Dispatches On War (Part IV)

Re: # 49

Ferozk...

Yes, you seem to me qualified, but as you say the problem of access may be one that cannot be overcome, by anyone, and that means that we - the world - will never know the entire ``truth.`` That has troubled me, and you, and no doubt many others.

A little (well, maybe a long way) off the subject. Have you read the article ``The Wrath of Khan`` appearing in the current (November) issue of ``The Atlantic``? Interesting reading, and one that Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy would no doubt find absorbing as well. If you are in contact with him you might mention the article, the first of two.

mirmir

Re: # 48

I am not sure, if I am qualified to undertake such an analysis. It is not the question of about the smoking clearing; the question is about access to the information and the real information will not be made public for awhile.

Ciao

Re: # 47
``Apparently, Saddam Hussain, decided on the invasion of Kuwait. And then to fight a military battle with the USA.``
I wonder. A history more removed in time may paint a different picture. Maybe the U.S. deliberately lured Saddam into certain defeat while gaining a valuable ally in Kuwait. And it may also be premature to speculate whether or not the U.S. will achieve its political objectives. Perhaps it will, but at greater cost and much more slowly than it anticipated. Pursuit of those objectives might well continue even after U.S. troops are withdrawn (if indeed they are). I suggested to Ferozk earlier that he consider a careful, objective analysis of this Iraq war - but only ``after the smoke clears.`` I don`t mean by that that we should stop speculating - this discussion by thoughtful, informed people raises some very valid and exceedingly interesting points about a vile, hateful war whose origins and purposes need to be laid bare. Keep it going, please. mimir
P.S. Perhaps there hasn`t even been a regime change. Let`s wait and see.

P.S. The reasons Iraqis got their butts kicked, so thoroughly, in the first Gulf War, is another example of what happens when politicians try to execute wars, against the advice of their Generals.

Apparently, Saddam Hussain, decided on the invasion of Kuwait. And then to fight a military battle with the USA. Again, any naive hawaldar could see that Iraq would lose in such a war. I am quite sure, Saddam`s Generals must have told him so. He, however, went ahead, and the Generals executed the wars, based on what he wanted. And it was the granny of all defeats....

This time around, Saddam was disposed, and not running anything. So the military commanders or Iraq, seem to have planned the execution of the gureilla warfare, on their own. And are winning..........While on the USA side, the same mistake that Saddam made in the first Gulf War, has been made, i.e. the politicians not only decided whether to fight the war or not (something they should do), they over-ruled their Generals on whether such a war was winnable, within the political paramaters the poltcians wanted to maintain. Obviously it was not winnable.........

Saddam Hussain is a lawyer by education. Is Rumsfeld a lawyer also? Just goes to show, much like soldiers should not be executing legal battles, similarly, lawyers should not be executing military battes..........

Dost-mittar/Ferozek: I agree with pretty much everything you have stated. I was trying to state the same things.....

``In my opinion, the pro-israeli lobby -the neocon types led by Wolfwitz- had a different objective than the other war-mongering lobby, the oil lobby led by Dick Chenny types....The former lobby`s main purpose......They have immensely succeeded in their objectives;``

I tend to agree. The USA has immensely failed. While the neo-con lobby may have succeeded. Though one has to wait and see. I don`t think they calculated an Irani born Shia Ayatollah gaining power in Iraq. Iran is now tied at the hip with Iraq. It is actually building an airport in Southern Iraq. If Iran gets nukes and controls the oil of Iraq, along with its own, the neo-cons plans will have backfired..........

``The overall assumption seems to be that failure to understand Clausewitz does not reside in the thinking of the United States` military, but it rests on the shoulders of those politicans, who commited the United States to fighting a war in Vietnam and in Iraq in 2003.``

Exactly!! All the talent in the USA seems to go into its business and academic arenas. American researchers and professors are the best in the world. As are American business executives and entrepreneurs. American military leadership, is the most literate and educated in the world. While American politicians are amongs the most ill-informed and ill-read in the world, in comparison to other politicians. Bush, from what I have read, did note even have a passport before becoming President!!

``I have no objections to the military been given the freedom of action to execute a war to a successful end, but I feel that in absense of a political limitation to the thinking of the military, wars will tend to degenerate into a endless mess.``

I agree with this, completely. The decision to go to war, and the political boundaries, within which the war should be fought, should always be laid down by politicians. For the simple reason, that military leaders, while experts at executing a war, do not have the exposure in other areas - economics, foreign policy, domestic politics etc. - to decide the boundaries of war.

What should happen is that the political leadership should make a decision to go into a war, or not. Then it should explain the politican boundaries to the Generals, i.e. we can only use 140,000 soldiers, since we don`t want to institute a draft; we will need to close the border to Saudi Arabia, since insurgents may cross in; we will not use carpet bombing, since it will get the Arabs angry; we will never use nukes (or will use them); we can keep the US population motivated for the war for only two years; we will not be able to get the Europeans to support us; etc. etc.....

After this, the Generals should plan out how such a war will be executed, and whether it is winnable. If they say it is not winnable, then the politicians should follow the Generals advice. Or ask them what else they need, to win. It is obvious that the US Generals said it was unwinnable within the limitations the US politicians had laid out (the limitations turned out to be wrong, making the war even more unwinnable). However, the US political leadership, ordered the Generals to fight the war anyways. And the Generals followed orders, and are losing the war, which they said they would lose to begin with............

Fuzair #42: ``There were/are two distinct phases to the Iraq War: regime change and the occupation.``

There is, always, only one war. The whole cohesive engagement is the war. There can be two battles, but only one war. One either wins the whole war, or one loses it. One cannot win part of the war and lose the other part....

``The first phase was an unqualified success. As in Gulf I, the actual war was an unqualified success: all objectives achieved with minimal US casualties.``

Not at all. The US fell into an Iraqi trap. Iraqis carried out a strategic withdrawl. A quicker version of the what the Soviets did to the invading Germans. They did not fight the Americans in the military battles, because they knew there was no way they could win. How many pictures of the Iraqi military, fighting in uniform, have you seen? They withdrew into the cities, immediately, and rejoined to fight a guerilla war. They seem to have stored large amounts of ammunition in strategic areas, in the city, and had established logistical and communication lines for a guerilla battle, from the begining. Hence there was no first phase.......The US military basically walked straight into Baghdad, much like the Iraqis wanted.........

There was an interview of an Iraqi Brigadier on TV, wearing a mask, who is leading part of the insurgency. He explained the whole strategy. Unlike the Gulf War, the Iraqis, correctly, decided to not fight on the front lines..........By the way, only 2-6% of the insurgents captured by the USA, according to its own figures, have turned out to be foreign fighters. The rest are all native Iraqis.

The Iraq war, I think I can say safely, will never be taught to young cadets at West Point, on how to fight wars. It has to rank as one of the biggest failures and defeats in the past century, for such a powerful military. I am trying to think hard to find a bigger failure.

To get an idea of the poor planning, consider the following: the USA spends over $400 billion on its military, per year. Yet it did not supply Humvees with protective armour, to secure soldiers against IDEs!. The soldies had to weld pieces of armour onto the Humvees. And they are still doing that. What kind of war was the USA planning to fight?

In fact, I have to now change my theories on guerilla warfare, after this. I use to think that it was impossible to occupy a county which had a population that is willing to die for its cause, and has an external country supporting it. Now I think even if there is no external country supporting it, guerillas can win.

The USA, despite having overwhelming odds, has lost the war on all fronts: military, economic, moral, political and ethical. And unlike, Vietnam, it cannot even carpet bomb the country into submission, since it is now stated that it invaded to rebuild the country. Even I couldn`t predict it would be such a mess, even though, I knew it would be a mess. Instead of Bush controlling Iraq`s political leaders` destiny, Sistani controls Bush`s destiny! And the USA has itself, ended up, through its own taxpayers money, putting in a religious govt. with strong ties to Iran in power, in Iraq! And there is still no exit strategy! And I cannot see there ever being an exit strategy. If the USA stays, Iraq will remain a mess. If it leaves, it may be an even bigger mess..........

