly educate me and provide a solid reference on this information.

re: #158 by friend

As you can clearly read in the sections titled ``PLEBISCITE``, the Resolution 47 passed in April 1948 established the principle of plebiscite.

Regardless of Pakistan`s troubled constitutional history and India`s stable one, the fact that Nehru was conspiring to get Kashmir incorporated into Indian Union under the Constitution underscores his mala fide intentions. Having agreed to the Plebiscite under Resolution 47, he was now trying to circumvent the Plebiscite through the back-door.

I stand by my comments in post#98 in which I explained why Pakistan did not withdraw the tribesmen. I will summarize those comments for your benefit. In essence, Pakistan could not withdraw its tribesmen without a mutually agreed roadmap. A roadmap would establish the following:

a) When would the Pakistanis begin their withdrawal?

b) How will the progress of this withdrawal be monitored? Will this be done by UN? By Pakistan? By India? Or Both?

c) After the withdrawal, when will India form a Plebiscite Administration? Will this Administration be staff with Indian officials only? Or will there be Pakistani and/or UN officials as well to verify its transparency & neutrality?

d) Will Pakistani and Indian politicians be allowed to canvass the Kashmiris? What will be the modalities of the Plebiscite?

e) And finally, how and when will the Plebiscite be held? Will there be one plebiscite for Jammu & Kashmir? Or will there be separate Plebiscites in Jammu, Ladakh and Kashmir?

f) How will the results of Plebiscite be interpreted? Should Pakistan get Kashmir if 51% or more people voted for Pak? Or should Pakistan get Kashmir only if 66% or more people voted for Pak?

It had become clear by Spring of 1948, that Nehru was not serious about the Plebiscite. In such a scenario, you can`t expect Mr. Jinnah to unilaterally withdraw without a reciprocal, specific and timebound commitment from Mr. Nehru.

All this makes sense if you remind yourself of the extreme suspicion and scorn Pakistanis and Indians have for each other. Nothing short of a formal roadmap (preferably supervised by a third-party) should be expected in Indo-Pak relations.

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KASHMIR JIHAD

There are fools every where who refuse to see the reality and prominant among them are the ones who talk of having peace with pakistan. Last week witnessed the highest number of killings in kasjmir including that of a whole family. The same is true for israel, saudi and morocco.
The fools cannot see the link, cannot accept who is calling the shots, i mean the real shots, and how i tis coordinated.

Kashmir is a requirement for the children of TNT to attain heaven, and peace with india is a after of life in hell only for the millions who rush out of the 200000 madrassas of pakistan.

#147 by ahmadzai on May 19, 2003 10:20am PT

[Why should we believe that those killed in Kashmir are by Freedom Fighters? They may have been killed by terrorists alright.]

This is the standard GoP line. But the world, prominently the US, has come to accept the fact that Pakistan does sponsor the insurgency in Kashmir. That is the reason why every visiting US/British and other US leader over the past 18 months has stressed upon Pakistan the need for an end to infiltration from across the LoC. You need to weigh in every word you type in lest you become the laughing stock. Amnesty International in the past has apportioned blame on the Indian security forces for excesses. But nowhere has the agency ever said that they resort to killings just so the terrorists could be blamed for it. This argument is well past its sell-by date. You need to look for a fresh one.

[1. Not a single terrorist has been caught alive to-date who could provide a hard evidence in favor of Indian accusations. Police is trained in shooting at legs in such a way that culprits can be caught red-handed. However, all those accused of terrorism have been shot dead.]

What a load of bull dust! If that were indeed the issue, there are any number of unemployed Pakistani youth who could be bought off and confessions manufactured by the dozen.

Dawood Ibrahim, India`s most-wanted underworld don, implicated in a series of blasts that rocked Bombay in the early nineties apparently lives a charmed life in Karachi protected by the ISI and other Pakistani agencies. Ghulam Hasnain, in a scoop for the magazine Newsline brought into light Dawood`s life in Pakistan last year, for which he had to pay by being assaulted by the ISI.

And what about Maulana Masood Azhar and Omar Saeed Sheikh? Weren`t these two exchanged in return for the hostages aboard the IA flight hijacked to Kandahar? Masood Azhar is the founder of the Jaish-e-Muhammad, an outfit very active in Kashmir and recently designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the US State Department. Omar Saeed Sheikh is being held for the Daniel Pearl murder.

