The Defence College Experience

I feel that Nazar`s article is thought provoking, precise, accurate and objective. Having been a student of Military Sociology, I must appreciate that he has formulated a hypothesis on which volumes could be written.

Of all the three services in Pakistan, Corporatism and Exclusivity runs the strongest in the Army being the largest force amonst the three. Perhaps same is the case with US Navy, that spreads national power across the oceans.

I am of the view that nothing in the Armed Forces has changed since the 80s. Armies by tradition are resistant to change. Today we see our son`s make the same notes in Infantry School that our parents made when they did the junior leadership course. Like the 25 pounder gun the old biases have a predisposition of getting back.


A word about the policies and battle as spelled by Nazar. The Army for a very long time has been studying the relation ship of War and Policy from the book by J F C Fuller, ``Conduct Of War`` This distorted and biased evaluation of Clausewitz has resulted over a period of time in evolution of the psyhce that leads to drawing war plans in the War College. It is the same situation that the German General Staff faced in the German Wars of Unifications and later the invasion of France. A militarily brilliant Sclieffen Plan was ruined through poor staff planning not because generalship had gone bankcupt as commomny believed but because all political linkages to the War were ignored. It would be worthwhile to analyse Pakistan`s wars in the same context. A tendency to explain why it becomes so easy in the War College to make openening narratives for War Games.

All military sociologists agree that militaries train and live in the past. Colonial/Post Colonial Armies are most resistant to change becoming even more inflexible if they develope Praetorian tendencies. Hence all policies get to be looked at through the window of security and preservation of inertia.

But the malaise is not just in the Armed Forces. It has crept in all walks of national life. Brilliancy and intellectualism has lost its merit long ago. Opportunity and sycophancy are the name of the game. In all institutions a deliberate exercise at de education is carried out. The plight of A Level students in various universities particularly NUST is a case in point. People like Nazar are fortunate to fly higher horizons. Most like me are cacooned in the system and forced to live with it.

I feel that if an individual is genuine, his attitudes will remain constant all his life. Vertical mobilisation will never alter his basic make up. So I disagree with the pro captain critic.

Thanks Nazar for your brilliant expose.

Nazar: do you pronounce your name as Nazar or Naazar? We had a Naazar Singh in our pind. I am wondering if it was distorted version of Nazar...unless it was given to him by fellow paindoos as naaN-zar..as he was very angry looking man. On the other hand Nazar(as in eye-sight) sounds like female name.

SR: #29: Is this the Air Defence College in Karachi?

I think you will get distinctly different responses from the PAF, Navy and Army. The fact that a commadant of the college can be objective enough to critique his own institution would be an indication to me that there is a higher level of objectivity in analysing the curriculum, than indicated in this article.

I have always been interested in seeing the behavior of my colleagues still in the military, those like me who left, and civilians who never joined the military. One sees some interesting patterns and trends, differences in attitudes, behaviors etc., divided obiviously along civilian-military boundaries, but also amongst military verticals (PAF, Army, Navy). And even within branchces of these verticals, i.e the more scholarly soldiers of the Engineering, Medical etc. branch and the lesser educated, but more gung-ho soldiers of the, ``command`` branches like Flying in the PAF, Armour, Infantry etc. in the Army, and Ship commanders etc. in the Navy.

There are even different points-of-views amongst individuals who retired. Those who retired as Generals, those who retired as Colonels (like Nazar) and those as Captains (like the group I hang around with) seem to have conflicting views about their experiences in the military. The Captains were unhappy in the military, but are happy in civilian life. They consider themselves civilians, but now consider their military experience an asset. The Generals were happy in the military, and are ever happier as civilians, and look back to their military experience with fondness. They still consider themselves to be soldiers, even after retirement. The Colonel group seems to have been the most unhappiest about the military. Those Colonels who were forced to leave, are unhappy because they feel they got a bum deal by not being promoted to General. Those who left voluntarily feel they lost their youth wasting time in the military (I think I would have been in this group had I made it to Colonel).

I think this article is mostly (though not completely, in my opinion) accurate about the military of Nazar`s generation. That was the generation where the officers were well-fed, well paid with ample private sector opportunities, and a higher living standard in comparison to civilians with similar talents and skills. They made a lot of money on military assignments to the Middle East. My guess in Nazar must have gone on one or two such assignments, also. You will find such individuals, now retired, doing well as civilians, living in Pakistan`s wealthiest areas. Due to this, that group of soldiers, both inside and outside the military had a misplaced superiority complex, about, ``knowing it all.`` I would say the last generation of this, ``well-fed`` group is now at the Major General rank.