As I mentioned earlier, I did a training course in the USA, during the Afghan war days. I have very close family friends in the USA military, from those days. We keep in close touch. American officers are the most competent, intelligent and talented group of people I have ever come across. More talented than the individuals I was with in Silicon Valley. As an example, the Major General commanding the Airborne Div in Iraq has a Ph.D from Princeton in Economics. So many of my American colleagues in that course went onto Ivy League schools. The USA military has more college degrees than IBM....

Thus, it is impossible that American Generals could plan such a blunder. And their comments are indicating that. They, like all Generals, can plan a blunder. But not such a catastrophic one. A flunkie retired West Point Leiutenant could do better planning........

Such huge blunders can only be planned by people who have zero military experience. It is the equivalent of me going to do heart surgery, just because I think I am a clever computer scientist. The political strategy was planned completely by the neo-con think tanks. And the military strategy by Rumsfeld, totally against the wishes of his military commanders. He had some wierd ideas about winning wars and running Iraq with small hi-tech armies. Perhaps he learnt his fighting skills and military strategy, when he was the CEO of G.D. Searle & Co - his pharmeceutical company!

Just take a look at the long list of naive policies and blunders. I will include the ones you have mentioned:

- Iraqis will welcome the US soldiers with flowers
- It will cost the USA $1 billion/year only to run Iraq (the figure now is $80 billion/year)
- The USA can win the war with 140,000 soldiers
- Within one year, Iraqis will put a statue of George Bush (Richard Perle`s words)
- Ahmad Chalabi will win the Iraqi elections
- Pakistan will send divisions of troops
- The Iraqi population will not join an insurgency

So on and so forth..........These weren`t even a strategy. These were naive hopes. I don`t think Clausewitz every commented on naive hopes. Probably because he never assumed any General would make such blunders..........

Re: # 40

Romair, I agree with you. The final decision on starting wars must be political and the execution of wars should be left to the military professionals.

The only problem is what happens, when the actual shooting war starts? Does politics (read civilian political control) still retains its dominant influence or does it take a subordinate role to the needs of military necessity? Are the generals allowed to enlarge the scope of the war beyond its original political parameters without any political checks or balance on the evolving military strategy? Who dictates the political aim of the war? More importantly, what happens if the political aim gets confused in the ``fog of war`` and the war continues endlessly for the sake of fighting itself?

If the example of the Iraq War (second edition) is to be considered, the United States` military problems, just like in the Vietnam War, resulted from a lack of clearly defined political objectives. The political aims were always shifting according to the politics du jour and hence, the military`s response reflected this confusion in the unduly protracted nature of the wars. It was the muddled politics of the wars, which created the military quagmires. On the level of pure combat and combat efficiency in attaining their military objectives, the United States scored high in both the Vietnam War and the Second Iraq War, but in both wars; the United States defeat was a political one. The overall assumption seems to be that failure to understand Clausewitz does not reside in the thinking of the United States` military, but it rests on the shoulders of those politicans, who commited the United States to fighting a war in Vietnam and in Iraq in 2003.

However, even though I agree, with the gist of your logic, I still tend to favor a political control of the military operations, because in the end; final peace ending any war has to be a political settlement and peace is always sustained politically and seldom militarily. I am a little weary of military policies shaping and influencing politics and I would much rather be inclined towards bad political decisions influencing strategy than no political inputs into military strategies at all. I have no objections to the military been given the freedom of action to execute a war to a successful end, but I feel that in absense of a political limitation to the thinking of the military, wars will tend to degenerate into a endless mess.

I can understand your point of view, but the total control of war being left to the generals unlimited by a political control is unnerving.

Ciao

Romair:

You and I have essentially agreed on Iraq, with one significant difference. In my opinion, the pro-israeli lobby -the neocon types led by Wolfwitz- had a different objective than the other war-mongering lobby, the oil lobby led by Dick Chenny types (there was of course, Bush, with a personal vendetta against Saddam). The former lobby`s main purpose was to weaken the only Arab state in the region with a potential to cause harm to Israel. Their objective was not merely to remove Iraq but to destroy its military potential by creating a civil war in Iraq along its various ethnic-religious faultlines. They have immensely succeeded in their objectives; this is why Wolfwitz has lost interst in Iraq and Thomas Friedman, who was a leading hawk for Iraq war, is now in favour of the US withdrawing from there.

Personally, I think that the US policy objectives in Iraq could have been more easily attained by buying a secular Saddam to their side than delivering Iraq to shiite mullas.

Romair

Some quibbles with what you wrote. There were/are two distinct phases to the Iraq War: regime change and the occupation. The first phase was an unqualified success. As in Gulf I, the actual war was an unqualified success: all objectives achieved with minimal US casualties. A chap I know is a US Navy doctor attached (then) to the Marines and his tour was terminated early because US casualties were so much lower than had been planned for. The US did not even need to use the troops enroute to Turkey (for an attack from there) which were denied permission to use Turkish territory--nice how the Turks repay the US for tens of billions of $ in aid.

However, as Molly Ivans said before the start of the war, ``It`ll be a very easy victory and the peace from Hell.`` The problem, as you point out, was that Rumsfeld and Co estimated that the US would need hardly any troops for an occupation. Gen. Shinseki, USA COS, estimated that it would need 250,000 troops for four years. Wolfowitz estimated that it might be out in as little as 6 months (more ``realistically`` 18 months but drawdown would start in a year) and need not even half that number at most. Clearly Shinseki was more accurate in his estimate.

Gen. Tommy Franks, in an article but also apparently in his book, said that it is wrong to blame the current mess on faulty planning or a misestimate of the difficulties in effecting the transition to ``democracy`` or managing the Occupation. The US had planned to have its troops do the actual fighting and have `allies` do the policing (i.e., use troops with more firepower and better training to win and then turn it over to troops that they consider second/third rate but good enough to patrol Fallujah/Basra/etc once the real fighting is over). However, these `allies` reneged on seemingly firm commitments and so the the US was caught short and had to scramble to find enough troops to occupy the country. Franks, IIRC, never actually names these reneging ``allies`` but based on Ijaz`s post, it seems that Pakistan was to provide the bulk of them (maybe India also? Egypt? Ijaz: truce? We`ll agree to disagree, if thats OK with you?).

IF you can get the allies to go along with your plan, that is eminently more sensible than 250,000 US troops for four years. However, if the allies renege, you are stuck. Depending upon how solid the commitments appeared to be, this is not an idiotic plan that even armchair strategists like me can find fault with.

However, to go back to Clausewitz, ``No battle plan survives contact with the enemy.``

#40 Romair,
I agree.

Interestingly, while carrying out a perceptive study of events if USA invades Iraq, I came across a US War game on Iraq. The War game was centered on CENTCOM and allied forces. Some of the highlights were: -
1. Shias to spearhead the revolts.
2. Exploit the Shia Sunni Kurd divides.
3. Subdue the Emirates through the Shia Card.
4. Two divisions of troops from Pakistan.

The exercise format was rather ambitios and simplified but relied heavily on overwhelming superiority. If you read my interacts of those days you will find some hints on the subject. In my analysis then, USA would not succed and middle east would be plummeted into a strife ridden region.

If you recollect, after the initial days, Rumsfield began briefing sessions of his own and always sounded confident. That demeanour said something.

I would rate Arab-Israel wars as the best examples of Policy leading the miliary action. The three short swift wars by Israel as also the Egyptian crossing of Barlev Line.

Chreerios

Fuzair/Ferozek/Ijaz #varoius: There is no way that the US Generals could have planned such a disastrous plan for the invasion of Iraq. American Generals, specifically the ones who have spent time in the area, are far too experienced to have come up with something so useless and ridiculous.

I had written an article, on the subject, indicating the mess it was going to turn into. Which it eventually did. If I can figure that out, with my limited experience, then I am sure that American Generals at CentCom and other areas, far more experienced than I, surely would have figured it out.

