Filtered Posts
How that Other Democracy (India) Differs
tendulkar, madhuri, nutan and tanuja....only thing redeeming ghatis...
It should be Suhas Patils. Vivek Ranadive, Shaku Atre, Kirloskars from Bangalore, Rahul Dravid, etc Also Isnt Rajnikant a Marathi too though from bangalore.
Are Marathas high caste? I dont think so. They are Kshtriyas. High caste Brahmins are not much in politics. Peshwas ruled long time back.
By the way current Maharashtra CM Sushilkumar Shinde is a Dalit.
Posted by
mumbaikar
Oct 20, 2004 10:02 am
Never attribute to love for ghatiland what can easily be explained with incompetence..... tendulkar, madhuri, nutan and tanuja....only thing redeeming ghatis...
It should be Suhas Patils. Vivek Ranadive, Shaku Atre, Kirloskars from Bangalore, Rahul Dravid, etc Also Isnt Rajnikant a Marathi too though from bangalore.
Are Marathas high caste? I dont think so. They are Kshtriyas. High caste Brahmins are not much in politics. Peshwas ruled long time back.
By the way current Maharashtra CM Sushilkumar Shinde is a Dalit.
How that Other Democracy (India) Differs
After the 1957 elections, the Maharashtra Congress went about internalising two core principles of Gandhian socialism: ensuring adequate representation of the ‘backward castes’ and the idea of cooperatives. These two features strengthened the Congress in Maharashtra. In addition, the party high command ensured the backing of the large industrial houses — the Bombay Club — to build an organisational network that could sustain the party
The voters’ verdict from Maharashtra, where the ruling Congress-NCP combine has managed to retain power, should have come as a pleasant surprise to both Sonia Gandhi and Sharad Pawar. That the coalition’s strength in the state assembly improved, even if marginally, over the last election is indeed an achievement. In an era when anti-incumbency is the rule and elections have turned into occasion for the masses to simply register their protest, such a verdict was certainly not expected.
The Maharashtra polls were critical for the Bharatiya Janata Party, though not for the Shiv Sena. After losing the April-May general elections, the BJP was showing signs of being crippled. Atal Behari Vajpayee looked lost and trying to evolve as an ‘elder’ statesman. LK Advani seemed obsessed with announcing the demise of the Left! The duo, who could be credited with having steered the affairs of the BJP since its inception (barring a couple of years when the party was presided over by an un-inspiring MM Joshi) and bringing it from the fringes of the political discourse to leadership of the Union government, showed signs of fatigue.
The Maharashtra elections were critical in this context. Did the next generation leaders of the party have the potential to turn around its fortunes? In other words, it was Pramod Mahajan’s opportunity to prove himself. It is not too early to conclude that he failed. The ruling coalition in Maharashtra was no less discredited than the Digvijay Singh dispensation in Madhya Pradesh (in November 2003) or the Chandrababu Naidu-led Telugu Desam in Andhra Pradesh (in May 2004).
The situation in Maharashtra, in fact, was worse than that in Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh. The Congress Legislature Party in Maharashtra, for instance, was plagued with endemic faction feuds — recall the unseemly episode a couple of years ago when the party MLAs revolted against the then chief minister Vilasrao Deshmukh and some of them had to be taken away to Bangalore and held in ‘custody’ in a luxury hotel before the vote of confidence. In due course, to ensure stability, the high command had to replace Deshmukh with Sushil Kumar Shinde.
The state coffers had gone dry and some departments of the government existed merely to preserve jobs. A large number of farmers killed themselves and starvation deaths were reported until recently from many parts of Maharashtra. All this pointed to the pathetic state of governance. In other words, the situation on the ground was not very different from what it was in Andhra Pradesh (under the Telugu Desam) and Madhya Pradesh (under the Congress) when elections were called there for the state assemblies. If the BJP-Sena still could not wrest power, it clearly shows that their leaders are out of sync with the political reality.
Indeed there may be a lot more bad news for the BJP in the next couple of years. It cannot hope to do well in Haryana, Bihar and Jharkhand — the states where polls will be held in February-March 2005. It is likely to lose Jharkhand. Again in May 2006, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and West Bengal are states where the party is not in the reckoning. Thus, it is going to be a pretty long political winter for the party.
It is only natural for Congressmen and those concerned with Mumbai’s cosmopolitan climate to celebrate. But then, it remains to be seen whether as a party the Congress will see the wisdom in reinventing itself as a platform committed to fighting sectarianism. In other words, apprehensions remain that the Congress-NCP leaders will opt to behave the way they did during December 1992 and January 1993. That was when Mumbai and its suburbs burnt for days on end. A large number of the dead turned out to be Muslims. After the next elections to the state assembly (in 1995) the BJP-Sena came to power in Maharashtra as the first ever non-Congress government of the state.
The electoral victory will also encourage commentators and Congress loyalists to heap praises on Sonia Gandhi. At another level, Sharad Pawar will manage to remain a force in the UPA scheme of things. Another aspect of the story — the fact that the balance of forces in the Maharashtra legislature will remain the same as it was in the previous house — will be pushed under the carpet. The truth is that the Congress-NCP coalition could retain power only because the two parties entered into a pre-poll alliance. Contrast this with the last elections. Congress and the NCP fought against each other and yet managed to secure 133 seats between themselves. This time, even after the united effort, they have not made substantial gains.
This indeed is the point where the Congress-NCP leaders should start from when they sit together to make sense of the mandate. Maharashtra is perhaps the only large state that has remained in Congress control barring four years of BJP-Sena rule between 1995 and 1999. All chief ministers of the state, barring Manohar Joshi and Narayan Rane came from the Congress stables. If it did not get decimated in Maharashtra (as it was in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar), it was because a course correction made by one of its legendary leaders from the state — Yaswantrao Chavan –in the ‘50s.
After the 1957 elections, the Maharashtra Congress went about internalising the two core principles of Gandhian socialism: ensuring adequate representation of the ‘backward castes’ and the idea of cooperatives. These two features strengthened the Congress in Maharashtra. In addition, the party high command ensured the backing of the large industrial houses — the Bombay Club — to build an organisational network that could sustain the party.
While successive leaders of the party, both in Maharashtra and in Delhi, did everything to weaken the organisation and render the cooperatives sick, Congress in Maharashtra is still different from the various other state units. The cooperatives, particularly in the sugar-manufacturing sector, are still a part of the political landscape. Similarly, the party in Maharashtra is not a preserve of the upper castes. These aspects alone helped the party, along with the NCP whose organisational structure too is rooted in the same tradition, to tide over a difficult election and keep the BJP-Sena at bay.
The task ahead is, however, not as simple as what has been accomplished. It is imperative for the Congress and the NCP leaders to consolidate upon this victory and commit themselves to this tradition — of social transformation and cooperatives — rather than persist with the attitude during the recent years when they allowed these institutions to sink. If the institutions sink any further their own parties will be decimated in Maharashtra. The Maharashtra experience can also help the Congress reinvent itself elsewhere.
VK Ananth, a former affiliate of The Hindu, is now a freelance writer
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_18-10-2004_pg3_5
Posted by
mumbaikar
Oct 18, 2004 07:49 am
Making sense of Maharashtra election —V Krishna AnanthAfter the 1957 elections, the Maharashtra Congress went about internalising two core principles of Gandhian socialism: ensuring adequate representation of the ‘backward castes’ and the idea of cooperatives. These two features strengthened the Congress in Maharashtra. In addition, the party high command ensured the backing of the large industrial houses — the Bombay Club — to build an organisational network that could sustain the party
The voters’ verdict from Maharashtra, where the ruling Congress-NCP combine has managed to retain power, should have come as a pleasant surprise to both Sonia Gandhi and Sharad Pawar. That the coalition’s strength in the state assembly improved, even if marginally, over the last election is indeed an achievement. In an era when anti-incumbency is the rule and elections have turned into occasion for the masses to simply register their protest, such a verdict was certainly not expected.
The Maharashtra polls were critical for the Bharatiya Janata Party, though not for the Shiv Sena. After losing the April-May general elections, the BJP was showing signs of being crippled. Atal Behari Vajpayee looked lost and trying to evolve as an ‘elder’ statesman. LK Advani seemed obsessed with announcing the demise of the Left! The duo, who could be credited with having steered the affairs of the BJP since its inception (barring a couple of years when the party was presided over by an un-inspiring MM Joshi) and bringing it from the fringes of the political discourse to leadership of the Union government, showed signs of fatigue.
The Maharashtra elections were critical in this context. Did the next generation leaders of the party have the potential to turn around its fortunes? In other words, it was Pramod Mahajan’s opportunity to prove himself. It is not too early to conclude that he failed. The ruling coalition in Maharashtra was no less discredited than the Digvijay Singh dispensation in Madhya Pradesh (in November 2003) or the Chandrababu Naidu-led Telugu Desam in Andhra Pradesh (in May 2004).
The situation in Maharashtra, in fact, was worse than that in Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh. The Congress Legislature Party in Maharashtra, for instance, was plagued with endemic faction feuds — recall the unseemly episode a couple of years ago when the party MLAs revolted against the then chief minister Vilasrao Deshmukh and some of them had to be taken away to Bangalore and held in ‘custody’ in a luxury hotel before the vote of confidence. In due course, to ensure stability, the high command had to replace Deshmukh with Sushil Kumar Shinde.
The state coffers had gone dry and some departments of the government existed merely to preserve jobs. A large number of farmers killed themselves and starvation deaths were reported until recently from many parts of Maharashtra. All this pointed to the pathetic state of governance. In other words, the situation on the ground was not very different from what it was in Andhra Pradesh (under the Telugu Desam) and Madhya Pradesh (under the Congress) when elections were called there for the state assemblies. If the BJP-Sena still could not wrest power, it clearly shows that their leaders are out of sync with the political reality.
Indeed there may be a lot more bad news for the BJP in the next couple of years. It cannot hope to do well in Haryana, Bihar and Jharkhand — the states where polls will be held in February-March 2005. It is likely to lose Jharkhand. Again in May 2006, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and West Bengal are states where the party is not in the reckoning. Thus, it is going to be a pretty long political winter for the party.
It is only natural for Congressmen and those concerned with Mumbai’s cosmopolitan climate to celebrate. But then, it remains to be seen whether as a party the Congress will see the wisdom in reinventing itself as a platform committed to fighting sectarianism. In other words, apprehensions remain that the Congress-NCP leaders will opt to behave the way they did during December 1992 and January 1993. That was when Mumbai and its suburbs burnt for days on end. A large number of the dead turned out to be Muslims. After the next elections to the state assembly (in 1995) the BJP-Sena came to power in Maharashtra as the first ever non-Congress government of the state.
The electoral victory will also encourage commentators and Congress loyalists to heap praises on Sonia Gandhi. At another level, Sharad Pawar will manage to remain a force in the UPA scheme of things. Another aspect of the story — the fact that the balance of forces in the Maharashtra legislature will remain the same as it was in the previous house — will be pushed under the carpet. The truth is that the Congress-NCP coalition could retain power only because the two parties entered into a pre-poll alliance. Contrast this with the last elections. Congress and the NCP fought against each other and yet managed to secure 133 seats between themselves. This time, even after the united effort, they have not made substantial gains.
This indeed is the point where the Congress-NCP leaders should start from when they sit together to make sense of the mandate. Maharashtra is perhaps the only large state that has remained in Congress control barring four years of BJP-Sena rule between 1995 and 1999. All chief ministers of the state, barring Manohar Joshi and Narayan Rane came from the Congress stables. If it did not get decimated in Maharashtra (as it was in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar), it was because a course correction made by one of its legendary leaders from the state — Yaswantrao Chavan –in the ‘50s.
After the 1957 elections, the Maharashtra Congress went about internalising the two core principles of Gandhian socialism: ensuring adequate representation of the ‘backward castes’ and the idea of cooperatives. These two features strengthened the Congress in Maharashtra. In addition, the party high command ensured the backing of the large industrial houses — the Bombay Club — to build an organisational network that could sustain the party.
