The Dispatches on War

re: rhue # 39

As to your question about my sources, they were varied in nature. Some material came from old college texts, others from class notes and lecture notes of a time, when I used to TA European history in college. Some came from reading autobiographies, which opened up new avenues of thought and reflection. However, the most meaningful source were the veterans, with whom I have talked and who were able to make me understand the reality of war by narrating their war experiences.

One source was my own interest and fascination with the subject of war and my academic background in European history and the political history of the 20th century. The fact that I have been reading on the topic since 1974, much of the material was a reflection of my own personal growth and muturity as I judged past knowledge in light of newer experiences and understandings.

On the issue of religion and war, there is a very strong linkage. Since the rulers, in the early part of human civilization, also carried out a priestly role, it was quite easy for them to combine both roles. This combination can also seen the terms of the divine right of the kings and it also be in the last two great wars of the 20th century.

It seems that religion is a very strong identifying force and it was periodically used to inflate the fighting morale of the armies. Even the secular nature of Europe and United States, could not entirely defeat this idea. In the First and Second World War, the British were fighting for ``God, King and Country`` and the Germans claimed that ``Gott ist mit uns`` - God is with us. The Americans are equating the war on terrorism with a crusade and the symbology is not that askewed, because at one point Eisenhower had refered to the invasion of Europe, in 1944, as ``great crusade``. Even Stalin, was forced to use religion as a political tool against Nazi Germany.

In the poem of Maculay (sp?) called the Lays of Ancient Rome, there is a line which says, `` how best can a man die than defending the ashes of his fathers and the temples of his gods``.

There is something mystical about fighting for a god and maybe, its is a wish in all of us towards for some sort of immortality.

Ciao

re: rhue # 39

Thank you for your comments.

I had posted a reply, but it was lost due to an untimley intervention of WAPDA in the submission process. Since WAPDA is still quite unsure of its intentions to be present or not, I will repost them when WAPDA has made up its as to what it wants to do!

Ciao

Mr. FerozK, this is an excellent piece of article written on a very fundamental topic of Human History. I am very impressed by the lack of bias employed and the analytical study on warfare with particular comparisons on both the Islamic and Western Empires.

As it is an open topic subject to various comments and criticism, I look forward to reading the rest of your articles before contributing my comments and criticisms. As a previous poster suggested, you should ensure that such valuable pieces are collected and compiled into a book form. Critics must understand that the object of this article is not to conclude that the Author is correct in his views but to appreciate the fact that another dimension or angle has been introduced in the attempt to explain the evolution of warfare. Such thought provocations is what makes progress possible and i am very curious to know what sources and leading historical researchers influenced your decision in concluding that theocracy in warfare has lead to the current political and power decline of Islamic States in international Relations.

re:HN # 37

Yes, it would seem that way, would it not? ;)

Ciao

Feroz:

Sorry, like I said an earlier post was messed up. This is a late reconstruction, and memory is not as sharp. But this statement of yours,


``This is ironic, because it seems that humanity has come a complete circle and the wars, are once more, being more influenced by theocratic considerations as seen in the clash of the civilization’s idea.``


I was under the impression that religion is as good an aphrodisiac as any other to pump up armies to keep them kicking and snorting through long and arduous campaigns.

A line from an old Vaipaul, as I remember is that one of the spies of the the Hindu king about to be invaded by Muslim armies` report that says the one reason nobody can last in their way is because the entire army prays together.

Even in India, they often built temporary temples etc at army camps to as a senior officer once told me....``keep the hot bloods busy, and focussed`` rather than getting the Devi`s blessings.

The one thought that crosses my mind right now is, Is there any army in the world right now in possession of a religion that can motivate their men? Methinks, only Islam currently seem to be able to do it.

I am told, religion is NOt the kind of Getafix`s magic potion even among the younger generation of Israelies as it used to be. Judaism perhaps came closest to being that kind of opiate of armies...but is losing or being tamed by time.

