To Die For.....the War at Wana

ferozk #142
I donot speak from the US point of view, I have no reason to do so.

I donot broadly disagree with you, except in the case of realpolitik. Real politik for Musharraf is US pressure vs refusal to change policy.

Pakistani government had 56 years since 1947 to integrate the tribal areas into mainstream. Pakistani government had 15 years since Soviets left in 1989 to integrate the tribal areas into mainstream.

Musharraf has had 2 years since 9/11 and fleeing of Bin Laden/Taliban/Al Qaeda from Afghanistan, to integrate the tribal areas into mainstream.

But only when the US has decided to corner Bin Laden in 2004 does Pakistani government/Musharraf declare the need to integrate the tribal areas.

This seems consistent with previous arguments made by Musharraf.
(let me list a few)

Before 9/11
`We have no influence with Taliban. Taliban is bound by tribal honor to shelter their guests Bin Laden and his Arabs`.

After 9/11, before the war
`Afghans have never been defeated by war, better negotiate with Taliban for surrender of Bin Laden`

During the war
`Muslim world will be offended if US doesnot stop bombing during Ramzan`,

After Kabul was won
`Moderate Taliban should be allowed to rule in Kabul or Pashtuns will split Afghanistan`,

When Taliban/Hekmatyar began their border attacks from Pakistan
`Unless Pashtuns are given representation via Taliban, Taliban will continue to launch attacks in Afghanistan`

When US troops complained that fighters they were pursuing fled into Pakistani territory
`Pak-Afghan border terrain is very difficult, we cannot prevent tribals from crossing over and finding sanctuary in Pakistan, these tribals donot recognise these boundaries anyway`

Now that US has said Bin Laden and his Arabs are hiding in FATA
`We need to integrate the tribal areas, build schools, roads first`

Do you see a pattern here?

re: Sadna # 141

I did not think that you were suggesting that Pakistan should follow the American way willy nilly. Pakistan has to work within the American imperatives, and that is a very tangible constraint on Pakistani options. That is the realpolitik of the situation. Still, I can understand the constraints of the American domestic politics, but I am hoping that the politicans in the United States and Pakistan do not end up making this situation even more worse than it is presently.

Sadna, you and I have no disagreements on this issue. Period. We only have a perceptionally different argument. I am seeing things from the Pakistani perspective and you are seeing things from the American perspective.

Ciao

ferozk #140
Thanks for your reply. Let me clarify I wasn`t suggesting that Pakistan should be guided by US or Indian interests, rather than its own. Rather I was suggesting that Pakistan has constrained options because US will be able to impose its own timetable, like happened with Pakistan`s Afghan policy on 9/12.

re: Sadna # 139

First of all thank you for reading that longish reply and I am sure whether to applaud you or commiserate with you! lol :)

First of all, there seems to be a basic divergence in our posts, which is quite natural and expected. Your views/perceptions are colored by your United States-India centric interests and to you, Pakistani concerns are and should be subordinate to the United States` war on terrorism and towards Indian interests under the rubric of United States` interests on similar issues, i.e. terrorism. I, on the other hand, view Pakistani interests in the war on terrorism and how to fight it, based on Pakistani realities, which suggest that Pakistan should keep its interests in harmony with the overall United States` aim in the war of terrorism, but should not follow the United States` time table on how the war on terrorism should be fought.

Secondly; Pakistan is not waiting for India vis-a-vis Taliban and Al-Qaeda and as far as this issue is concerned, the linkage does not exist. I should have clarified what I was wishing to say and that is, the best remedy to the problem is to offer the people of the region some economic incentive to give up their erring ways. Good economic ties with India will help the matters in way of a transit trade between India and Afghanistan, whose natural route is through Pakistan and once the trade improves and people have a stake in the economic prosperity, it will be much easier to weed away the people of FATA from the political allure of Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Also, when a policy decision is made to reverse the past policy, it does not happen over night and takes time since the old system, based on old policy decisions, has to be gradually dismantled and this takes time. You are correct that this process is going to take time, but it will happen and impatience is not going to help the matters, but make the whole situation even more worse.

Pakistan is not holding India responsible for jihad or the madrassa education or its funding by Saudi Arabia.

As to the United States no longer being able to afford work on Pakistani time table, the Pakistanis are not willing to afford the costs of operating on an American time table. Sadna, this problem is one of gradual progression and cannot be limited within a time frame. This a long drawn out process and should be considered as a marathon race; the idea is not to finish the race first and create a world time record, but to finish the race regardless of long it takes.