[2. It has been confirmed that many Pakhtoon youth from Pakistan`s tribal areas (not NWFP) were caught by the Northern Alliance during anti-Taliban war and handed over to India. They are still languishing in Indian jails. The point to note is that these youth may be shot in fake encounters and accused to be actively involved in terrorism.]

You have been going on and on without furnishing any shred of evidence to support your statements. Where is the evidence that these youth were handed over to India? How do you know that these Pakhtoon youth are not from the NWFP? Are they known to you by any chance?

Also see para.1 of my response to your point No. 1.

Reply #160 Ironman

Yes. My cultural history and soul begins from Moenjodaro.

My soul has an element of Hindue in it. I never deny it. I have no problems with holy or temples.

My soul also has a strong Punjabi ethos to it.

I like Bengali songs and music. Persioa and French sounds very good to me.

I find the church hymes very soothing. In fact, I find the arabic language sounds somewhat rough.

South Asia is a cultural and linguistic one distinct zone. Whether one likes it or not.

All political boundaries within it are artificial.

Just wait for another 10 years before the outside pressures bring it close to the realization of these historical and geographical facts.

HE #164
the fact that Nehru was conspiring to get Kashmir incorporated into Indian Union under the Constitution underscores his mala fide intentions.

You keep referring to so many facts about Nehru without ever giving any reference. Would you be kind enough to provide a solid reference to your facts.

After harping on ``India not honoring UN resolutions``, now your stand appears to be that UN resolution need to be followed by a roadmap. Am I incorrect to understand this?

Now coming to your questions
1. When should Pakistan start its withdrawl - It is first condition of UN resolutions. If Pakistan wants UN resolutions to be honored, it has to meet the first condition. Either one is very dumb, or very innocent, to ask when should be start first step.
Read further in *RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN ON 13 AUGUST 1948. (DOCUMENT NO.S/1100, PARA 75, DATED 9 NOVEMBER 1948)



PART II

TRUCE AGREEMENT

Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their Representatives and the Commission.

A. (1) As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.

UN resolution state very clearly what ``material change`` happened between first UN resolution and resolution adopted in November.

You only logic seems to be Pakistan did it due to some ``pre-conceived`` ideas about Indian intentions.

Note that Pakistani invasion started in Kashmir when no merger had taken place. India was patiently waiting. Details of invasion can be found in many articles in ``The defence journal`` published by Pakistani Army.

These so called intentions of India and Nehru is just a bogey that is raised by Pakistan to justify all its actions.

If you take time to read the UN resolutions, you will find answers to many of your questions about ``roadmap``
1. Who monitors withdrawl has been addressed in ``When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the Council`s Resolution 39 (1948) that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective`` in resolution dated April 21st.

2. Plebiscite administrator - who appoints him/her is addressed in ``The Government of India should agree that a nominee of the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be appointed to be the Plebiscite Administrator. `` in resolution dated April 21st.

If your case is that UN resolutions do not carry sufficient instructions, than Pakistan should have gone to UN to get more clear instuctions. Blaming India will not help.

Now over to you.

ahmedzai #whichever

You may find this inspiring:

http://www.jamatdawa.org/data2/jihad.html
http://www.jamatdawa.org/english/articles/jihad/index.htm

re: #165 by friend

I am afraid you have misunderstood my comments. I have not changed my position on UN SC 47, plebiscite, roadmap and Nehru.

I stand by my position that

* UN SC Resolution 47 spelled out a principle (i.e plebiscite) for resolving the Kashmir issue, leaving the roadmap and timeframe to be mutually decided by both the parties (India and Pakistan).

* However, Nehru soon realized that a Plebiscite would certainly go in Pakistan`s favour, especially in Kashmir Valley. To avoid international embarrassment, he didn`t rule out plebiscite immediately. But in Indo-Pak summit talks between 1949 and 1955, he avoided discussions on the roadmap for Plebiscite. Instead he wanted Pakistan to accept the status quo.