Feroz:

Sorry, like I said an earlier post was messed up. This is a late reconstruction, and memory is not as sharp. But this statement of yours,


``This is ironic, because it seems that humanity has come a complete circle and the wars, are once more, being more influenced by theocratic considerations as seen in the clash of the civilization’s idea.``


I was under the impression that religion is as good an aphrodisiac as any other to pump up armies to keep them kicking and snorting through long and arduous campaigns.

A line from an old Vaipaul, as I remember is that one of the spies of the the Hindu king about to be invaded by Muslim armies` report that says the one reason nobody can last in their way is because the entire army prays together.

Even in India, they often built temporary temples etc at army camps to as a senior officer once told me....``keep the hot bloods busy, and focussed`` rather than getting the Devi`s blessings.

The one thought that crosses my mind right now is, Is there any army in the world right now in possession of a religion that can motivate their men? Methinks, only Islam currently seem to be able to do it.

I am told, religion is NOt the kind of Getafix`s magic potion even among the younger generation of Israelies as it used to be. Judaism perhaps came closest to being that kind of opiate of armies...but is losing or being tamed by time.

Ferozek #34: The whole disucussion started from,

``As to your comment about the public opinion being a factor in the decision of GHQ not to send troops to the Gulf in 1990-1991 and in 2003, I would have to differ from your view. Public opinion does not matter in Pakistan, when it comes to the military`s self-interest.``

You are correct in stating that the COAS does not worry about public opinion when carrying out a coup. Nor does he worry about the opinion of the other two forces. For the simple reason that he times his coup at a point when he knows no one is going to come out in the streets to support the political party in power.

At the same time, within the context of deploying troops to places like Iraq, which is where this discussion started, of course, the COAS cannot do it by himself. Even in the capacity of President, Musharraf has not been able to do it, even though he wanted to. The whole country would be up in arms (though it would not be up in arms at a coup).

As just the COAS, it would be impossible to deploy troops outside Pakistan. He would need so many resources, from the PAF to the Navy to the Foreign Service etc., that there is no way, a COAS could just get up and deploy troops, as and when he wants......

re: Romair # 27

Romair, the orginal discussion was on Pakistani politics and I will remain within that parameter.

COAS does not need the help of air force or the navy and the question is not about deploying the army. COAS and the army do not need air force`s or the naval help because in order to rule Pakistan, what is needed is the corps which are already deployed within the cities of Pakistan. In a military sense, Pakistani army ``occupies`` Pakistan strategically and one does not need the air force to airlift airborne troops to TV stations to capture them or it needs naval marines to storm the harbor at Karachi.

The other two services may dislike the army and disdain on the martial laws, but it does not matter much unless they are willing to, physically, interdict the army and prevent martial laws. They may not like martial law and they may not cooperate, but they have never resisted it either and that makes all the difference! In my humble opinion, they are as gulity as the army by their acts of omissions. On the other hand, we can sit around and parse the levels of guilt and quibble over the stains of original sin, but a sinful and an illegal act, will always remain as such regardless of the gloss of morality by which it is covered.

COAS does rule Pakistani politics and once in power, he is immune to outside political suggesstion. COAS is a potent power in Pakistani politics regardless of who is in power. The army is, and might not be a monolithic entity but the interests of the army remain monolithic and the interests of army, within Pakistani politics, is about the self-preservation of its political interests and existence in Pakistan. Another point of fact; it is wrong to consider the army in Pakistan as being apolitical, because the army is very political in Pakistan.

Ciao

re: ana # 32

I have heard of the author and I had the book, but had to leave it with all my other books behind in Salt Lake City, when I moved back to Pakistan. The friend, with whom I left my cache of books, apprently moved to Kentucky and did not leave any forwarding address. So I have no idea, where my books are! :)

Still, thanks for offering the suggestion and I appreciate it.

re: dost-mittar # 28

The reason being that Arab and Muslim societies chose on purpose to cut-off contacts with the outside world. The same thing happened in China and Japan. Trade brought exposure to the Arab societies and along with trade, also brought in political, cultural and other influences into the Arab societies. Politically, it meant that such influences were questioning the traditional nature of power and had to be stopped. Arab societies were quite progressive in the begining and later on, they seem to have entered a Dark Age, from which they have still not left.