There is ample information, leaks etc. highlighting that the plan that the Generals wanted to execute was quite a bit different from what the political leadership used. For starters, the Generals, correctly, stated that this would require more twice, or larger, number of troops on the ground. That, in itself, results in a completely different type of plan, from the start.

There was only one person in Bush`s senior staff who had any experience of military strategy. And that was General Powell. Apart than Rumsfeld, who has two years in uniform, the remaining (Bush, Cheney, Wolfowitz etc.) don`t have even basic training worth of military experience; other than a few political assignments.

And Powell, the one who understood war, didn`t want to carry out the invasion to begin with........

It is very difficult for pure theoretical strategists, who have never worn a uniform, to judge the nature of an upcoming battle. It is one thing to read books about swimming. It is another to jump into the water and try to stay afloat. Moreso, it is impossible for politicians, who haven`t even been strategists, much less military commanders, to make such a judgement.

Military commanders, especially the intellecutal kind tha the US produces, develop a sixth sense for what will work and what will not. One can read Clausewitz till the cows come home, but that sixth sense only comes from actually firing guns and commanding soldiers (no offence to the three of you :-)).

American theorists and think tanks telling American Generals how to fight a war is like a man telling a woman, how it feels to be pregnant...........

War maybe an extension of politics and diplomacy, but believe me, it is not too dangerous to be left to the Generals. Yhat adage sounds good in a poem, but it does not work in real life. The only thing that should not be left to the Genrals, is the decision on whether to go to war, or not. The execution, after the decision has been made, has to be left to them, since they have spent their whole lives learning how to execute wars. Politicians should decide which wars the country should fight and the parameters, under which they want them to be fought.

After that, they should ask for the expert opinion of the Generals, on whether the war can be fought and the results achieved, within those parameters. It is obvious that the US Generals told Rumsfeld that they could not be achieved, with the small amount of soldiers, and without the clear exit strategy. Even I was able to see that. Rumsfeld went ahead anyways and is now stuck. I am surprised he is still around, after creating such a mess.

The Iraq War has to rank as one of the poorest executed operations of the past decades, anywhere in the world. A tiny group of ragtag insurgents have tied up, into an unsolvable quagmire, the mightiest economy and military the world has ever seen. And that too, unlike Vietnam and Afghanistan, without any external support! In Vietnam, Afghanistan etc. the insurgents had tremendous support from third-party countries.

Not only have the insurgents got the US into a military quagmire, they have gotten the USA into a political and financial quagmire also..........

There were the following reasons for such incorrect decision-making, in my opinion:

- This war was not only a continuation of international politics, by other means, it became a complete extension of domestic politics, i.e. what to invade and not invade etc. is being decided by what suites the political prospects of the Republican party in the next elections......the Fallujah raid was delayed, until after Bush`s re-election campaign, etc.

- The decision making was taken over by a group of neo-cons, with no military experience, who, at least, in my opinion, had interests, other than the well-being of USA in mind

- Any form of criticism of the war, the Bush govt. etc. was equated with lack of patriotism, being anti-Bush etc, thereby creating an atmosphere where only, ``Yes-men`` were allowed to express their views. Notice what happened to Powell........

It is quite clear that the current abstract strategies on this war were imposed on the Generals, against their better advice. And the results are in front of everyone............The US Generals have been put in a no-win situation, by an inexperienced and overly-confident political leadership, working under the advice of ideologically motivated think-tank strategists from places like the Enterprise Institute, etc............

#38 ferozok,
I agree with all your paragraphs lest third. During the invasion of Iraq, there were strikes on Baghdad about which Tommy was ignorant. These strikes were conducted directly by the Pentogan/CIA on intelligence sensitive targets purpotedly on information supplied by pro USA Iraqis. This was a direct civil participation with Tommy out of the loop. Though this was not a large scale operation, but because it was conducted directly puts it in the category I maintain. To say the least, I am impressed by your grasp of strategy.

Fuzair, you are putting words based on your perception in my mouth. I hope my para above will clarify the point. These were exclusive operations carried out during the war without knowledge of CENTCOM.

Technology has made it possible to bypass the military instrument and this is the theory I support. It is not mine but that of Ken Booth.

Lets avoid personal attacks
Cheerios

re: Fuzair and ijaz_gul

Clausewitz`s basic idea was that war is the application of violent force for political ends and in that sense, wars are the continuation of politics by other means. In the end, however, the aim of the war remains political and it should be fought within political limits. Hence, Clemenceau`s statement that ``wars are too important to be left to the generals``. Clausewitiz dealth with the nature of war and in his assessment; wars are always of a political nature. Wars are limited by a political aim; are fought for a political aim and politics is, and will remain, the Alpha-Omega of all wars.

Interestingly enough, Clausewitz also sounded the warning that should a war not be able to attain its political aim, it should be ended immediately before it causes a negative reaction in guise of public protests, riots and other internal problems, which might badly influence the ability of the nation waging such an enterprise. An argument can be made that once it was clear that the Schlieffen Plan had failed in its overall objectives, Germany should have sought an end of hostilities, with France. In a similar sense, the United States` military problems in Iraq can be identified, with a failure to define the political aim of the war in Iraq. If the intention was really regime change, the Americans miscalculated the political end of the war, because they committed far less troops than were necessary to ensure a smooth transition from disposing Saddam Hussein to replacing him, with a pro-American regime. The Americans committed enough troops to defeat Saddam Hussein, but failed to reinforce those troops, with troops that would be needed to secure the political aim; making sure that the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq would be politically secure enough to validate the reasons for invading Iraq and toppling Saddam Hussein.

As to Tommy Franks and CentCom and Pentagon, the American military tradition suggests that the military professionals, prior to a war or a planned military action, will give their considered opinion, but the final decision to start a war, will always be a political choice and once that decision is made, the military will carry out the wishes of its civilian-political masters. Tommy Franks, might have been responsible for conducting operations against Iraq, but it does not necessarily suggest that he planned the final operation against Iraq itself. American military`s world commands, such CentCom, have plans for a military response for any situation and these plans are continually upgraded in view of the newly emerging threat perceptions and/or to accomodate changes in the political environment. Tommy Franks simply executed the best prepared plan for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as such a plan existed in 2003, with a few modifications.

Now the argument that Bush et al, exploited the civilian over military chain of command is another debate, but it is highly doubtful that, given the intergrated nature of the operation against Iraq, with its reliance on combined land-sea-air operations, any centralized planning institution such as Pentagon might have been kept out of the loop in the final planning of such an operation. The third option, which is also debateable, is that there is difference between Pentagon bureaucrats and serving generals of the line in terms of their outlook. It is a fact that the Pentagon is infamously political and the military officers appointed to the Pentagon are appointed for their political skills in getting the funds out of the Armed Services Committee on the Hill. Hence, why General Shinseki`s request for the troops levels was different than the Pentagon`s ``political-generals`` for the invasion and the subsequent occuaption of Iraq.

Still, this turning out be an interesting discussion...

Ciao

#36

Even conceding for a moment that you were referring to non-military engagements, not something your post implies, since when does the President have to clear, coordinate, implement, etc, non-military attempts at regime change/assasination/bribery/whatever through the military? Let me reming you what you said and then ignored: Clausewitz said that war is the continuation of diplomacy through other means; war is then an extension of foreign policy not the other way around. In all non-military dictatorships in the 20th century, wars were conducted by the politicians and fought by the military (one hopes with cosiderable technical input from the generals!). Or do you really think that all Secret Services carried out operations only after clearing them through the military before Bush came to power? If so, you really can be ignored! What Bush and Rumsfeld did is no different than what Lloyd George or Clemenceau did during WWI.

I still stand by my view that your post displays your ignorance. If you mean `X,` then say `X.` Don`t say `Y` and when your errors are pointed out, claim that you meant `X.` Take another look at your #29 and show me where you said what you now claim.

#29 Fuzair,
You are entitled to make opinions but not judgements on others. This is a serious topic and your comments are taken in bad taste. Sure, you may have lots of knowledge in Military History but dont deprive yourself an opportunity for a discourse.

