Dispatches On War (Part IV)

Romair

Some quibbles with what you wrote. There were/are two distinct phases to the Iraq War: regime change and the occupation. The first phase was an unqualified success. As in Gulf I, the actual war was an unqualified success: all objectives achieved with minimal US casualties. A chap I know is a US Navy doctor attached (then) to the Marines and his tour was terminated early because US casualties were so much lower than had been planned for. The US did not even need to use the troops enroute to Turkey (for an attack from there) which were denied permission to use Turkish territory--nice how the Turks repay the US for tens of billions of $ in aid.

However, as Molly Ivans said before the start of the war, ``It`ll be a very easy victory and the peace from Hell.`` The problem, as you point out, was that Rumsfeld and Co estimated that the US would need hardly any troops for an occupation. Gen. Shinseki, USA COS, estimated that it would need 250,000 troops for four years. Wolfowitz estimated that it might be out in as little as 6 months (more ``realistically`` 18 months but drawdown would start in a year) and need not even half that number at most. Clearly Shinseki was more accurate in his estimate.

Gen. Tommy Franks, in an article but also apparently in his book, said that it is wrong to blame the current mess on faulty planning or a misestimate of the difficulties in effecting the transition to ``democracy`` or managing the Occupation. The US had planned to have its troops do the actual fighting and have `allies` do the policing (i.e., use troops with more firepower and better training to win and then turn it over to troops that they consider second/third rate but good enough to patrol Fallujah/Basra/etc once the real fighting is over). However, these `allies` reneged on seemingly firm commitments and so the the US was caught short and had to scramble to find enough troops to occupy the country. Franks, IIRC, never actually names these reneging ``allies`` but based on Ijaz`s post, it seems that Pakistan was to provide the bulk of them (maybe India also? Egypt? Ijaz: truce? We`ll agree to disagree, if thats OK with you?).

IF you can get the allies to go along with your plan, that is eminently more sensible than 250,000 US troops for four years. However, if the allies renege, you are stuck. Depending upon how solid the commitments appeared to be, this is not an idiotic plan that even armchair strategists like me can find fault with.

However, to go back to Clausewitz, ``No battle plan survives contact with the enemy.``

#40 Romair,
I agree.

Interestingly, while carrying out a perceptive study of events if USA invades Iraq, I came across a US War game on Iraq. The War game was centered on CENTCOM and allied forces. Some of the highlights were: -
1. Shias to spearhead the revolts.
2. Exploit the Shia Sunni Kurd divides.
3. Subdue the Emirates through the Shia Card.
4. Two divisions of troops from Pakistan.

The exercise format was rather ambitios and simplified but relied heavily on overwhelming superiority. If you read my interacts of those days you will find some hints on the subject. In my analysis then, USA would not succed and middle east would be plummeted into a strife ridden region.

If you recollect, after the initial days, Rumsfield began briefing sessions of his own and always sounded confident. That demeanour said something.

I would rate Arab-Israel wars as the best examples of Policy leading the miliary action. The three short swift wars by Israel as also the Egyptian crossing of Barlev Line.

Chreerios

Fuzair/Ferozek/Ijaz #varoius: There is no way that the US Generals could have planned such a disastrous plan for the invasion of Iraq. American Generals, specifically the ones who have spent time in the area, are far too experienced to have come up with something so useless and ridiculous.

I had written an article, on the subject, indicating the mess it was going to turn into. Which it eventually did. If I can figure that out, with my limited experience, then I am sure that American Generals at CentCom and other areas, far more experienced than I, surely would have figured it out.

There is ample information, leaks etc. highlighting that the plan that the Generals wanted to execute was quite a bit different from what the political leadership used. For starters, the Generals, correctly, stated that this would require more twice, or larger, number of troops on the ground. That, in itself, results in a completely different type of plan, from the start.

There was only one person in Bush`s senior staff who had any experience of military strategy. And that was General Powell. Apart than Rumsfeld, who has two years in uniform, the remaining (Bush, Cheney, Wolfowitz etc.) don`t have even basic training worth of military experience; other than a few political assignments.

And Powell, the one who understood war, didn`t want to carry out the invasion to begin with........

It is very difficult for pure theoretical strategists, who have never worn a uniform, to judge the nature of an upcoming battle. It is one thing to read books about swimming. It is another to jump into the water and try to stay afloat. Moreso, it is impossible for politicians, who haven`t even been strategists, much less military commanders, to make such a judgement.

