The Door To The Barracks

re: ikonoclast # 177

Yes, I would tend to agree with your post that the final solution (no pun intended) might indeed lie through an institutional and later, a constitutional approach to remove the military from politics. The problem is not the eventuality of a constitutional solution; the problem is what do in the mean time till the institutions are being crafted in Pakistani politics, which one day ease the military out of power.

My sense of realpolitik suggests that the civilian institutions are not in a position to challenge the military or seek its ouster directly from politics and it would be better to evolve some sort of a Faustian power sharing bargain. The National Security Council might be a bad a idea, but is it a step in the right direction? If Pakistan emulates the Turkish experience, then the means justify the end but we must never allow the end to justify the means in Pakistani politics. As to the Chinese tank driver, he had the good sense to stop and not roll over that lone man - the point being we cannot rely on the good nature of the miltiary to behave within rules. After all, politics is not a game of cricket; more like a game of mud wrestling. :)

Ciao

re: Fuzair # 178

Thanks for an insightful post. As to my cousin, there is much truth in what you say, but I also remember that a bunch of forward looking and progressive officers were shown the door under Zia. In fact, any one with a common sense that argued the usefulness of Zia`s policies was shown the exist. Zia was pre-occupied by religion but he was also shrewd enough to use religion for his political gains and that made him the worst of opportunist.

Musharraf`s liberalism will limited by the tolerances of his corps commanders and to Justice Das, I welcome that nomination. The officer corps of the Pakistani army might be liberal minded but can the same be said about the rank and file?

Ciao

Feroz,

I was simply curious about how much first-hand experience you have with the Pakistani Army since you have written a great deal about it; and I was wondering just how much exposure you had had to the Army.

As far as overt discrimination in the Army goes, I will not say that it doesn`t exist (of course it does) but it is less there than in virtually any other sphere of Pakistani society. As far as your cousin goes, my guess would be that simply being a Parsi would not have been the cause of his being forced to retire as a Squadron Leader (i.e., major). The seniormost Parsi that I am aware of was Brig. Jal Golwala but he did retire a looooong time ago (i.e., well before Zia`s time). Believe it or not, there was also a very confused Hindu officer at the time of Partition who insisted on opting for Pakistan; he was some AMC colonel and I think he wound up going to India. Some Hindu officers from Peshawar/Abbotabad/Rawalpindi/etc did also opt for Pakistan but were told (by whom I`m not sure) that they had to choose India.

Under Zia, the seniormost Christian officer was Maj. Gen. Daniel Austin BUT he was denied command of a division and sent on promotion to DGDP or something of that sort. He did command a brigade though. Another Christian officer, Brig. Jivanandham, didn`t make Maj. Gen. because he didn`t have the necessary qualifications (Staff College and War College) but if he had, there is little doubt that he would have gotten his second star.

The unwritten rule is that no non-Muslim may go past Maj. Gen. or be given a division to command. BUT I am not sure that Musharraf would follow it. In his personal views/beliefs, he is extremely liberal (by ``normal`` Pakistani standards), as is shown by his appointment of Mr. Justice Bhagwan Das to the Supreme Court and sending two female athletes to the Olympics.

Romair:
Zia`s son has a very strong support base in Okara but I am not sure which city Zia`s family called ``home.``

Musa and his son-in-law are Hazaras, not exactly of Iranian origin but I think they are Farsi/Darri speaking. Hazaras (not to be confused with the Hazara district of NWFP) are are Mongol descendants who converted to Islam and stuck around. There were a series of IlKhan rulers of Persia who were Mongols but they didn`t last for too long.

Gen Baloch is an ethnic Baloch, the highest ranking one in the Army. There have been other high ranking officers (Pathans) from Baluchistan but he is the only Baluchi.

re:Ferozk# 175
First I would like to comment on your comments on Romair 173#
I concur absolutely with you that politics will pollute and corrupt the military; indeed it has done that; take it from someone who has the firsthand knowledge about it :) But it should not be surprising, because politics by function is a dirty game. Period.
Now about the various biases in the military: to a certain extent, there is meritocracy till the middle ranks; but its all politics in higher ranks. It is also germane to point here that, if you analyse the vocational set-up of the elite families, the military, feudals and politicians are cross-married. Than there is a certain tacit ``quota`` aystem in vogue at the top ranks. There was a definite bias against the Shia officers during the Zia period, as there is a bias against the bearded ones.
Coming to your views on my post, I am an ardent believer of pragmatism and realpolitik! The only peaceful means of getting the military to the barracks is by strengthening the civil institutions. It might look like an insurmountable task, but not an impossible one. Let me give a few recent examples:depite the fact that the military holds the gun, its periodic forays into politics have delibitated it. The days of military ukase of Ayub and Zia are over. There is an open criticism of the military atrocities for example at the Okara Farms; it was made possible because of the muscle, albeit a feeble one of the civil right groups and the press. Yesterday Turkey got its first civilian Secretary-General of its all-powerful NSC. If you observe the Turkish scene, you will notice that the pre-eminent power of the Turkish military is eroding day by day. It was only 2 years ago that the Turk COAS would issue regular and overt warnings to the civilian government and the parliment. One last example: Remember the photo-shot of an alone, fragile civilian standing in front of a column of Chinese tanks, during the days of Tianmen Square standoff in 1989?
Therefore my friend, there is hope, potent hope that given enough willpower, we can rollback the jaggernaut, though it will take time and immense effort.
Your thoughts on this?
So long!

re:Ferozk# 175
First I would like to comment on your comments on Romair 173#
I concur absolutely with you that politics will pollute and corrupt the military; indeed it has done that; take it from someone who has the firsthand knowledge about it :) But it should not be surprising, because politics by function is a dirty game. Period.
Now about the various biases in the military: to a certain extent, there is meritocracy till the middle ranks; but its all politics in higher ranks. It is also germane to point here that, if you analyse the vocational set-up of the elite families, the military, feudals and politicians are cross-married. Than there is a certain tacit ``quota`` aystem in vogue at the top ranks. There was a definite bias against the Shia officers during the Zia period, as there is a bias against the bearded ones.
Coming to your views on my post, I am an ardent believer of pragmatism and realpolitik! The only peaceful means of getting the military to the barracks is by strengthening the civil institutions. It might look like an insurmountable task, but not an impossible one. Let me give a few recent examples:depite the fact that the military holds the gun, its periodic forays into politics have delibitated it. The days of military ukase of Ayub and Zia are over. There is an open criticism of the military atrocities for example at the Okara Farms; it was made possible because of the muscle, albeit a feeble one of the civil right groups and the press. Yesterday Turkey got its first civilian Secretary-General of its all-powerful NSC. If you observe the Turkish scene, you will notice that the pre-eminent power of the Turkish military is eroding day by day. It was only 2 years ago that the Turk COAS would issue regular and overt warnings to the civilian government and the parliment. One last example: Remember the photo-shot of an alone, fragile civilian standing in front of a column of Chinese tanks, during the days of Tianmen Square standoff in 1989?
Therefore my friend, there is hope, potent hope that given enough willpower, we can rollback the jaggernaut, though it will take time and immense effort.
Your thoughts on this?
So long!

re: Romair # 173

Yes, I agree that the role of politics in military and how it influences the military seems to be a problem.

Regardless, if there is not an ethnic or a regional bias or a religious, there seems to be a reason to suspect a political bias in the military. The fact of the matter is that the military has been polluated by its links to politics and the more it stays in politics, the more it will represent the nation in its political biases. If it wants to avoid becoming like the politicans its yearns to loathe, then it should seriously think about leaving politics. The military`s involvment with politics has destroyed the process of politics in Pakistan and its continued role in politics will destory the military as an institution.

re: ikonoclast # 174

I agree with your assessment of the judges and their role in Pakistani coups, but the rest of your post is pure utopian. In an ideal world what you say may have any value but these sentiments have no value in Pakistan and they will be ignored. The question is how to translate the idealism and make it work within the limitations of Pakistan`s reality? Should we favor pragmatism or idealism in our efforts to solve Pakistan`s problems? Should we work within our limitations or should our reach exceed our grasp? The reality of Pakistan would disagree with your noble words. :)

Ciao

The writer`s point about having a consensual constitutional role is a non-starter, because the constitution accords the military no political rule. Military by definition is supposed to be an apolitical organization; also military being a state organ is requird to be subservient to the civilian political head of the country. And one should also remember that derailing a legitimate government by a coup is a treasonable offence. All military takeovers are in direct and explicit violation of the constitution. But here in Pakistan, the judiciary has always not only concurred in the military takeovers, but provided legitimacy and succour to it. to
Than there is the role of the political players. Take the case of the present ruling political coterie; they are the creatures of the military. Period. Therefore, a military rollback to the barracks will not be in their interest.
Civil society is not required to grant any gurantees of safeguarding the military`s political interests, because its a non sequiter. The only way out is to develop enough spine among the high preists of our judiciary; reasoning with army is futile.

