Vajpayee’s Srinagar offer of Talks to Pakistan

The farting contest continues over kargil . Stupid people trying to justify the mis-adventures of their so called jihadi criminals and Generals just because they happen to share the same nationality.
Indian muslims have a very clear understanding of PAki muslim elite`s games. They have repeatedly asked the Pakistani muslim elites to refrain from showing concern about their problems and training the ignorant amonst them in subversion and terrorist methods through incitement. THey want the guys like HE, HS, Musharaff to shut up and have requestds them to elevate the problems of their own co-religious brothers in the streets and villages of Pakistan, they have repeatedly asked them not to try and be spokes-persons to Indian muslims just to score some points in their own domestic territory.

But the very logic of the ``two nation theory`` on which the elites have buit the foundations of PAkistan INEVITABLY forces them to adopt this belligerent posture towards non-muslim ``them``. (Imagine if Pakistan was bordering America then would it have lived in peace?). THe ONLY SOLUTION is to re-built the SECULAR traditions of the original constitution of PAkistan and reverse the Islamization of Constitution which started with General Zia.

http://www.milligazette.com/Archives/01082002/01082002049.htm

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HisExcellency #379

{{Helluva difference between Hamood-ur-Rehman Report and Indian Kargil Committee`s Report. The former was inked 3 decades ago; most of the people named are already retired or dead. OTOH, the Kargil Report is much more relevant since it will expose the incompetence and weaknesses of BJP, Indian Army and intelligence network.}}

You omitted the most salient difference.

The Hamood-ur Rehman commission report stayed sealed for three decades. The Kargil Report was commissioned in late 1999, shortly after the end of the Kargil Conflict, handed over to Prime Minister Vajpayee in January 2000, was tabled in the Indian Parliament on February 23rd 2000, and has been in the public domain ever since.

{{Sealing the Kargil Report is the only way India can sustain the ``media myth`` of its so-called military might. … Goebbelian disinformation in this age of information and glasnost?}}

HE, why do you do this to yourself? Perhaps your mother never taught you that honesty is the best policy – it helps you keep your story straight. Now just who is engaging in disinformatsia in this age of glasnost?

#377 by AlephNull

You are perhaps not aware that Kargil Committee Report is a semi-official document. And this report was itself released after several deletions and omissions of classified material. I have read the Kargil Committee Report released in 2000 but unfortunately it does not give an operational account of the military campaign.

It is a good starting point because K. Subramanyam received unprecedented support from governmence agencies. But it falls short of a definitive, revealing account of military operations. In this regards, it pales in comparison with the Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report which was extremely revealing about military`s conduct.

Do you have any links that point to declassified operational details about the military campaign??

Inspired by the quote-articles-on-the-web game, here`s a little something for you to choke on:

Kargil Crisis Recedes in Wake of Clinton-Sharif Meeting, But Menacing Kashmir Problem Remains Unsolved

Washington Report on Middle East Affairs

The State of Jammu and Kashmir does not belong to either India or Pakistan. This is a fact that many outside the subcontinent do not know, and some do not care to recognize. Anyone who is even remotely interested in resolving the menacing Kashmir dispute, however, needs to remember that in this case the devil is not in the details but in the basic underlying facts.

The issue is not Kargil or Daars, as it has been made out to be in recent weeks in the international media. It is the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir which is contested in a dispute that jeopardizes the peace of one of the most heavily populated regions of the world. Further, the organized international community needs to be reminded that it pledged through the United Nations in 1948to let the 13 million people of Kashmir determine their own political future. It is a promise that has gone unredeemed for the past half-century.

The subcontinent has paid a heavy price in economic and human terms for this denial of the right of self-determination–a principle honored by great powers all over the world in the abstract, but repeatedly denied to all who are prepared to fight and die for it. The Kargil crisis, it must be recognized, is just the latest example of the willingness of Kashmiris to lay down their lives for their freedom.

