The Dispatches on War

How about bringing back stranded Pakistanis? I am sending the following letter to Mushy:

President General Pervez Musharraf
President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Islamabad, Pakistan

Dear Mr. President:

First let me commend you on how you have brilliantly steered the nation through these treacherous times. I am an American of Pakistani origin and I would like to request your action on a matter of the highest humanitarian importance. While there are many issues concerning Islam in general and Pakistan in particular, that cause my head to bow in shame, nothing is more disturbing and humiliating than the plight of innocent Pakistanis stranded in Bangladesh since 1971.

Several successive Pakistani governments, from Bhutto to your own regime, have ignored this disaster. I understand the cruel pressure on the Pakistani government from indigenous people such as Punjabis and others that have blocked resolution of this rather easy problem. No one is requesting that these Pakistanis be resettled in Punjab - there is plenty of room near Karachi for them. The people of Karachi are prepared to house them, feed them, and provide necessary employment for these brethren. Saudi Arabia, in the past, had offered to fund the transportation for these hundreds of thousands of Pakistani citizens.

You had the courage to remove an inefficient and corrupt Punjabi Prime Minister and send him packing for a permanent Hajj. Once again, you can demonstrate proactive, decisive, and courageous leadership by bringing back these unfortunate Pakistanis. Do it for Allah, do it for Islam, but most of all, do it for Pakistan. I have faith in you. My next action will be to contact my Congressman and Senator, both important Republicans, to provide any help that may be necessary to assist your government in the resettlement effort.

Once this problem is solved, I would like to make suggestions concerning the plight of our Ahmedi brothers and sisters.

I thank you for your prompt attention to my request.

Sincerely yours,



Salim Ahmed Chauhan

re: rhue # 39

As to your question about my sources, they were varied in nature. Some material came from old college texts, others from class notes and lecture notes of a time, when I used to TA European history in college. Some came from reading autobiographies, which opened up new avenues of thought and reflection. However, the most meaningful source were the veterans, with whom I have talked and who were able to make me understand the reality of war by narrating their war experiences.

One source was my own interest and fascination with the subject of war and my academic background in European history and the political history of the 20th century. The fact that I have been reading on the topic since 1974, much of the material was a reflection of my own personal growth and muturity as I judged past knowledge in light of newer experiences and understandings.

On the issue of religion and war, there is a very strong linkage. Since the rulers, in the early part of human civilization, also carried out a priestly role, it was quite easy for them to combine both roles. This combination can also seen the terms of the divine right of the kings and it also be in the last two great wars of the 20th century.

It seems that religion is a very strong identifying force and it was periodically used to inflate the fighting morale of the armies. Even the secular nature of Europe and United States, could not entirely defeat this idea. In the First and Second World War, the British were fighting for ``God, King and Country`` and the Germans claimed that ``Gott ist mit uns`` - God is with us. The Americans are equating the war on terrorism with a crusade and the symbology is not that askewed, because at one point Eisenhower had refered to the invasion of Europe, in 1944, as ``great crusade``. Even Stalin, was forced to use religion as a political tool against Nazi Germany.

In the poem of Maculay (sp?) called the Lays of Ancient Rome, there is a line which says, `` how best can a man die than defending the ashes of his fathers and the temples of his gods``.

There is something mystical about fighting for a god and maybe, its is a wish in all of us towards for some sort of immortality.

Ciao

re: rhue # 39

Thank you for your comments.

I had posted a reply, but it was lost due to an untimley intervention of WAPDA in the submission process. Since WAPDA is still quite unsure of its intentions to be present or not, I will repost them when WAPDA has made up its as to what it wants to do!

Ciao

Mr. FerozK, this is an excellent piece of article written on a very fundamental topic of Human History. I am very impressed by the lack of bias employed and the analytical study on warfare with particular comparisons on both the Islamic and Western Empires.

As it is an open topic subject to various comments and criticism, I look forward to reading the rest of your articles before contributing my comments and criticisms. As a previous poster suggested, you should ensure that such valuable pieces are collected and compiled into a book form. Critics must understand that the object of this article is not to conclude that the Author is correct in his views but to appreciate the fact that another dimension or angle has been introduced in the attempt to explain the evolution of warfare. Such thought provocations is what makes progress possible and i am very curious to know what sources and leading historical researchers influenced your decision in concluding that theocracy in warfare has lead to the current political and power decline of Islamic States in international Relations.

re:HN # 37

Yes, it would seem that way, would it not? ;)

Ciao

Feroz:

Sorry, like I said an earlier post was messed up. This is a late reconstruction, and memory is not as sharp. But this statement of yours,


``This is ironic, because it seems that humanity has come a complete circle and the wars, are once more, being more influenced by theocratic considerations as seen in the clash of the civilization’s idea.``


I was under the impression that religion is as good an aphrodisiac as any other to pump up armies to keep them kicking and snorting through long and arduous campaigns.

A line from an old Vaipaul, as I remember is that one of the spies of the the Hindu king about to be invaded by Muslim armies` report that says the one reason nobody can last in their way is because the entire army prays together.

Even in India, they often built temporary temples etc at army camps to as a senior officer once told me....``keep the hot bloods busy, and focussed`` rather than getting the Devi`s blessings.

The one thought that crosses my mind right now is, Is there any army in the world right now in possession of a religion that can motivate their men? Methinks, only Islam currently seem to be able to do it.

I am told, religion is NOt the kind of Getafix`s magic potion even among the younger generation of Israelies as it used to be. Judaism perhaps came closest to being that kind of opiate of armies...but is losing or being tamed by time.

Feroz:

Sorry, like I said an earlier post was messed up. This is a late reconstruction, and memory is not as sharp. But this statement of yours,


``This is ironic, because it seems that humanity has come a complete circle and the wars, are once more, being more influenced by theocratic considerations as seen in the clash of the civilization’s idea.``


I was under the impression that religion is as good an aphrodisiac as any other to pump up armies to keep them kicking and snorting through long and arduous campaigns.

A line from an old Vaipaul, as I remember is that one of the spies of the the Hindu king about to be invaded by Muslim armies` report that says the one reason nobody can last in their way is because the entire army prays together.

Even in India, they often built temporary temples etc at army camps to as a senior officer once told me....``keep the hot bloods busy, and focussed`` rather than getting the Devi`s blessings.

The one thought that crosses my mind right now is, Is there any army in the world right now in possession of a religion that can motivate their men? Methinks, only Islam currently seem to be able to do it.

