Rozaiba February 9, 2004
#218 Posted by AlephNull on February 21, 2004 6:55:42 am
Hossp #177
As to the rest of your post. your method is to compare the situation immediately post 9/11/2001 with that immediately post 5/11/1998. You claim that 9/11 was a far more important event than 5/11; that
{{Pakistan support in the war against terrorists was really incalculable at that time-}}.
You go on to argue that:
{{Despite the fact that 911 was much more important than nuke tests the US did not do any of those things so why would it would have done what you have speculated in your post at the time of nuke tests???}}
There are fatal flaws in your method of comparing between the post-511 and post-911 situations. To begin with, other things did not remain constant in going from May 1998 to September 2001. In fact the world changed quite substantially between 511 and 911, and to the detriment of Pakistan’s bargaining position. Here are some of the significant factors:
(1) First off, Pakistan had been forced to test, so it had to be explicitly considered as a country that had exploded at least one nuclear device and thus possessing a putative nuclear weapons capability. Bye bye F-16s.
(2) Post May 1998, there was an extended security dialogue between India and the US. This together with worsening of relations between the US and China led to what was touted as the beginning of a strategic partnership between India and the US. Pakistan meanwhile had its importance relative to India downgraded; the US administration made it clear that relations with the two countries would follow independent trajectories, i.e. no more ‘India-Pakistan equal-equal’.
(3) The Kargil war was fought; the US denied any aid to Pakistan and if anything sided with India.
(4) Nawaz Sharif’s government was overthrown by a military dictator, putting Pakistan further in the doghouse. Pakistan failed to cooperate with the US in capturing Osama bin Laden.
(5) Indian strength in IT became a significant factor to the US and world economy; whereas Pakistan had little or nothing comparable to offer.
(6) A large NRI lobby with deep pockets, mobilized post Pokharan and especially post Kargil, began to wield substantial potential influence, affecting many actions the US government took regarding Pakistan.
(7) The change of US administrations, Clinton to Bush, led to a further development of ties between the US and India, and further weakening of Pakistan’s relative position.
Further, the US and India were striving for opposed goals in May 1998 – India wanting Pakistan to test, the US trying to prevent Pakistan from testing.
In September/October 2001, by contrast, US and Indian goals were far more compatible. The US decided to demolish the Taliban regime, which meshed perfectly with a long-standing Indian goal. Pakistan, as the creator and sponsor of the Taliban, protector of bin Ladin, and with various other known connections with al Qaeda, was itself a prime target for US bombing had it not cooperated. The US made it clear that it would not tolerate any obstruction.
Pakistan did try to extract its pound of flesh for post-911 cooperation only for India to come gleefully barging in with its own offer of access, thus driving down Pakistan’s asking price for cooperation in the destruction of their own Taliban proxies to rock-bottom values. The US also made it clear at the time that cooperation with Pakistan would be for short-term goals and would not disrupt the strategic cooperation with India.
So while 911 might have been far more important to the US than 511, Pakistan’s bargaining position post 911 was far far weaker than it was post 511. Thus Pakistan’s failure to extract concessions post 911 does not establish that the same concessions could not have been successfully extracted post 511. You completely ignore the vast changes in Pakistan’s predicament. Hence your argument, I regret to say, is unsound, and your conclusions, I am afraid, are not tenable.
As to the rest of your post. your method is to compare the situation immediately post 9/11/2001 with that immediately post 5/11/1998. You claim that 9/11 was a far more important event than 5/11; that
{{Pakistan support in the war against terrorists was really incalculable at that time-}}.
You go on to argue that:
{{Despite the fact that 911 was much more important than nuke tests the US did not do any of those things so why would it would have done what you have speculated in your post at the time of nuke tests???}}
There are fatal flaws in your method of comparing between the post-511 and post-911 situations. To begin with, other things did not remain constant in going from May 1998 to September 2001. In fact the world changed quite substantially between 511 and 911, and to the detriment of Pakistan’s bargaining position. Here are some of the significant factors:
(1) First off, Pakistan had been forced to test, so it had to be explicitly considered as a country that had exploded at least one nuclear device and thus possessing a putative nuclear weapons capability. Bye bye F-16s.