Military commanders, especially the intellecutal kind tha the US produces, develop a sixth sense for what will work and what will not. One can read Clausewitz till the cows come home, but that sixth sense only comes from actually firing guns and commanding soldiers (no offence to the three of you :-)).

American theorists and think tanks telling American Generals how to fight a war is like a man telling a woman, how it feels to be pregnant...........

War maybe an extension of politics and diplomacy, but believe me, it is not too dangerous to be left to the Generals. Yhat adage sounds good in a poem, but it does not work in real life. The only thing that should not be left to the Genrals, is the decision on whether to go to war, or not. The execution, after the decision has been made, has to be left to them, since they have spent their whole lives learning how to execute wars. Politicians should decide which wars the country should fight and the parameters, under which they want them to be fought.

After that, they should ask for the expert opinion of the Generals, on whether the war can be fought and the results achieved, within those parameters. It is obvious that the US Generals told Rumsfeld that they could not be achieved, with the small amount of soldiers, and without the clear exit strategy. Even I was able to see that. Rumsfeld went ahead anyways and is now stuck. I am surprised he is still around, after creating such a mess.

The Iraq War has to rank as one of the poorest executed operations of the past decades, anywhere in the world. A tiny group of ragtag insurgents have tied up, into an unsolvable quagmire, the mightiest economy and military the world has ever seen. And that too, unlike Vietnam and Afghanistan, without any external support! In Vietnam, Afghanistan etc. the insurgents had tremendous support from third-party countries.

Not only have the insurgents got the US into a military quagmire, they have gotten the USA into a political and financial quagmire also..........

There were the following reasons for such incorrect decision-making, in my opinion:

- This war was not only a continuation of international politics, by other means, it became a complete extension of domestic politics, i.e. what to invade and not invade etc. is being decided by what suites the political prospects of the Republican party in the next elections......the Fallujah raid was delayed, until after Bush`s re-election campaign, etc.

- The decision making was taken over by a group of neo-cons, with no military experience, who, at least, in my opinion, had interests, other than the well-being of USA in mind

- Any form of criticism of the war, the Bush govt. etc. was equated with lack of patriotism, being anti-Bush etc, thereby creating an atmosphere where only, ``Yes-men`` were allowed to express their views. Notice what happened to Powell........

It is quite clear that the current abstract strategies on this war were imposed on the Generals, against their better advice. And the results are in front of everyone............The US Generals have been put in a no-win situation, by an inexperienced and overly-confident political leadership, working under the advice of ideologically motivated think-tank strategists from places like the Enterprise Institute, etc............

#38 ferozok,
I agree with all your paragraphs lest third. During the invasion of Iraq, there were strikes on Baghdad about which Tommy was ignorant. These strikes were conducted directly by the Pentogan/CIA on intelligence sensitive targets purpotedly on information supplied by pro USA Iraqis. This was a direct civil participation with Tommy out of the loop. Though this was not a large scale operation, but because it was conducted directly puts it in the category I maintain. To say the least, I am impressed by your grasp of strategy.

Fuzair, you are putting words based on your perception in my mouth. I hope my para above will clarify the point. These were exclusive operations carried out during the war without knowledge of CENTCOM.

Technology has made it possible to bypass the military instrument and this is the theory I support. It is not mine but that of Ken Booth.

Lets avoid personal attacks
Cheerios

re: Fuzair and ijaz_gul

Clausewitz`s basic idea was that war is the application of violent force for political ends and in that sense, wars are the continuation of politics by other means. In the end, however, the aim of the war remains political and it should be fought within political limits. Hence, Clemenceau`s statement that ``wars are too important to be left to the generals``. Clausewitiz dealth with the nature of war and in his assessment; wars are always of a political nature. Wars are limited by a political aim; are fought for a political aim and politics is, and will remain, the Alpha-Omega of all wars.

Interestingly enough, Clausewitz also sounded the warning that should a war not be able to attain its political aim, it should be ended immediately before it causes a negative reaction in guise of public protests, riots and other internal problems, which might badly influence the ability of the nation waging such an enterprise. An argument can be made that once it was clear that the Schlieffen Plan had failed in its overall objectives, Germany should have sought an end of hostilities, with France. In a similar sense, the United States` military problems in Iraq can be identified, with a failure to define the political aim of the war in Iraq. If the intention was really regime change, the Americans miscalculated the political end of the war, because they committed far less troops than were necessary to ensure a smooth transition from disposing Saddam Hussein to replacing him, with a pro-American regime. The Americans committed enough troops to defeat Saddam Hussein, but failed to reinforce those troops, with troops that would be needed to secure the political aim; making sure that the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq would be politically secure enough to validate the reasons for invading Iraq and toppling Saddam Hussein.

