Dispatches On War (Part IV)

P.S. The reasons Iraqis got their butts kicked, so thoroughly, in the first Gulf War, is another example of what happens when politicians try to execute wars, against the advice of their Generals.

Apparently, Saddam Hussain, decided on the invasion of Kuwait. And then to fight a military battle with the USA. Again, any naive hawaldar could see that Iraq would lose in such a war. I am quite sure, Saddam`s Generals must have told him so. He, however, went ahead, and the Generals executed the wars, based on what he wanted. And it was the granny of all defeats....

This time around, Saddam was disposed, and not running anything. So the military commanders or Iraq, seem to have planned the execution of the gureilla warfare, on their own. And are winning..........While on the USA side, the same mistake that Saddam made in the first Gulf War, has been made, i.e. the politicians not only decided whether to fight the war or not (something they should do), they over-ruled their Generals on whether such a war was winnable, within the political paramaters the poltcians wanted to maintain. Obviously it was not winnable.........

Saddam Hussain is a lawyer by education. Is Rumsfeld a lawyer also? Just goes to show, much like soldiers should not be executing legal battles, similarly, lawyers should not be executing military battes..........

Re: # 47
``Apparently, Saddam Hussain, decided on the invasion of Kuwait. And then to fight a military battle with the USA.``
I wonder. A history more removed in time may paint a different picture. Maybe the U.S. deliberately lured Saddam into certain defeat while gaining a valuable ally in Kuwait. And it may also be premature to speculate whether or not the U.S. will achieve its political objectives. Perhaps it will, but at greater cost and much more slowly than it anticipated. Pursuit of those objectives might well continue even after U.S. troops are withdrawn (if indeed they are). I suggested to Ferozk earlier that he consider a careful, objective analysis of this Iraq war - but only ``after the smoke clears.`` I don`t mean by that that we should stop speculating - this discussion by thoughtful, informed people raises some very valid and exceedingly interesting points about a vile, hateful war whose origins and purposes need to be laid bare. Keep it going, please. mimir
P.S. Perhaps there hasn`t even been a regime change. Let`s wait and see.

Re: # 48

I am not sure, if I am qualified to undertake such an analysis. It is not the question of about the smoking clearing; the question is about access to the information and the real information will not be made public for awhile.

Ciao

Re: # 49

Ferozk...

Yes, you seem to me qualified, but as you say the problem of access may be one that cannot be overcome, by anyone, and that means that we - the world - will never know the entire ``truth.`` That has troubled me, and you, and no doubt many others.

A little (well, maybe a long way) off the subject. Have you read the article ``The Wrath of Khan`` appearing in the current (November) issue of ``The Atlantic``? Interesting reading, and one that Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy would no doubt find absorbing as well. If you are in contact with him you might mention the article, the first of two.

mirmir

Dost-mittar/Ferozek: I agree with pretty much everything you have stated. I was trying to state the same things.....

``In my opinion, the pro-israeli lobby -the neocon types led by Wolfwitz- had a different objective than the other war-mongering lobby, the oil lobby led by Dick Chenny types....The former lobby`s main purpose......They have immensely succeeded in their objectives;``

I tend to agree. The USA has immensely failed. While the neo-con lobby may have succeeded. Though one has to wait and see. I don`t think they calculated an Irani born Shia Ayatollah gaining power in Iraq. Iran is now tied at the hip with Iraq. It is actually building an airport in Southern Iraq. If Iran gets nukes and controls the oil of Iraq, along with its own, the neo-cons plans will have backfired..........

``The overall assumption seems to be that failure to understand Clausewitz does not reside in the thinking of the United States` military, but it rests on the shoulders of those politicans, who commited the United States to fighting a war in Vietnam and in Iraq in 2003.``

Exactly!! All the talent in the USA seems to go into its business and academic arenas. American researchers and professors are the best in the world. As are American business executives and entrepreneurs. American military leadership, is the most literate and educated in the world. While American politicians are amongs the most ill-informed and ill-read in the world, in comparison to other politicians. Bush, from what I have read, did note even have a passport before becoming President!!

