Aly Ercelawn and Muhammad Nauman June 23, 1998
#8 Posted by murtam on July 9, 1998 12:16:42 pm
Here is an article I read on the said issue. I think it appeared in The News, International.
Agenda for prosperity and bright future
Prof Dr Ali Hasan
The Prime Minister in his address to the nation on June 11 announced a
number of revolutionary decisions. The
National Agenda has the inherent potential of making this country
self-reliant and prosperous; rather it would
revolutionise the society if implemented with commitment, devotion and
dedication. It is an uphill task but certainly
not impossible. There is, however, a very strong need for the people to
realise the gravity of the situation and
day-to-day deteriorating conditions of the economy. No time for laxity
or relaxation now.
The decision to make Pakistan a nuclear power was a popular decision
made in accordance with the wishes and
aspirations of the people and was in fact essential to safeguard the
defence and security of the country. It has
indeed inculcated a sense of pride and security in the minds and hearts
of the common man. But now, we have to
prove that we are an honourable, proud nation which can take independent
decisions to safeguard our national
interests. To achieve this goal we have to change habits, attitude and
behaviour. We have to think and act like one
nation. We will have to come out of our self made cocoons of
provincialism and regionalism. This is perhaps the
time to act as one and united Pakistan if we have to make future bright
prosperous and safe.
The most important decision the Prime Minister announced on June 11, is
construction of Kalabagh Dam which in
fact was long overdue. This decision perhaps should have been taken two
decades ago. Had this decision been
taken earlier, our economic conditions would have not been so bad as
they are now. The dam has already been
controversial ever since the project was conceived. Our friends from
NWFP and Sindh have been still expressing
apprehensions and reservations about this project.
Politicisation of the dam
The tragedy is that the project has been made a political issue and
nobody ever tried to look at its technical
aspects. Had it been analysed on technical grounds, perhaps it would
have not gone so out of proportion
politically. Ironically, again, only the Kalabagh Dam issue is being
politicised, whereas the Prime Minister
announced another major decision of land reforms which is going to hit
big landlords and jagirdars. Loan defaulters
issues is another important step which would severely affect the big
industrialists and businessmen. Why Kalabagh
Dam has been chosen by certain people to criticise?
In fact the project is likely to revolutionise the entire spectrum of
society. If implemented, it would serve as a
catalyst in accelerating the process of prosperity and development. The
dam would make the common man of
NWFP and Sindh self-reliant and prosperous. It would help in making the
agrarian reforms a success. It would
provide job opportunities to thousands and thousands of people and end
our reliance on expensive thermal power
projects. It is therefore time for our educated and patriotic people to
educate the common man to advocate early
construction of this dam and the power project.
Let`s see the technical aspects of this project. Those in NWFP, who are
opposing this project, fear that historic
flooding of Peshawar valley including Nowshera town would be aggravated
in the event of recurrence of 1929
record floods. Drainage of surrounding area of Mardan, Pabbi and Swabi
plains would be adversely affected by
the reservoir thus creating water-logging and salinity. Operation of
Mardan SCARP would be adversely affected.
Fertile cultivable lands would be submerged and a large number of people
would be displaced.
The fact is that in the modified design of the project, the reservoir
conservation level has been lowered by 10 feet
from 925 to 915 feet above mean sea level (MSL), thus eliminating the
need for construction of any protective
dyke near Nowshera. At maximum conservation level of 915 feet, the
backwater effect of Kalabagh lake would
end about 10-miles downstream of Nowshera. Real causes of flooding of
Nowshera and Peshawar valley
upstream are entrance of Kabul river at Nowshera into confined channel
at the end of Peshawar valley, and
backing effect of the Attock gorge downstream through which Indus river
has to pass after its confluence with
Kabul river. Before the confluence, Indus river flows through a wide
valley of over 8,000 feet and its then forced to
pass though 1000 feet wide gorge for 5 miles. This construction forces
the river water to back up thus raising flood
levels in Kabul river upto Nowshera. Whereas the dam will not adversely
affect flooding in Nowshera and
Peshawar valley, an upstream dam on Swat river could provide effective
assurance against this chronic inherent
problem. Consequently, Munda Dam multi-purpose project is being included
in NWRDP.
The lowest ground levels at Mardan, Pabbi and Swabi areas are 970.962 ft
and 1000 ft above MSL respectively,
as compared to the maximum conservation level of 915 for Kalabagh. This
maximum Kalabagh reservoir level
would be maintained only for 3 to 4 weeks during September and October
after which it would deplete as water is
released for Rabi crops and power generation. Ultimately it would go
down to dead storage level of 825 feet by
early June. This operation pattern of reservoir by no stretch of
imagination could block the drainage and thus cause
water-lodging or salinity in Mardan, Pabbi and Swabi areas.