There were two plans implemented in invasion of Iraq. The military operations under the Centcom that involved concentration of forces, the land invasion and softening by the airforce and missile units. At the same time CIA in coordination with department of defence used its own munitions including predaters againt Iraq, about the employment and timings of which Tommy Frank had no knowledge. In fact his un easiness on the issue became public.

As regards Tommy Franks participation, its not a question of invasion but of the actual conduct of war.

Cheerios

But mirmir, why should any general have a role in a country`s decision to invade another country, except in offering advice to civilian leadership regarding the feasibility of an effective military campaign?

Re: # 29
My take is about the same as yours - CENTCOM was, I believe, essentially ``out of the loop.`` Tommy Franks, as a good soldier, simply followed orders. Those orders would certainly have required him to plan the military engagement. I doubt that he took, or that he was asked to take, any key role in the decision to invade.

Re: # 31
Yes, I could as easily have said ``The Act of Settlement of 1701,`` or any other parchment. ``Constitution`` was mentioned in an earlier posting and it seemed to me more clarification wouldn`t hurt. I only wanted to point out that the British constitution is UNcodified and a part of the government while that of the U.S.A. (and most since, including that being debated in Iraq) is codified and - in theory, anyway - superior to government. But I`m beating a dead horse.
Of more importance to me is whether or not you might undertake a careful, objective analysis of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, particularly the passions, ambitions and ``grandiose schemes`` of the players. There is a great deal about this vile U.S. adventure in Iraq that recalls for me the U.S. invasion of Mexico, labeled by Gen. Grant the most unjust war ever perpetrated by a strong nation against a weaker. Do you suppose Gen. Powell`s conscience will eventually induce him to say the same about Iraq?
mirmir

Re: #29

Ummmmm, don`t look now but wasn`t Tommy Franks the Commander of CentCom? So how could CentCom be ``out of the loop?`` The entire Afghan and Iraq plans were Franks` creation, i.e., CentCom`s. You could make a case that the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs were out of the loop; that Shinseki was deliberately ignored because he wasn`t in line with Rumsfeld`s and Wolfowitz`s views BUT how can you say what you just did? It`s this kind of sloppy thinking that is the hallmark of the antiBush people. There are many valid reasons to oppose the War in Iraq but you just demonstrated that your opinions can be ignored completely since you have no idea what you are talking about.

Re: # 28

Thanks for the correction; duly noted! :)

As to the Magna Carta, please keep in mind that it was a compact, between the barons of England and the monarchy in England to delimit the lands and arrive at a power sharing arrangement. It was not really a document about representative rights for the peasantry. Still, it came to be known as the ``supreme law of the realm`` and did, gradually establish the principle of a unique monarchial system in England, which later through the laws of parliament would turn into a constitutional monarchy.

Ciao

Re: # 29

I would concur, with this analysis.

Ciao

War after the Napolianic campaigns was seen as grandoise and therefore something to be glorified. This is what poets and writers did. Clausewitz gave it a new name by calling it TOTAL and ABSOLUTE. However, he cautioned that this was just an ideal as no war could be total.It would destroy everything. In his concept, the war would always remain subservient to policy and therefore limited to the subservience of the enemy`s will. If enemy`s will is compromised, the ends of politics are met.

Unfortunately, these words were lost in the translations that followed, and the German General Staff ignored the primacy of policy and the logic of ends means relationship and prosecuted WW1 through a faulty plan. They wanted a total war which ended at Versailles.

Advent of nuclear weapons again raised the question of total annhilation and Absolute War in the concepts of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and Massive Retaliation. It was in Korea that McArthur wanted to use nuclear weapons to put an end to the conflict. A need was therefore felt to put these weapons of mass destruction directly under civil albeit political controls because just like war was thought to be too sensitive an issue to be left in the hands of the generals, nuclear weapons were even more sensitive to be left in the hands of the generals. This changed the concept of nuclear warheads in Europe which were gradually removed. But a nuclear strategist Ken Booth argued that the danger in this was that Civilians could now alter the course of the battle and bypass the entire military instrument. He called such would be trigger happy civilians as Neo Clausewitzians and Absolutists.

Technology since has developed even further. It now gives politicians and civilians direct role in the war, just like Bush and Rumsfield bypassed the entire CENTCOM and carried out engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan with CENTCOM out of the loop.

The question is, Are Bush and Rumsfield the first neo Clausewitzians/Absolutists?

Ferozk...

Did you intend ``succeeding`` instead of ``preceding?``

``The Battle of Somme would have a profound influence on the British life and in a larger sense, how the preceding generations would view war, an outlook that would be our legacy.``

mirmir

Ferozk...
This series of articles gets my vote, too, as the best I’ve come across on Chowk.
A further note on constitutions. The uncodified constitution that constitutes the British government consists of both written and unwritten provisions while the codified constitution of the U.S.A. - perhaps the first and certainly the oldest of that kind still in force - is wholly written. The most fundamental difference, though, concerns their status. The British constitution is not superior to the government. That allows parliament to change it, even amend the Magna Carta of 1215, if it wants. The constitution of the U.S.A., being superior to the government, can only be changed by that body that wields ultimate power – the people.
I appreciate the attention you gave to the character and ambitions of Urban II. I only wish that you had given more attention to other strong personalities - those “bold, audacious men of action” - instrumental in the initiation and prosecution of wars. History (excluding natural history) is simply man’s attempt to remember and record what earlier men have done. Men’s actions are ruled by their passions, their ambitions and, all too often, by their frailties. History, I believe, should be written more from a biographical perspective than it ordinarily is.
The horror and tragedy of Vietnam hasn’t prevented the U.S.A. from prosecuting war. Memories are short, people are easily led, men harbor grandiose schemes and, not least, wars are hugely profitable to some few powerful and influential people (Halliburton; Kellogg, Brown and Root in Iraq). Any careful, objective analysis of the Iraqi invasion would, I believe, tell us a great deal about war in general and about the passions and ambitions of those who prosecute them. Perhaps you will undertake such an analysis when the smoke clears (if it ever does) in Iraq – I sincerely hope that you do.
mirmir

Re: # 22

Thanks, again, for a very interesting post.

As to your comments, I think that in the case of the war poets or any group of men thrown into violence, the foremost bond of loyalty is to each other; the espirit d` corps. Hence, to the men in the ``front of the front line trenches``, the overall strategy of the war was not as important as staying alive and thus, their sense of duty was to their friends and comrades and not so much as to the cause, for which they were fighting. There was no general animosity, between the armies and the spontanous Christman Truce, where the soldiers left their trenches and mingled, with each other hints to this idea. The fact that the officers made sure such an incident did not occur again, suggests that politics in the trenches had not lost its humanity as it had in the GHQs. Just, because the war poets served in an army does not lessen their revulsion to the horrors of the war and neither does it make their sentiments any less meaningful.

The fine balancing act, between the insanity of the war and staying sane in the the midst of all the maddness is a very human phenomena and it is a bit churlish to decry these men as ``misfits`` simply because they questioned the wisdom of what they, themselves, were doing. Soldiers in all wars have questioned their actions and yet have fought honorably and I would hope, that in future all soldiers would question their actions, because atleast it shows a humanity and such questioning soldiers are better than those who simply ``follow orders``.

As to the debate, within the Wehrmacht, the debate was more inclined towards the prevention of a two front war and the German army was ready for combat in 1939, but as you stated, the inclusion of England into the war, on the side of Poland, was unexpected. As to the year 1944, I think (harking back to my undergraduate time) that this was the year stated by the German navy as when it would be ready for war - having enough capital ships to aid the army operations. The German army was primed for war, but it was the political choices of Hitler, which led to its over-extension and Hitler`s overruling the German generals, which created problems.

On the issue of the Italians, the key should be their willingness to fight and not how, well they marched on the parade ground. Despite their marching powress, the average Italian soldier did not share any of Mussolini`s visions of a revived Roman Empire. The Italians would dispose of Mussolini twice in the course of the war and would seek to make peace term, with the Allies. This does not bode well for their fighting spirit or they eagerness of war under the facists.