While successive leaders of the party, both in Maharashtra and in Delhi, did everything to weaken the organisation and render the cooperatives sick, Congress in Maharashtra is still different from the various other state units. The cooperatives, particularly in the sugar-manufacturing sector, are still a part of the political landscape. Similarly, the party in Maharashtra is not a preserve of the upper castes. These aspects alone helped the party, along with the NCP whose organisational structure too is rooted in the same tradition, to tide over a difficult election and keep the BJP-Sena at bay.
The task ahead is, however, not as simple as what has been accomplished. It is imperative for the Congress and the NCP leaders to consolidate upon this victory and commit themselves to this tradition — of social transformation and cooperatives — rather than persist with the attitude during the recent years when they allowed these institutions to sink. If the institutions sink any further their own parties will be decimated in Maharashtra. The Maharashtra experience can also help the Congress reinvent itself elsewhere.
VK Ananth, a former affiliate of The Hindu, is now a freelance writer
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_18-10-2004_pg3_5
How that Other Democracy (India) Differs
Curing what ails India`s Hindu hardliners
By K Gajendra Singh
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FJ19Df03.html
Indian press review
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3752154.stm
The Hindu called the Congress alliance win a ``superlative victory``
The power tussle within the winning coalition in western Maharashtra state leads Monday`s newspaper front pages in India.
Message in the age of nuance
http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=57136
Posted by
mumbaikar
Oct 18, 2004 07:49 am
Maharashtra electionsCuring what ails India`s Hindu hardliners
By K Gajendra Singh
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FJ19Df03.html
Indian press review
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3752154.stm
The Hindu called the Congress alliance win a ``superlative victory``
The power tussle within the winning coalition in western Maharashtra state leads Monday`s newspaper front pages in India.
Message in the age of nuance
http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=57136
US Elections Concern for India
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=711&e=10&u=/usatoday/20041014/tc_usatoday/endangeredspeciesusprogrammers
Thu Oct 14, 7:32 AM ET
By David R. Francis, The Christian Science Monitor
Say goodbye to the American software programmer. Once the symbols of hope as the nation shifted from manufacturing to service jobs, programmers today are an endangered species. They face a challenge similar to that which shrank the ranks of steelworkers and autoworkers a quarter century ago: competition from foreigners.
Some experts think they`ll become extinct within the next few years, forced into unemployment or new careers by a combination of offshoring of their work to India and other low-wage countries and the arrival of skilled immigrants taking their jobs.
Not everybody agrees programmers will disappear completely. But even the optimists believe that many basic programming jobs will go to foreign nations, leaving behind jobs for Americans to lead and manage software projects. The evidence is already mounting that many computer jobs are endangered, prompting concern about the future of the nation`s high-tech industries.
Since the dotcom bust in 2000-2001, nearly a quarter of California technology workers have taken nontech jobs, according to a study of 1 million workers released last week by Sphere Institute, a San Francisco Bay Area public policy group. The jobs they took often paid less. Software workers were hit especially hard. Another 28% have dropped off California`s job rolls altogether. They fled the state, became unemployed, or decided on self-employment.
The problem is not limited to California.
Although computer-related jobs in the United States increased by 27,000 between 2001 and 2003, about 180,000 new foreign H-1B workers in the computer area entered the nation, calculates John Miano, an expert with the Programmers Guild, a professional society. ``This suggests any gain of jobs have been taken by H-1B workers,`` he says.
H-1B visas allow skilled foreigners to live and work in the US for up to six years. Many are able to get green cards in a first step to citizenship. Another visa, L-1, allows multinational companies to transfer workers from foreign operations into the US.
The H-1B visa has been highly controversial for years. This fiscal year, Congress set a quota of 65,000 visas, which was snapped up immediately after they became available Oct.1. Now, US business is pleading for Congress to let in more such workers.
The US Chamber of Commerce (news - web sites), for instance, wants Congress to revisit the cap ``to ensure American business has access to the talent it needs to help keep our economy strong.``
That rationale makes no sense to the Programmers Guild and other groups that have sprung up to resist the tech visas. Since more than 100,000 American programmers are unemployed - and many more are underemployed - the existing 65,000 quota is inexcusably high, they argue. H-1B and L-1 visas are ``American worker replacement programs,`` says the National Hire American Citizens Society.
Further, the H-1B program, set up in 1990, is flawed, critics charge. For example, employers are not required to recruit Americans before resorting to hiring H-1Bs, says Norman Matloff, a computer science professor at the University of California, Davis.
And the requirement that employers pay H-1Bs a ``prevailing wage`` is useless, he adds, because the law is riddled with loopholes. Nor are even any remaining regulations enforced.
The average wage for an American programmer runs about $60,000, says John Bauman, who set up the Organization for the Rights of American Workers. Employers pay H-1Bs an average $53,000.
A programmer, Mr. Bauman was out of work for 20 months before finally taking a job with a 40% pay cut. His experience is common enough that programmers are organizing to fight in Congress against H-1B and L-1 visas.
But they face an uphill battle, says Mr. Miano, as business groups are far better organized and funded than the smattering of programmer groups. ``They have the best legislation money can buy,`` he says.
Miano sees such a dim future for programmers that he decided to enter law school. ``I saw the handwriting on the wall,`` he says.
Copyright 2004, The Christian Science Monitor
Posted by
mumbaikar
Oct 15, 2004 01:29 pm
Endangered species: US programmershttp://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=711&e=10&u=/usatoday/20041014/tc_usatoday/endangeredspeciesusprogrammers
Thu Oct 14, 7:32 AM ET
By David R. Francis, The Christian Science Monitor
Say goodbye to the American software programmer. Once the symbols of hope as the nation shifted from manufacturing to service jobs, programmers today are an endangered species. They face a challenge similar to that which shrank the ranks of steelworkers and autoworkers a quarter century ago: competition from foreigners.
Some experts think they`ll become extinct within the next few years, forced into unemployment or new careers by a combination of offshoring of their work to India and other low-wage countries and the arrival of skilled immigrants taking their jobs.
Not everybody agrees programmers will disappear completely. But even the optimists believe that many basic programming jobs will go to foreign nations, leaving behind jobs for Americans to lead and manage software projects. The evidence is already mounting that many computer jobs are endangered, prompting concern about the future of the nation`s high-tech industries.
Since the dotcom bust in 2000-2001, nearly a quarter of California technology workers have taken nontech jobs, according to a study of 1 million workers released last week by Sphere Institute, a San Francisco Bay Area public policy group. The jobs they took often paid less. Software workers were hit especially hard. Another 28% have dropped off California`s job rolls altogether. They fled the state, became unemployed, or decided on self-employment.
The problem is not limited to California.
Although computer-related jobs in the United States increased by 27,000 between 2001 and 2003, about 180,000 new foreign H-1B workers in the computer area entered the nation, calculates John Miano, an expert with the Programmers Guild, a professional society. ``This suggests any gain of jobs have been taken by H-1B workers,`` he says.
H-1B visas allow skilled foreigners to live and work in the US for up to six years. Many are able to get green cards in a first step to citizenship. Another visa, L-1, allows multinational companies to transfer workers from foreign operations into the US.
The H-1B visa has been highly controversial for years. This fiscal year, Congress set a quota of 65,000 visas, which was snapped up immediately after they became available Oct.1. Now, US business is pleading for Congress to let in more such workers.
The US Chamber of Commerce (news - web sites), for instance, wants Congress to revisit the cap ``to ensure American business has access to the talent it needs to help keep our economy strong.``
That rationale makes no sense to the Programmers Guild and other groups that have sprung up to resist the tech visas. Since more than 100,000 American programmers are unemployed - and many more are underemployed - the existing 65,000 quota is inexcusably high, they argue. H-1B and L-1 visas are ``American worker replacement programs,`` says the National Hire American Citizens Society.
Further, the H-1B program, set up in 1990, is flawed, critics charge. For example, employers are not required to recruit Americans before resorting to hiring H-1Bs, says Norman Matloff, a computer science professor at the University of California, Davis.
And the requirement that employers pay H-1Bs a ``prevailing wage`` is useless, he adds, because the law is riddled with loopholes. Nor are even any remaining regulations enforced.
The average wage for an American programmer runs about $60,000, says John Bauman, who set up the Organization for the Rights of American Workers. Employers pay H-1Bs an average $53,000.
A programmer, Mr. Bauman was out of work for 20 months before finally taking a job with a 40% pay cut. His experience is common enough that programmers are organizing to fight in Congress against H-1B and L-1 visas.
But they face an uphill battle, says Mr. Miano, as business groups are far better organized and funded than the smattering of programmer groups. ``They have the best legislation money can buy,`` he says.
Miano sees such a dim future for programmers that he decided to enter law school. ``I saw the handwriting on the wall,`` he says.
Copyright 2004, The Christian Science Monitor
The Dragon’s Teeth
The weapons we`re sending to Islamabad are targeted against India, not the Taliban.
By Joshua Kucera
Posted Monday, Oct. 4, 2004, at 4:52 AM PT
http://www.slate.com/id/2107610/
Pakistan`s nuclear-capable Shaheen II missile
KARACHI, Pakistan—The slogan for this year`s version of Pakistan`s biggest arms show, IDEAS 2004, is ``Arms for Peace.`` But despite all the heavy weapons on display, the host city, Karachi, seems markedly insecure. Exhibitors and attendees drive from the Sheraton to the expo center in armed convoys. Police with machine guns are stationed every 50 yards along the 30-minute drive. Snipers peek from the rooftops surrounding the expo center. Delegates are advised not to leave the hotel, which is where 11 French submarine engineers were killed two years ago on their way to work on subs that France and Pakistan are assembling here. Karachi is also where Daniel Pearl was kidnapped.
As delegations from a veritable Who`s Who of pariah states—North Korea, Myanmar, Iran, Zimbabwe, Sudan—make the rounds, a Pakistani company shows off its new cluster bombs (which, the company press release notes, ``can be used against soft targets``). A Bangladeshi delegation looks approvingly at a display of Pakistani tanks.
There`s a new policy in effect post-A.Q. Khan
Pakistan`s missiles, including the nuclear-capable Shaheen II, are displayed outside, behind a sign reading ``Technological Demonstration—Not for Sale.`` It seems to be an oblique reference to the most notorious past IDEAS exhibitor—A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan`s nuclear program and now the apparent mastermind of a global nuclear smuggling network. Four years ago, his company, Khan Research Laboratories, was at IDEAS handing out glossy brochures advertising specialized equipment for making a nuclear bomb.
But the big news at the show is the U.S. presence. This is the first time that American companies have exhibited at IDEAS, and they have turned out in force. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, United Defense, and several smaller companies are here. The United States imposed weapons sanctions in the 1990s after it found out about Pakistan`s secret nuclear bomb program. But then came Sept. 11 and the war in Afghanistan. Pakistan became our new best friend, and the sanctions were lifted. And although Pakistan`s military is still overwhelmingly oriented toward India—hardly a major front in the ``war on terror``—Washington has opened up its pocketbooks again. Over the next five years, Pakistan will get at least $1.5 billion in defense aid from the United States.
An announcement made at IDEAS 2004 suggests where some of that money is going to be spent: Pakistani officials revealed that the United States is ready to reverse its longtime opposition to selling new F-16 fighter jets to Islamabad. The chief of the Pakistan Air Force told me Washington wants to provide the F-16s, in part, to help Pakistan fight Islamist extremists in the tribal areas in the northwestern part of the country.
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has deftly played the United States since Sept. 11, and Washington has let him get away with it. Shortly before IDEAS 2004 opened, he announced that he will not step down as chief of the army, as he had promised. The United States barely let out a peep. The operations against the insurgents in the northwest are centered in Waziristan, not around Quetta or Peshawar, where intelligence officials and analysts believe most Taliban and al-Qaida operatives are based. One analyst told me the Pakistanis are attacking Waziristan because it`s an easy target, and because tribal forces humiliated Pakistani army troops there earlier this year, and now the military establishment wants revenge. Yet U.S. officials praise the operations as an important battle in the ``war on terror.``
Even if Pakistan were serious about fighting the Taliban, it could certainly find a better way to spend the hundreds of millions of dollars the F-16s will cost. But the Pakistanis gave a clue as to what they really want with the planes: They are requesting that the F-16s be armed with top-of-the-line air-to-air missiles that would be of little use against targets like the Islamists it`s fighting on the ground. Other equipment Pakistan is getting from the United States—navy surveillance planes, for example—is similarly useless against a guerrilla insurgency. They would, of course, be useful in a war against India.