The invert levels of main drains of the Mardan SCARP are higher than
maximum elevation of 915 feet. Thus, these
drains would keep on functioning without any obstruction.
Total culturable land submerged under the reservoir elevation of 915 ft
would be 27,5000 acres (24,500 acres in
Punjab and 3000 acres in NWFP). The submerged irrigated land would be
only 3000 acres (2900 acres in Punjab
and 100 acres in NWFP). It may be noted that about 1,000 acres of
irrigated land were acquired for Mardan
SCARP alone.
The estimated population to be affected by the project would be 83000
with 48,500 in Punjab and 34,500 in
NWFP. A liberal resettlement plan would provide alternate irrigated
lands to the affected families. The affected
population would be resettled along the reservoir periphery in
extended/new model villages with modern facilities of
water supply, electricity, roads, dispensaries, schools and other civic
amenities.
Another major incentive provided for the affectees in this case, not
previously practised in Pakistan, would be to
fully compensate the farmers for the land on the reservoir periphery
above normal conservation level of 915 feet
that could be flooded once in five years. This land would remain the
property of the original owners for cultivation
with the only undertaking that they would not claim any damages to crops
for occasional flooding. The
comprehensive resettlement package proposed for Kalabagh Dam is in fact
most innovative and attractive than
those previously adopted for Mangla and Tarbela dams.
Unsubstantiated apprehensions
But some friends from Sindh are expressing apprehensions that the
project would turn their land into a desert.
There would be no surplus water to fill the reservoir at Kalabagh.
Cultivation in riverain (sailaba) areas would be
adversely affected. Sea water intrusion in the Indus estuary would
accentuate. The mangrove forests, which are
already threatened would be further affected adversely. Fish production
and drinking water supply below Kotri
would be adversely affected.
Dams don`t consume any water. Instead these store water during flood
season and then make it available on crop
demand basis for the remaining dry periods of the year. The real
demonstration of this came after full
commissioning of Tarbela Dam in 1976. During pre-storage period of
1960-67, the average annual canal
withdrawals of Sindh were 35.6 million acres feet (MAF). After the
Tarbela Dam started functioning the
corresponding figure rose to 44.5 MAF with over 22% increase in the Rabi
season. In fact, Rabi diversions alone
increased from 10.7 to 15.2 MAF. It is estimated that after the
completion of Kalabagh Dam, canal withdrawals of
Sindh would further increase. Most of this increase would come in the
crucial early Kharif cotton sowing season.
Thus the oft-repeated apprehension regarding desertification of Sindh
defies even the basic logic of a storage
reservoir.
The Water Apportionment Accord (WAA) of 1991 has allocated, on the
average, about 12 million acre feet
additional supplies to the provinces almost all of which is in Kharif
season. On the other hand, surplus water is
available only within 70-100-day flood period. It is estimated that to
provide additionally allocated water over the
year, a storage of about 3.6 MAF would be needed (out of this, 2.2 MAF
would be in the early Kharif season of
April to July).
By the turn of the century, the three storage facilities would lose
about 3 MAF of live capacity.
In lieu of these two requirements about 6.6 MAF of surplus water would
become available. Against this, live
storage capacity at Kalabagh is 6.1 MAF. Hence there should be
absolutely no doubt that surplus water would not
be available to fill the reservoir.
Initial studies have indicated that construction of high level outlets
at Kalabagh is economically unviable.
Notwithstanding this, if any province wants to build these outlets, then
its share of water would be strictly governed
by WAA, 1991.
An impression is also prevailing that with Kalabagh Dam, riverain areas
of Sindh, commonly called `sailaba`, would
got out of production due to control over floods. It can be appreciated
from configuration of the riverain area that
`sailaba` crops are grown on the land adjacent to the mainstream and the
creeks. Though crops are sown on the
soil moisture soon after the floods, these need more than one watering
to mature. As a result `sailaba` lands give
poor yields, and farmers are generally required to provide irrigation
facility through shallow tubewells or lift-pumps.
Prime movers on these tubewells have to be removed during the flood
season to avoid damage.
Sindh has presently 660,000 acres of `Sailaba` cultivated area from
Guddu Barrage to the sea. This area is initially
sown due to the moisture provided by flooding with river stage of
300,000 cusecs and above.
Flood peaks above 33,000 cusecs would still be coming after the Kalabagh
Dam is built, without much detriment
to the present cultural practices, while large floods would be
effectively controlled. This would, in fact, be
conducive to installation of permanent tubewells to provide perennial
irrigation facility in riverain areas. Towards
this end, a separate scheme is being included in NWRDP.