As to the American public demanding accountability, it is a subjective argument at the best of times. The American public`s sense of accountability revives every four years in November and between that time period, they exist in a political coma. The American public should indeed demand accountability, but should demand it from its elected representatives. The American people are, with the exception of the east coast foreign policy pundits, gulliable and completely ignorant and apathetic towards the execution of foreign policies by their goverments. Where was the American public`s sense of accountability when the Americans were supporting military rule in Pakistan due to their interests in the Cold War of containing the Soviet Union? Where was the American public`s sense of accountability, when the United States was a supporting Zia-ul-Haq in the guise of fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan? Where was the American public`s sense of accountability when the American governments were aiding the very forces which were destroying democracy in Pakistan?

Besides, American public demanding ``accountability`` is a disquise for revenge and revenge was taken on Afghanistan in 2001 as an accountability for Taliban and Al-Qaeda`s role tin the incident of terrorist attacks on Washington and New York. The American public`s sense of accountability does not mean that other nations and other peoples have no rights or interests but should simply agree to United States interests. The reality is that, as you have astutely pointed out, thousands of unregistered madrassas were created by the Saudis for a wabbhi (spelling?) based education and for fermenting a violent brand of Islam. Kashmir or India were not the primary focus of these madrassas` education and they were encouraged by the United States` when it needed human fodder for its political interests against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the Russian invasion and occupation of that nation.

If the American public is not convinced of this fact, I am sorry but I cannot alter past events and the historic record to appease the American public`s sense of ignorance about world events. :)

As to the New York times article, ten miles is a huge distance in Wana and in South Waziristan, because it is a rugged country. The mountains create a natural barrier and most of the communities are isolated due to poor means of communications and road links. Secondly, a major Pakistani army base is not the same thing as a major American base. In South Waziristan, such a base most likely belonged to frontier militia. As to the Saudi royal family visting Bin Ladin, the question is why did the American not kill the Saudi royal family in the process of getting Bin Ladin? This was a missed opportunity and the world would have been a much better place if the Saudis had also been targetted. Is the safety of the Saudi royal family more important to the Americans than prevention of terrorist attacks and what does this incident tell you about the United States? The Americans are no angels in this matter. :)

Indian capitulation on Kashmir as a linkage to Al-Qaeda and Taliban does not exist and you should not make this linkage and the Americans do not need to consult India before erdicating Taliban or Al-Qaeda. The Americans are interested in internationalizing the LoC and not in favoring Indian or Pakistani capitulation over Kashmir. :)

The United States does not need to sustain any argument for the sake of Pakistan. All the United States needs to do is realize that there is a perceptional gap between how the Americans and the Pakistanis see the problem and though the end is the same, the means to the end are going to be different.

I agree with you that it is in the long term interests of Pakistan to solve the problems of the jihadic culture, of MMA-religion in politics, but Pakistani attempts to do such will be guided more by Pakistan`s domestic political limitations and not United States` sense of political urgency.

Ciao

P.S.: Sorry :)

ferozk #138
I read your whole reply, thanks.

``but how simple it is really depends on India and how intelligently India deals with the issues!``

ferozk, if Pakistan is waiting for India, then evidently the Al Qaeda and Taliban cleanup process is going to take Pakistan as long as reversing its Taliban policy took.

Pakistanis have to stop holding India responsible for everything in Pakistan, whether the jihad taught to children in its textbooks, or the millions of dollars of funding its religious parties get from Arab countries.

For one thing, the US can no longer afford to operate on the Pakistani timetable wrt this.

For instance, it will be hard to convince the US public demanding acocuntability that thousands of unregistered madrassas are set by Arab funding for the sake of Kashmir alone.

One interesting tidbit was in yesterday`s New York Times, which pointed out that the scene of the Waziiristan standoff was not in some remote area, it was 10 miles from a major Army base. And these were not militants who were helpful to the Kashmir jihad.

``Military officials offered no explanation for how the fighters had been able to spend weeks, if not months, building the tunnels on the compound. The battle, in fact, occurred in a cluster of villages 10 miles from a major Pakistani army base, not in a remote area. Pakistani officials said the house had been raided in December, but no militants or tunnels were found. ``

And another example, George Tenet testified to the 9/11 commission that pre 9/11, there was one particular occasion they knew Bin Laden`s location, but couldnot fire missiles and kill him because it would have wiped out the major part of an Arab royal family which was visiting him at that time. Now if Bin Laden is hiding in Pakistani territory and if by chance US intelligence locates him now, will they refrain from launching missiles because Pakistan is waiting for India to deliver on Kashmir?