The majority of questions Pakistani journalists asked in the show`s press conferences were centered around one theme: ``Can this help us beat India?`` The Indian air force is formidable—earlier this year they beat U.S. pilots in a war game. Meanwhile, Pakistan`s air force has stagnated as a result of U.S. sanctions, about which the Pakistanis are still resentful The most notorious episode of the sanctions period was when the United States refused to allow the importation of 70 F-16s that Pakistan bought in the 1980s—after Islamabad had paid for them in advance. It took a decade just to get the money refunded. This lends the F-16 deal the look of a thank-you gift rather than a serious weapon in the ``war on terror.``
Joshua Kucera is a staff reporter in the Washington bureau of Jane`s Defence Weekly. He can be reached at Joshua_kucera@yahoo.com.
Posted by
mumbaikar
Oct 5, 2004 06:39 am
To Pakistan, With ThanksThe weapons we`re sending to Islamabad are targeted against India, not the Taliban.
By Joshua Kucera
Posted Monday, Oct. 4, 2004, at 4:52 AM PT
http://www.slate.com/id/2107610/
Pakistan`s nuclear-capable Shaheen II missile
KARACHI, Pakistan—The slogan for this year`s version of Pakistan`s biggest arms show, IDEAS 2004, is ``Arms for Peace.`` But despite all the heavy weapons on display, the host city, Karachi, seems markedly insecure. Exhibitors and attendees drive from the Sheraton to the expo center in armed convoys. Police with machine guns are stationed every 50 yards along the 30-minute drive. Snipers peek from the rooftops surrounding the expo center. Delegates are advised not to leave the hotel, which is where 11 French submarine engineers were killed two years ago on their way to work on subs that France and Pakistan are assembling here. Karachi is also where Daniel Pearl was kidnapped.
As delegations from a veritable Who`s Who of pariah states—North Korea, Myanmar, Iran, Zimbabwe, Sudan—make the rounds, a Pakistani company shows off its new cluster bombs (which, the company press release notes, ``can be used against soft targets``). A Bangladeshi delegation looks approvingly at a display of Pakistani tanks.
There`s a new policy in effect post-A.Q. Khan
Pakistan`s missiles, including the nuclear-capable Shaheen II, are displayed outside, behind a sign reading ``Technological Demonstration—Not for Sale.`` It seems to be an oblique reference to the most notorious past IDEAS exhibitor—A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan`s nuclear program and now the apparent mastermind of a global nuclear smuggling network. Four years ago, his company, Khan Research Laboratories, was at IDEAS handing out glossy brochures advertising specialized equipment for making a nuclear bomb.
But the big news at the show is the U.S. presence. This is the first time that American companies have exhibited at IDEAS, and they have turned out in force. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, United Defense, and several smaller companies are here. The United States imposed weapons sanctions in the 1990s after it found out about Pakistan`s secret nuclear bomb program. But then came Sept. 11 and the war in Afghanistan. Pakistan became our new best friend, and the sanctions were lifted. And although Pakistan`s military is still overwhelmingly oriented toward India—hardly a major front in the ``war on terror``—Washington has opened up its pocketbooks again. Over the next five years, Pakistan will get at least $1.5 billion in defense aid from the United States.
An announcement made at IDEAS 2004 suggests where some of that money is going to be spent: Pakistani officials revealed that the United States is ready to reverse its longtime opposition to selling new F-16 fighter jets to Islamabad. The chief of the Pakistan Air Force told me Washington wants to provide the F-16s, in part, to help Pakistan fight Islamist extremists in the tribal areas in the northwestern part of the country.
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has deftly played the United States since Sept. 11, and Washington has let him get away with it. Shortly before IDEAS 2004 opened, he announced that he will not step down as chief of the army, as he had promised. The United States barely let out a peep. The operations against the insurgents in the northwest are centered in Waziristan, not around Quetta or Peshawar, where intelligence officials and analysts believe most Taliban and al-Qaida operatives are based. One analyst told me the Pakistanis are attacking Waziristan because it`s an easy target, and because tribal forces humiliated Pakistani army troops there earlier this year, and now the military establishment wants revenge. Yet U.S. officials praise the operations as an important battle in the ``war on terror.``
Even if Pakistan were serious about fighting the Taliban, it could certainly find a better way to spend the hundreds of millions of dollars the F-16s will cost. But the Pakistanis gave a clue as to what they really want with the planes: They are requesting that the F-16s be armed with top-of-the-line air-to-air missiles that would be of little use against targets like the Islamists it`s fighting on the ground. Other equipment Pakistan is getting from the United States—navy surveillance planes, for example—is similarly useless against a guerrilla insurgency. They would, of course, be useful in a war against India.
The majority of questions Pakistani journalists asked in the show`s press conferences were centered around one theme: ``Can this help us beat India?`` The Indian air force is formidable—earlier this year they beat U.S. pilots in a war game. Meanwhile, Pakistan`s air force has stagnated as a result of U.S. sanctions, about which the Pakistanis are still resentful The most notorious episode of the sanctions period was when the United States refused to allow the importation of 70 F-16s that Pakistan bought in the 1980s—after Islamabad had paid for them in advance. It took a decade just to get the money refunded. This lends the F-16 deal the look of a thank-you gift rather than a serious weapon in the ``war on terror.``
Joshua Kucera is a staff reporter in the Washington bureau of Jane`s Defence Weekly. He can be reached at Joshua_kucera@yahoo.com.
Pakistan: Inside The Nuclear Closet
To Pakistan, With Thanks
The weapons we`re sending to Islamabad are targeted against India, not the Taliban.
By Joshua Kucera
Posted Monday, Oct. 4, 2004, at 4:52 AM PT
Pakistan`s nuclear-capable Shaheen II missile
KARACHI, Pakistan—The slogan for this year`s version of Pakistan`s biggest arms show, IDEAS 2004, is ``Arms for Peace.`` But despite all the heavy weapons on display, the host city, Karachi, seems markedly insecure. Exhibitors and attendees drive from the Sheraton to the expo center in armed convoys. Police with machine guns are stationed every 50 yards along the 30-minute drive. Snipers peek from the rooftops surrounding the expo center. Delegates are advised not to leave the hotel, which is where 11 French submarine engineers were killed two years ago on their way to work on subs that France and Pakistan are assembling here. Karachi is also where Daniel Pearl was kidnapped.
As delegations from a veritable Who`s Who of pariah states—North Korea, Myanmar, Iran, Zimbabwe, Sudan—make the rounds, a Pakistani company shows off its new cluster bombs (which, the company press release notes, ``can be used against soft targets``). A Bangladeshi delegation looks approvingly at a display of Pakistani tanks.
There`s a new policy in effect post-A.Q. Khan
Pakistan`s missiles, including the nuclear-capable Shaheen II, are displayed outside, behind a sign reading ``Technological Demonstration—Not for Sale.`` It seems to be an oblique reference to the most notorious past IDEAS exhibitor—A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan`s nuclear program and now the apparent mastermind of a global nuclear smuggling network. Four years ago, his company, Khan Research Laboratories, was at IDEAS handing out glossy brochures advertising specialized equipment for making a nuclear bomb.
But the big news at the show is the U.S. presence. This is the first time that American companies have exhibited at IDEAS, and they have turned out in force. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, United Defense, and several smaller companies are here. The United States imposed weapons sanctions in the 1990s after it found out about Pakistan`s secret nuclear bomb program. But then came Sept. 11 and the war in Afghanistan. Pakistan became our new best friend, and the sanctions were lifted. And although Pakistan`s military is still overwhelmingly oriented toward India—hardly a major front in the ``war on terror``—Washington has opened up its pocketbooks again. Over the next five years, Pakistan will get at least $1.5 billion in defense aid from the United States.
An announcement made at IDEAS 2004 suggests where some of that money is going to be spent: Pakistani officials revealed that the United States is ready to reverse its longtime opposition to selling new F-16 fighter jets to Islamabad. The chief of the Pakistan Air Force told me Washington wants to provide the F-16s, in part, to help Pakistan fight Islamist extremists in the tribal areas in the northwestern part of the country.
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has deftly played the United States since Sept. 11, and Washington has let him get away with it. Shortly before IDEAS 2004 opened, he announced that he will not step down as chief of the army, as he had promised. The United States barely let out a peep. The operations against the insurgents in the northwest are centered in Waziristan, not around Quetta or Peshawar, where intelligence officials and analysts believe most Taliban and al-Qaida operatives are based. One analyst told me the Pakistanis are attacking Waziristan because it`s an easy target, and because tribal forces humiliated Pakistani army troops there earlier this year, and now the military establishment wants revenge. Yet U.S. officials praise the operations as an important battle in the ``war on terror.``
Even if Pakistan were serious about fighting the Taliban, it could certainly find a better way to spend the hundreds of millions of dollars the F-16s will cost. But the Pakistanis gave a clue as to what they really want with the planes: They are requesting that the F-16s be armed with top-of-the-line air-to-air missiles that would be of little use against targets like the Islamists it`s fighting on the ground. Other equipment Pakistan is getting from the United States—navy surveillance planes, for example—is similarly useless against a guerrilla insurgency. They would, of course, be useful in a war against India.
The majority of questions Pakistani journalists asked in the show`s press conferences were centered around one theme: ``Can this help us beat India?`` The Indian air force is formidable—earlier this year they beat U.S. pilots in a war game. Meanwhile, Pakistan`s air force has stagnated as a result of U.S. sanctions, about which the Pakistanis are still resentful The most notorious episode of the sanctions period was when the United States refused to allow the importation of 70 F-16s that Pakistan bought in the 1980s—after Islamabad had paid for them in advance. It took a decade just to get the money refunded. This lends the F-16 deal the look of a thank-you gift rather than a serious weapon in the ``war on terror.``
Joshua Kucera is a staff reporter in the Washington bureau of Jane`s Defence Weekly. He can be reached at Joshua_kucera@yahoo.com.
Posted by
mumbaikar
Oct 5, 2004 06:39 am
http://www.slate.com/id/2107610/To Pakistan, With Thanks
The weapons we`re sending to Islamabad are targeted against India, not the Taliban.
By Joshua Kucera
Posted Monday, Oct. 4, 2004, at 4:52 AM PT
Pakistan`s nuclear-capable Shaheen II missile
KARACHI, Pakistan—The slogan for this year`s version of Pakistan`s biggest arms show, IDEAS 2004, is ``Arms for Peace.`` But despite all the heavy weapons on display, the host city, Karachi, seems markedly insecure. Exhibitors and attendees drive from the Sheraton to the expo center in armed convoys. Police with machine guns are stationed every 50 yards along the 30-minute drive. Snipers peek from the rooftops surrounding the expo center. Delegates are advised not to leave the hotel, which is where 11 French submarine engineers were killed two years ago on their way to work on subs that France and Pakistan are assembling here. Karachi is also where Daniel Pearl was kidnapped.
As delegations from a veritable Who`s Who of pariah states—North Korea, Myanmar, Iran, Zimbabwe, Sudan—make the rounds, a Pakistani company shows off its new cluster bombs (which, the company press release notes, ``can be used against soft targets``). A Bangladeshi delegation looks approvingly at a display of Pakistani tanks.
There`s a new policy in effect post-A.Q. Khan
Pakistan`s missiles, including the nuclear-capable Shaheen II, are displayed outside, behind a sign reading ``Technological Demonstration—Not for Sale.`` It seems to be an oblique reference to the most notorious past IDEAS exhibitor—A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan`s nuclear program and now the apparent mastermind of a global nuclear smuggling network. Four years ago, his company, Khan Research Laboratories, was at IDEAS handing out glossy brochures advertising specialized equipment for making a nuclear bomb.