I am using the term in a purely historic sense and historically, a dark age is considered as a period in which no learning or knowledge takes place.

There are very interesting questions that need to be, quite urgently, addressed. The question is how did the Arab societies go from openness to closing off their proverbial doors to progress and learning new things? In the early days of Islam, religion was quite practical in the terms of being subordinated to the dictates of secular power and then, it went on to dominate and influence secular power. When, and how, but more importantly, why did this happen?

Every Muslim talks about the Golden Age of Islam, and justly so, in terms of science, medical progress, scientific achivements, and philosophical/religious inquiries, but no one is interested in answering the questions as to how these things ended? There must be a reason, why Islam suddenly went into a deep freeze intellectually speaking.

My own hypothesis is, that it was fear of losing political power that made the Arabs shun outside contact.

Ciao

feroz,

interesting article.

as i was reading it i wondered if you`ve read a book by barbara ehrenreich called ``blood rites: origins and history of the passions of war``? it`s quite interesting. there`s a brief excerpt from it at amazon.com. if it interests you enough to read through. . . and it`s not readily available, let me know. i`ll send you my copy. :)

Romair:

``My guess is they said their prayers, fasted and that was about it; and spent the rest of the time planning and training their soldiers.``

There is at least one muslim conqueror who fitted that image - Babar. It is said that he was a great drinker. But everytime he had to undertake a major campaign, he would invite his soldiers and in their presence break his bottle of wine and wine glass and forsook never to imbibe the haram drink again. This worked up the relgious zeal of his soldiers who were then prepared for the attack the following day.

Once the campaign was over, it was ``Kee-main-ne-agar-pee-ke-tau-kis-baat-ki-tauba`` time.

re: #21 by Romair
``Public opinion does matter in Pakistan. This is exactly why Musharraf has not been able to send troops to Iraq, even though, it seems like he wanted to. ``

So how do you explain Pak Armys U-turn in case of supporting Taliban. I guess Pak public would have definitely supported Osama and Mullah Omar. But realising the possibility of facing the U.S. army the Pak Army went against the general public opiniion in giving support/bases to the U.S. Army.
Hence I would say that even though the public opinion matters, there are certain classified information which the public in general is not aware of and hence the political/military leadership has to take the decision best for the country.

dost-mittar #28: ``But it is somewhat surprising that arabs did not have any navy, considering their consummate skill as traders by sea with dhows and all that.

I have always had difficulty finding good accounts of the mlitary tactics used by the Muslims, specifically the Arabs. Either I haven`t looked hard enough or it is because much of Arab military history is written in the context of religion. Rather than an analysis of the tactics used. Khalid Bin Waleed etc. must have been the greatest strategicians of their times. However, they are looked at as religious figures. I have always wondered how religious they really were. My guess is they said their prayers, fasted and that was about it; and spent the rest of the time planning and training their soldiers. Looked probably more like Imran Khan than Qazi Hussain.......

The Arab merchant navy seems to have reached to quite a few corners of the known world. I wonder if the military navy could have been far behind. The word, ``admiral`` is an off-shoot of the Arabic word, ``ameer al-bahar`` meaning commander of the waters/seas.

temporal, feroz:

My knowledge of the early spread of islam is quite superficial. But it is somewhat surprising that arabs did not have any navy, considering their consummate skill as traders by sea with dhows and all that.

Ferozek #25: ``Romair, though I have no objections to your post or the information you have stated in it, I still hold the opinion that the opinion of the COAS in Pakistan matters more than the public opinion.``

I don`t think this is correct. For the simple reason, that it cannot be practically possible. If this were correct, then Musharraf, who is not only COAS but President also, would have been able to sent troops to Iraq. Why didn`t he? Because 98% of Pakistan was against it. As were the soldiers in the military.