Effect on delta waters
The fear that the present extent of sea water intrusion in the Indus
Delta would be further aggravated by the dam is
not substantiated by facts and data. Studies indicate that presently the
total effect of the Indus estuary is only limited
to the lower most portion of the delta and gets dissipated below Garho
and Chowgazo gauges. This is further
confirmed by the fact that the gauge heights at Garho are comparatively
insensitive to Indus discharges of upto
700,000 cusecs. Therefore, the sea water intrusion, which seems to be at
its maximum even now, is unlikely to be
aggravated further by Kalabagh Dam.
Another apprehension is that sea water intrusion into existing aquifer
system would cause serious quality
deterioration. The groundwater contained in the aquifer is effectively
saline as far north as Hyderabad. Therefore,
intrusion of sea water along shoreline of the delta is of little
consequence. This is further supported by the fact that
there is southward oriented groundwater gradient throughout this
aquifer. Considering the very low transmissivities
of the aquifer, upward sea water intrusion can be almost ruled out.
Out of the total 1.53 million acres (MA) tidally inundated historic
Indus Delta, mangrove forest cover an area of
almost 0.32 N/a. In this forest, spreading from Karachi in the west to
Rann of Kutch in the east, 95% of the
plantation now consist of a salt tolerant variety.
The extent of the active delta area (as distinct from the historic delta
area described above) is about 294,000
acres. Out of this, the mangroves cover only 7,400 acres or 2.5% of the
area. Most of the remaining area is in
form of mud-flats. The reason for this area being too small could be a
combination of factors. Recently, NED
University of Engineering and Technology carried out a study titled
``What really threatens us and our mangroves``.
This brings out that reduction in mangroves is essentially due to
frequency of tidal inundation being too small instead
of fresh water reduction caused by upstream obstruction, which started
with Sukkur Barrage in 1932. Other major
causes are uncontrolled overgrazing and cutting due to extreme
population pressure of Karachi.
Therefore, in order to revive the mangroves, real need is for replanting
salt tolerant varieties with provision for
controlled doses of fresh water. Obviously, this possibility would be
much enhanced with an upstream storage
facility like the one proposed at Kalabagh.
A recent study has shown that there is no clear evidence to suggest that
fisheries stocks in the river reach below
Kotri have declined due to progressive reduction in the surface water
supplies. On the other hand, fish production
has been constantly increasing as indicated by statistics.
As such, the dam is unlikely to have any adverse effect on fish
production in the area.
In the riverain area downstream to Kotri Barrage, groundwater is
predominantly saline or brackish and as such not
suitable for either irrigation or water supply. After the construction
of Kalabagh Dam, winter supply in the river
would improve thus assuring more drinking water.
Dam means no loadshedding
In fact, the dam with its initial installed capacity of 2400 MW
(ultimate 3600 MW) would add to the system a very
large chunk of cheap hydropower. In an average year, 11413 million
kilowatts hours (MKWhs) of electricity
would be generated at Kalabagh. Further, as a result of conjunctive
operation an additional 336 MKWhs and up
to 600 megawatts (MW) of additional peak power would be generated at
Tarbela. To put these figures in
perspective, if Kalabagh was in place and working today, there would
have been no loadshedding in Pakistan.
The energy generated at Kalabagh would be equivalent to 20 million
barrels of oil per year. Kalabagh would
reduce the frequency and severity of flooding along the Indus,
particularly between the dam site and Indus/Panjnad
confluence, 300 miles downstream. For the riverain areas lower down in
Sindh, it would enable conversion of the
existing `Sailaba` areas to the year round tubewell irrigation.
On a conservative basis, the overall direct benefits of Kalabagh Dam
would be around Rs20 billion per annum.
Thus the investment cost of the project would be thus used for sowing
and final maturing of the Kharif crops and
entire Rabi crops.
Irrigation-oriented operation of the project gives the highest overall
economic return. Thus the full live storage of
6.1 MAF would be available, guaranteeing assured irrigation supplies
throughout the year, including replacement of
the storage loss on the three existing reservoirs.
Agenda for prosperity and bright future
Prof Dr Ali Hasan
The Prime Minister in his address to the nation on June 11 announced a
number of revolutionary decisions. The
National Agenda has the inherent potential of making this country
self-reliant and prosperous; rather it would
revolutionise the society if implemented with commitment, devotion and
dedication. It is an uphill task but certainly
not impossible. There is, however, a very strong need for the people to
realise the gravity of the situation and
day-to-day deteriorating conditions of the economy. No time for laxity
or relaxation now.