But the big news at the show is the U.S. presence. This is the first time that American companies have exhibited at IDEAS, and they have turned out in force. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, United Defense, and several smaller companies are here. The United States imposed weapons sanctions in the 1990s after it found out about Pakistan`s secret nuclear bomb program. But then came Sept. 11 and the war in Afghanistan. Pakistan became our new best friend, and the sanctions were lifted. And although Pakistan`s military is still overwhelmingly oriented toward India—hardly a major front in the ``war on terror``—Washington has opened up its pocketbooks again. Over the next five years, Pakistan will get at least $1.5 billion in defense aid from the United States.
An announcement made at IDEAS 2004 suggests where some of that money is going to be spent: Pakistani officials revealed that the United States is ready to reverse its longtime opposition to selling new F-16 fighter jets to Islamabad. The chief of the Pakistan Air Force told me Washington wants to provide the F-16s, in part, to help Pakistan fight Islamist extremists in the tribal areas in the northwestern part of the country.
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has deftly played the United States since Sept. 11, and Washington has let him get away with it. Shortly before IDEAS 2004 opened, he announced that he will not step down as chief of the army, as he had promised. The United States barely let out a peep. The operations against the insurgents in the northwest are centered in Waziristan, not around Quetta or Peshawar, where intelligence officials and analysts believe most Taliban and al-Qaida operatives are based. One analyst told me the Pakistanis are attacking Waziristan because it`s an easy target, and because tribal forces humiliated Pakistani army troops there earlier this year, and now the military establishment wants revenge. Yet U.S. officials praise the operations as an important battle in the ``war on terror.``
Even if Pakistan were serious about fighting the Taliban, it could certainly find a better way to spend the hundreds of millions of dollars the F-16s will cost. But the Pakistanis gave a clue as to what they really want with the planes: They are requesting that the F-16s be armed with top-of-the-line air-to-air missiles that would be of little use against targets like the Islamists it`s fighting on the ground. Other equipment Pakistan is getting from the United States—navy surveillance planes, for example—is similarly useless against a guerrilla insurgency. They would, of course, be useful in a war against India.
The majority of questions Pakistani journalists asked in the show`s press conferences were centered around one theme: ``Can this help us beat India?`` The Indian air force is formidable—earlier this year they beat U.S. pilots in a war game. Meanwhile, Pakistan`s air force has stagnated as a result of U.S. sanctions, about which the Pakistanis are still resentful The most notorious episode of the sanctions period was when the United States refused to allow the importation of 70 F-16s that Pakistan bought in the 1980s—after Islamabad had paid for them in advance. It took a decade just to get the money refunded. This lends the F-16 deal the look of a thank-you gift rather than a serious weapon in the ``war on terror.``
Joshua Kucera is a staff reporter in the Washington bureau of Jane`s Defence Weekly. He can be reached at Joshua_kucera@yahoo.com.
Bombs, Missiles and Pakistani Science
To Pakistan, With Thanks
The weapons we`re sending to Islamabad are targeted against India, not the Taliban.
By Joshua Kucera
Posted Monday, Oct. 4, 2004, at 4:52 AM PT
Pakistan`s nuclear-capable Shaheen II missile
KARACHI, Pakistan—The slogan for this year`s version of Pakistan`s biggest arms show, IDEAS 2004, is ``Arms for Peace.`` But despite all the heavy weapons on display, the host city, Karachi, seems markedly insecure. Exhibitors and attendees drive from the Sheraton to the expo center in armed convoys. Police with machine guns are stationed every 50 yards along the 30-minute drive. Snipers peek from the rooftops surrounding the expo center. Delegates are advised not to leave the hotel, which is where 11 French submarine engineers were killed two years ago on their way to work on subs that France and Pakistan are assembling here. Karachi is also where Daniel Pearl was kidnapped.
As delegations from a veritable Who`s Who of pariah states—North Korea, Myanmar, Iran, Zimbabwe, Sudan—make the rounds, a Pakistani company shows off its new cluster bombs (which, the company press release notes, ``can be used against soft targets``). A Bangladeshi delegation looks approvingly at a display of Pakistani tanks.
There`s a new policy in effect post-A.Q. Khan
Pakistan`s missiles, including the nuclear-capable Shaheen II, are displayed outside, behind a sign reading ``Technological Demonstration—Not for Sale.`` It seems to be an oblique reference to the most notorious past IDEAS exhibitor—A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan`s nuclear program and now the apparent mastermind of a global nuclear smuggling network. Four years ago, his company, Khan Research Laboratories, was at IDEAS handing out glossy brochures advertising specialized equipment for making a nuclear bomb.
But the big news at the show is the U.S. presence. This is the first time that American companies have exhibited at IDEAS, and they have turned out in force. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, United Defense, and several smaller companies are here. The United States imposed weapons sanctions in the 1990s after it found out about Pakistan`s secret nuclear bomb program. But then came Sept. 11 and the war in Afghanistan. Pakistan became our new best friend, and the sanctions were lifted. And although Pakistan`s military is still overwhelmingly oriented toward India—hardly a major front in the ``war on terror``—Washington has opened up its pocketbooks again. Over the next five years, Pakistan will get at least $1.5 billion in defense aid from the United States.
An announcement made at IDEAS 2004 suggests where some of that money is going to be spent: Pakistani officials revealed that the United States is ready to reverse its longtime opposition to selling new F-16 fighter jets to Islamabad. The chief of the Pakistan Air Force told me Washington wants to provide the F-16s, in part, to help Pakistan fight Islamist extremists in the tribal areas in the northwestern part of the country.
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has deftly played the United States since Sept. 11, and Washington has let him get away with it. Shortly before IDEAS 2004 opened, he announced that he will not step down as chief of the army, as he had promised. The United States barely let out a peep. The operations against the insurgents in the northwest are centered in Waziristan, not around Quetta or Peshawar, where intelligence officials and analysts believe most Taliban and al-Qaida operatives are based. One analyst told me the Pakistanis are attacking Waziristan because it`s an easy target, and because tribal forces humiliated Pakistani army troops there earlier this year, and now the military establishment wants revenge. Yet U.S. officials praise the operations as an important battle in the ``war on terror.``
Even if Pakistan were serious about fighting the Taliban, it could certainly find a better way to spend the hundreds of millions of dollars the F-16s will cost. But the Pakistanis gave a clue as to what they really want with the planes: They are requesting that the F-16s be armed with top-of-the-line air-to-air missiles that would be of little use against targets like the Islamists it`s fighting on the ground. Other equipment Pakistan is getting from the United States—navy surveillance planes, for example—is similarly useless against a guerrilla insurgency. They would, of course, be useful in a war against India.
The majority of questions Pakistani journalists asked in the show`s press conferences were centered around one theme: ``Can this help us beat India?`` The Indian air force is formidable—earlier this year they beat U.S. pilots in a war game. Meanwhile, Pakistan`s air force has stagnated as a result of U.S. sanctions, about which the Pakistanis are still resentful The most notorious episode of the sanctions period was when the United States refused to allow the importation of 70 F-16s that Pakistan bought in the 1980s—after Islamabad had paid for them in advance. It took a decade just to get the money refunded. This lends the F-16 deal the look of a thank-you gift rather than a serious weapon in the ``war on terror.``
Joshua Kucera is a staff reporter in the Washington bureau of Jane`s Defence Weekly. He can be reached at Joshua_kucera@yahoo.com.
Posted by
mumbaikar
Oct 5, 2004 06:39 am
http://www.slate.com/id/2107610/To Pakistan, With Thanks
The weapons we`re sending to Islamabad are targeted against India, not the Taliban.
By Joshua Kucera
Posted Monday, Oct. 4, 2004, at 4:52 AM PT
Pakistan`s nuclear-capable Shaheen II missile
KARACHI, Pakistan—The slogan for this year`s version of Pakistan`s biggest arms show, IDEAS 2004, is ``Arms for Peace.`` But despite all the heavy weapons on display, the host city, Karachi, seems markedly insecure. Exhibitors and attendees drive from the Sheraton to the expo center in armed convoys. Police with machine guns are stationed every 50 yards along the 30-minute drive. Snipers peek from the rooftops surrounding the expo center. Delegates are advised not to leave the hotel, which is where 11 French submarine engineers were killed two years ago on their way to work on subs that France and Pakistan are assembling here. Karachi is also where Daniel Pearl was kidnapped.
As delegations from a veritable Who`s Who of pariah states—North Korea, Myanmar, Iran, Zimbabwe, Sudan—make the rounds, a Pakistani company shows off its new cluster bombs (which, the company press release notes, ``can be used against soft targets``). A Bangladeshi delegation looks approvingly at a display of Pakistani tanks.
There`s a new policy in effect post-A.Q. Khan
Pakistan`s missiles, including the nuclear-capable Shaheen II, are displayed outside, behind a sign reading ``Technological Demonstration—Not for Sale.`` It seems to be an oblique reference to the most notorious past IDEAS exhibitor—A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan`s nuclear program and now the apparent mastermind of a global nuclear smuggling network. Four years ago, his company, Khan Research Laboratories, was at IDEAS handing out glossy brochures advertising specialized equipment for making a nuclear bomb.
But the big news at the show is the U.S. presence. This is the first time that American companies have exhibited at IDEAS, and they have turned out in force. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, United Defense, and several smaller companies are here. The United States imposed weapons sanctions in the 1990s after it found out about Pakistan`s secret nuclear bomb program. But then came Sept. 11 and the war in Afghanistan. Pakistan became our new best friend, and the sanctions were lifted. And although Pakistan`s military is still overwhelmingly oriented toward India—hardly a major front in the ``war on terror``—Washington has opened up its pocketbooks again. Over the next five years, Pakistan will get at least $1.5 billion in defense aid from the United States.
An announcement made at IDEAS 2004 suggests where some of that money is going to be spent: Pakistani officials revealed that the United States is ready to reverse its longtime opposition to selling new F-16 fighter jets to Islamabad. The chief of the Pakistan Air Force told me Washington wants to provide the F-16s, in part, to help Pakistan fight Islamist extremists in the tribal areas in the northwestern part of the country.
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has deftly played the United States since Sept. 11, and Washington has let him get away with it. Shortly before IDEAS 2004 opened, he announced that he will not step down as chief of the army, as he had promised. The United States barely let out a peep. The operations against the insurgents in the northwest are centered in Waziristan, not around Quetta or Peshawar, where intelligence officials and analysts believe most Taliban and al-Qaida operatives are based. One analyst told me the Pakistanis are attacking Waziristan because it`s an easy target, and because tribal forces humiliated Pakistani army troops there earlier this year, and now the military establishment wants revenge. Yet U.S. officials praise the operations as an important battle in the ``war on terror.``
Even if Pakistan were serious about fighting the Taliban, it could certainly find a better way to spend the hundreds of millions of dollars the F-16s will cost. But the Pakistanis gave a clue as to what they really want with the planes: They are requesting that the F-16s be armed with top-of-the-line air-to-air missiles that would be of little use against targets like the Islamists it`s fighting on the ground. Other equipment Pakistan is getting from the United States—navy surveillance planes, for example—is similarly useless against a guerrilla insurgency. They would, of course, be useful in a war against India.
The majority of questions Pakistani journalists asked in the show`s press conferences were centered around one theme: ``Can this help us beat India?`` The Indian air force is formidable—earlier this year they beat U.S. pilots in a war game. Meanwhile, Pakistan`s air force has stagnated as a result of U.S. sanctions, about which the Pakistanis are still resentful The most notorious episode of the sanctions period was when the United States refused to allow the importation of 70 F-16s that Pakistan bought in the 1980s—after Islamabad had paid for them in advance. It took a decade just to get the money refunded. This lends the F-16 deal the look of a thank-you gift rather than a serious weapon in the ``war on terror.``
Joshua Kucera is a staff reporter in the Washington bureau of Jane`s Defence Weekly. He can be reached at Joshua_kucera@yahoo.com.
What is Killing Pakistan?
By Khalid Hasan
WASHINGTON: Pakistan possesses the human material to become a modern state, but it has been squandered for three generations by an elite in the belief that the country’s critical strategic location will be enough to get it through difficult times. And now that the “distant future has arrived,” Pakistan is unprepared to face a fast-changing world, according to Stephen P Cohen, head of the South Asia programme at the Brookings Institution.