As to Tommy Franks and CentCom and Pentagon, the American military tradition suggests that the military professionals, prior to a war or a planned military action, will give their considered opinion, but the final decision to start a war, will always be a political choice and once that decision is made, the military will carry out the wishes of its civilian-political masters. Tommy Franks, might have been responsible for conducting operations against Iraq, but it does not necessarily suggest that he planned the final operation against Iraq itself. American military`s world commands, such CentCom, have plans for a military response for any situation and these plans are continually upgraded in view of the newly emerging threat perceptions and/or to accomodate changes in the political environment. Tommy Franks simply executed the best prepared plan for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as such a plan existed in 2003, with a few modifications.

Now the argument that Bush et al, exploited the civilian over military chain of command is another debate, but it is highly doubtful that, given the intergrated nature of the operation against Iraq, with its reliance on combined land-sea-air operations, any centralized planning institution such as Pentagon might have been kept out of the loop in the final planning of such an operation. The third option, which is also debateable, is that there is difference between Pentagon bureaucrats and serving generals of the line in terms of their outlook. It is a fact that the Pentagon is infamously political and the military officers appointed to the Pentagon are appointed for their political skills in getting the funds out of the Armed Services Committee on the Hill. Hence, why General Shinseki`s request for the troops levels was different than the Pentagon`s ``political-generals`` for the invasion and the subsequent occuaption of Iraq.

Still, this turning out be an interesting discussion...

Ciao

#36

Even conceding for a moment that you were referring to non-military engagements, not something your post implies, since when does the President have to clear, coordinate, implement, etc, non-military attempts at regime change/assasination/bribery/whatever through the military? Let me reming you what you said and then ignored: Clausewitz said that war is the continuation of diplomacy through other means; war is then an extension of foreign policy not the other way around. In all non-military dictatorships in the 20th century, wars were conducted by the politicians and fought by the military (one hopes with cosiderable technical input from the generals!). Or do you really think that all Secret Services carried out operations only after clearing them through the military before Bush came to power? If so, you really can be ignored! What Bush and Rumsfeld did is no different than what Lloyd George or Clemenceau did during WWI.

I still stand by my view that your post displays your ignorance. If you mean `X,` then say `X.` Don`t say `Y` and when your errors are pointed out, claim that you meant `X.` Take another look at your #29 and show me where you said what you now claim.

#29 Fuzair,
You are entitled to make opinions but not judgements on others. This is a serious topic and your comments are taken in bad taste. Sure, you may have lots of knowledge in Military History but dont deprive yourself an opportunity for a discourse.

There were two plans implemented in invasion of Iraq. The military operations under the Centcom that involved concentration of forces, the land invasion and softening by the airforce and missile units. At the same time CIA in coordination with department of defence used its own munitions including predaters againt Iraq, about the employment and timings of which Tommy Frank had no knowledge. In fact his un easiness on the issue became public.

As regards Tommy Franks participation, its not a question of invasion but of the actual conduct of war.

Cheerios

But mirmir, why should any general have a role in a country`s decision to invade another country, except in offering advice to civilian leadership regarding the feasibility of an effective military campaign?

Re: # 29
My take is about the same as yours - CENTCOM was, I believe, essentially ``out of the loop.`` Tommy Franks, as a good soldier, simply followed orders. Those orders would certainly have required him to plan the military engagement. I doubt that he took, or that he was asked to take, any key role in the decision to invade.

Re: # 31
Yes, I could as easily have said ``The Act of Settlement of 1701,`` or any other parchment. ``Constitution`` was mentioned in an earlier posting and it seemed to me more clarification wouldn`t hurt. I only wanted to point out that the British constitution is UNcodified and a part of the government while that of the U.S.A. (and most since, including that being debated in Iraq) is codified and - in theory, anyway - superior to government. But I`m beating a dead horse.
Of more importance to me is whether or not you might undertake a careful, objective analysis of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, particularly the passions, ambitions and ``grandiose schemes`` of the players. There is a great deal about this vile U.S. adventure in Iraq that recalls for me the U.S. invasion of Mexico, labeled by Gen. Grant the most unjust war ever perpetrated by a strong nation against a weaker. Do you suppose Gen. Powell`s conscience will eventually induce him to say the same about Iraq?
mirmir

Re: #29

Ummmmm, don`t look now but wasn`t Tommy Franks the Commander of CentCom? So how could CentCom be ``out of the loop?`` The entire Afghan and Iraq plans were Franks` creation, i.e., CentCom`s. You could make a case that the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs were out of the loop; that Shinseki was deliberately ignored because he wasn`t in line with Rumsfeld`s and Wolfowitz`s views BUT how can you say what you just did? It`s this kind of sloppy thinking that is the hallmark of the antiBush people. There are many valid reasons to oppose the War in Iraq but you just demonstrated that your opinions can be ignored completely since you have no idea what you are talking about.

