Aziz Narejo January 12, 2005
#43 Posted by mutant on December 20, 2005 6:36:57 am
Kalabagh Dam Project would play very important role by way of:-
a. Replacing storage lost by sedimentation in existing reservoirs at Mangala, Chashma and Tarbala (estimated about 3 MAF by the year 2000).
b. Providing additional storage to meet existing water shortages during early Kharif sowing period of April-June (particularly critical for cotton crop in Sindh).
c. Providing effective regulation of Indus river to meet additional Kharif allocations of the provinces under WAA, 1991.
d. Regulation and control of high flood peaks in the Indus to enable provision of perennial tubewell irrigation to the riverain area in Sindh.
e. Generating a large chunk of hydro-power for meeting the growing demand of agricultural, industrial and domestic consumers through low cost option.
f. Reducing dependence on imported fuels.
g. Creating employment for 30,000 persons during construction and significant numbers after commissioning.
APPREHENSIONS
As part of controversy on Kalabagh Dam, a number of apprehensions/doubts have been expressed both by upper (NWFP) and lower (Sindh) riparian provinces. Most of these are based either on lack of information or hear say. In addition, there have been reservations in the mind of some quarters without any apparent rhyme or reason. Consequently, the Project has been thoroughly reviewed and revised/modified to remove the apprehensions and doubts, which in the pat may have blocked its implementation.
The apprehensions and the factual position, in the light of critical examination/supporting studies, are presented in the following.
Apprehensions of NWFP
i) It is feared that historic flooding of Peshawar Valley including Nowshera town would be aggravated in the event of recurrence of 1929 record flood.
ii) Drainages of surrounding area of Mardan, Pabbi and Swabi plains would be adversely affected by the reservoir thus creating water-logging and salinity.
iii) Operation of Mardan SCARP would be adversely affected.
iv) Fertile culturable land would be submerged.
v) Large number of people would be displaced.
Answer:
i) a. In the modified design of the project the reservoir conservation level has been lowered by 10 feet from 925 to 915 feet above mean sea level (MSL) thus eliminating the need for construction of any protective dyke near Nowshera. At maximum conservation level of 915 feet, the back-water effect of Kalabagh lake would end about 10 miles downstream of Nowshera (refer Illustration-I). A state-of-art computer based study, backed by physical modeling in Pakistan, has established that recurrence of record flood of 1929 would not affect the water level at Nowshera even after 100 years of sedimentation in reservoir (refer Illustration-II). It may be noted that this completely ignores the effect of Tarbela reservoir, which is now factually providing relief by attenuating flood peaks. It is also notable that flood warring system at Tarbala provides a minimum of 48 hours advance warning before the arrival o large flood peaks.
b. Real causes of flooding at Nowshera and Peshawar Valley upstream entrance of Kabul river at Nowshera into confined channel at the end of Peshawar valley; and backing effect of Attock Gorge downstream through which Indus river has to pass after its confluence with Kabul river (refer illustration I). Before the confluence, Indus river flows through a wide valley of over 8,000 feet and is then forced to pass through 1000 feet wide gorge for 5 miles. This constriction forces the river water to back up thus raising flood levels in Kabul river upto Nowshera. Whereas Kalabagh should not adversely affect flooding in Nowshera and Peshawar Valley above, an upstream dam on Swat river could provide effective assurance against this chronic inherent problem. Consequently, Munda Dam multi-purpose project is being included in NWRDP.
ii) Lowest ground levels at Mardan, Pabbi and Swabi areas are 970,962 and 1000 feet above MSL respectively, as compared to the maximum conservation level of 915 for Kalabagh (refer Illustration-III). This maximum Kalabagh reservoir level would be maintained only for 3 to 4 weeks during September and October after which it would deplete as water is released for Rabi crops and power generation (refer Illustration-IV). Ultimately it would go down to dead storage level of 825 feet by early June. This operation pattern of reservoir, by no stretch of imagination, could block the drainage and thus cause water-logging or salinity in Mardan, Pabbi and Swabi areas.
iii). The invert level of main drain of the Mardan SCARP are higher than maximum elevation of 915 feet. Thus, these drains would keep on functioning without any obstruction.
iv) Total culturable land submerged under the reservoir elevation of 915 feet would be 27,500 acres (24,500 acres in Punjab and 3000 acres in NWFP). The submerged irrigated land would be only 3000 acres (2,900 acres in Punjab and 100 acres in NWFP). It may be noted that about 1,000 acres of irrigated land acquired for Mardan SCARP alone.
v) a. The estimated population to be affected by the project would be 83,000 with 48,500 in Punjab and 34,500 in NWFP. A liberal resettlement plan would provide alternate irrigated lands to the affected families. The affected population would be resettled along the reservoir periphery in extended/new model villages with modern facilities of water supply, electricity, roads, dispensaries, school and other civic amenities. The affectees would enjoy and improved environment.
b. Another major incentive provided for the affecters in this case, not previously practiced in Pakistan, would be to fully compensate the frames for the land on the reservoir periphery above normal conservation level of 915 feet that could be flooded once in five years. This land would remain the property of the original owners for cultivation with the only undertaking that they would not claim any damages to crops for occasional flooding.
c. The comprehensive resettlement package proposed for Kalabagh is in fact most innovative and attractive then those previously adopted for Mangla and Tarbala Dams. The basic objective being that “a the end of day”, the affectees should find themselves in a better socio-economic environment.
Apprehensions of Sindh
i) The anxiety that the project would render Sindh into a desert.
ii) There would be no surplus water to fill Kalabagh reservoir.
iii) High level outlets would be used to divert water from the reservoir.
iv) Cultivation in riverain (Sailaba) areas would be adversely affected.
v) Sea water intrusion in Indus estuary would accentuate.
vi) Mangrove forest, which are already threatened, would be further affected adversely.
vii) Fish production and drinking water supply below Kotri would be adversely affected.
Answers:
i) Dams don’t consume any water. Instead these store water during flood season and then make it available on crop demand basis for the remaining dry periods of t years. The real demonstration of this came after full commissioning of Tarbala Dam in 1076. during pre-storage era of 1960-67, average annual canal withdrawals of Sindh were 35.6 MAF. After Tarbala the corresponding figure rose to 44.5 MAF with over 22 percent increase in the Rabi diversions alone increased from 10.7 to 15.2 MAF. It is estimated that after Kalabagh, canal withdrawals of Sindh would further increase. A indicated in Illustration-V, most of this increase would come in regarding desertification of Sindh defies even the basic logic of a storage reservoir.
ii) A. WAA of 1991 has allocated, on the average, about 12 MAF additional supplies to the provinces almost all of which is in Kharif season. On the other hand, factually the surplus water is a available only within 70-100 days flood period. It is estimated that to provided additional allocated water over the year, a storage of about 3.6 MAF would be needed (out of this, 2.2 MAF would be in the early Kharif season of April to July).
iii) Initial studies have indicated that construction of high level outlets at Kalabagh is economically unviable. Notwithstanding this, if any province wants to build, then its share of water would be strictly governed by WAA, 1991.
iv)a An impression is also prevailing that with Kalabagh Dam, riverain areas of Sindh, commonly called “ Sailaba” would got out of production due to control over floods. It can be appreciated from configuration of riverain area (refer Illustration-VI) that “Sailaba’ crops are grown on the land adjacent to main river and the creeks. Though crops are sown on the soil moisture soon after the floods, these need more than one watering to mature. As a result ‘ Sailba’ lands give poor yields. Consequently, frames are generally required provide irrigation facility through shallow tube wells or lift pimps. Prime movers on these tubewells have to be removed during the flood season to avoid damage.
b Sindh has presently 660,000 acres of ‘ Sailaba cultivated area form Guddu Barrage to sea. This area is initially sown due to the moisture provided by flooding with river stage of 300,000 cusecs and above.
c. Flood peaks above 300,000 cusecs would still be coming after Kalabagh, without much detriment to the present cultural practices, while large floods would be effectively controlled. This would, in fact, be conductive to installation of permanent tubewells to provide pernnial irrigation facility in riverain areas. Towards this end, a separate scheme is being included in NWRDP.
v)a. The fear that present extent of sea water intrusion in the Indus Delta would be further aggravated by Kalabagh is not substantiated by factual data. Studies indicate that presently the total effect of Indus estuary is only limited to the lower most portion of Delta and gets dissipated below Garho and Chowgazo gagues heights at Garho are completely insensitive to Indus discharges of upto 700,000 cusees (refer III ustration-VIII). Therefore, the sea water intrusion, which seems to be at its maximum even now, is unlikely to be aggravated further by Kalabagh Dam.
b Another apprehension is that sea water intrusion into existing aquifer system would cause serious quality deterioration. The groundwater contained in the aquifer is effectively saline as far north as Hyderabad. Therefore, intrusion of sea water along shore line of Delta is of little consequence. This is further supported by the the fact that there is southward oriented groundwater gradient throughout this aquifer. Considering the very low transmissivities of the aquifer in Delta region, upward sea water intrusion can be almost ruled out.
vi)a. Out of the total 1.53 million acres(MA) tidally inundated historic Indus Delta, Mangrove forest cover an area of almost 0.32 MA In this forest, spreading from Karachi in the west to Rann of Kutch in the east, 95% of the population now consist of a salt tolerant variety.
b. Extent of the active delta area(as distinct from the historic delta area described above) is about 294,000 acres. Out of this, the mangroves cover only 7,400 acres or 2.5% of the area. Most of the remaining area is in form of mud-flats. The reason for this area being too small could be a combination of factors. Recently, NED University of Engineering and Technology has carried out a study titled “ What Realy Threatens us and Our Mangroves” This brings out that reduction in mangroves in essentially due to frequency of tidal inundation being too small instead of fresh water reduction caused by upstream abstractions, which started with Sukkur Barrage in 1932. Other major causes are uncontrolled overgrazing and cutting due to extreme population pressure of Karachi.
c. Therefore, in order to revive the mangroves, real need is for replanting salt tolerant varieties with provision for controlled doses of fresh water. Obviously, this possibility would be much enhanced with an upstream storage facility like Kalabagh.
vii)a. A recent study has shown that there is no clear evidence to suggest that fisheries stocks in the river reach below Kotri have declined due to progressive reduction in the surface water supplies. On the other hand, fish production has been constantly increasing as indicated by statistical data. As such, Kalabagh Dam is unlikely to have any adverse effect on fish production in the area.
b. In the riverain area downstream to Kotri Barrage, groundwater is predominantly saline or brackish and as such unsuitable for either irrigation water supply. After Kalabagh, winter supply in the river would improve thus assuring more drinking water.
PROJECT BENEFITS
Kalabagh would store surplus water in the flood season and make it available for controlled utilization during the low flow season. This water would thus be used for sowing and final maturing of the Kharif crops and entire Rabi crops.
Irrigation oriented operation of the project gives the highest overall economic return. Thus the full live storage of 6.1MAF would be available for guaranteeing assured irrigation supplies throughout the year including replacement of the storage loss on the three existing reservoirs.
Power
Kalabagh wit its installed capacity of 2400 MW (ultimate 3600 MW) would add to the system a very large chunk of cheap hydro-power. In an average year, 11413 million kilowatts hours (MKWh’s) of electricity would be generated at Kalabagh. Further, as a result of conjunctive operation an additional 336 million MKWh’s and upto 600 megawatts (MW) of additional peak power would be generated at Tarbela. To put these figures in perspective, if Kalabagh was in position today, there would have been no load-shedding in Pakistan.
The energy generated at Kalabagh would be equivalent to 20 million of oil per year.
Flood Alleviation
Kalabagh would reduce the frequency and severity of flooding along the Indus particularly between the dam site an Indus/Punjab confluence, 300 miles downstream.
For the riverain areas lower down in Sindh, it would enable conversation of the existing ‘Sailaba’ areas to the year round tubewell irrigation.
Overall Benefits
On a conservation basis, the overall direct benefits of Kalabagh Dam would be around Rs. 25 billion per annum. Thus the investment cost of project would be repaid within a very short period of 9-10 years.
CONSEQUENCES OF NOT BUILDING KALABAGH DAM
i) National food security would be jeopardized, thus subjecting the economy to additional burden of importing food grains.
ii) Loss of storage capacity of the on-line reservoir due to sedimentation would result in shortage of committed irrigation supplies causing serious dropeven in existing agriculture production.
iii) For implementation of water Apportionment Accord 1991, a new storage project like Kalabagh is essential. In its absence it would give rise to bitter inter-provincial disputes and recriminations particularly in a dry water year. Dispute between Punjab and Sindh on shortage of about 0.2 MAF water during Rabi maturing/Kharig sowing 1993-94 should eye-opener. It may be worth mentioning that Rabi 1993-94 had a normal river inflow pattern.
http://www.pakissan.com/english/watercrisis/kalabagh.dam.shtml
a. Replacing storage lost by sedimentation in existing reservoirs at Mangala, Chashma and Tarbala (estimated about 3 MAF by the year 2000).
b. Providing additional storage to meet existing water shortages during early Kharif sowing period of April-June (particularly critical for cotton crop in Sindh).
c. Providing effective regulation of Indus river to meet additional Kharif allocations of the provinces under WAA, 1991.
d. Regulation and control of high flood peaks in the Indus to enable provision of perennial tubewell irrigation to the riverain area in Sindh.
e. Generating a large chunk of hydro-power for meeting the growing demand of agricultural, industrial and domestic consumers through low cost option.
f. Reducing dependence on imported fuels.
g. Creating employment for 30,000 persons during construction and significant numbers after commissioning.
