Operation Searchlight
Tariq Aqil November 19, 2003
#195 Posted by fuzair on November 24, 2003 10:39:01 am
Oh, and I should also add that our ORs are patient, long-suffering, and don`t complain a tenth as much as the US ice cream soldiers. However, for a mechanized force, they really aren`t that useful.
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#194 Posted by fuzair on November 24, 2003 10:19:12 am
Re: the debate on Pakistani generals,
One thing that must not be forgotten is that everybody who became a general before 1971 was on the promotion fast track after Partition. They had neither the training nor the experience to adequately prepare them for the positions they held in the Pakistan Army. Ayub Khan, with British and US help, tried to send people for Senior Officer`s Courses and short training visits, etc, but this isn`t going to substitute for years of experience and proper grooming. As a rough rule of thumb, most people got at least two promotions past their level of competence and some (e.g., Musa) managed three (a distorted Peter Principle at work here).
In contrast to this, everybody who got their first star under Zia (the last of the prePartition commissioned officers) had much more formal military training and experience. However, they also served in a much more politicized and corrupt military, so what would have mattered more if there had been a full-scale war in 1986 or 1990? Who knows? Certainly the Pakistani Army would not have made the same stupid blunders then that it did in 1965 or 1971. It would have made new ones, of course.
Finally, lets not go overboard about our JCOs/NCOs/ORs. I have a certain amount of first-hand observation experience here and I can safely say that, on average, our (both Indian and Pakistani actually) armies need officers to do what the US Army does with NCOs. You simply cannot rely on our enlisted men to carry out tasks competently and efficiently (with some honorable exceptions, of course) and so the personality, character, competence and ability of the junior officer assumes a level of importance that has no paralell in Western armies. Whether this is because our men are basically illiterate or the way they are trained (memorize simple mechanical tasks), I don`t know. Both probably. However, to a good officer, they are loyal unto death. Unfortunately, good officers are hard to come by.
One thing that must not be forgotten is that everybody who became a general before 1971 was on the promotion fast track after Partition. They had neither the training nor the experience to adequately prepare them for the positions they held in the Pakistan Army. Ayub Khan, with British and US help, tried to send people for Senior Officer`s Courses and short training visits, etc, but this isn`t going to substitute for years of experience and proper grooming. As a rough rule of thumb, most people got at least two promotions past their level of competence and some (e.g., Musa) managed three (a distorted Peter Principle at work here).
In contrast to this, everybody who got their first star under Zia (the last of the prePartition commissioned officers) had much more formal military training and experience. However, they also served in a much more politicized and corrupt military, so what would have mattered more if there had been a full-scale war in 1986 or 1990? Who knows? Certainly the Pakistani Army would not have made the same stupid blunders then that it did in 1965 or 1971. It would have made new ones, of course.
Finally, lets not go overboard about our JCOs/NCOs/ORs. I have a certain amount of first-hand observation experience here and I can safely say that, on average, our (both Indian and Pakistani actually) armies need officers to do what the US Army does with NCOs. You simply cannot rely on our enlisted men to carry out tasks competently and efficiently (with some honorable exceptions, of course) and so the personality, character, competence and ability of the junior officer assumes a level of importance that has no paralell in Western armies. Whether this is because our men are basically illiterate or the way they are trained (memorize simple mechanical tasks), I don`t know. Both probably. However, to a good officer, they are loyal unto death. Unfortunately, good officers are hard to come by.
#193 Posted by Romair on November 24, 2003 9:08:17 am
Stuka/Feroke/Urstruly #181: Interesting article, Stuka. Becomes even more credible, since it was written by an Indian. It is good to see both sides of the story.
I generally agree with Urstruly’s assessment of the Army-civilian relationship, with a few differences. I think Pakistanis are generally democratic in nature. However, they have very little faith in the democratic leaders of the moment, and are thus equally cynical towards both the Army leadership and the civilian leadership. Now they give economic progress more importance than anything else, amongst the middle-class and lower middle-class groups. And, “fear of mullah,” the biggest importance, amongst the upper-class groups (Chowk crowd).
The event that could act as a catalyst for getting rid of Army in politics, will be one of the following, in my opinion:
- A lower class revolution, combined with a religious ideological revolution, led by the maulvis
- A middle class revolution (if the economy goes down the drain, under the Army), led by an Altaf Hussain type figure, who has appeal across the urban populace of the country, and not just within one ethnicity
For the above to happen, a situation would have to occur, where the economy stays in the doldrums under the Army. Or if the world-wide, “us vs. them” war gains intensity within Pakistan, to uncontrollable levels. Other than that I really cannot see the people rising up in the street to bring back BB or NS type figures any longer. One only gets one chance to get the people to, “rise up.” BB and NS have had their chances and blown it. Perhaps PPP and PML, under completely new leadership, would get that chance. I doubt anyone would support the Army either, if it were the same General coming in, again and again. The Army has a new face at the helm, every time. And I think Pakistanis are willing to give each new face, about three years – be it from the Army or the civilian ranks.
Regarding the rise of Generals from Colonels. The Pakistan Army is very competent up to the level of Colonels. No doubt about it. Specifically at the level of NCOs, JCOs, Airmen, Sailors etc., i.e. enlisted ranks. They are loyal, dedicated, patriotic, and professional and have always performed well. They are also very highly respected in Pakistan, across the spectrum. I say this through personal experience. As well as through international surveys. They, along with Israel, India and USA, were ranked as the highest respected military, by their citizens, in the world. BB, NS, various editors, commentators etc. will never say anything negative about the Pakistani sapahi, jawan, fighter pilot etc. As a Lieutenant, I got nothing but respect, from the taxi drivers, shopkeepers, etc. The only groups that kind of looked down upon my profession, were the wealthy crowd (quite a few on Chowk), who considered the military, a profession below them, since, it is now very middle and lower middle class profession.
The problem starts, at the ranks of Brigadier and above, as FerozeK has correctly pointed out. The issues related to involvement in politics have been discussed. However, there are professional issues within their own profession of arms also, which have nothing to do with politics. The PAF and Navy, who do not get involved in Martial Laws, face these issues of incompetence, as well.
However, I don`t think the problems are because, “levels of intergration into the social and political ethos of the military officer corps and had very little to do with your professional skills.” Quite the contrary. The Pakistan military is actually a big meritocracy. Some of the individuals who have not been promoted may disagree, but statistics support it as a meritocracy.
The individuals, who graduate at the top of their class as cadets, generally become Generals. If you take a look at the previous Chiefs of the PAF, every single one was at the top of his class, in everything, from the age of 20 till 55. The top positions in the PAF are – going abroad as a cadet, flying the top aircraft (F-104, F-16), commanding an F-16 sqn, going abroad for staff courses, commanding PAF base Sargodha or Masroor, becoming head of Operations at the HQ, and then Chief. Basically every single Chief has followed this line. And they generally have a good record, fighting in wars also.
In the other branches, I don’t have all the details. But generally it is the same. All the candidates for Chiefs seem to be at the top in their cadet and staff courses. Ali Quli Khan, Asif Nawaz, Ayub Khan, Musharraf, Jehangir Karamat, etc., topped their local courses and all went abroad for cadet and staff courses.
One can argue that they are the most competent, amongst a group of incompetents, but that is a different debate. Within their groups, people generally rise on merit, up to the rank of Lt. Gen. After that, it is totally a political appt., depending on whom the PM and President like. In fact, any time this tradition has been broken by the politicians, it has harmed the politicians, themselves. Bhutto appointed Zia, against tradition, and look what happened. Nawaz Sharif tried to appoint someone, who was from his bradiri, but wasn’t in line for the position of COAS, and another coup occurred. Not quite democratic, but a good indication that merit counts.
The general trend is that the guys, who graduate at the top of their class as cadets, either rebel early on and leave the military, or they die performing their duties in wars or during peace times. Or they become Generals.
So, it is meritocracy, all the way, till Lt. General (with some politics thrown in, but they are not the deciding factor). The riffraff generally get washed out by the rank of Brigadier. Why do they Generals still show so much incompetence, even if they were at the top of their classes throughout their careers? In civilian affairs, because they don’t know how to run civilian enterprises, since they are not trained for that. In military affairs, due to various reasons (lack of exposure, lack of education of command branches, overconfidence etc.) which can be discussed in a later reply.
