Nazar Khan July 9, 2003
#95 Posted by stuka on July 16, 2003 2:23:01 pm
Harimau: Are you in DC/Virginia area as well????? Damn!!
#94 Posted by tahmed32 on July 16, 2003 2:23:00 pm
harimau #93
I did not say manassas.
I said ``major civil war battlefields``.
Manassas is not the only major civil war battlefield.
Ergo: duh-uh.
I did not say manassas.
I said ``major civil war battlefields``.
Manassas is not the only major civil war battlefield.
Ergo: duh-uh.
#93 Posted by harimau on July 16, 2003 11:36:22 am
Ref tahmed32 #92
[The US civil war is another fascinating war i think, and i have visited all the major civil war battlefields in our area (until my wife decided enough was enough).]
How did THAT happen? After all, the mall at Manassas has been built on the battlefield of the battle at Manassas!
[The US civil war is another fascinating war i think, and i have visited all the major civil war battlefields in our area (until my wife decided enough was enough).]
How did THAT happen? After all, the mall at Manassas has been built on the battlefield of the battle at Manassas!
#92 Posted by tahmed32 on July 16, 2003 8:37:12 am
Nazar #83 I grew up in military cantonments, and have plenty of folks in the military (father, father-in-law, uncles, cousins, nephews, even a granduncle who fought in France in WWI, losing three fingers in a trench, and who told us how the pay was Rs. 10 and you were expected to bring your own horse). I am a certified armchair military guy though - but have enough interest in the subject that my wife thinks that all men are afflicted with some genetic problem that causes them to be fascinated by war. I read books when I can (one of the earliest was in class 8 when i finished a 1000 page 19th century published book written on Napoleon`s campaigns that was written by a chap - Abbott - who actually met napoleon. the latest was a book i read a four months back on the Bataan Death March plus subsequent liberation of the prisoners that is a fascinating read). The US civil war is another fascinating war i think, and i have visited all the major civil war battlefields in our area (until my wife decided enough was enough).
Also read up a bit on the 1971 war and discussed with participants (my father-in-law used to visit Bangladesh in those fateful days between march and december 1971 and would meet all the Niazis and others there and had some interesting things to tell about their mindset - which he did not appreciate at all i may add).
I understand that a basic problem was that the pak army had two strategies, one driven by political goals (and meant not yielding an inch of ground in bangladesh) and the other by military goals (and meant consolidating army by moving troops within a defense perimeter around Dhaka). The political strategy was geared to fighting the mukti bahini, while the military one was supposed to replace it in case the indian army attacked. The switch never took place, and indian army simply by-passed the troops scattered around the country and the rest is history. So, as i said earlier: it was a war of the incompetents, with the more incompetent general surrendering.
Also read up a bit on the 1971 war and discussed with participants (my father-in-law used to visit Bangladesh in those fateful days between march and december 1971 and would meet all the Niazis and others there and had some interesting things to tell about their mindset - which he did not appreciate at all i may add).
I understand that a basic problem was that the pak army had two strategies, one driven by political goals (and meant not yielding an inch of ground in bangladesh) and the other by military goals (and meant consolidating army by moving troops within a defense perimeter around Dhaka). The political strategy was geared to fighting the mukti bahini, while the military one was supposed to replace it in case the indian army attacked. The switch never took place, and indian army simply by-passed the troops scattered around the country and the rest is history. So, as i said earlier: it was a war of the incompetents, with the more incompetent general surrendering.
#91 Posted by tahmed32 on July 16, 2003 8:32:57 am
stuka #89 ``Any other Chowkies in the DC/ Virginia area?``
Moi. tauheedahmed@hotmail.com
Moi. tauheedahmed@hotmail.com
#89 Posted by stuka on July 16, 2003 6:44:30 am
Fuzair: Guess my previous post got missed. Welcome back!!