I am told, religion is NOt the kind of Getafix`s magic potion even among the younger generation of Israelies as it used to be. Judaism perhaps came closest to being that kind of opiate of armies...but is losing or being tamed by time.

Ferozek #34: The whole disucussion started from,

``As to your comment about the public opinion being a factor in the decision of GHQ not to send troops to the Gulf in 1990-1991 and in 2003, I would have to differ from your view. Public opinion does not matter in Pakistan, when it comes to the military`s self-interest.``

You are correct in stating that the COAS does not worry about public opinion when carrying out a coup. Nor does he worry about the opinion of the other two forces. For the simple reason that he times his coup at a point when he knows no one is going to come out in the streets to support the political party in power.

At the same time, within the context of deploying troops to places like Iraq, which is where this discussion started, of course, the COAS cannot do it by himself. Even in the capacity of President, Musharraf has not been able to do it, even though he wanted to. The whole country would be up in arms (though it would not be up in arms at a coup).

As just the COAS, it would be impossible to deploy troops outside Pakistan. He would need so many resources, from the PAF to the Navy to the Foreign Service etc., that there is no way, a COAS could just get up and deploy troops, as and when he wants......

re: Romair # 27

Romair, the orginal discussion was on Pakistani politics and I will remain within that parameter.

COAS does not need the help of air force or the navy and the question is not about deploying the army. COAS and the army do not need air force`s or the naval help because in order to rule Pakistan, what is needed is the corps which are already deployed within the cities of Pakistan. In a military sense, Pakistani army ``occupies`` Pakistan strategically and one does not need the air force to airlift airborne troops to TV stations to capture them or it needs naval marines to storm the harbor at Karachi.

The other two services may dislike the army and disdain on the martial laws, but it does not matter much unless they are willing to, physically, interdict the army and prevent martial laws. They may not like martial law and they may not cooperate, but they have never resisted it either and that makes all the difference! In my humble opinion, they are as gulity as the army by their acts of omissions. On the other hand, we can sit around and parse the levels of guilt and quibble over the stains of original sin, but a sinful and an illegal act, will always remain as such regardless of the gloss of morality by which it is covered.

COAS does rule Pakistani politics and once in power, he is immune to outside political suggesstion. COAS is a potent power in Pakistani politics regardless of who is in power. The army is, and might not be a monolithic entity but the interests of the army remain monolithic and the interests of army, within Pakistani politics, is about the self-preservation of its political interests and existence in Pakistan. Another point of fact; it is wrong to consider the army in Pakistan as being apolitical, because the army is very political in Pakistan.

Ciao

re: ana # 32

I have heard of the author and I had the book, but had to leave it with all my other books behind in Salt Lake City, when I moved back to Pakistan. The friend, with whom I left my cache of books, apprently moved to Kentucky and did not leave any forwarding address. So I have no idea, where my books are! :)

Still, thanks for offering the suggestion and I appreciate it.

re: dost-mittar # 28

The reason being that Arab and Muslim societies chose on purpose to cut-off contacts with the outside world. The same thing happened in China and Japan. Trade brought exposure to the Arab societies and along with trade, also brought in political, cultural and other influences into the Arab societies. Politically, it meant that such influences were questioning the traditional nature of power and had to be stopped. Arab societies were quite progressive in the begining and later on, they seem to have entered a Dark Age, from which they have still not left.

I am using the term in a purely historic sense and historically, a dark age is considered as a period in which no learning or knowledge takes place.

There are very interesting questions that need to be, quite urgently, addressed. The question is how did the Arab societies go from openness to closing off their proverbial doors to progress and learning new things? In the early days of Islam, religion was quite practical in the terms of being subordinated to the dictates of secular power and then, it went on to dominate and influence secular power. When, and how, but more importantly, why did this happen?

Every Muslim talks about the Golden Age of Islam, and justly so, in terms of science, medical progress, scientific achivements, and philosophical/religious inquiries, but no one is interested in answering the questions as to how these things ended? There must be a reason, why Islam suddenly went into a deep freeze intellectually speaking.

My own hypothesis is, that it was fear of losing political power that made the Arabs shun outside contact.

Ciao

feroz,

interesting article.

as i was reading it i wondered if you`ve read a book by barbara ehrenreich called ``blood rites: origins and history of the passions of war``? it`s quite interesting. there`s a brief excerpt from it at amazon.com. if it interests you enough to read through. . . and it`s not readily available, let me know. i`ll send you my copy. :)

Romair:

``My guess is they said their prayers, fasted and that was about it; and spent the rest of the time planning and training their soldiers.``

There is at least one muslim conqueror who fitted that image - Babar. It is said that he was a great drinker. But everytime he had to undertake a major campaign, he would invite his soldiers and in their presence break his bottle of wine and wine glass and forsook never to imbibe the haram drink again. This worked up the relgious zeal of his soldiers who were then prepared for the attack the following day.

Once the campaign was over, it was ``Kee-main-ne-agar-pee-ke-tau-kis-baat-ki-tauba`` time.

re: #21 by Romair
``Public opinion does matter in Pakistan. This is exactly why Musharraf has not been able to send troops to Iraq, even though, it seems like he wanted to. ``

So how do you explain Pak Armys U-turn in case of supporting Taliban. I guess Pak public would have definitely supported Osama and Mullah Omar. But realising the possibility of facing the U.S. army the Pak Army went against the general public opiniion in giving support/bases to the U.S. Army.
Hence I would say that even though the public opinion matters, there are certain classified information which the public in general is not aware of and hence the political/military leadership has to take the decision best for the country.

dost-mittar #28: ``But it is somewhat surprising that arabs did not have any navy, considering their consummate skill as traders by sea with dhows and all that.

I have always had difficulty finding good accounts of the mlitary tactics used by the Muslims, specifically the Arabs. Either I haven`t looked hard enough or it is because much of Arab military history is written in the context of religion. Rather than an analysis of the tactics used. Khalid Bin Waleed etc. must have been the greatest strategicians of their times. However, they are looked at as religious figures. I have always wondered how religious they really were. My guess is they said their prayers, fasted and that was about it; and spent the rest of the time planning and training their soldiers. Looked probably more like Imran Khan than Qazi Hussain.......