Unfortunately, there is more hypocrisy than honesty in international relations. Depending on who is defining them, the groups that have revived the demand for an independent Kashmir are identified as mujahedeen, freedom fighters, intruders, infiltrators or mercenaries. Whatever they are called, they are people dying for their own independence, a cause with which Americans, only two centuries after their own similar struggle, should easily empathize. This is particularly so since, until it is resolved, the Kashmir dispute presents the world’s greatest threat, by far, of nuclear war. The half-century-old Kashmir dispute has proven, beyond a shadow of doubt, that time is no healer, as it has defied all manner of delaying tactics over the years.

New Delhi has been able to avoid a settlement only by deploying more than 700,000 army and paramilitary troops to “keep order” in the Indian-occupied two-thirds of Kashmir. Nor has any amount of counterfeit democracy reduced the demand for freedom in the state. India has arrested prominent Kashmiri leaders belonging to the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, a conglomerate of groups fighting for freedom, and India’s puppet Kashmiri chief minister, Farooq Abdullah, has accused his fellow Kashmiris living in the Kargil-Daars area of supporting alleged mercenary intruders. However, none of this theater or fakery has changed the mind-set of the local population, who have suffered deeply under severe repression. Their struggle for freedom continues unabated.

The Kargil Crisis

Pending final settlement of the Kashmir dispute, a temporary Line of Control (LOC), was set up some 27 years ago demarcating the Indian- and the Pakistani-controlled parts of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Ever since, the LOC, which marks the front lines at the time a cease-fire was negotiated, has been monitored by a U.N. peacekeeping force, although the artificial boundary has been porous, especially during the short summer when snow and ice do not impede passage.

India accused Pakistan of aiding and abetting “intruders” who breached the LOC and occupied high ground on the Indian side, shooting down at the Indian troops trying to regain the lost territory. It is snow-clad and treacherous terrain and, by New Delhi’s own admission, the Indian army suffered major casualties.

Military skirmishes and exchanges of fire began in mid-May, with both sides making contradictory claims. The United States called only for a return to the status quo, and respect for the LOC. India quotes the Simla Agreement of 1972 wherein the two countries had agreed to “resolve” all issues, including the Kashmir dispute, through bilateral negotiations. And Pakistan, which acknowledges no control over the mujahedeen, has lost trust in bilateral talks and accuses India of “stalling” instead of negotiating sincerely to resolve the dispute. Pakistan wants third-party (preferably American) mediation. But the stalemate remains.

The mujahedeen succeeded in tying up a vastly larger Indian force. But even with the support of Pakistan it is not clear that they can win the war. Nor is it clear how long India can sustain the human and economic costs of maintaining positions in Kargil, especially in view of the impending snowfall that will begin in late September. Will Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee pay a political price in India’s September elections for the huge military strain in Kargil? Mujahedeen withdrew from Kargil and the Indian army has re-occupied its lost posts. Tensions have been defused for the time being.

Internal Realities

Atal Behari Vajpayee’s caretaker government (BJP) is faced with mid-term national elections in September, but he cannot afford to call for a delay in the voting because the opposition will interpret it as a departure from democratic procedure and a confession of political weakness. Pakistani Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif also rides a tiger and faces a difficult task. Pakistan’s economy is still heavily dependent on external assistance for survival. Therefore he cannot afford a costly, extended conventional war with India. He also faces the reality that his own powerful army will not be happy if he surrenders the upper (literally) hand that has been achieved in the heights of Kashmir. But the option of opening up alternative military fronts on the lengthy India-Pakistan border to take pressure off the combatants in Kashmir risks a nuclear war that no one wants. Ironically, as happened in the Soviet-U.S. Cold War, the nuclear capability on both sides has become a deterrent against the outbreak of a full-fledged war like the three that already have been fought in the second half of the 20th century between India and Pakistan. But if mutually assured nuclear destruction becomes the only bulwark for peace between the two governments, the next millenium will become a perilous one in the subcontinent.

#376 by puyu

I agree with your comments about Jihadi violence. Attacks in Nadimarg, Chittisinghpura, Anantnag and Kaluchak have complicated matters for Pakistan as well as the Kashmiris.