* Pakistan was ready to discuss the modalities and roadmap for implementing UN SC 47. In fact, Pakistan insisted on the roadmap during Liaqat-Nehru talks, Bogra-Nehru talks and Ghulam Muhammad-Nehru talks. It was Nehru who insisted on ``other options``, instead of discussing the roadmap necessary to implement UN SC 47

EXCERPTS FROM Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 28 (February 1-May 31, 1955)

... in 1947 Nehru was confident of winning the plebiscite. Earlier volumes in the series record Nehru`s retreat from plebiscite and moves for partition. One would suspect that when it concerned Kashmir, Nehru had reservations on a plebiscite even in 1947. Thus, he wrote to Abdullah on November 21, 1947: ``Dwarkanath writes to me that there is strong feeling in the leadership of the National Conference against a referendum. I know this and quite understand it. In fact I share the feeling myself. But you will appreciate that it is not easy for us to back out of the stand we have taken before the world. That would create a very bad impression abroad and especially in U.N. circles. I feel, however, that this question of referendum is rather an academic one at present... If we said to the UNO that we no longer stand by a referendum in Kashmir, Pakistan would score a strong point and that would be harmful to our cause. On the other hand, if circumstances continue as they are and the referendum is out of the question during these next few months, then why worry about it now?... It is all a question of the best tactical approach. I would personally suggest to you not to say anything rejecting the idea of a referendum...`` (V. 4, pp. 336-7).

Nehru pleaded with the Maharaja of Kashmir (December 1, 1947): ``If the average Muslim (in Kashmir) feels that he has no safe or secure place in the Union, then obviously he will look elsewhere... The present position is that in Kashmir proper, the mass of the population Muslim and Hindu is no doubt in favour of the Indian Union. In the Jammu area, all the non-Muslims and some Muslims are likely to be in favour of the Union. But this depends entirely on the policy to be pursued during the next few months`` (V. 4; p. 351).

Another consideration weighed with Nehru. He knew that a pro-Pakistan constituency existed in Kashmir. It has to be defeated or marginalised by winning over the people - through the plebiscite offer. Hence his wise counsel to the Sheikh on November 1, 1947: ``The people must be made to feel that the question of accession will have to be decided finally according to their own wishes. How this is to be done can be determined later. As far as I can see, it should be done under the auspices of the United Nations`` (V. 4; p. 300). Mountbatten`s suggestion for reference to the U.N. came later, on December 8.

With Lord Ismay`s help V. P. Menon and Chaudhry Mohammed Ali, Secretary-General of Pakistan`s Cabinet, arrived at a Draft Kashmir Agreement in November which Ismay discussed with Nehru and Liaquat in detail on December 28, 1947. It had no chance of success given Nehru`s attitude despite Liaquat`s concessions (V.4; pp. 408-9).

Once the debates in the U.N. Security Council began in January 1948, Nehru became increasingly uneasy and confused. To Krishna Menon he mentioned two alternatives: ``One is the possibility of Kashmir being considered more or less independent and guaranteed as such by India, Pakistan and possibly the U.N. The other is the possibility of some kind of partition either by previous agreement or as a result of the vote. I do not fancy either of these; but I do not wish to rule them out altogether`` (February 20, 1949; V. 5; p. 222).

On February 26, Mountbatten proposed that ``a vote for independence should be included in the plebiscite`` (V. 5; p. 232).

The Sheikh was warned on November 29, 1948 that while Nehru had ``refused to discuss any details of the plebiscite at this stage, it is not easy in the circumstances just to say no to the commission so far as the plebiscite is concerned. We have to remember that an adverse decision of the Commission may prove harmful to us; so we tried to avoid this while at the same time maintaining a stiff attitude`` (V. 8; p. 62). He was rightly confident that time ran in India`s favour, a fact to which Pakistan was utterly oblivious (V. 11; p. 367).

Towards the end of 1949, the certitude of 1947 gave way to gnawing doubt which he confided to the British High Commissioner, Archibald Nye, on September 9, 1949: ``Whilst he (Nehru) did not accept for one moment the suggestion that the majority of Muslims, because they were Muslims, would vote for Pakistan, he thought that it was true to say that the result of a free and impartial plebiscite, if one could be held, would be for the Poonch area to go to Pakistan and for the Jammu area to go to India, whilst it was doubtful which way the valley would vote. He thought further that a solution on the lines of Western Kashmir going to Pakistan, Jammu and possibly Ladakh to India and a plebiscite being confined to the valley and the area north of it (excluding Gilgit) was worthy of consideration. I (Nye) said that from India`s point of view this may well be so but did he really think there was any prospect of getting Pakistan to agree to any such proposal. I pointed out that Pakistan believed, and has good reason to believe, that there was a very good chance that an overall plebiscite would give a majority to Pakistan which would justify their claiming the whole country. He admitted that Pakistan might not be prepared to agree but thought there was a possibility that a solution could be found on some such line`` (V. 13; p. 225).