Ferozek #172: There is little to no ethnic discrimination in the military. This can be seen by the diverse ethnicities of the individuals who have made it to Chief. In addition, if you notice, the person who tops as a cadet, ends up topping all the way through, most of the time. This also indicates there is very little discrimination in the military along financial lines.

The military is easily the biggest meritocracy I have seen in Pakistan. I have friends who topped their courses, and are from very poor families. Some from villages. And they are still on top of their courses, and will become Generals. In ciivlian competition, they would never have had the sifarish or burger skills to even get selected for good jobs.

There is religious discrimination in the miltiary. However, it does not exist due to the internals of the military, i.e. officers do not practice amongst each other. It has been introduced through the pressure of political forces. Zafar Chaudhry, an Ahmedi, was the Chief of Air Staff. And a Christian was acting Chief at one point. However, now a non-Shia or Sunni will not make it past Maj General. Not because of anything internal in the military, but due to political policies, practiced in Pakistan.

Zia was not very successful in Islamising the military. At least not as successful as he was in Islamising the rest of the society. I think military traditions are far too strong, and take a long time in changing. None of the Army cheifs after him were maulvis. Many were actually quite Westernised, like Musharraf and Asif Nawaz.

The US gave more free training to Pakistanis, during Zia`s days, than at anytime in the history of the country. Due to the Afghan war. Nearly everyone in the PAF went abroad, at least once. Sometimes on two week courses. I had a chance to attend a course in the USA, in my early twenties.

re: Romair # 171

Thanks for a very informative post. You do ask a pointed question, but if you had the choice yourself, how would you define the national representation in Pakistani military?

I think that you are correct to an extent that the military has no internal biases, but what about political biases based on the ethnicity of its officers or their particular religion?

One of my cousins, who happened to be a Parsi officer in the PAF was cashiered by Zia in the early 1980s and had to retire at the rank of squadron-leader, as further promotions were denied to him. Romair, where I disagree with you is on the issue that the military does have certain institutional biases and some times these biases are often a result of political considerations. If we look at the recent attempts on the life of Musharraf, even Musharraf mentioned the involvement of lowly tiered personnel from PAF and army. If that is a case, then there is a certain religious bias in the military, which seems to justify its existence within a political rubric.

There may be no ethnic biases as you mention, but is there a religious bias? The time period of Zia-ul-Haq and its process of Islamization greatly influenced the military. The majority of the present corps of officers all started out under Zia and soon will assume critical positions in the military. Musharraf is the last of the ``gin and tonic sahibs``. The United States` Pentagon just announced a program to encourage the cross-training of Pakistani officers with the American ones. Why? The answer was provided by Pentagon itself, when it said that the Pakistani military is an important institution in Pakistan. Are the Americans trying to influence Pakistan via its military to favor American policies? Will this end up harming the democratic process in Pakistan? Is MMA right after all, when it complains of the American influence in Pakistan and the military`s capitulation to it?

The point being, that the inner ethnic representation of the military will to a degree reflect the political realities of its core recruiting areas and if Pakistani politics have a bias, can we also assume that the military has them too?

Ciao

HP/Ferozek #various: Before we can talk about the national make-up of the Pakistani military (or any other organization in the country), we have to first define how the ethnic boundaries of Pakistan are drawn. Most individuals use provinces to define ethnic boudaries. However, provincial boundaries do not match ethnic boundaries in Pakistan.

These statistics are dated, by a few decades, but:

The number of Pathans in NWFP is quite a bit less than what people think. And the largest Pathan city in the country, is actually Karachi, not Peshawar. The most populous district in NWFP is Hindko speaking Hazara. And a majority of people in Peshawar and not Pathans.

Similarly, only 50%, or so, of the population of Baluchistan is actually Baluchi. It has large groups of Pathans. Nearly 30% of the population, or so, is Pathan.

Similarly, Sind has a large Baluchi population. In fact, there maybe be twice as many Sindhi speaking ethnic Baluchis in Sind than the total number of ethnic Baluchis in Baluchistan.

Punjab is an evern bigger hodge-podge. Southern Punjab is actually Sindhi. Multan used to be the capital of Sind. And a big portion of Punjab speaks Sariaki. Sariaki is spoken by almost as many people (10%) in Pakistan as Sindhi (12%). Infact, Sariaki is spoken by about as many people as Pushto (8%) and Baluchi (3%), combined.

Furthermore, the bordering areas of Punjab with Baluchistan, consist of Baluchi tribes. Farooq Leghari is the head of a Baluchi tribe, and is the most influential Baluchi politician in Pakistan. However, his contituency is in Punjab.

Kashmir is another dilema. Pakistani Kashmiris do not speak Kashmiri. They (not counting Northern Areas) speak Punjabi. In fact, they have more in common with Punjabis, than Sariaki speakers of southern Punjab (many of whom want a separate province, from Punjab) have in common with Punjabis.

So how exactly would you define the boundaries of Pakistan`s national army. If we go by linguistic boundaries, then only 15% of Pakistan (12% Sindhi speakers, and 3% Baluchi speakers) are not represented in the Army. The other 85% are represented. However, if we furthur go into literacy rates, then the literacy rate of Sindhi speakers (rual Sind) is around 20%??, and that of Baluchistan is around 11%???. This means roughly 15% of the Baluchis and Sindhis are even candidates for the military, to begin with. So 15% of 15% of the total population = 2.5% of the total population is not getting representation.

However, if you look at the boundaries geographically, Baluchistan and Sind constituted well over 50% of the landmass. So more than 50% of Pakistan is not getting representation.

One has to figure out how to define the boundaries, as well as the literate population available for recruitement.

fuzair #163: I thought, after migrating from India, Zia considered Peshawar his hometown. What was his hometown in Pakistan?

The highest ranking individual from Baluchistan in the military, would have to be General Musa Khan. He was of Iranian origin, having settled in Quetta. The second highest would have to be his son-in-law, Changezi (who looks Chinese), who was a sword of honor winner and retired as Air Marshall. The highest ranking Sindhi, in the military, would be Air Marshall Daudpota. He is a true Sindhi. He was made head of PIA, under Benazir. He was also COAS of Zimbabwe Air Force. He was also appointed Governor of Sind by Musharraf. He is quite highly respected in the PAF circles.

All said and done, the Pakistan military is Punjabi and Pathan at the enlisted levels. And like all other institutions, Punjabi, Pathan and Muhajir at the officer level. Much more Muhajir than even most Muhajirs realize. However, with much fewer ethnic biases internally, than other organizations. It, however, does not isolate Baluchis and Sindhis, by design. It just reflects the demographics of Pakistan`s educated class.

re: HP # 166

Yes, the quota system is present in each nation and yes; it is a debate for another time and place. :)

Ciao

re: fuzair # 167

My involvment with the military?

I have no direct involvment with the militaryand as to indirect involvment, I am not sure what you mean by that term. Fareed Zakaria`s ``illiberal democracy`` argument is not one I support and though it makes sense, to me that amounts to an appeasement of the military, which is why I tend to reject it.

I have one thing to say to the generals of Pakistan. If you want democracy and claim democracy for Pakistan, then start by going back to the barracks as a first step. If you want to rule Pakistan as a fiefdom, then stop wasting your breath by talking lies about democracy and rule with iron fist, but you cannot have it both ways!

Ciao

Feroz,

About Sindh Regiment- It was just to illustrate that how a civilian supervision of the army could have made the army more sensitive to smaller provinces need for representation in National institutions.
All these issues have cropped up because the army would not let itself be supervised by the civilians. I think it is a case of looking down on people rather than fighting capabilities. Fighting capabilities is another can of worms and may be we will discuss that some other time.
The quota is another contentious issue. But pretty much all countries that have to deal with the under class or under developed classes in their society, find quotas are they way to alleviate some of the problems. This has nothing to with how advanced and industrialized a country is. India in our neighborhood has an active quota program. In the US affirmative action is nothing more than a quota program.

But all that some other time.
Thanks.

Feroz,

Just curious, what is your direct or indirect involvement with the Pakistani military? And, on a not unrelated note, have you read Fareed Zakaria`s ``illiberal democracy`` argument?

re: Romair and HP

You have made some good observations about the nature and the role of the military in Pakistan. The basic fact is that the military is a representative of Pakistani society, and what ever the debate, the nation will more likely represent the military than the military will accurately represent the nation. A truly utopian outcome is not possible and whether it is certain or not is open to question. In the areas of politics and ruling Pakistan, the military is no better than the civilians it decries and to accept it to be otherwise might be a difficult proposition.