APPREHENSIONS
As part of controversy on Kalabagh Dam, a number of apprehensions/doubts have been expressed both by upper (NWFP) and lower (Sindh) riparian provinces. Most of these are based either on lack of information or hear say. In addition, there have been reservations in the mind of some quarters without any apparent rhyme or reason. Consequently, the Project has been thoroughly reviewed and revised/modified to remove the apprehensions and doubts, which in the pat may have blocked its implementation.
The apprehensions and the factual position, in the light of critical examination/supporting studies, are presented in the following.
Apprehensions of NWFP
i) It is feared that historic flooding of Peshawar Valley including Nowshera town would be aggravated in the event of recurrence of 1929 record flood.
ii) Drainages of surrounding area of Mardan, Pabbi and Swabi plains would be adversely affected by the reservoir thus creating water-logging and salinity.
iii) Operation of Mardan SCARP would be adversely affected.
iv) Fertile culturable land would be submerged.
v) Large number of people would be displaced.
Answer:
i) a. In the modified design of the project the reservoir conservation level has been lowered by 10 feet from 925 to 915 feet above mean sea level (MSL) thus eliminating the need for construction of any protective dyke near Nowshera. At maximum conservation level of 915 feet, the back-water effect of Kalabagh lake would end about 10 miles downstream of Nowshera (refer Illustration-I). A state-of-art computer based study, backed by physical modeling in Pakistan, has established that recurrence of record flood of 1929 would not affect the water level at Nowshera even after 100 years of sedimentation in reservoir (refer Illustration-II). It may be noted that this completely ignores the effect of Tarbela reservoir, which is now factually providing relief by attenuating flood peaks. It is also notable that flood warring system at Tarbala provides a minimum of 48 hours advance warning before the arrival o large flood peaks.
b. Real causes of flooding at Nowshera and Peshawar Valley upstream entrance of Kabul river at Nowshera into confined channel at the end of Peshawar valley; and backing effect of Attock Gorge downstream through which Indus river has to pass after its confluence with Kabul river (refer illustration I). Before the confluence, Indus river flows through a wide valley of over 8,000 feet and is then forced to pass through 1000 feet wide gorge for 5 miles. This constriction forces the river water to back up thus raising flood levels in Kabul river upto Nowshera. Whereas Kalabagh should not adversely affect flooding in Nowshera and Peshawar Valley above, an upstream dam on Swat river could provide effective assurance against this chronic inherent problem. Consequently, Munda Dam multi-purpose project is being included in NWRDP.
ii) Lowest ground levels at Mardan, Pabbi and Swabi areas are 970,962 and 1000 feet above MSL respectively, as compared to the maximum conservation level of 915 for Kalabagh (refer Illustration-III). This maximum Kalabagh reservoir level would be maintained only for 3 to 4 weeks during September and October after which it would deplete as water is released for Rabi crops and power generation (refer Illustration-IV). Ultimately it would go down to dead storage level of 825 feet by early June. This operation pattern of reservoir, by no stretch of imagination, could block the drainage and thus cause water-logging or salinity in Mardan, Pabbi and Swabi areas.
iii). The invert level of main drain of the Mardan SCARP are higher than maximum elevation of 915 feet. Thus, these drains would keep on functioning without any obstruction.
iv) Total culturable land submerged under the reservoir elevation of 915 feet would be 27,500 acres (24,500 acres in Punjab and 3000 acres in NWFP). The submerged irrigated land would be only 3000 acres (2,900 acres in Punjab and 100 acres in NWFP). It may be noted that about 1,000 acres of irrigated land acquired for Mardan SCARP alone.
v) a. The estimated population to be affected by the project would be 83,000 with 48,500 in Punjab and 34,500 in NWFP. A liberal resettlement plan would provide alternate irrigated lands to the affected families. The affected population would be resettled along the reservoir periphery in extended/new model villages with modern facilities of water supply, electricity, roads, dispensaries, school and other civic amenities. The affectees would enjoy and improved environment.
b. Another major incentive provided for the affecters in this case, not previously practiced in Pakistan, would be to fully compensate the frames for the land on the reservoir periphery above normal conservation level of 915 feet that could be flooded once in five years. This land would remain the property of the original owners for cultivation with the only undertaking that they would not claim any damages to crops for occasional flooding.
c. The comprehensive resettlement package proposed for Kalabagh is in fact most innovative and attractive then those previously adopted for Mangla and Tarbala Dams. The basic objective being that “a the end of day”, the affectees should find themselves in a better socio-economic environment.
Apprehensions of Sindh
i) The anxiety that the project would render Sindh into a desert.
ii) There would be no surplus water to fill Kalabagh reservoir.
iii) High level outlets would be used to divert water from the reservoir.
iv) Cultivation in riverain (Sailaba) areas would be adversely affected.
v) Sea water intrusion in Indus estuary would accentuate.
vi) Mangrove forest, which are already threatened, would be further affected adversely.
vii) Fish production and drinking water supply below Kotri would be adversely affected.
Answers:
i) Dams don’t consume any water. Instead these store water during flood season and then make it available on crop demand basis for the remaining dry periods of t years. The real demonstration of this came after full commissioning of Tarbala Dam in 1076. during pre-storage era of 1960-67, average annual canal withdrawals of Sindh were 35.6 MAF. After Tarbala the corresponding figure rose to 44.5 MAF with over 22 percent increase in the Rabi diversions alone increased from 10.7 to 15.2 MAF. It is estimated that after Kalabagh, canal withdrawals of Sindh would further increase. A indicated in Illustration-V, most of this increase would come in regarding desertification of Sindh defies even the basic logic of a storage reservoir.
ii) A. WAA of 1991 has allocated, on the average, about 12 MAF additional supplies to the provinces almost all of which is in Kharif season. On the other hand, factually the surplus water is a available only within 70-100 days flood period. It is estimated that to provided additional allocated water over the year, a storage of about 3.6 MAF would be needed (out of this, 2.2 MAF would be in the early Kharif season of April to July).
iii) Initial studies have indicated that construction of high level outlets at Kalabagh is economically unviable. Notwithstanding this, if any province wants to build, then its share of water would be strictly governed by WAA, 1991.
iv)a An impression is also prevailing that with Kalabagh Dam, riverain areas of Sindh, commonly called “ Sailaba” would got out of production due to control over floods. It can be appreciated from configuration of riverain area (refer Illustration-VI) that “Sailaba’ crops are grown on the land adjacent to main river and the creeks. Though crops are sown on the soil moisture soon after the floods, these need more than one watering to mature. As a result ‘ Sailba’ lands give poor yields. Consequently, frames are generally required provide irrigation facility through shallow tube wells or lift pimps. Prime movers on these tubewells have to be removed during the flood season to avoid damage.
b Sindh has presently 660,000 acres of ‘ Sailaba cultivated area form Guddu Barrage to sea. This area is initially sown due to the moisture provided by flooding with river stage of 300,000 cusecs and above.
c. Flood peaks above 300,000 cusecs would still be coming after Kalabagh, without much detriment to the present cultural practices, while large floods would be effectively controlled. This would, in fact, be conductive to installation of permanent tubewells to provide pernnial irrigation facility in riverain areas. Towards this end, a separate scheme is being included in NWRDP.
v)a. The fear that present extent of sea water intrusion in the Indus Delta would be further aggravated by Kalabagh is not substantiated by factual data. Studies indicate that presently the total effect of Indus estuary is only limited to the lower most portion of Delta and gets dissipated below Garho and Chowgazo gagues heights at Garho are completely insensitive to Indus discharges of upto 700,000 cusees (refer III ustration-VIII). Therefore, the sea water intrusion, which seems to be at its maximum even now, is unlikely to be aggravated further by Kalabagh Dam.
b Another apprehension is that sea water intrusion into existing aquifer system would cause serious quality deterioration. The groundwater contained in the aquifer is effectively saline as far north as Hyderabad. Therefore, intrusion of sea water along shore line of Delta is of little consequence. This is further supported by the the fact that there is southward oriented groundwater gradient throughout this aquifer. Considering the very low transmissivities of the aquifer in Delta region, upward sea water intrusion can be almost ruled out.
vi)a. Out of the total 1.53 million acres(MA) tidally inundated historic Indus Delta, Mangrove forest cover an area of almost 0.32 MA In this forest, spreading from Karachi in the west to Rann of Kutch in the east, 95% of the population now consist of a salt tolerant variety.
b. Extent of the active delta area(as distinct from the historic delta area described above) is about 294,000 acres. Out of this, the mangroves cover only 7,400 acres or 2.5% of the area. Most of the remaining area is in form of mud-flats. The reason for this area being too small could be a combination of factors. Recently, NED University of Engineering and Technology has carried out a study titled “ What Realy Threatens us and Our Mangroves” This brings out that reduction in mangroves in essentially due to frequency of tidal inundation being too small instead of fresh water reduction caused by upstream abstractions, which started with Sukkur Barrage in 1932. Other major causes are uncontrolled overgrazing and cutting due to extreme population pressure of Karachi.
c. Therefore, in order to revive the mangroves, real need is for replanting salt tolerant varieties with provision for controlled doses of fresh water. Obviously, this possibility would be much enhanced with an upstream storage facility like Kalabagh.
vii)a. A recent study has shown that there is no clear evidence to suggest that fisheries stocks in the river reach below Kotri have declined due to progressive reduction in the surface water supplies. On the other hand, fish production has been constantly increasing as indicated by statistical data. As such, Kalabagh Dam is unlikely to have any adverse effect on fish production in the area.
b. In the riverain area downstream to Kotri Barrage, groundwater is predominantly saline or brackish and as such unsuitable for either irrigation water supply. After Kalabagh, winter supply in the river would improve thus assuring more drinking water.
PROJECT BENEFITS
Kalabagh would store surplus water in the flood season and make it available for controlled utilization during the low flow season. This water would thus be used for sowing and final maturing of the Kharif crops and entire Rabi crops.
Irrigation oriented operation of the project gives the highest overall economic return. Thus the full live storage of 6.1MAF would be available for guaranteeing assured irrigation supplies throughout the year including replacement of the storage loss on the three existing reservoirs.
Power
Kalabagh wit its installed capacity of 2400 MW (ultimate 3600 MW) would add to the system a very large chunk of cheap hydro-power. In an average year, 11413 million kilowatts hours (MKWh’s) of electricity would be generated at Kalabagh. Further, as a result of conjunctive operation an additional 336 million MKWh’s and upto 600 megawatts (MW) of additional peak power would be generated at Tarbela. To put these figures in perspective, if Kalabagh was in position today, there would have been no load-shedding in Pakistan.
The energy generated at Kalabagh would be equivalent to 20 million of oil per year.
Flood Alleviation
Kalabagh would reduce the frequency and severity of flooding along the Indus particularly between the dam site an Indus/Punjab confluence, 300 miles downstream.
For the riverain areas lower down in Sindh, it would enable conversation of the existing ‘Sailaba’ areas to the year round tubewell irrigation.
Overall Benefits
On a conservation basis, the overall direct benefits of Kalabagh Dam would be around Rs. 25 billion per annum. Thus the investment cost of project would be repaid within a very short period of 9-10 years.
CONSEQUENCES OF NOT BUILDING KALABAGH DAM
i) National food security would be jeopardized, thus subjecting the economy to additional burden of importing food grains.
ii) Loss of storage capacity of the on-line reservoir due to sedimentation would result in shortage of committed irrigation supplies causing serious dropeven in existing agriculture production.
iii) For implementation of water Apportionment Accord 1991, a new storage project like Kalabagh is essential. In its absence it would give rise to bitter inter-provincial disputes and recriminations particularly in a dry water year. Dispute between Punjab and Sindh on shortage of about 0.2 MAF water during Rabi maturing/Kharig sowing 1993-94 should eye-opener. It may be worth mentioning that Rabi 1993-94 had a normal river inflow pattern.
http://www.pakissan.com/english/watercrisis/kalabagh.dam.shtml
#42 Posted by M.B.Z.Isphahani on January 23, 2005 9:09:40 am
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#41 Posted by nangaparbat on January 22, 2005 6:34:21 pm
Aziz Narejo,
You have articulated several good points about the stupidity of constructing this dam. Unfortunately, in Pakitan, or anywhere else, where does a 600 lb gorilla sit? The answer is anywhere it wants to. Punjab gets whatever Punjab wants - to the detriment of the rest of Pakistan. When will these Punjabis realize that they have ruined Pakistan from its inception and they are close to putting the final nails in the poor coffin. They pissed off the Bengalis, bomed the Baluchis, killed Pathans, ruined the Sindhis, and have totally alienated the Mohajirs - not to mention what they have done to the Kashmiris and the poor Biharis, stranded in BD. I say, split Punjab into at least three or four smaller provinces and the problem will be solved. That is what India did to E. Punjab, and it worked. Good luck.
You have articulated several good points about the stupidity of constructing this dam. Unfortunately, in Pakitan, or anywhere else, where does a 600 lb gorilla sit? The answer is anywhere it wants to. Punjab gets whatever Punjab wants - to the detriment of the rest of Pakistan. When will these Punjabis realize that they have ruined Pakistan from its inception and they are close to putting the final nails in the poor coffin. They pissed off the Bengalis, bomed the Baluchis, killed Pathans, ruined the Sindhis, and have totally alienated the Mohajirs - not to mention what they have done to the Kashmiris and the poor Biharis, stranded in BD. I say, split Punjab into at least three or four smaller provinces and the problem will be solved. That is what India did to E. Punjab, and it worked. Good luck.
#40 Posted by harish_hyd on January 20, 2005 6:49:18 am
#18 by Romair
[Similarly, Baluchistan needs to be divided into more parts. It constitutes one-third to half of Pakistan`s landmass. And much of its natural resources. Yet it is the control of a tiny group of tribal leaders, who have never allowed it to develop. Which is one of the reasons Baluchistan may be the most backward area in the world.]