I generally agree with Urstruly’s assessment of the Army-civilian relationship, with a few differences. I think Pakistanis are generally democratic in nature. However, they have very little faith in the democratic leaders of the moment, and are thus equally cynical towards both the Army leadership and the civilian leadership. Now they give economic progress more importance than anything else, amongst the middle-class and lower middle-class groups. And, “fear of mullah,” the biggest importance, amongst the upper-class groups (Chowk crowd).
The event that could act as a catalyst for getting rid of Army in politics, will be one of the following, in my opinion:
- A lower class revolution, combined with a religious ideological revolution, led by the maulvis
- A middle class revolution (if the economy goes down the drain, under the Army), led by an Altaf Hussain type figure, who has appeal across the urban populace of the country, and not just within one ethnicity
For the above to happen, a situation would have to occur, where the economy stays in the doldrums under the Army. Or if the world-wide, “us vs. them” war gains intensity within Pakistan, to uncontrollable levels. Other than that I really cannot see the people rising up in the street to bring back BB or NS type figures any longer. One only gets one chance to get the people to, “rise up.” BB and NS have had their chances and blown it. Perhaps PPP and PML, under completely new leadership, would get that chance. I doubt anyone would support the Army either, if it were the same General coming in, again and again. The Army has a new face at the helm, every time. And I think Pakistanis are willing to give each new face, about three years – be it from the Army or the civilian ranks.
Regarding the rise of Generals from Colonels. The Pakistan Army is very competent up to the level of Colonels. No doubt about it. Specifically at the level of NCOs, JCOs, Airmen, Sailors etc., i.e. enlisted ranks. They are loyal, dedicated, patriotic, and professional and have always performed well. They are also very highly respected in Pakistan, across the spectrum. I say this through personal experience. As well as through international surveys. They, along with Israel, India and USA, were ranked as the highest respected military, by their citizens, in the world. BB, NS, various editors, commentators etc. will never say anything negative about the Pakistani sapahi, jawan, fighter pilot etc. As a Lieutenant, I got nothing but respect, from the taxi drivers, shopkeepers, etc. The only groups that kind of looked down upon my profession, were the wealthy crowd (quite a few on Chowk), who considered the military, a profession below them, since, it is now very middle and lower middle class profession.
The problem starts, at the ranks of Brigadier and above, as FerozeK has correctly pointed out. The issues related to involvement in politics have been discussed. However, there are professional issues within their own profession of arms also, which have nothing to do with politics. The PAF and Navy, who do not get involved in Martial Laws, face these issues of incompetence, as well.
However, I don`t think the problems are because, “levels of intergration into the social and political ethos of the military officer corps and had very little to do with your professional skills.” Quite the contrary. The Pakistan military is actually a big meritocracy. Some of the individuals who have not been promoted may disagree, but statistics support it as a meritocracy.
The individuals, who graduate at the top of their class as cadets, generally become Generals. If you take a look at the previous Chiefs of the PAF, every single one was at the top of his class, in everything, from the age of 20 till 55. The top positions in the PAF are – going abroad as a cadet, flying the top aircraft (F-104, F-16), commanding an F-16 sqn, going abroad for staff courses, commanding PAF base Sargodha or Masroor, becoming head of Operations at the HQ, and then Chief. Basically every single Chief has followed this line. And they generally have a good record, fighting in wars also.
In the other branches, I don’t have all the details. But generally it is the same. All the candidates for Chiefs seem to be at the top in their cadet and staff courses. Ali Quli Khan, Asif Nawaz, Ayub Khan, Musharraf, Jehangir Karamat, etc., topped their local courses and all went abroad for cadet and staff courses.
One can argue that they are the most competent, amongst a group of incompetents, but that is a different debate. Within their groups, people generally rise on merit, up to the rank of Lt. Gen. After that, it is totally a political appt., depending on whom the PM and President like. In fact, any time this tradition has been broken by the politicians, it has harmed the politicians, themselves. Bhutto appointed Zia, against tradition, and look what happened. Nawaz Sharif tried to appoint someone, who was from his bradiri, but wasn’t in line for the position of COAS, and another coup occurred. Not quite democratic, but a good indication that merit counts.
The general trend is that the guys, who graduate at the top of their class as cadets, either rebel early on and leave the military, or they die performing their duties in wars or during peace times. Or they become Generals.
So, it is meritocracy, all the way, till Lt. General (with some politics thrown in, but they are not the deciding factor). The riffraff generally get washed out by the rank of Brigadier. Why do they Generals still show so much incompetence, even if they were at the top of their classes throughout their careers? In civilian affairs, because they don’t know how to run civilian enterprises, since they are not trained for that. In military affairs, due to various reasons (lack of exposure, lack of education of command branches, overconfidence etc.) which can be discussed in a later reply.
#192 Posted by ballukhan on November 24, 2003 7:51:24 am
never ever let free and fair elections to happen in Pakistan ever again; keep the politicians corrupt and intimidated; and never let civilians take charge of their affairs above union council level; keep bureaucracy corrupt; keep courts corrupt; and let police lose.
Oh! I be damned! Tonight is the night of power! I request all my brothers to pray tonight that the army falls in no time!!! THe angels would listen!! Pray Pray!!!
Oh! I be damned! Tonight is the night of power! I request all my brothers to pray tonight that the army falls in no time!!! THe angels would listen!! Pray Pray!!!
#191 Posted by rsridhar on November 24, 2003 7:51:24 am
re: BJP`s evolving political ideology
Time was when it was feared that a HIndu nationalistic party like BJP would be anti-muslim. It looks like BJP`s political brass is evolving a new strategy, where hobnobbing with the Arab world is not a sin. Latest visit of ABV to Syria is a case in point.
Romairs of the Chowk may take note.
http://www.sulekha.com/redirectnh.asp?cid=321523
Excerpts:
1. ``One of the surprises that the Vajpayee administration has thrown at the diplomatic corps in Delhi is its ability to deal with Muslims of all hues and establish strategic ties with them. Be it secular Turkey or fundamentalist Iran, secular Malaysia or moderately Islamic Indonesia, India has not had difficulty in establishing and strengthening close strategic ties. Vajpayee and even Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishan Advani have traveled to a number of Muslim countries promoting India`s traditional ties with them. And so have Sinha and Fernandes, among other senior ministers. ``
The author goes on to pose a question and try to answer it:
``What has happened in the last year to bring about this metamorphosis in BJP leaders` mindset? Until last year they were pursuing a policy dictated by their political philosophy - wary of China and the Muslim world, they were simply kowtowing the West.
I do not presume to know the answer. But I can hazard a guess. What may have apprised them of the reality of the situation and expunged the influence of ideology is the world`s reactions to the events in Gujarat. About 2,000 Muslims were killed and a 100,000 rendered homeless, the whole of central Gujarat cleansed of their presence, following the killing of 59 Hindus in a train compartment that was burned down, presumably by Muslims. From all accounts these anti-Muslim massacres were either organized, or at least encouraged by the BJP government of Gujarat.
This was the first large-scale mass murder in India in the age of electronic media and human rights activists. Word and images wend around and the world came to know of it. A strange thing happened. From the RSS point of view, neither China nor a single Muslim country protested. BJP politicians had to face a lot of flak. But all of it came from the West, either European governments or Western and Third World liberals trained in the West.
This may have shattered in the Hindutva mind the myth of a Muslim ummah, a world Muslim community. This myth had persisted in their mind against all evidence to the contrary presented to them by scholars from around the world. This may have also removed from their minds the fear of a clash between an alliance of Islamic and Chinese civilizations on the one hand ranged against the Hindu and Judeo-Christian civilizations on the other. If this is indeed what has happened, Gujarat may well have served a good purpose. Good can indeed come out of evil too.``
A fascinating article. Totally debunks the myth of BJP as a fascist or anti-muslim party. Politicians finally have to change with evolving times and do what is in national interest.
Contrast this fine tuning of foreign policy by BJP with Musharraf`s tunnel vision policy of not seeing anything beyond Kashmir. I always thought Mushy was the most pathetic human excrement in existence today and he proves that again and again.
Sridhar
Time was when it was feared that a HIndu nationalistic party like BJP would be anti-muslim. It looks like BJP`s political brass is evolving a new strategy, where hobnobbing with the Arab world is not a sin. Latest visit of ABV to Syria is a case in point.