In his new book – The Idea of Pakistan – to be published in Pakistan in October by Vanguard Pakistan, the eminent South Asia scholar charts out six possible scenarios for Pakistan’s future; from the indefinite continuation of the present military-directed order to the rise of authoritarianism to the country’s breakup to the emergence of an Islamist state to a major war with India and its aftermath.
Dr Cohen considers it a reasonable possibility that in five years Pakistan will be “pretty much what it is today”. Pakistan’s present political and social order, dominated by an oligarchic establishment with the military at its core and a centre-right ideology strongly resistant to social or political change, could continue “indefinitely”.
Pakistan, he argues, has “rented” itself out to powerful states such as the US, China and Saudi Arabia. The establishment is prone to much wishful thinking that something or someone will come to the country’s rescue because of its location. “Pakistan now negotiates with its allies and friends by pointing a gun to its own head,” he observes.
Gen Musharraf, he believes, will resist radical change in foreign or domestic policy. He himself is “replaceable”, having little standing beyond his position as army chief. Pakistan, he points out, has again become strategically important, the army’s role seems unchallengeable, the establishment is content and the opposition is divided.
However, writes Dr Cohen, Pakistan is subject to tremendous demographic pressures and it is anyone’s guess if its domestic institutions will have the strength to cope with them. Without massive investment, Pakistan will fall further and further behind as a modern state when compared with its peers.
It is also an open question, he writes, if Pakistan will alter its fundamental opposition to India and ease its “obsession with Kashmir,” thus paving the way for economic growth.
If the present system persists, there might also be little change in relations with neighbours, notably India. “As for the Islamists … the establishment will continue to use Islamist forces and outright terrorists as instruments of diplomacy in dealing with its neighbours, and even at home to balance liberal forces and perhaps divide the conservatives,” according to one scenario.
Dr Cohen maintains that the “current system may continue if its leadership is able to do a few things reasonably well – such as repair the economy, contain the Islamist radicals, and maintain good relations with powerful states while avoiding a major confrontation with India. This is not impossible, nor even improbable, but it is also unlikely.”
About Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, Dr Cohen writes that his lack of political experience makes it difficult to assess whether he will have a significant impact.
According to the South Asian expert, the full restoration of democracy in Pakistan falls on the “side of the improbable rather than the unlikely”. An “astonishingly large” number of Pakistanis are committed to democracy and politicians who may not be able to make it work nevertheless like to try. The Pakistani elite is in nominal favour of democracy but is not comfortable with the idea of mass democratic politics. Civilian leaders will have to display a level of tact and competence that has not yet been evident. A democracy where the military takes its order from civilians is impossible until the army retreats from its role as guardian of the state. He says if Pakistan becomes an established democracy, religion is likely to play an ancillary or subordinate role as in Catholic Poland or Jewish Israel. Pakistan has to work out if it is a Muslim, an Islamic or a democratic state or some combination of all three.
The scenarios for Pakistan’s future include one Dr Cohen calls “authoritarian Pakistan”, according to which Pakistan does not have a social basis for totalitarianism because it is fragmented and underdeveloped, making state penetration difficult.
He calls Benazir Bhutto “perhaps the most promising political leader in Pakistan’s recent history but she could not measure up to her father in ruthlessness, charisma, and experience. She did compare with him in her capacity for self-deception. Her friends more than her enemies were disillusioned by her tendency to see herself as more than she was … She very much resembled Indira Gandhi, but lacked Indira’s intimate knowledge of her own country and had a much tougher set of enemies in the army.”
The army, he maintains, is an unlikely source for a “great” leader. Musharraf thinks he could be a Sadaat but he has turned out to be a Barak. He has also shown political ineptness, but with luck he could evolve into a Husni Mubarak. “If he resembles any past Pakistani leader, it is General Yayha Khan.”
Dr Cohen is of the view that Pakistan is in many ways a weaker state now than it was 10, 20 or 30 years ago. A fresh challenge to the army’s integrity could come from several directions. However, if the army became divided on fundamental issues, then “all bets are off on the future of Pakistan”. He considers war between India and Pakistan “an ever-present possibility”. A major war could cause a split in the army between hawks and doves along ethnic, sectarian or even ideological lines. Pakistan today is less able to handle the consequences of a major war than it was 10 or 20 years ago.
Dr Cohen concludes after playing with different scenarios, “Given the omnipresence of the military, Pakistan will remain a national security state, driven by security objectives to the neglect of development and accountability and unable to change direction because of a lack of imagination and legitimacy. The performance of Pervez Musharraf as both army chief and president over a four-year period has left much to be desired. It is hard to see how four more years of Musharraf’s leadership will dramatically change Pakistan’s future – but then it is hard to envision any other leader doing much better.”
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_30-9-2004_pg1_8
Posted by
mumbaikar
Sep 30, 2004 07:30 am
‘Pakistan unequipped to be modern state’By Khalid Hasan
WASHINGTON: Pakistan possesses the human material to become a modern state, but it has been squandered for three generations by an elite in the belief that the country’s critical strategic location will be enough to get it through difficult times. And now that the “distant future has arrived,” Pakistan is unprepared to face a fast-changing world, according to Stephen P Cohen, head of the South Asia programme at the Brookings Institution.
In his new book – The Idea of Pakistan – to be published in Pakistan in October by Vanguard Pakistan, the eminent South Asia scholar charts out six possible scenarios for Pakistan’s future; from the indefinite continuation of the present military-directed order to the rise of authoritarianism to the country’s breakup to the emergence of an Islamist state to a major war with India and its aftermath.
Dr Cohen considers it a reasonable possibility that in five years Pakistan will be “pretty much what it is today”. Pakistan’s present political and social order, dominated by an oligarchic establishment with the military at its core and a centre-right ideology strongly resistant to social or political change, could continue “indefinitely”.
Pakistan, he argues, has “rented” itself out to powerful states such as the US, China and Saudi Arabia. The establishment is prone to much wishful thinking that something or someone will come to the country’s rescue because of its location. “Pakistan now negotiates with its allies and friends by pointing a gun to its own head,” he observes.
Gen Musharraf, he believes, will resist radical change in foreign or domestic policy. He himself is “replaceable”, having little standing beyond his position as army chief. Pakistan, he points out, has again become strategically important, the army’s role seems unchallengeable, the establishment is content and the opposition is divided.
However, writes Dr Cohen, Pakistan is subject to tremendous demographic pressures and it is anyone’s guess if its domestic institutions will have the strength to cope with them. Without massive investment, Pakistan will fall further and further behind as a modern state when compared with its peers.
It is also an open question, he writes, if Pakistan will alter its fundamental opposition to India and ease its “obsession with Kashmir,” thus paving the way for economic growth.
If the present system persists, there might also be little change in relations with neighbours, notably India. “As for the Islamists … the establishment will continue to use Islamist forces and outright terrorists as instruments of diplomacy in dealing with its neighbours, and even at home to balance liberal forces and perhaps divide the conservatives,” according to one scenario.
Dr Cohen maintains that the “current system may continue if its leadership is able to do a few things reasonably well – such as repair the economy, contain the Islamist radicals, and maintain good relations with powerful states while avoiding a major confrontation with India. This is not impossible, nor even improbable, but it is also unlikely.”
About Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, Dr Cohen writes that his lack of political experience makes it difficult to assess whether he will have a significant impact.
According to the South Asian expert, the full restoration of democracy in Pakistan falls on the “side of the improbable rather than the unlikely”. An “astonishingly large” number of Pakistanis are committed to democracy and politicians who may not be able to make it work nevertheless like to try. The Pakistani elite is in nominal favour of democracy but is not comfortable with the idea of mass democratic politics. Civilian leaders will have to display a level of tact and competence that has not yet been evident. A democracy where the military takes its order from civilians is impossible until the army retreats from its role as guardian of the state. He says if Pakistan becomes an established democracy, religion is likely to play an ancillary or subordinate role as in Catholic Poland or Jewish Israel. Pakistan has to work out if it is a Muslim, an Islamic or a democratic state or some combination of all three.
The scenarios for Pakistan’s future include one Dr Cohen calls “authoritarian Pakistan”, according to which Pakistan does not have a social basis for totalitarianism because it is fragmented and underdeveloped, making state penetration difficult.
He calls Benazir Bhutto “perhaps the most promising political leader in Pakistan’s recent history but she could not measure up to her father in ruthlessness, charisma, and experience. She did compare with him in her capacity for self-deception. Her friends more than her enemies were disillusioned by her tendency to see herself as more than she was … She very much resembled Indira Gandhi, but lacked Indira’s intimate knowledge of her own country and had a much tougher set of enemies in the army.”
The army, he maintains, is an unlikely source for a “great” leader. Musharraf thinks he could be a Sadaat but he has turned out to be a Barak. He has also shown political ineptness, but with luck he could evolve into a Husni Mubarak. “If he resembles any past Pakistani leader, it is General Yayha Khan.”
Dr Cohen is of the view that Pakistan is in many ways a weaker state now than it was 10, 20 or 30 years ago. A fresh challenge to the army’s integrity could come from several directions. However, if the army became divided on fundamental issues, then “all bets are off on the future of Pakistan”. He considers war between India and Pakistan “an ever-present possibility”. A major war could cause a split in the army between hawks and doves along ethnic, sectarian or even ideological lines. Pakistan today is less able to handle the consequences of a major war than it was 10 or 20 years ago.
Dr Cohen concludes after playing with different scenarios, “Given the omnipresence of the military, Pakistan will remain a national security state, driven by security objectives to the neglect of development and accountability and unable to change direction because of a lack of imagination and legitimacy. The performance of Pervez Musharraf as both army chief and president over a four-year period has left much to be desired. It is hard to see how four more years of Musharraf’s leadership will dramatically change Pakistan’s future – but then it is hard to envision any other leader doing much better.”
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_30-9-2004_pg1_8
Musharraf and Bush—A Symbiotic Thing?
By Khalid Hasan
WASHINGTON: Pakistan possesses the human material to become a modern state, but it has been squandered for three generations by an elite in the belief that the country’s critical strategic location will be enough to get it through difficult times. And now that the “distant future has arrived,” Pakistan is unprepared to face a fast-changing world, according to Stephen P Cohen, head of the South Asia programme at the Brookings Institution.
In his new book – The Idea of Pakistan – to be published in Pakistan in October by Vanguard Pakistan, the eminent South Asia scholar charts out six possible scenarios for Pakistan’s future; from the indefinite continuation of the present military-directed order to the rise of authoritarianism to the country’s breakup to the emergence of an Islamist state to a major war with India and its aftermath.
Dr Cohen considers it a reasonable possibility that in five years Pakistan will be “pretty much what it is today”. Pakistan’s present political and social order, dominated by an oligarchic establishment with the military at its core and a centre-right ideology strongly resistant to social or political change, could continue “indefinitely”.
Pakistan, he argues, has “rented” itself out to powerful states such as the US, China and Saudi Arabia. The establishment is prone to much wishful thinking that something or someone will come to the country’s rescue because of its location. “Pakistan now negotiates with its allies and friends by pointing a gun to its own head,” he observes.
Gen Musharraf, he believes, will resist radical change in foreign or domestic policy. He himself is “replaceable”, having little standing beyond his position as army chief. Pakistan, he points out, has again become strategically important, the army’s role seems unchallengeable, the establishment is content and the opposition is divided.
However, writes Dr Cohen, Pakistan is subject to tremendous demographic pressures and it is anyone’s guess if its domestic institutions will have the strength to cope with them. Without massive investment, Pakistan will fall further and further behind as a modern state when compared with its peers.
It is also an open question, he writes, if Pakistan will alter its fundamental opposition to India and ease its “obsession with Kashmir,” thus paving the way for economic growth.
If the present system persists, there might also be little change in relations with neighbours, notably India. “As for the Islamists … the establishment will continue to use Islamist forces and outright terrorists as instruments of diplomacy in dealing with its neighbours, and even at home to balance liberal forces and perhaps divide the conservatives,” according to one scenario.