Those from my group (currently Majors) are poorly paid, poorly looked after, with little opportunity in the private sector (unless they leave at an early stage like me) and have a much lower living standard than civilians with equal talent and skills. This group, thus, has developed a misplaced inferiority complex with respect to civilians. I can tell by the emails my friends in the military send me regularly. I doubt they will suffer from, ``knowing it all,`` until they become Generals. Quite the opposite of Nazar`s generation.

There are two common things I have noticed about retired officers of Nazars` generation:

1) Those of them who retired as Generals, consider themselves more successful and more, ``evolved`` than those who retired as Colonels, and consider the later to be losers, since the later group couldn`t, ``make it`` in the military. While those who retired (willingly) as Colonels consider themselves more, ``evolved`` than their General colleagues, since they feel they have more exposure :-)

2) They other thing I have noticed about retired officers of this generation is that a disproportionately high number of them (retired Generals and Colonels) like writing analystical articles about their military experiences, trying to explain how their group has evolved more than the others`. :-)

Each group seems to have a superiority complex with respect to the other (one can see more than a touch of this, in the article also - no offense Nazar :-)).

If you ask me the only sensible ones are the ones who retired as Captains. :-) They got the best of the military and the best of the civilian world.

It is good to see articles about the military on this site, from individuals who saw it from the inside, rather than the nonsensical illogical critiques that come from people who never spent a day in uniform. On the whole, a good article. I think it applies accurately only to Nazar`s genertion of officers, however. Those from my group are under completely different cirumstances/dynamics and do not consider themselves, ``know-it-alls`` (at least not while they are in the military:-)). They seem to be too pre-occupied by how to make their next payment for their Yamaha 100 motorcycle.

stuka # 22

just call me nazar. Feels more earthly.

I think my public school life was a liberating experience. But I guess it is just a habit of questioning and an open mind. An inquisitive approach generally gets you close to the correct answer.

Ayub`s era was not golden. This military involvement in politics weakened the very foundations of the state - finally led to the break up.

nazar #19 On protecting ``state secrets`` from ``The Enemy``. There used to be a joke about Gen. Musa, who some officer said in public was not too smart. The officer (so the joke went) was the court-martialled. Not for insulting a superior officer, but for divulging state secrets.

Being no great fan of the military in general and of General Zina-ul-Haq in particular, I could not have trusted myself to be objective in evaluating an article that was critical of the lot. Therefore, I sent the article to some old military friends of mine. The army fellows have not yet responded. However, one of them who, until very recently, used to be in the Air Force e-mailed me the following reply:

Sohail

Nazar is a hearty fat soul who now flies for the PIA.
He never did much in the PAF, but he seemed to have an
independent streak alright.

Having been a graduate, instructor and Commandant of
the Air War College as well as a graduate of the
National Defence Colelge, I am, I think qualified to
comment on Nazar`s piece. I AGREE WITH HIM 100%.
Thats the short of the long.

More later and sorry for being a bit abrupt. I have a
sick wedding to attend. The weather is damp and humid
and I am not impressed by the grooms `heat` either.

Good writing Khan sahib. Keep it up.

...SR

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Maharan #21 ``When you compare the two armies, Pak army turns out to be a law unto itself, while Indian army is just a government arm. ``
I agree here. The Indian army has certainly done the right thing in not meddling in politics, and Indian military leaders deserve full marks for that. Our generals on the other hand have set back our political institutions by one or two generations.

Having said this, my earlier comments on the unimaginative and ultimately incompetent approach to military strategy on both sides remain valid I think. If you see anything I specifically said (rather than anything you thought you read between the lines) that you think is illogical or unrealistic, I would be much obliged if you were to point that out.

As for national pride, if you had been on chowk as long as i have been, you would know that for me national pride is a meaningless, and indeed in today`s world, an unproductive concept. It is the future of the ordinary people in both India and Pakistan - and in particular the vast majority of people in both India and Pakistan who suffer grinding poverty while the ``bara sahibs`` play their war games - that is vastly more important than any of these dumb symbols of ``national pride``.

SameerJb...Fazl-e-Haq and Saeed Qadir also needed to be mentioned as the beneficiary of the `behtee ganga``. Remember the creation of NLC.

Romair. [At which point they end up commanding militaries against each other. ] Then Major Sahibzada Yaqoob Khan (FM, Gov., & Lt. Gen) commanded Paki troops in Kashmir in 1948 against his major brother in Indian Army.