IMHO, Lahore Declaration was a step in the right direction. The problem with Lahore Declaration was not in the declaration itself... but with the people who were signing it. Vajpayee wanted peace but didn`t want to compromise on India`s rigid ``atoot ang`` rhetoric. Nawaz wanted peace but secretly okayed the Kargil plan before meeting Vajpayee. While Lahore Declaration was being signed, mullahs were leading mass demonstrations against it. And the 3 Services Chiefs refused to even receive Vajpayee at Wagah. Lahore was a half-hearted effort at best, a deception at worst. Perhaps it came too early. Public opinion in Pakistan was not ready for a unilateral about-turn on Kashmir in 1999.

++
You take a high moral ground on this issue. please evaluate how Pakistan has helped the Kashmiris.
++

Without historical perspective, we cannot objectively evaluate Pakistan (or for that matter) India`s role in Kashmir especially in the ongoing 14-year insurgency. Since there is not enough distance in time between us and the insurgency, any such evaluation is bound to be subjective and uninformed.

Perhaps you should ask this questions after another 5 years.

Other facts:

According to the Times of India, June 2, 1999, the Indian army in Kashmir became aware of the presence of Mujahideen on the Kargil heights on May 6, 1999, when they were informed by a shepherd. The paper goes on to say that it took six days for the information to reach the defence ministry in Delhi and another two days for the ministry to conclude that ``the infiltrators only occupied remote and unheld areas``. The then suggests that ``there is something deeply wrong with our security decision making. The sudden switch from inaction to high-profile air strikes with their escalation potential testifies to the same flaws``.

``On May 9 India launched a major assault to drive out some 400 or so Muslim guerrillas, allegedly trained by Pakistan from its side of the Line of Control (LoC) in the desolate, high-altitude Kargil sector of Kashmir`` wrote the Rising Nepal of Kathmandu, June 9, 1999. ``This attack was apparently beaten back with heavy losses to the army which prompted a Colonel to remark `we are dying like dogs here`. At this point, India lost three aircraft, two fighter jets and one helicopter gunship besides suffering 50 casualties. The initial Indian euphoria concerning the use of air power for the first time in Kashmir since 1971 has been dampened considerably``.

A report published in The Times of India, June, 12, 1999, stated, ``In fact, on the night of May 12, the Northern Area Commander, Lt. Gen. H. M. Khanna, had informed defence minister George Fernandes at the Siachin brigade headquarters at Partapur that a batch of about 100 intruders had occupied three ridges in the Batalik sub-sector and would be dislodged within two days``. Of course, this statement by a high-ranking Indian officer never came true.

Also, then there`s the entire issue of George Fernandes offering a ``safe passage`` to anyone in Kargil. As Tribune India, June 3, 1999 states: ``The Defence Minister, Mr George Fernandes’ statement on providing “safe passage” to Pakistani intruders in the Kargil sector came under strong criticism from senior retired service officers as well as the Congress party. Mr Fernandes was more ‘’concerned about the well being of the aggressors than in the defence of the nation’’ charged Congress spokesman, Mr K Natwar Singh. He also said it was ‘’unfortunate’ that the Prime Minister, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee had endorsed Mr Fernandes’ stand today.`` If India was so easily victorious in Kargil, why would George Fernandes be so willing to extend such a generous offer?

Then there is the The Telegraph of Calcutta, June 27, 1999 which said, ``Exactly a month after Operation Vijay was launched, the army has made little gain, finding only a toehold in a few peaks in the Drass sub-sector, while most of occupied Kargil remains in the hands of the intruders.... The Pakistanis are showing no signs of ceding territory ... By the army`s own admission, the success percentage is low``.

``The high casualties on the Indian side``, reported The Hindustan Times, June 23, 1999 from Srinagar, ``has given them the reason to prolong their stay, hiding in the natural rock covers when jets hover over them and coming out when the sky is clear and targeting the Indian positions``. It went on to state.``It is in this scenario that the Army is finding it difficult to retrieve the bodies of the officers and soldiers from the high ridges``

Bottom line. There was much loss of human life in Kargil. Please stop rejoicing in it and making silly, gleeful claims that aren`t correct.