Romairs of the Chowk may take note.
http://www.sulekha.com/redirectnh.asp?cid=321523
Excerpts:
1. ``One of the surprises that the Vajpayee administration has thrown at the diplomatic corps in Delhi is its ability to deal with Muslims of all hues and establish strategic ties with them. Be it secular Turkey or fundamentalist Iran, secular Malaysia or moderately Islamic Indonesia, India has not had difficulty in establishing and strengthening close strategic ties. Vajpayee and even Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishan Advani have traveled to a number of Muslim countries promoting India`s traditional ties with them. And so have Sinha and Fernandes, among other senior ministers. ``
The author goes on to pose a question and try to answer it:
``What has happened in the last year to bring about this metamorphosis in BJP leaders` mindset? Until last year they were pursuing a policy dictated by their political philosophy - wary of China and the Muslim world, they were simply kowtowing the West.
I do not presume to know the answer. But I can hazard a guess. What may have apprised them of the reality of the situation and expunged the influence of ideology is the world`s reactions to the events in Gujarat. About 2,000 Muslims were killed and a 100,000 rendered homeless, the whole of central Gujarat cleansed of their presence, following the killing of 59 Hindus in a train compartment that was burned down, presumably by Muslims. From all accounts these anti-Muslim massacres were either organized, or at least encouraged by the BJP government of Gujarat.
This was the first large-scale mass murder in India in the age of electronic media and human rights activists. Word and images wend around and the world came to know of it. A strange thing happened. From the RSS point of view, neither China nor a single Muslim country protested. BJP politicians had to face a lot of flak. But all of it came from the West, either European governments or Western and Third World liberals trained in the West.
This may have shattered in the Hindutva mind the myth of a Muslim ummah, a world Muslim community. This myth had persisted in their mind against all evidence to the contrary presented to them by scholars from around the world. This may have also removed from their minds the fear of a clash between an alliance of Islamic and Chinese civilizations on the one hand ranged against the Hindu and Judeo-Christian civilizations on the other. If this is indeed what has happened, Gujarat may well have served a good purpose. Good can indeed come out of evil too.``
A fascinating article. Totally debunks the myth of BJP as a fascist or anti-muslim party. Politicians finally have to change with evolving times and do what is in national interest.
Contrast this fine tuning of foreign policy by BJP with Musharraf`s tunnel vision policy of not seeing anything beyond Kashmir. I always thought Mushy was the most pathetic human excrement in existence today and he proves that again and again.
Sridhar
#190 Posted by ferozk on November 24, 2003 6:29:59 am
re: Stuka # 181
I read that article.
One has to remember that the command structure in the Pakistan army tends to stagnate above the level of colonels. The progression to a general`s star in the Pakistani army was, (is based) based on your levels of intergration into the social and political ethos of the military officer corps and had very little to do with your professional skills. Pakistani army has very able colonels, and Lt.Colonels and a good supply of regimental and company and battlion officers. Niazi was more likely a company commander on the Burma front. There is no doubt on the lower levels, Pakistani army will fight; but it is the upper leadership of the Pakistan army that shows a disdain for fighting.
Overall, it was an interesting article and as more and more people, both Indian and Pakistani veterans, write about the wars, the truth is coming out and that is good. 40 years or 30 years later, it makes no difference who won or lost, but it makes a difference between believing a myth and understanding the truth.
Ciao
I read that article.
One has to remember that the command structure in the Pakistan army tends to stagnate above the level of colonels. The progression to a general`s star in the Pakistani army was, (is based) based on your levels of intergration into the social and political ethos of the military officer corps and had very little to do with your professional skills. Pakistani army has very able colonels, and Lt.Colonels and a good supply of regimental and company and battlion officers. Niazi was more likely a company commander on the Burma front. There is no doubt on the lower levels, Pakistani army will fight; but it is the upper leadership of the Pakistan army that shows a disdain for fighting.
Overall, it was an interesting article and as more and more people, both Indian and Pakistani veterans, write about the wars, the truth is coming out and that is good. 40 years or 30 years later, it makes no difference who won or lost, but it makes a difference between believing a myth and understanding the truth.
Ciao
#189 Posted by Urstruly on November 24, 2003 6:26:50 am
LESSONS LEARNED
Stuka # 181
A good article but needs a little record setting. I do not agree with Bose`s contention that Pak Army i.e. POWs were not received very well in Pakistan. It is not true. The POWs were received with open arms by the general public who went to Wagha to welcome them with garlands and all. The nation did not even question for once about their competence and bravery. There is and there was ageneral concensus among the general public at the time and now that the soldiers fought well against all odds and they delivered what is humanly possible. However, nation is not very kind, and rightfully so, towards top military brass of the time and the politicians. Bhutto did a very commendable job by building bridges between the nation and its army but army repaid his kindness by hanging him. Since Army has been controlling media and freedom of expression since begining it has successfully shifted the blame to ``trecherous Bengalis`` and ``corrupt politicians``, and ``Bhutto`` only.
The matter is very simple. Yahya Khan`s biggest mistake was that he held the most fair elections in the history of Pakistan whereas all he wanted was to secure his presidency while finding a Jamali for himself - and he found not one but two Jamalis - Bhutto & Mujib. Whereas Bhutto readily accepted to play his patsy, Mujib did not. Not that Mujib did not want to but he couldn`t because his electorate was already simmering with anti-millitary feelings and wanted to get rid of military even at the cost of separation. I think Yahya could eventually have made a deal with Mujib but Bhutto always got in the way. Bhuttos solution i.e. ``You there, we here`` was not acceptable to Mujib because of the pressures from his electorate and he did not want to appear to be too concedeing to his electorate. So ultimately the talks broke down.
The only entity who has learned any lessons from this whole debacle is the Pak Army contrary to the popular beleif. The army devised its undeclared doctrine since then which goes like this ``never ever let free and fair elections to happen in Pakistan ever again; keep the politicians corrupt and intimidated; and never let civilians take charge of their affairs above union council level; keep bureaucracy corrupt; keep courts corrupt; and let police lose`` . Pak Army has religiously followed this doctrine since they won the political power back from civilians in 1977 after deposing Bhutto and later hanging him. Since then, Zia came into power and he chose his hand picked Jamali who was Jonejo. Army through ISI meddelled in all elections since then. And now Mushsraf has his own Jamali who is the front man of mob behind him. People of Pakistan are democratic by nature otherwise why would dictators bother to play this tamasha of ``front man democracy`` time and again. I don`t know what, but something will trigger and detonate what is simmering in the civilian pressure cooker for so long. And I am pretty sure that it ain`t gonna be a repeat of Georgia.
Stuka # 181
A good article but needs a little record setting. I do not agree with Bose`s contention that Pak Army i.e. POWs were not received very well in Pakistan. It is not true. The POWs were received with open arms by the general public who went to Wagha to welcome them with garlands and all. The nation did not even question for once about their competence and bravery. There is and there was ageneral concensus among the general public at the time and now that the soldiers fought well against all odds and they delivered what is humanly possible. However, nation is not very kind, and rightfully so, towards top military brass of the time and the politicians. Bhutto did a very commendable job by building bridges between the nation and its army but army repaid his kindness by hanging him. Since Army has been controlling media and freedom of expression since begining it has successfully shifted the blame to ``trecherous Bengalis`` and ``corrupt politicians``, and ``Bhutto`` only.
The matter is very simple. Yahya Khan`s biggest mistake was that he held the most fair elections in the history of Pakistan whereas all he wanted was to secure his presidency while finding a Jamali for himself - and he found not one but two Jamalis - Bhutto & Mujib. Whereas Bhutto readily accepted to play his patsy, Mujib did not. Not that Mujib did not want to but he couldn`t because his electorate was already simmering with anti-millitary feelings and wanted to get rid of military even at the cost of separation. I think Yahya could eventually have made a deal with Mujib but Bhutto always got in the way. Bhuttos solution i.e. ``You there, we here`` was not acceptable to Mujib because of the pressures from his electorate and he did not want to appear to be too concedeing to his electorate. So ultimately the talks broke down.