The Arab merchant navy seems to have reached to quite a few corners of the known world. I wonder if the military navy could have been far behind. The word, ``admiral`` is an off-shoot of the Arabic word, ``ameer al-bahar`` meaning commander of the waters/seas.

temporal, feroz:

My knowledge of the early spread of islam is quite superficial. But it is somewhat surprising that arabs did not have any navy, considering their consummate skill as traders by sea with dhows and all that.

Ferozek #25: ``Romair, though I have no objections to your post or the information you have stated in it, I still hold the opinion that the opinion of the COAS in Pakistan matters more than the public opinion.``

I don`t think this is correct. For the simple reason, that it cannot be practically possible. If this were correct, then Musharraf, who is not only COAS but President also, would have been able to sent troops to Iraq. Why didn`t he? Because 98% of Pakistan was against it. As were the soldiers in the military.

There are other reasons also. Armies, in todays warfare do not deploy in isolation. Gone are the days, when ground troops was all that was needed. In today`s warfare, the battles are fought jointly by the Army, Air Force and Navy. Specifically the Air Force.

No Army can deploy in a battle without air cover; neither can a Navy. This is why the US Navy has as its core part, an Air group, which is larger than most of the air forces in the world. This is also why the US air force used to actually be a part of the US Army (I think till post-WW II).

An Army Chief would be committing suicide if he were to just send soldiers, without getting the Air Force involved(other than perhaps in guirella warfare). And the Air Force and Navy in Pakistan, have a completely different point of view on various issues than the Army. The PAF and Navy, for example, never get involved in Martial Laws, even though they are asked. This is not a coincidence. This is a part of the culture of the PAF and Navy. The higher command of the Army supports Martial Laws, while the higher commands of the PAF and Navy do not like Martial Laws.

Similarly, the Chiefs of Air Staff and Naval Staffs are in no way subordinate to the Chief of Army Staff. In some cases they are actually senior to the Chief of Army Staff. And in other cases the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff is from the Air Force or Navy. Hence the former two Chiefs do not take orders from the Army Chief. Quite the contrary. There is a healthy rivalry between the three forces. And most of the Air Force (and Naval) officers consider themselves quite, ``superior`` to the Army officers.

Hence there is no set of laws, traditions, etc. under which the Chief of Army Staff can, ``order`` or force the other forces into battle. A good example is Kargil. Where the Air Force, refused to participate. This is probably why, when Musharraf carried out the coup, he fired the complete high command of the PAF. About eight or nine PAF generals were superseeded and thus they resigned.

The only time the Chief of Army Staff can order other forces into battle is if he is the President also. In which case, he is acting in the capacity of the President, and not the Chief of Army Staff. And that is a political capacity, and all politicians (even dictators) have to take the public opinion into account.

So, what to talk of the whole public, the Chief of Army Staff cannot even order the Air Force and Navy into battle, on his own.

And even when he orders the Army into battle, he has to consider the opinions of the corps commanders as well as the motivation of the troops towards that battle......

As I said, the military is not a monolithic institution. And the COAS is not as powerful as people make him out to be. He is only powerful when dealing with groups that have skeletons in thier own closets, like various politicians, and can thus be bought. It is not possible for him to order around groups that are loyal to thier own solid traditions, e.g the other two forces, or the maulvi brigade, or various ethnic forces in Pakistan etc.

re: wahi_to # 23

Wars are not just contests of brute force and modern wars are not about overpowering the enemy. Wars are ideological in nature; they can have political overtones and economic rationales. Wars have myriad reasons for their origins. My agrument about the poor nature of Arabs and their wars was not based on their 1400 history and neither was it based on their war fighting skills.

The Arabs, in my view, have a poor war fighting record, because most of the Arab wars lacked a political motive to them and were overtly religious. If you hold wars to a political reason for their execution, as most wars are understood, then Arab wars and the reasons for them do not have very strong political reasons behind their intents. Even as you have stated and I agree with you, that Islam was a resurgent religion and it was winning militarily till the mid 1700s, it still does not the answer the question explaining Islam`s political failure.

Wars and winning wars does not mean much if such a war is lost politically. History does not remember who started the war as much as history remembers how that particular war ended. Islam might have won wars for a thousand years out of its fourteen hundred year history, but it lost all those wars politically. In that sense, Islam has a very poor record of fighting wars.

Islam lost out politically, in a historic sense, because the wars of Islam were not about the creation of a political order, as much as they were about the sustainability of a personalizd rule of individuals. Islamic states and kingdoms had no institutionalized political legacies and were usually identified with the ruler and their sovereign power was in equal measure to the political power of the king/caliph. Even history and history of Islam identifies and discusses periods of Islamic powers not by the rise and fall of nations, but through the rise and fall of individual dynastic rules identified by the name of the person and not that of the state/kingdom.

Ciao

re: amit # 22

Amit, would you be interested in doing the honors and the work associated with such an undertaking? I would be really interested in reading a non-Muslim perspective of the Muslim invasions of India.

The points you mentioned about the varying nature of Muslim rule suggests that you have enough material to come up with a hypothesis and a thesis. I hope you will consider my suggestion. :)

I agree with you. A dispassionate analysis of Indian history does tell us that to rule India, there has to be an inclusion of all the groups in India. It is therefore not suprising that Mughuls would have co-opted the Hindus and Rajput in their administrations to rule India. I would also venture and state that it was the omission of this principle, which was responsible for the agruments leading to Pakistan. :)

re: Romair # 21

Romair, though I have no objections to your post or the information you have stated in it, I still hold the opinion that the opinion of the COAS in Pakistan matters more than the public opinion. I am well aware that the army has internal heirarchy of power and in many ways, it is more democratic than anything outside of the army. One only has to be invited to a few regimental meetings, in which the senior officer are made to account for their actions, to understand and appreciate the levels of open discussion within the armed forces.

Ciao

dost and feroz:

Re: early spread of islam

…i forget the source…perhaps hitti...could be rodinson, watt, hooker, hamidullah or rao…made an interesting observation…other than the obvious …circ 670ad both the persian and the byzantine empires were past their prime…a vibrant and dynamic islam appears over the horizon …the interesting observation had to do with the introduction of horses in their campaigns…speed and mobility…if memory serves the word was razzias… and i also recall within that early spread under discussion hardly any navy was used…any thoughts?

mr khan makes some wide raging generalizations that are not supported by facts, the arguments are more like his opinion rather than historical fact. I will make the following points:

Author mentions that ``Arabs have traditionally employed mercenary forces to guard their interests.`` I really wonder how did he come up with this conclusion. To my understanding Arabs have always fought their own wars. In the seventh/eighth century it was arab armies that fanned out in different continents and established muslim empires. Arab forces not rented soldiers defeated the crusades. And more recently Iraqis, not foreigners, fought Iran-Iran war. Based on ONE war (1990 gulf war) the author has generalized the history of arab warfare. The fact is there were 300,000 iraqi forces on the border of KSA in 1990 and total KSA army was 70,000. Outside help was the only option for KSA.