stuka #15 My point is exactly that the induction of (revolutionizing) new military technology in south asia is NOT reflected in the military strategy of either Pakistan or India. The US did indeed fight a WWII style blitzkrieg in Iraq - but that succeeded because (a) the enemy (Iraqi forces) was also basically in the WWII era technologically as well as in terms of strategy - their scud missiles were essentially ineffective, and (b) while superficially the US fought a WWII style campaign, in fact behind the blitzkrieg style ground war as a completely new ``networked military``. As a result, the only real defense the Iraqis attempted was close to Baghdad where their armored columns came out to fight a WWII style battle and were quickly wiped out by US airpower.
The situation in India and Pakistan is different. They both have the ability to inflict incredible damage to their major cities as well as to any massed WWII style military formations, and this situation is not going to change anytime soon. Even if India develops a networked military a la the US, it would never be able to counter the ability of Pakistan to deliver nukes within minutes to places like Delhi etc. as well as to wipe out any massive ground push. The fact that this lesson was until last year at least lost on India is clear from the all out efforts the BJP government made to overrun Pakistan once and for all. The current peace initiatives seem to indicate a growing realization of this change - and is indeed the only option either India or Pakistan have of achieving any serious national objective (I do not consider the ambitions of jingoists on both sides to be part of any serious national objective).

re bbabu #6:

``How competent are the senior level generals in the Pakistani military ?``

The CEO of Goldman Sachs made a statement recently saying only 20% of the people in his firm contributed anything of real value. I agree with him. No matter how much heartburn it caused to the 80%, if the most prestigious firm in the world is like that, what hope is there for the rest of the world? This is by and large true of the Pakistani military also. As nazar pointed out most of the ``professional`` soldiers don`t make it beyond Major and Colonel level. And as you pointed out politics plays a much more important role in climbing up the ladder.

I think just as most Pakistanis believe that the BJP and RSS goons get up every morning to plan their latest conspiracy against the Muslims, the Indians also believe that Pakistani generals form a closely knit group that is forever scheming to harm India. Both impressions are probably incorrect. Most generals are political animals who will mould themselves to curry favor with the current commander-in-chief. The man at the top dictates everything. This is what Musharraf means when he talks about ``unity of command``. This subordination to the man at the top does not mean that there are no thoroughly ``professional`` generals in the Pakistani army. They are however generally not in the limelight and fade away quietly to run poultry farms.

The problem as I have pointed out before is not with the individuals but with the institution. Generals should be left to designing elaborate war-games. They should not be allowed to put their plans into action or they shouldn`t be asked to run our Universities or our foreign policy.

later
-sac

Tahmed # 9,
Janaab, I think my post hurt your national pride not mine. And yes I`m not interested in paper indo-pak wars either. But, if you notice no indian on chowk rationalizes the 1962 defeat as a walkover due to any reasons. Calling a spade, a spade is not wrong.
When you compare the two armies, Pak army turns out to be a law unto itself, while Indian army is just a government arm. Its precisely, this lack of accountability, that has led pak army to launch attacks on india first. Be it 71 or kargil. If they had any sense of strategy, or tactic, they would never have fooled around. Kind of like, Indian army not attcking pak even after amassing a million troops, knowing well that both nations are nuclear powers.

Adios

Nnazar Hayat Khan: Keeping in mind your article, as well as your thoughts published at other times, I would like to ask you a question. I was never in the Armed Forces but having grown up in that atmosphere I have seen it up close. I believe that institutionalized thinking ..a ``don`t rock the boat`` mentality, is a feature of armed forces personnel in general.

The fact that you grew up in an ideological state, went on to join the Air Force, and (i`m guessing here) reached adult maturity during the Ayub era which is nostalgically looked upon by Pak Faujis as a golden era, how have you managed to flesh out such an independent line of thought? Is it your family background, any education outside of the mainstream?

test

Romair # 14

Ali Kuli, son of Gen Habibullah, is a decent person. May be he would have been a safer COAS for Nawaz. Ahmed Kuli his brother is out of Air force and is now in Gandhara Insistries, father`s empire built during Ayub days.

Rahim Yousafzai was our course mate in this course.

We do not need the wisdom and efficiencies of persons like Javed Nasir or Ashraf Qazi at the political level. They are only good for military. They have a tunnel vision on the national affairs and have been a great source of embarrassment and loss to the nation.

sameerJb, aqazi, Stuka, Tehmed32, Sac, Veeresh

I had to put two cold buckets of water over me to make it soft and mellow to be digested by ``Dawn``. They liked it and published it twice with a gap. Some name dropping had to be done to keep the intelligence off my back. Even then Abbas Khattak, the PAF Chief then told me not to write such articles because ``Enemy`` may get to know our thinking. I was by then flying for the PIA.

Stuka - I was a fighter pilot in Air force. My themes are based on my experieces. Maybe forthcoming articles will be on flying and relationships.

Veeresh- Zia, one of our course mates, also became an ISI boss and is presently behind bars put by Musharraf. Incidently, Musharaf himself, a newly promoted excited Brigadier, was one of our Instructors. I bury my past completely not keeping in touch or misusing the contacts I made in official capacity.

Aqazi- My thinking was on right track 20 years back as the turn of events has proved and will continue to prove. I have no complex. Thank God the military system dumped me. I got to enjoy a bit of life.