The only entity who has learned any lessons from this whole debacle is the Pak Army contrary to the popular beleif. The army devised its undeclared doctrine since then which goes like this ``never ever let free and fair elections to happen in Pakistan ever again; keep the politicians corrupt and intimidated; and never let civilians take charge of their affairs above union council level; keep bureaucracy corrupt; keep courts corrupt; and let police lose`` . Pak Army has religiously followed this doctrine since they won the political power back from civilians in 1977 after deposing Bhutto and later hanging him. Since then, Zia came into power and he chose his hand picked Jamali who was Jonejo. Army through ISI meddelled in all elections since then. And now Mushsraf has his own Jamali who is the front man of mob behind him. People of Pakistan are democratic by nature otherwise why would dictators bother to play this tamasha of ``front man democracy`` time and again. I don`t know what, but something will trigger and detonate what is simmering in the civilian pressure cooker for so long. And I am pretty sure that it ain`t gonna be a repeat of Georgia.
#188 Posted by fountainheader on November 24, 2003 5:44:28 am
Thanks ahmadzai.
By the way, moonh khol hi do.
While there are some postings considered as ``punishment`` postings by bureaucrats and judges, like Bihar, Chambal valley etc, what you state is wrong. The bureaucracy works at 2 levels. One is the central bureaucracy for which candidates are selected through the Union Public Service Commission, and the state bureaucracy for which candidates are selected through the state`s Public Service Commission. So someone who got through the state bureaucracy can`t be sent to anopther state. At the central level, people aren`t posted according to their origins.
In fact, my hometown Pune, has not had a local Municipal Commissioner, District Magistrate, Income tax commissioner or even Police commissioner for as long as I can remember. And it is prosperous and peaceful town with no mafia or communal trouble, so it is not a punishment posting either.
Not saying that Indian bureaucracy is a paragon of honesty and efficiency, far from it. The concept of punishment postings and reward postings is there, but it does not have anything to do with your origins. Even a Bihari will consider Bihar as punishment posting
By the way, moonh khol hi do.
While there are some postings considered as ``punishment`` postings by bureaucrats and judges, like Bihar, Chambal valley etc, what you state is wrong. The bureaucracy works at 2 levels. One is the central bureaucracy for which candidates are selected through the Union Public Service Commission, and the state bureaucracy for which candidates are selected through the state`s Public Service Commission. So someone who got through the state bureaucracy can`t be sent to anopther state. At the central level, people aren`t posted according to their origins.
In fact, my hometown Pune, has not had a local Municipal Commissioner, District Magistrate, Income tax commissioner or even Police commissioner for as long as I can remember. And it is prosperous and peaceful town with no mafia or communal trouble, so it is not a punishment posting either.
Not saying that Indian bureaucracy is a paragon of honesty and efficiency, far from it. The concept of punishment postings and reward postings is there, but it does not have anything to do with your origins. Even a Bihari will consider Bihar as punishment posting
#187 Posted by Ahmadzai on November 24, 2003 5:20:42 am
fountainheader:
Pakistan`s economic performance:
This is in response to your query to Romair.
I have produced many websites on Chowk showing improved performance, including once during my discussion with Mantolives.
An honest evaluation of Pakistan`s economy appears here:
http://www.dawn.com/2003/11/23/top6.htm
Pakistan`s economic performance:
This is in response to your query to Romair.
I have produced many websites on Chowk showing improved performance, including once during my discussion with Mantolives.
An honest evaluation of Pakistan`s economy appears here:
http://www.dawn.com/2003/11/23/top6.htm
#186 Posted by Ahmadzai on November 24, 2003 5:20:42 am
ballukhan at # 185:
``The guy has no idea about Indian buraucracy!!!! What propaganda? I am amazed? ``
Read my intro. Note that I am a traveler. Maira Moon mutt khulwana.
But for your own information as a beginning, do read the two URLs I have listed in one of my previous posts.
:-)
``The guy has no idea about Indian buraucracy!!!! What propaganda? I am amazed? ``
Read my intro. Note that I am a traveler. Maira Moon mutt khulwana.
But for your own information as a beginning, do read the two URLs I have listed in one of my previous posts.
:-)
#185 Posted by fountainheader on November 24, 2003 12:46:09 am
Maula Jat. Jat in London. Jeera Blade. Mirza, Majnu tay Ranjha. Jat, Gujjar tay Nat.
All classics, by the way.
Haha, OK. :)
Love their names, remind me of Johar-Mehmood or Govinda ``classics``. By the way, are all these movies Punjabi, or some are urdu?
As I stated earlier, Pakistanis are not interested in getting all of Kashmir. I say this as someone who is from Kashmir. Look at any survey in Pakistan. Even the govt. repeatedly says self-determination for Kashmiris. This could result in Kashmir joining Pakistan, India, or independence.
OK, two things. ``Pakistanis`` are not interested in getting all of Kashmir, is what you claim based on opinion polls. Even if we do accept this, it is the wish of the common people, and NOT the army or the government.
And I am pretty sure that the government of Pakistan`s official position is still ``we want a plebiscite, 1947 style``, which means only 2 options - join india or join pakistan. no option of independence. yes, many pakistanis may wish to give kashmir independence from both india and pak, but the official government demand is still ``self determination with 2 options - india or pakistan``. in fact this has been a major cause of factionalism in the hurriyat. the geelani faction is pro-pakistan and the lone-mirwaiz faction is pro-azaadi. abdul ghani lone was gunned down by pakistanis. hiw own son, came on BBC saying ``pakistanis killed my father``. are you telling me that pakistani army has been pumping so much money and manpower into kashmir just to let it be ``azaad``? puhleeeeeeeeeeeeeeez. exactly who here was born yesterday?
another thing is if the pakistani establishment did not want ``all of kashmir`` they would have lapped up the Chenab Formula. as mentioned in an article in Friday times(drat why dont they have archives) a couple of month back by Khalis Hasan, the Chenab Formula is a plan that would give Pakistan 80% of the land of the Kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir, leaving India with only parts of Ladakh and Jammu. The valley would go to Pakistan. As Hasan wrote, the chenab formula itself is a big dream because India simply would not agree to it. Yet, at 80%, it is the best deal that could even be realistically mentioned in negotiations. And yet, Sikandar Hayat Khan was disqualified by the High Court for endorsing this formula.
This is from the daily Jang 16 September 2003
Sikandar’s disqualification reference
MUZAFFARABAD: The AJK High Court has set up a full bench for the preliminary hearing of constitutional writ petition field by opposition leader in AJK Legislative Assembly Barrister Sultan Mehmood Chaudhry regarding disqualification of AJK Prime Minister Sikandar Hayat on his comments about Chenab Formula dealing with Kashmir dispute. Kh. Atta Ullah Chak represented the petitioner while AJK Advocate General presented on behalf of the other side. The AJK Chief Justice Syed Manzoor Husain Gilani after hearing both sides remarked that ``In view of the nature of constitutional points taken up in the petition it should be placed before the full court on September 29, 2003.`` According to the detail earlier the AJK Opposition leader had filed a reference with the AJK Speaker Sardar Siab Khalid for the disqualification of AJK Premier Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan for his statement regarding Chenab Formula about the proposed solution of Kashmir dispute, which the Speaker had rejected. Meanwhile the opposition leader Sultan Mehmood filed a writ petition with AJK High court requesting the Court for disqualification of the Premier Sikandar Hayat Khan pleading that by supporting the Chenab Formula the AJK premier has clearly deviated from our principle stand on Kashmir and violated the AJK constitution under which he (the premier) had taken the oath that as prime minister he would strictly adherent to the ideology of accession to Pakistan.
You said
The ones fighting in Kashmir, are only interested in Kashmir.
This is rich, this is really really rich. The Kashmiri terrorists from J&K might be interested only in that. But you have conveniently ignored the example of Sheikh Omar saeed who was first involved in kidnapping of tourists in kashmir, then was arrested by the Indians, released with Masood Azhar during the kandahar hijacking, transfered money to Moahammad Atta of 9/11 fame, killed Daniel Pearl..... Come on, everyone, even your own papers have accepted the link between Kashmir and Al Qaeda. Let me give you one more example. John Walker Lindh, the American taliban, fought in kashmir. The Virginia Terror network guys, fought in Kashmir.
While someone like Syed Salahuddin and his Hizbul maybe Kashmir-centric, the Jaish, Lashkar, Markaz et al have bigger designs. their own websites say so, for god`s sake. I have some coffee here in case you want to smell it.