Fuzair, I think you have misread my comments about Churchill. I had stated that he was haunted by the images of Somme and I never, as you seemed to have alleged, stated that he was a pacifist. Churchill was an ardent imperalist and he never missed an opportunity to fight, and he fought, with the British army in Sudan; against the Pathans, with Malakand Field Force; against Boers in South Africa. In all of these actions with the exception of the Malakand expedition, the interesting thing is that he was not soldier, was but was a war correspondent. Yes, I am aware of his command of a battlion in the First World War and I also remember one of his first commands to his officers and men: ``Gentlemen, we are now going to declare war on mice!``

Churchill`s non-willingness to make a peace treaty, with Hitler`s Germany was more a political choice than a military one, because his condition for peace was the continuation of the British empire and the Royal Navy, while agreeing to German domination of Europe. Churchill, was not haunted by his past, as you seem have wrongly attributed to me, but he was haunted by the British public`s reaction if there had been another massacre on the scale of Somme or political-strategic folly like the Dardanelles operation. In any case, Somme did influence his choices in the Second World War and we can disagree on the nature of those choices. However, the over-arching fact is that after Somme and the blood bath of the First World War, the public opinion did not look at war, with the same eyes of innocence and eagerness as it did before and in that sense; battles like Somme did change the popular opinion of war.

Agreed that one should not generalize over the misfits, but neither should one ignore them for sake of ``discipline in the ranks``. Tragedies have happened, when people have followed orders and had it not been for the misfits of wars questioning the nature of the war they were fighting; war would have lost what ever last shred of humanity it might have posessed. It is the misfits, who make sure that there is some semblance of decency and justice left in war, when they question the wrong acts committed in the name of war. I hope, the misfits never stop pricking the conscience of humanity in any war, because if they did; then wars would simply make us into unthinking killing zombies.

Ciao

Re: # 24

Please do!

Ciao

Somme through the eyes of a generation is more about misery and images clouded by it. But the reality is, how that generation of Generals misread Clausewitz, and the impact, technology and the social dimension of strategy would have on it. As brought out by Fuzair, the lessons of the American Civil War were soon forgotten in WW1 but again in WW2. Perhaps the full grasp of the dimensions of Strategy came to fore after the Korean war, but forgotten once again in the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. So the transition to modern war that began with Napoleon methamorphised in Korea; who knows still behind its time. Towards its end a new generation of ABSOLUTIST were born. I would love to elucidate if a friend cathches on this point.

just popped back in because i`m curious, especially reading the exchange between fuzair and feroz. . . have either of you read pat barker`s regeneration? i read it a few years back. . .

just some of the reviews/synopses from amazon.com:

Amazon.com
Regeneration, one in Pat Barker`s series of novels confronting the psychological effects of World War I, focuses on treatment methods during the war and the story of a decorated English officer sent to a military hospital after publicly declaring he will no longer fight. Yet the novel is much more. Written in sparse prose that is shockingly clear -- the descriptions of electronic treatments are particularly harrowing -- it combines real-life characters and events with fictional ones in a work that examines the insanity of war like no other. Barker also weaves in issues of class and politics in this compactly powerful book. Other books in the series include The Eye in the Door and the Booker Award winner The Ghost Road.

From Library Journal
In 1917, decorated British officer and poet Siegfried Sassoon wrote a declaration condemning the war. Instead of a court-martial, he was sent to a hospital for other ``shell-shocked`` officers where he was treated by Dr. William Rivers, noted an thropologist and psychiatrist. Author Barker turns these true occurrences into a compelling and brilliant antiwar novel. Sassoon`s complete sanity disturbs Dr. Rivers to such a point that he questions his own role in ``curing`` his patients only to send them back to the slaughter of the war in France. World War I decimated an entire generation of European men, and the horrifying loss of life and the callousness of the government led to the obliteration of the Victorian ideal. This is an important and impressive novel about war, soldiers, and humanity. It belongs in most fiction collections.
- C. Christopher Pavek, National Economic Research As socs. Lib., Washington, D.C.
Copyright 1992 Reed Business Information, Inc.--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

From Kirkus Reviews
In this fact/fiction hybrid, Barker (Union Street, 1983, etc.) turns from the struggle for survival of northern England working- class folk to the struggle back to sanity by British officers unhinged by WW I trench warfare. Craiglockhart War Hospital, a grim psychiatric facility outside Edinburgh, is the setting. The framework is the arrival of Siegfried Sassoon at Craiglockhart in the summer of 1917, and his discharge back to France in November. Sassoon is treated by the eminent neurologist (and Army captain) William Rivers, whose job is to restore his damaged warriors to fighting condition. Sassoon is a relatively easy assignment. Despite his public statement protesting the war, Sassoon is no pacifist; this complex poet feels at home in the Army and is an exceptionally courageous officer, beloved by his men, to whom he feels a blood-debt that can be paid only by his return. For all the sparring between Sassoon and Rivers, only a hair separates them, for the latter is also a man of enormous integrity, profoundly troubled by the horrors his patients must endure. And it is these horrors (not the clipped exchanges of Sassoon and Rivers) that linger in the mind: Burns`s vomiting nightmares caused by a mouthful of decomposing German flesh; Prior`s being rendered mute after handling a human eye. At the center is Rivers, a model therapist, whose unstinting support may give even the wretched Burns a chance at a normal life. Barker has also provided some workmanlike off-base romance for Prior, her one developed fictional character; but the heart of the work, where the big fish swim, is Rivers`s consciousness, his insights into front- line behavior enriched by his anthropological straining. Don`t look here for the dramatic sweep of a war novel; instead, you get a scrupulously fair reconstruction of Craiglockhart, plus a moving empathy for both doctors and patients. The extent of that empathy earns Barker`s work a place on the shelf of WW I literature. -- Copyright ©1992, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

Feroz:

Your comment:
``The war poets serving in the army does not mean that they were always keen about the objectives they were fighting and dying for, as you have suggested.``

While they may not have been foaming at the mouth jingoists, they did feel there was a sense of duty, of obligation, to their country or just to their battalion. The sense of despair that you are talking about should lead to either complete apathy and depression or to a manic love of violence and death. While some of the poets, notably Sassoon, were certainly certifiable, most of them did their duty. Men who are so shattered by their experience do not, I think, behave this way.


``The debate within the German army itself, before the re-occupation of the Rhineland suggests that the Wehrmacht was not entirely behind Hitler`s gamble and even prior to Poland, there was a dissent within the ranks about the course set out by Hitler.``

Absolutely true BUT the debate was not on whether or not to fight a war but on WHEN to fight it; i.e., was the German military strong enough to prevail? IIRC, Hitler had promised OKH (I think) that the war would not start before 1942 (or 1944? not sure of the date here). With this they were perfectly satisfied. Starting it in 1939 was of concern. In any rate, Hitler thought they would take Poland the same way they took Czechoslovakia: without a fight.


As for the Italians, not being happy about fighting a war (and being bad soldiers, barring a few exceptional divisions) is very differnt from being pacifists. The Italians were willing to militarize, march around, boast, etc., just not willing to really fight.


As for Churchill`s reluctance, given the Dieppe fiasco (Mountbatten`s doing), do you blame Churchill for being reluctant to embark on another, much larger scale, such enterprise? I notice that he was so horrified about the Somme that he willingly sacrificed the Empire to keep fighting Germany after the Fall of France (here I agree with Niall Ferguson`s take). Rather than negotiate a peace with Germany, and save the Empire, he decided to keep fighting and risk an invasion of Britain. Is this the act of a man who is haunted by his past? Remember, Churchill actually commanded a battalion in the trenches (in addition to his service in the Boer War and minor colonial campaigns). He knew what war was like, yet he did not want to negotiate a peace.

Yes, sometimes misfits are more interesting than the ``norm`` BUT the misfits are outliers and one should not ever generalize from them!

Regards.