HP, if you say that the military has certain national aspirations to look up, you are right and the military does need to show case the national diversity. However, when talking about the army`s regiments, the question should be more focused on its fighting capabilities than on its quota of ehtnic representations. In Pakistan, this question is a moot one, because it is not the fighting ability of the army but it is political skills which matter more in Pakistan. Hence, should we measure the military as a military organization or a political organization? In the end, the national aspirations of the military will be determined by how we judge the military and if our aspirations are realistic in their judgement of it as an organization, but which organization or institution it is - political or a military one?

On the other hand, the system of ethnic quota system in the national politics or the national bureaucracy has not done a whit to improve the situation, so why should we expect that it will have a better result in the military? Incidently, why is Sindh and the Sindhis so pre-occupied with the idea of quotas? Will a Sindhi COAS will be less prone to instituting a martial law in Pakistan? If naming a regiment or the entire army as Sindhi help the matter, then by means please implement it. However the question is; will it help the matter? I do not think that it will help the matter.

Faruk (#164), the conclusion is open to debate and whether the army is the best medicine or not seems to pale in light of the fact that, good or bad, it seems to be the only medicine and that is simply unacceptable. Still the question is not to settle an argument on the goodness or the bad nature of the army, because in a nation wishing for democracy, the role of the military in politics cannot be appeased under any conditions. A more elusive question is how to remove the influence of the military from politics. There seems to be a consensus that the military is a part and parcel of politics in Pakistan, but why is there a consensus on this issue? The acceptance of the military as a consensual reality of Pakistani politics is a more vexing issue and then again, the question revolves around to who is really to be blamed for this state of affairs; the military which harms politics or the politicans who harm the political evolution by tolerating the military in politics?

In the final analysis, the military is not the best medicine for Pakistan. It should leave politics but the manner in which it will leave politics causes more fright than comfort for the process of demcoracy in Pakistan. If we keep the military in the folds of politics, then the harm will insidiously seep into the political institutionalism in Pakistan and continue to undermine the political process.

Ciao

So what’s the conclusion? Is the army the best medicine for Pakistan?

Regards,

Faruk

Romair,

Zia was indeed from Jullundur--a very Punjabi city in the Indian Punjab. I believe he lived in Peshawar for some years but that certainly doesn`t make him ``from`` the Frontier.

Ayub Khan was indeed a non-Pathan; Hindko speaking, but they ``became`` Pathans and stopped speaking Hindko. However, he was a Tarin Pathan so maybe they were Pashto speaking after all. OR maybe they were Hazaras who called themselves Tarins? Who knows.

Yahya`s family was from Peshawar but they weren`t Pathans. They are Qizilbashi, Farsi speakers from Iran originally.

Lt. Gen. (r) Qadir Baloch is an ethnic Balochi but you are correct, there aren`t that many of them. There were some Sindhi officers in the first few PMA batches but they left the Army pretty early on. One did win the Sword of Honor, though.

Regards.

Fuzair #160: My reference was to Pathans, as well as people from NWFP (non-Pathans). For example, Ayub Khan was from Abottabad. That would make him a non-Pathan, I assume. And, Yahya Khan was born in Chakwal, but was from NWFP. Similarly, I thought, Zia was from Jullundher(?) and considered Peshawar his home (which is why he gave Dilip Kumar a Nishan-e-Pakistan or something similar).

My knowledge of the make-up of individual Regiments, is not too good. I only have info on the overall makeup of the Army. I cannot recall running into a single Baluchi or Sindhi officer in my life. I guess there must have been some, but I didn`t know who they were. Nearly every officer I ran into was Punjabi, Pathan or Muhajir (or Kashmiri)......

Interestingly, the PAF has no concept of Regiments, or ethnic units. You never know who you may run into at what point in which city, in which squadron.....

HP #159: Interesting comments. I agree with most of them. Other than the fact that I have never agreed with the division of Pakistan`s good and bad, along, ``liberal`` and, ``religious`` lines. This is the argument used to define good and bad in Pakistan, and it polarizes the country. The true divisions are along rich and poor lines. Feudal and non-feudal lines. Urban and rural lines. etc.

Being to the left or right of Jinnah`s views is not a valid criteria for national progress either. Valid criterias are economic growth rates, true democracy, law and order, poverty reduction, etc.

Now to your main points:

``1. The army failed to turn itself into a national army due to its complacency.
2. It had interfered in the civilian structure of the country and
3. It has destroyed and then attempted to modify the national aspirations of the people of Pakistan when it never had any mandate to do that.``

1. Kind of. It is a national institutional moreso than any other I can think of in Pakistan. With no ethnic or religious conflicts internally. However, like all institutions, it has little Baluchi and Sindhi presence.

2. Yes

3. Yes. But no more so than any other leadership we have had (other than Jinnah)

Romair:

Zia was not a Pathan or from NWFP, he was a Punjabi.

HP:
Sind Regiment was not established by ZAB but by Zia. You are correct that, in the early years, there were almost no sindhi speakers to be found in the Sind Regiment (its class composition is supposed to be 50% S/Bs (Sindhi/Baluchis) and 50% PMs (Punjabi Musulmans). However, now there is a very large (if not quite 50%) S/B representation in the Sind Regiment. BTW, there are also quite a few Sindhis in other parts of the Army as well. I was in Lahore recently and went out to the Garrison Golf Club a few times. I was quite surprised to see that many of the Baluch Regiment jawans (26 Baluch? Not sure which one it was) doing RP duty and fatigues on the links were actually Sindhis. This is one of the few Baluch Battalions that has nonPunjabis in it.

Also, the NLI is 100% locally recruited. There are no Punjabis, other than officers, in it. I`m not sure of the official class composition of the NLI but there are a lot of Ismailis, as well as Shias (Burushko speaking) and mainly Sunnis (Shina speaking) in it.

Does the army represent the National aspirations of the people of Pakistan?

Again the question is what are the National aspirations of the people of Pakistan?
A tricky question; as it is really hard to put Pakistan National aspirations in simple words.
I will divide the answer in three phases.

1st Phase 1947 to 70:
We may have to really start from 1947, when the Muslim League presented a sort of moderate social agenda with Islamic mustard on top. Generally, people accepted it and for sometime even the former East Pakistan had no problems in getting along with moderate national goals and aspirations. The problem with the east Pakistan started when the struggle for sharing power, led to myopic infighting where west Pakistan tried to hang on to the power and East Pakistan tried to snatch it. E. Pak had numerical majority and in any democratic or even in any civilian power sharing formula, would have wiped out the bureaucrats in Karachi. The babus in Karachi sought army’s help after the first fair election fiasco in E. Pak. When jugtu front won the majority and threatened to take over power in the future national elections. Since 1954 the army had a seat in the national cabinet and mainly the only support babus had in Pakistan. Eventually, the army took over to avoid proposed elections in 1959. Throughout this period nobody ever raised a question about the national agenda of Pakistan. Surprisingly, even the East Pakistan never actually challenged the goals that were set for Pakistan by Jinnah in 1947. The army was also comfortable with that and the Martial Law in 1958 did not attempt to redefine Pakistan’s National aspirations of a moderate to liberal enchilada embellish by religion.
Ayub Khan, co-opted Pakistani feudal or big to mid size land owners as his ruling partner as the army had to have some base in the civil society to effective manage the day to day mundane issues. It also needed to create a façade that so-called most influential economic groups in Pakistan support the army rule.
The nightmare of 1968-70: Ayub Khan went down along with the feudal who were supposed to be all powerful. Gen. Yahya and his group tried to work with the Islamic parties but nobody in the public knew anything about them and the 1970 elections were won by three parties that were actually to the left of Jinnah’s moderate Pakistani goals. To put it in a better perspective we can say that Awami League, PPP and the National Awami Party(wali Khan) in NWFP and Balochistan were from left to left of the center whereas the army itself was more to the right of the center than the center.
All during the Ayub Martial Law and the military govt in the 60s, the people of Pakistan were headed in different direction than the ruling elite could handle.
2nd phase 1972-1979:
While there was a major crisis in Pakistan in 1971, the army was actually cementing its relations with the extreme right in Pakistan. The rightist supported the army action, provided volunteers to help the army. The army in turn provided them arms and literary militarized the right wing in Pakistan. The 1973 constitution in Pakistan was actually more to the left than any other legal bases in Pakistan. That signaled that the PPP and the NAP were looking to lead Pakistan to more liberal goals. That constitution represented the first significant document to show the emerging aspirations of the people for a far liberal Pakistan than the Jinnah envisioned and it was a natural progression.
3rd Phase 1979-Present:
In 1977 the army turned to support from Islamic Parties when it felt that it needed to remove Bhutto from the power. After that the govt. of Zia declared some vague Islamic goals for Pakistan. The actual turned around came when the soviet entered Afghanistan. The Islamic parties provided the ideological base to the army and the army’s US and Saudi supporters to wage a war against the soviets and in turn the army turned the intellectual leadership to the mullah and attempted to redefine the aspirations and goals of Pakistan people in much more orthodox way than it is acceptable to Pakistani people, Who had shown in the first thirty years of Pakistan that they favor moderation and lean more toward liberalism than far right extremism etc.