#378 by arjun_m

++
If Pakistan was winning in Kargil, why did Nawaz Sharif rush to DC, uninvited and on the 4th of July?
++

To salvage American support and prevent widening of the conflict. Indian Army`s progress during latter half of June and early July was extremely slow and frustrating. With monsoons just weeks away, Musharaf`s brilliant plan appeared quite successful. Nawaz feared that India would widen the theater of conflict out of frustration. Pakistan successfully dictated terms in the limited conflict, but in a wider conflict (i.e. war across the international border), India would dictate terms. Nawaz feared nuclear escalation.

And more importantly, the cold Chinese and American response had isolated Pakistan internationally. Since Pakistan was already under U.S. nuclear sanctions and at the brink of default, any loss of American support (and new sanctions) would be catastrophic for Pakistan in the longer run. Nawaz believed that the benefits of successfully altering LOC through Kargil intrusion would be outweighed by the economic and diplomatic costs.

Nawaz`s dash to Washington was motivated by these fears: economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and nuclear escalation. And in that order.

#383 by dost-mittar

I also don`t know what India gains through Siachen. Perhaps its vainglory. Or perhaps there is some strategic purpose that even Indian Army doesn`t know about! As for the Kargil-Siachen theory, I don`t think Pakistan launched Kargil just to get Indians off Siachen. Kargil had different aims and IMHO had greater strategic importance.

HE#382:
[Independently of which side is more to blame, it is legitimate to ask, What does India stand to gain by bleeding itself--and Pakistan--to control Siachen?]

A very good question!
I do not know the answer. But I do know that when Kargil was launched and seemed to be succeeding at first, there was a lot of talk from the Pakistani side (and the military rep. romair on chowk) that the operation was launched to force India to withdraw from Siachen as a quid pro quo for Pakistan vacating the captured lands in Kargil.

So to repeat your question, what does India -and Pakistan - stand to gain by this absurd stand-off at Siachen?

His Excellency and others,
The whole of India didn`t embark on a revenge campaign after Godhra.
Gujarat is only one of the 28(unless we have carved out another) states of India.
Even the most communally sensative Mumbai and Hyderabad were calm.
Hindus from other states didn`t cross into Gujrat to take up the cause of their brothern.
If you want to know the reaction of hindus to the post Godhra carnage read on.
a popular chain letter circulating in india.Its said to be written by Rajdeep Sardesai of NDTV(a horrible hindoo ,may i add).Even if he is not the author it represents the feelings of the majority in India.Also please read my previous post and see why I insist on Pakistan behaving responsibly and also on living upto the `high` moral standards they preach.

---

letter from Rajdeep Sardesai (NDTV) to Narendra Modi

---

My dear Narendrabhai, Firstly, many congratulations on
your famous
victory in Gujarat. Elections are often only about the
end result, the means do not matter, only the ends do.
Let’s be honest. You ran a strategically brilliant
campaign, one that was based on whipping up public
emotion and stirring a religious identity. I still
remember the classic ad that you ran on voting day.
The Congress campaign ad was a long sermon by
Shankarsinh Vaghela on the development of Gujarat,
written in small type, and with very little that we
hadn’t heard of in the last 55 years. Your ad was
simple and direct.

In bold type, you just reminded the reader of the old
Haqueeqat
classic, “Ae mere vatan ke logon” and asked the voter
of Gujarat to treat their franchise as a homage to the
dead. No specific mention of Godhra or Akshardam, as
per election commission rules, but a clear recall of
recent events. Little wonder then that the next ad
club function should honour you and your faithful ally
Arun Jaitley with the copywriter of the year award.

I also remember your campaign pitch on the last day of
campaigning.
While a complacent Congress was relishing the concept
of cashing in on the anti-incumbency mood, you were
waving a news item that you claimed was a religious
fatwa asking the Muslims of Gujarat to vote hundred
per cent for the Congress.

Of course, you didn’t have to tell the voter the
entire truth: that
there was no real “fatwa”, that all that had happened
was that some unknown Muslim cleric in faraway Uttar
Pradesh had issued an appeal to voters to support the
Congress, and that the advertisement in Gujarati
newspapers had been inserted by members of the sangh
parivar. The fatwa worked, and you were able to ensure
that Hindus came out in large numbers to vote for you
and your party.