``I have no objections to the military been given the freedom of action to execute a war to a successful end, but I feel that in absense of a political limitation to the thinking of the military, wars will tend to degenerate into a endless mess.``

I agree with this, completely. The decision to go to war, and the political boundaries, within which the war should be fought, should always be laid down by politicians. For the simple reason, that military leaders, while experts at executing a war, do not have the exposure in other areas - economics, foreign policy, domestic politics etc. - to decide the boundaries of war.

What should happen is that the political leadership should make a decision to go into a war, or not. Then it should explain the politican boundaries to the Generals, i.e. we can only use 140,000 soldiers, since we don`t want to institute a draft; we will need to close the border to Saudi Arabia, since insurgents may cross in; we will not use carpet bombing, since it will get the Arabs angry; we will never use nukes (or will use them); we can keep the US population motivated for the war for only two years; we will not be able to get the Europeans to support us; etc. etc.....

After this, the Generals should plan out how such a war will be executed, and whether it is winnable. If they say it is not winnable, then the politicians should follow the Generals advice. Or ask them what else they need, to win. It is obvious that the US Generals said it was unwinnable within the limitations the US politicians had laid out (the limitations turned out to be wrong, making the war even more unwinnable). However, the US political leadership, ordered the Generals to fight the war anyways. And the Generals followed orders, and are losing the war, which they said they would lose to begin with............

Fuzair #42: ``There were/are two distinct phases to the Iraq War: regime change and the occupation.``

There is, always, only one war. The whole cohesive engagement is the war. There can be two battles, but only one war. One either wins the whole war, or one loses it. One cannot win part of the war and lose the other part....

``The first phase was an unqualified success. As in Gulf I, the actual war was an unqualified success: all objectives achieved with minimal US casualties.``

Not at all. The US fell into an Iraqi trap. Iraqis carried out a strategic withdrawl. A quicker version of the what the Soviets did to the invading Germans. They did not fight the Americans in the military battles, because they knew there was no way they could win. How many pictures of the Iraqi military, fighting in uniform, have you seen? They withdrew into the cities, immediately, and rejoined to fight a guerilla war. They seem to have stored large amounts of ammunition in strategic areas, in the city, and had established logistical and communication lines for a guerilla battle, from the begining. Hence there was no first phase.......The US military basically walked straight into Baghdad, much like the Iraqis wanted.........

There was an interview of an Iraqi Brigadier on TV, wearing a mask, who is leading part of the insurgency. He explained the whole strategy. Unlike the Gulf War, the Iraqis, correctly, decided to not fight on the front lines..........By the way, only 2-6% of the insurgents captured by the USA, according to its own figures, have turned out to be foreign fighters. The rest are all native Iraqis.

The Iraq war, I think I can say safely, will never be taught to young cadets at West Point, on how to fight wars. It has to rank as one of the biggest failures and defeats in the past century, for such a powerful military. I am trying to think hard to find a bigger failure.

To get an idea of the poor planning, consider the following: the USA spends over $400 billion on its military, per year. Yet it did not supply Humvees with protective armour, to secure soldiers against IDEs!. The soldies had to weld pieces of armour onto the Humvees. And they are still doing that. What kind of war was the USA planning to fight?

In fact, I have to now change my theories on guerilla warfare, after this. I use to think that it was impossible to occupy a county which had a population that is willing to die for its cause, and has an external country supporting it. Now I think even if there is no external country supporting it, guerillas can win.

The USA, despite having overwhelming odds, has lost the war on all fronts: military, economic, moral, political and ethical. And unlike, Vietnam, it cannot even carpet bomb the country into submission, since it is now stated that it invaded to rebuild the country. Even I couldn`t predict it would be such a mess, even though, I knew it would be a mess. Instead of Bush controlling Iraq`s political leaders` destiny, Sistani controls Bush`s destiny! And the USA has itself, ended up, through its own taxpayers money, putting in a religious govt. with strong ties to Iran in power, in Iraq! And there is still no exit strategy! And I cannot see there ever being an exit strategy. If the USA stays, Iraq will remain a mess. If it leaves, it may be an even bigger mess..........