This is a lame argument. If after almost 6 decades, the Army that controls every aspect of Pakistani life can allow a group of Sardars to hold Baluchistan hostage, it has no one but itself to blame.
[Similarly, Baluchistan needs to be divided into more parts. It constitutes one-third to half of Pakistan`s landmass. And much of its natural resources. Yet it is the control of a tiny group of tribal leaders, who have never allowed it to develop. Which is one of the reasons Baluchistan may be the most backward area in the world.]
This is a lame argument. If after almost 6 decades, the Army that controls every aspect of Pakistani life can allow a group of Sardars to hold Baluchistan hostage, it has no one but itself to blame.
#39 Posted by harish_hyd on January 20, 2005 6:49:18 am
#22 by labyrinth1
[Phew, look at the liberal class - they are now trying to bloody break Balochistan and Sind into pieces now - they did talked about breaking Punjab as well ; who are they ? break this break that - thats all you guys could talk about !]
What else can expected from the progeny of the TNT-ists?
[Phew, look at the liberal class - they are now trying to bloody break Balochistan and Sind into pieces now - they did talked about breaking Punjab as well ; who are they ? break this break that - thats all you guys could talk about !]
What else can expected from the progeny of the TNT-ists?
#38 Posted by anarejo on January 19, 2005 6:55:37 am
Baglihar vs. Kalabagh Dam:
Why is one `haraam` and other a `halaal` dam?
After ‘waffling and wavering for several years’ (as reported by a newspaper today), Pakistan has finally requested the World Bank to appoint a neutral expert to settle its Baglihar dam dispute with India.
It may be recalled that the WB had brokered the 1960 water-sharing treaty between India and Pakistan and also stands as its guarantor. The treaty gives both the countries the third party option in case of a deadlock over any issue. Article IX of the treaty provides for settling disputes through neutral expert or arbitration if they cannot be resolved between the two Indus water commissioners.
Main Pakistani objections to the Baglihar Dam revolve around the theme that the project as designed would manipulate flow of water to Pakistan`s disadvantage. “The project can lead to acute water shortages in Pakistan due to suspension of supplies for up to 28 consecutive days during certain months”, Pakistani experts say. They fear that the dam may deprive Pakistan of up to 7,000 cusecs of water per day.
Now the people of Sindh, the lower riparian province of Pakistan have similar objections against Kalabagh Dam or any other mega dam upstream. The NWFP has its own objections against the proposed Kalabagh Dam. Why is it that the governments of Punjab and Pakistan turn a blind eye to their concerns? If they object to Baglihar on similar grounds, how can they go ahead with KB or any other dam of their own? Why can’t they abide by their own argument? Why this duplicity and hypocrisy? Why the double standards?
I think it is time that the experts in water and legal matters sympathetic to the point of view of Sindh, the NWFP and Balochistan prepare their own case and request the World Bank to make them a party in the dispute.
#37 Posted by Pakfin on January 17, 2005 8:00:33 pm
Under the current thought, mega dams are not only ecological disasters, but are also not very efficient in meeting their objetives.
As regards the World Bank, it will have its own motivations for providing funding for different projects.
The major issue with Kalanbagh dam is that it will displace a lot of people up stream of the Indus and will render a lot of agricultural land uncultivable downstream. The question here is that should the country use a lot of its resources to simply transfer economic gains from Sindh and NWFP to the Punjab?
If Pakistan is for all Pakistanis, then the viewpoint of three out of four provinces should be given due consideration.
As regards the World Bank, it will have its own motivations for providing funding for different projects.
The major issue with Kalanbagh dam is that it will displace a lot of people up stream of the Indus and will render a lot of agricultural land uncultivable downstream. The question here is that should the country use a lot of its resources to simply transfer economic gains from Sindh and NWFP to the Punjab?
If Pakistan is for all Pakistanis, then the viewpoint of three out of four provinces should be given due consideration.
#36 Posted by anarejo on January 15, 2005 7:59:49 am
``Infeasibility of the Kalabagh Dam``
Here is what former IRSA Chairman, Engnr Fatehullah Khan (I don`t think he is from Sindh. He could be from the NWFP) says in another article on the life and thus the infeasibility of the Kalabagh Dam in an article in daily Dawn on November 1, 2004:
Infeasibility of the Kalabagh Dam
``For further proof of its infeasibility, refer to the KBD`s project report June 1988, page 3.9 para 3.31, which states: -
``Chas T. Main etc considered special low-level sluices to achieve very low drawdown. In that case power generation must be discontinued. Thus economic Penalty is large``. The above excerpts indicate that the KBD is neither beneficial for irrigation nor for power generation. It also shows that Kalabagh is not the suitable site for a storage dam as prefixed by WAPDA in the TOR for the consultants. It may be investigated for a barrage.
Implications: Refer to the KBD main report page 4.11 para 4.55 which emphasizes that heavy silting will take place in the 3.5 maf Attock portion of the KBD reservoir against the heavy inflow of about 90 maf of water. As KBD reservoir has the poorest CI ratio in the world, therefore it will rapidly silt up as Tarbela is fast losing its silt trap efficiency after performing 30 years of service.
The muddy Kabul River is also contributing about 110 million tons of silt equal to 0.1 maf annually in addition to 0.2 maf of silt flow from Tarbela Reservoir. Besides all above, the lurking danger of the liquefaction of 200 feet high and about 60 Km long silt island in Tarbela Reservoir would be a potential catastrophe for a down stream storage dam.
The selection and fixation of reservoir site by Wapda with the poorest CI ratio is a great mistake, as it will rapidly silt up. This is why the Kalabagh consultants have shown great concern of rapid silting in the main project report on page 3.5 para 3.17, page 4.12 para 4.57.and page 3.9 para 3.31. Few relevant excerpts are quoted below: -
I. ``Upstream of Attock the flood level are sensitive to the amount of sediment so that flood risk will increase with time``.
ii. ``The future distribution of sediment can be predicted in general terms only and local behaviour will depend on actual sediment inflows, reservoir operation and local flow pattern``.
iii. ``No immediate solution for sediment management seems to be practically viable``.
iv. ``The high sediment load carried by the Indus at Kalabagh has an important bearing on the design of Kalabagh Dam and on the operation rules of the reservoir.``
v. ``In the long run the generation of power will be on run-of-river``.
The above excerpts show that the dam is a very short lived project due to rapid silting like the original Sanmenxia Dam in China that was built with mid-level sluicing design and failed with in two years of its construction due to rapid silting and backwater flooding....``
#35 Posted by ahmedmadani on January 15, 2005 7:59:49 am
can engineer type readers can give estimate of cost for dam and pipe lines? That will be good. With fee from Iran of $ 700 million dollars per year we can almost work for next 25 years on mega projects every year and all money should be spent on Mega infrastructure project. Can any any body tell how much cost of maintainance and protection pre year? assuming 100 million dollars per year still 700-100= 600 million dollars. I think if used only for mega projects we can become like economy say ireland or turkey. Hope this money is not squandered on poors who breed like rats and make more poor. thanks
#34 Posted by anarejo on January 15, 2005 1:47:51 am
Dear participants in this discussion,
Don’t listen to the one ‘taken to color his sentiments’ that lead ‘to confrontation’, listen to the world famous author and see what he says about mega dams.
It is Patrick McCully, the Executive Director of the International Rivers Network. He has written some books on the subject and is also an Associate Editor of ‘The Ecologist’. The following passage is from his book ‘Silenced Rivers’ (page 24):
“A growing number of academic and activist researchers, however, have been building up an impressive corpus of data showing the extensive damage which dams and their associated irrigation schemes cause to watersheds, cultures and national economies. Furthermore the evidence is steadily mounting to show how dams have not fulfilled the promises made for them. Dams invariably cost much more than claimed, diverting investments from more beneficial uses. Reservoirs tend to fill with silt long before predicted and hydro plants to supply much less electricity than promised. Irrigation schemes are badly managed, destroy soils, bankrupt small farmers and turn lands used to feed local people over to the production of crops for export. Dams assist the powerful and wealthy to enclose the common land, water and forests of the politically weak. By misleading people into thinking that they cab control huge floods, dams encourage settlements on flood plains, turning damaging floods into devastating ones.”
#33 Posted by anarejo on January 15, 2005 1:47:51 am
#29 by HP
World Bank pushing the dam?
I don’t know where learned HP gets this idea. I have read statements by Pakistani Water and Power Minister and other officials saying that the government has not yet approached any financial institution for assistance to build KB Dam.
WB has financed several mega dams but after the World Commission on Dams’ report criticizing the utility of mega dams and the widespread opposition against such projects, it has pulled back from several. WB quit its support to India’s Sardar Sarovar Dam in 1993 in the face of huge movement against the dam. Two years later, the bank was pressured into pulling out of the controversial Arun III Dam in Nepal accepting the main arguments of its opponents.
I have seen a letter on e-groups by WB Country Director in Pakistan saying that the bank has not decided to finance the KB Dam and that no decision would be taken without listening to the stake-holders.
KB Dam’s life:
Sir, I don’t say it. The Indus River System River Authority, IRSA, the supreme official body on water in Pakistan rejected the Kalabagh Dam through its letter dated October 22, 1996 on the basis that: a) The Dam will be silted rather quickly. b) Its short life: 22 - 30 years. c) Poor performance. d) Comparatively lower electric generation capability.
Here is what an expert on the issue and former IRSA Chairman, Engnr. Fatehullah Khan says on the subject in an article in daily Dawn dated 13th December, 2004:
“The most serious and dangerous is the blockage of the sub-surface drainage flow from the two valleys towards the only outlet through Attock gorge. The area up stream of the Attock gorge is subjected to heavy silting. According to the KBD consultants this area is most sensitive to silting.
It will receive 0.1 maf silt annually from Kabul River and 0.2 maf from the Indus River. The consultants have estimated 540 million tons of silt flow annually at Attock.
This will hardly give a life span of about 15 to 20 years in depleting order for the 3.5 maf Attock portion of the KBD reservoir….”
HP says:
“Every Dam would have silt issue and regular maintenance should take care of that. I don’t see that to be a reason to shelve this project.”
Please tell it to WAPDA. Why don’t they ‘regularly maintain’ the Tarbela and Mangla dams and ‘take care’ of the silt problem. Why do they argue to build another dam citing the silt problem?
Have you forgot about the ‘great’ Warsak Dam? How soon it was silted and rendered useless? Do you have any idea?
Everybody supports the KB Dam except Sindhis:
This could be a candidate for the misstatement of the year!
Not once but it has been several times (7 times according to one count) that the PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES of three out of four federating units have UNANIMOUSLY passed resolutions against the construction of the Kalabagh Dam. And it happened during various governments so you can’t taint it as opinion of a certain group.
Also that one is aware of the strong opposition to KB Dam in the NWFP. How can one say that everybody supports KB Dam except Sindh? Who has forgot the great rallies of 90s when the Pukhtoons gathered at Attock and Sindhis and Balochs at Kamoo Shaheed forcing the NS government to back track on the issue?
#32 Posted by ahmedmadani on January 14, 2005 7:47:25 pm
One aspect of building dam is good. That is employment to people in construction is important. Also this will jobs for people for years and out cement factories will have lots of work. Due to that feels Iran Pakistan pipe line as well as Turkamen - pakistan and Quartar-Pak all three pipe lines be built and no need to request india. We can enjoy sweet benefits of these pipe lines and abudance of energy in pakistan. This can give boost to our industry. Once Iran and and others built pipeline we should not allow pipeline to extend to India till india govt become flexible and accept arbitaration. Also discourage profit makers to cry for trade with India. If india wants they can purchase value added gas only . No real gas to India. Sell enegy and fertilizers made at good profit. Also tell india if dam things do not stop on pakistani rivers in India , cut travelling of airmachine on pakistani territory. Also india it getting dollars from pakistanies by selling products by smuggling many things. If wall energy lines start pumping gas and new cfertilizer plants, cement plants, heroic technologies ( war hardwere) can change pakistan for ever. On reasonlly priced gas we can become work shop of middle eastern and north african countries. Unless we have huge mega peojects we can not improve. ( port is shining example how things better. Thar coal can produce electricity in too much excess and we can sell value added gasproducts and electricity. When they become dependant one just cut say tech problem or jehidis burst from pipe lines ans they talk about Kashmir problem at that time, Indians will be elastic as otherwise ruined economy based on pakistani controlled power angd gas value added products. At high level inquiry should be made how and why indian RAW played part on attack on gas fields. I think those our friends want to spread bad reputation that gas piple line is braeking etc. Let us hope time of mega projects arrive and little projects do not waste talent and energy. May K B dam be built sooner for industrial revival. Good feb 05. good luck
#31 Posted by M.B.Z.Isphahani on January 14, 2005 6:43:00 pm
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#30 Posted by Romair on January 14, 2005 2:29:51 pm
HisExcellency #23:`` You are describing the long-term result of bifurcating Punjab into 3 smaller provinces. In the short-term (5-10 years), however the three provinces (Potohar, Punjab and Seraikistan) will continue to vote collectively and identically on most issues.``
This may prove to be correct, or it may not prove to be correct. However, what other option is there? The provinces have to be broken up in some manner. Might as well start now. Another solution would be to break all of Pakistan into district size provinces.