So we have three phases in which Pakistani national aspirations were defined and redefined. Civilian took Pakistan to a more liberal country but the army to safeguard its own interest dropped it in the lap of the crackpot religious ideologues, who have so far provided only chaos to the country and the army is now trying to extricate itself from the mess of the last 25 years that it helped to create.
IMO, on the National aspirations test the army has failed the people of Pakistan that are moderate and liberal but the army tried to push them to the medieval ideology and helped in destroying the cohesion of population on its national aspirations.
Now there are numerous other plots and subplots and writing about them would require almost writing a book and I have tried to be generic, as I know both of you are as or more familiar with the Pakistani history as I am.
I have raised three issues.
1. The army failed to turn itself into a national army due to its complacency.
2. It had interfered in the civilian structure of the country and
3. It has destroyed and then attempted to modify the national aspirations of the people of Pakistan when it never had any mandate to do that.

I really owe another post as I think there are some redeeming features in the whole story and I have not captured them fully. I will present them, but in the meantime you guys can put forward your thoughts and we can discuss them.

Romair- I will have comments on your post later. I am exhausted right now.

HP #156: I think your reply is correct, if you look at things in purely a theoretical manner. In that sense, the military (Army included) is not national. At least, not fully national.

However, one has to do a comparison, within the boundaries of all institutions of Pakistan. And not in a utopian boundary. Is the Army national, in comparison to the other instituitons? I would say very much so. In fact moreso. Which other institutions in Pakistan are fully national? Even politics is not national. It is dominated by specific ethnic groups, and those too, with distinct financial boundaries.

The ``national``-ness of any institution in Pakistan should be looked at, along two lines: a) ethnic b) financial levels. Let us look at where the military fits in, with regard to this:

a) Ethnic:

Based on whatever I can remember, the Army enlisted class, comes almost completely from Punjab and NWFP (and maybe Kashmir). However, even within these areas, it comes from five districts: Pindi, Jehlum, Chakwal?, Kohat, Mardan?. Hence it is not even a fully Punjab Army. It is a Nothern Punjab and South Eastern NWFP Army.

However, the enlisted class in the military has very little influence in its affairs. It is the officer class that decides everything. The officer class comes from Punjab, NWFP Kashmir, and Urban Sind. Mostly from Punjab and NWFP.

Moreso, in the military, it is actually the person in the COAS who decides everything. Militaries, by design, are dictatorships. The COAS of the Pakistan Army have mostly nbeen non-Punjabis. Ayub, Yahya, Kakar, Zia trace their roots back to some city in NWFP. Musa was Baluchi. Aslam Beg and Musharraf are Muhajirs. In fact, a Punjabi COAS has never implemented Martial Law. And it is the COAS, who decides on these issues, as a dictator. So, non-Punjabi ethnicities can and have regularly risen to the top, and controlled the whole Army, without any problems.

The PAF officer class comes from the pilots ranks, exclusively. And most, or dispropotiionately high number of them are (were?) Pathans. Jamal Khan, Hakimullah, Farooq Feroze Khan(?), Asghar Khan being either Pathans or from NWFP.

The Navy is completely in Karachi, and has a lot of Muhajir influence.

Statistically, I read that 75% of the Army is Punjabi. However 63% of the population of Pakistan is Punjabi. So the numbers are not too far from each other, ratio-wise. If you look at the recruitement into the Army, you will notice it comes from those areas of Punjab which do not have a strong industrial and agricultural base. Jehlum, Chakwal, Pindi are generally barren areas. The agriculture of Pakistan being in Southern Punjab and Northern Sind. Hence, traditionally only those Punjabis are joining the Army, in the enlisted class, who cannot make a living, any other way.

A good example of this is from Karachi. While you will see a high number of Muhajir officers in the miltary. You will not see too many Muhajir enlisted persons. The reason is that anyone in urban Sind can make a much better living, opening up a small corner pan store, than becoming a soldier.

Hence, the military, generally consists of soldiers from areas, where there is education, but no other options for livelihood are available to the people, financially.

From the above discussion, it should be clear that there are two areas that are not represented in the military, at any level: rural Sind and all of Baluchistan. However, name any other institution where anyone from these areas is employed, in large numbers. In fact, forget about the national level, name any place in these provinces themselves, where a common Sindhi or common Baluch has any influence.

These two areas are exclusively controlled by Sindhi feudals and Baluchi tribals. First and foremost, they are to be blamed for the condition of the people there. It is not in there interest for the people there to prosper. Hence the literacy rate of rural Sind is less than 20% and that of Baluchistan is around 10%.

The military tries its best to recruit from all areas of Pakistan, for obvious reasons. I know this from first hand information. There are no height/weight ratios (for officers, at least). One only has to pass physical tests, like running, eyesight etc. Yet the education base of rural Sind and Balushistan is so low, that they cannot compete anywhere in Pakistan.

So, in that sense, Pakistan`s military is not a national military, due to the exclusion of rural Sind and Baluchistan. But it is definitely not by design. And it is no different, in this regard, than any other instituiton in Pakistan. It does, however, include all other ethnic groups - Pathans, Punjabis, Saraikis, Muhajirs, and Kashmiris - in large numbers. All of whom have gone to the top of the military.

The solution to spreading it to non-represented areas, is first and foremost removing the influence of feudals from those areas. Secondly, perhaps, for a brief time, starting an affirmative action program from these areas, where technical skills are not a major requirement. For technical areas, like fighter flying, ship captains etc. it obviously has to be merit.

More on the financial side, later.................

P.S. starting a regiment named after a province is not going to do much. The Army regiments include officers and soldiers from all ethnicities. Not, solely, from the ethnicity the regiment is named after. Bhutto would have been more successful in creating a more national military, had he removed feudalism from Sind, than staring a regiment named after Sind............

re: HP # 156

I will respond after your second post. :)

Ciao

Feroz, Romair,
This may be a long post and if I am unable to finish it tonight I will take one more post. I may still leave same gaps and I know we can discuss them.


I will attempt to define the national army in two broad categories.
1. Does the army represent the National character of a country and
2. Does it represent the national aspirations of the people of a country?

Let’s take the National Character first.
What is Pakistan’s national character?

Pakistan has four legal provinces and almost a fifth province is Azad ilaqa. It has four ethnic communities or may be five, if we take urban Sindh as a separate entity. There are different languages and uneven economic development in different regions.
On the development side Pakistan has emerged as one economic entity though mostly it is the economic cooperation between Karachi and Punjab. The development of national infrastructure such as National highways, National power and Gas grid, have also shown that left out underdeveloped economic regions in smaller provinces can be pulled into the economic structure if the resource distribution issue is settled thru the constitution in Pakistan.
IMO, the bone of contention between the provinces is the distribution of resources and that is where the Pakistan army plays a role and that role tend to tilt towards one province. With that tilt, army maintains a structure of recruitment and grooming of officer cadre from one province. Smaller provinces don’t have adequate representation in the army; and they assume that the army is only guarding the interests of one province. The army also has failed to impress the smaller provinces in recruitment and officer development from the smaller provinces.
Based on the National characteristics of Pakistan alone, we can make a determination that the army has failed the litmus test and it is not a national army as it does not represent the national characteristics of Pakistan. But that would be a hasty call and would amount to ignoring the factors that make the army tilt towards one province.
How do armies recruit? Just a small comparison with the Indian army here would be in order.
Indian army like the Pakistan army was developed by the British. With Brits experience of always having the volunteer army instead of the draft, they earmarked some areas in India for army recruitment. After Independence, the Indian army on prompting from the civilian leaders changed its recruitment system and it now accepts all recruits w/o any height or chest measurement requirement. Still, it draws heavily from one ethnic area but that is gradually changing.

Pakistan Army was never under any civilian pressure to change its structure and since the Generals were comfortable with that, they continued with the British system. They did make some half hearted attempts like the Sindh regiment but they almost never had recruiters who could speak Sindhi too. Same is the case in Balochistan. Some individual officers do come from other provinces but they have to look after the overall interest of the army and not of their area alone.
There is another factor that people tend to ignore. The economic and social conditions of other provinces make it difficult for the army to recruit in the smaller province. In Sindh, the employment is still there though the incomes are going down. Yet the job in the army is not attractive enough. Balochistan is a self contained society where the writ of the tribal leaders is still much more important than a recruiter’s word or an opportunity to make some money thru the army. Other two areas in the north, NWFP and Azad Ilaqa accept army recruitment based on their economic needs.
Now can we fault the army for sticking to the areas for recruitment where it is easier to recruit instead of making an extra effort in areas where people are still reluctant?