I will also not forget the manner in which you were
able to successfully use the demonisation of Mian
Musharaff as a vote-gathering technique. We all
dislike the Pakistani general, and his refusal to end
cross-border terrorism in Kashmir, but you were able
to translate anti-Pakistani sentiment into a potent
state election issue.

What Musharaff had to do with the Gujarat elections is
unclear, but
somehow you were able to convince the voter that
Islamabad was monitoring every move in Gandhinagar.
“If I win, the entire country will celebrate, if the
Congress wins, crackers will be burst in Pakistan.” It
was yet another classic one-liner, designed to stir
the kind of jingoism that may not end the
low-intensity conflict on the border, but will
certainly add to your unique brand of macho politics.

As a representative of the pseudo-secular English
language media in
particular, I admired the manner in which you were
able to blame the
media for virtually everything that had gone wrong in
the state, from the killing of innocents on the
Sabarmati express, to the loot and mass murders that
followed to the large-scale exodus of Muslim families
from their homes.


Let me also say that I will never forget the manner in
which you were
able to use the Godhra incident for political benefit
for months on end, and suggest that somehow all
Muslims in the state were linked to an act of villainy
by a group of criminals from the minority community. I
distinctly remember how you had posters put up all
over the state of the burning train compartment. I
also remember how you got a family member of one of
the Godhra victims to be present at the inauguration
of your party office.

I remember your yatra to Godhra where you shared the
anguish of the
people who had lost their loved ones in the train
tragedy. Somehow, I don’t recall you ever reaching out
to those living in the Shah Alam camp, or Naroda-Patia
or the numerous other refugee camps in the state. Nor
did I ever see you in the company of Muslim children
who saw their entire families being burnt alive before
their eyes.

I must also admire the manner in which you were able
to use the Vishwa
Hindu Parishad cadres in the political campaign. Until
now, we were always told that the VHP was a
socio-cultural organisation that had little to do with
day-to-day politics. You made sure that the VHP
fiction was buried once and for all, and that Praveen
Togadia was transformed from surgeon to a political
rabble-rouser.

Finally, I must salute you for the way you stood up to
virtually anyone
who questioned the politics of Moditva. I will not
forget how you even put the prime minister in his
place.

When Mr Vajpayee asked you to follow the rajdharma,
you quietly
listened to him, and then went about doing your own
thing. A weakened Vajpayee was reduced to being your
self-appointed advocate by the end of the elections.
Indeed, in the last few election meetings, I didn’t
even see a single poster of Vajpayee or even of the
original Hindutva mascot, L K Advani. This victory
then is yours and yours alone.

While you celebrate your triumph, may I leave you with
a final thought?
Now, that you’ve won the battle, will you win the war?
Could you become the chief minister of each and every
one of the five crore Gujaratis, Hindus and Muslims,
you now claim to represent?

You could perhaps start with paying a weekly visit to
the homes of
those who still live in fear and despair. It may not
fit in with your worldview, but it would at least
convince some of us that Gujarat’s Chote Sardar is
more than just a hero of hatred.

Affectionately yours,
Rajdeep Sardesai.

The writer is managing editor, NDTV

Some crispy excerpts about Siachen from the international press..

http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/05/20/siachen.kashmir/

``Mirza Aslam Beg, head of Pakistan`s armed forces a decade ago, told Reuters news agency that supplying troops with a loaf of bread costs India two rupees (four U.S. cents) in the plains and 200 rupees on Siachen because it has to be taken by helicopter. ``

http://members.tripod.com/~no_nukes_sa/siachen.html

Siachen is the world`s most strategically absurd high-altitude war, fought at elevations exceeding 6,000 metres. The dispute, over an undemarcated border beyond a point known as NJ-9842, has defied solution, although this is obviously in the interests of both India and Pakistan. Siachen means the loss of 2.7 men and Rs. 2.5 to 6 crores a day for India. Thousands of our soldiers are being exposed to frostbite, hypoxia and severe mental stress. Pakistan`s costs are perhaps a fourth of this. According to Indian army sources, air maintenance for the Siachen operation alone costs Rs. 2.5 crores a day, or Rs. 1,000 crores a year. A Cheetah helicopter sortie costs Rs. 20,000 an hour; it can only carry 25 kg when flying to high altitudes.