I really doubt too many people in smaller provinces will complain if Punjab is broken up. I think they are crying out for it. Why would they complain? Punjabis, inside Punjab are not a uniform group. There are actually Saraiki province small scale movements going on. Why would Potoharis feel closer to Lahoris than to NWFP. The main profession in Potohar is the military. And in that they have far more in common with district Kohat than with any Punjabi district. And why would Saraikis feel closer to Lahoris than to Sindhis? Just because they happen to be geographically in one province currently? That is not enough of a reason.
In the end, politics is local. People`s loyalties are to their neighborhood and their city. Potoharis and Sarakis etc. will only look for their own interests. People in Multan would be far more concerned about Multan than about Gujranwala.
Similarly in Baluchistan, you have a few tribal leaders controlling half of Pakistan. And all of Baluchistan. If the coast is turned into a Mekran province, it may want to develop independently of Quetta. I am sure the people of Gwadar would want a big town there. Why should Bugti sitting up north or Mazari sitting in Karachi be allowed to control what they want.
The end aim should be to divide everything into equal manageable units. And not have one group completely dominate all others in geographical or populational size. Punjab has a population of 70 to 80 million. Canada has a population 40% of that and has 10 provinces and three territories. Punjab itself could be divided into 15 provinces, if required. How many provinces did India have in 47? How many does it have now?
This may prove to be correct, or it may not prove to be correct. However, what other option is there? The provinces have to be broken up in some manner. Might as well start now. Another solution would be to break all of Pakistan into district size provinces.
I really doubt too many people in smaller provinces will complain if Punjab is broken up. I think they are crying out for it. Why would they complain? Punjabis, inside Punjab are not a uniform group. There are actually Saraiki province small scale movements going on. Why would Potoharis feel closer to Lahoris than to NWFP. The main profession in Potohar is the military. And in that they have far more in common with district Kohat than with any Punjabi district. And why would Saraikis feel closer to Lahoris than to Sindhis? Just because they happen to be geographically in one province currently? That is not enough of a reason.
In the end, politics is local. People`s loyalties are to their neighborhood and their city. Potoharis and Sarakis etc. will only look for their own interests. People in Multan would be far more concerned about Multan than about Gujranwala.
Similarly in Baluchistan, you have a few tribal leaders controlling half of Pakistan. And all of Baluchistan. If the coast is turned into a Mekran province, it may want to develop independently of Quetta. I am sure the people of Gwadar would want a big town there. Why should Bugti sitting up north or Mazari sitting in Karachi be allowed to control what they want.
The end aim should be to divide everything into equal manageable units. And not have one group completely dominate all others in geographical or populational size. Punjab has a population of 70 to 80 million. Canada has a population 40% of that and has 10 provinces and three territories. Punjab itself could be divided into 15 provinces, if required. How many provinces did India have in 47? How many does it have now?
#29 Posted by HP on January 14, 2005 9:15:24 am
#25 by anarejo
Narejo,
The World Bank has been pushing the Dam for the Last 25 years and they are fronting the money for it. If this dam had a lifespan of only 20 years, they would not have supported it for such a long time. I doubt that the WB engineering staff is so incompetent that they would not see some thing like that.
Every Dam would have silt issue and regular maintenance should take care of that. I don’t see that to be a reason to shelve this project.
I also looked thru the links that you provided.
First let me state this clearly. SANA and its leaders like Iqbal Tareen, Zahid Makhdoom and Mehar Shah still live in 30 years old politics. The dynamics and the politics in Sindh have changed so much that I am not willing to invest too much capital with these Guys. I did meet Mehar Shah in Karachi about 2-3 years ago. He was trying to break into Sindhi politics but he is so far off that there is nothing for him there. I am sure he is back in the US now.
Getting back to the issue. None of the article that you provided links to showed any economic loss to Sindh due to KB DAM. Barring their unsubstantiated stories about palla Machi. Yes! I enjoyed Palla at Jamshoro and Kotri but it is not the single most important thing in Sindhi life. If they have lost 4500 tons already, another loss of 500 tons would not mean much. In history many species have disappeared due to human progress and we can mourn the loss of palla but it is not enough to work against the progress.
The coal in Thar- if it was so hot many companies would have lined up to mine that, but only Chinese are working there and they are still doing initial estimation and explorations.
Power needs are not going to diminish; they are going to increase in the coming years and KB Dam is not going to fulfill all of them. So if in future Thar coal can be used for Power generation that would be good, but stopping KB based on some assumptions has no merit whatsoever.
Most of the people that would suffer would be from Punjab and NWFP and they wanna go with the project and Sindhi nationalist opposition to the Dam is just empty politicking not much substance to it.
Again, I repeat that Sindh would benefit from constant supply of water instead of relying on Barani areas for bulk of its products.
Paucity of water is an important reason to create storage for bad times not otherwise.
#28 Posted by M.B.Z.Isphahani on January 14, 2005 7:49:53 am
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#27 Posted by MantoLives on January 14, 2005 7:49:53 am
The issue can be solved by strengthening democracy, and if the people of Pakistan decide that no, it should not be built then we should seek alternatives. I agree with HP`s position on the matter ofcourse. I have no doubt that the building of a damn like Kalabagh is essential, but it should not be done at the cost of any federating unit. I must say the author is often taken to color his sentiments... this leads to confrontation.
#26 Posted by MantoLives on January 14, 2005 7:49:53 am
I think the division of Punjab into three provinces is a good idea. The arguments provided against it by His Excellency are flimsy at best. Three linguistic provinces will develop an identity soon enough, and it will help new urban centers to develop.
Let us not forget ... that NWFP once upon a time, a long long time ago, was part of the Punjab province. It is important to remember that the name Punjabi does not denote an ethnicity, but the land of five rivers, just like Sindh represents the land of Indus. In this respect every Pakistani is a Sindhi and a Punjabi. I know this is a very simplistic argument to make but this goes to show that new divisions will be adopted by Pakistanis, just give them a chance.
Let us not forget ... that NWFP once upon a time, a long long time ago, was part of the Punjab province. It is important to remember that the name Punjabi does not denote an ethnicity, but the land of five rivers, just like Sindh represents the land of Indus. In this respect every Pakistani is a Sindhi and a Punjabi. I know this is a very simplistic argument to make but this goes to show that new divisions will be adopted by Pakistanis, just give them a chance.
#25 Posted by anarejo on January 14, 2005 12:58:19 am
#7 fnahmad and other participants,
Mega Dams: some alternatives
It is wrong to say that if new dams are not constructed, there won`t be any progress or development in the country and that there are no alternatives to the construction of new dams.
Dams are mainly constructed for generating power and irrigation purposes. For electricity, `Run of the River` dams can be built as the Ghazi Barotha Dam. Coal may be used to build huge power plants. For irrigation purposes, small, carry over dams can be built. Lining of watercourses and some of the canals can greatly help. Improving water management is another key to increased agriculture production.
Conservation: misuse and wastage of water has to end and measures have to be taken including educating the people to conserve this precious natural resource.
Wastage in system: During past few years, there has been 102-104 MAF of water available in the system. Out of which approximately 55 MAF is wasted in the system. Besides the wastage through seepage and evaporation in the rivers and dam reservoirs, a large quantity is wasted in canals, distributaries, and watercourses and due to the flood irrigation system. A substantial quantity could be saved through lining the canals, the distributaries and watercourses and by adopting better irrigation system. The water thus saved could equal to 4 to 5 Kalabagh or Bhasha size dams. You could imagine how much more land could be brought under cultivation if such measures are taken.
Population: Water availability is not going to drastically increase. Recent studies of Himalaya glaciers tell us that water availability may even decrease in coming years due to changing weather patterns (another argument against mega dams). On the other hand the population keeps increasing. That will put immense pressure on available water in coming years. There is a need to have an effective control over population increase.
Greed must end: most of the problems have been created due to the greed of powerful feudal lobbies in the upper riparian Punjab province. Chashma-Jehlum and Taunsa-Panjnad link canals were built with an understanding that they will be operated only in flood months. Now they are operated the year around. Greater Thal Canal is being built over the objections of the lower riparian province. Similarly Reinee and Kachhi canals are being built without taking the availability of water into account. They will create another big farming lobby that will put more demands on water.
De-silting of Tarbela Dam: one of the arguments for a new dam is that Tarbela has lost storage capacity substantially due to silting (although we haven’t filled Tarbela and Mangla dams this year despite their lost capacity). Many experts have suggested ways to overcome that problem. In 1997 TAMS, the designers of Tarbela Dam, had conducted a study that recommended sediment sluicing to meet the problem. It advised that Tarbela would become a perpetual storage of 6 million acre feet if new tunnels and an underwater dyke were constructed for its proper sediment sluicing.
In 1998 an eminent American engineer, who had spent about 6 years at Tarbela and many years with TAMS, had advised the ministry of water and power that by using the existing low-level tunnels 3 and 4 for sediment sluicing the existing storage capacity of Tarbela can be preserved, without the construction of new tunnels and dyke.
Syed Shahid Husain, former Secretary Water and Power, also strongly advocated the use of tunnels 3 and 4 for the sediment sluicing of Tarbela. Experts suggest that the expenditure on the de-silting process would only be a fraction of the cost of a dam. Raising the height of Mangla would also provide an increased storage capacity to offset any loss.
Mangla Dam: we will have increased capacity to store water in Mangla Dam after its height is raised. However the dam shouldn’t be filled before meeting the requirements of the lower riparian province.
Dear participants, these measures will cost a lot less than mega dams and will not divide the people making them enemies forever. I hope we will not support the plans forwarded by vested interests that will lead to the weakening of the federation. One hopes sense will prevail before it is too late.
Aziz
#24 Posted by anarejo on January 13, 2005 10:41:11 pm
Building mega dams is an extremely important issue. It requires huge amounts of money – at least 10-15 billion dollars if all the aspects are considered. Spending that much money on a project that has a life span of only 22-30 years is a sheer wastage of resources. It is not worth it. The dam will be silted before we even pay off the debts incurred on it. It will bankrupt the country and be a source of division and infighting during its operational years.
Another thing to keep in mind is that THE DAMS STORE WATER, THEY DON’T CREATE WATER. If there is no water in the river system, what good a dam will do? It will be empty at least 4 out of 5 years and 24 out of 30 years (its maximum life).
Why do you want to waste national resources on an infeasible project?
Someone has given example of China and India building mega dams. Please also note the protests in those countries against mega dams. Also read about the disasters due to the failure of dams in China. And the reports against mega dams by World Commission on Dams and the International Rivers Network.
If anybody is interested in reading on technical aspects of this project, please visit the following links:
Engr. ANG Abbasi and Engr. Abdul Majid Qazi: Kalabagh Dam: Look Before Your Leap: http://www.sanalist.org/kalabagh/a-7.htm
Engnr. Iftikhar Ahmed: Kalabagh Dam -- Development or disaster? http://www.sanalist.org/kalabagh/a-10.htm
Dr. Shaheen Rafi Khan: The Kalabagh Controversy: http://www.sanalist.org/kalabagh/a-14.htm
Chief Engnr. A A Musalman: Rivers water dispute: Making of a tragedy-I: http://www.sanalist.org/kalabagh/a-21.htm
Chief Engnr. A A Musalman: Rivers water dispute: Harvest of problems-II: http://www.sanalist.org/kalabagh/a-22.htm
#23 Posted by HisExcellency on January 13, 2005 9:28:32 pm
Urstruly #19
Mr. Bugti may be speaking the truth about DSG involvement in Shazia rape case... but he has no absolutely no right to be judge, jury and executioner simultaneously. There is an elected government in Baluchistan that is investigating this matter. The Baluchistan High Court is also scheduled to launch a judicial probe into the rape case from Jan 17. There are a dozen independent TV channels and newspapers that are covering this story. What is the justification then for storming the Sui gas plant and killing several civilians, FC and DSG guards? What is the justification for cutting off gas supply to thousands of homes in NWFP and northern Punjab? Why should millions of people be punished for a mishap that involves just one unfortunate lady and three perverts?
With these medieval tactics, Nawab Bugti has succeeded in alienating many people who otherwise oppose military rule and favor political dialogue with the Balochi nationalists.
Romair #21
``If Punjab is divided into Potohar, Punjab and Saraiki province, these provinces will soon develop their own identities.``
You are describing the long-term result of bifurcating Punjab into 3 smaller provinces. In the short-term (5-10 years), however the three provinces (Potohar, Punjab and Seraikistan) will continue to vote collectively and identically on most issues. This is because of widespread intermarriages between the dominant families of these regions. Many north Punjabi industrialists have factories in southern Punjab, southern Punjabi traders have retail shops in central punjab, etc.
Do non-Punjabis have the patience to wait for more than 10-15 years for the 3 Punjabi provinces to evolve their own identity? What if one of the new provinces starts to dominate the rest of the provinces because of its sheer economic might? I say this because central Punjab is richer than both Southern Punjab (Seraiki belt) and northern Punjab (Potohar).
It is quite possible that people from Lahore, Sargodha, Faisalabad, Sialkot, Gujrat and Jhang will start dominating NWFP, Baluchistan, Sindh as well as southern and north punjabi cities such as Dera Ghazi Khan, Rajanpur, Bahawalpur and Rawalpindi.
Mr. Bugti may be speaking the truth about DSG involvement in Shazia rape case... but he has no absolutely no right to be judge, jury and executioner simultaneously. There is an elected government in Baluchistan that is investigating this matter. The Baluchistan High Court is also scheduled to launch a judicial probe into the rape case from Jan 17. There are a dozen independent TV channels and newspapers that are covering this story. What is the justification then for storming the Sui gas plant and killing several civilians, FC and DSG guards? What is the justification for cutting off gas supply to thousands of homes in NWFP and northern Punjab? Why should millions of people be punished for a mishap that involves just one unfortunate lady and three perverts?