Author generalizes ``Islam had a difficult time and a very poor record of fighting wars``. Out of the 1400-year history of islam, muslim armies, generally, were victorious for the first 1000 years. It was in year 1707 that Mughal empire in India reached its zenith. Ottoman empire stretched over continents till first world war. I would suggest that muslim armies were immensely successful in their first millennia and stood unchallenged. It is the muslim backwardness in technology and sciences that led to downfall of muslim warfare.

Mr Khan contends that Islamic nations are correctly termed as rogue nations because ``In Islam, it is the individual authority and not the state’s authority that has the power to declare war. ``. This theoretical generalization holds no ground if we analyze it in light of present-day reality. The fact is that concept of nation-state has given us two world wars and enormous other conflicts. It is an absurd assumption that a state will necessarily behave in a civilized manner. Let us not forget that nazi germany was a nation-state with democratically elected government, so was serbia in early 1990`s and so is present day USA.

Re:ferozek#16

It would be quite valuable to analyze the muslim invasions of India in a dispassionate manner because the nature of these invasions varied quite significantly over time. I agree that initially the invasions were opportunistic in nature and mainly for plunder. At the same time, religious ideology was at work along with the plunder. The areas of Pakistan were the primary target of these invasions. The accounts of the invasions at that time not only mention looting and plundering but also talk a lot about destruction of temples and religious places as a means to establish the supremacy of religious ideology. In addition, the religious conversion of Pakistani people happened at the same time, although it was probably a combination of the invasions as well as the preaching of sufis who came along.

In the later years, when the invasions focused on the Indo-Gangetic plains, the nature of the invasions changed from plunder to empire building. At that time, religious ideology was given a complete backseat, since the invaders needed cooperation from the local people to consolidate their hold on the region and establish their empire. You no longer heard of destruction of temples etc. The Mughals actually collaborated with the Rajputs and the people of the Indo-Gangetic plains did not convert to Islam, in spite of nearly 800 years of muslim rule. I also suspect that the muslim rulers in Delhi did not really want all hindus to convert because they wanted to maintain the distinction between the rulers and the ruled. Given the egalitarian nature of Islam, it was unlikely that the Turko-Mughal-Afghan domination would work if every Indian converted to Islam. They would demand equal treatment under Islam and could even snatch power away from the elites. While Aurangzeb did try to bring back religious ideology in the picture, it was too late and also half-hearted. I do believe that in the end it is the lack of religious ideology that led to the eventual end of muslim rule in India because the ideological underpinnings disappeared.

Ferozek #20: There is no country in the world, where public opinion does not matter. It is just expressed in different ways. Public opinion does matter in Pakistan. This is exactly why Musharraf has not been able to send troops to Iraq, even though, it seems like he wanted to. This is also why the MMA brigade was not able to create an uprising in all of Pakistan, against Pakistan taking on the Taliban. At the same time, this is also why the MMA won in NWFP, because it did take on the American point of view.

The military that the Pakistan military officers have the closest relationship is neither Saudi nor Iraqi military. It is the US military. The whole high command of the Pakistan military was trained in the USA, at some stage of their careers. More so, they all work on US equipment, over a time span of decades. This means that they are constantly in touch with the various US corporations regarding this equipment. It is common for engineers in the PAF to be in touch with Boeing, Lockheed etc. on a regular basis, via mail, email etc., for spare parts, upgrades etc. Kind of like a Pakistani IT company working with a US IT company in a partnership for a long time. You tend to become personal friends.

Bonds between soldiers, due to various reasons, regardless of which country they belong to are very strong. When Musharraf carried out the coup, the first person he called was his colleague and friend Gen. Tony Zinni, the Centcom commander. I attended a few months of training in the USA, and I still have family contacts with my US classmates. We visit each other, when we have time. Also, my course mates who graduated with me in the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force will always remain my close friends, regardless of the differing careers we may have.

I have not seen anything like this in the civilian world, where friendships tend to be very short-term and profit-oriented.

It is true that Gen Baig preferred Iraq. But at a personal level, I am sure his closest contacts would be with Americans. However, he does not make decisions alone. He has a group of corps commanders who assist him. The govt. wanted to support Saudi Arabia. The population wanted to oppose the USA, and support Iraq. Pakistan took the middle road: it supported Saudi Arabia, but very mildly.

In addition, the Pakistan military is not a monolithic institution, like most people think. Like most professional organizations, it has a clear command structure, and it executes the orders given. However, internally all the soldiers have their own differing opinions, and they do express them. And even if the ruling General does not worry about the civilian public opinion, he does pay a great deal of attention to the internal opinions of his own constituency, i.e. the Army.

99.999% of the soldiers have no political power. I believe 90% of the military consists of simple villagers or individuals from lower financial groups who are serving in enlisted ranks. Their opinions, as well as the opinions of most non-General officers tend to be inline with the rest of Pakistan on foreign policy issues.

In addition, while a person may himself be in the Army, his parents, sisters, brothers, son-in-laws, etc. tend to generally be civilians. Hence he forms his opinions, from that point of view. Keeping that in mind, it needs to be understood that it is not as easy as most people think for a General to just send troops wherever he wants. He can get away with it, once or twice. But sooner or later, his own troops will turn against him. Especially for a General who is relying on the same troops to ensure he stays in power politically………

re Romair # 11

I think you have stated the facts quite clearly on the deployment of Pakistani armed forces in Saudi Arabia and the reasons behind their recall.

As to your comment about the public opinion being a factor in the decision of GHQ not to send troops to the Gulf in 1990-1991 and in 2003, I would have to differ from your view. Public opinion does not matter in Pakistan, when it comes to the military`s self-interest. In the first instance, it was the personal animosity of the COAS, General Beg, towards America and his fondness for Pan-Islamic causes, which was the main reason why Pakistan did not dispatch a force to the Gulf. In that war, if memory serves me correctly, Beg favored Iraq over the Allied Coalition.