You know, in my opinion the biggest problem that Pakistan faces with keeping the terror tap on in kashmir is that those guys are going to want to do more. Because most of them (not all) are driven not by nationalistic sentiments, but religious ones. They are fighting(they think) the cause of Islam and not kashmir. kashmir is just one step. their bigger targets are going to be Israel and America. So America did not mind Pakistan funding Khalistani terrorists, cos they would hurt only India, but it will certainly mind the jehadis in kashmir.
And your surveys show that. the pakistani ``people`` are not obsessed enough with the cause of Kashmir to die for it. But throw in the islamic jehad angle, with promises of jannat, and allah`s mercy, and a lot of people are willing to do it. If pakistan can divorce religion from the roxy war it has launched on india, it will really be more effective. Think about it.
There was an interview on News Night in Pakistan, where the BJP minister was being interviewed. The interviewer showed a copy of the text of the original Agra agreement to the minister, and asked whether she wanted to debate it. She refused. He made the same points, and asked why it had been cancelled after the BJP had agreed to it. She had no answer.
Could you point out why the original agreement was cancelled?
I saw the interview myself, and I dont see how the breakfast meeting reason is justified by it. In fact your comment was the first time I have ever heard anyone mention the breakfast as a reason. Pakistanis have alleged that the hawks like Advani scuttled the talks because vajpayee agreed to drop the issue of ``cross border terrorism``, and they didnt like it. Indians say that it was scuttled because Musharraf agreed to address cross border terrorism in the draft but later changed his mind. I myself am not quite clear about it, but my opinion is that Vajpayee agreed to more concessions than the hawks wanted. Where does the breakfast come into picture?
The reason NS was removed was because he tried to fire Musharraf. Plain and simple. It was not a planned coup. Even the coup makers did not know what to do after the coup.
Are you saying that Nawaz`s fall had nothing to do with Kargil? This is something on which I have heard different versions from Pakistanis themselves. Some say Nawaz didn`t know about Kargil, or else he wouldnt have had the lahore meeting. Some say he knew but couldnt stop it. A very few say nawaz actually ordered Kargil (!!!). you people sort it out amongst yourselves.
All classics, by the way.
Haha, OK. :)
Love their names, remind me of Johar-Mehmood or Govinda ``classics``. By the way, are all these movies Punjabi, or some are urdu?
As I stated earlier, Pakistanis are not interested in getting all of Kashmir. I say this as someone who is from Kashmir. Look at any survey in Pakistan. Even the govt. repeatedly says self-determination for Kashmiris. This could result in Kashmir joining Pakistan, India, or independence.
OK, two things. ``Pakistanis`` are not interested in getting all of Kashmir, is what you claim based on opinion polls. Even if we do accept this, it is the wish of the common people, and NOT the army or the government.
And I am pretty sure that the government of Pakistan`s official position is still ``we want a plebiscite, 1947 style``, which means only 2 options - join india or join pakistan. no option of independence. yes, many pakistanis may wish to give kashmir independence from both india and pak, but the official government demand is still ``self determination with 2 options - india or pakistan``. in fact this has been a major cause of factionalism in the hurriyat. the geelani faction is pro-pakistan and the lone-mirwaiz faction is pro-azaadi. abdul ghani lone was gunned down by pakistanis. hiw own son, came on BBC saying ``pakistanis killed my father``. are you telling me that pakistani army has been pumping so much money and manpower into kashmir just to let it be ``azaad``? puhleeeeeeeeeeeeeeez. exactly who here was born yesterday?
another thing is if the pakistani establishment did not want ``all of kashmir`` they would have lapped up the Chenab Formula. as mentioned in an article in Friday times(drat why dont they have archives) a couple of month back by Khalis Hasan, the Chenab Formula is a plan that would give Pakistan 80% of the land of the Kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir, leaving India with only parts of Ladakh and Jammu. The valley would go to Pakistan. As Hasan wrote, the chenab formula itself is a big dream because India simply would not agree to it. Yet, at 80%, it is the best deal that could even be realistically mentioned in negotiations. And yet, Sikandar Hayat Khan was disqualified by the High Court for endorsing this formula.
This is from the daily Jang 16 September 2003
Sikandar’s disqualification reference
MUZAFFARABAD: The AJK High Court has set up a full bench for the preliminary hearing of constitutional writ petition field by opposition leader in AJK Legislative Assembly Barrister Sultan Mehmood Chaudhry regarding disqualification of AJK Prime Minister Sikandar Hayat on his comments about Chenab Formula dealing with Kashmir dispute. Kh. Atta Ullah Chak represented the petitioner while AJK Advocate General presented on behalf of the other side. The AJK Chief Justice Syed Manzoor Husain Gilani after hearing both sides remarked that ``In view of the nature of constitutional points taken up in the petition it should be placed before the full court on September 29, 2003.`` According to the detail earlier the AJK Opposition leader had filed a reference with the AJK Speaker Sardar Siab Khalid for the disqualification of AJK Premier Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan for his statement regarding Chenab Formula about the proposed solution of Kashmir dispute, which the Speaker had rejected. Meanwhile the opposition leader Sultan Mehmood filed a writ petition with AJK High court requesting the Court for disqualification of the Premier Sikandar Hayat Khan pleading that by supporting the Chenab Formula the AJK premier has clearly deviated from our principle stand on Kashmir and violated the AJK constitution under which he (the premier) had taken the oath that as prime minister he would strictly adherent to the ideology of accession to Pakistan.
You said
The ones fighting in Kashmir, are only interested in Kashmir.
This is rich, this is really really rich. The Kashmiri terrorists from J&K might be interested only in that. But you have conveniently ignored the example of Sheikh Omar saeed who was first involved in kidnapping of tourists in kashmir, then was arrested by the Indians, released with Masood Azhar during the kandahar hijacking, transfered money to Moahammad Atta of 9/11 fame, killed Daniel Pearl..... Come on, everyone, even your own papers have accepted the link between Kashmir and Al Qaeda. Let me give you one more example. John Walker Lindh, the American taliban, fought in kashmir. The Virginia Terror network guys, fought in Kashmir.
While someone like Syed Salahuddin and his Hizbul maybe Kashmir-centric, the Jaish, Lashkar, Markaz et al have bigger designs. their own websites say so, for god`s sake. I have some coffee here in case you want to smell it.
You know, in my opinion the biggest problem that Pakistan faces with keeping the terror tap on in kashmir is that those guys are going to want to do more. Because most of them (not all) are driven not by nationalistic sentiments, but religious ones. They are fighting(they think) the cause of Islam and not kashmir. kashmir is just one step. their bigger targets are going to be Israel and America. So America did not mind Pakistan funding Khalistani terrorists, cos they would hurt only India, but it will certainly mind the jehadis in kashmir.
And your surveys show that. the pakistani ``people`` are not obsessed enough with the cause of Kashmir to die for it. But throw in the islamic jehad angle, with promises of jannat, and allah`s mercy, and a lot of people are willing to do it. If pakistan can divorce religion from the roxy war it has launched on india, it will really be more effective. Think about it.
There was an interview on News Night in Pakistan, where the BJP minister was being interviewed. The interviewer showed a copy of the text of the original Agra agreement to the minister, and asked whether she wanted to debate it. She refused. He made the same points, and asked why it had been cancelled after the BJP had agreed to it. She had no answer.
Could you point out why the original agreement was cancelled?
I saw the interview myself, and I dont see how the breakfast meeting reason is justified by it. In fact your comment was the first time I have ever heard anyone mention the breakfast as a reason. Pakistanis have alleged that the hawks like Advani scuttled the talks because vajpayee agreed to drop the issue of ``cross border terrorism``, and they didnt like it. Indians say that it was scuttled because Musharraf agreed to address cross border terrorism in the draft but later changed his mind. I myself am not quite clear about it, but my opinion is that Vajpayee agreed to more concessions than the hawks wanted. Where does the breakfast come into picture?
The reason NS was removed was because he tried to fire Musharraf. Plain and simple. It was not a planned coup. Even the coup makers did not know what to do after the coup.
Are you saying that Nawaz`s fall had nothing to do with Kargil? This is something on which I have heard different versions from Pakistanis themselves. Some say Nawaz didn`t know about Kargil, or else he wouldnt have had the lahore meeting. Some say he knew but couldnt stop it. A very few say nawaz actually ordered Kargil (!!!). you people sort it out amongst yourselves.
