Baloch Rights or Sardars’ Rights?

HP,

Your analogy to Sindh is appropriate. However, large scale affirmative action in Bhutto senior`s time helped develop a Sindhi middle class quickly, something that might have to be repeated in Baluchistan.

Re: # 40
``If you cannot take care of your regions and have little or no interest in them then you should not penalize them. Set them free.``
Zahra,
I do not know what you want to prove, but when you say set them free, free from what? Are they in some sort of bondage? What is rthe penalty that we have imposed on them? No one is denying that a grievious wrong has been committed and that needs to be reversed. The point is that you have in-hospitable areas in all countries and and not necessarily be able to develop them. Even India has them, the USA (Alaska) has them, Russia has loads of them. Does that mean that it is offensive to refer to these areas as inhospitable. Does it mean that if you cannot develop all inhospitable areas you should hand them over to another country, that already has enough of them. Look at it rationally and you will realise that no country has enough resources to develop all its areas equitably.

On 2nd thoughts, there should be an international council, with a focus on how all countries on Earth (and not on Mars) manage their regions and territories. Each country should be given the basics that they should follow. If they go above and beyond then that`s well and good and they should be graded accordingly. If they do not then the underprivileged areas should be taken away and put in a category which requires assistance in further development. The neigboring country should be the 1st one to be considered as a foster parent. If that does not work out then the region should be allowed only once to go back to its original parents. After that the International Council should take over.

My two cents.

Yahya:

[My point is that even after we reverse the wrong by undertaking massive development both in terms of mega projects and of direct benefit to the people (like roads, hospitals, schools, improved social sevices etc) the bulk of the landscape will remain the same as over 60 percent of the area of Balochistan is virtually uninhabitable. ]

Then, set them free! Let them have their own separate land.

If the government is not willing to develop that land and treat them equitably then why make their lives miserable. Why are you keeping an inhospitable land under your wings?

Why not go after Dul Lake? There will be some tourism related revenue there. In addition to that, the area can be/is considered as ``Asian Switzerland``.

Isn`t it foolish to let go of the Asian Switzerland and concentrate on an ``inhospitable land ... ``the dump where Allah shot the rubbish of creation`` ?

If you cannot take care of your regions and have little or no interest in them then you should not penalize them. Set them free.

HP: I looked into the reference you had provided at the end of the article. And, I understand that you used the opening remarks as a quote from another article/reference. I am clear that you were not the writer of the 1st three statements. No arguments there. Whoever said those remarks did not think through the whole context. That`s my point.

To your point, if people can be taught something then they can also get out of it and learn something new. There is another significant element to consider here. People only discard those teachings which have not proven to be of much value to them . In other words, they discard what they never truly bought into. How does that happen? On its own? Or some external elements kick in to create awareness? Or they expand their horizons? In order to do the last few types they have to have the basic education to differentiate.

Since you had focused on the nuances of Sardars vs. Baluchs, therefore I was only referring to them - mostly the Sardars. What I understood from the overview was that one group holds a crooked outlook and the other has very little/no entitlement to nurture an outlook. My point was that those with a crooked outlook are not going to change. Will they? Have they? If I am wrong here then I should not be blamed. I followed the horrific picture you have drawn of the Sardars to come to this conclusion :)

Somehow, I think that you also addressed a few elements in this article that were not well addressed in the SUI Episode - mainly around the difference between the baluchs and the sardars. I did not see any similarities except for one being a subset of the other.

Thanks.

re: HP

Thanks for the feed back on BLA. I am bit skeptical about the involvment of intelligence in the Baluch insurgency. I have my own set of assumptions on the situation in Baluchistan. The suggestion of an intelligence involvement is plausible, but it cannot be the sole reason for the political ferment in the province.

Ciao

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HP #34: I`ll see if get some time to write one. It would have to be quite long. It is difficult to summarize it.

I will give you the basic gist of why the Army has dominated all other institutions. It has nothing to do with guns. It has a lot to do with the internal weaknesses of the other institutions, and their infighting. This includes political parties, judiciary, etc.

The military internally is a large meritocracy. It must be the largest one in Pakistan. It is internally extremely egalitarian also. It is difficult to tell the difference between the son of a sweeper and the son of a millionaire when they are in their unit. And the son of the sweeper has an equal chance of moving up, as the son of Zafarullah Jamali and Musharraf.

It is also internally very united. There are next to none (in fact none) fault lines along ethnicities, religion, secularism etc. Only one`s rank counts. And it is very cohesive at the higher ranks. Despite their best efforts, political leaders have not been able to divide the Army high command. They have divided the judiciary, but not the Army.