#88 Posted by stuka on July 16, 2003 6:44:30 am
Nazar: I just read your post about your vacation in Virginia in your ILog. I dunno how much sense it makes to publish your phone number there when an email would suffice (just from a safety perspective)
Anyways, I live in DC. Would definitely like to meet up. My email address is pvohra@yahoo.com
Any other Chowkies in the DC/ Virginia area? I was thinking of going to Nazar`s place in Kkarachi for dinner. But now the Mountain is coming to Mohammad and we can meet right here. :)
Anyways, I live in DC. Would definitely like to meet up. My email address is pvohra@yahoo.com
Any other Chowkies in the DC/ Virginia area? I was thinking of going to Nazar`s place in Kkarachi for dinner. But now the Mountain is coming to Mohammad and we can meet right here. :)
#87 Posted by harish_hyd on July 16, 2003 6:04:56 am
Madani Sahab,
Believe me, your post is much more interesting than the posts of some of your more educated compatriots. I would have loved to interact personally with you. Unfortunately I`d need a visa for that. Keep posting. They make Chowk a lively place.
Warm Regards,
Harish
Believe me, your post is much more interesting than the posts of some of your more educated compatriots. I would have loved to interact personally with you. Unfortunately I`d need a visa for that. Keep posting. They make Chowk a lively place.
Warm Regards,
Harish
#86 Posted by Ansari on July 16, 2003 12:01:16 am
Madani sahab: please mera bhi number likh lain; whenever you have time, would love to sit down and talk with you. 0300-2271678. aur isko istimaal karne ke liya courage waghaira ki koi zaroorat nahin; mujhe aap se milke khushi ho gi.
#85 Posted by stuka on July 15, 2003 10:37:09 pm
Harimou: Nazar is a bit too kind. The main problem of the Indian Armed Forces, as correctly pointed out by Americans, is the tight control or rather the stranglehold the bureaucrats have over uniformed services.
Now, the IAS`s mantra is ``civil control of armed forces`` which is exactly how it should be. However, the civil control means that the armed forces should reported to the elected representatives. There can at most be a bureaucrat per service to do liasion, such as secretary of the Army, Air Force etc. In India however, the MIN of Defense is composed entirely of IAS people who form an unbridgeable layer between the politicians and the military. In actual terms it means that the Armed Forces are stuck in inertia, be it in procurement, transfers or organizational changes at a macro level.
In India and Pakistan, money has been made on procurement. There is no difference at all. One hand it ismilitary officers that make money and on the other it is IAS. However. the crucial difference is that procurement procedures meet the needs of the Pakistan Army whereas in India constant delays have lead to unnecessary degradation of preparedness.
Now, the IAS`s mantra is ``civil control of armed forces`` which is exactly how it should be. However, the civil control means that the armed forces should reported to the elected representatives. There can at most be a bureaucrat per service to do liasion, such as secretary of the Army, Air Force etc. In India however, the MIN of Defense is composed entirely of IAS people who form an unbridgeable layer between the politicians and the military. In actual terms it means that the Armed Forces are stuck in inertia, be it in procurement, transfers or organizational changes at a macro level.
In India and Pakistan, money has been made on procurement. There is no difference at all. One hand it ismilitary officers that make money and on the other it is IAS. However. the crucial difference is that procurement procedures meet the needs of the Pakistan Army whereas in India constant delays have lead to unnecessary degradation of preparedness.
#84 Posted by nazarhayatkhan on July 15, 2003 10:37:09 pm
Nakhok # 82
Without going into long theories, let me give you my cold-blooded bottom lines in all cases:
1947 - If the tribal Lashkars had been sent, they should not have been stopped mid-way. Wrong political decision by Pakistan. India simply occupied the Muslim states within its territory. That was perhaps the only military solution ever possible in Kashmir case. After that there was none.
1962 - It was an oppurtunity for Pakistan to exploit just as India exploited the 1971 oppurtunity. Pakistan made the wrong political decision by not jumping into the war with China. No such oppurtunity will ever come in future.