Dr Cohen maintains that the “current system may continue if its leadership is able to do a few things reasonably well – such as repair the economy, contain the Islamist radicals, and maintain good relations with powerful states while avoiding a major confrontation with India. This is not impossible, nor even improbable, but it is also unlikely.”
About Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, Dr Cohen writes that his lack of political experience makes it difficult to assess whether he will have a significant impact.
According to the South Asian expert, the full restoration of democracy in Pakistan falls on the “side of the improbable rather than the unlikely”. An “astonishingly large” number of Pakistanis are committed to democracy and politicians who may not be able to make it work nevertheless like to try. The Pakistani elite is in nominal favour of democracy but is not comfortable with the idea of mass democratic politics. Civilian leaders will have to display a level of tact and competence that has not yet been evident. A democracy where the military takes its order from civilians is impossible until the army retreats from its role as guardian of the state. He says if Pakistan becomes an established democracy, religion is likely to play an ancillary or subordinate role as in Catholic Poland or Jewish Israel. Pakistan has to work out if it is a Muslim, an Islamic or a democratic state or some combination of all three.
The scenarios for Pakistan’s future include one Dr Cohen calls “authoritarian Pakistan”, according to which Pakistan does not have a social basis for totalitarianism because it is fragmented and underdeveloped, making state penetration difficult.
He calls Benazir Bhutto “perhaps the most promising political leader in Pakistan’s recent history but she could not measure up to her father in ruthlessness, charisma, and experience. She did compare with him in her capacity for self-deception. Her friends more than her enemies were disillusioned by her tendency to see herself as more than she was … She very much resembled Indira Gandhi, but lacked Indira’s intimate knowledge of her own country and had a much tougher set of enemies in the army.”
The army, he maintains, is an unlikely source for a “great” leader. Musharraf thinks he could be a Sadaat but he has turned out to be a Barak. He has also shown political ineptness, but with luck he could evolve into a Husni Mubarak. “If he resembles any past Pakistani leader, it is General Yayha Khan.”
Dr Cohen is of the view that Pakistan is in many ways a weaker state now than it was 10, 20 or 30 years ago. A fresh challenge to the army’s integrity could come from several directions. However, if the army became divided on fundamental issues, then “all bets are off on the future of Pakistan”. He considers war between India and Pakistan “an ever-present possibility”. A major war could cause a split in the army between hawks and doves along ethnic, sectarian or even ideological lines. Pakistan today is less able to handle the consequences of a major war than it was 10 or 20 years ago.
Dr Cohen concludes after playing with different scenarios, “Given the omnipresence of the military, Pakistan will remain a national security state, driven by security objectives to the neglect of development and accountability and unable to change direction because of a lack of imagination and legitimacy. The performance of Pervez Musharraf as both army chief and president over a four-year period has left much to be desired. It is hard to see how four more years of Musharraf’s leadership will dramatically change Pakistan’s future – but then it is hard to envision any other leader doing much better.”
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_30-9-2004_pg1_8
Posted by
mumbaikar
Sep 30, 2004 07:30 am
‘Pakistan unequipped to be modern state’ By Khalid Hasan
WASHINGTON: Pakistan possesses the human material to become a modern state, but it has been squandered for three generations by an elite in the belief that the country’s critical strategic location will be enough to get it through difficult times. And now that the “distant future has arrived,” Pakistan is unprepared to face a fast-changing world, according to Stephen P Cohen, head of the South Asia programme at the Brookings Institution.
In his new book – The Idea of Pakistan – to be published in Pakistan in October by Vanguard Pakistan, the eminent South Asia scholar charts out six possible scenarios for Pakistan’s future; from the indefinite continuation of the present military-directed order to the rise of authoritarianism to the country’s breakup to the emergence of an Islamist state to a major war with India and its aftermath.
Dr Cohen considers it a reasonable possibility that in five years Pakistan will be “pretty much what it is today”. Pakistan’s present political and social order, dominated by an oligarchic establishment with the military at its core and a centre-right ideology strongly resistant to social or political change, could continue “indefinitely”.
Pakistan, he argues, has “rented” itself out to powerful states such as the US, China and Saudi Arabia. The establishment is prone to much wishful thinking that something or someone will come to the country’s rescue because of its location. “Pakistan now negotiates with its allies and friends by pointing a gun to its own head,” he observes.
Gen Musharraf, he believes, will resist radical change in foreign or domestic policy. He himself is “replaceable”, having little standing beyond his position as army chief. Pakistan, he points out, has again become strategically important, the army’s role seems unchallengeable, the establishment is content and the opposition is divided.
However, writes Dr Cohen, Pakistan is subject to tremendous demographic pressures and it is anyone’s guess if its domestic institutions will have the strength to cope with them. Without massive investment, Pakistan will fall further and further behind as a modern state when compared with its peers.
It is also an open question, he writes, if Pakistan will alter its fundamental opposition to India and ease its “obsession with Kashmir,” thus paving the way for economic growth.
If the present system persists, there might also be little change in relations with neighbours, notably India. “As for the Islamists … the establishment will continue to use Islamist forces and outright terrorists as instruments of diplomacy in dealing with its neighbours, and even at home to balance liberal forces and perhaps divide the conservatives,” according to one scenario.
Dr Cohen maintains that the “current system may continue if its leadership is able to do a few things reasonably well – such as repair the economy, contain the Islamist radicals, and maintain good relations with powerful states while avoiding a major confrontation with India. This is not impossible, nor even improbable, but it is also unlikely.”
About Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, Dr Cohen writes that his lack of political experience makes it difficult to assess whether he will have a significant impact.
According to the South Asian expert, the full restoration of democracy in Pakistan falls on the “side of the improbable rather than the unlikely”. An “astonishingly large” number of Pakistanis are committed to democracy and politicians who may not be able to make it work nevertheless like to try. The Pakistani elite is in nominal favour of democracy but is not comfortable with the idea of mass democratic politics. Civilian leaders will have to display a level of tact and competence that has not yet been evident. A democracy where the military takes its order from civilians is impossible until the army retreats from its role as guardian of the state. He says if Pakistan becomes an established democracy, religion is likely to play an ancillary or subordinate role as in Catholic Poland or Jewish Israel. Pakistan has to work out if it is a Muslim, an Islamic or a democratic state or some combination of all three.
The scenarios for Pakistan’s future include one Dr Cohen calls “authoritarian Pakistan”, according to which Pakistan does not have a social basis for totalitarianism because it is fragmented and underdeveloped, making state penetration difficult.
He calls Benazir Bhutto “perhaps the most promising political leader in Pakistan’s recent history but she could not measure up to her father in ruthlessness, charisma, and experience. She did compare with him in her capacity for self-deception. Her friends more than her enemies were disillusioned by her tendency to see herself as more than she was … She very much resembled Indira Gandhi, but lacked Indira’s intimate knowledge of her own country and had a much tougher set of enemies in the army.”
The army, he maintains, is an unlikely source for a “great” leader. Musharraf thinks he could be a Sadaat but he has turned out to be a Barak. He has also shown political ineptness, but with luck he could evolve into a Husni Mubarak. “If he resembles any past Pakistani leader, it is General Yayha Khan.”
Dr Cohen is of the view that Pakistan is in many ways a weaker state now than it was 10, 20 or 30 years ago. A fresh challenge to the army’s integrity could come from several directions. However, if the army became divided on fundamental issues, then “all bets are off on the future of Pakistan”. He considers war between India and Pakistan “an ever-present possibility”. A major war could cause a split in the army between hawks and doves along ethnic, sectarian or even ideological lines. Pakistan today is less able to handle the consequences of a major war than it was 10 or 20 years ago.
Dr Cohen concludes after playing with different scenarios, “Given the omnipresence of the military, Pakistan will remain a national security state, driven by security objectives to the neglect of development and accountability and unable to change direction because of a lack of imagination and legitimacy. The performance of Pervez Musharraf as both army chief and president over a four-year period has left much to be desired. It is hard to see how four more years of Musharraf’s leadership will dramatically change Pakistan’s future – but then it is hard to envision any other leader doing much better.”
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_30-9-2004_pg1_8
Musharraf: Excerpts from an Interview in NYT
Manmohan Singh on Charlie Rose
Posted by
mumbaikar
Sep 23, 2004 07:40 am
http://boards.charlierose.com/board/topic.asp?ti=8621Manmohan Singh on Charlie Rose
Musharraf: Excerpts from an Interview in NYT
http://www.charlierose.com/
Posted by
mumbaikar
Sep 21, 2004 02:52 pm
Indian Prime Minister is on PBS show Charlie Rose tonight Tuesday September 21, 2004.http://www.charlierose.com/
The Rational Warrior
Pakistan has also objected to calling Sudan genocide in Darfur as GENOCIDE even though thousands of Black Muslims have been killed by Arab Muslims. Pakistan does not want to impose sanction over Sudan.
Posted by
mumbaikar
Sep 13, 2004 08:41 am
`There is no genocide in Sudan`Pakistan has also objected to calling Sudan genocide in Darfur as GENOCIDE even though thousands of Black Muslims have been killed by Arab Muslims. Pakistan does not want to impose sanction over Sudan.
The Rational Warrior
Jamal Hasan
http://www.chowk.com/show_article.cgi?aid=00000538&channel=civic%20center&start=0&end=9&page=1&chapter=1
The above article works but not below ....... Moderators, restore the below article
Bangladesh Memories
Ras Siddiqui
http://www.chowk.com/show_article.cgi?aid=00000445&channel=gulberg&start=0&end=9&page=1&chapter=1
Posted by
mumbaikar
Sep 11, 2004 03:18 pm
Balkan Tragedy: A Re-enactment of the 1971 Genocide in BangladeshJamal Hasan
http://www.chowk.com/show_article.cgi?aid=00000538&channel=civic%20center&start=0&end=9&page=1&chapter=1
The above article works but not below ....... Moderators, restore the below article
Bangladesh Memories
Ras Siddiqui
http://www.chowk.com/show_article.cgi?aid=00000445&channel=gulberg&start=0&end=9&page=1&chapter=1
When Balochistan bleeds, Why Pakistan Doesn’t Feel the Pain?
By Ayaz Amir
As another independence day is about to be commemorated with fake sentiment and false speeches - we having fine-honed the talent of turning national holidays into the most boring events imaginable - the toughest question our history throws up can no longer be shirked: if Pakistan was to be a country dedicated to permanent dictatorship, what was the point of it all?
Did we go through the blood-drenching and mass migration accompanying partition - more than a million people killed and about 8-10 million people uprooted from their homes - so that Pakistan should be a country dedicated to the permanent usurpation of power?
Was Pakistani independence meant to be a synonym for authoritarianism?
Harsh questions? Not if you consider the mess our history has been or, more to the point, if you consider our apparently unshakeable determination to keep making a mess of it.
Pakistan was created for the people of Pakistan. This at least is the orthodox line turned into cruel myth by the steady march of authority figures on the Pakistani stage, our consistent specialty, the extra-constitutional take over. It bears branding into our collective consciousness that not a single peaceful transition of power marks the 57 tempestuous years of our history.
Yet, and savour the paradox, the bonds of nationhood (the sense of belonging to a nation) remain strong. Not because of Pakistan`s rulers who constitute a dismal club but because of the Pakistani people, most of whom, although not all, have nowhere else to go, no place else to call home.
If the flame of patriotism still burns in Pakistani breasts, and it does, it is a tribute not to blinkered and often downright stupid leadership but to the resilience and fortitude of the Pakistani people.
So, is there still something that we can call the Pakistani dream? There is but in the minds of the poor and the defenceless, not in the passions or pocketbooks of the rich and well-placed who long ago made a virtue of swimming with the tide and, in the process, exchanging the power of hope and striving for the armour of an all-weather cynicism.
But to recap the usual factors held responsible for the founding of Pakistan, Islam was not in danger in pre-1947 India. Indeed, considering the sectarian violence and religious bigotry we face today, it was in better health then.
Nor was democracy the issue because even if partition had not happened, India was getting democracy once the British left. The Indian Independence Act promised that.