In addition, it has very strong traditions, which are next to impossible to break. Zia Islamized Pakistan, but he was unable to Islamize the Army. All the COAS after him, were non-maulvis. When someone is made the COAS, all other competitors for the job, as per military tradition, quietly resign. They don`t try to bring the new COAS down, or wash their dirty laundry outdoors.

On the whole, it is internally quite uncorrupt. I never had to indulge in corruption to get anything done. Corruption in the military, both legalized and illegal, starts at very senior ranks. Unlike the civil service, where it exists at all ranks.

Due to this, if you ever notice, you will see that the poor enlisted sepoy has a strong loyalty with his unit, his commmander and with the general commanding him. And vice-versa. This is very genuine. They all respect each other and rarely, if ever, overstep their bounds toward each other. This is quite different from say the civilian, ``awam`` of Pakistan. It has no respect nor loyalty towards its political leaders. And vice-versa.

Infact, internally the military is very efficiently run, with little wastage, nepotism etc. Even though most of the professionals in the military are paid much lower salaries than their civilian counterparts...........

But most of all, the military now, specifically the Army, has a very middle class base amongst its officers. Due to which it has a lot of popularity amongst the middle class civilians (the non-Chowk crowd) of Pakistan. Taxi-drivers, panwallas, etc. who have sons and nephews in it, and consider it a status symbol. Alongwith the MQM, and Jamaat-i-Islami it is the only organization in which a poor man can make it to the top in Pakistan........

Etc. etc. Organizaitons that are internally cohesive will always dominate organizations that are internally disorganized and corrupt, in doing both good and bad..................If the PPP etc. want to dominate the Army, they need to internally reorganize and re-institutionalize themselves. This can be done with or without a democracy in Pakistan....The need to get the awam`s respect, much like the sepoys respect their commanders in the military.......And a son of a sweeper should be able to become the Chairperson of PPP just like he can become the Chief of the Army Staff.........

Re: # 32
ZahraJ,
``But I would like to revist the opening remark, ``inhospitable land`` ?

I disagree with this remark.
I also find the analogy simply ridiculous. ``

The province is so vast (imagine less than 5 percent of the population of Pakistan living in 48 percent of the area and that too concentrated around few towns/cities). I find the analogy to mars purely in physical terms appropriate. You can travel for hours and hours and yet not come across a single soul leave alone a settlement. The landscape in Makran especially between Gwadar and Jiwani is stark and resembles moon or mars (no exaggeration). My point is that even after we reverse the wrong by undertaking massive development both in terms of mega projects and of direct benefit to the people (like roads, hospitals, schools, improved social sevices etc) the bulk of the landscape will remain the same as over 60 percent of the area of Balochistan is virtually uninhabitable.

``Again, the issue is with the people and not necessarily wioth the institutions. If the institutions have wrong policies and procedures then that is one thing. They can be revisited. But if the people have upside down thought process and malicious mindset for whatever reason, that cannot be fixed. They are who they are.``

Are you referring to the decision makers or the people of Balochistan? My apologies if I appear thick.

Zehra,

As a young student, I traveled to Balochistan to help a family friend in an election campaign, a couple of years later I drove in a rickety Willis jeep from Karachi to Gwadar in the middle of summer. At that time, the present Coastal Highway was nothing more than a dirt road where often you could not drive more than 20 miles an hour.
When I read that quote, I felt that it correctly described my feelings about Balochistan. Balochistan at that time had unbelievably harsh environments.
I don’t blame Baloch for being so strong willed and often hard headed. The environments make life difficult for them. I have heard that things have changed considerably since. Asphalt roads now go right into the heart of Balochistan into Punjgur and Kharan and the newer SUV’s have taken over the old Willis Jeeps.
I agree with you on the words that you pointed out. I guess over the years, I have become too cynical to miss the finer details that you picked up so diligently. I should have removed the reference from the quote.

What I don’t agree with you on when you say, “But if the people have upside down thought process and malicious mindset for whatever reason, that cannot be fixed. They are who they are.”
That, I am afraid, goes against the human nature. People learn what they are taught and they can also unlearn things that they were always taught. That is what we learned in the 20th century, when a whole group of people was indoctrinated against the basic and common Christian beliefs they held for centuries, in a very short span of time.

If you are following the Zia’s children board, you will notice how indoctrination in Pakistan at that time affected peoples’ lives and the thought process. That kind of hypocrisy could not have gone on forever and I think things have begun to change in Pakistan after a long period of suffocation.