IMO, had the army been under the civilian control, it would have made the extra effort. Recall that ZAB forced the army to establish the Sindh Regiment.

Next part:
Does the army represent the National aspirations of the people of Pakistan?

Ferozek #152: ``Another of discussion is that Pakistani society still has a very dated view of the army and most Pakistanis do not even know the inner workings of the army.``

This is true. I have met hardly anyone, outside the military, who actually knows the situation inside. Most people`s views of the Army are based on their views of Ayub Khan and Zia. Though both were from very middle class backgrounds, the former grew to become a aristratic-like individual with family members married into the high feudal ranks. The later joined in with the maulvis.

So people consider the whole Army to be either rich aristocrats, or maulvis. This is furthust from the truth of the real Army.

``You mentioned that intellectual elites hate the army and HP mentioned a need to turn the elities away from the army. HP also mentioned that elites need the army to secure its interests.``

There is a different between intellectual elites and elites. The elites are the feudal politicians, rich businessmen etc., like BB and NS. They have needed and used the Army to obtain their interests. The intellectual elites are the English-speaking non-feudal, non-businessman, educated upper-middle class crowd, i.e. parents of everyone on Chowk. The newspaper editors, poets, expats etc. They have always looked down upon the Army.

re: HP # 153

If I am missing the point, then pray tell me what is the point? :)

It seems that your idea of a national army is different from mine. My idea about the characteristics of the Pakistani army and its national identifying traits, are similar to Romair`s explanation. Pakistani army does have a national representation through the recruitment from the different provinces and granted that though Punjab dominates this process, it does not lessen the overall nationalistic make up of the army. The question of recruitment ratios from the provinces can be debated. Still, the army does represent Pakistan and its tilt towards Punjab is simply due to the fact that the province has been a traditional source of cannon fodder for Pakistani army like it was for the British Indian Army of the Raj fame.

The only way this error or oversight can be corrected is through a different means of recruitment, but what that new system will be, I have not the slightest idea. HP, if your contention was to show the disparity in the provincial recruitment, then how can you avoid that issue? If the army will not recruit from its traditional areas, where it is supposed to recruit from? On the other hand, and please correct me if this is the wrong impression, but are you suggesting a quota system for the army`s recruitment policies? My friend, the quota system in Pakistan is an evil of untold porportions and is nothing more than a weak reason to deny the right of merit. Such a system in the Pakistani bureaucracy, though meant to address the ``concerns of smaller provinces`` was always used for political reasons and it was an employment scam by which politicans would keep their election promises of finding jobs for their supporters. This system was also abused by the military, when it filled the civilian bureaucracy jobs with retired military personel.

I hope this is not what you are suggesting that the army should use a quota system for its recruitment, so it can have a national representation.

If you are suggesting that national army reprents the social, political and economic demographics of Pakistan, then there is some truth to your statement, because it does to a significant extent. The army in Pakistan is in a process of changing and it has changed greatly since 1947. From 1947 to 1972 its officer corps mostly came from feudal familes and after 1972, there was infusion of middle class people, which made it more representative of the nation, but not enough. Then the period of Zia-ul-Haq saw an overt Islamization of the army in its junior ranks, but that process was aborted by the death of Zia and his cohorts in 1988. Under Musharraf the army is moving back to the its ``pukkah sahib`` traditions.

The army has always reflected the national mood and its internal changes have been commeasurate with the national changes. The army`s character is based on Pakistani character and it cannot escape this link. The fact to be remembered is that despite the fringe element in the army, the army as an institution has been able to maintain its moderation and in that sense, it does represent Pakistan nationally, because Pakistan and Pakistanis are generally moderate in their outlooks. I am not denying the extermists in our middle and I am not denying that they pose a very serious and credible threat, but I am stressing the fact that they represent minority. The extermists are, themselves, a small minority and within this small group, there is another minority and these are the fundlementalists.

I am looking forward to your post! :)

Ciao

Romair and Feroz,

Sorry just did not get enough time to post a reply to Romair. I will do that as soon as I can. However, you both are missing the point about the National Army and that has nothing to do with big 26 or big one. Nor it has anything to do with who is running the army. A national army is the one that has a National character in the context of the whole country. It doesn’t matter where the top brass is from. Hopefully, I will post something on this tomorrow.
Thanks.

re: Romair # 151

Thanks for your reply and there is much weight in your conclusions and I do tend to agree with you that the army is middle class and as to the class dislikes of the army, personal bias and perception of the classes plays an important role. Another of discussion is that Pakistani society still has a very dated view of the army and most Pakistanis do not even know the inner workings of the army. In the past, I have been hauled over the coals but I still maintain what I said then and that is, in its inner workings the army is not only the most organized institution, but it is also the most consensus oriented organization in Pakistan.

The Group of Twenty-Six, as you called them, all work on the principle of a common agreement. The fact that the army does not break ranks, gives it added influence and the reason is that its leadership is loyal to the idea of institutional cohesion unlike its civilian counterparts.

On another point, there seems to be a contradiction in HP`s and your statement. You mentioned that intellectual elites hate the army and HP mentioned a need to turn the elities away from the army. HP also mentioned that elites need the army to secure its interests. If both of you are correct, it would suggest that there is a love-hate relationship between the elites and the army in Pakistan. Is that a reasonable conclusion?

Ciao

Ferozek/HP #150/148: ``Romair, if you are reading this, would you care to comment on HP`s question (in post #148) about the Pakistani army and its societal characterizations?``

``Lastly, if you get a chance to think and write about it: where do we place the Pak Army in over all Pakistani society? Is it a National army or the party of usurpers? I think once it is determined that it is not a national army, all struggles by the smaller provinces become legal even when it leads to separation from Pakistan.``

The Pakistan Army, in the overall society, is actually still quite respected. The only groups that hate it are the elite intellectuals and the nationalists from the smaller provinces. The former dislike it because of its alliances with the maulvis during the Zia regime. The later hate it because of its Punjabi dominance.

It is now a very middle class to lower-middle class organization of urbanites. Hence the taxi-driver, shopkeeper, janitor, etc. are ok with it, because they all have a son or nephew in it. I say this based on surveys, and through my personal experiences.

One can divide the military into three parts, and those three parts into a furthur two each. The two divisions are along the officers and enlisted categories. And the three divisions are along the Army, PAF and Navy lines. Each of the six have different characteristics and ethnic make-up.

The enlisted in the Army are from rural areas, with a minimum amount of education. They fall under the poor somewhat-educated category, i.e the oppressed category of Pakistan. That would probably be around 90%(?) of the workforce of the Army. Maybe more. They come from five districts in Pakistan. Three in Northern Punjab (Jehlum, Pindi, Attock) and two in adjacent NWFP (Mardan, Kohat).

The officer class comes from urban NWFP, urban Punjab and urban Karachi. So Baluchistan and rural Sind are unrepresented, as ethnic groups. This class to the ranks of Lt. Col., is very middle class, and living hand to mouth, by standards of educated professionals.

So the above two groups can barely feed themselves, much less usurp, anything.

As a whole, I found the military, to be the only place in Pakistan which was basically free of ethnic and religious divisions. Or even financial divisions. Christians, Ahmedis etc. feel far more secure in the military than in Pakistan`s civil society. And their is no ethnic violence of any sort. Rich and poor officers live in the same neighborhoods. A Muhajir General has been commanding the Army, now, for a while, and has been firing Punjabis left and right, without problem. And I have seen Christian and Ahmedis retired COs get treated like VIPs when they return to their units for reunions.

The powerful group in the Army starts from Brigadier upwards. Actually really from Maj. General upwards. There are 100 Maj. Gens. and 25 Lt. Gens. Commanded by 1 General. This group of the top 26 actually decide the direciton of the Army. Everyone else follows, in a very disciplined manner. This group also runs Pakistan, from the background. It is so powerful because it is the only united group in Pakistan, which never breaks it ranks. The judiciary, politicians, beaurecrats, break ranks, all the time.

This group can at any one time, have representations from any ethnicity (except Baluchi and rural Sindhi, since they are not in the Army to begin with). However, its loyaltites are always towards the Army, not towards its ethnicity. And it ensures that the Army stays involved in power, because it allows this group to gain a lot of benefits (jobs, plots, businesses etc.).

I hope this answers your questions, about the make-up of the Army.

The top command runs the whole Army (like all Armies of the world). And that changes regularly, as Generals retire. So all these points about opening fronts against the Army are baseless and useless, if you ask me. The Army is not one monolithic institution. It would be the equivalent of Baluchis and Sindhis (not in the Army) opening up a front against Pathans, Punjabis and Muhajirs (all in the Army). Is a Musharraf-led Army with 20 Punjabi Lt. Gens. a Muhajir Army or a Punjabi Army? Is a Kakar led Army with 15 Muhajir Lt. Gens. a Pathan Army or a Muhajir Army or a Punjabi Army?