It is politically much easier for US to take military action against Taliban and Al Qaeda on its own than get India to capitulate to Pakistani demands on Kashmir.

While the US may have for years accepted on face value the argument that MMA and the Army were sympathetic to jihad, Taliban and Al Qaida only because of Kashmir, IMO, this is not an argument which any US government can sustain eternally for Pakistan`s sake.

re: Sadna # 137

You are entirely welcome.

The next deadline need not be another terrorist attack in the United States; it can be anywhere in the world. The idea behind this war is to end the scourage of terrorism and solve its underlying problems and for that, there should be no time limits.

Intergrating the tribal areas into Pakistan is problematic, but as you said earlier it is in Pakistan`s interest to seek such an inclusion. Musharraf`s actions are limited by the people around him and with those, with whom he has to work. Musharraf`s alliance with MMA is opportunistic and MMA is the major share holder in the jihadic ideals, but MMA is also interested in filling the vacuum in the Pakistani politics left by the marginalization of PPP and PML-N. This weakness will be exploited and the MMA will be restrained, but in due time.

On the contary, Al-Qaeda has a stake in MMA and not MMA in Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda despite it`s intentions is a political organization and its interests and aims are political and it is mode of operations is simply a distortation of the Clausewitzian dictum - terrorism is the continuation of politics by other means. In this sense, terrorism is a low level insurgency waged to change the political dynamics of international politics, but in the end the aim is a political one. Al-Qaeda is not interested in waging a perpetual war with the world and neither does it wish to, because it will never win such a conflict. However, it wants to maintain a low level insurgency, which increases the political costs, which are related when its political concerns are ignored.

MMA offers Al-Qaeda a political outlet to air its point of view and that has more value to Al-Qaeda than a offers of jihad from MMA, because MMA is made up of political hypocrites, who are more interested in maintaining power than losing it by waging a holy war. MMA is a political party, with political limitations and it is simply using religion to attain its political aims.

If you take an unbiased look at MMA`s political center of gravity, jihad is a fulcrum to attain political power in Pakistani politics. MMA realizes that pursuit of a jihadic intentions will lessen its political power base. Since the MMA is an alliance with the Pakistan army, it also realizes that army is a political party in Pakistani politics and if the army`s political interests are endangered by MMA`s jehadic politics, the army will move away from MMA politically.

Sadna, Pakistani politics are so straitjacketed, that there is no freedom of independent manuever and sadly, the western media fails to realize this, because they think of Musharraf in the classical banana republic type of a military dictator and hence, assume that he is an absolutist ruler. Pakistan army is a oligarchy and the real power of decision lies with the corps commanders and not the COAS. People find it hard to believe, but the army`s corps commanders reach decisions on a consensual basis and the COAS is simply their ``point man``.

There is another interesting point in this discussion. The present body of corps commanders are made of officers who had served the in military rule of Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) as middle tiered officers and had seen the radicalization of the officer corps and the indoctorination of religion into the army. They graduated and got their commissions in the middle 1960s, when the Pakistani army was non-religious and secular minded. This secularist nature of the army was their introduction into officer corps and they have retained their initial impressions of the army. Since first impressions are last impressions, they were disenchanted by Zia`s drift towards theocracy within the ranks and are now, slowly, moving the army back to its centeristic philosophies.

Still, it will take time to weed out the roots, which were planted 20 years ago but the process has already started. Musharraf and his corps commanders represent this group of officers, who wish to take the army to a more centerist politics and who, realize that past policies were an unmigtiated failure. Their biggest handicap is that reversing the last 20 years of bad policies and its side effects takes time and will be resisted by those, who have benefitted from such policies. The biggest concern for this group is improving the economy of Pakistan, because once the economy improves and people actually, in a very tangible sense, experience the prosperity, they will pay less heed to the arguments of confrontation and violence. The reason being, that Pakistani people will have a stake in prosperity and will not wish to lose it; right now they are economically disenfranchized and the idea is to give them economic representation.

In this sense, economic ties with India and a closer trade intergration will India makes more strategic sense for Pakistan than an alliance with the United States or be given a major non-NATO ally status. In this view, it is heartening to see the Indian prime minister softening the edges of Indian economic hegemony in the region. Indian economic powress is a foregone conclusion, and the only requirement is that Indians learn to ``package`` it more attractivily.