With these medieval tactics, Nawab Bugti has succeeded in alienating many people who otherwise oppose military rule and favor political dialogue with the Balochi nationalists.
Romair #21
``If Punjab is divided into Potohar, Punjab and Saraiki province, these provinces will soon develop their own identities.``
You are describing the long-term result of bifurcating Punjab into 3 smaller provinces. In the short-term (5-10 years), however the three provinces (Potohar, Punjab and Seraikistan) will continue to vote collectively and identically on most issues. This is because of widespread intermarriages between the dominant families of these regions. Many north Punjabi industrialists have factories in southern Punjab, southern Punjabi traders have retail shops in central punjab, etc.
Do non-Punjabis have the patience to wait for more than 10-15 years for the 3 Punjabi provinces to evolve their own identity? What if one of the new provinces starts to dominate the rest of the provinces because of its sheer economic might? I say this because central Punjab is richer than both Southern Punjab (Seraiki belt) and northern Punjab (Potohar).
It is quite possible that people from Lahore, Sargodha, Faisalabad, Sialkot, Gujrat and Jhang will start dominating NWFP, Baluchistan, Sindh as well as southern and north punjabi cities such as Dera Ghazi Khan, Rajanpur, Bahawalpur and Rawalpindi.
#22 Posted by labyrinth1 on January 13, 2005 3:53:20 pm
Phew, look at the liberal class - they are now trying to bloody break Balochistan and Sind into pieces now - they did talked about breaking Punjab as well ; who are they ? break this break that - thats all you guys could talk about !
#21 Posted by Romair on January 13, 2005 3:36:48 pm
HisExcellency #20: There is no country in the world (that I know of, at least) where one province has a higher population than the rest of the provinces combined. Other than Pakistan. And in Pakistan`s case it is not marginally higher, it is significantly higher. Nearly, 2/3rd of the Pakistani population lives in Punjab. The largest province in USA (California) has only 1/10th the population of the whole country.....
The other country that comes to mind was the USSR, with Russia. Look what happened there. And Yoguslavia with Serbia may have been in a similar situation. Or very close. And look what happened there, as well. Hence, the concept of having one such large province has been rejected by the whole world. It won`t work for too long in Pakistan, either.
The current divisions of Pakistan into provinces does not map to any sort of logic. Neither based on linguistic divisions, alone. Or even purely ethnic divisions. And definitely not in terms of management units. The biggest Pushto speaking city in Pakistan is not Peshawar. It is Karachi. The second highest spoken language of Pakistan is Sindhi at 12%. However, Saraiki is third highest at 10%. Urdu is fourth at 8%. And only 3% of Pakistan speaks Baluchi. Punjabi being first at around 45%.
Yet, Punjab has veto power, just by itself in the Assembly. No law can pass if Punjab refuses it. However, for any law to be stopped, all the other three provinces have to gang up on Punjab in the Senate. In addition, 3% Baluchi speakers control nearly half of the geographical area of Pakistan and so many of its natural resources (actually less than 3%, since all the Baluchi speakers do not live in Baluchistan).
If Punjab is divided into Potohar, Punjab and Saraiki province, these provinces will soon develop their own identities. Specifically Saraiki province, which has a distinct language of its own, and has as much common with Sind as it does with Punjab. How many of the Saints of Multan migrated there from Punjab and how many from Sindh? Multan, historically, at one time was the capital of Sindh.....
Similarly Potohar will also slowly develop its own priorities. Even though it does not have a distinctly different language. Nearly all the Kashmiris in Pakistan speak Punjabi, yet their loyalties are with Kashmir, before Punjab. Similarly Potohar with borders on Kashmir will develop a similar loyalty to its own new province. In addition, contrary to popular belief, the Pakistani military does not come from all of Punjab. It comes from Potohar and southeastern NWFP. This will also give a new province its own identity. A Punjabi in Chakwal heads for the Army, one in Lahore for business and one in Multan to grow Chaunsa mangoes. Hence Potohar will find commonalities with Kashmir and NWFP. And Saraiki province with Sind. I don`t think Saraiki speakers are too enthusiastic to live with Punjab to begin with.
These provinces will votes differently in the Assembly and in the Senate. As they will evolve into distinct etities. Do keep in mind that under the British, NWFP and Punjab were managed jointly. Even if they don`t, at least one province on its own will not be able to veto (or pass) any bill in the Assembly........
Regardless of what criteria one uses for division (I have just presented one), these current provincial structure has to be reorganized. I don`t think too many smaller provinces will complain about the Senate. It is the NA which is important. The Senate is just important in stopping a law. It won`t need to be stopped if it is not created in the first place.
More on Baluchistan later........
The other country that comes to mind was the USSR, with Russia. Look what happened there. And Yoguslavia with Serbia may have been in a similar situation. Or very close. And look what happened there, as well. Hence, the concept of having one such large province has been rejected by the whole world. It won`t work for too long in Pakistan, either.
The current divisions of Pakistan into provinces does not map to any sort of logic. Neither based on linguistic divisions, alone. Or even purely ethnic divisions. And definitely not in terms of management units. The biggest Pushto speaking city in Pakistan is not Peshawar. It is Karachi. The second highest spoken language of Pakistan is Sindhi at 12%. However, Saraiki is third highest at 10%. Urdu is fourth at 8%. And only 3% of Pakistan speaks Baluchi. Punjabi being first at around 45%.
Yet, Punjab has veto power, just by itself in the Assembly. No law can pass if Punjab refuses it. However, for any law to be stopped, all the other three provinces have to gang up on Punjab in the Senate. In addition, 3% Baluchi speakers control nearly half of the geographical area of Pakistan and so many of its natural resources (actually less than 3%, since all the Baluchi speakers do not live in Baluchistan).
If Punjab is divided into Potohar, Punjab and Saraiki province, these provinces will soon develop their own identities. Specifically Saraiki province, which has a distinct language of its own, and has as much common with Sind as it does with Punjab. How many of the Saints of Multan migrated there from Punjab and how many from Sindh? Multan, historically, at one time was the capital of Sindh.....
Similarly Potohar will also slowly develop its own priorities. Even though it does not have a distinctly different language. Nearly all the Kashmiris in Pakistan speak Punjabi, yet their loyalties are with Kashmir, before Punjab. Similarly Potohar with borders on Kashmir will develop a similar loyalty to its own new province. In addition, contrary to popular belief, the Pakistani military does not come from all of Punjab. It comes from Potohar and southeastern NWFP. This will also give a new province its own identity. A Punjabi in Chakwal heads for the Army, one in Lahore for business and one in Multan to grow Chaunsa mangoes. Hence Potohar will find commonalities with Kashmir and NWFP. And Saraiki province with Sind. I don`t think Saraiki speakers are too enthusiastic to live with Punjab to begin with.
These provinces will votes differently in the Assembly and in the Senate. As they will evolve into distinct etities. Do keep in mind that under the British, NWFP and Punjab were managed jointly. Even if they don`t, at least one province on its own will not be able to veto (or pass) any bill in the Assembly........
Regardless of what criteria one uses for division (I have just presented one), these current provincial structure has to be reorganized. I don`t think too many smaller provinces will complain about the Senate. It is the NA which is important. The Senate is just important in stopping a law. It won`t need to be stopped if it is not created in the first place.
More on Baluchistan later........
#20 Posted by HisExcellency on January 13, 2005 2:01:29 pm
Romair #18
Division of Punjab into 3 smaller provinces ( Upper Punjab, Central Punjab, Southern Punjab ) and division of Baluchistan into 2 provinces could certainly reduce the anti-Punjabi sentiment. But it would further dilute the relative power of NWFP and Sind vis-a-vis Punjab in the Senate.
Consider. At present, the breakdown of Senate is:
Baluchistan: 20 seats
NWFP : 20 seats
Punjab: 20 seats
Sindh: 20 seats
TOTAL = 80 seats
With 3 additional provinces:
Baluchistan #1: 20 seats
Baluchistan #2: 20 seats
NWFP: 20 seats
Upper Punjab: 20 seats
Central Punjab: 20 seats
Southern Punjab: 20 seats
Sindh: 20 seats
TOTAL = 140 seats
Unlike the present Senate in which Punjab enjoys 25% seats, the new Senate will give 43% seats! Baluchis will enjoy a marginal increase from 25% to 29% seats... but NWFP and Sindh will complain because their share of Senate seats will decrease from 25% to 14%. The creation of more provinces could exacerbate the balance of power between the provinces, instead of improving it.
Secondly, even if we decide to create more provinces, that decision should be separate from the decision to construct Kalabagh dam. Even if Musharraf gives the green light to build Kalabagh Dam, the construction could take 5-10 years. In contrast, the decision to create new provinces shall take less than 5 years including the parliamentary debate, consensus building, preparation and implementation phases. We should not delay the construction of Kalabagh dam until that time.
Division of Punjab into 3 smaller provinces ( Upper Punjab, Central Punjab, Southern Punjab ) and division of Baluchistan into 2 provinces could certainly reduce the anti-Punjabi sentiment. But it would further dilute the relative power of NWFP and Sind vis-a-vis Punjab in the Senate.
Consider. At present, the breakdown of Senate is:
Baluchistan: 20 seats
NWFP : 20 seats
Punjab: 20 seats
Sindh: 20 seats
TOTAL = 80 seats
With 3 additional provinces:
Baluchistan #1: 20 seats
Baluchistan #2: 20 seats
NWFP: 20 seats
Upper Punjab: 20 seats
Central Punjab: 20 seats
Southern Punjab: 20 seats
Sindh: 20 seats
TOTAL = 140 seats
Unlike the present Senate in which Punjab enjoys 25% seats, the new Senate will give 43% seats! Baluchis will enjoy a marginal increase from 25% to 29% seats... but NWFP and Sindh will complain because their share of Senate seats will decrease from 25% to 14%. The creation of more provinces could exacerbate the balance of power between the provinces, instead of improving it.
Secondly, even if we decide to create more provinces, that decision should be separate from the decision to construct Kalabagh dam. Even if Musharraf gives the green light to build Kalabagh Dam, the construction could take 5-10 years. In contrast, the decision to create new provinces shall take less than 5 years including the parliamentary debate, consensus building, preparation and implementation phases. We should not delay the construction of Kalabagh dam until that time.
#19 Posted by Urstruly on January 13, 2005 1:23:58 pm
HE
Is it possible that Bugti might be telling the truth? Why are you so certain that a government whose head lies and breaks every promise in front of 150 million people on TV without blinking an eye is telling the truth?
Romair:
As you so often advise to Hindus on Kashmir, don`t you think that GOP should also allow Human Rights orgs and journalist`s (even Pakistanis for crying out loud) entry into Waziristan and Baluchistan first - what do you say?
Is it possible that Bugti might be telling the truth? Why are you so certain that a government whose head lies and breaks every promise in front of 150 million people on TV without blinking an eye is telling the truth?
Romair:
As you so often advise to Hindus on Kashmir, don`t you think that GOP should also allow Human Rights orgs and journalist`s (even Pakistanis for crying out loud) entry into Waziristan and Baluchistan first - what do you say?
#18 Posted by Romair on January 13, 2005 12:34:35 pm
The solution to this, and similar, problems is to divide Punjab into three or more pieces. There is a huge amount of dislike for Punjabis, amongst non-Punjabis. Most Punjabis don`t realize how huge this dislike happens to be. At the same time, there isn`t much of a dislike to Pakistan, amongst non-Punjabis; except at the fringes.
Punjab, just by virtue of its population dominates Pakistan in a manner, no other province or unit dominates any country. Due to this, any suggestion, be it good or bad, can always be portrayed as bad easily, through the anti-Punjab factor.
Similarly, Baluchistan needs to be divided into more parts. It constitutes one-third to half of Pakistan`s landmass. And much of its natural resources. Yet it is the control of a tiny group of tribal leaders, who have never allowed it to develop. Which is one of the reasons Baluchistan may be the most backward area in the world.
I don`t think there is any way to protect the Baluchi identity. It is too small a population. Infact much of Baluchistan doesn`t even speak Baluchi. And some of the main Baluchi tribes, like Legharis sit inside Punjab. If there is development in Baluchistan, like the gigantic Gwadar initiative, where are the skills going to come from? They should come from Baluchistan, first. But they don`t exist there. Eventually, they will come from Punjab and Karachi.
And pretty soon Punjabi speakers and Urdu speakers will end up in large numbers in Baluchistan. They other alternative is for Baluchistan to remain as backwards as it is, under the control of tribal leaders, who live in Karachi, themselves, and send their own kids abroad to study.......
Provincial nationalism is very valid if it is based on the argument that other provinces are usurping the resources of a province (Sui gas, water, taxes etc.). It is an invalid argument if it is designed to ensure the power of a ruling class........
Punjab, just by virtue of its population dominates Pakistan in a manner, no other province or unit dominates any country. Due to this, any suggestion, be it good or bad, can always be portrayed as bad easily, through the anti-Punjab factor.
Similarly, Baluchistan needs to be divided into more parts. It constitutes one-third to half of Pakistan`s landmass. And much of its natural resources. Yet it is the control of a tiny group of tribal leaders, who have never allowed it to develop. Which is one of the reasons Baluchistan may be the most backward area in the world.
I don`t think there is any way to protect the Baluchi identity. It is too small a population. Infact much of Baluchistan doesn`t even speak Baluchi. And some of the main Baluchi tribes, like Legharis sit inside Punjab. If there is development in Baluchistan, like the gigantic Gwadar initiative, where are the skills going to come from? They should come from Baluchistan, first. But they don`t exist there. Eventually, they will come from Punjab and Karachi.