Re: # 6

Ijaz, I think, I will have to disagree with you and state that it would seem that the French Army of 1914 was more influenced by the writing of a Swiss mercenary Baron Jomini than it was by Clausewitz. To borrow a page from Romair, I do not think that any army in the Great War paid too much attention to Clausewitz and in fact; they seemed to have violated his most basic warnings on the nature of war itself.

As to Helmut von Molkte the Junior, his weaking of the Schlieffen Plan was crucial, but one should not overlook the tactical misjudgement of the General Alexander von Kluck, who instead of wheeling behind Paris, turned before it and thus, presented the French army garrision in Paris his exposed flanks, which were counter-attacked at Marne. Also, the spirited resistence of the Belgians under their King Albert to the Germans really disjointed the schedule of the Schlieffen Plan and in this regard, the ``battle of the frontiers`` bought the French additional time to prepare a response and would allow the British to deploy in France.

Ciao

Re: # 16

Malik, your comment about the ``invaders`` seeing their handiwork on the TV did suggest a bias in your comments and I might have jumped to a conclusion, but you did provide the spring for my leap!

Ciao

Re: Fuzair # 18

This was a very interesting post from you! :)

I do remember the walls listing the dead from the Great War; being a product of British public school system myself, I still remember the assemblies marking Armistic Day and wearing poppies, but that is another story...

I am not reading too much into Somme, but merely using it as a pivot which influenced and shaped a perception about war. Granted that maybe Somme was a stepping stone, amongst many, but its impact was significant nevertheless. However, I do differ with you that after Somme and generally, the British soldier though obedient was cynical of his superiors. Whether this was the professionalism of the British army, or it was sense of a still remaining scrap of patriotism can be further debated. The war poets serving in the army does not mean that they were always keen about the objectives they were fighting and dying for, as you have suggested.

As to the Italians and the Germans, a distinction needs to be made between the soldiers and the civilian society. Yes, the German and the Italian facist political parties were not too shy about another war in the interwar period, but the civil society was not as eager to cheer their troops in 1939 as they were in 1914. Also, after 1918, the German general staff circulated a belief that Germany was ``stabbed in the back`` and thus did not lose the war, so there was another dynamic working to negate the influences/horrors of the First World War. Italy, in the First World War, was on the winning side, but the average Italian soldier was not a very active participant in Mussolini`s campaigns in the Second World War. In India during the Second World War, while the German PoWs were planning escape; the Italians were playing football! This is not exactly a ringing validation of a war ethos, which you are suggesting that the Italians had! :)

Despite Goering`s war egoism, there were many serving German officers who were not too happy with starting another war. The debate within the German army itself, before the re-occupation of the Rhineland suggests that the Wehrmacht was not entirely behind Hitler`s gamble and even prior to Poland, there was a dissent within the ranks about the course set out by Hitler.

As to Churchill, Somme still haunted him and we know of this, from his correspondence with Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Dwight D. Eisenhower on the opening of the second front in Europe. Churchill, much to the annoyance of the Americans, was seen as dragging his feet over the timing of the invasion of Europe, because as he reminded Eisenhower, he was horrified of another Somme and seeing the channel red, ``with the flower of the British youth``.

In any case, it is the misfits who are a lot more interesting than the ones, who simply melt into the crowd. :)

Ciao

Feroz,

Point taken about you not explicitly mentioning the bad generalship of the British but your disclaimer is somewhat disingenous. ``Blame the Generals`` is the undercurrent of the first part of your narrative. The description of the ``parade ground`` advance, hiding the news from the public, the inability to fathom that the very nature of war had changed, surely all this impies incompetence on somebody`s part?

The second part of your narrative I would also beg to differ with (somewhat). While the ``War Poets`` certainly wrote endlessly about the horror and futility of the Great War, they all did their duty. Graves, as you no doubt know from his autobiography, was quite a savage taskmaster, drill instructor and trainer--something that was needed if these new recruits were to have any hope of surviving for a few months and recoup the cost of their training. Far from the Alan Alda-like Hawkeye Pierce character you imply, during the War he knew his duty and did it without endlessly criticizing God, King and Country (although he did savage the Blimps, his immense pride in his Royal Welch Fusiliers is apparent). I think the spurning of Britain in ``Goodbye to All That`` (one of the three best war memoirs ever written) is one of the reasons that his best friend, Siegfried Sassoon, broke off their friendship. At the start of WWII, Graves tried to enlist again but was turned down by the Army. Hardly the actions of a man who was disgusted by everything that he had seen and experienced! Perhaps it was this rejection by England that caused him to ``hate`` her so passionately?

Here is the last verse of Graves`s ``Retrospect: The Jest of the Clock:``

Poor fool, knowing too well deep in his heart
That he`ll be ready again: if urgent orders come,
To quit his rye and cabbages, kiss his wife and part
At the first sullen rapping of the awakened drum,
Ready once more to sweat with fear and brace for the shock,
To greet beneath a falling flare the jests of the clock.

Sounds like he was writing about himself....

However, you must remember that Graves and to a certain extent many of the other War Poets, were people who did not fit into the ``normal`` staid bourgeois life of the British middle/upper-middle class. Even if the War had not taken place, they would have been like the current US professors of cultural studies or literary theory who endlessly criticize their government, society, morality and mores for no other reason than the fact that this makes them feel intellectually superior to the ``stupid people`` who are richer/more-successful/smarter/whatever than themselves.

The Battle of the Somme certainly did not destroy the British soldiers faith in his officers or in the gentry or the officer class. It was the French Army that mutinied, not the British. British troops knew that their officers paid more dearly than the NCOs and ORs. Remember that famous saying, ``The job of a second lieutenant is to die well?`` Well they died in their tens of thousands. Go to Oxford, Cambridge, or any English public schools and do into their Chapels. The Wall of the Dead seems endless.

On the German and Italian side, the Great War, far from encouraging the kind of feckless pacifism you describe in Britain, led to the glorification of war, speed, and modernity. The German Freikorps had more than a streak of nihilism in them, as did the Italian Fascisti. The core of the Freikorps and SA were the Frontsoldaten who wanted nothing more than another chance to make Deutsch Uber Alles again. Hitler himself served, and was wounded badly, in the trenches. Goering was the last commander of the Jagdgeschwader Richthofen, the famed Jasta 11, and a winner of the Pour Le Merite.

Finally, while the Oxford Union may have voted 275 to 173 that ``this house will in no circumstances fight for its king and country,`` the man who drafted the motion was not a pacifist and loyally served the British propaganda effort against Germany during WWII.
When war actually came, all of Britain again fought; and under Churchill, the arch reactionary and warmonger (albeit after he was on gardening leave for quite a few years).

This post is getting quite long so I`ll end it here. I think you are reading too much into the Somme and how a small group of misfit intellectuals reacted to it. Yes, war is horrible and the Great War was indeed hell on earth in the trenches BUT it did not change anything permanently. You read far too much into the writings of too few.

Keep up the good work!

Nolli illegitimi carborundum

Cheers!

Ferozek/Malik99: I am not sure if any one event in a battle or the whole battle itself, can really result in an evolution of thought, for the next generations. I think one can safely say that WWI, as a whole did result in an evolution of thought. And then by the end of WWII, that evolution was complete, i.e. Western Europe had seen so much death and destruction that they have become completety antagonist to war; at least within Europe. So much so that the master initiator of wars, Germany, has turned into a complete pacifist, overturning govts. which even support other countries in war, much less get into one themselves.

But can one battle or event have that impact? One could argue that the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan could have resulted in an evolution of thought, i.e. no one was willing to use nukes, again, after what they have seen.

Interestingly, the most pro-war country, today, in Europe is actually Britain. And Russia, which lost the most citizens in both WWI and in WWII is (was) the most pro-war country in the world; statistically, second only to the USA (which averages a direct or indirect attack on another country once every two and a half years).