As I mentioned earlier, I did a training course in the USA, during the Afghan war days. I have very close family friends in the USA military, from those days. We keep in close touch. American officers are the most competent, intelligent and talented group of people I have ever come across. More talented than the individuals I was with in Silicon Valley. As an example, the Major General commanding the Airborne Div in Iraq has a Ph.D from Princeton in Economics. So many of my American colleagues in that course went onto Ivy League schools. The USA military has more college degrees than IBM....

Thus, it is impossible that American Generals could plan such a blunder. And their comments are indicating that. They, like all Generals, can plan a blunder. But not such a catastrophic one. A flunkie retired West Point Leiutenant could do better planning........

Such huge blunders can only be planned by people who have zero military experience. It is the equivalent of me going to do heart surgery, just because I think I am a clever computer scientist. The political strategy was planned completely by the neo-con think tanks. And the military strategy by Rumsfeld, totally against the wishes of his military commanders. He had some wierd ideas about winning wars and running Iraq with small hi-tech armies. Perhaps he learnt his fighting skills and military strategy, when he was the CEO of G.D. Searle & Co - his pharmeceutical company!

Just take a look at the long list of naive policies and blunders. I will include the ones you have mentioned:

- Iraqis will welcome the US soldiers with flowers
- It will cost the USA $1 billion/year only to run Iraq (the figure now is $80 billion/year)
- The USA can win the war with 140,000 soldiers
- Within one year, Iraqis will put a statue of George Bush (Richard Perle`s words)
- Ahmad Chalabi will win the Iraqi elections
- Pakistan will send divisions of troops
- The Iraqi population will not join an insurgency

So on and so forth..........These weren`t even a strategy. These were naive hopes. I don`t think Clausewitz every commented on naive hopes. Probably because he never assumed any General would make such blunders..........

Romair:

You and I have essentially agreed on Iraq, with one significant difference. In my opinion, the pro-israeli lobby -the neocon types led by Wolfwitz- had a different objective than the other war-mongering lobby, the oil lobby led by Dick Chenny types (there was of course, Bush, with a personal vendetta against Saddam). The former lobby`s main purpose was to weaken the only Arab state in the region with a potential to cause harm to Israel. Their objective was not merely to remove Iraq but to destroy its military potential by creating a civil war in Iraq along its various ethnic-religious faultlines. They have immensely succeeded in their objectives; this is why Wolfwitz has lost interst in Iraq and Thomas Friedman, who was a leading hawk for Iraq war, is now in favour of the US withdrawing from there.

Personally, I think that the US policy objectives in Iraq could have been more easily attained by buying a secular Saddam to their side than delivering Iraq to shiite mullas.

Romair

Some quibbles with what you wrote. There were/are two distinct phases to the Iraq War: regime change and the occupation. The first phase was an unqualified success. As in Gulf I, the actual war was an unqualified success: all objectives achieved with minimal US casualties. A chap I know is a US Navy doctor attached (then) to the Marines and his tour was terminated early because US casualties were so much lower than had been planned for. The US did not even need to use the troops enroute to Turkey (for an attack from there) which were denied permission to use Turkish territory--nice how the Turks repay the US for tens of billions of $ in aid.

However, as Molly Ivans said before the start of the war, ``It`ll be a very easy victory and the peace from Hell.`` The problem, as you point out, was that Rumsfeld and Co estimated that the US would need hardly any troops for an occupation. Gen. Shinseki, USA COS, estimated that it would need 250,000 troops for four years. Wolfowitz estimated that it might be out in as little as 6 months (more ``realistically`` 18 months but drawdown would start in a year) and need not even half that number at most. Clearly Shinseki was more accurate in his estimate.

Gen. Tommy Franks, in an article but also apparently in his book, said that it is wrong to blame the current mess on faulty planning or a misestimate of the difficulties in effecting the transition to ``democracy`` or managing the Occupation. The US had planned to have its troops do the actual fighting and have `allies` do the policing (i.e., use troops with more firepower and better training to win and then turn it over to troops that they consider second/third rate but good enough to patrol Fallujah/Basra/etc once the real fighting is over). However, these `allies` reneged on seemingly firm commitments and so the the US was caught short and had to scramble to find enough troops to occupy the country. Franks, IIRC, never actually names these reneging ``allies`` but based on Ijaz`s post, it seems that Pakistan was to provide the bulk of them (maybe India also? Egypt? Ijaz: truce? We`ll agree to disagree, if thats OK with you?).