Which is why his Note of December 4, 1949 to Vallabhbhai Patel urged ``broader`` terms of reference for the single mediator from the U.N. freed from resolutions on plebiscite; one would consider ``the present situation in all its aspects, and the basic facts of history, geography, language and culture of the State`` (V. 14 (i); p. 198). Patel wrote on July 3, 1950: ``I agree with you that a plebiscite is unreal`` (Sardar Patel`s Correspondence; Vol. 1; p. 317).

The best mediator to come, Sir Owen Dixon, later Chief Justice of Australia, proposed a plebiscite confined to areas where the wishes of the inhabitants were uncertain - the Kashmir Valley. The rest could be assigned to either State, as the case may be. The plan fell through because Nehru rejected his suggestion of an impartial administration in the Valley. The Sheikh must not be removed.

At an informal conference in London of Commonwealth Prime Ministers on January 9, 1951, Nehru firmly stood by the status quo (V. 15 (ii); p. 280). However, at a press conference in New Delhi on November 3, 1951, he said ``I welcome a plebiscite`` (V. 17; p. 424), though he had ruled it out three years earlier.

SOME MORE EXCERPTS FROM Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 28 (February 1-May 31, 1955)

...in this very volume there is a document which, in turn, leads to another that contains the clue to Nehru`s change of policy. From prison, Sheikh Abdullah had asked Nehru to explain precisely what were the mistakes he had committed as Nehru had alleged in the Lok Sabha. In his reply (April 8, 1955), Nehru referred him to a confidential Note dated August 25, 1952 which he had sent to the Sheikh from Sonemarg (SWJN; Vol. 19; pp. 322-330). It is a document of cardinal importance. As mentioned earlier (``Kashmir: History and Politics``, Frontline, July 31, 1988), it virtually admitted that he had set his face against a plebiscite ``towards the end of December 1948``. He was resolved to maintain by force ``the status quo then existing``.

Nehru wrote: ``We are superior to Pakistan in military and industrial power. But that superiority is not so great as to produce results quickly either in war or by fear of war. Therefore, our national interest demands that we should adopt a peaceful policy towards Pakistan and, at the same time, add to our strength. Strength ultimately comes not from the defence forces, but the industrial and economic background behind them. As we grow in strength, and we are likely to do so, Pakistan will feel less and less inclined to threaten or harass us, and a time will come when, through sheer force of circumstances, it will be in a mood to accept a settlement which we consider fair, whether in Kashmir or elsewhere.``

He wanted the Sheikh and his colleagues to have ``a firm and clear outlook, and no debate about basic issues. If we have that outlook, it just does not matter what the United Nations thinks or what Pakistan does.``

Nehru made three mistakes. Pakistan, aggrieved, could not acquiesce in a status quo established by force. Sheikh Abdullah would not continue with his support to Nehru if it cost him popular support in the State. Nehru`s third and gravest mistake was in underestimating the assertiveness of the people if not, indeed, of their relevance. ``It must be remembered that the people of the Kashmir Valley and round-about, though highly gifted in many ways - in intelligence, in artisanship, etc. - are not what are called a virile people. They are soft and addicted to easy living.``

Events were to prove him wrong on all three points. Yet, this is the disastrous policy which won national acceptance and has been followed to this day. Forgotten was his repeated public pledges of a plebiscite, from 1947 to 1954; ``not merely a pledge to your (Pakistan`s) Government, but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world`` (Vol. 4; p. 298; his wire to Liaquat Ali Khan on October 31, 1947).

Why the volte-face in 1948? On May 14, Indira Gandhi wrote to Nehru: ``They say that only Sheikh Saheb is confident of winning the plebiscite... Personally, I feel that all this political talk will count for nothing if the economic situation can be dealt with. Because after all the people are concerned with only (one) thing - they want to settle their goods and to have food and salt.`` They had no soul or mind, evidently. (Sonia Gandhi; Two Alone, Two Together: Letters Exchanged between Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru 1940-1964; p. 551.)