The USA is so pro-war because its citizens have never seen destruction themselves. However why have Russia and the Brits remained pro-war (or at least their govts.) even after Somme etc.? While the Germans and then the French are amongst the most anti-war. My guess is because Brits and Russians have never lost a war, for a long time. The Russians pro-war-ness stopped after they lost in Afghanistan........The USA lost Vietnam, but kept going, because it did not see destruction, close to home like the Russians had seen in WWII

So perhaps the two criteria for being very anti-war are:

- one has to see a massive amount of death and destruction, through a war at home
- one has to lose a major war

I have found that very few civilians can picturize battles, wars and even ammunition. Hence, they cannot really understand offensive wars. Which is why it is so easy to get a population riled up to attack another. The only thing they do understand are loved ones that they may have lost. So if one tells someone, that 100,000 tons of ammunition was dropped on country X, through 3000 sorties, consisting of 1,000 laser guided bomb, 5,000 cluster boms, 50 daisy cutters, and 10,000 rockets, they cannot visualize it, unless their own neighborhood happened to have been hit. However, those of us who have seen what weaponry can do, can visualize it.

Similarly, if someone is told that 5,000 people or 50,000 people died, they are not affected, unless their own son or brother died, as a soldier or civilian, and they felt it close to home.

This is why civilian leaders and civilians in general, are far more gung-ho on wars than soldiers.

feroz # 15 writes ``I am afraid that Ana was right and you are using this article as a pretext to engage in some ``west bashing``.``

Feroz, i am afraid that you and Ana jumped the gun and are dead wrong on that. I was simply trying to make a point that with history being so subjective and often written by the winners, I am not sure if we should tie a concept as grand as ``evolution of thought`` to one incident. Indeed 60,000 british troops may have died in one day, but I can name you several ``Sommes`` in the history of war.

We can call certain events as ``defining`` events, or the ``straws that broke the camel`s back``, but to put the kind of definitive emphasis that Feroz has put on Somme would make any historian cringe.

Re: malik99 # 7

We can disagree on the lethality of a battle or a war, and can continue to debate the importance of such battles/wars endlessly. There is no distinction in death and I was a bit dismayed to read your comments about ``invaders`` perceptions of war. I am afraid that Ana was right and you are using this article as a pretext to engage in some ``west bashing``.

Ciao

Fuzair #11: I think you are correct.

One cannot simply blame Generals, for doing what they are trained and taught to do. They are trained to fight wars based on certain theories and techniques, developed by analysing previous wars. It is only when those techniques are tested in actual battle that their shortcomings are revealed. One can, thus, only blame them if they deploy the same techniques, even after the shortcomings have been highlighted.

There have been very few Generals in history, who have had enough impact on warfare to the point that they have changed the way battles are fought. One can count them on ones fingertips:

Changez Khan the most successful warrior of all time, would be at the top of the list. I read somewhere that one out of every 200 people in the world have some Mongolian blood in them. He is the only man to have conquered Russia, after invading it. Something that even Napoleon and Hitler failed at. Had the Mongolian generals not returned after their leaders suddden death, to elect a new leader, and had their conquerors not adapted local customs (converting to Islam etc.) Mongolians would have ruled the knonwn world. In fact, had the extremely large Mongolian fleet not sunk, due to a storm, off the coast of Japan, they would have easily conquered Japan also; thereby controlling Russia, China, Japan, Middle East, Central Asia and Central Europe. And then I assume, they would have eventually conquered Western Europe and South Asia. In fact, Taimur, who moved into India, was technically a Mongol also; albeit a Muslim Mongol.

Basically, the Mongolians, under Chengez, changed warfare, with their ability to move and deploy so quickly, i.e. speed.........

Napoleon would be another. He was a Brigadier by the age of 26. Again, not innovative like a scientist, but a great student of military tactics. His idea of turning divisions into independent corps, which can move and fight on their own, in a self-contained manner, is something that is the basis of all armies, even today. Had he not invaded Russia, and just fought in Western Europe, everyone in Europe may have been speaking French today.

He was obsessed with defeating the Brits, and may have eventually done it, had he not gone after Russia. Same mistake that Hitler made. Interestingly, I read that Tipu Sultan, another person ahead of his times by South Asian standards, was in communication with the French duing those days. Had the French not been defeated, who knows what kind of alliance they would formed against the Brits in South Asia.

Obviously, every General cannot be a Chengez Khan or Napoleon.......

What is interesting is that, in all cases, the country with better politicians, eventually defeats the country with better generals. Britain hasn`t produced a Napoleon, nor a Rommel. Yet it defeated both the French and the Germans, again and again............

Re: # 11

Fuzair, since I never mentioned any general or any general`s military virtue or skill or lack thereof, I am not sure, where you got the impression that I was blaming the generals. I am afraid that it is you, who has fallen into the trap of assuming the article was about military tactics. You mentioned that I had failed to appreciate the nuances and had painted a one sided picture. I am afraid, that in wishing to view the article in solely military-tactical terms, you yourself have sought to provide a one sided picture devoid of the nuances, which you mentioned that I had ignored. :)

In case you missed the point, the article was not about military tactics per se but was about the perceptions of war.

Ciao

Thanks to everyone, who has posted a comment. I

I will post a general comment on the nature of the article, here, and deal with individual comments individually.

I think, that there seems be a general misconception, amonst the readers, about the article that it seeks to analyze the battle of Somme. The article is about the perceptions of a British generation, which fought Somme and their attitudes towards war and how, Somme influenced their perceptions on war. The article is not about the politics of World War One and neither is it an ``intellectual exposition`` of the military tactics of the war, as some of the the readers seem to think. The basic theme of the article is about humanism; humanity and humanity`s views on war as seen through the eyes of one particular British generation. I have used various poems and quotations to show, how one particular British generation was brought up to glorify war and how the same generation reacted to outbreak of war and what was the same generation`s view on war after having survived the Great War.

In my opinion, only Ana and Romair, Tahmed32 and Dost-Mittar seemed to have grasped its evocation of a human suffering, which results from war. The article is, and was, about the articulation of a generation`s views on war as seen through their own words, which is why I had posted ``Words of a Generation`` as a sub-title to the article. By tracing their words before and after an event, which I chose as Somme, the idea was to showcase how their attitudes towards war in particular evolved from a romantic admiration to a cynical disdain of war itself.

Ciao

While the butcher`s bill at the Somme was indeed horrendous, I fear that Feroz has (partly) fallen into the trap of blaming the WWI generals without (complete) justification.

This is from Dr. Forczyk`s review on amazon.com of Niall Ferguson`s revisionist tripe, ``The Pity of War:``

``Unable to understand the real doctrinal and technical military problems posed by the Western Front, Ferguson joins the crowd of academics who decry the ``waste`` of lives and plead for any alternative. The fact that narrow frontages, defended in depth are always difficult to penetrate (not just Ypres in 1917 but Kursk in 1943 and the Suez and Golan fronts in 1973), means that the problem was not unique to the First World War. The price of victory is not always cheap.``

Romair and Feroz are correct, again an old argument, that in WWI, advances in defense technology had far outpaced offensive technology. Don`t forget, the US Civil War foreshadowed many of the same situations as WWI and the casualty rates were also appalling. The Civil War and WWI suffered from many of the same issues. Hastily raised and so poorly trained armies are not capable of complex battlefield maneuvers. The most you can go with the soldiers is to point them in the right direction and hope for the best. The British (some, not all) marched slowly across in line abreast order because they were not trained to a high enough level to do anything different. Such as advance across in a broken skirmish line behind a rolling barrage (Brit artillery wasn`t that good either).

The artillery barrages tore up the ground and made it almost impossible for heavily laden infantry to cross quickly. Communications broke down and so local advances could not be exploited. The Old British Regular Army had died at Mons; calling themselves the Old Contemptibles (after the Kaiser`s term of derison for them), they had stopped the Germans in 1914 but had been decimated. While General Kitchener did manage to raise new divisions quickly, they were not as well trained or as capable as the old regular army. Hence there were serious limitations as to what could be expected of them on the battlefield, i.e., Hutier tactics were not possible by these troops.