IF you can get the allies to go along with your plan, that is eminently more sensible than 250,000 US troops for four years. However, if the allies renege, you are stuck. Depending upon how solid the commitments appeared to be, this is not an idiotic plan that even armchair strategists like me can find fault with.

However, to go back to Clausewitz, ``No battle plan survives contact with the enemy.``

#40 Romair,
I agree.

Interestingly, while carrying out a perceptive study of events if USA invades Iraq, I came across a US War game on Iraq. The War game was centered on CENTCOM and allied forces. Some of the highlights were: -
1. Shias to spearhead the revolts.
2. Exploit the Shia Sunni Kurd divides.
3. Subdue the Emirates through the Shia Card.
4. Two divisions of troops from Pakistan.

The exercise format was rather ambitios and simplified but relied heavily on overwhelming superiority. If you read my interacts of those days you will find some hints on the subject. In my analysis then, USA would not succed and middle east would be plummeted into a strife ridden region.

If you recollect, after the initial days, Rumsfield began briefing sessions of his own and always sounded confident. That demeanour said something.

I would rate Arab-Israel wars as the best examples of Policy leading the miliary action. The three short swift wars by Israel as also the Egyptian crossing of Barlev Line.

Chreerios

Fuzair/Ferozek/Ijaz #varoius: There is no way that the US Generals could have planned such a disastrous plan for the invasion of Iraq. American Generals, specifically the ones who have spent time in the area, are far too experienced to have come up with something so useless and ridiculous.

I had written an article, on the subject, indicating the mess it was going to turn into. Which it eventually did. If I can figure that out, with my limited experience, then I am sure that American Generals at CentCom and other areas, far more experienced than I, surely would have figured it out.

There is ample information, leaks etc. highlighting that the plan that the Generals wanted to execute was quite a bit different from what the political leadership used. For starters, the Generals, correctly, stated that this would require more twice, or larger, number of troops on the ground. That, in itself, results in a completely different type of plan, from the start.

There was only one person in Bush`s senior staff who had any experience of military strategy. And that was General Powell. Apart than Rumsfeld, who has two years in uniform, the remaining (Bush, Cheney, Wolfowitz etc.) don`t have even basic training worth of military experience; other than a few political assignments.

And Powell, the one who understood war, didn`t want to carry out the invasion to begin with........

It is very difficult for pure theoretical strategists, who have never worn a uniform, to judge the nature of an upcoming battle. It is one thing to read books about swimming. It is another to jump into the water and try to stay afloat. Moreso, it is impossible for politicians, who haven`t even been strategists, much less military commanders, to make such a judgement.

Military commanders, especially the intellecutal kind tha the US produces, develop a sixth sense for what will work and what will not. One can read Clausewitz till the cows come home, but that sixth sense only comes from actually firing guns and commanding soldiers (no offence to the three of you :-)).

American theorists and think tanks telling American Generals how to fight a war is like a man telling a woman, how it feels to be pregnant...........

War maybe an extension of politics and diplomacy, but believe me, it is not too dangerous to be left to the Generals. Yhat adage sounds good in a poem, but it does not work in real life. The only thing that should not be left to the Genrals, is the decision on whether to go to war, or not. The execution, after the decision has been made, has to be left to them, since they have spent their whole lives learning how to execute wars. Politicians should decide which wars the country should fight and the parameters, under which they want them to be fought.

After that, they should ask for the expert opinion of the Generals, on whether the war can be fought and the results achieved, within those parameters. It is obvious that the US Generals told Rumsfeld that they could not be achieved, with the small amount of soldiers, and without the clear exit strategy. Even I was able to see that. Rumsfeld went ahead anyways and is now stuck. I am surprised he is still around, after creating such a mess.

The Iraq War has to rank as one of the poorest executed operations of the past decades, anywhere in the world. A tiny group of ragtag insurgents have tied up, into an unsolvable quagmire, the mightiest economy and military the world has ever seen. And that too, unlike Vietnam and Afghanistan, without any external support! In Vietnam, Afghanistan etc. the insurgents had tremendous support from third-party countries.