Independently of which side is more to blame, it is legitimate to ask, What does India stand to gain by bleeding itself--and Pakistan--to control Siachen? Strategically, the answer is, precious little. The glacier is too far away from the Karakoram highway to matter. There is no direct access to it through a major road from any direction. No other military factors are so weighty as to justify the disproportionate expense in human life, money and materiel. Rs. 2,000 crores a year is no joke. Nor are thousands of casualties. Sensible military leaders have called for an end to this horrible war. Little else explains the Indian stand than a predisposed refusal to vacate Siachen, expressed repeatedly by defence minister George Fernandes.

Persistence of the Siachen impasse has three implications. First, India and Pakistan are engaging in talks without a deep commitment to producing successful, if modest, outcomes through a give-and-take process. It is as if the two were talking largely in response to international pressure, not a desire to succeed. In the Indian case, there is no comprehensive Pakistan policy within which the talks can be located.

Second, the repeated failure to resolve outstanding disputes through bilateral talks is likely to generate a demand for third- party mediation--a proposal India loathes, but will find it increasingly difficult to resist, especially if there is another flare-up in Kashmir between the two now-nuclearised states over and above the 350-plus instances of cross-border firing in the first eight months of 1998 alone (compared to 50 last year).

Most important, a big question-mark hangs over the assumption that India and Pakistan can be trusted to behave responsibly and reasonably in the event of a military stand-off, in particular to avoid a disastrous nuclear conflict. A precondition for nuclear deterrence (a dubious doctrine in the first place) is that adversaries agree on what is in their interest, on just what constitutes ``unacceptable damage``, and how best to avoid it. The Siachen impasse shows that the assumption is fragile. If the two states cannot agree on something where their mutual interests converge, how can they be expected to wisely tackle hostility, especially its nuclear dimension?

#arjun_m

Shouldn`t you be honeymooning at some RSS convention ? Give the yapping without sense a break or respond to some of the questions put forth.

And has it started to rain yet or did they bundle some poor thing up with you without any good coming of it.

#HisExcellency

It`s a definite step in the right direction to have the LOC be a loose border of sorts, and to allow families to be reunited. Having said that, I don`t think it is a solution by itself in isolation. For one, it doesn`t solve the problem of living under the auspices of a regime hell-bent on oppressing minorities. Unless India puts an end to all this nonsense of granting full immunity to people like Advani, Modi and Bal Thackeray, stops idly standing by as mosques are razed, and pays heed to the wishes of people other arjun_m and his band of merry loons, there will be no long-term resolution. The Kashmir issue cannot be made to go away by disregarding the wishes of the people in Kashmir. Period. Although open borders might make life a whole lot better, they have to be supplemented by a less imperialistic approach on the part of the Indian authorities. Still, you`re right. The Kashmir conflict doesn`t seem as if it is going to be resolved overnight and doing something is better than doing nothing. Over the long run however, this positive step must be followed with many others.

[Of course, just because the idea seems like a step towards progress doesn`t mean it will be acceptable to the arjun_ms out there. I`m sure his schizophrenic mind will see it as a gambit aimed at making it easier for the ``external intrusion`` that will undoubtedly persist in Kashmir till Delhi stops foisting Farooq Abdullahs on the region]

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#372 by arjun_m

Helluva difference between Hamood-ur-Rehman Report and Indian Kargil Committee`s Report. The former was inked 3 decades ago; most of the people named are already retired or dead. OTOH, the Kargil Report is much more relevant since it will expose the incompetence and weaknesses of BJP, Indian Army and intelligence network. BJP is contesting elections today, not 32 years ago. Sealing the Kargil Report is the only way India can sustain the ``media myth`` of its so-called military might. Perhaps you should direct your barbed inquiries at your own government as to why it is resorting to Goebbelian disinformation in this age of information and glasnost?

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