It is also incorrect to say that the British did not try innovations but just kept throwing bodies at the enemy trenches. Tanks were used for the first time at the Somme in an effort to break the stalemate of trench warfare. The British learnt many important military lessons, albeit at a very heavy cost, that they used to good effect later on in the war. I don`t think you can legitimately call the WWI generals ``incompetent,`` within the limitations of their training and experience, they were trying to deal with a very rapidly changing military technological scenario.

While I don`t think I will take issue with Feroz`s overall characterization of the Battle of the Somme, the facts are actually much more nuanced than the one sided picture he paints.

Somme was the epitome of the incompetence of a military mind on both sides. It also proved that military logic is mostly behind its time as soldiers fight for a war they fought last.

Suggest leaf through `psychology of the military incompetence`

Cheerios

One would like to think that articles like this would get more hits on Chowk. But unfortunately, it won`t. Just goes to show, how Chowk has been turned into (or turned into, by itself) a site where people are more interested in yelling at each other, and pushing agendas, rather than discussing history, science, poetry, art etc........Anywho:

Ijaz_Gul #6: I would tend to agree. I think WWI was a point where technology had advanced to a point, where it could do major damage. But not to a point, where it could quickly overawe the opponent. Due to this, it resulted in trench warfare, where each side would lose thousands of soldiers, but would only advance a few yards......

By WWII, technology had completely taken control. And the Germans were able to move through quickly, because they were able to overwhelm their opponents, not only in strategy, but in technology, also.......

Malik99 #7: Somme was definitely important. As were a lot of other battles, in history. I think thought about war changes, not only due to war, but due to the advancement of strategy, ideas and technology also. Napoleon`s concept of corps. Liddlehart`s concept of lightning warfare, which would, ironically, be utilized by Guderian and the Germans under blitzkreig. Then the Americans usage of nukes. And now state and individual terrorism.........

with all due respect, the battle of somme is not given too much credit because it was one of those moments that was a watershed in the lives of the british, those who fought, and those who lost. agreed that we should examine events over time, but this battle was for the time it was fought, a symbol of horror in the number of lives that were lost just in that one battle and just in one day. the great war, supposedly the war to end all wars would affect those who were known as the war poets such as wilfred owen, siegfried sassoon, robert graves, and novelists such as virginia woolf in her characterization of septimus in ``mrs. dalloway.`` somme would according to some historians also be an example of the futility of trench warfare. talking about a battle in which approximately 60,000 soldiers were lost the first day is not giving it too much credit.

there have been many many horrors before this and many many horrors following this. and i`m sure that feroz`s intention is not to diminish any of those. of course any opportunity to be highly critical of the west is not lost on some people.

thus ends my participation on this board. . .

Feroz writes ``The day the Battle of Somme was fought would be an important event in the evolution of human thought about war.``

I believe the author is giving too much credit to a single event. The evolution of human thought about war has taken more or less the same trajectory as the evolution of human thought about world hunger or environment or child labor - with or without a ``Somme``. Granted, a hit on the reigning superpower has far larger a consequences than a hit of higher causualties on a tinpot country. Still, to box the evolution of thought to a single event is a bit of unjustice. Given the events that are taking place in world today, would the historians in 100 years tie them to 9/11/2001 or 1/21/2001(the oath taking ceremony of Bush) or the rise of evangelist/rightwing nexis in US in the 90s?

With history being a subjective subject, perhaps its better to look at the trends over a period of time. But if we must tie the evolution of human thought on war to a defining event, then it has to be the advent of TV and global media - whereby the news of killings and gore could now be instantly splashed across globe. THAT has perhaps contributed more towards how the invaders look at war than perhaps lessons of Somme.

Well Written. Here are my pennies on strategy.

First WW1 prolonged because military overlooked political controls. The original SCLLIFFEN Plan was changed by the incompetent Moltke Junior which envisaged wheeling from the right and getting between Paris and Calais within a fortnight, paralysing the French centre of gravity. Because the right was weakened, the offensive stalled near Verdun and Marne Europe got stuck in a ditch for many years to come.

Secondly, French generals were obssessed with Clausewitz who took napoleonic wars as his case study. Marshall Foch blindly followed the Levee en Masse based on frontal suicidal attacks making war look grandoise and chivalrous. So many French and British fell into the ditch. This is where Liddel Hart and Fuller also picked their biases against Clausewitz.

Third, Railways and telegraphy revolutionised logistics and communications in war. Whereas railways boosted the war staminas and hence more brave men to go to death, commanders got stuck with their telephones leaving companies and batallions leaderless in frontal assaults.

Fourth, it introduced air and tanks that were to form the basics of Blitzkrieg in WW2.

Fifth and most important it highlighted the social dimension of war. Not only more common citizens were ready to die, the humilation brought to Germans in Versailles backlashed in WW2.

Cheerios

Interesting.......

Dost-mittar #2: ``Indians and Pakistanis still have to develop this aversion.``

The wars fought by Pakistanis and Indians are microscopic, in comparison to those fought in Europe. They are not even wars. They are more like battles. The total deaths from all these wars is less than the deaths in WW I in one day. In addition, the Indo-Pak wars have been quite civilized, with hardly any civilian casualities.......

``French probably developed such aversion after the Napoleonic disaster in Russia.``

The country that has been completely devastated by European wars is actually, not France, UK, USA, or Germany. It is Russia. They have been invaded from all directions, and have defeated everyone (other than Genghis Khan). But those defeats have taken a heavy toll on them....

It was actually the French, and not the British, who fought the longest battle of WWI. The Battle of Verdun, fought between the French and Germans, is what actually started the Battle of Somme. Germans and French both lost around 350,000 people in this battle, alone. These figures are second only to the losses in Battle of Somme, described above......

Interestingly, the Germans were in both battles; fighting French in Verdun and French and Brits in Sommes. Germans lost 350,000 in Verdun and 500,000 in Somme!! Both these battles started in 1916. Verdun started in Feb and ended in dec 1916. At which point Somme started........

Pakistan and India have never seen anything close to this...........Hence have not developed this aversion.......

Having said that, the USA dropped more ammunition on Vietnam, than all the ammunition used by all forces in WW II!. And the USA killed 1 to 2 million Vietnamese. More people thaan all the inviduals killed in Somme and Verdun combined.............

Interestingly the larges ever attack on the Continental USA, in the past 150 years (?) was the one carried out by OBL recently, in which 4,000 people died. Americans have, thus, never experienced war on their own shores. They are always on the giving end. And are thus, still very pro-war.......

feroz: Well researched and well written article. Thanks.

While no doubt millions of men fought and died bravely in WWI - it is also true that the generals were incredibly callous and inept. And even more so, the political leaders on both sides who failed to prevent this war to begin with. The war was basically a challenge of the rising power of Prussia to the established power of UK and France. Statesmanship on both sides could have resulted in mutual accomodation. However, throughout the first decade of the 20th century, numerous attempts were made at arms disarmament by both sides - and failed. Because they failed to recognize the underlying political causes of the arms race. And when war ended, there was no victor in any realistic sense.

That, more than the sacrifices of sargeant tommy, are the lasting lessons of World War I.

feroz:

i would look at the British tragedy at Somme more as a military failure than a reason for british pacifism.
by the middle of the twentieth century, britain was being replaced by germany as a powerful military-industrial powerhouse. Germanys growth was unprecedented.

Sending men to their deaths without any regard to their lives or prospects of victory is just criminal. The samw happened during ANZA operation in Anatolia. Even during kargil, it was thought that the early rush to get troops up the hills without any regard to their safety was a rash decision.

Feroz:
Continuing with excellence in this series.

A couple of points: The soldiers who died in the first world war played a crucial role in establishing a national identity for Canada. Secondly, I think that the negative attitude about the war that you describe after the Great War was perhaps mostly a British phenomenon. It didn`t stop Hitler to whip up the war fever within the same generation of Germans. French probably developed such aversion after the Napoleonic disaster in Russia. Russians and Germans did so after the second world war. The Americans did so, or so we thought, after the Vietnam war. Indians and Pakistanis still have to develop this aversion.

feroz:

...thanks for another good one!

men are naïve
when the clouds rain
then they begin
to yearn for times
they whiled away
with cognizance
………………..none