(2) Post May 1998, there was an extended security dialogue between India and the US. This together with worsening of relations between the US and China led to what was touted as the beginning of a strategic partnership between India and the US. Pakistan meanwhile had its importance relative to India downgraded; the US administration made it clear that relations with the two countries would follow independent trajectories, i.e. no more ‘India-Pakistan equal-equal’.
(3) The Kargil war was fought; the US denied any aid to Pakistan and if anything sided with India.
(4) Nawaz Sharif’s government was overthrown by a military dictator, putting Pakistan further in the doghouse. Pakistan failed to cooperate with the US in capturing Osama bin Laden.
(5) Indian strength in IT became a significant factor to the US and world economy; whereas Pakistan had little or nothing comparable to offer.
(6) A large NRI lobby with deep pockets, mobilized post Pokharan and especially post Kargil, began to wield substantial potential influence, affecting many actions the US government took regarding Pakistan.
(7) The change of US administrations, Clinton to Bush, led to a further development of ties between the US and India, and further weakening of Pakistan’s relative position.
Further, the US and India were striving for opposed goals in May 1998 – India wanting Pakistan to test, the US trying to prevent Pakistan from testing.
In September/October 2001, by contrast, US and Indian goals were far more compatible. The US decided to demolish the Taliban regime, which meshed perfectly with a long-standing Indian goal. Pakistan, as the creator and sponsor of the Taliban, protector of bin Ladin, and with various other known connections with al Qaeda, was itself a prime target for US bombing had it not cooperated. The US made it clear that it would not tolerate any obstruction.
Pakistan did try to extract its pound of flesh for post-911 cooperation only for India to come gleefully barging in with its own offer of access, thus driving down Pakistan’s asking price for cooperation in the destruction of their own Taliban proxies to rock-bottom values. The US also made it clear at the time that cooperation with Pakistan would be for short-term goals and would not disrupt the strategic cooperation with India.
So while 911 might have been far more important to the US than 511, Pakistan’s bargaining position post 911 was far far weaker than it was post 511. Thus Pakistan’s failure to extract concessions post 911 does not establish that the same concessions could not have been successfully extracted post 511. You completely ignore the vast changes in Pakistan’s predicament. Hence your argument, I regret to say, is unsound, and your conclusions, I am afraid, are not tenable.
#217 Posted by AlephNull on February 21, 2004 6:55:42 am
Hossp #177
{{So, I will go back to my original question:
What exactly Indian planners had in mind when they supposedly suckered Pakistan into testing and sanctions?}}
First tell me what your ground rules are for plausible argument. You are asking what Indian planners had in mind. I cannot read minds; I am not a confidant of Vajpayee or Brajesh Mishra; I do not attend or eavesdrop at the meetings of the cabinet committee on security. I’m just an attentive layperson who reads the newspapers, journal articles, a few books, so I do have an idea what people like K Subramaniam have been saying for the last four decades. I can only look at the situation and explain what I would have done in Vajpayee’s or Brajesh Misra’s position, and why. By its very nature this exercise involves considering various hypothetical contingencies and assigning probabilities to them, based on past history and my understanding of the current situation. It unavoidably enters the realm of hypotheticals, of ‘speculation’.
I can carry out this exercise – in fact I’ve done some of this in previous posts. I can even tell you quite honestly where my own personal judgment would have erred in 1998, as well as what I think India’s leadership might have done wrong. But I do not want to go to this effort again only to be met with pompous flatulence on the lines of:
{{Your speculations, I am afraid, are not tenable.}}
{{So, I will go back to my original question:
What exactly Indian planners had in mind when they supposedly suckered Pakistan into testing and sanctions?}}
First tell me what your ground rules are for plausible argument. You are asking what Indian planners had in mind. I cannot read minds; I am not a confidant of Vajpayee or Brajesh Mishra; I do not attend or eavesdrop at the meetings of the cabinet committee on security. I’m just an attentive layperson who reads the newspapers, journal articles, a few books, so I do have an idea what people like K Subramaniam have been saying for the last four decades. I can only look at the situation and explain what I would have done in Vajpayee’s or Brajesh Misra’s position, and why. By its very nature this exercise involves considering various hypothetical contingencies and assigning probabilities to them, based on past history and my understanding of the current situation. It unavoidably enters the realm of hypotheticals, of ‘speculation’.