So what was the compelling reason for the Muslims to insist on a separate homeland especially when there was no going around the uncomfortable fact that, no matter how generously the frontiers of the new state were drawn, an uncomfortably large number of Muslims would remain in India?
The purpose of Pakistan, transcending anything to do with safeguarding Islam or promoting democracy, was to create conditions for the Muslims of India, or those who found themselves in the new state, to recreate the days of their lost glory.
For eight centuries Muslim warriors - lured by tales of India`s wealth and, I daresay, the beauty of its women, and crossing the same Hindukush passes through which, centuries before, Aryan hordes had marched - invaded, conquered and ruled India, putting the impress of their culture and thought upon the land they colonized and receiving something from that land in return.
In the process, both invader and invaded were transformed. After eight centuries of intermingling and assimilation the Muslim in India, however hard he clung to his historical memories, was no longer a Turk, a Persian or an Arab but something else: an Indian Muslim. The land was transformed too, post-Muslim India not being the same as pre-Muslim India.
With the coming of the British, however, another transformation was also underway. Muslims lost their pre-eminent status, a process beginning with the disintegration of the Mughal Empire but carried much further as the British consolidated their hold on India.
Knocked off their pedestal, Muslims were now amongst the subjugated. But another discovery awaited them too. Outnumbered by the Hindu population, even amongst the subjugated they were not of the first rank.
Their overall position in India was thus relegated to number three, after the British and the Hindus, this being a measure of the shift in the historical calculus.
From mid-19th Century onwards, beginning with the first stirrings of a modern Muslim consciousness as expressed by the Aligarh school, Muslims may have agitated for jobs and special safeguards, such as separate electorates, but informing and indeed fuelling their quest was a vision of the past when they were great and the whole of India, not just a part, was their happy hunting ground.
At odds with the reality of Muslim impotence, this vision, this harking back to the past, reduced the Indian Muslim leadership to fighting a rearguard action: seeking to play the new game, of which the British were now the umpires, not across the entire field, because they felt it not in their power to do so, but asking that a patch be reserved for them so that in that reserved patch they should be able to ride unchallenged.
In a crucial sense, then, the Pakistan movement signalled a retreat from the heartland of empire to its outer edges, the final evacuation from Delhi and Agra to new centres of power in Punjab and Bengal.
But even then it was for the new state, Pakistan, to create a historical justification for itself by emulating and rivalling, in achievement and glory, even if on a reduced scale, the success of its historical model, the Mughal Empire (in a 20th Century setting, it goes without saying).
In other words, breaking away from India, for that`s what partition did, the justification for Pakistan lay not in merely existing but in showing the spark, vitality and vigour of a new organism, like America to the old world, Israel to its decadent surroundings, the breakaway part, in short, proving better in all that qualifies for civilized achievement than the erstwhile whole.
Against this scale of measurement how on earth do you place the kind of farce regularly staged in Pakistan: mediocre figures (no successors to Babar or Akbar, excuse me), meddling in politics when it is not their business to do so, adept neither at peace nor war, not understanding their own business or that of others, a succession of hopeless figures conspiring to make a mockery of a not-so-bad country? Mughal Empire indeed. Islamabad seems more like a replay of the last days of the Oudh dynasty.
The principal strengths of Muslim rule in the subcontinent were war, the consolidation of conquest, politics and administration. In all these fields Pakistan has not distinguished itself. Wars that should never have been fought started and then lost. About politics the less said the better.
It`s not as if Pakistan lacked promise or potential. It did not. But it has been betrayed by its stars and a succession of cardboard figures who would have received short shrift at Akbar`s court.
Is it all hopeless? Of course not. It`s not too late to turn the ship around. But we`ll have to go back to the drawing boards and, instead of taking Pakistan for granted which we often do, try to understand why this country was created.
For rule by a few? To be lorded over by an oligarchy at once inept and corrupt, heedless of history and out of sync with the times? Come off it. Pakistan was meant for better things which it can still reach provided we stop making a mess of our politics.
http://www.dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/ayaz.htm
Posted by
mumbaikar
Aug 16, 2004 11:36 am
What, then, was partition all about? By Ayaz Amir
As another independence day is about to be commemorated with fake sentiment and false speeches - we having fine-honed the talent of turning national holidays into the most boring events imaginable - the toughest question our history throws up can no longer be shirked: if Pakistan was to be a country dedicated to permanent dictatorship, what was the point of it all?
Did we go through the blood-drenching and mass migration accompanying partition - more than a million people killed and about 8-10 million people uprooted from their homes - so that Pakistan should be a country dedicated to the permanent usurpation of power?
Was Pakistani independence meant to be a synonym for authoritarianism?
Harsh questions? Not if you consider the mess our history has been or, more to the point, if you consider our apparently unshakeable determination to keep making a mess of it.
Pakistan was created for the people of Pakistan. This at least is the orthodox line turned into cruel myth by the steady march of authority figures on the Pakistani stage, our consistent specialty, the extra-constitutional take over. It bears branding into our collective consciousness that not a single peaceful transition of power marks the 57 tempestuous years of our history.
Yet, and savour the paradox, the bonds of nationhood (the sense of belonging to a nation) remain strong. Not because of Pakistan`s rulers who constitute a dismal club but because of the Pakistani people, most of whom, although not all, have nowhere else to go, no place else to call home.
If the flame of patriotism still burns in Pakistani breasts, and it does, it is a tribute not to blinkered and often downright stupid leadership but to the resilience and fortitude of the Pakistani people.
So, is there still something that we can call the Pakistani dream? There is but in the minds of the poor and the defenceless, not in the passions or pocketbooks of the rich and well-placed who long ago made a virtue of swimming with the tide and, in the process, exchanging the power of hope and striving for the armour of an all-weather cynicism.
But to recap the usual factors held responsible for the founding of Pakistan, Islam was not in danger in pre-1947 India. Indeed, considering the sectarian violence and religious bigotry we face today, it was in better health then.
Nor was democracy the issue because even if partition had not happened, India was getting democracy once the British left. The Indian Independence Act promised that.
So what was the compelling reason for the Muslims to insist on a separate homeland especially when there was no going around the uncomfortable fact that, no matter how generously the frontiers of the new state were drawn, an uncomfortably large number of Muslims would remain in India?
The purpose of Pakistan, transcending anything to do with safeguarding Islam or promoting democracy, was to create conditions for the Muslims of India, or those who found themselves in the new state, to recreate the days of their lost glory.
For eight centuries Muslim warriors - lured by tales of India`s wealth and, I daresay, the beauty of its women, and crossing the same Hindukush passes through which, centuries before, Aryan hordes had marched - invaded, conquered and ruled India, putting the impress of their culture and thought upon the land they colonized and receiving something from that land in return.
In the process, both invader and invaded were transformed. After eight centuries of intermingling and assimilation the Muslim in India, however hard he clung to his historical memories, was no longer a Turk, a Persian or an Arab but something else: an Indian Muslim. The land was transformed too, post-Muslim India not being the same as pre-Muslim India.
With the coming of the British, however, another transformation was also underway. Muslims lost their pre-eminent status, a process beginning with the disintegration of the Mughal Empire but carried much further as the British consolidated their hold on India.
Knocked off their pedestal, Muslims were now amongst the subjugated. But another discovery awaited them too. Outnumbered by the Hindu population, even amongst the subjugated they were not of the first rank.
Their overall position in India was thus relegated to number three, after the British and the Hindus, this being a measure of the shift in the historical calculus.
From mid-19th Century onwards, beginning with the first stirrings of a modern Muslim consciousness as expressed by the Aligarh school, Muslims may have agitated for jobs and special safeguards, such as separate electorates, but informing and indeed fuelling their quest was a vision of the past when they were great and the whole of India, not just a part, was their happy hunting ground.
At odds with the reality of Muslim impotence, this vision, this harking back to the past, reduced the Indian Muslim leadership to fighting a rearguard action: seeking to play the new game, of which the British were now the umpires, not across the entire field, because they felt it not in their power to do so, but asking that a patch be reserved for them so that in that reserved patch they should be able to ride unchallenged.
In a crucial sense, then, the Pakistan movement signalled a retreat from the heartland of empire to its outer edges, the final evacuation from Delhi and Agra to new centres of power in Punjab and Bengal.
But even then it was for the new state, Pakistan, to create a historical justification for itself by emulating and rivalling, in achievement and glory, even if on a reduced scale, the success of its historical model, the Mughal Empire (in a 20th Century setting, it goes without saying).
In other words, breaking away from India, for that`s what partition did, the justification for Pakistan lay not in merely existing but in showing the spark, vitality and vigour of a new organism, like America to the old world, Israel to its decadent surroundings, the breakaway part, in short, proving better in all that qualifies for civilized achievement than the erstwhile whole.
Against this scale of measurement how on earth do you place the kind of farce regularly staged in Pakistan: mediocre figures (no successors to Babar or Akbar, excuse me), meddling in politics when it is not their business to do so, adept neither at peace nor war, not understanding their own business or that of others, a succession of hopeless figures conspiring to make a mockery of a not-so-bad country? Mughal Empire indeed. Islamabad seems more like a replay of the last days of the Oudh dynasty.
The principal strengths of Muslim rule in the subcontinent were war, the consolidation of conquest, politics and administration. In all these fields Pakistan has not distinguished itself. Wars that should never have been fought started and then lost. About politics the less said the better.
It`s not as if Pakistan lacked promise or potential. It did not. But it has been betrayed by its stars and a succession of cardboard figures who would have received short shrift at Akbar`s court.
Is it all hopeless? Of course not. It`s not too late to turn the ship around. But we`ll have to go back to the drawing boards and, instead of taking Pakistan for granted which we often do, try to understand why this country was created.
For rule by a few? To be lorded over by an oligarchy at once inept and corrupt, heedless of history and out of sync with the times? Come off it. Pakistan was meant for better things which it can still reach provided we stop making a mess of our politics.
http://www.dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/ayaz.htm
My Friend, My Enemy
Rabindranath Tagore
Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high
Where knowledge is free
Where the world has not been broken up into fragments
By narrow domestic walls
Where words come out from the depth of truth
Where tireless striving stretches its arms towards perfection
Where the clear stream of reason has not lost its way
Into the dreary desert sand of dead habit
Where the mind is led forward by thee
Into ever-widening thought and action
Into that heaven of freedom, my Father, let my country awake
Posted by
mumbaikar
Aug 15, 2004 08:27 am
Where The Mind is Without FearRabindranath Tagore
Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high
Where knowledge is free
Where the world has not been broken up into fragments
By narrow domestic walls
Where words come out from the depth of truth
Where tireless striving stretches its arms towards perfection
Where the clear stream of reason has not lost its way
Into the dreary desert sand of dead habit
Where the mind is led forward by thee
Into ever-widening thought and action
Into that heaven of freedom, my Father, let my country awake
When Balochistan bleeds, Why Pakistan Doesn’t Feel the Pain?
What If India Hadn`t Been Partitioned?
http://www.outlookindia.com/full.as...l+Ainslie&sid=1
It is a very big `What if?` and all I can do is to list how the ideals of the leaders might have been worked out, with advantage to all the people of South Asia...
AINSLIE T. EMBREE
``I wonder whether you realise,`` Lord Wavell, the governor-general, asked the Indian people in a radio address on May 17, 1946, ``that this is the greatest and most momentous experiment in government in the whole history of the world—a new Constitution to control the destiny of 400 million people.`` The decision being made, for or against the Partition of India, would, in 58 years, control the lives of the billion and a quarter people of South Asia and for the foreseeable future. Could another decision have been made and would it have been better for that immense population? ‘Could’ means there was nothing inevitable in the decision made in the summer of 1946.
For those of us who believe that history is ``the play of the contingent and unforeseen``, that no events are inevitable until they happen, and that there are many plausible possibilities in every decision, ``What if India hadn’t been partitioned?``
becomes the most intriguing of questions.
In the spring of 1946, the Labour government sent out to India the Cabinet Mission, consisting of Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the secretary of state for India; A.V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty; Sir Stafford Cripps, president of the Board of Trade, to see how power could be transferred to an independent India. The mission’s tasks were to convince Indian leaders that the British really intended to leave, to help the viceroy negotiate on the establishing of a constitution-making body or Constituent Assembly and to set up an interim executive council to which power could be transferred.