#184 Posted by fountainheader on November 24, 2003 12:46:09 am
The AgrSummit: An Engagement Fouled by Dr. Muni of the JNU. JNU-wallahs are acknowledged by pakistanis to be objective, hence I am pasting a few excerpts from the article.
He frankly confessed to the Indian editors outside the summit negotiations that for his very political survival in Pakistan, he cannot be seen to be diluting his position on Kashmir.
You see romair, Musharraf confessed that himself, on tape. I guess you think he is wrong, and he can dilute his position of Kashmir and still survive?
The Pakistani armed forces see this territorial gain in the valley as a part of avenging its defeat of 1971 and a requirement of its self-created ``national identity`` vis-à-vis India. General Musharraf`s linking of Kargil conflict with 1971 in his breakfast talks with the Indian editors at Agra could be seen in this context. The post-summit statements made by him and his foreign minister in Islamabad indicate that accepting the word ``cross-border`` amounts to Pakistan giving sanctity to LOC that it does not want.
See what I mean? I am sure if we go to some chowk 2001 archives, we will find a hundred views about why the summit failed. I would love to see how many people blame the breakfast for it
He frankly confessed to the Indian editors outside the summit negotiations that for his very political survival in Pakistan, he cannot be seen to be diluting his position on Kashmir.
You see romair, Musharraf confessed that himself, on tape. I guess you think he is wrong, and he can dilute his position of Kashmir and still survive?
The Pakistani armed forces see this territorial gain in the valley as a part of avenging its defeat of 1971 and a requirement of its self-created ``national identity`` vis-à-vis India. General Musharraf`s linking of Kargil conflict with 1971 in his breakfast talks with the Indian editors at Agra could be seen in this context. The post-summit statements made by him and his foreign minister in Islamabad indicate that accepting the word ``cross-border`` amounts to Pakistan giving sanctity to LOC that it does not want.
See what I mean? I am sure if we go to some chowk 2001 archives, we will find a hundred views about why the summit failed. I would love to see how many people blame the breakfast for it
#183 Posted by ballukhan on November 24, 2003 12:46:09 am
#162 by ahmadzai on November 23, 2003 11:05am PT
``Also, remember that in India if a civil servant or a judge has to be penalized, his services are transferred to a state other than his original. This ensures his demise, because outside his own state, he is treated as a pariah....``
The guy has no idea about Indian buraucracy!!!! What propaganda? I am amazed?
``Also, remember that in India if a civil servant or a judge has to be penalized, his services are transferred to a state other than his original. This ensures his demise, because outside his own state, he is treated as a pariah....``
The guy has no idea about Indian buraucracy!!!! What propaganda? I am amazed?
#182 Posted by SyedAhmed on November 23, 2003 10:21:20 pm
SUb: Admiral Ahsan....
There were a number of notable Generals who oopposed West Pakistani Policies in Bangladesh. Vice-Admiral Ahsan was prominent amongst those. He was soon removed from office. Even Lt Gen Saihbzada Yakoob Ali khan - despite his earlier saber-rattling as part of the Insurgency planning came to see things differently once posted GOC - Eastern Command - He was subsequently demoted to Maj-Gen and placed under house arrest in West Pakistan during the duration of the 71 war. It was Zia ul Haq who later rehabilitated him as Foreign minister and restored his rank to Lt-Gen ( post Retirement)......
Of course Gen Tikka Khan a la ``Butcher of Dacca`` was later promoted by Bhutto to Chief of staff ( or Cinc C i am not sure wheteher Cin C was abolished in the 70`s) and later as Governor of Punjab. there were many even in the Lahore gentry that avoided this man like the plague.... - He was a personal and professional digrace - Nothing more than a glorified subaltern....
there were other Graduates of Bangladesh that were later to lead insurgency operations in Baluchistan - Sind and karachi ...
Lt Gen Jehanzeb Arbab ( Later a corrupt Gov of Sind) - is listed is the Hammodur Rehman Report ha shaving been involved in looting and misappropriation of funds......
The infamous Naseerullah Babur ( another Bhutto protege)- who reportedly as a Captain deserted his post in bangladesh ( and later a POW) - was involved in the bloody repression of the MQM in Karachi where thousands of non-political civilians came in the cross fire. He used to proudly boast as being the Father of the Taliban as well. I hope they haul his rotten ass to Guantanomo......
THe HamoodurRehman report is online at
http://www.dawn.com/events/14aug2000/report/report.htm
It describes quite vividly and unrevocably the complete corruption of Command and Control - with all the guilty parties - IT also describes in shocking detail - Dereliction of duty, and in some cases abandonment of positions by two star and one star generals......
As for Adm Mansoor ul Haq - it is alittle known fact that he is a Bhutto too.... His mother was Bhutto Sr`s sister who was married off to a local Clan in SOuthern Punjab.....
IT is also well known that most Zia protege`s from Gen Fazle Haq the drug Baron Gov of NWFP during Zia`s tenure, to GEn AKthar Abdur Rehman ( His son) , Gen Aslam beg, and Gen Zia ( through his son ... were dollar bilionaires exposed by Musharraf during his vaunted anti-corruption drive......
There were a number of notable Generals who oopposed West Pakistani Policies in Bangladesh. Vice-Admiral Ahsan was prominent amongst those. He was soon removed from office. Even Lt Gen Saihbzada Yakoob Ali khan - despite his earlier saber-rattling as part of the Insurgency planning came to see things differently once posted GOC - Eastern Command - He was subsequently demoted to Maj-Gen and placed under house arrest in West Pakistan during the duration of the 71 war. It was Zia ul Haq who later rehabilitated him as Foreign minister and restored his rank to Lt-Gen ( post Retirement)......
Of course Gen Tikka Khan a la ``Butcher of Dacca`` was later promoted by Bhutto to Chief of staff ( or Cinc C i am not sure wheteher Cin C was abolished in the 70`s) and later as Governor of Punjab. there were many even in the Lahore gentry that avoided this man like the plague.... - He was a personal and professional digrace - Nothing more than a glorified subaltern....
there were other Graduates of Bangladesh that were later to lead insurgency operations in Baluchistan - Sind and karachi ...
Lt Gen Jehanzeb Arbab ( Later a corrupt Gov of Sind) - is listed is the Hammodur Rehman Report ha shaving been involved in looting and misappropriation of funds......
The infamous Naseerullah Babur ( another Bhutto protege)- who reportedly as a Captain deserted his post in bangladesh ( and later a POW) - was involved in the bloody repression of the MQM in Karachi where thousands of non-political civilians came in the cross fire. He used to proudly boast as being the Father of the Taliban as well. I hope they haul his rotten ass to Guantanomo......
THe HamoodurRehman report is online at
http://www.dawn.com/events/14aug2000/report/report.htm
It describes quite vividly and unrevocably the complete corruption of Command and Control - with all the guilty parties - IT also describes in shocking detail - Dereliction of duty, and in some cases abandonment of positions by two star and one star generals......
As for Adm Mansoor ul Haq - it is alittle known fact that he is a Bhutto too.... His mother was Bhutto Sr`s sister who was married off to a local Clan in SOuthern Punjab.....
IT is also well known that most Zia protege`s from Gen Fazle Haq the drug Baron Gov of NWFP during Zia`s tenure, to GEn AKthar Abdur Rehman ( His son) , Gen Aslam beg, and Gen Zia ( through his son ... were dollar bilionaires exposed by Musharraf during his vaunted anti-corruption drive......
#181 Posted by stuka on November 23, 2003 9:34:04 pm
Interesting and Timely article from the Daily Times:
Op-ed: The courageous Pak army stand on the eastern front —Sarmila Bose
There is much for Pakistan to come to terms with what happened in 1971. But the answers don’t lie in unthinking vilification of the fighting men who performed so well in the war against such heavy odds in defence of the national policy. Rather, in failing to honour them, the nation dishonours itself
My introduction to international politics was 1971, as a schoolgirl in Calcutta. Many images from that year are still etched in my mind, but the culminating one was the photo on Ramna racecourse of two men sitting at a table — the smart, turbaned Sikh, ‘our’ war-hero, Jagjit Singh Aurora, and the large man in a beret, A A K Niazi, commander of the other side, signing the instrument of surrender.