Not only have the insurgents got the US into a military quagmire, they have gotten the USA into a political and financial quagmire also..........

There were the following reasons for such incorrect decision-making, in my opinion:

- This war was not only a continuation of international politics, by other means, it became a complete extension of domestic politics, i.e. what to invade and not invade etc. is being decided by what suites the political prospects of the Republican party in the next elections......the Fallujah raid was delayed, until after Bush`s re-election campaign, etc.

- The decision making was taken over by a group of neo-cons, with no military experience, who, at least, in my opinion, had interests, other than the well-being of USA in mind

- Any form of criticism of the war, the Bush govt. etc. was equated with lack of patriotism, being anti-Bush etc, thereby creating an atmosphere where only, ``Yes-men`` were allowed to express their views. Notice what happened to Powell........

It is quite clear that the current abstract strategies on this war were imposed on the Generals, against their better advice. And the results are in front of everyone............The US Generals have been put in a no-win situation, by an inexperienced and overly-confident political leadership, working under the advice of ideologically motivated think-tank strategists from places like the Enterprise Institute, etc............

Re: # 40

Romair, I agree with you. The final decision on starting wars must be political and the execution of wars should be left to the military professionals.

The only problem is what happens, when the actual shooting war starts? Does politics (read civilian political control) still retains its dominant influence or does it take a subordinate role to the needs of military necessity? Are the generals allowed to enlarge the scope of the war beyond its original political parameters without any political checks or balance on the evolving military strategy? Who dictates the political aim of the war? More importantly, what happens if the political aim gets confused in the ``fog of war`` and the war continues endlessly for the sake of fighting itself?

If the example of the Iraq War (second edition) is to be considered, the United States` military problems, just like in the Vietnam War, resulted from a lack of clearly defined political objectives. The political aims were always shifting according to the politics du jour and hence, the military`s response reflected this confusion in the unduly protracted nature of the wars. It was the muddled politics of the wars, which created the military quagmires. On the level of pure combat and combat efficiency in attaining their military objectives, the United States scored high in both the Vietnam War and the Second Iraq War, but in both wars; the United States defeat was a political one. The overall assumption seems to be that failure to understand Clausewitz does not reside in the thinking of the United States` military, but it rests on the shoulders of those politicans, who commited the United States to fighting a war in Vietnam and in Iraq in 2003.

However, even though I agree, with the gist of your logic, I still tend to favor a political control of the military operations, because in the end; final peace ending any war has to be a political settlement and peace is always sustained politically and seldom militarily. I am a little weary of military policies shaping and influencing politics and I would much rather be inclined towards bad political decisions influencing strategy than no political inputs into military strategies at all. I have no objections to the military been given the freedom of action to execute a war to a successful end, but I feel that in absense of a political limitation to the thinking of the military, wars will tend to degenerate into a endless mess.

I can understand your point of view, but the total control of war being left to the generals unlimited by a political control is unnerving.

Ciao

#38 ferozok,
I agree with all your paragraphs lest third. During the invasion of Iraq, there were strikes on Baghdad about which Tommy was ignorant. These strikes were conducted directly by the Pentogan/CIA on intelligence sensitive targets purpotedly on information supplied by pro USA Iraqis. This was a direct civil participation with Tommy out of the loop. Though this was not a large scale operation, but because it was conducted directly puts it in the category I maintain. To say the least, I am impressed by your grasp of strategy.

Fuzair, you are putting words based on your perception in my mouth. I hope my para above will clarify the point. These were exclusive operations carried out during the war without knowledge of CENTCOM.

Technology has made it possible to bypass the military instrument and this is the theory I support. It is not mine but that of Ken Booth.

Lets avoid personal attacks
Cheerios

re: Fuzair and ijaz_gul

Clausewitz`s basic idea was that war is the application of violent force for political ends and in that sense, wars are the continuation of politics by other means. In the end, however, the aim of the war remains political and it should be fought within political limits. Hence, Clemenceau`s statement that ``wars are too important to be left to the generals``. Clausewitiz dealth with the nature of war and in his assessment; wars are always of a political nature. Wars are limited by a political aim; are fought for a political aim and politics is, and will remain, the Alpha-Omega of all wars.