And pretty soon Punjabi speakers and Urdu speakers will end up in large numbers in Baluchistan. They other alternative is for Baluchistan to remain as backwards as it is, under the control of tribal leaders, who live in Karachi, themselves, and send their own kids abroad to study.......
Provincial nationalism is very valid if it is based on the argument that other provinces are usurping the resources of a province (Sui gas, water, taxes etc.). It is an invalid argument if it is designed to ensure the power of a ruling class........
#17 Posted by Ally on January 13, 2005 11:25:36 am
has anyone read the book by Arundhati Roy where she talks about the Nimada Dam, and how it is in fact useless and costs more than what it produces!
She also mentions how Pakistan has already messed up its landscape becasue of the dams we have built. There are alternatives that need to be looked into seriously. Most of the developed world knows that dams are not good, and casue more damage than good, and have now abondened them.
I think the book is called the cost of living, or something like that. Very small and readable.
She also mentions how Pakistan has already messed up its landscape becasue of the dams we have built. There are alternatives that need to be looked into seriously. Most of the developed world knows that dams are not good, and casue more damage than good, and have now abondened them.
I think the book is called the cost of living, or something like that. Very small and readable.
#16 Posted by HisExcellency on January 13, 2005 11:25:36 am
The Pakistan and Gulf Economist magazine addressed this issue in two articles. I am posting the most recent one (published in the Oct 6-12, 2003 issue):
THE ISSUE OF KALABAGH DAM: Need to develop consensus
by Syed Muhammad Aslam
Should Kalabagh Dam be built? It is extremely expensive, offer limited benefits, have short life, is rejected by three of the four provinces and was shelved three years ago by the former federal cabinet of the President Pervez Musharraf who has recently vowed to go along with the plan.
One of the most important prerequisite for the construction of a mega dam like Kalabagh is the adequate and reliable availability of water and one of the top criteria for it is that it must have water four years out of five. Critics of the dam in the engineering sector say that Kalabagh does not fulfil this extremely essential criterion. They also say that the figures presented by the WAPDA about the availability of water is misleading because it basis it on the quantity of water whose roots are in India and thus unreliable.
Critics also say that the life of dam is too short and its cost too exorbitant to make it a highly uneconomical project. They say that the life of the dam is only 28 years once Tarbela silts because it is located downstream of Tarbela. In addition, since it is downstream, Kalabagh would in no way be able to improve Tarbela`s life-expectancy. In addition, the Kalabagh has the lowest capacity inflow ratio in the world — 0.26:1 once again resulting in short life span.
Professionals among the engineering community also say that Kalabagh is an unfeasible project geographically. They say that it has unnatural dam site — narrow valley for storage and a long length and would allow to waste flood water without storing it to avoid desilting. It would store perennial water flaring up water disputes between the provinces and the storing perennial water, for power generation would affect the availability of irrigation water to crops, particularly to the lower regions of the country. Power generation by storing perennial water can affect timely irrigation which can have a disastrous impact on agrarian economy like Pakistan.
The strong opposition to the construction of Kalabagh Dam, however, in no way lessens the problem related to the scarcity of irrigation water in the country which becomes extremely severe at times due to extended dry spells in the last few years. For instance Tarbela Dam did not fill up till August 31, 2000 for the first time since its commissioning in 1974 falling short by 15 to 16 feet from its maximum level of 1550 feet.
The meeting of the then federal cabinet which decided to shelf the Kalabagh Dam plan was held on August 30, 2000 and was attended by then Punjab governor, Lt. Gen. (retd) Muhammad Safdar, Federal Minister for Environment, Umer Asghar Khan, advisor to the Chief Executive on Agriculture and Irrigation Shafi Niaz, and Minister of Science and Technology Dr. Atta-ur-Rehman. It was briefed by the chairman WAPDA Lt. Gen. Zulfiqar Ali Khan during which the participants voiced the reservations of the smaller provinces on the project. The representatives of the Sindh government raised questions over the supply of irrigation schemes by WAPDA asking to wait for few more years about the project so as to maintain the national unity understanding fully well, the strong sentiments that Kalabagh evokes in their province.
The meeting of the federal cabinet ended with a direction given to the WAPDA to identify the potential sites for the construction of small dams in all the four provinces so as to enhance water reservoir storage capacity for the future. It is easy to see that there is no disagreement about the necessity to build water reservoirs but there is no consensus about Kalabagh.
HISTORY AND TECHNICALITIES
Pakistan has 3 main rivers — Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. Mangla Dam is located on the Jhelum river and Tarbela Dam on the Indus river. The absence of surplus water resource on the Jhelum river renders it incapable for housing another storage dam in addition to Mangla. On the other hand, there is no suitable site on the Chenab river where a storage dam can be built. The River Indus, thus, remains the only river with substantial water resource available to house additional storage dam, and even dams, besides Tarbela. Kalabagh is one such site which was identified along with Mangla and Tarbela.
The Kalabagh Dam is proposed to be located on the River Indus at about 120 miles downstream of Tarbela Dam, 92 miles downstream the confluence of Kabul and Indus Rivers and 16 miles upstream of the existing Jinnah Barrage. The site is a narrow and deep channel extending over 5-mile distance where the river is about 1,300 feet wide.
One of the major reason for the insistence to build a storage dam at Kalabagh is that it is the only option ready for immediate implementation supported by number of surveys and feasibility studies costing billions of rupees.
The planners and water engineers realised that storage dams are the only option to utilize the water resource of Indus river system for the future economic progress of Pakistan soon after the country gained independence in 1947. The Central Engineering Authority with the help of Dams Investigation Circle of Punjab Irrigation Department identified three sites suitable for large storage reservoirs by the early 1950s. Kalabagh along with Mangla and Tarbela was one of the three sites identified. Mangla and Tarbela were selected for Indus Basin Project while Kalabagh was earmarked for the next development programme.
In 1972, the work of preparing a proper feasibility report was assigned to Associated Consulting Engineers (Pvt) Ltd. of Pakistan. The company also appointed a board of international experts to review the progress at each stage. The experts were taken in various disciplines of dam engineering and from different countries, to benefit from a wide range of opinion in specialized fields.
The feasibility report, spread over 8 volumes, was submitted in 1975 and received a good response. Its copies were supplied to provincial governments and all other related agencies, in both government and non-government sectors. The overall reaction immediately after submission of the feasibility report was favourable. During the post-feasibility period of 1975 to 1979 reviews and consultations continued between at various bodies related to planning and the government finally took the decision that Kalabagh Project should be sponsored as a top priority project for seeking aid from international funding agencies.
Pakistan approached UNDP in 1979 for sanctioning of a grant to finance the cost of detailed engineering study of this project. It was approved by the UNDP which also nominating the World Bank as the implementing agency. The Bank sent its own appraisal mission in June 1980, who gave the approval, after a thorough scrutiny of the feasibility report and other documents and inspection of the site. They found the project ``technically sound and economically viable``. In February 1982 a joint venture under the name of ``Kalabagh Consultants` comprising of Binnie & Partners of UK, Harza Engineering Co. of USA, Mott Ewbank Preece Ltd. of UK, Associated Consulting Engineers & NESPAK of Pakistan were fielded to carry out Project Planning, Detailed Design and preparation of Contract Documents for the Project.
The new group once again reviewed the previous work done and satisfied themselves with the major parameters of the project before proceeding with the detailed project planning study. In this phase, several research type studies and investigations were undertaken to elaborate various aspects of design, construction and operation of the Project. State-of-the-art techniques using computerized methods of analysis and modelling were utilized for the studies in this stage.
During the course of engineering studies an independent Panel of Experts, was also constituted by the World Bank, to progressively review the consultants work and to advise them. Members of this panel were eminent world experts in related fields and were drawn from different countries. In addition to the panel, specialists on specific subjects were invited from time to time for giving their views on selected topics, where needed.
An independent review panel was also constituted by the Government of Pakistan consisting of eminent Pakistani engineers to review the Project Planning Report. It consisted of Engr. Manzoor Ahmed Sheikh, Engr. Asghar Ali Abidi and Engr. Shah Nawaz Khan. This panel also concurred with the Project Planning Report and supported its recommendations.
By the end of 1987, all the reviews, refinements and clarifications were incorporated in the project scheme and properly documented. With this the project was ready to be launched in the construction stage.
THE CONTROVERSY
Perhaps the single most important reason for the strong sentiments that Kalabagh project invokes is the shroud of secrecy surrounding its planning. The critics say that the mega project favoured by a single province and the secrecy surrounding the planning, designing and implementation of the project has made smaller provinces extremely suspicious. They also say that the insistence to build Kalabagh in an era when big dams have gone out of fashion globally and when other possible alternatives are available is dividing the people at a time when unity is most essential.
Critics also blamed WAPDA for creating the controversy for failing to consult the provinces at all stages of the project from planning, designing and implementation till the completion of its detail design as late as by 1985. Otherwise, what could explain the strong opposition to the Kalabagh project in the late 1980s after receiving initial good response after the submission of feasibility study in 1975?
The statements from the responsible officials of the federal government have also created confusion instead of clarifying the issue. For instance, the government of Punjab as well as WAPDA first declared Kalabagh dam as only a storage dam to offset the storage loss of Tarbela and Mangla Dams due to sedimentation. Later it was promoted as a project vital for generation of inexpensive hydel power and still later it was announced that the project would also have Left and Right Bank canals for irrigation purposes. This perpetually changing additions and the ensuing confusion helped turn the project into a controversial mess that its in today.
The lack of public disclosure of all the relevant facts regarding selection criteria, planning parameters, design guidelines, cost estimates, environmental and socio-economic assessments, government`s priorities, and financing mechanism of the planned construction have also added fuel to the fire. Also missing is the impact of the project on the human displacement in a country where tens of thousands of affectees of the other dams remain uncompensated after the passage of decades and also the concerns about the impact that would have on the environment and the surrounding areas. The situation is further complicated in a country where rows between the provinces about the equitable distribution of water despite the presence of Indus River System Authority, a high-level body constituted just this for purpose.
THE ISSUE OF KALABAGH DAM: Need to develop consensus
by Syed Muhammad Aslam
Should Kalabagh Dam be built? It is extremely expensive, offer limited benefits, have short life, is rejected by three of the four provinces and was shelved three years ago by the former federal cabinet of the President Pervez Musharraf who has recently vowed to go along with the plan.
One of the most important prerequisite for the construction of a mega dam like Kalabagh is the adequate and reliable availability of water and one of the top criteria for it is that it must have water four years out of five. Critics of the dam in the engineering sector say that Kalabagh does not fulfil this extremely essential criterion. They also say that the figures presented by the WAPDA about the availability of water is misleading because it basis it on the quantity of water whose roots are in India and thus unreliable.
Critics also say that the life of dam is too short and its cost too exorbitant to make it a highly uneconomical project. They say that the life of the dam is only 28 years once Tarbela silts because it is located downstream of Tarbela. In addition, since it is downstream, Kalabagh would in no way be able to improve Tarbela`s life-expectancy. In addition, the Kalabagh has the lowest capacity inflow ratio in the world — 0.26:1 once again resulting in short life span.
Professionals among the engineering community also say that Kalabagh is an unfeasible project geographically. They say that it has unnatural dam site — narrow valley for storage and a long length and would allow to waste flood water without storing it to avoid desilting. It would store perennial water flaring up water disputes between the provinces and the storing perennial water, for power generation would affect the availability of irrigation water to crops, particularly to the lower regions of the country. Power generation by storing perennial water can affect timely irrigation which can have a disastrous impact on agrarian economy like Pakistan.
The strong opposition to the construction of Kalabagh Dam, however, in no way lessens the problem related to the scarcity of irrigation water in the country which becomes extremely severe at times due to extended dry spells in the last few years. For instance Tarbela Dam did not fill up till August 31, 2000 for the first time since its commissioning in 1974 falling short by 15 to 16 feet from its maximum level of 1550 feet.
The meeting of the then federal cabinet which decided to shelf the Kalabagh Dam plan was held on August 30, 2000 and was attended by then Punjab governor, Lt. Gen. (retd) Muhammad Safdar, Federal Minister for Environment, Umer Asghar Khan, advisor to the Chief Executive on Agriculture and Irrigation Shafi Niaz, and Minister of Science and Technology Dr. Atta-ur-Rehman. It was briefed by the chairman WAPDA Lt. Gen. Zulfiqar Ali Khan during which the participants voiced the reservations of the smaller provinces on the project. The representatives of the Sindh government raised questions over the supply of irrigation schemes by WAPDA asking to wait for few more years about the project so as to maintain the national unity understanding fully well, the strong sentiments that Kalabagh evokes in their province.
The meeting of the federal cabinet ended with a direction given to the WAPDA to identify the potential sites for the construction of small dams in all the four provinces so as to enhance water reservoir storage capacity for the future. It is easy to see that there is no disagreement about the necessity to build water reservoirs but there is no consensus about Kalabagh.
HISTORY AND TECHNICALITIES
Pakistan has 3 main rivers — Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. Mangla Dam is located on the Jhelum river and Tarbela Dam on the Indus river. The absence of surplus water resource on the Jhelum river renders it incapable for housing another storage dam in addition to Mangla. On the other hand, there is no suitable site on the Chenab river where a storage dam can be built. The River Indus, thus, remains the only river with substantial water resource available to house additional storage dam, and even dams, besides Tarbela. Kalabagh is one such site which was identified along with Mangla and Tarbela.
The Kalabagh Dam is proposed to be located on the River Indus at about 120 miles downstream of Tarbela Dam, 92 miles downstream the confluence of Kabul and Indus Rivers and 16 miles upstream of the existing Jinnah Barrage. The site is a narrow and deep channel extending over 5-mile distance where the river is about 1,300 feet wide.