Muhajir civilians fighting an Army run by a Muhajir General (whose whole family is Muhajir civilan) serves no one`s ethnic or separatist purpose. Just like Pathan tribals fighting Pathan soldiers under the command of a Pathan corps commander (who may himself be from tribal areas), serves no one purpose, either. The Pathan corps comander may well be the only person in his family in the Army, with the rest of his extended family, being Pathan civilians......His brother maybe an MNA supporting the tribals.....

So the Army is made up of individuals who were civilians, at one point, and whose families are all civilians. How can someone divide them along us vs. them lines.......

If the top positions of the military were restricted to Punjabis only, such arguments would make sense. However, they rotate on the basis of merit. To the point that individuals of non-Punjabi ethnicity have commanded the Army far more than their ratios in the Army. And have never complained of any ethnic bias.

The issues with the Army are at a national level, and not at an ethnic level.

The separatist problem is the large size of Punjab, as a province. If people want to open up fronts, that is who they should be targeting, and asking for its breakup into three parts. The moment Punjab is broken into three or so pieces, all issues of nationalistic provincial groups will be resolved. Getting the Army out of politics is a different story. But that is a national issue, and will require the civilian population having more faith in political leaders, than in the Army leaders. That will only happen, when the BB, NS, Zardari lot of politicians are history and replaced by more credible ones.

Until that time, the Army will be able to take over the country, whenever it wants, without any problem. This is true in all countries.................

re: Romair

Romair, if you are reading this, would you care to comment on HP`s question (in post #148) about the Pakistani army and its societal characterizations?

Ciao

re: HP # 148

The joke was funny! :)

To be honest with you, I have not thought too much upon the question of the Pakistani army within the context of Pakistani society. I have also seen it as another political party in Pakistan, but more organized and more effective than other main stream national political parties. In fact, I think that Romair would be better placed to answer that question. It is hard to say, whether the Pakistani army is a national army or an army of a particular province. The truth is questionable, but the perception of the situation would strongly hint towards a pro-Punjab bias in the army.

We can debate the value or manner of the reforms in the judicary, but the fact remains that there is a drastic need for reforms in the judicary. I do not favor the present system of three year tenure for the judges and I am of the opinion that judgeship has to be for life and if that option is not possible, then the judges in Pakistan must stand for elections and we can limit their terms of office. Again, this suggestion brings us to the original sin that since elections are tainted in Pakistan, how can we assure of a fair elections to elect the judges. On the other hand, if we do opt for life long tenure for the judges, there will be a few bad apples but the process, if allowed to run its course, will vet them.

HP, there is no immediate or instant solution to Pakistan`s problems. That is why, I favor a creation of a process, which over a period of time corrects the problems, but also offers a sense of procedures by which to deal with the problems. I have no problems with nationalism of the provinces, but nationalism based on the ideas of a provincialism is fraught with peril and it will always cause havoc in the federation. Granted that Islamabad has not always helped the situation, but the provinces themselves are not beyond the pale of sin in fermenting political problems using the provincial nationalism as guise for political opportunties.

Ciao

ferozk

Just a Couple of things.

Judiciary is part of the bureaucracy and it is as corrupt as the bureaucracy itself. At higher level, making a corrupt bureaucrat judge for life would mean another lucrative position to grab for life. Even if the judges are for life, there are other ways to get to them.
This works in countries where people get respect for doing their job and not in a third world country. This won’t work in India either.
The constitutionality of the struggle for civilian rule and then democracy is not an issue. As long as the struggle remains within the confine of overall Pakistan society, it is constitutional and within the constitution.
Lastly, if you get a chance to think and write about it: where do we place the Pak Army in over all Pakistani society? Is it a National army or the party of usurpers? I think once it is determined that it is not a national army, all struggles by the smaller provinces become legal even when it leads to separation from Pakistan.

I hope this joke would perk you up a little.

A plane was taking off from Kennedy International Airport in New York. After it reached a comfortable cruising altitude, the captain announced over the intercom,``Ladies and gentlemen, this is your captain speaking. Welcome to Flight Number 293, nonstop from New York to Los Angeles. The weather ahead is good and, therefore, we should have a smooth and uneventful flight. Now sit back and relax... OH, MY GOD!``
Silence followed, and after a few minutes, the captain came back on the intercom and said, ``Ladies and Gentlemen, I am so sorry if I scared you earlier. While I was talking to you, the flight attendant accidentally spilled a cup of hot coffee in my lap. You should see the front of my pants!``

A passenger in Coach yelled, ``That`s nothing. You should see the back of mine!``

re: HP # 145

There is no simple or a formulaic answer to this question. The nature of the question itself only allows for speculation, but such a speculation can be based on the historic example of Pakistani politics. My only divergence from your point of view is that I was hoping for a solution, if that was possible, within a constitutional context. I can understand the need or even the urgency to confront the military, as you have suggested, but I am still hopeful that a constitutional means to end the military`s power over a period of time can be devised.

Your point about the nature of power in Pakistan in very apt and the question is really about sharing of the power. If the intent of the Pakistani politicans had been democractic, one would have atleast seen an example of that within their own parties` politics. Even at level of the political parties, power is distributed and never gained through votes and Pakistani political parties habit of having chairpersons for life makes a vulgarity out of their democratic claims. The fact that political elites assume for their workers and make a decision and then have it imposed on the workers is a cruel joke of the democratic process in Pakistan. As to the sharing of power, it would help if the political parties in Pakistan have periodic elections to elect the party leadership and in fact, hold organized conventions to hammer their political platforms into a party agenda. This will instill a sense of sharing power, which then can be translated upon the national scene. However, even in the present circumtances, political power is contested in political parties through means, which are not democratic but are rather more suited to a street fight with all its elegance for rules of behavior.

I agree, with you that it is this craving for sharing power, which forces the politicans to make unsavory deals with the military and this sort of behavior has greatly undermined the process of democracy in Pakistan. The corruption of politics in Pakistan is not a problem in comparsion to the appeasement of the politics to the dictates of military rule. The military knows this weakness of the Pakistani politics and has always played favoritism by anointing a ``king`s party``, which then offers the proverbial fig leaf to the military rule. Nawaz Sharif and Benazir may be the twins of Lucifer, but their actual sins lie in the systematic way in which they have dismantled the institutions of the state just to safe-guard their own power base. It was the lack of sharing power, and the habit of absolutism as exhibitated by Bhutto and Sharif, which made the lesser fortunate parties appeal to the military.

This point really galls me, because the function of the Pakistani military, i.e. the army is not to act as the lever of political power in Pakistan. In this sense, the politicans of Pakistan cannot absolved from the blame that they have encouraged the military and offered it a reason to intervene in politics. If that statement is true and accepted, then according to the constitition of Pakistan, the politican are guilty of treason since they have attempted to subvert the constitution just as the military interventions in Pakistan are nothing else than an act of treason. The real traitor in this whole sordid game of falsehoods, has been the role of the judicary in Pakistan and its habitual acceptance of the logic of accreditating legal cover to the military rule in Pakistan.

The judicary has to be sperated and made into a legal oversight institution charged with the mandate of ensuring the consitutionality of the acts of the executive and legislative branch of the governments. The judicary needs an urgent reform, because it has ceased to be of any value and all it does is delay justice and condone the illegality of the law through its inactions. In my view, the judges in Pakistan are as keen, as any one else, to curry favor and for their own satisfaction, they are quite happy to ignore the rule of the law. This prostitution of justice comes from the insecurity of the judges themselves, which orginates in the flawed idea of their tenures. The judges should be appointed for life in Pakistan and in this sense, they will feel secure enough to stop plying for political favors by doing consitutional misdeeds.

Yes, the rulers of Pakistan, regardless, their of their taste in clothes are part of the same elite group, which has taken turns to rule Pakistan. Again, this brings up the point that the dispute over sharing of power is itself located within this small group. When we talk of democracy and democratic rights, we are basically talking about the ``democratic rights`` of this group and not about the democratic rights of the Pakistani people. Given the nature of the rule and the rulers in Pakistan, the democracy being debated nationally is an exclusivist democracy limited to a very narrow segement of the the Pakistani society.

The problem still lies in the cooperation of the political interests with the army and as to MQM cutting its ties with the army, the self-interest of MQM would make them very cautious to this idea. Also, putting additional pressure on the borders might work, but this kind of activity opens up the doors to an aggressive nationalism of a political varity, which army will exploit. As I said in the begining, I do not see the value of confronting the army, when the political house of Pakistani politics is itself divided over the issue and seems to be inclined towards capitulation to the army rule simply to scrap off some political crumbs for itself. Lahore is too timid to rise up against the military and as to Punjab, the province is not interested in resisting the army, since the army is the love child of the province. The army has influenced the politics of Punjab and by extension Pakistan for too long and hence, there is no ruler of Punjab who has not owned his rise to political power to the army. Punjab will never dare raise its voice against the army lest its own interests might be undermined.