In the second Gulf war, the GHQ would have send troops but it was not willing to risk the destabilization of its rule in Pakistan. GHQ was a willing participant in the military operations against Taliban in Afghanistan in November 2001. Another difference was that in 1990-1991 Pakistan was not under military rule, but in 2003 it was and there was an urgent need for the military to limit the fronts on which it was fighting. Also, in the First Gulf War, the military was not in a political alliance with the religious parties.

The reasons for not sending Pakistani troops varied during war in 1990-1991 and in 2003, but it was not influenced by public opinion as much as it was influenced by the army`s own calculations of power within Pakistan and the political consequences of its decision to send troops. In 1990-1991 the blame would have landed on the desk of Benazir Bhutto and in 2003, it would have landed on the desk of General Musharraf. Another point to ponder is that in 2001, it was not public opinion which made Pakistan join the war on terror; it was the army`s instinct of self-preservation. The first Gulf War did not threaten the existence of the army, but the war on terrorism did if Pakistan had refused the American ultimata and in both cases, the decision was made by an individual who happened to be COAS.

Ciao

re: Dost-Mittar # 18

You hinted towards some very interesting ideas about early Islam and I hope you will develop them a bit further. I agree with you that at the end of the 17th century, Islam and Europe went their own ways.

Pax Islamica? In the areas conquered by the Muslims there was a Pax Islamica and the reason it collapsed was economics. The economies of the Islamic kingdoms were not good at sustaining the political vision of Islam. Secondly, the lack of military modernization meant that Islam would not be a position to defend Pax Islamica even if it had wished. In many ways historically, it seems that Islam has ``missed the bus``.

I agree with your hypothesis that maybe the Prophet did not visualize the expanse of Islam outside of Arabia. Also, what is often overlooked is that Islam itself was influenced as it added more territory to its rule. This created different interpretations of Islam and Islam not only developed as a religion, but it also developed in a culturalal and political sense, which was seperate from Islam in Arabia and Arabia`s culture and politics.

Ciao

Hi Feroz:

You have provided an academic theory of the origins of war. My knowledge of that period of European and Middle Eastern history is quite limited, so I learnt quite a bit from this.

As for the state of islam and war, I think that you have underplayed the success of islam, which conquered a large swath of landmass from the present day Austria to India in less than a century. Could it be that Pax Islamia could not take place as the concept of the nation of islam broke down with the end of the khilafat? I believe that the early caliphs did play a role somewhat similar to that played by the pope in Europe until the 17th century; I remember reading about Mohammad bin Qassim seeking the approval of the caliph in certain matters. Unlike christendom, the concept of an ummah still holds a powerful apeal to the hearts of all practising muslims; in practice, however, it has remained largely a myth despite the formation of the Organisation of Islamic states. This was perhaps inevitable as the prophet was probably thinking of a homogeneous nation of arabs and did not foresee the success his religion would have in encompassing a vast diversity of races, ethnicities and the development of nation states.

I will wait for your future essays to make any comment upon the more contemporary art and science of war.

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re: amit # 10

Yes, those are the broad classifications, by which wars are judged and understood. However, there is a fourth classification and it is of economics. Traditionally, most histrographies had concentrated on the politics of wars and very few had sought to understand the role of economics behind the wars. The Muslim invasions were motivated by the economics and ideology, but between the two; ideology was always at disvantage to the reasons of economics.

As I mentioned in my article, but not in specific detail, the primary focus of Muslim raids into India seems to be good examples of opportunism. India was vunerable to invasions and it was invaded not for conquest but for plunder. It was after many years of such periodic raids, that the Muslims sought to build their political rule in India. Likewise, the same example applied to the British and the British East India Company in India in the 1700s.

As to the American invasion of India and Pakistan, the Americans would have to fight back the Indians and Pakistanis or increase the HI-B quotas or add two more new states to the American union :)

Ciao

re: #7 by ferozk

``Saudi Arabia has a long tradition of using proxy wars to fight for its interests. ``

With so much of petro-dollars around, I guess they can buy anything.

``Pakistan did not send its armed forces to fight Saddam not due to its India centric policy``

I used the word India centric because any flare up on kashmir would require Pak to be ready with the entire military strength. As happened a few years back, Pak was going to recall all its peace keeping force as well as depute the forces from the Afghan border to the east.

``because the hardware would have been provided by the Saudis and the Pakistanis would have simply manned the Saudi equipment.``

Now from where would the Saudis get there hardware from? I don`t think the F16 U.S. fighters fly are the same as the ones Saudis has or Pak will have. Also Osama also was ready to bring in his battle hardened, high morale mujahids to the rescue of Saudis.

``the prospect of earning hard dollars by being rent-a-soldiers for the Saudis was quite attractive to the officer corps in Rawalpindi. ``

Definitely, but my concern would be why take a chance. If the best fighting machine in the world is offering you help, why would you look some where else. U.S. and its allies not only discisively defeated Saddams army, they crushed his ability to even rebuild it by enforcing sanctions and no-fly zones. Also remember how Saddams army burnt the oil wells. American came in handy there too.

Coming back to The Treaty of Westphalia,
``......and how the balance of power was recreated, you will see that Europe wanted to remain politically fragmented and with a multipolarity of power centers. ``

Before the war too there were several power centers like the French, Spain, Hapsburg, and the Holy Roman Empire. Towards the end of the war the Holy Roman Empire was clearly in no position to carry on but neither could the Swedes or the French deliver a knockout blow from a military point of view. Hence this treaty was also called The Peace of Exhaustion.
And after 30 years of war the centers of powers changed. Along with the end of the supremacy of the Holy Roman Empire, France emerged as a dominant power.So even though there were several powers these were allies during the war just like present day U.S./U.K./Spain. Even though three new great Powers arose from this peace: Sweden, the United Netherlands and France, Sweden`s time as a Great Power was short lived.

But after the war definitely the Protestants were there to stay. In Islam more than 90-95% are sunnis, shias are hardly a match for them. Iran-Iraq 8 year war could be compared to the 30 year war. But it failed to bring any introspection in Islam. because of its rigidity it will never compromise on its principle. I had an experince with a Jordanian, we were in a seminar. After some data was presented and some conclusions drawn, the Jordanian who is a devout Muslim asked him why is he (the presenter) so much sure of the conclusion. Has he independently verified it? I started to think the same why is he blindly following his religious books. Has he independently verified it? I guess when you have faith, you don`t care for reason.

BTW, because of this article I did some more reading. It was really an interesting discussion.

Amit #10: I think you are correct.