One of the major reason for the insistence to build a storage dam at Kalabagh is that it is the only option ready for immediate implementation supported by number of surveys and feasibility studies costing billions of rupees.
The planners and water engineers realised that storage dams are the only option to utilize the water resource of Indus river system for the future economic progress of Pakistan soon after the country gained independence in 1947. The Central Engineering Authority with the help of Dams Investigation Circle of Punjab Irrigation Department identified three sites suitable for large storage reservoirs by the early 1950s. Kalabagh along with Mangla and Tarbela was one of the three sites identified. Mangla and Tarbela were selected for Indus Basin Project while Kalabagh was earmarked for the next development programme.
In 1972, the work of preparing a proper feasibility report was assigned to Associated Consulting Engineers (Pvt) Ltd. of Pakistan. The company also appointed a board of international experts to review the progress at each stage. The experts were taken in various disciplines of dam engineering and from different countries, to benefit from a wide range of opinion in specialized fields.
The feasibility report, spread over 8 volumes, was submitted in 1975 and received a good response. Its copies were supplied to provincial governments and all other related agencies, in both government and non-government sectors. The overall reaction immediately after submission of the feasibility report was favourable. During the post-feasibility period of 1975 to 1979 reviews and consultations continued between at various bodies related to planning and the government finally took the decision that Kalabagh Project should be sponsored as a top priority project for seeking aid from international funding agencies.
Pakistan approached UNDP in 1979 for sanctioning of a grant to finance the cost of detailed engineering study of this project. It was approved by the UNDP which also nominating the World Bank as the implementing agency. The Bank sent its own appraisal mission in June 1980, who gave the approval, after a thorough scrutiny of the feasibility report and other documents and inspection of the site. They found the project ``technically sound and economically viable``. In February 1982 a joint venture under the name of ``Kalabagh Consultants` comprising of Binnie & Partners of UK, Harza Engineering Co. of USA, Mott Ewbank Preece Ltd. of UK, Associated Consulting Engineers & NESPAK of Pakistan were fielded to carry out Project Planning, Detailed Design and preparation of Contract Documents for the Project.
The new group once again reviewed the previous work done and satisfied themselves with the major parameters of the project before proceeding with the detailed project planning study. In this phase, several research type studies and investigations were undertaken to elaborate various aspects of design, construction and operation of the Project. State-of-the-art techniques using computerized methods of analysis and modelling were utilized for the studies in this stage.
During the course of engineering studies an independent Panel of Experts, was also constituted by the World Bank, to progressively review the consultants work and to advise them. Members of this panel were eminent world experts in related fields and were drawn from different countries. In addition to the panel, specialists on specific subjects were invited from time to time for giving their views on selected topics, where needed.
An independent review panel was also constituted by the Government of Pakistan consisting of eminent Pakistani engineers to review the Project Planning Report. It consisted of Engr. Manzoor Ahmed Sheikh, Engr. Asghar Ali Abidi and Engr. Shah Nawaz Khan. This panel also concurred with the Project Planning Report and supported its recommendations.
By the end of 1987, all the reviews, refinements and clarifications were incorporated in the project scheme and properly documented. With this the project was ready to be launched in the construction stage.
THE CONTROVERSY
Perhaps the single most important reason for the strong sentiments that Kalabagh project invokes is the shroud of secrecy surrounding its planning. The critics say that the mega project favoured by a single province and the secrecy surrounding the planning, designing and implementation of the project has made smaller provinces extremely suspicious. They also say that the insistence to build Kalabagh in an era when big dams have gone out of fashion globally and when other possible alternatives are available is dividing the people at a time when unity is most essential.
Critics also blamed WAPDA for creating the controversy for failing to consult the provinces at all stages of the project from planning, designing and implementation till the completion of its detail design as late as by 1985. Otherwise, what could explain the strong opposition to the Kalabagh project in the late 1980s after receiving initial good response after the submission of feasibility study in 1975?
The statements from the responsible officials of the federal government have also created confusion instead of clarifying the issue. For instance, the government of Punjab as well as WAPDA first declared Kalabagh dam as only a storage dam to offset the storage loss of Tarbela and Mangla Dams due to sedimentation. Later it was promoted as a project vital for generation of inexpensive hydel power and still later it was announced that the project would also have Left and Right Bank canals for irrigation purposes. This perpetually changing additions and the ensuing confusion helped turn the project into a controversial mess that its in today.
The lack of public disclosure of all the relevant facts regarding selection criteria, planning parameters, design guidelines, cost estimates, environmental and socio-economic assessments, government`s priorities, and financing mechanism of the planned construction have also added fuel to the fire. Also missing is the impact of the project on the human displacement in a country where tens of thousands of affectees of the other dams remain uncompensated after the passage of decades and also the concerns about the impact that would have on the environment and the surrounding areas. The situation is further complicated in a country where rows between the provinces about the equitable distribution of water despite the presence of Indus River System Authority, a high-level body constituted just this for purpose.
#15 Posted by HisExcellency on January 13, 2005 11:25:36 am
The first article was published by the Pakistan and Gulf Economist magazine in their July 24-30, 2000 issue:
THE IMPORTANCE OF KALABAGH DAM: By the year 2009 or 2010 Pakistan will have a water short fall of over 6 million acre feet
by Shamim Ahmed Rizvi
The Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf initiated the process of developing a national consensus on the construction of Kalabagh Dam when he personally presented before a gathering of Sindh newspapers editors, generally hostile to the dam, how important it was for the national economy to start work on the dam and how any further delay in its construction would be an invitation to a disaster for the country in the near future.
The Chief Executive warned against the perils of depleting water reservoirs and the need for construction of not only Kalabagh Dam but many other dams to meet the future water requirements of the country specially of the Sindh Province. Pointing out that our existing dams are depleting, Gen. Musharraf informed the editors of Daily Sindhi Newspaper coming out from Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur that by the year 2009 or 2010 Pakistan will have a water short fall of over six million acre feet which is equal to water stored in Mangla Dam and this shortage will continue to increase with every passing year and the biggest sufferer will be the province of Sindh. He said the depleting capacity of the existing water reservoirs call for at least one dam like Kalabagh, Bhasha or Bunji every 10 years. We have been neglecting this dire requirement and did not construct any new dam during the last 30 years and the country is today suffering for this criminal neglect in the form of drought and acute water shortage throughout the country specially Sindh and Balochistan. He explained that Punjab Province has plenty of sweet sub soil water and in case of shortage it can meet its requirement by sinking more tubwells. But Sindh has brackish sub soil water which cannot be used for irrigation purposes. The water shortage in province will be much more acute in the coming years and this disaster can be averted only by undertaking construction of new dams on warfooting, he added.
General Pervez Musharraf was right when he said that big dams take a long time to build, and that even the feasibility study for a major dam can take several years. He was also right when he said that Pakistan urgently needs to build more dams to boost the country`s water-storage capacity, citing the example of Turkey which has built 40 dams on the Tigris River and other rivers over the last five decades, while Pakistan, during the same period, has built only two. Mangla Dam on the River of Jhelum (completed in 1968) and Tarbela Dam on the River Indus (completed in 1974). He said ``If we take a decision right now to go ahead with the construction of a dam, it will be completed in the year 2010, by which time the water shortage in the country will rise to 6 million acre-feet, and by the year 2014 or 2015 the shortage will go up to 8 million to 10 million acre-feet. ``Would it not be stupidity if we keep losing our water and our people keep longing for it. Do we want to give our people a concept that they should go on longing for water,`` Gen. Musharraf rightly posed a question.
The feasibility study of Kalabagh Dam was prepared long ago and lot of preliminary work has already been done on the project. Its construction can be started in few months hoping to complete it by 2009/2010. In the meanwhile work on feasibilities of Bhasha and Nunji should be taken in hand with a plan of action to start work on these two dams in 2005, and 2010 and completing by 2015 and 2020 respectively. If we want to meet the water requirements of next fifty years, we will have to build all these dams besides identifying new sites, he added.
The Kalabagh Dam has become an absolute necessity for the country and delaying or abandoning its construction would be an invitation to a disaster. The water situation has become precarious and the provinces are going to each other throat over the issue of water supply. Pakistan is one of the unfortunate country which has not built a major dam in the last three decades. No wonder, today the country is facing a serious water crisis. Millions and millions of rupees have been spent on the feasibility report of the Dam, alterations have been made in the plan to remove the apprehensions of those who have opposed it for one reason or the other, but all these have proved futile exercises and the project has not moved an inch forward. The unnecessary politicisation of the issue has been the major hurdle. However, it would be advisable for the Chief Executive to allay the genuine fears, if any, of the critics of the Dam. It would be suicidal to let the Dam become victim of a political controversy. Those who are using the issue as a political ploy to do politicking are advised not to do so as it amounts to playing with the destiny of the country. The government would not find it easy to build up a consensus on the issue. They need to muster support of politicians who matter. And it would require patience, imagination, good sense and finally power of persuasion. It is good that the Chief Executive has already initiated a process of dialogue with the politicians. The governors should also become a part of it at their level. Secondly, the opponents of the project have become allergic to the name of Kalabagh Dam. There is a lot of merit in Imran Khan`s suggestion to change the name of the Dam to Indus Channel. Apparently this may appear a gimmick, but surrounded by a peculiar political controversy as Kalabagh Dam is, this gimmick may deliver, as it could provide a way out to those staunch opponents who had gone too far in their opposition of Kalabagh Dam, but would accept it if given another nomenclature.
Alternatively let a national conference of all our leading water and power experts be called by the Chief Executive. Let the experts go over every aspect of the proposed dam and let them arrive at a clear decisions: yes or no. The deliberations of this conference should be held away from the glare of publicity so that there is no playing to the gallery. After the experts arrive at a decision it should be presented to the government and made public at the same time. And then let us have the wisdom and courage to abide by the considered opinion of the experts. If they conclude that the Kalabagh Dam is imperative for the good of the country, then work on the project should begin without the fear of any adverse reaction. If, on the other hand, the experts deliver a negative answer, let the feasibility study be buried without any tears being shed over it. Further shilly-shallying on this issue we cannot afford. Let us get a clear answer and then stick to it.
It would be a great achievement of Gen. Pervez Musharraf and his colleagues if they could make a breakthrough on this explosive issue. If they do it, they would not only carve out a name for themselves in the history of the country, but also win the abiding gratitude of the nation.
THE IMPORTANCE OF KALABAGH DAM: By the year 2009 or 2010 Pakistan will have a water short fall of over 6 million acre feet
by Shamim Ahmed Rizvi
The Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf initiated the process of developing a national consensus on the construction of Kalabagh Dam when he personally presented before a gathering of Sindh newspapers editors, generally hostile to the dam, how important it was for the national economy to start work on the dam and how any further delay in its construction would be an invitation to a disaster for the country in the near future.
The Chief Executive warned against the perils of depleting water reservoirs and the need for construction of not only Kalabagh Dam but many other dams to meet the future water requirements of the country specially of the Sindh Province. Pointing out that our existing dams are depleting, Gen. Musharraf informed the editors of Daily Sindhi Newspaper coming out from Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur that by the year 2009 or 2010 Pakistan will have a water short fall of over six million acre feet which is equal to water stored in Mangla Dam and this shortage will continue to increase with every passing year and the biggest sufferer will be the province of Sindh. He said the depleting capacity of the existing water reservoirs call for at least one dam like Kalabagh, Bhasha or Bunji every 10 years. We have been neglecting this dire requirement and did not construct any new dam during the last 30 years and the country is today suffering for this criminal neglect in the form of drought and acute water shortage throughout the country specially Sindh and Balochistan. He explained that Punjab Province has plenty of sweet sub soil water and in case of shortage it can meet its requirement by sinking more tubwells. But Sindh has brackish sub soil water which cannot be used for irrigation purposes. The water shortage in province will be much more acute in the coming years and this disaster can be averted only by undertaking construction of new dams on warfooting, he added.
General Pervez Musharraf was right when he said that big dams take a long time to build, and that even the feasibility study for a major dam can take several years. He was also right when he said that Pakistan urgently needs to build more dams to boost the country`s water-storage capacity, citing the example of Turkey which has built 40 dams on the Tigris River and other rivers over the last five decades, while Pakistan, during the same period, has built only two. Mangla Dam on the River of Jhelum (completed in 1968) and Tarbela Dam on the River Indus (completed in 1974). He said ``If we take a decision right now to go ahead with the construction of a dam, it will be completed in the year 2010, by which time the water shortage in the country will rise to 6 million acre-feet, and by the year 2014 or 2015 the shortage will go up to 8 million to 10 million acre-feet. ``Would it not be stupidity if we keep losing our water and our people keep longing for it. Do we want to give our people a concept that they should go on longing for water,`` Gen. Musharraf rightly posed a question.
The feasibility study of Kalabagh Dam was prepared long ago and lot of preliminary work has already been done on the project. Its construction can be started in few months hoping to complete it by 2009/2010. In the meanwhile work on feasibilities of Bhasha and Nunji should be taken in hand with a plan of action to start work on these two dams in 2005, and 2010 and completing by 2015 and 2020 respectively. If we want to meet the water requirements of next fifty years, we will have to build all these dams besides identifying new sites, he added.