Nearly a generation later, a chance interview for the BBC with Lt Gen. Aurora took me back to 1971. The interview was not about 1971, but about injustices suffered by Sikhs at the hands of the state General Aurora had served. I thought he was a bigger hero for what he had to say then. That view was reinforced as I read — with incredulity — the disparaging remarks by other Indian officers about him, and each other, in their books. If this is what happened to the winning commander, I wondered what had happened to the other man in the photo. The result was a revelation.
It turns out that General Niazi has been my ‘enemy’ since the Second World War. As Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army fought on the Burma front in 1943-45 in their quest for India’s freedom, Niazi was fighting on the other side, for the British Indian Army, under the overall command of General (later Field Marshal) William Joseph Slim. Slim and his 14th Army halted the advance of the INA and the Japanese at the Imphal campaign and turned the course of the war.
In the process of inflicting military defeat upon my ancestor, Niazi’s performance was so exceptional that the British awarded him an on-the-spot Military Cross for action on the Assam-Burma front in June 1944. On another occasion they wanted to award a DSO, but he was too junior, so a Mention in Despatches was recorded. In the original record of his MC signed by his commanding officers all the way up to Slim, which I obtained from the British Ministry of Defence, the British commanders describe Niazi’s gallantry in detail: “He organized the attack with such skill that his leading platoon succeeded in achieving complete surprise over the enemy.” They speak of how he personally led his men, the ‘great skill and coolness’ under fire with which he changed tactics with changing circumstances, created diversionary attacks, extricated his wounded, defeated the enemy and withdrew his men by section, remaining personally at the rear in every case.
The British honoured Niazi for “personal leadership, bravery and complete disregard for his own personal safety.” On 15 December 1944 the Viceroy Lord Wavell flew to Imphal and in the presence of Lord Mountbatten knighted Slim and his corps commanders Stopford, Scoones and Christison. Only two ‘Indian’ officers were chosen to be decorated by the Viceroy at that ceremony — ‘Tiger’ Niazi was one of them.
In 1971 Niazi was a highly decorated Pakistani general, twice receiving the Hilal-e-Jurat. He was sent to East Pakistan in April 1971 — part of a sorry tradition in South Asia of political rulers attempting to find military solutions to political problems. By then Tikka Khan had already launched the crackdown of 25 March for which he has been known to Bengalis as the ‘butcher of Bengal’ ever since. The population of East Bengal was completely hostile and Pakistan condemned around the world.
Authoritative scholarly analyses of 1971 are rare. The best work is Richard Sisson and Leo Rose’s War and Secession. Robert Jackson, fellow of All Soul’s College, Oxford, wrote an account shortly after the events. Most of the principal participants did not write about it, a notable exception being Gen. Niazi’s recent memoirs (1998). Some Indian officers have written books of uneven quality — they make for an embarrassing read for what the Indians have to say about one another.
However, a consistent picture emerges from the more objective accounts of the war. Sisson and Rose describe how India started assisting Bengali rebels since April, but “the Mukti Bahini had not been able to prevent the Pakistani army from regaining control over all the major urban centers on the East Pakistani-Indian border and even establishing a tenuous authority in most of the rural areas.” From July to October there was direct involvement of Indian military personnel. “...mid-October to 20 November... Indian artillery was used much more extensively in support ...and Indian military forces, including tanks and air power on a few occasions, were also used...Indian units were withdrawn to Indian territory once their objectives had been brought under the control of the Mukti Bahini — though at times this was only for short periods, as, to the irritation of the Indians, the Mukti Bahini forces rarely held their ground when the Pakistani army launched a counterattack.”
Clearly, the Pakistani army regained East Pakistan for their masters in Islamabad by April-May, creating an opportunity for a political settlement, and held off both Bengali guerrillas and their Indian supporters till November, buying more time — time and opportunity that Pakistan’s rulers and politicians failed to utilise.
Contrary to Indian reports, full-scale war between India and Pakistan started in East Bengal on 21 November, making it a four-week war rather than a ‘lightning campaign’. Sisson and Rose state bluntly: “After the night of 21 November...Indian forces did not withdraw. From 21 to 25 November several Indian army divisions...launched simultaneous military actions on all of the key border regions of East Pakistan, and from all directions, with both armored and air support.” Indian officers like Sukhwant Singh and Lachhman Singh write quite openly in their books about India invading East Pakistani territory in November, which they knew was ‘an act of war’.
None of the outside scholars expected the Eastern garrison to withstand a full Indian invasion. On the contrary, Pakistan’s longstanding strategy was “the defense of the east is in the west”. Jackson writes, “Pakistani forces had largely withdrawn from scattered border-protection duties into cleverly fortified defensive positions at the major centres inside the frontiers, where they held all the major ‘place names’ against Mukti Bahini attacks, and blocked the routes of entry from India...”
Sisson and Rose point out the incongruity of Islamabad tolerating India’s invasion of East Pakistani territory in November. On 30 November Niazi received a message from General Hamid stating, “The whole nation is proud of you and you have their full support.” The same day Islamabad decided to launch an attack in the West on 2 December, later postponed to 3 December, after a two-week wait, but did not inform the Eastern command about it. According to Jackson, the Western offensive was frustrated by 10 December.
Though futile, the Western offensive allowed India to openly invade the East, with overwhelming advantages. “ ...despite all these advantages, the war did not go as smoothly and easily for the Indian army...”, but Sisson and Rose come to the balanced judgment that “The Pakistanis fought hard and well; the Indian army won an impressive victory.” Even Indian officers concede the personal bravery of Niazi and the spirited fight put up by the Pakistanis in the East. That the troops fought so well against such overwhelming odds is a credit both to them, and to their commanders, for an army does not fight well in the absence of good leadership.
However, as Jackson put it, “...India’s success was inevitable from the moment the general war broke out — unless diplomatic intervention could frustrate it.” As is well known, Pakistan failed to secure military or diplomatic intervention. Sisson and Rose also say, “The outcome of the conflict on the eastern front after 6 December was not in doubt, as the Indian military had all the advantages.” On 14 December Niazi received the following message from Yahya Khan: “You have fought a heroic battle against overwhelming odds. The nation is proud of you ...You have now reached a stage where further resistance is no longer humanly possible nor will it serve any useful purpose... You should now take all necessary measures to stop the fighting and preserve the lives of armed forces personnel, all those from West Pakistan and all loyal elements...” Sisson and Rose naturally describe this message as “implying that the armed forces in East Pakistan should surrender”.
No matter how traumatic the outcome of 1971 for Pakistan, the Eastern command did not create the conflict, nor were they responsible for the failure of the political and diplomatic process. Sent to do the dirty work of the political manoeuvrers, the fighting men seem to have performed remarkably well against overwhelming odds. It is shocking therefore to discover that they were not received with honour by their nation on their return. Their commander, Niazi, appears to have been singled out, along with one aide, to be punished arbitrarily with dismissal and denial of pension, without being given the basic right to defend himself through a court-martial, which he asked for.
The commission set up allegedly to examine what had happened in 1971 was too flawed in its terms of reference and report to have any international credibility. However, even its recommendations of holding public trials and court-martials were ignored. There is much for Pakistan to come to terms with what happened in 1971. But the answers don’t lie in unthinking vilification of the fighting men who performed so well in the war against such heavy odds in defence of the national policy. Rather, in failing to honour them, the nation dishonours itself.
Sarmila Bose is Assistant Editor, Ananda Bazar Patrika, India & Visiting Scholar, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University
H
Op-ed: The courageous Pak army stand on the eastern front —Sarmila Bose
There is much for Pakistan to come to terms with what happened in 1971. But the answers don’t lie in unthinking vilification of the fighting men who performed so well in the war against such heavy odds in defence of the national policy. Rather, in failing to honour them, the nation dishonours itself
My introduction to international politics was 1971, as a schoolgirl in Calcutta. Many images from that year are still etched in my mind, but the culminating one was the photo on Ramna racecourse of two men sitting at a table — the smart, turbaned Sikh, ‘our’ war-hero, Jagjit Singh Aurora, and the large man in a beret, A A K Niazi, commander of the other side, signing the instrument of surrender.