If there has to be a meaningful change in Pakistan, then it has to come outside of Punjab and away from Punjabi influence. The process can be started simply by denying to Punjab the right to define Pakistani nationalism as a Punjabi nationalism, because it is this ethnic egocentric chauvinism of Punjab, which is disgusting the rest of the provinces in Pakistan. The role of Punjab in Pakistani politics has alway been to polarize the issues, because the nature of Punjab is to deny an equal share of the political power in Pakistan, but at the same time consume the majority of the resources of the other province for its own needs. The reality needs to be brought out that the rest of the provinces joined Pakistan in 1947 and they did not agree to join Pakistan as serfs to Punjab, which is exactly how Punjab treats the rest of the provinces. Since 1947, the British Raj has been replaced by Punjab Raj and the attitude of Punjab is the same; it wants its imperial rule to hold influence in Pakistan and the rest of the provinces are nothing more than colonies to it.

As you have made clear, the army has to realize that it cannot exist without the support of the civilian politicans, but before that to happen, Punjab must also be made aware the fact that it cannot exist without the rest of Pakistan and it will have to share power. The saying in Pakistani politics is very true that where Punjab goes, there goes the army. The political reforms of the army in Pakistan have to start in its core constituency of Punjab and once Punjab is convinced of the error of its ways, the army will follow suit because it power base resides in the politics of Punjab.

One more point. Can you visualize a change within a constitutional framework or do you still see the process of reform/change as through a means of confrontation?

Ciao

re: HP # 145

I am in overall agreement, with your analysis. There is not much that I disagree with, but as happens naturally, I have few more questions and some points of clarifications. Generally, what you have said does offer a viable means to ending the problem or atleast solving it.

I will respond after having re-read your post and after reflecting upon your comments.

Thanks for taking the time to compose such an excellent reply! :)

Ciao

#140 by ferozk

“My question is, is it possible for the political parties in Pakistan to turn the elites away from the army and if so, how?”

I wish there was any simple and straight forward answer to that. But if we try we can get to some reasonable work around to this puzzle. So here is my take and it would be helpful if you put together you ideas.

In my previous posts # 40 and others, I had tried to show that the conflict between the army and the civilians is not over democracy but over sharing power. Civilians have already conceded that they have to live with the army and find some workable solution or some terms that both parties can adhered to.
Before I go any further, let me just say this clearly that the two groups in Pakistan led by NS and BB are not democrats like you and I are. Their goals are not democracy a la India but some kind of civilian rule, where they dominate the political spectrum and not the army. They want concessions from the army but mostly on terms that the army would not physically remove them from the power and agree to stay in the background and still have vital input on essential issues.
OTOH, the army used to being in total control of the system, is not agreeable to a position where the threat to remove the political government disappears, thus giving the civilians time to eventually dismantle the army power base.

Here is the question: Why Zardari is still in Jail and why NS still prefers to be in KSA rather than be in Pakistan? Once we begun to answer this question then we will have a better understanding of the conflict within the Pakistan elite.

Both BB+ Zardari and NS don’t have any record of fighting for democracy or even adhering to any democratic principals when they were in power. Then what is prompting them to so steadfastly hold on to their grounds? Zardari has spent 7 years in Jail now and NS almost 4 years in jail and in exile; still they are not willing to compromise with the army. Why? Does this not defy their political background or as Marxists would put it their class character? Why are they holding out when more conscious Pakistani elite feel that there is no way to possibly remove the army from the power, unless some catastrophic event happens. Obviously, NS and BB are not waiting for some catastrophic event. NS and BB have right alliances to win any fair election in Pakistan. Together it will be a landslide never seen before, but they also know that winning elections is no guarantee that they will also control the power. Which basically means that w/o winning the elite over they possibly cannot come to power.

I hope you would agree with me that the army generals, NS and BB+zardari are part of the same Pakistani elite. They have no claims to any populace ideology neither they champion human or democratic rights. In nutshell, they represent the same segment of Pakistani elite that is NOT convinced of unadulterated democracy. Now the question is much deeper. It is not merely that political parties have failed to win over the majority of elite but they have so far failed to win over the elite that the parties themselves represent.
I think with this background I can possibly put out a few things to answer your question in a better way.

It appears to me that currently two issues are much more important to Pakistani elite:
1. Their vulnerability in the face of emerging right wing and Nationalist forces in all three smaller provinces in Pakistan
2. A reliable force that can protect them from changing geo-political situation in Pakistan
A third factor that I think has some value is: possibly, that the elite would not like to work with the elements in Karachi and Sindh that will dominate, if any political set up is established.
The army in Pakistan is partially responsible for No.2, yet it is the only force that can provide protection, if the geo-political situation gets out of hand. Before 911, the army was in much more vulnerable position but now the elite have totally gone in the army’s corner. The elite want army to take care of the terrorists, Rightwing, and nationalist thus we see that the army is rolling back all the concessions that it gave up a year or two ago.

I don’t know how NS or BB or Zardari look at the situation. They may have more insight but I think barring some drastic changes in the international situation their chances of becoming a viable option for the elite in the near future look pretty bleak. Their current strategy of working with the international forces alone would not pay off.

Here is how I think the elite can be turned around.
1. Open as many fronts as possible against the army. Including the nationalist guerilla warfare option. We see some of it in Balochistan now.
2. Accelerate Sindhi nationalist movement and force the army to get in conflict with people in Sindh.
3. Force the MQM to severe its alliance with the army. Karachi is the key city for the army and any disturbances there would aggravate the situation for the army.
4. Persuade neighbors to go slow on easing pressure off the army on the borders.
5. Attempt to have some kind of agitation going against the army in Punjab, especially in Lahore.

The army is scared of Islamic terrorists and sooner or later it would have to look for some support from the moderate politicians. If there are more things happening simultaneously, chances of the army going to the barracks become viable.

re: Faruk # 141

Faruk, the problem with the elites and elitism in Pakistan is two-fold. One; it refuses to trust the choice of the people and secondly, it always assumes that it knows what is good for the people. Until this mentality changes, there will be elitism in Pakistani politics, which periodically retard the growth of democratic politics in the nation.

Ciao

re: Romair # 139

Yes, there is a contradiction because land reforms will only happen in Pakistan if the feudals implement it. Otherwise, there is no hope for any land reforms in Pakistan. Feudalism as a culture is dying out as more and more young feudal scions sell their lands for money so that they can waste the money in the cities. Feudals will always remain politically strong but the influence of fedualism is not what it used to be once.

The army is made up of the middle class, but this is only a twenty year or more trend and it needs to be seen how much of the values of Pakistani middle class will influence the values of the army. The army officer corps, up to the level of colonel, is increasingly professional. The problem starts in the ``flag country`` and it seems that professionalism always loses to politics in the upper ranks of Pakistani army. The air force, given its technical nature, is more professional than the military and has a better ratio of educated people in its ranks. I am not sure about the navy, but with the increasing modernization of the naval arm, I think that the navy will become more technical and will attract more professional minded people.

Musharraf comes from a solid middle class background and his family, by Pakistani standards, would be in the upper middle class. Musharraf`s children are employed in middle class professions and it seems that Musharraf will not follow the way of the other military rulers in wooing the feudals.

Ciao

ferozek #139: ``I agree with you that feudalism is a problem but in the long run, I see a lack of political institutionalism as a bigger problem in Pakistan than the feudal rule, which is already in its twilight.``

I don`t think feudal rule is in its twilight. I am not sure why people keep making this comment. Why is its twilight? If you take a look at the statistic of the last four elections, the proportional of feudals in NA remains between 60-66%, consistently. It is only in this elections, that the maulvis have made inroads into the landed aristocracy`s seats. So the only way the feudals` rule is in its twilight is if the maulvis are able to defeat them everywhere.

Lack of political institutionalism is obviously the biggest problem. But that is a result of feudal rule, and its after-effects - including the entry of non-democratic forces like the Army into politics. Instituions do not appear from thin air. They only appear, if the pre-requisites are there.

``Romair, the feudals are not a serious problem and they can be easily dealt with, but the real problem is the lack of will to implement serious land reforms.``

This is a self-contradicting statement. If feudals are not a problem, then land reforms should be easy. The reason they aren`t easy is because feudals dominate the legislative house, which would introduce these land reforms. Why are feudals into politics so much, and not into their chose profession of agriculture? It certainly isn`t for public service or to promote democracy. It is to protect their lands against any nationalistic legislation (as happened in India). And this is why they are the biggest supporters of the current system of democracy. They know they have it beat, and it is under their control.