Re: # 28

Thanks for the correction; duly noted! :)

As to the Magna Carta, please keep in mind that it was a compact, between the barons of England and the monarchy in England to delimit the lands and arrive at a power sharing arrangement. It was not really a document about representative rights for the peasantry. Still, it came to be known as the ``supreme law of the realm`` and did, gradually establish the principle of a unique monarchial system in England, which later through the laws of parliament would turn into a constitutional monarchy.

Ciao

Re: # 29

I would concur, with this analysis.

Ciao

War after the Napolianic campaigns was seen as grandoise and therefore something to be glorified. This is what poets and writers did. Clausewitz gave it a new name by calling it TOTAL and ABSOLUTE. However, he cautioned that this was just an ideal as no war could be total.It would destroy everything. In his concept, the war would always remain subservient to policy and therefore limited to the subservience of the enemy`s will. If enemy`s will is compromised, the ends of politics are met.

Unfortunately, these words were lost in the translations that followed, and the German General Staff ignored the primacy of policy and the logic of ends means relationship and prosecuted WW1 through a faulty plan. They wanted a total war which ended at Versailles.

Advent of nuclear weapons again raised the question of total annhilation and Absolute War in the concepts of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and Massive Retaliation. It was in Korea that McArthur wanted to use nuclear weapons to put an end to the conflict. A need was therefore felt to put these weapons of mass destruction directly under civil albeit political controls because just like war was thought to be too sensitive an issue to be left in the hands of the generals, nuclear weapons were even more sensitive to be left in the hands of the generals. This changed the concept of nuclear warheads in Europe which were gradually removed. But a nuclear strategist Ken Booth argued that the danger in this was that Civilians could now alter the course of the battle and bypass the entire military instrument. He called such would be trigger happy civilians as Neo Clausewitzians and Absolutists.

Technology since has developed even further. It now gives politicians and civilians direct role in the war, just like Bush and Rumsfield bypassed the entire CENTCOM and carried out engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan with CENTCOM out of the loop.

The question is, Are Bush and Rumsfield the first neo Clausewitzians/Absolutists?

Ferozk...

Did you intend ``succeeding`` instead of ``preceding?``

``The Battle of Somme would have a profound influence on the British life and in a larger sense, how the preceding generations would view war, an outlook that would be our legacy.``

mirmir

Ferozk...
This series of articles gets my vote, too, as the best I’ve come across on Chowk.
A further note on constitutions. The uncodified constitution that constitutes the British government consists of both written and unwritten provisions while the codified constitution of the U.S.A. - perhaps the first and certainly the oldest of that kind still in force - is wholly written. The most fundamental difference, though, concerns their status. The British constitution is not superior to the government. That allows parliament to change it, even amend the Magna Carta of 1215, if it wants. The constitution of the U.S.A., being superior to the government, can only be changed by that body that wields ultimate power – the people.
I appreciate the attention you gave to the character and ambitions of Urban II. I only wish that you had given more attention to other strong personalities - those “bold, audacious men of action” - instrumental in the initiation and prosecution of wars. History (excluding natural history) is simply man’s attempt to remember and record what earlier men have done. Men’s actions are ruled by their passions, their ambitions and, all too often, by their frailties. History, I believe, should be written more from a biographical perspective than it ordinarily is.
The horror and tragedy of Vietnam hasn’t prevented the U.S.A. from prosecuting war. Memories are short, people are easily led, men harbor grandiose schemes and, not least, wars are hugely profitable to some few powerful and influential people (Halliburton; Kellogg, Brown and Root in Iraq). Any careful, objective analysis of the Iraqi invasion would, I believe, tell us a great deal about war in general and about the passions and ambitions of those who prosecute them. Perhaps you will undertake such an analysis when the smoke clears (if it ever does) in Iraq – I sincerely hope that you do.
mirmir