Romair,
you did not pick up what I was implying in a hypothectical situation. Anyway, we will discuss that when you write the article about the army.

Re: # 31
`You maybe confusing corps with regiments. Corps are self-sufficient fighting group. Regiments are a personnel organization structure. Pakistan Army has nine corps plus Northern Area Command and Aviation Corps. They are numbered with Roman NumeralsL I, IV XXXI etc. They are headquartered in Pindi, Mangla, Pannu Aqil, Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar, Quetta, Multan and Gurjranwala. `

There is no Corps Headquarter in Panu Aqil. But you are right about the command culture of the Pakistan Army. Notwithstanding its justified/unjustified forays in politics, it remains a disciplined organistion. If you look at the history of military interventions in Pakistan, the decision to intervene has always been made by the Army Chief. The few atempts at lower level never went beyond the planning stage.

HP

I am glad you took the time and effort to share some nuances of the Baluch/Sardar culture after reading the SUI Episode on Chowk. This article helps in clarifying many unspoken facts. The masses did not buy into the ideology that was imposed on them. In addition to that, behind every system there is an element that contributes to its strength or its failure. In this case, the failure is caused by inequitable treatment of the provinces. And as a result it trickles down to the masses. Again, the issue is with the people and not necessarily wioth the institutions. If the institutions have wrong policies and procedures then that is one thing. They can be revisited. But if the people have upside down thought process and malicious mindset for whatever reason, that cannot be fixed. They are who they are.

But I would like to revist the opening remark, ``inhospitable land`` ?

I disagree with this remark.
I also find the analogy simply ridiculous.

The current and past governments have never showed any interest in developing the ``inhospitable land``. There has always been more focus on Kashmir(capturing the ``Dul Lake``) and consuming hasheesh from across the border than caring to develop Baluchistan and other areas of Pakistan requiring attention. To add fuel to the fire, enough energy, resources and efforts have been expended on religious endeavors that have not added an ounce to the social fabric of the masses. Had Punjab or Sindh been left unattended then the masses would have faced similar consequences. The opening remark was a poorly thought out statement.

HP #30: ``I hope this would get Romair rolling!``

If your comments were a joke, then no. Otherwise, yes :)

I am assuming you were joking about the structure of the Army. If you weren`t then, you are ruining whatever acknowledgement you are getting about your knowledge of Sind and Baluchistan, with your ill-informed thesis on the Army.

One should stick with one`s expertise.

If I get some time, I will write a article about how the military functions, and why it is able to dominate the civil society, including political parties. Having seen both sides of the picture, from the inside, in quite a bit of detail, I think I have a pretty good idea. One point I would like to make is that no one in the military understands the civilians. And no one amongst civilians understands the military; specifically those on this site. That I am convinced of.......I myself had so many biases about the civilian side of Pakistan, when I was in the military. And am amazed to see similar biases on the civilian side. Conspiracy theories galore!!!

Assuming you werent` joking, here are some corrections:

``Pakistan army has five main corps. They are in Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan, Frontier, and Mangla (actually Kashmir corps)``

You maybe confusing corps with regiments. Corps are self-sufficient fighting group. Regiments are a personnel organization structure. Pakistan Army has nine corps plus Northern Area Command and Aviation Corps. They are numbered with Roman NumeralsL I, IV XXXI etc. They are headquartered in Pindi, Mangla, Pannu Aqil, Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar, Quetta, Multan and Gurjranwala.

``The corps commander in Karachi has full control over the army in Sindh. He also can force the air force and the navy in Karachi to follow his orders.``

This is obviously not true. Is Pannu Aqil in Sind? The corp commander in any city cannot simply declare independence. How in the world will he do that? What about all the poeple under him? All those officers are only stationed under him for a few months to years. What about finances. His salaries and budget come from GHQ. He has authority over the corps, completely, once it is ordered into war........

Also, the Army corps commanders has no authority over he PAF and Navy. They follow their own chain of command. Why in the world would the PAF and Navy Generals listen to him?

``say all four commanders in Karachi, Lahore, Quetta and Peshawar decide to separate from Pakistan``

:). This is too funny to comment on. What about the other five, ``commanders`` commanding the other corps?

HisExcellency #24

“In the longer run, this is dangerous for Pakistan since Balochistan forms 48% of Pakistan`s land mass.”