``The question is, what will make the army move against the feudals?``

Of all the questions about the Army, this is the one I cannot figure out. Why doesn`t the Army move against the feudals. Previously, it may have been because many feudals were married into the Army, or one sibling was in the Army. But now that is no longer true. The Army is an extremely middle-class urban group. Far more middle-class than those of us on Chowk. Musharraf`s has moved against everyone, to the point of risking his own life. But not against the feudals. Ayub and Zia`s families actually joined the feudals. Musharraf`s has yet to do that.

I cannot see any way to take on the feudal, other than the maulvi or the massive urbanization of Pakistan, through economic growth, where small cities in feudal areas, like Gwadar, Tando Allah Yar etc. become economic centers, thereby allowing the local peasant popuation to take a stand.

re: HP # 133

I am not denying that Pakistan is another socio-cultural milieu. But I don’t think the hopes and aspiration of its people are that different from other peoples of the world.

I assure you Indira Gandhi did not call elections because 0.01 % of the Indian population was protesting. No dictator or wannabe dictator has quit because a very small number of people were protesting their rule.

“Lastly, which is more elitist political party in India than the old mighty Congress itself?

Congress has ruled India in the last 48 years out of 57 years and how do they do that: by making the same dirt poor to vote for them. Congress attacked the democracy in India. The Indian elite brought them back in power within three years, after the Indian poor had booted them out soundly.
…..
…
Democracy is the form of government chosen by the elite to govern the society. In some countries like India, they do it by being nice and in some like Pakistan; they do it by showing the muscle.
By the people, for the people… that was a joke…”


Why do you think congress is elitist? What makes you think the Indian elite decide elections is India. Do you really believe that BJP would have lost the last election if the Indian elite had that much influence? For all its faults the Indian economy and the Indian elite were doing really well under the BJP.

I understand your point about that the established system has an inertia and it’s difficult to change. The question is what will trigger the change. I think democracy is worth it, you don’t and that’s fine too.


Regards,

Faruk

re: HP # 133

HP, that was a very well thought post.

My question is, is it possible for the political parties in Pakistan to turn the elites away from the army and if so, how?

If you have any answer, I would like to like know what it might be, because what you say is a serious problem in Pakistan.

Ciao

re: Romair # 134

I agree with you that feudalism is a problem but in the long run, I see a lack of political institutionalism as a bigger problem in Pakistan than the feudal rule, which is already in its twilight.

Romair, the feudals are not a serious problem and they can be easily dealt with, but the real problem is the lack of will to implement serious land reforms. There is no political will in the nation to deal with the feudals and their power. The army is a major beneficary of lands in Pakistan and the question is, who will bell the cat? Despite the percentages of the feudal held seats in the national assembly, they are no match and neither can they resist if the army moves against them. The question is, what will make the army move against the feudals?

The most obvious answer seems to be a threat to the army`s rule itself and just like the army ditched the Taliban, because supporting them seemed to undercut its own rule, the army will move against the feudals once its own institutional interests are threatened.

The other option is to marginalize the feudal vote bank by appealing to the urban voters but that implies an acceptance of the major political parties, which are present in the cities and their politics, which is something that the army is not willing to stomach. The fact of the matter is that the military better wise up and realize two things: one, it cannot any longer play the politics of divide and conquer and secondly, it cannot rule Pakistan unilaterally any more.

What is needed in Pakistan is a fusion of the politics to demand that military leave politics and the political osteracism of those who support military rule. I have my doubts as to whether it can happen, but idealism will have to replace realism, and the need of the hour is an idealism, which is not willing to compromise in order to evict the military from power.

Ciao

faruk
//....That is largely true. But what about our current prime minister, Natwar singh, Yashwant sinha, Rajesh pilot and a host of others. I hope it will change in the future. ...//

Very unlikely. Because - politics in India is all about money (like politics anywhere, I guess) - huge amounts of it. Consequently - middle class folks with hard-earned white money can hardly afford it. So mafias have moved in .... people with dubious characters who have made monies thru black trade have moved in ..... Which in turn has deteriorated the quality of politicking ... muscle power , violence has been already been incorporated as legitimate tools of business.

This has muddied the water to the point where only the most crooked can trive in there .... And this ain`t going to change near future.

Unless there is a strong reaction from public and institutions and other ``good`` politicians. Recently the EC has moved some ideas regarding barring criminals fighting from elections. That would be a welcome first step.

re: ballukhan # 136

So soon! I had expected much more grit from you. :)

Ciao

Amazing! I think Pakistan is not good enough for democracy! I give up.

re :Faruk # 127

No! I do not agree, with others, that a benevolent dictator is the best choice. In fact, I do not even consider it as a choice and I do not wish to accept this statement as a choice either. I believe that there is no subsitute to populism and democracy. I believe in the common sense of the average Pakistani and I believe that s/he does not need to be told, what is good for them, but they should be given the choice to decide for themselves, what is good and what is bad. I believe that a dictator, benevolent or not, is still a dictator.

My post might sound pessimistic, because that is the experience of the society I grew up in and understood and learned. If people think I am wrong, all they have to do is prove me wrong and none would be more happy than I. However, that is not going to happen. There is a quote from Goethe, which once it is paraphrased describes my loss of hope vis-a-vis Pakistanis. Goethe was talking about the German people and all I have to do is replace the word ``German`` with Pakistani`` and the sentiment still holds true. As Goethe said, and I am paraphrasing him, I feel bitter sorrow for the Pakistani people, which is so estimable in the individual and so wretched in the generality. I am quite confident that my pessimism in the Pakistani political experience will not be proven wrong.

Ciao

Faruk #130: ``My point is different too. What will it take for the normal/general/common people of Pakistan to get tiered of dictators and look for another choice. I am not advocating one form of dictatorship over another.``

You have to divide the people into two categories: those in urban and non-feudal rural areas. And those in feudal rural areas. For the later, other than massive land reforms or related economic progress, through other means, nothing else will change their lifestyles. They have lived for generations under their feudal masters, and will continue to do so.

For the urban group, I really don`t know. They are not under the control of feudals. They have some money, etc. And now they even have options. My family supports PTI actively, and all of us thought it would easily emerge as a counter to PPP and PML in the urban areas. It has a lot to offer Pakistan, and is honest and middle to upper-middle class. Its candidates are accomplished urbanites.

Yet it cannot get more than one seat. Imran Khan got crushed even in his hometown Lahore constituency, where he built a cancer hospital. If he cannot even win, there, then what chance is there for anyone else?

I think the main obstacle is that 66% of the Assembly seats are under feudal control. So urban politics doesn`t really matter much. What will need to happen is what happened everywhere else, including India, pre 47. Urbanization will need to increase, through a growth in the economy, and more jobs. This will result in cities growing larger, and the distribution of population for feudal areas to cities. This will slowly tilt the Assembly in favor of the urban areas, thereby allowing the passge of land reforms.

The other option is what we are seeing now. The religious parties, due to their democratic nature, and their lower class memberships will start winning in feudal areas. The peasant is scared of only one thing, more than he is scared of the feudal. And that is God, which is why he may vote for the relgious parties. And then the religious parties may introduce land reforms........

This is how things have worked out in all feudal socieites - be if Europe or India. Either it is a slow urbanization process, as in India, pre-47. Or a civil war, that got rid of the landed aristocracy`s hold on power, as in USA.

Faruk 109, Ferozk

“Let me give you an example from India. …………..but I support the right of people to fight for their rights.

Why are the Pakistani people not fighting for their rights? They protest the violation of the rights of Palestinians and everyone under the sun, but never Pakistanis.”

Examples from India?

Let say this from the very outset that Pakistan and India are two different countries and they have chosen two different paths for development and comparing the two countries does not make sense.
These two examples would tell; how hollow the comparisons are.

Pakistanis are struggling to find ways to get to democracy and Indian democracy is struggling to find ways to end the communal violence against minorities. Mostly it is Muslims but sometime Sikhs, Christians and Dalit become victims of majority’s hooliganism.

Unfortunately, the Indian democracy has not even begun to find solutions after 57 years of democracy. Now the purpose here is not to start a flame war but merely to point out that during the emergency, when the Indian democracy was effectively toppled, less than 0.01 percent showed up on the streets to “fight for their rights”. When the only thing that Indians had ever known as a form of government was democracy, not many including the all mighty media in India showed any sign of “fighting for their rights”.

Comparisons are futile and in fact downright stupid.

Let us just think what “people” fight for. People don’t even fight when they or their families go hungry and when they see their kids dying. If they do come out and fight for bread, the governments would consider that civil disobedience and crush them outright. Has anybody in this world seen demonstrations by people against hunger or political rights, when all protestors were not surrounded by the law enforcement?

This begs the question: Are street demonstration and Hartals the only form of protest? I think that they are the most uncivilized forms of protest. But that is not the issue here.

Let me just hypothetically put this out here: What if tomorrow morning we wake up and find that India Army has t