The concept of ideology is very strong in Islam. Within the context of war, the concept of, ``Shahadat`` must be amongst the strongest concepts, of any kind, in the world. It is generally accepted by Muslims of all sides. This includes radical Muslims as well as the most Westernized ones. The Pakistani soldiers who couldn`t recite a single verse of the Quran, during the gora days of the 60s etc., still believed in the concept of Shaheeds. Even the non-Muslims who have died fighting for Pakistan, are refered to as Shaheeds.

Once a population is convinced they are going to heaven if they die, fighting for a cause they consider legitimate, they become extremely difficult to occupy. This is why it is difficult to take over a Muslim country. Even though, due to their backwardness it may not be too difficult to defeat them in a war. The Afghans broke the back of the mighty USSR. Even though, the USSR was able to invade much more powerful and developed East European countries as and when it wanted. It was the maulvis who fought in Afghanistan. While the secular forces joined up with the invading Soviets or fled to California.

Similarly, it is the maulvis who are leading the fight in Iraq. While most of the secular Iraqi leadership has joined with the occupying Americans, or have fled to Dearborn, Michigan. There is, as you said, an ideological Islamic resistance, alongwith a nationalistic Iraqi resistance to the USA in Iraq.......

``I wonder what would happen if the US had attacked Pakistan or India to wage such an ideological battle.``

Hmm... I don` think this can happen. No country that has nuclear weapons has ever been attacked by an Army, across its borders, in the history of mankind. The first indication that Iraq did not have nukes was the fact that the USA attacked it. If Iraq had nukes, it would never have been attacked. Much like North Korea will never be attacked........(sidenote: the Egyptian attack on Israel in the Yom Kippur holiday is an exception to the above rule. However, at that time, I am not sure how sure Egypt was about Israel`s nuclear power)......

Netizen, 98% of them were indeed converted and you are correct in your claim that they were taken from Christian areas. However, those Christian areas were economically and politicall subordinate to the Ottoman Empire and soon even fell to the Ottomon Collosus. Any hows, the 2% that were not converted were the elite bodyguards of the Sultan. They were exceptionally fine soliders and I even got a chance to see their bodyarmour and weapons when I was in Istanbul. I visited the Top Kopi Palace and a multitude of other historical sites.

it wont happen in Born-again Evangelical United States to the Ghettoized Islam........they will be segregated and pretty safe -- in the Land of the Neocons.....

The funny thing is muslims are not ghettoized in the US (with the possible exception of arabs in detroit, but even that is a stretch) while they are ghettoized in northern europe.

Ferozek #8: ``Pakistan did not send its armed forces to fight Saddam not due to its India centric policy, but due to the politics of GHQ in Rawalpindi. Had the COAS not been so politically against United States, Pakistani army would have had more than a brigade fighting Iraqi army. Pakistani brigade did not fight as it was stationed in the rear for ``logistical`` reasons. ``

Pakistan used to have a huge Army presence in Saudi Arabia. It was the (un)official protector of the Saudi royalty. I think the presence was around an Army div or so. Unlike the PAF, which has (had) a presence, for training purposes, in most Arab countries, the presence of the Army in Saudi Arabia was for non-trainnig purposes.

This presence was withdrawn during the Zia regime, when the Saudis demanded that Pakistan Army only send Sunni soldiers to Saudi Arabia. The Army obviously could not accept this, since it is a mixture of a large number of Sunnis and Shias, hence the Army presence in Saudi Arabia ended.

Pakistan did not send frontline troops in the first Gulf war due to the same reason for which it did not send them during this Gulf war. The population of Pakistan is always, overwhelmingly, against the USA, in any war. In this Gulf War, 98% of Pakistan is against it. In the previous one, I remember there were pictures of Saddam praying, as US jets flew over, his country, on the backs of vans in Pakistan.

The above is despite the fact that Saddam had attacked another Muslim country. And even moreso, despite the fact, that Saddam had always been more pro-India than pro-Pakistan. Iraq never supported Pakistan on Kashmir etc. While Saudi Arabia has traditionally been quite pro-Pakistan.

In the big scheme of things, I think anti-American feeling in Pakistan`s (non-Chowk) crowd, always supersedes anti-anything else feeling............People viewed the first Gulf war as a fight between USA and Iraq, not as a fight between Saudi Arabia and Iraq..........

Re:Ferozk#8

You raise some very interesting questions. I think there are three kinds of wars - the purely materialistic wars, the purely ideological wars and thirdly a hybrid of the two. Purely materialistic wars are started simply to gain territory, wealth and power. I would say the conquests of Alexander, Romans, Mongols, Ashoka etc fall in this category. Purely ideological wars are started to establish the supremacy of an ideology or religion. The crusades in the middle ages, the cold war between US and USSR and the current war on terrorism are examples of purely ideological wars. Finally you have the hybrid where there is both ideology and greed involved. Most wars fall in this category including WW2, the Islamic conquests of India etc.

A nation starts believing it is mighty if it has both the strength of material resources and an accompanying ideology for their way of life. In fact, ideology is even more important than just material strength to sustain and win wars because it motivates people to die for their cause. Early muslims were victorious all over simply because of the strength of their ideology. Even Osama Bin Laden felt he was mighty simply on the basis of religious ideology and attacked the twin towers in New York. On the other hand Alexander`s victories fizzled out after his death because it really didn`t have any ideological base to support it after his demise.

The US believes it is mighty because it has humongous material resources backed by a powerful ideology of capitalism and individual liberty. The war in Iraq is an ideological war. It is wrongly protrayed as a war for oil. In fact the primary purpose of the neo-cons in US is to change the ideological landscape of the middle-east, defeat political Islam and force all middle-eastern countries to become democratic and secular i.e. adopt western ideology. Iraq was just chosen to be the battlefield because it was in the cross-hairs for a long time. Some flimsy excuses were given to launch the conflict. In reality it was just the place where the Bush administration chose to wage battle against political Islam and hoped for a domino effect in the middle-east.