1965 - A completely stupid war initiated by Pakistan that put Pakistan on the downhill out of which it has not recovered as yet. War outcome was a stalemate. For Pakistan, the day was saved by the Air Force which had good equipment.
1971 - A complete political and a miltary failure by Pakistan.
Kargil - A stupid action by Pakistan with no political foresight. Lost a great deal in terms of its image in the world, damaged the Kashmiri cause and finally lost militarily.
India`s Srilankan adventure and Tamils has been its one mistake. But it recovered in time and now never talks on this issue.
The future lies in forgetting all the above. Making an Economic SAARC Union and gradually progressing towards a political Union.
#83 Posted by nazarhayatkhan on July 15, 2003 9:41:50 pm
Harimou # 77
The US report is based on their own national interest. In Pakistan, they can directly deal with Army and get the thing regulaized from the Civil Government, if that happens to be different.
In India, there is a proper system of complete civilian control over the military, as it should be. The issue has to be resolved at the Political level before translating it into some action by the military.
Otherwise, there is absolutely no difference in man-to-man comparison or efficiency - both are from the same stock. Although Bangla Desh was primarily a political failure by Pakistan but even here the Pakistan Army used a poor strategy and the Indian Army used the correct strategy. (Pakistan Army spread itself too thin in Pockets - Indian Army simply bypassed them and reached Dacca)
So the US report is nothing more than what simply suites them. It is big subject. More some time later.
Tehmed 32
I am impressed by your knowledge of history. I am sure it is your personal interest or did you study the subject some where. You are most invited for dinner with Stuka and Madani Sahib.
#82 Posted by fuzair on July 15, 2003 4:58:00 pm
Hello All,
After a long absence from Chowk, I thought I would poke around and see what was going on. Glad to see that some of the old gang is still around, still fighting the (same old) good fight!
Stuka, I am truly touched that you missed me!
Hello also to Romair, Tahmed, SameerJB and anyone else I may `know` on this board.
Someone I know did the War Course some years before WCDR Nazar (do I have the rank right or are you a GCPT?) did, when NDC was still in Lalkurti, and I am reminded of a story he used to recount. Gen Nishat (I think thats the name), a gentleman of the old school, was the Commandant and one day this person was called into his office. Gen. Nishat said that he should really control his syndicate`s discussion more tightly since the topics were sometimes getting out of hand. Basically, Col. Sarwar should stop badmouthing the corrupt generals in the Army otherwise Nishat might have to take official notice of it. Since the officer in question had just said this a few hours ago, it was unlikely that it had already been reported to the Commandant. So Nishat was asked how he knew what Sarwar had said to the syndicate? Apparently, all the conference rooms were bugged and the Commandant could listen in on the discussions!
BTW, for those of you who may recall him from his political days, this is the same Col. Sarwar who served Benazir Bhutto as her Minister of State for Defense after he was kicked out of the Army. Apparently, during a Q&A session with Gen. Zia, Sarwar asked him what he was going to do about the corrupt generals in the Army. Zia hemmed and hawed and said that while there was some corruption in the Army, it was minimal and he was going to act against it when and if it was found. Sarwar responded that he was not talking about general corruption in the Army but specifically about high ranking generals who were corrupt. Zia did his famous ``Heh, heh, heh,`` and changed the subject.
Sarwar was retired from the Army shortly thereafter and then went into politics. Sarwar had an excellent war record and was a very bright man, not to mention pretty darn near fearless, although as a politician, I`ve heard he decided to make money instead.
BTW, WCDR saab, in your sojourn at NDC, did you study the 1971 fiasco at all? Even 1965?
Regards.
After a long absence from Chowk, I thought I would poke around and see what was going on. Glad to see that some of the old gang is still around, still fighting the (same old) good fight!
Stuka, I am truly touched that you missed me!
Hello also to Romair, Tahmed, SameerJB and anyone else I may `know` on this board.