The Kalabagh Dam has become an absolute necessity for the country and delaying or abandoning its construction would be an invitation to a disaster. The water situation has become precarious and the provinces are going to each other throat over the issue of water supply. Pakistan is one of the unfortunate country which has not built a major dam in the last three decades. No wonder, today the country is facing a serious water crisis. Millions and millions of rupees have been spent on the feasibility report of the Dam, alterations have been made in the plan to remove the apprehensions of those who have opposed it for one reason or the other, but all these have proved futile exercises and the project has not moved an inch forward. The unnecessary politicisation of the issue has been the major hurdle. However, it would be advisable for the Chief Executive to allay the genuine fears, if any, of the critics of the Dam. It would be suicidal to let the Dam become victim of a political controversy. Those who are using the issue as a political ploy to do politicking are advised not to do so as it amounts to playing with the destiny of the country. The government would not find it easy to build up a consensus on the issue. They need to muster support of politicians who matter. And it would require patience, imagination, good sense and finally power of persuasion. It is good that the Chief Executive has already initiated a process of dialogue with the politicians. The governors should also become a part of it at their level. Secondly, the opponents of the project have become allergic to the name of Kalabagh Dam. There is a lot of merit in Imran Khan`s suggestion to change the name of the Dam to Indus Channel. Apparently this may appear a gimmick, but surrounded by a peculiar political controversy as Kalabagh Dam is, this gimmick may deliver, as it could provide a way out to those staunch opponents who had gone too far in their opposition of Kalabagh Dam, but would accept it if given another nomenclature.
Alternatively let a national conference of all our leading water and power experts be called by the Chief Executive. Let the experts go over every aspect of the proposed dam and let them arrive at a clear decisions: yes or no. The deliberations of this conference should be held away from the glare of publicity so that there is no playing to the gallery. After the experts arrive at a decision it should be presented to the government and made public at the same time. And then let us have the wisdom and courage to abide by the considered opinion of the experts. If they conclude that the Kalabagh Dam is imperative for the good of the country, then work on the project should begin without the fear of any adverse reaction. If, on the other hand, the experts deliver a negative answer, let the feasibility study be buried without any tears being shed over it. Further shilly-shallying on this issue we cannot afford. Let us get a clear answer and then stick to it.
It would be a great achievement of Gen. Pervez Musharraf and his colleagues if they could make a breakthrough on this explosive issue. If they do it, they would not only carve out a name for themselves in the history of the country, but also win the abiding gratitude of the nation.
#14 Posted by M.B.Z.Isphahani on January 13, 2005 11:25:36 am
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#13 Posted by HisExcellency on January 13, 2005 11:25:36 am
Urstruly #11
Nawab Akbar Bugti has dozens of reasons for making (false) allegations of gang-rape against officials of DSG. During the 1990s, the MQM frequently used such rape accusations for political mileage. During Benazir`s govt, the MQM alleged that a PPP MNA from Karachi and his sector incharge gang-raped Farzana, the sister of an MQM worker. The PPP govt challenged this claim and offered free medical examination of Farzana by any European or American doctor. The MQM decided to further politicize this matter by claiming that PPP was insulting the integrity of Pakistani doctors.
Whether Dr. Shazia was raped by DSG officers, Baloch nationalists, or just a bunch of perverts can only be determined after the investigations are complete. But one thing is for sure: Nawab Akbar Bugti certainly wasted no time in making political capital out of this incident.
Before rushing to judgements, think about who gains most from such incidents. The real enemy is not inside Pakistan. Beware of that enemy which considers the very existence of Pakistan as a slap on its face and a prick to its bloated ego.
Nawab Akbar Bugti has dozens of reasons for making (false) allegations of gang-rape against officials of DSG. During the 1990s, the MQM frequently used such rape accusations for political mileage. During Benazir`s govt, the MQM alleged that a PPP MNA from Karachi and his sector incharge gang-raped Farzana, the sister of an MQM worker. The PPP govt challenged this claim and offered free medical examination of Farzana by any European or American doctor. The MQM decided to further politicize this matter by claiming that PPP was insulting the integrity of Pakistani doctors.
Whether Dr. Shazia was raped by DSG officers, Baloch nationalists, or just a bunch of perverts can only be determined after the investigations are complete. But one thing is for sure: Nawab Akbar Bugti certainly wasted no time in making political capital out of this incident.
Before rushing to judgements, think about who gains most from such incidents. The real enemy is not inside Pakistan. Beware of that enemy which considers the very existence of Pakistan as a slap on its face and a prick to its bloated ego.
#12 Posted by HP on January 13, 2005 11:25:36 am
It would have been better, if Narejo has also presented other side’s argument too and there are many to counter the ones Narejo presented.
Dams big and small are an absolute necessity for water and power supply. Most major US cities have some Dams somewhere to supply water. Nuke plants are now pretty much non available for the third world countries like Pakistan and the only viable option is to build dams to cater for the growing need of water and Power. The argument that bigger dams are out is not true either. India and China both are building bigger dams, as bigger dams are cost effective for countries like Pak, India and China.
The opposition to Kalabagh dam is actually political and that has been going on for more than two decades.
Sindhi Nationalist first voiced their opposition just to despise Punjabi establishment initially. There were no viable arguments against the Dam except that it was going to help Punjab more. Since I knew most of them personally, I feel that Sindhi nationalist have basically politicalised this issue and really they don’t have any overwhelming argument to oppose the Dam. Most of them had no background in the technical or the ecological aspect of the dam. Their opposition was mere negativity and then this opposition caught on the Sindhi nationalist imagination.
I have also followed debates on this, mostly one sided, in Kawish and Ibrat. I knew some engineers that wrote those articles too and whenever I confronted them with their illogical technical arguments, they told me I have become a Punjabi after moving to the USA!
Every Dam creates some ecological issues and displacement of population. There is no doubt that some people would be discomforted but what percentage of the population they are and if they are adequately compensated for their dislocation than what seems to the problem there?
In Pakistan, there just not enough viable geographical locations where Dams can be build without shifting the population around. You cannot find locations like Hoover dam in every country.
The crux of the Sindhi agitation against the Dam is:
“If the dam is built there will not be any water available for downstream Kotri in the future. As a result the Delta and the Katcha areas in Sindh will be destroyed and the sea intrusion will cause annual losses of billions of rupees to the Sindh economy.”
I have traveled Sujawal, Badin, Katcha areas and it is a legit concern that sea would intrude more into those areas. But how much water river Indus has now at the end of its run. Not much! So the Sea is already intruded as for as it could. What kind of production are we talking about from those areas and what population would be impacted? From TM Khan to Sujawal used to a barren and water logged area and only drains helped brought some land into cultivation. Later water form some canals from the GM Barrage helped them. Still, beyond Sujawal nothing is produced that should be of major concern to anybody. Mostly Mohanas (fishermen) live in Katcha area and they too are very limited in number. The Sujawal Bridge on the way to Thatta would tell the story of miles and miles of barren lands that have not been used in centuries.
I must also admit that I have not visited that area in about 20 years now. There may be worsening of the situation rather than any improvement.
I am always of the opinion that this Dam would help upper Sindh(more fertile area of Sindh)more than any other province. The most affected province would be NWFP and there is no significant opposition to the KB DAM there.
#11 Posted by Urstruly on January 13, 2005 10:22:21 am
Forget Dam. It would be a miracle now if fauji fukks could keep this country intact.:

#10 Posted by fnahmad on January 13, 2005 7:59:34 am
Kindly spend at least as much time as you have taken in collecting arguments against construction of kalabagh dam and give me a single alternative. As I have mentioned many times it is easy to oppose a given solution it is most difficult to suggest an alternative. People who have suggested this solution have spent lot more able and valuable hours than the respected author to work out alternatives and even then considering kalabagh dam feasable.
fnahmad@gmail.com
fnahmad@gmail.com
#9 Posted by labyrinth1 on January 13, 2005 7:59:34 am
If Government of Pakistan ( Government of Feudrals , Genrals , Punjabis ) ignore us in Sind , Balochistan - and go ahead with the plans of Kalabagh Dam , I will be the first person to bomb the dam . I support Sardar Muree a brave soldier whos fighting for the basic rights - We in Sind and Balochistan are not against Pakistan we are against officals of a province which is somehow ignoring every other province . We in Balochistan are fighting not for liberating our land from the state of Pakistan but we are fighting for our rights and a fair financing . Either its MQM , Mushraff , Jamali or Bhugtti anyone who puts there intrest first and ignore the intrest of Balochistan and Sind - will face his / her fate ..
#8 Posted by labyrinth1 on January 13, 2005 7:59:34 am
Habib Jalib said,
yeh na mera Pakistan hai , na tera Pakistan hai ,
yeh uss ka Pakistan hai , jo Sadar-e-Pakistan hai ..
If Islamabad and Punjab ( same thing ) continue what they are usually doing then the map of Pakistan will be quite different in 10 years time where Land of Pure will be Punjab - and the rest of remaining Pakistan will be Pakistan .
#7 Posted by kamlani on January 13, 2005 7:59:34 am
You have outlined the case against kalabagh dam really well....what I would like to read is the case for it....anyone?
#6 Posted by nazarhayatkhan on January 13, 2005 12:58:41 am
Norejo
I agree. This is no more a technical issue. It is a political issue. And politics are more important than technicalities.
If the Dam is built without the willing consensus of smaller provinces, it will be disastrous. The Fauji mind looks only at black-and-white aspects ignoring the public perceptions, feelings, thoughts.
Ayub alientated East Pakistan. Yahya did the final act. Zia disrupted the society with his convoluted perceptions. This may be the biggest damage Mussharraf may end up doing - an irreversible one. (like the state of our provinicial autonomy)
There are many other places for Dams. We need to listen to the voices of smaller provinces.
nhk
#5 Posted by nazarhayatkhan on January 13, 2005 12:58:40 am
Norejo
I agree. This is no more a technical issue. It is a political issue. And politics are more important than technicalities.
If the Dam is built without the willing consensus of smaller provinces, it will be disastrous. The Fauji mind looks only at black-and-white aspects ignoring the public perceptions, feelings, thoughts.
Ayub alientated East Pakistan. Yahya did the final act. Zia disrupted the society with his convoluted perceptions. This may be the biggest damage Mussharraf may end up doing - an irreversible one. (like the state of our provinicial autonomy)
There are many other places for Dams. We need to listen to the voices of smaller provinces.
nhk
#4 Posted by twintopaz on January 12, 2005 11:16:14 pm
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#3 Posted by ahmedmadani on January 12, 2005 9:12:37 pm
Reactionto response#1,2
The die is already cast.General has openly said it will be built, it will be built. Indus is Nallah beyond Kotri Barrage. See old bridges built by british look at wrong places as Indus is dry.
Thal Canal was opposed by minority provinces. It is being built. It is supposed to run few months, we know it will be 12 month canal. Chasma Canal was supposed to carry only small amout. Sindh burns in summer and mentioned Canal carries water. Hope its not beginning of some thing. Agartala case was started and left and damaged was done. It is not true but perception in B/Stan and Sindh is all is done in PK at cost of them. Scratch any Sindhi he is anti Punjabi. I feel there many illusions regarding exploitation of Sindh. Unfortunately most of times illusions are powerful than truth. Sindh can be easily controlled as Karachi MQM rulers will do anything for Uncle P. Same way B.Stan is warned by General and nothing much can be done by B.stan or Sindh. Whatever is done as Its not elected peoples decision but idea of generals and his assistant servant PM S.A. can say any thing but it will be decision of General. Nothing can be done as General will be still there around 2007. Discussion is useless unfortunately.
The die is already cast.General has openly said it will be built, it will be built. Indus is Nallah beyond Kotri Barrage. See old bridges built by british look at wrong places as Indus is dry.
Thal Canal was opposed by minority provinces. It is being built. It is supposed to run few months, we know it will be 12 month canal. Chasma Canal was supposed to carry only small amout. Sindh burns in summer and mentioned Canal carries water. Hope its not beginning of some thing. Agartala case was started and left and damaged was done. It is not true but perception in B/Stan and Sindh is all is done in PK at cost of them. Scratch any Sindhi he is anti Punjabi. I feel there many illusions regarding exploitation of Sindh. Unfortunately most of times illusions are powerful than truth. Sindh can be easily controlled as Karachi MQM rulers will do anything for Uncle P. Same way B.Stan is warned by General and nothing much can be done by B.stan or Sindh. Whatever is done as Its not elected peoples decision but idea of generals and his assistant servant PM S.A. can say any thing but it will be decision of General. Nothing can be done as General will be still there around 2007. Discussion is useless unfortunately.
#2 Posted by labyrinth1 on January 12, 2005 4:20:55 pm
Kalabagh is a good project and is in national intrest of Pakistan - thats what we in ( Sind , Baluchistan and NWFP ) thinks but we in Sind , Baluchistan atleast somehow don`t trust Punjab . We believe that Punjab will control our water - they would have the control on our waters whatever we get .
Mushraff Sahib is trying to build confidence and our answer to President Sahib is we could somehow agree if there are some guarantee`s - and Punjab withdraws from her stand on NFC Awards - to my knowledge there is negociations going on now on Kalabagh between
a) MQM and Government
b) Government and some PPP Members ..
c) Government and Concerned Parties in N.W.F.P ..
Mushraff Sahib is trying to build confidence and our answer to President Sahib is we could somehow agree if there are some guarantee`s - and Punjab withdraws from her stand on NFC Awards - to my knowledge there is negociations going on now on Kalabagh between
a) MQM and Government
b) Government and some PPP Members ..
c) Government and Concerned Parties in N.W.F.P ..
#1 Posted by labyrinth1 on January 12, 2005 4:20:55 pm
The bottomline is like or not Sind and Balochistan will never agree on whatever Punjab says - we can`t trust them ( Punjabi Establishment ) - be it Sui , Gawader , Badin or Karachi - we are victums of Punjabi Establishment which for Punjab Intrest thinks Pakistan is Punjab -
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