Had he lost the plebiscite, Nehru feared he might lose his job as well. Men of such stature tend to combine in their person personal interests with national interests. He feared that the right wing, within and outside the Congress, might become powerful. These very fears prompted him to reject Zhou En-lai`s proposals for a border settlement. He said as much in private as Neville Maxwell revealed. (India`s China War; p. 166: ``If I give them that, I shall no longer be Prime Minister of India. I will not do it``). There were bigger stakes in Kashmir. Pakistan did not make matters easy by adopting a non-confrontationist stance. Conciliation came belatedly in 1953.

On August 7, 1948, at his very first meeting with the UNCIP, a body mandated to hold a plebiscite, Nehru hinted at alternatives. One of the members, Joseph Korbel, replied that the Commission ``had no right to submit a solution on which the parties had not agreed. He said that the commission believed it possible that a solution different from that envisaged in the Security Council resolution might be worked out and that the commission would be quite willing to help in this respect`` (The UNCIP`s First Interim Report; S/1100, p. 107).

No wonder that on January 12, 1949, a week after the UNCIP`s plebiscite resolution of January 5, Nehru wrote reassuringly to Sheikh Abdullah: ``You know well that this business of plebiscite is still far away and there is a possibility of the plebiscite not taking place at all. I would suggest however that this should not be said in public, as our bona fides will then be challenged`` (V. 9; p. 198).

Mountbatten also began working for partition. ``The partition maps were all marked up, and discussed between Pandit Nehru and the Chief of Army Staff`` (H.V. Hodson; The Great Divide; p. 472). Now the bits fall into place. Nehru accepted on December 23, 1948 the UNCIP`s proposals for a plebiscite; not because he was willing to hold one, but to secure a ceasefire. A recent offensive had pushed Pakistan`s troops to a line beyond which neither he nor Abdullah wished to go or could have gone without triggering a war.

Nehru had already made up his mind not to hold a plebiscite. He just was not saying it out loud yet, for diplomatic and political reasons. The following letter offers a glimpse of his thinking.

NEHRU`S LETTER TO C.C.DESAI (Feb 27, 1955)
http://www.flonnet.com/fl1815/18150730.htm

Nehru wrote .... to India`s High Commissioner in Karachi, C. C. Desai, in strict confidence: ``I recognise and feel that Ghulam Mohammed is anxious to have a settlement and is prepared to go some distance for it. That is a welcome approach. But to suggest that a plebiscite should be held in Jammu and Kashmir state in the autumn of this year is manifestly not possible... Personally I really see no way out except a recognition by both parties of the status quo, subject to minor modifications. Also of course, if there is an agreement, many mutual privileges might follow. At the same time, I am very reluctant naturally to say that we will not have a plebiscite. That might appear as a breach of faith and I do not want to be guilty of that.`` This counsel of discretion was a constant refrain, as we shall see, whether in his letters to Sheikh Abdullah or other confidants. Nehru played with his cards close to his chest.

Pakistan`s legal case on Kashmir is further bolstered by Jawaharlal Nehru`s own statement in UN Security Council in January 1948:

``We have declared that he fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja has supported it, not only to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, but also to the world. We will not and cannot back out of it``.

It is precisely because of these political, legal and moral realities that the US, UK and UN in particular have always agreed with Pakistan`s stand in principle. Their disagreement is with the modus operandi (i.e. Jihadi infiltration) of Pakistan`s Kashmir policy, not its basis. ``

I didn`t get a chance to see this earlier. This statement by Nehru is the political basis of Pakistan`s stand, not the legal basis. As per the law, Kashmir acceded to Iindia due to the action taken by the Maharaja of Kashmir.

The UN resolution in it`s entirety may be considered a legal basis as well, but then if Pakistan does not fulfill it`s bargain (and there is no timeframe as per you) India is not obligated to do so either. In fact the letter of the law makes it mandatory for Pakistan to revert the situation in POK as it existed before 1948. Since that cannot be done because Ppakistan ceded a portion of it`s territory to China, India has no reason to hold a referendum. There is also no mention of a road map in the resolution.

Also, I have never come across any American or British statement explicitely supporting Pakistan`s stand in principle.