HE,
Why is it dangerous for Pakistan? The reality is that is the exact line the army uses to destroy opposition. I never buy this fear mongering by the army for the simple reason that I consider every political and economic demand and struggle in Pak to take Pakistan towards democracy, away from the military dictatorship no matter how benign that dictatorship may be.
This really requires another article but here is my take on what is behind the ‘destruction of Pakistan” line.
Now Manto would not be happy to read this but the reality is that Pakistan has artificial borders. This creates a built in fear in the middleclass and the bureaucracy’s mind that somehow, these borders could be redrawn by some internal struggle or any forceful opposition to the center would result in the breakup of Pakistan. This is now a double whammy after the army went down in the East Pakistan and still blamed Bengalis, India, Bhutto, and what not for its failure.
The problems that Pakistan has are pretty common in many third world countries. Let me point you to first India and then Sri Lanka to find parallels in the situation. India has several problems from Kashmir to Assam and from Naga to sometimes Tamil to name just a few. The Indian government uses several methods to deal with these issues but nobody ever hears that these problems would lead to break up of India. Sri Lanka is also dealing with an insurgency for a long time now, what are the odds that it will break up?

Now here is my theory! Put your thinking hat on :)

Pakistan army has five main corps. They are in Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan, Frontier, and Mangla (actually Kashmir corps)
Four corps commanders sit in Karachi, Lahore, Quetta and Peshawar. (Mangla HQ Pindi)
The corps commander in Karachi has full control over the army in Sindh. He also can force the air force and the navy in Karachi to follow his orders.
Now this hypothetical situation: If the corps commander in Karachi decides to go bonkers and announces independence for Karachi, is there any force in Pakistan to stop him from doing that right away?
Take it even further; say all four commanders in Karachi, Lahore, Quetta and Peshawar decide to separate from Pakistan, what force Islamabad would have left to stop them from doing that?
So what is more dangerous for Pakistan, the stupidly designed army structure or the political dissent?

(I hope this would get Romair rolling!)

Thanks temporal!
I was writing a response to Feroz’s post when I saw your post. I scratched my detailed response and would draw on the report by TFT to answer Feroz’s question.

Feroz! On reading this report, you should have a fair idea now who is behind the BLA.

“The interior ministry’s report, however, gives no expenditures for the working of various intelligence agencies that operate in the province.”
”During one of the meetings of the Committee when Secretary Defence Hamid Nawaz was trying to explain to the members the working of the army and intelligence agencies in the province, senators from Balochistan lashed out and accused these agencies of fuelling the insurgency in the province by adopting wrong methods and targeting the politicians.

”However, the defence secretary strongly defended the role of the ISI and MI in the province when the senators criticised their activities.”

The first instinct in the Pak admin and even in India is to follow the British model where every dissent is anti state. So what the government agencies do, they penetrate the dissenting group or create quasi groups that attempt to demonize the legal demands of the dissenting group.
Pakistan agencies are past masters in this game. From the Taliban to the Jihadi outfits in Kashmir all had some sponsorship from Pakistan agencies, popularly lumped under ISI. Every political party or group has some members that report to some agency. Politicians call them “Agency walla,” “Darhi wala” or simply “the beard” or “Darhi” Some of these agents may not grow darhi still that is the word for them.

Pres. Musharraf announced military bases in Balochistan, I think, about a year and half ago. Since then dissent in Balochistan has emerged. The Baloch have precarious relations with the Pak army and they would prefer that the army not live next door to them. That is why the army always used the FC cover to stay in Balochistan.
One way to overcome this dissent is to work with the Baloch and sell them the idea and the other and administrative way is to force it on the Baloch. The first option is time consuming and the bases are time sensitive. The army wants to force it; it is creating conditions where it could claim that the law and order situation is so bad in the province that the army’s presence is necessary. With the BLA, and many other groups with questionable political and destructive activities, the army now has the option to raise the terrorist bogey to enter Balochistan.
As I have already said, Sardar Bugti is also creating conditions that would sideline the Baloch demands and the army would just succeed in putting the bases in Balochistan.

Nasah,
The Gawadr port is near completion, so are the US plans about Iran. We may be looking at the Kuwait of 2003 or the Saudi Arabia of 1991.

Read the last Para from my article above.
“The proud and militaristic Baloch are in for difficult times. The leadership that held them together on nationalist rights has now become too entrenched with its own interests and monetary gains. The chapter of final deception by the Baloch Sardars is about to be written and the poor Baloch, .... are in for a surprise that may change Balochistan for good.”