Someone I know did the War Course some years before WCDR Nazar (do I have the rank right or are you a GCPT?) did, when NDC was still in Lalkurti, and I am reminded of a story he used to recount. Gen Nishat (I think thats the name), a gentleman of the old school, was the Commandant and one day this person was called into his office. Gen. Nishat said that he should really control his syndicate`s discussion more tightly since the topics were sometimes getting out of hand. Basically, Col. Sarwar should stop badmouthing the corrupt generals in the Army otherwise Nishat might have to take official notice of it. Since the officer in question had just said this a few hours ago, it was unlikely that it had already been reported to the Commandant. So Nishat was asked how he knew what Sarwar had said to the syndicate? Apparently, all the conference rooms were bugged and the Commandant could listen in on the discussions!
BTW, for those of you who may recall him from his political days, this is the same Col. Sarwar who served Benazir Bhutto as her Minister of State for Defense after he was kicked out of the Army. Apparently, during a Q&A session with Gen. Zia, Sarwar asked him what he was going to do about the corrupt generals in the Army. Zia hemmed and hawed and said that while there was some corruption in the Army, it was minimal and he was going to act against it when and if it was found. Sarwar responded that he was not talking about general corruption in the Army but specifically about high ranking generals who were corrupt. Zia did his famous ``Heh, heh, heh,`` and changed the subject.
Sarwar was retired from the Army shortly thereafter and then went into politics. Sarwar had an excellent war record and was a very bright man, not to mention pretty darn near fearless, although as a politician, I`ve heard he decided to make money instead.
BTW, WCDR saab, in your sojourn at NDC, did you study the 1971 fiasco at all? Even 1965?
Regards.
#81 Posted by nakhok on July 15, 2003 4:58:00 pm
This is what Altaf Gauhar (the powerful information secretary in the
regime of ``Field Marshal`` Ayub Khan) wrote the 1947 war of
``liberation`` in Jammu & Kashmir:
``.....the Kashmir invasion, planned by hoardes of lawless tribesmen of
the NWF, who indulged in murder and looting as they moved into the
territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Khurshid Anwar, an ex-army officer,
who was killed in the operation, was supposed to be the main organiser
of this operation. The tribesmen were assured that the Indian army was
too ill-organised to offer any counter offensive, so they could fight
their war of freedom without fear. No one remembered that frontier
rebels do not fight wars of freedom on behalf of other people. They
settle their tribal disputes through looting, murder and devastation.``
It is interesting to note that Pakistan`s ruling elite was quite
willing to have its cake and eat it too. Thus at independence, it
quickly accepted the Junagarh Nawab`s offer to join Pakistan even as
it organized the tribal onslaught on Jammu & Kashmir lest its Maharaja
does a Junagarh. It is another matter that Pakistan`s duplicity was
less than fruitful - losing 100% of Junagarh and retaining about a
third of Jammu & Kashmir.
regime of ``Field Marshal`` Ayub Khan) wrote the 1947 war of
``liberation`` in Jammu & Kashmir:
``.....the Kashmir invasion, planned by hoardes of lawless tribesmen of
the NWF, who indulged in murder and looting as they moved into the
territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Khurshid Anwar, an ex-army officer,
who was killed in the operation, was supposed to be the main organiser
of this operation. The tribesmen were assured that the Indian army was
too ill-organised to offer any counter offensive, so they could fight
their war of freedom without fear. No one remembered that frontier
rebels do not fight wars of freedom on behalf of other people. They
settle their tribal disputes through looting, murder and devastation.``
It is interesting to note that Pakistan`s ruling elite was quite
willing to have its cake and eat it too. Thus at independence, it
quickly accepted the Junagarh Nawab`s offer to join Pakistan even as
it organized the tribal onslaught on Jammu & Kashmir lest its Maharaja
does a Junagarh. It is another matter that Pakistan`s duplicity was
less than fruitful - losing 100% of Junagarh and retaining about a
third of Jammu & Kashmir.
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