The recent peace talks between India and Pakistan is an attempt at packaging this reality and sugar coating it for a relatively easy consumption. SAFTA is a logical step in the right direction; a directional route which was derailed in 1947, when the symbiotic enonomies of the region, the sub-continent, were disjoined by the political act of 1947. Once this happens, and Pakistani economy meshes within the Indian economy, two things will happen which will benefit Pakistan. One is that the problem of Kashmir will be eventually decided, but more more importantly than that, the Pakistani border with India will normalize and stablize into a lasting peace. Secondly, once the eastern border has stabilized, Pakistan will have the room to manuever and deal with the problems associated with the western border and thus, in this sense intergrate FATA into Pakistan. In the end, it is Pakistan that gains on all accounts, but it will take time to reverse the process because if you go from the fourth gear into ``reverse`` immediately, you will destroy the crankshaft of Pakistan (economy) and ruin the gear box (politics) by throwing it off balance. It will happen, but again in due time.

You are right, when you said, ``perhaps getting rid of lawlessness and getting the tribal areas integrated into Pakistani nation is the simpler part``, but how simple it is really depends on India and how intelligently India deals with the issues! :)

Ciao

P.S.: I am truly sorry Sadna, for this long post. Please read what you wish to and ignore the rest. :)

ferozk #134
Thanks for your reply.

``This a long term problem and the war on terrorism is an ongoing battle and it should have no arbitary deadlines like the November 2004 elections. ``

Perhaps the deadline is arbitrary, and not in US hands either. The deadline is the next successful terrorist attack on US soil.

Perhaps getting rid of lawlessness and getting the tribal areas integrated into Pakistani nation is the simpler part. Musharraf is clearly dragging his feet on the more dangerous and difficult part - getting the establishment and its MMA allies to give up their stake in Al Qaeda and jihad.

Sadna at # 130:

Your link also supports what Feroz suggested in his last para at # 134.

Tauheed at # 133:

American example that you gave had skipped our minds. That could be an excellent model to follow for bringing tribal areas within the net of Government`s writ.

From what I have heard from our tribal influencials, they are willing to assimilate into Pakistan, but are at the moment reluctant to contribute to the economy through taxes. I know that they use the pretext of locals not able to pay the taxes. My suggestion: so be it. Let us give them some kind of concessions for a certain time period and start moving in. Let the Government start by building infrastructure that you have mentioned in one of your earlier posts. There is no harm in short term losses for making long term gains.

re: Sadna # 126

Sadna, a greater sense of urgency does not exist in FATA. Life in the region moves at relaxed pace and has not changed over the centuries. Pakistani government`s sense of ``urgency`` resides in its fears of an unsettled western border and the revivial of the Pukhtunistan issue. Hence, it was always willing to leave the FATA alone and thus, not get entangled in the FATA affairs. Pakistani government may be eager to catch Osama Bin Ladin and Zawahiri, but not at the cost of stirring a hornet`s nest.

Granted, the political dynamics of the region might suggest an urgency, but the Pakistani government has to balance that urgency with the prudence of its past experience. Helping the Americans catch Bin Ladin and Zawahiri at expense of inflaming the FATA might be good idea in the immediate sense, but the Pakistanis realize that the Americans will not be living next to FATA. Pakistan has to live with these tribes and we have to think of our future and not American interests in FATA. Hence, whereas the American are looking at short term gains, we have to think of this region after the Americans leave and that fact, given past American ``commitment fatigues``, gives Pakistan no sense of urgency.

This should not suggest a carte blanche for FATA tribes. It should suggest that it would be in Pakistan`s interest to evict Bin Ladin and Zawahiri and to end the lawlessness of the FATA region, but at our own pace of action, which suit our own interests. This a long term problem and the war on terrorism is an ongoing battle and it should have no arbitary deadlines like the November 2004 elections. There is no urgency and neither should there be an urgency to mess up the whole situation, because of political reasons of an incumbent, who lives on 1600 Penn Ave.

Bin Ladin or Zawahiri will never stay in one place regardless of what the jirga does not does not do. Their safety lies in constant movement and not in staying at one place for any lenght of time. In all probability, Bin Ladin and Zawahiri are skipping across the border on both sides, but do not venture inland. They are constantly moving and zigzagging across the Durand line in the Pushtun areas of the Pakistan and Afghanistan border.

Ciao

ahmedzai #128 Good point about ``homes`` in NWFP referring to those medieval type fortresses. However....I just think that destroying buildings of any kind as a form of punishment means there is something wrong in which the government is approaching the whole situation (and obviously the fact that the british colonials and israelis have done it does not make it right). And in NWFP I think the answer is clear - the laissez faire treatment of tribals has resulted in these areas becoming a haven for car thieves and now terrorists.