As far as winning a war is concerned, it depends on the material strength of the aggressor, the ideological strength if there is an ideology involved and the nature of the losing side as to how quickly they succumb. The US was able to win Iraq militarily but holding on to it has been very tough. This is because political Islam is a tough ideological opponent and its followers do not give up easily and succumb to the western ideology of democracy and freedom. If the Iraqis simply wanted to get rid of the US, they would peacefully hold elections, adopt their new constitution and have the US leave. Rather they want to establish an Islamic regime in Baghdad for which not only must the US leave but it must also lose in the process. Hence the violence that we see everyday. I wonder what would happen if the US had attacked Pakistan or India to wage such an ideological battle. I think far from fighting, we would probably line up at the US embassy and ask for green cards and US citizenships :-)

In reply to #5 by haroonellahi

``Muslims have indeed recruited Christians and many Christians have used for Muslim wars``

I am myself curious to know about it, as I have no such knowledge of Muslims employing non-Muslims to fight their wars/battles. The Mughal army did have Hindu generals and the Rajputs did fight for the Mughals. But it was a pact, whereby the Rajputs always had a 50,000 (somewhat) standing army ready at the disposal of the Emperors. These forces fought anyone, anywhere to expand the Mughal Empire. They were used against those Rajput kingdoms who preferred to stay independent as well as against the Deccani Muslim Sultans.
Regarding the Janissaries, you have only reflected my views in comment # 3.

``they had entire programs where Christian parents would give their childern to the Turkish authorities. ``

The program that you are mentioning is nothing but devshirme, which produced the Janissaries, (``New Force`` in Turkish). In addition to what you have wrote about the Janissaries, these Ottoman foot soldiers were pre-adolescent Christian boys who were taken from their families ( some of the families readily gave them for a better life), housed in special barracks, converted to Islam, and trained either for military or bureaucratic service. Hence, their being Christian is not right, they had become Muslims. Also these kids were from the Christian territories like the Balkans which the Ottomans had captured. What do yo umean by ``Elite Christian unit``? Do you still mean the Janissaries or some other Catholics/Orthodox units serving the Ottomans?

re: amit # 2

Sir, I do not have any disagreements with your point of view, since it is the realist or realpolitik view of power. As Bismarck stated, might is right! I myself subscribe to this point of view.

However, a good question is what makes a nation think that it is mighty? The mighty British army of its time did not win the war of 1776 to 1783 just as the mighty American army did not win the war in Vietnam and is not winning in Iraq. Might makes a nation right, and can start a war, but it will not help it win the war. Wars are won on the basis of economics and politics. Starting a war is not the same as fighting it and winning it.

Lust for war, false justifications and strong defences still does not answer the question, why war has changed since its invention nearly 4000 years ago and why the face of war of todayis so different from yesterday`s war?

re: nasah # 1

Aptly said and willingly agreed! :)

Ciao

re: Netizen # 3

I will see if I can get the names of the books from the library, which cite the examples of the early Muslims using mercenaries and once I do, I will post them for you.

As to Saudi Arabia asking United States for protection in 1990-1991, the point is that the Saudis went to a non-Muslim army to help it guard its interests. Whether Bush, Sr. fought that war for oi or notl is a side issue, because if the American interest was oil, oil was also the interest of the Saudi ruling family to have called in the American divisions to guard the oil fields of the House of Saud. Saudi Arabia has a long tradition of using proxy wars to fight for its interests. It used Iraq to fight against Iran, when the Iran revolution of 1979 threatened its interests and it used the Americans to fight the Iraqis, when Iraq threatened it in 1990-1991.

Pakistan did not send its armed forces to fight Saddam not due to its India centric policy, but due to the politics of GHQ in Rawalpindi. Had the COAS not been so politically against United States, Pakistani army would have had more than a brigade fighting Iraqi army. Pakistani brigade did not fight as it was stationed in the rear for ``logistical`` reasons. Secondly, the deployment of Pakistani soldiers to Saudi Arabia would not have re-orientated its India specific threat axis, because the hardware would have been provided by the Saudis and the Pakistanis would have simply manned the Saudi equipment. Since Pakistan has a large number of manpower and its was a low-tech army in the 1980s, light on technology and heavy on human resources, the prospect of earning hard dollars by being rent-a-soldiers for the Saudis was quite attractive to the officer corps in Rawalpindi.

In this sense, Pakistani army can classified as a mercenary army. For that matter, it can also be safely argued that United Nations peacekeeping missions are nothing more than mercenary wars also. United Nations is simply hiring soldiers from the Third World to go and fight wars, which no one wants to fight and in return, the nations contributing troops to the United Nations get foreign exchange. Any army of any nation, which deploys outside of its national territory to defend another nation and in return makes a financial gain from it, can be considered as a mercenary army.

As to the Thirty Years War, my interpretation of that conflict was in the sense of its contribution to nature of war. I do not disagree, with your statements since they are the basic version of the conflict. What you are discussing is the origins of that war and what I was discussing, were the consequences of that war upon the nature of war itself and on the political development of Europe as a collection of secular states. Every school child knows that the war of 1618-1648 was between Catholics and Protestants, but revolt of Martin Luther was basically an attempt to break the political power of the Holy Roman Empire and that of Spain and it was to prevent the domination of Europe by a single nation. If you closely look at the Treaty of Westphalia, and how the balance of power was recreated, you will see that Europe wanted to remain politically fragmented and with a multipolarity of power centers.

The pope and the papal states had a lot to with the Thirty Years Wars. What is often overlooked is that the Church was a very temporal power in Europe in 1500s. Starting with the coronation of Pepin the Short by the pope in the 1200s, the legitimacy of the king came from his being be crowned by the pope and the popes often used religion to get political aims. Prior to the Thirty Years War, the popes were quite wary of the power of Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor and King of Spain, because his power was a direct threat to the power of the popes. According to the Peace of Augsburg of 1556, the first conflict phase of the Reformation of 1517 ended when Charles V agreed to abdicate as the Holy Roman Emperor and not because the Prostestant German princes were defeated. In fact, there is a strong historic chronology that suggests that the period of 1517 to 1648 was actually a series of the same war to decide the political future of Europe and religion was an afterthought to that outcome and was not the scintilla of the conflict.

In the end, I think we agree because as you have stated and I quote ``Islam has still retained this characteristic thats why you see people from several nationalities in Al Qaida``. I believe, I had made similar point that unlike Europe after 1648, Islam was not able to develop this argument its politics and is still struggling to settle the issue. As you pointed out, Europe was pan-religious but then it discarded the idea and Islam still thinks that Pan-Islamism or pan religion is a good idea.

Ciao

Its very rare now that one finds intellectually stimulating articles on Chowk... there are a bunch of articles that feroz has written here and elsewhere that deserve to be compiled in a bookform...