Nearly a generation later, a chance interview for the BBC with Lt Gen. Aurora took me back to 1971. The interview was not about 1971, but about injustices suffered by Sikhs at the hands of the state General Aurora had served. I thought he was a bigger hero for what he had to say then. That view was reinforced as I read — with incredulity — the disparaging remarks by other Indian officers about him, and each other, in their books. If this is what happened to the winning commander, I wondered what had happened to the other man in the photo. The result was a revelation.
It turns out that General Niazi has been my ‘enemy’ since the Second World War. As Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army fought on the Burma front in 1943-45 in their quest for India’s freedom, Niazi was fighting on the other side, for the British Indian Army, under the overall command of General (later Field Marshal) William Joseph Slim. Slim and his 14th Army halted the advance of the INA and the Japanese at the Imphal campaign and turned the course of the war.
In the process of inflicting military defeat upon my ancestor, Niazi’s performance was so exceptional that the British awarded him an on-the-spot Military Cross for action on the Assam-Burma front in June 1944. On another occasion they wanted to award a DSO, but he was too junior, so a Mention in Despatches was recorded. In the original record of his MC signed by his commanding officers all the way up to Slim, which I obtained from the British Ministry of Defence, the British commanders describe Niazi’s gallantry in detail: “He organized the attack with such skill that his leading platoon succeeded in achieving complete surprise over the enemy.” They speak of how he personally led his men, the ‘great skill and coolness’ under fire with which he changed tactics with changing circumstances, created diversionary attacks, extricated his wounded, defeated the enemy and withdrew his men by section, remaining personally at the rear in every case.
The British honoured Niazi for “personal leadership, bravery and complete disregard for his own personal safety.” On 15 December 1944 the Viceroy Lord Wavell flew to Imphal and in the presence of Lord Mountbatten knighted Slim and his corps commanders Stopford, Scoones and Christison. Only two ‘Indian’ officers were chosen to be decorated by the Viceroy at that ceremony — ‘Tiger’ Niazi was one of them.
In 1971 Niazi was a highly decorated Pakistani general, twice receiving the Hilal-e-Jurat. He was sent to East Pakistan in April 1971 — part of a sorry tradition in South Asia of political rulers attempting to find military solutions to political problems. By then Tikka Khan had already launched the crackdown of 25 March for which he has been known to Bengalis as the ‘butcher of Bengal’ ever since. The population of East Bengal was completely hostile and Pakistan condemned around the world.
Authoritative scholarly analyses of 1971 are rare. The best work is Richard Sisson and Leo Rose’s War and Secession. Robert Jackson, fellow of All Soul’s College, Oxford, wrote an account shortly after the events. Most of the principal participants did not write about it, a notable exception being Gen. Niazi’s recent memoirs (1998). Some Indian officers have written books of uneven quality — they make for an embarrassing read for what the Indians have to say about one another.
However, a consistent picture emerges from the more objective accounts of the war. Sisson and Rose describe how India started assisting Bengali rebels since April, but “the Mukti Bahini had not been able to prevent the Pakistani army from regaining control over all the major urban centers on the East Pakistani-Indian border and even establishing a tenuous authority in most of the rural areas.” From July to October there was direct involvement of Indian military personnel. “...mid-October to 20 November... Indian artillery was used much more extensively in support ...and Indian military forces, including tanks and air power on a few occasions, were also used...Indian units were withdrawn to Indian territory once their objectives had been brought under the control of the Mukti Bahini — though at times this was only for short periods, as, to the irritation of the Indians, the Mukti Bahini forces rarely held their ground when the Pakistani army launched a counterattack.”
Clearly, the Pakistani army regained East Pakistan for their masters in Islamabad by April-May, creating an opportunity for a political settlement, and held off both Bengali guerrillas and their Indian supporters till November, buying more time — time and opportunity that Pakistan’s rulers and politicians failed to utilise.
Contrary to Indian reports, full-scale war between India and Pakistan started in East Bengal on 21 November, making it a four-week war rather than a ‘lightning campaign’. Sisson and Rose state bluntly: “After the night of 21 November...Indian forces did not withdraw. From 21 to 25 November several Indian army divisions...launched simultaneous military actions on all of the key border regions of East Pakistan, and from all directions, with both armored and air support.” Indian officers like Sukhwant Singh and Lachhman Singh write quite openly in their books about India invading East Pakistani territory in November, which they knew was ‘an act of war’.
None of the outside scholars expected the Eastern garrison to withstand a full Indian invasion. On the contrary, Pakistan’s longstanding strategy was “the defense of the east is in the west”. Jackson writes, “Pakistani forces had largely withdrawn from scattered border-protection duties into cleverly fortified defensive positions at the major centres inside the frontiers, where they held all the major ‘place names’ against Mukti Bahini attacks, and blocked the routes of entry from India...”
Sisson and Rose point out the incongruity of Islamabad tolerating India’s invasion of East Pakistani territory in November. On 30 November Niazi received a message from General Hamid stating, “The whole nation is proud of you and you have their full support.” The same day Islamabad decided to launch an attack in the West on 2 December, later postponed to 3 December, after a two-week wait, but did not inform the Eastern command about it. According to Jackson, the Western offensive was frustrated by 10 December.
Though futile, the Western offensive allowed India to openly invade the East, with overwhelming advantages. “ ...despite all these advantages, the war did not go as smoothly and easily for the Indian army...”, but Sisson and Rose come to the balanced judgment that “The Pakistanis fought hard and well; the Indian army won an impressive victory.” Even Indian officers concede the personal bravery of Niazi and the spirited fight put up by the Pakistanis in the East. That the troops fought so well against such overwhelming odds is a credit both to them, and to their commanders, for an army does not fight well in the absence of good leadership.
However, as Jackson put it, “...India’s success was inevitable from the moment the general war broke out — unless diplomatic intervention could frustrate it.” As is well known, Pakistan failed to secure military or diplomatic intervention. Sisson and Rose also say, “The outcome of the conflict on the eastern front after 6 December was not in doubt, as the Indian military had all the advantages.” On 14 December Niazi received the following message from Yahya Khan: “You have fought a heroic battle against overwhelming odds. The nation is proud of you ...You have now reached a stage where further resistance is no longer humanly possible nor will it serve any useful purpose... You should now take all necessary measures to stop the fighting and preserve the lives of armed forces personnel, all those from West Pakistan and all loyal elements...” Sisson and Rose naturally describe this message as “implying that the armed forces in East Pakistan should surrender”.
No matter how traumatic the outcome of 1971 for Pakistan, the Eastern command did not create the conflict, nor were they responsible for the failure of the political and diplomatic process. Sent to do the dirty work of the political manoeuvrers, the fighting men seem to have performed remarkably well against overwhelming odds. It is shocking therefore to discover that they were not received with honour by their nation on their return. Their commander, Niazi, appears to have been singled out, along with one aide, to be punished arbitrarily with dismissal and denial of pension, without being given the basic right to defend himself through a court-martial, which he asked for.
The commission set up allegedly to examine what had happened in 1971 was too flawed in its terms of reference and report to have any international credibility. However, even its recommendations of holding public trials and court-martials were ignored. There is much for Pakistan to come to terms with what happened in 1971. But the answers don’t lie in unthinking vilification of the fighting men who performed so well in the war against such heavy odds in defence of the national policy. Rather, in failing to honour them, the nation dishonours itself.
Sarmila Bose is Assistant Editor, Ananda Bazar Patrika, India & Visiting Scholar, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University
H
#180 Posted by stuka on November 23, 2003 9:25:30 pm
Tahmed:
Pmisra says:
``in addition to Khushwant Singh, folks like M. J. Akbar, Shekhar Gupta and Tavleen Singh bring a balanced and experienced viewpoint. Mark Tully is another person with deep background in India and consistent opinions``
I would agree with his list. For socioeconomic issues, I would add Swaminathan S Anklesaria Aiyar. Mind you, none of these are apologists for any sort of right wing orgainzation or apologists for Sangh parivar outfits.
Pmisra says:
``in addition to Khushwant Singh, folks like M. J. Akbar, Shekhar Gupta and Tavleen Singh bring a balanced and experienced viewpoint. Mark Tully is another person with deep background in India and consistent opinions``
I would agree with his list. For socioeconomic issues, I would add Swaminathan S Anklesaria Aiyar. Mind you, none of these are apologists for any sort of right wing orgainzation or apologists for Sangh parivar outfits.
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