Incidentally, coming back to that question that you and ferozk also mentioned about the methodology for converting tribal areas from ``federally administered`` areas to regular districts - the US has had over 2 centuries experience in this, since this after all is how many of the ``territories``, starting with the Louisiana purchase in the early 1800`s, and the last major one being the conversion of Hawaii to a state in the 1950`s I think. The most relevant might be the case of Puerto Rico where the issue of providing full statehood has been an on again off again issue for years. My point here is simply that there is nothing written in stone about leaving tribals areas the way they are and not introducing the same form of locally elected officials here as has (quite successfully, it seems so far after a couple of years) been done in other parts of Pakistan.

re: harimau # 131

I was not aware that the Israelis were also following a British practice. Thanks for letting me know.

re: tahmad32 # 124

A constitutional amendment would be the most feasible idea and it should be an amendment, which voids the separate status of the FATA and brings the entire region under the writ of Islamabad.

Your idea of writing to papers is a purely American one, which will not work in Pakistan and as to preparing a bill in the National Assembly, there is no chance of it happening either. Bills are presented in National Assembly if there is some sort of political hay to be made and given the government`s reliance on MMA, it is highly doubtful if such a bill will be ever presented.

Ciao

ahmadzai #129
Sorry I donot know how to change things on the intro page.

``You are unnecessarily convinced that Zawahiri and OBL may be in tribal areas of Pakistan. If you have an evidence to this effect, may I suggest that you inform our Interior Ministry about the same. ``

ahmadzai sahib, it is not my country or my hometown which is at risk here, no point in asking me to take action. It is solely for Pakistanis to do the right things here.

As for my informing the Pakistani Interior Ministry about Bin Laden`s whereabouts, there is no point in telling them what they already suspect, or perhaps Interior Minister is bluffing for a share of that reward?

http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/US/sept11_OBL_030908.html

``But according to Pakistan Interior Minister Makhdoom Faisal Saleh Hayat, they have been handicapped by centuries-old tribal tradition and customs.

``Because of their tribal sensitivities, it could be entirely possible that Osama, or his other aides — his closest aides — they could be in hiding in parts of the tribal belt,`` said Saleh Hayat.

Tribal customs and traditions aside, Saleh Hayat said it is imperative of Pakistan, ``to now focus on the tribal belts and to extend its laws into those areas … but it is a gradual process.`` ..``

The question still is how will a gradual process ever succeed in catching Al Qaeda members on the run.

Ref ferozk #110

[A point of clarification. The idea of demolishing tribal dwellings was a British invention. The British would demolish houses of a tribe, if it acted against the British and after partition, Pakistani army simply carried out the British practice. Before 1947, it was RAF which bombed FATA and after 1947, was PAF which would bomb those areas....

Maybe and this is speculation, may the Israelis also got the idea from the British?]

You hit the bull`s eye. The Israelis always say that they are merely carrying out British laws still on the books in Palestine when they demolish the homes of terrorists.

Mohtarma Sadna Sahiba at # 125 and # 126:

My 2 bits:

1. Our high value targets are all foreign terrorists, including but not limited to Zawahiri and OBL, who we are convinced are involved in acts of violence in Pakistan - bomb blasts, attempts on the life of the President, sectarian killings of Quetta, etc. But when we start talking about high value targets, the West automatically assumes two names - Zawahiri and OBL.

2. You are unnecessarily convinced that Zawahiri and OBL may be in tribal areas of Pakistan. If you have an evidence to this effect, may I suggest that you inform our Interior Ministry about the same. The recent audio release indicates that at least the former may be in Afghanistan.

3. Also, I have given you my argument that there is no chance that the terrorists could have escaped from the scene under prolonged negotiations, because the area has been cordoned off for a long time now. Again, if you have any evidence to the contrary, please furnish it to our Interior Ministry. Not only you will get a handsome financial reward, Pakistanis will also be eternally grateful to you for earning us a good riddance from the two satans.

:-)

Feroz, Romair, Sadna and Tauheed:

I would just like to clarify that the word ` home ` is misleading when we talk about tearing them down. The correct word should be `residential heavily armed fortresses`. All houses in the tribal agencies are fortresses and are heavily defended with all kinds of weaponery ranging from short range guns to medium range artillery and rockets.

Feroz`s post at # 122 nicely outlines the step by step methodolgy that leads to destruction of these fortresses after serving a notice.

Tauheed at 123:

Using MMA could be a long drawn process, but given the sensitivities involved, this seems to be the only option available. I agree with the process that you have highlighted.

The only option that could be seriously wrong is that if military leadership like the station commander of Peshawar is allowed to keep venting out his anger and feeling of revenge and subsequently military attempts to go into the tribal agency under this feeling of revenge.