I can carry out this exercise – in fact I’ve done some of this in previous posts. I can even tell you quite honestly where my own personal judgment would have erred in 1998, as well as what I think India’s leadership might have done wrong. But I do not want to go to this effort again only to be met with pompous flatulence on the lines of:
{{Your speculations, I am afraid, are not tenable.}}
#216 Posted by hossp on February 20, 2004 8:34:13 pm
tahmad,
When I was in Lucknow they told me to go Faizabad for some fun. So basically I made it up.
Lucknow kay Bankay correct but old Urdu.
I actually wanted to go to Faizabad also after I saw the movie Amrao jan ada. Having read the book some years ago it was fun to see a deserted and really medieval place.
What amazed me then was that all the buildings all over India were so old and most of the houses were still on French type kutacha bathrooms and that was hilarious.
Reminded me of houses in Arya Mohalla in Pindi. :)
I can only go there in summer and I am hoping to visit some Mango orchards.
In Delhi my Indian friend’s father wants me to stay with his family by the golf course. He said bathrooms are better now! :)
#215 Posted by bongdongs on February 20, 2004 8:34:13 pm
#213
Ethnically: ``Gonga`` is my mother, ``Podda`` too is my mother
``Birth Certificate``ically: Where the furnaces first glowed as they poured metal to build a new India
Cultureally: Where culture and learning blossomed: in the land of PL Deshpande and Bhimsen Joshi
``Ration Card`` & ``Election ID Card``ally: In the city where everyone comes with dreams and ends up dangling from the 6`o clock fast
Physically: Where the ``Longhorn`` reigns in the land of green backed lucre
Ethnically: ``Gonga`` is my mother, ``Podda`` too is my mother
``Birth Certificate``ically: Where the furnaces first glowed as they poured metal to build a new India
Cultureally: Where culture and learning blossomed: in the land of PL Deshpande and Bhimsen Joshi
``Ration Card`` & ``Election ID Card``ally: In the city where everyone comes with dreams and ends up dangling from the 6`o clock fast
Physically: Where the ``Longhorn`` reigns in the land of green backed lucre
#214 Posted by tahmed32 on February 20, 2004 6:42:58 pm
hossp #208 I am in shock and awe of your knowledge of the local lingo in India. And they do seem to have a lot of local specialties out there. Faizabad ki Randian sounds interesting. But wasnt it supposed to be Lucknow kay bankay rather than chahla?
I guess you picked summer to visit India for reasons other than the weather. Or are you planning to go to someplace cool?
I guess you picked summer to visit India for reasons other than the weather. Or are you planning to go to someplace cool?
#213 Posted by Shamsul on February 20, 2004 6:41:16 pm
=== Interact Filtered ===
view this users filtered interacts
view this users filtered interacts
#212 Posted by tahmed32 on February 20, 2004 6:41:16 pm
gujjubania #209 : With that ``tahmed chachu`` you slipped yet again in your Shamsul disguise. Ha! Ha!
You have to be the most unintentionally funny man I have come across on chowk.
You have to be the most unintentionally funny man I have come across on chowk.
#211 Posted by tahmed32 on February 20, 2004 6:41:16 pm
bong dongs #210 and which part of India do you hail from? (if you dont mind my asking).
#210 Posted by bongdongs on February 20, 2004 5:45:05 pm
#206
well, atleast you have retained your Punjabi optimism :-)
well, atleast you have retained your Punjabi optimism :-)
#209 Posted by Shamsul on February 20, 2004 5:45:04 pm
=== Interact Filtered ===
view this users filtered interacts
view this users filtered interacts
#208 Posted by hossp on February 20, 2004 5:45:04 pm
tahmad!
Excellent!
We are planning to visit India this summer. Hope it works out.
Okay so here are some more:
Lucknow Ka Chahla (Like Lahori Talanga)
Muradabad ka Lota
Shahjahanpur kay Pathan Or Shahjahanpuri Pathan in Arjun speak
Faizabad ki Randian
Saharanpur kay maulvi.
Deoband ka madarssa
There are more. I hope Indians on this board can add a few more
to the list.
#207 Posted by Shamsul on February 20, 2004 5:45:04 pm
=== Interact Filtered ===
view this users filtered interacts
view this users filtered interacts
#206 Posted by tahmed32 on February 20, 2004 3:32:42 pm
hossp #201 Very nice indeed. must check out haapar ka paapar. My brother and his wife have been around in India and liked it. Their daughter spent i think 4-5 months year before last after graduating from her university in germany. Being the adventurous one, she even checked out khuumb mela. Didnt have any problems with the locals, and people were actually quite friendly when she told them she was pakistani. My brother and his wife took a train from jullunder to delhi, and it seems like a great journey - they serve excellent food, and deliver it in your carriage.