There are other reasons also. Armies, in todays warfare do not deploy in isolation. Gone are the days, when ground troops was all that was needed. In today`s warfare, the battles are fought jointly by the Army, Air Force and Navy. Specifically the Air Force.

No Army can deploy in a battle without air cover; neither can a Navy. This is why the US Navy has as its core part, an Air group, which is larger than most of the air forces in the world. This is also why the US air force used to actually be a part of the US Army (I think till post-WW II).

An Army Chief would be committing suicide if he were to just send soldiers, without getting the Air Force involved(other than perhaps in guirella warfare). And the Air Force and Navy in Pakistan, have a completely different point of view on various issues than the Army. The PAF and Navy, for example, never get involved in Martial Laws, even though they are asked. This is not a coincidence. This is a part of the culture of the PAF and Navy. The higher command of the Army supports Martial Laws, while the higher commands of the PAF and Navy do not like Martial Laws.

Similarly, the Chiefs of Air Staff and Naval Staffs are in no way subordinate to the Chief of Army Staff. In some cases they are actually senior to the Chief of Army Staff. And in other cases the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff is from the Air Force or Navy. Hence the former two Chiefs do not take orders from the Army Chief. Quite the contrary. There is a healthy rivalry between the three forces. And most of the Air Force (and Naval) officers consider themselves quite, ``superior`` to the Army officers.

Hence there is no set of laws, traditions, etc. under which the Chief of Army Staff can, ``order`` or force the other forces into battle. A good example is Kargil. Where the Air Force, refused to participate. This is probably why, when Musharraf carried out the coup, he fired the complete high command of the PAF. About eight or nine PAF generals were superseeded and thus they resigned.

The only time the Chief of Army Staff can order other forces into battle is if he is the President also. In which case, he is acting in the capacity of the President, and not the Chief of Army Staff. And that is a political capacity, and all politicians (even dictators) have to take the public opinion into account.

So, what to talk of the whole public, the Chief of Army Staff cannot even order the Air Force and Navy into battle, on his own.

And even when he orders the Army into battle, he has to consider the opinions of the corps commanders as well as the motivation of the troops towards that battle......

As I said, the military is not a monolithic institution. And the COAS is not as powerful as people make him out to be. He is only powerful when dealing with groups that have skeletons in thier own closets, like various politicians, and can thus be bought. It is not possible for him to order around groups that are loyal to thier own solid traditions, e.g the other two forces, or the maulvi brigade, or various ethnic forces in Pakistan etc.

re: wahi_to # 23

Wars are not just contests of brute force and modern wars are not about overpowering the enemy. Wars are ideological in nature; they can have political overtones and economic rationales. Wars have myriad reasons for their origins. My agrument about the poor nature of Arabs and their wars was not based on their 1400 history and neither was it based on their war fighting skills.

The Arabs, in my view, have a poor war fighting record, because most of the Arab wars lacked a political motive to them and were overtly religious. If you hold wars to a political reason for their execution, as most wars are understood, then Arab wars and the reasons for them do not have very strong political reasons behind their intents. Even as you have stated and I agree with you, that Islam was a resurgent religion and it was winning militarily till the mid 1700s, it still does not the answer the question explaining Islam`s political failure.

Wars and winning wars does not mean much if such a war is lost politically. History does not remember who started the war as much as history remembers how that particular war ended. Islam might have won wars for a thousand years out of its fourteen hundred year history, but it lost all those wars politically. In that sense, Islam has a very poor record of fighting wars.

Islam lost out politically, in a historic sense, because the wars of Islam were not about the creation of a political order, as much as they were about the sustainability of a personalizd rule of individuals. Islamic states and kingdoms had no institutionalized political legacies and were usually identified with the ruler and their sovereign power was in equal measure to the political power of the king/caliph. Even history and history of Islam identifies and discusses periods of Islamic powers not by the rise and fall of nations, but through the rise and fall of individual dynastic rules identified by the name of the person and not that of the state/kingdom.

Ciao