Netizen, I agree with you with what you had to say about how it was mere interest for Sr. Bush . However, I do not have any contemporary examples to support the authors claim however Muslims have indeed recruited Christians and many Christians have used for Muslim wars. Backtrack to the Ottomon Turks, dude, they had entire programs where Christian parents would give their childern to the Turkish authorities. The Turks would create `batches` and these young childern, aged 4-5, would lose all contact with their family. They would have no loyalty to any one segmenct of society nor would they be in the petty family rivalries. They would however have loyalty to one man alone and that would be the Turkish Sultan. Therefore, that would decrease chances of mutiny. Most Vazirs in the Ottoman Empire governiing Ottoman Provines came out of this system. Also, Janasseries of the Turkish Armies. Elite Christian unit which would exceptionally strong. Most Generals were also out of this amazing system.

To those, who have responded and commented, I offer my thanks. I have just a few points to make on this article and the rest, which will follow it. The intention of the statements made in the article are open to question and the arguments made are open to debate. I am not stating an idee fixe on the nature of war, but merely offering a historic perspective on its evolution. This an interpretation of an event, which in this case happens to be war and the political and economic contexts associated with it. This is not the Sermon on the Mount on the nature of the war itself. The idea behind the article was to generate a debate on the issue and like with all debates, I think that I will learn more from the interacts than I can hope to teach my readers.

Dear readers, you are free to state your views, question my statements and hopefully, you will eludicate me on my favorite hobby, which is the study of war.

To those who might respond in the future, I thank you!

Ciao

there was once upon a time when Islam civilized the barbarian`s Europe -- now it`s European`s turn to civilize barbarian`s Islam.......

and it will be done not by war -- but by Europeanizing the Imam ... ban on importing Imams from the mother countries -- educating Imams in European universities -- with compulsory courses of Religions of the World 101....

.....assimilation assimilation assimilation -- there will be assimilation for the Musliims in Europe -- no escaape from that ....

....as they say when the jackal has a death wish it heads for the city -- same for the fundamentalist Muslims heading for Europe -- the European St. Bernards are going to rescue the FUN from the Fundamentalist Islam in coming decades....

it wont happen in Born-again Evangelical United States to the Ghettoized Islam........they will be segregated and pretty safe -- in the Land of the Neocons.....

Feroze,

There is only one real reason to start a war - might is right!! People can come up with all kinds of justification but the reality is that whoever is strong and powerful, attacks and defeats the weak. It has little to do with religious philosophies. Even if the stronger party has democracy, free press etc, it can barely control the lust for war. The current war in Iraq is a perfect example where imaginary reasons were given for a war. The same goes for Vietnam. Look at the German instigation of WW2. Some imaginary justification was given about conditions of germans in Sudetenland.

In the subcontinental context, the Ghazanavis and Ghauris repeatedly attacked and plundered India when Indians never did any harm to any muslims. Some false justfication was given about some ruler in Sindh. Babur attacked Ibrahim Lodhi only because he could and because of his lust for the throne at Delhi. So it is just human nature to take advantage of the other party`s weakness.

The real lesson from all this is that you must have a rock solid defense. It does not matter how good your own intentions are. You should never depend on the kindness of others not to harm you. Today India and Pakistan are talking real peace because they know that they cannot conquer each other.

``but the Muslims overcame this hindrance by employing armies of non-Muslims to fight their wars.``

Can you give examples of where Muslims have done that.

``Therefore, it was not surprising for Saudi Arabia to ask for United States’ military protection against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1990 and to garrison non-Muslim armies on Islam’s holiest soils.``

I think ythis conclusion has flaws, I don`t think Saudi Arabia asked United States for help becuase the U.S. army was non-muslim. Sr. Bush was as eager to protect the oil pipelines in Saudi as the Saudis were to ask for help. Don`t forget that U.S. was and still is the strongest army the world has ever seen. Saddams army before the first Gulf war was, if not the best then one of the best armies in the middle east. I don`t think the Saudis would have taken any chances with Osama`s rag tag army. Regarding Pakistan, where does its military get its hardware and planes. Do you think India-centric Pak would have sent a 500,000 strong army to defend Saudi against 500,000 - 1 million Saddams battle hardened force.

``The Arab idea of mercenaries was later included in the armies of the Ottoman Turks in the guise of the corps of Jannarsies, who were non-Muslims and who fought for the Turkish Ottoman Empire. ``

The turks have been using Jannisaries since 14th century. Though the Janissaries consisted of conscripted Christian kids/youths (from the defeated populace) they were converted to Islam and brainwashed into defending the faith and the Sultan.

``It was this power, which was contested in the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), when the Europeans nations fought the church’s power to define their own sense of political suzerainty without the church’s influence. Reformation of 1517 might be the brainchild of Martin Luther, but it was sustained politically and via military resistance by the German principalities of Mitteleuropa not on religious grounds but on the need to break the church’s political monopoly over European states symbolized in the sovereign right to declare wars.``

Thirty years war was occured for a number of reasons but basically it was fought between the Protestants and the Catholics. The Holy Roman Empire wanted to extend its influence over more states and the Protestants and the Calvinists wnated to defeat these Empire. Hence it was a religious war.

``In the aftermath of the Thirty Years War and the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, the powers to make war was taken away from the individual (the pope) and given to the state.``

I don`t think the Pope and the Papal states had anything to do with the Thirty year war. These battles were fought in Central and Eastern Europe along religious, lingual and ethnic lines.

``Since the church had assumed supremacy over the European states and the war was fought to break that supremacy, it was decided that all states would be equal in power and wars could only be fought for reasons of preserving the state’s power. It was hoped that through this, wars would be of defensive political nature only and not of an aggressive religious style. ````
Once againt the war was fought between the Imperial forces and various groups like the Bohemians, the Danes, the Swedes (they wanted to check Catholicism), the French (even though it was a Catholic state, it wanted to weaken the Hapsburg). Even within the Holy Roman Empire there were several princes some Catholic, some Protestants and some Calvinists. You can say that the treaty helped to establish nation-states. Also, it was agreed that the citizens of the nation state was subjected to the laws and actions of their own government rather than to those of neighbouring powers. These laws/actions could be religious or secular. The nation state could have become Catholic/ Lutherans/ Calvinist states depending on what the king and the populace favoured. The difference was earlier overlapping political and religious loyalties were common. Hence Catholic Spainiards could could in aid of the Holy Roman Empire against the Protestant Swedes. Islam has still retained this characteristic thats why you see people from several nationalities in Al Qaida.