Interestingly enough, Clausewitz also sounded the warning that should a war not be able to attain its political aim, it should be ended immediately before it causes a negative reaction in guise of public protests, riots and other internal problems, which might badly influence the ability of the nation waging such an enterprise. An argument can be made that once it was clear that the Schlieffen Plan had failed in its overall objectives, Germany should have sought an end of hostilities, with France. In a similar sense, the United States` military problems in Iraq can be identified, with a failure to define the political aim of the war in Iraq. If the intention was really regime change, the Americans miscalculated the political end of the war, because they committed far less troops than were necessary to ensure a smooth transition from disposing Saddam Hussein to replacing him, with a pro-American regime. The Americans committed enough troops to defeat Saddam Hussein, but failed to reinforce those troops, with troops that would be needed to secure the political aim; making sure that the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq would be politically secure enough to validate the reasons for invading Iraq and toppling Saddam Hussein.

As to Tommy Franks and CentCom and Pentagon, the American military tradition suggests that the military professionals, prior to a war or a planned military action, will give their considered opinion, but the final decision to start a war, will always be a political choice and once that decision is made, the military will carry out the wishes of its civilian-political masters. Tommy Franks, might have been responsible for conducting operations against Iraq, but it does not necessarily suggest that he planned the final operation against Iraq itself. American military`s world commands, such CentCom, have plans for a military response for any situation and these plans are continually upgraded in view of the newly emerging threat perceptions and/or to accomodate changes in the political environment. Tommy Franks simply executed the best prepared plan for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as such a plan existed in 2003, with a few modifications.

Now the argument that Bush et al, exploited the civilian over military chain of command is another debate, but it is highly doubtful that, given the intergrated nature of the operation against Iraq, with its reliance on combined land-sea-air operations, any centralized planning institution such as Pentagon might have been kept out of the loop in the final planning of such an operation. The third option, which is also debateable, is that there is difference between Pentagon bureaucrats and serving generals of the line in terms of their outlook. It is a fact that the Pentagon is infamously political and the military officers appointed to the Pentagon are appointed for their political skills in getting the funds out of the Armed Services Committee on the Hill. Hence, why General Shinseki`s request for the troops levels was different than the Pentagon`s ``political-generals`` for the invasion and the subsequent occuaption of Iraq.

Still, this turning out be an interesting discussion...

Ciao

#36

Even conceding for a moment that you were referring to non-military engagements, not something your post implies, since when does the President have to clear, coordinate, implement, etc, non-military attempts at regime change/assasination/bribery/whatever through the military? Let me reming you what you said and then ignored: Clausewitz said that war is the continuation of diplomacy through other means; war is then an extension of foreign policy not the other way around. In all non-military dictatorships in the 20th century, wars were conducted by the politicians and fought by the military (one hopes with cosiderable technical input from the generals!). Or do you really think that all Secret Services carried out operations only after clearing them through the military before Bush came to power? If so, you really can be ignored! What Bush and Rumsfeld did is no different than what Lloyd George or Clemenceau did during WWI.

I still stand by my view that your post displays your ignorance. If you mean `X,` then say `X.` Don`t say `Y` and when your errors are pointed out, claim that you meant `X.` Take another look at your #29 and show me where you said what you now claim.

#29 Fuzair,
You are entitled to make opinions but not judgements on others. This is a serious topic and your comments are taken in bad taste. Sure, you may have lots of knowledge in Military History but dont deprive yourself an opportunity for a discourse.

There were two plans implemented in invasion of Iraq. The military operations under the Centcom that involved concentration of forces, the land invasion and softening by the airforce and missile units. At the same time CIA in coordination with department of defence used its own munitions including predaters againt Iraq, about the employment and timings of which Tommy Frank had no knowledge. In fact his un easiness on the issue became public.

As regards Tommy Franks participation, its not a question of invasion but of the actual conduct of war.

Cheerios

But mirmir, why should any general have a role in a country`s decision to invade another country, except in offering advice to civilian leadership regarding the feasibility of an effective military campaign?