HP:

TFT does not arhive..hence with reluctance i will paste the entire article here...rauf klasra needs no intro:

priorities in Balochistan

M R Klasra

As the situation in Balochistan continues to simmer, with Baloch sardars threatening to take their defiance of Islamabad to a higher level, two official reports put out by the ministries of interior and finance separately provide some indication of the federal government’s priorities in dealing with the province.

The first report by the interior ministry shows that the federal government has spent a sum of Rs 12 billion on the 31,000-strong Frontier Corps in the province since 2001. The paramilitary FC, controlled by the federal government, is meant to cover Area B of the province not under the control of the police. Area B constitutes 95 percent of the Balochistan.

On the other hand, a finance ministry report says that during the same period, the federal government gave Balochistan Rs10 billion in gas royalties, a sum of Rs2 billion each

year. TFT is in possession of both the reports.

The interior ministry’s report, however, gives no expenditures for the working of various intelligence agencies that operate in the province. However, as one source in Islamabad told TFT, “one can guess the expenses of the intelligence agencies by the amount Islamabad has spent on FC”.

Ironically, one of the demands made by the Baloch leaders is to get Islamabad to increase gas royalties by another Rs 2 billion, a demand that the federal government has been resisting so far. The Sixth Finance Commission Award, a constitutional requirement, has also not been met as yet since the formula worked out by the finance ministry under former finance minister and current Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz has been rejected by the smaller provinces, including Balochistan.

Despite several rounds of talks in 2003-4, the finance ministry could not get the three smaller federating units to accept the formula which Sindh, Balochistan and the NWFP rejected as favouring the Punjab. Even personal interventions by then-prime minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali and General Pervez Musharraf failed to resolve the issue. The Award still awaits finalisation.

The interior ministry report gives the break up of the expenditure as follows: the federal government spent Rs 1.9 billion, Rs 2 billion, Rs 2.3 billion, Rs 2.4 billion and Rs 2.6 billion in the period 2001 through 2004-5 on FC. The break-up also shows the expenditure has constantly risen through the said period.

The report also gives the deployment of FC troops. While 2752 troops are deployed to the Mekran division, 28808 are operating in the rest of the province. Critics question the spending by pointing out that despite such expenditure, FC has not been able to control the law and order situation in the province. “Not only has the force failed, its indirect cost is the image it has developed in the province. The Baloch look at it as an occupation army,” says an analyst who has long dealt with the politics of Balochistan.

The highhandedness of FC troops also came to light when, during a briefing to the parliamentary committee on Balochistan, Inspector-General FC (Balochistan), Major-General Shujaat Hussain Dar, admitted that his troops had exceeded their brief in certain cases. He also sought an apology from the people of the province in the same meeting held in Quetta recently in a bid to lessen the pain of the aggrieved people.

“There are many issues here, one being an obvious comparison between how much Islamabad is spending on FC and what it is giving the province in gas royalty,” said an analyst. “Why can it not increase the royalty when that is more likely to defuse the situation than spending on FC?”

Sources privy to the meetings of the parliamentary committee on Balochistan say the members have a fair idea of how FC personnel generally behave and what needs to be done to improve the situation. “They have recorded statements of people about the conduct of FC troops and there is clear need on the basis of that information to recommend a revamping of the brief of the force and its conduct,” says an insider.

During one of the meetings of the Committee when Secretary Defence Hamid Nawaz was trying to explain to the members the working of the army and intelligence agencies in the province, senators from Balochistan lashed out and accused these agencies of fuelling the insurgency in the province by adopting wrong methods and targeting the politicians.

However, the defence secretary strongly defended the role of the ISI and MI in the province when the senators criticised their activities. Briefing the participants, the secretary revealed that the ISI and MI were meant to counter hostile foreign intelligence agencies working in the province. In addition, they are meant to check cross-border smuggling and acts of terrorism, besides pre-empting and curbing religious extremism.

The defence secretary strongly denied the accusations that any of these agencies was involved in hounding the politicians as claimed by the Baloch politicians. He told the meeting that the agencies do not decide their activities but work according to the directions of the government of the day.

On increasing recruitment in the army from the province, the defence secretary told the meeting that the federal government was sparing no efforts to attract the Baloch to join the forces. He also referred to mobile army recruiting teams and the establishment of an ISSB (Inter-Services Selection Board) centre in Quetta.

“The army does seem to be working hard enough to improve its image in the province,” says a source, “But there are too many political issues involved here and the government needs to take a multi-pronged approach to win over the Baloch. It is going to be difficult but is not impossible, especially if Islamabad begins to get its priorities right.”