Prime Minister Attlee’s belief, based, he said, on his experience when he was on the Simon Commission, was that there was a strong spirit of nationalism in India that would override Muslim-Hindu differences, of which too much had been made in both England and India.
The Congress vision of independent India, as enunciated with passionate vigour by Nehru and others, was of a united India encompassing the British Indian empire, with a strong central government and relatively weak provinces. Adherence to Hinduism or Islam was not to be the basis of citizenship but adherence to a united India, although the Cabinet Mission’s own documents, it may be noted, are full of references to Hindus and Muslims, implying that these religious categories defined primary identities and loyalties.
The Muslim League’s vision, much less clearly defined by Jinnah, was for the provinces with a Muslim majority to be central to a homeland for Muslims, with a weak central union government or, not always unambiguously stated, a sovereign state of Pakistan. In other words, at this stage Pakistan was not a non-negotiable demand. Reading the documents, one is struck at how seldom it was recognised that the two parties—the Congress and the Muslim League—had rival political agendas, based on a struggle for political power, not on Hinduism and Islam.
The Cabinet Mission did not bring a proposal for the structure of the devolution of authority, but after weeks of inconclusive, frustrating discussions with the leaders of the Congress, the League, and many other Indians, they offered two proposals on May 8, Scheme A and Scheme B. Scheme A was the one the mission and the British cabinet preferred.
Scheme A envisaged a unitary India, consisting of British India as a loose federation, with a central legislature charged primarily with defence, foreign affairs, fundamental rights, communication, and the right of taxation for funding these purposes. Remaining powers would be vested in the provinces. The Union Legislature would be composed in equal proportions from the Muslim-majority and Hindu-majority provinces and the Indian states.
The provinces could form themselves into groups, the Hindu-majority ones into one group, and the Muslim-majority into another, which would have the right to set up executives and legislatures.
(How this Hindu-Muslim emphasis must have grated on secularists!) There would be a constitutional provision for the provinces at 10-year intervals to reconsider these terms. This, then, was the three-tier system that was to replace the central government and British India provinces.
The Indian states posed a special problem, since paramountcy could neither be retained by Britain nor transferred to the new government, but the mission reported that representatives of the states had assured it of their cooperation.
Scheme B described a divided India, with the sovereign state of Pakistan comprising the majority Muslim districts of Baluchistan, Sind, NWFP, Western Punjab and Eastern Bengal without Calcutta but with Sylhet district. Impressed by the acute anxiety of Muslims lest they be subjected to a perpetual Hindu-majority rule, they examined with special care the implications of forming a fully sovereign state of Pakistan but concluded they could not advise the British government to transfer its power to two sovereign states. Instead, they recommended the transfer of British power in India to a Union of India, embracing both British India and the Indian states, as described in Scheme A.
The implications of the responses of the Congress and the League to this recommendation have been much debated by scholars. There seems a reasonable consensus that Jinnah and the League gave their assent, but with the insistence that this did not preclude the creation of an independent Pakistan. For Nehru and other Congress leaders, the Cabinet Mission recommendation, with its weak centre and with the right of provinces to opt out of the Union, was an invitation to disunity and destabilisation. It seemed to foreclose the hope of an independent India finding its rightful place in the world, of righting age-old wrongs through programmes of social justice for the poor and oppressed, of creating a secular, democratic nation—in short, the definition of India later enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India as a united, sovereign, democratic, secular, socialist republic.
I would like to suggest that while many of those great ideals have been fulfilled for the Indian people in the India that came into being on August 15, 1947, they might have been more fully realised, not just for India but for all the people of South Asia, had the Cabinet Mission’s three-tier constitutional idea been adopted. It is a very big ‘What if?’ and all I can do is to list how the ideals of the leaders might have been worked out, with advantage to all the people of South Asia.
* The subcontinent would have escaped the wrenching experience of Partition with its attendant suffering and continued bitterness.
* The foreign policy of India would not have been dominated by relations with Pakistan, with all the attendant distortions. Nor would it have been distorted by the differing foreign policies of India and Pakistan during the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union might both have been friendly—or indifferent—to the new India. A united federation would not have been involved, as Pakistan became involved, with the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan nor would it have become so enmeshed in the American war on terrorism as Pakistan has been.
* The suffering caused by the secession of Bangladesh could have been avoided.
* The dispute over Kashmir would not have occurred, with all the attendant terrorism that has distorted life in India.
* A three-tiered India would have had at least the same industrialisation that has occurred and the areas that are now Pakistan and Bangladesh would have profited from it. It would have been a vast ``free trade zone`` with no equal in the world.
* It would have been a democratic republic, without military dictators. There would seem to be no reason why Muslim voters could not have exercised their franchise, just as they do in present-day India.
* This vast new India would have been a secular state, fulfilling the dream so often enunciated by Indian leaders both before and after 1947. Nehru’s commitment to secularism can scarcely be doubted. To that must be added a reminder of Jinnah’s speech on August 11, 1947: ``You can belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State. We are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.`` Would not he and Nehru—and a host of others—have said that for the Three-Tier India?
History cannot be reversed, but the realisation that there was nothing inherently improbable in a very different scenario in 1946 surely helps in looking at South Asia in a different way in 2004.
Indologist Ainslie T. Embree is professor emeritus, history, Columbia University.
Posted by
mumbaikar
Aug 14, 2004 12:38 pm
Happy Independence Day .....What If India Hadn`t Been Partitioned?
http://www.outlookindia.com/full.as...l+Ainslie&sid=1
It is a very big `What if?` and all I can do is to list how the ideals of the leaders might have been worked out, with advantage to all the people of South Asia...
AINSLIE T. EMBREE
``I wonder whether you realise,`` Lord Wavell, the governor-general, asked the Indian people in a radio address on May 17, 1946, ``that this is the greatest and most momentous experiment in government in the whole history of the world—a new Constitution to control the destiny of 400 million people.`` The decision being made, for or against the Partition of India, would, in 58 years, control the lives of the billion and a quarter people of South Asia and for the foreseeable future. Could another decision have been made and would it have been better for that immense population? ‘Could’ means there was nothing inevitable in the decision made in the summer of 1946.
For those of us who believe that history is ``the play of the contingent and unforeseen``, that no events are inevitable until they happen, and that there are many plausible possibilities in every decision, ``What if India hadn’t been partitioned?``
becomes the most intriguing of questions.
In the spring of 1946, the Labour government sent out to India the Cabinet Mission, consisting of Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the secretary of state for India; A.V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty; Sir Stafford Cripps, president of the Board of Trade, to see how power could be transferred to an independent India. The mission’s tasks were to convince Indian leaders that the British really intended to leave, to help the viceroy negotiate on the establishing of a constitution-making body or Constituent Assembly and to set up an interim executive council to which power could be transferred.
Prime Minister Attlee’s belief, based, he said, on his experience when he was on the Simon Commission, was that there was a strong spirit of nationalism in India that would override Muslim-Hindu differences, of which too much had been made in both England and India.
The Congress vision of independent India, as enunciated with passionate vigour by Nehru and others, was of a united India encompassing the British Indian empire, with a strong central government and relatively weak provinces. Adherence to Hinduism or Islam was not to be the basis of citizenship but adherence to a united India, although the Cabinet Mission’s own documents, it may be noted, are full of references to Hindus and Muslims, implying that these religious categories defined primary identities and loyalties.
The Muslim League’s vision, much less clearly defined by Jinnah, was for the provinces with a Muslim majority to be central to a homeland for Muslims, with a weak central union government or, not always unambiguously stated, a sovereign state of Pakistan. In other words, at this stage Pakistan was not a non-negotiable demand. Reading the documents, one is struck at how seldom it was recognised that the two parties—the Congress and the Muslim League—had rival political agendas, based on a struggle for political power, not on Hinduism and Islam.
The Cabinet Mission did not bring a proposal for the structure of the devolution of authority, but after weeks of inconclusive, frustrating discussions with the leaders of the Congress, the League, and many other Indians, they offered two proposals on May 8, Scheme A and Scheme B. Scheme A was the one the mission and the British cabinet preferred.
Scheme A envisaged a unitary India, consisting of British India as a loose federation, with a central legislature charged primarily with defence, foreign affairs, fundamental rights, communication, and the right of taxation for funding these purposes. Remaining powers would be vested in the provinces. The Union Legislature would be composed in equal proportions from the Muslim-majority and Hindu-majority provinces and the Indian states.
The provinces could form themselves into groups, the Hindu-majority ones into one group, and the Muslim-majority into another, which would have the right to set up executives and legislatures.
(How this Hindu-Muslim emphasis must have grated on secularists!) There would be a constitutional provision for the provinces at 10-year intervals to reconsider these terms. This, then, was the three-tier system that was to replace the central government and British India provinces.
The Indian states posed a special problem, since paramountcy could neither be retained by Britain nor transferred to the new government, but the mission reported that representatives of the states had assured it of their cooperation.
Scheme B described a divided India, with the sovereign state of Pakistan comprising the majority Muslim districts of Baluchistan, Sind, NWFP, Western Punjab and Eastern Bengal without Calcutta but with Sylhet district. Impressed by the acute anxiety of Muslims lest they be subjected to a perpetual Hindu-majority rule, they examined with special care the implications of forming a fully sovereign state of Pakistan but concluded they could not advise the British government to transfer its power to two sovereign states. Instead, they recommended the transfer of British power in India to a Union of India, embracing both British India and the Indian states, as described in Scheme A.
The implications of the responses of the Congress and the League to this recommendation have been much debated by scholars. There seems a reasonable consensus that Jinnah and the League gave their assent, but with the insistence that this did not preclude the creation of an independent Pakistan. For Nehru and other Congress leaders, the Cabinet Mission recommendation, with its weak centre and with the right of provinces to opt out of the Union, was an invitation to disunity and destabilisation. It seemed to foreclose the hope of an independent India finding its rightful place in the world, of righting age-old wrongs through programmes of social justice for the poor and oppressed, of creating a secular, democratic nation—in short, the definition of India later enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India as a united, sovereign, democratic, secular, socialist republic.
I would like to suggest that while many of those great ideals have been fulfilled for the Indian people in the India that came into being on August 15, 1947, they might have been more fully realised, not just for India but for all the people of South Asia, had the Cabinet Mission’s three-tier constitutional idea been adopted. It is a very big ‘What if?’ and all I can do is to list how the ideals of the leaders might have been worked out, with advantage to all the people of South Asia.
* The subcontinent would have escaped the wrenching experience of Partition with its attendant suffering and continued bitterness.
* The foreign policy of India would not have been dominated by relations with Pakistan, with all the attendant distortions. Nor would it have been distorted by the differing foreign policies of India and Pakistan during the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union might both have been friendly—or indifferent—to the new India. A united federation would not have been involved, as Pakistan became involved, with the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan nor would it have become so enmeshed in the American war on terrorism as Pakistan has been.
* The suffering caused by the secession of Bangladesh could have been avoided.
* The dispute over Kashmir would not have occurred, with all the attendant terrorism that has distorted life in India.
* A three-tiered India would have had at least the same industrialisation that has occurred and the areas that are now Pakistan and Bangladesh would have profited from it. It would have been a vast ``free trade zone`` with no equal in the world.
* It would have been a democratic republic, without military dictators. There would seem to be no reason why Muslim voters could not have exercised their franchise, just as they do in present-day India.
* This vast new India would have been a secular state, fulfilling the dream so often enunciated by Indian leaders both before and after 1947. Nehru’s commitment to secularism can scarcely be doubted. To that must be added a reminder of Jinnah’s speech on August 11, 1947: ``You can belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State. We are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.`` Would not he and Nehru—and a host of others—have said that for the Three-Tier India?
History cannot be reversed, but the realisation that there was nothing inherently improbable in a very different scenario in 1946 surely helps in looking at South Asia in a different way in 2004.
Indologist Ainslie T. Embree is professor emeritus, history, Columbia University.
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