I just spent 24 hours in delhi, took a couple of internal flights connecting to mumbai and calcutta (or whatever they call it). Have a statement of intent to make a more leasurely visit sometime in the future (past visits were hurried since they were work related and was merely passing through india). Took in as much as i could of india, and would definitely like to visit our ancestral home in jullunder. Lets hope they dont mess up the peace process in the meantime, making travel difficult.
I just spent 24 hours in delhi, took a couple of internal flights connecting to mumbai and calcutta (or whatever they call it). Have a statement of intent to make a more leasurely visit sometime in the future (past visits were hurried since they were work related and was merely passing through india). Took in as much as i could of india, and would definitely like to visit our ancestral home in jullunder. Lets hope they dont mess up the peace process in the meantime, making travel difficult.
#205 Posted by tahmed32 on February 20, 2004 3:32:42 pm
bong dong #202 i am sure that was meant to be a compliment. ;-)
#204 Posted by sadna on February 20, 2004 1:30:10 pm
#199
PS: Actually the Pakistani nuclear threat episode in 1990 also puts Pakistan`s 1999 Kargil expedition in perspective.
In 1990, by US accounts, the US forced VP Singh and India to back off retaliating against jihadis in PoK, citing Pakistani intention to use nukes if Indians did so. In 1998-1999, Pakistan embarked on Kargil expedition with the same expectation, that US would force India to back off.
The blame for US NOT asking India to back off in the Kargil conflict is still put by the PArmy on Nawaz Sharif for not having the requisite nerve to wait and let the conflict escalate - until the point that US told India to back off (and cede ground), citing Pakistani intent to launch a nuclear attack, exactly as happened in 1990. Pakistani strategists thought they could do under cover of overt nukes in 1999 what they did under cover of covert nukes in 1990 and subsequently, ie proxy war in J&K.
But things worked out differently for Pakistan in 1999. India didnot escalate the conflict beyond Kargil, Nawaz`s desperate dash to China apparently didnot yield him much joy and the US ended up not intervening in Pakistan`s favor either. Was the 1998 coming out of nuclear closet of India, the reason for US and China`s `changed` behaviour? Dunno.
PS: Actually the Pakistani nuclear threat episode in 1990 also puts Pakistan`s 1999 Kargil expedition in perspective.
In 1990, by US accounts, the US forced VP Singh and India to back off retaliating against jihadis in PoK, citing Pakistani intention to use nukes if Indians did so. In 1998-1999, Pakistan embarked on Kargil expedition with the same expectation, that US would force India to back off.
The blame for US NOT asking India to back off in the Kargil conflict is still put by the PArmy on Nawaz Sharif for not having the requisite nerve to wait and let the conflict escalate - until the point that US told India to back off (and cede ground), citing Pakistani intent to launch a nuclear attack, exactly as happened in 1990. Pakistani strategists thought they could do under cover of overt nukes in 1999 what they did under cover of covert nukes in 1990 and subsequently, ie proxy war in J&K.
But things worked out differently for Pakistan in 1999. India didnot escalate the conflict beyond Kargil, Nawaz`s desperate dash to China apparently didnot yield him much joy and the US ended up not intervening in Pakistan`s favor either. Was the 1998 coming out of nuclear closet of India, the reason for US and China`s `changed` behaviour? Dunno.
#203 Posted by arjun_m on February 20, 2004 1:30:10 pm
=== Interact Filtered ===
view this users filtered interacts
view this users filtered interacts
Interact Index
Latest Interacts
- masadi: HP writes "My use... There is no ‘honour’
- masadi: HP writes "Asadi sahib... There is no ‘honour’
- _arjun19: There used to be... US Commando Strike in
- masadi: HP writes "You brought... There is no ‘honour’
- DawgUSA: My Dear NFP.. How... What Talibanization?
- rabiawsti: "There is a greater... US Commando Strike in
- rabiawsti: CreateAlpha: my point was... US Commando Strike in
- anil: Hamidm sahib: Taxing where the... US Commando Strike in








reply to this interact
write a new interact
add to favorites
flag objectionable content