The decision to make Pakistan a nuclear power was a popular decision
made in accordance with the wishes and
aspirations of the people and was in fact essential to safeguard the
defence and security of the country. It has
indeed inculcated a sense of pride and security in the minds and hearts
of the common man. But now, we have to
prove that we are an honourable, proud nation which can take independent
decisions to safeguard our national
interests. To achieve this goal we have to change habits, attitude and
behaviour. We have to think and act like one
nation. We will have to come out of our self made cocoons of
provincialism and regionalism. This is perhaps the
time to act as one and united Pakistan if we have to make future bright
prosperous and safe.
The most important decision the Prime Minister announced on June 11, is
construction of Kalabagh Dam which in
fact was long overdue. This decision perhaps should have been taken two
decades ago. Had this decision been
taken earlier, our economic conditions would have not been so bad as
they are now. The dam has already been
controversial ever since the project was conceived. Our friends from
NWFP and Sindh have been still expressing
apprehensions and reservations about this project.
Politicisation of the dam
The tragedy is that the project has been made a political issue and
nobody ever tried to look at its technical
aspects. Had it been analysed on technical grounds, perhaps it would
have not gone so out of proportion
politically. Ironically, again, only the Kalabagh Dam issue is being
politicised, whereas the Prime Minister
announced another major decision of land reforms which is going to hit
big landlords and jagirdars. Loan defaulters
issues is another important step which would severely affect the big
industrialists and businessmen. Why Kalabagh
Dam has been chosen by certain people to criticise?
In fact the project is likely to revolutionise the entire spectrum of
society. If implemented, it would serve as a
catalyst in accelerating the process of prosperity and development. The
dam would make the common man of
NWFP and Sindh self-reliant and prosperous. It would help in making the
agrarian reforms a success. It would
provide job opportunities to thousands and thousands of people and end
our reliance on expensive thermal power
projects. It is therefore time for our educated and patriotic people to
educate the common man to advocate early
construction of this dam and the power project.
Let`s see the technical aspects of this project. Those in NWFP, who are
opposing this project, fear that historic
flooding of Peshawar valley including Nowshera town would be aggravated
in the event of recurrence of 1929
record floods. Drainage of surrounding area of Mardan, Pabbi and Swabi
plains would be adversely affected by
the reservoir thus creating water-logging and salinity. Operation of
Mardan SCARP would be adversely affected.
Fertile cultivable lands would be submerged and a large number of people
would be displaced.
The fact is that in the modified design of the project, the reservoir
conservation level has been lowered by 10 feet
from 925 to 915 feet above mean sea level (MSL), thus eliminating the
need for construction of any protective
dyke near Nowshera. At maximum conservation level of 915 feet, the
backwater effect of Kalabagh lake would
end about 10-miles downstream of Nowshera. Real causes of flooding of
Nowshera and Peshawar valley
upstream are entrance of Kabul river at Nowshera into confined channel
at the end of Peshawar valley, and
backing effect of the Attock gorge downstream through which Indus river
has to pass after its confluence with
Kabul river. Before the confluence, Indus river flows through a wide
valley of over 8,000 feet and its then forced to
pass though 1000 feet wide gorge for 5 miles. This construction forces
the river water to back up thus raising flood
levels in Kabul river upto Nowshera. Whereas the dam will not adversely
affect flooding in Nowshera and
Peshawar valley, an upstream dam on Swat river could provide effective
assurance against this chronic inherent
problem. Consequently, Munda Dam multi-purpose project is being included
in NWRDP.
The lowest ground levels at Mardan, Pabbi and Swabi areas are 970.962 ft
and 1000 ft above MSL respectively,
as compared to the maximum conservation level of 915 for Kalabagh. This
maximum Kalabagh reservoir level
would be maintained only for 3 to 4 weeks during September and October
after which it would deplete as water is
released for Rabi crops and power generation. Ultimately it would go
down to dead storage level of 825 feet by
early June. This operation pattern of reservoir by no stretch of
imagination could block the drainage and thus cause
water-lodging or salinity in Mardan, Pabbi and Swabi areas.
The invert levels of main drains of the Mardan SCARP are higher than
maximum elevation of 915 feet. Thus, these
drains would keep on functioning without any obstruction.
Total culturable land submerged under the reservoir elevation of 915 ft
would be 27,5000 acres (24,500 acres in
Punjab and 3000 acres in NWFP). The submerged irrigated land would be
only 3000 acres (2900 acres in Punjab
and 100 acres in NWFP). It may be noted that about 1,000 acres of
irrigated land were acquired for Mardan
SCARP alone.
The estimated population to be affected by the project would be 83000
with 48,500 in Punjab and 34,500 in
NWFP. A liberal resettlement plan would provide alternate irrigated
lands to the affected families. The affected
population would be resettled along the reservoir periphery in
extended/new model villages with modern facilities of
water supply, electricity, roads, dispensaries, schools and other civic
amenities.
Another major incentive provided for the affectees in this case, not
previously practised in Pakistan, would be to
fully compensate the farmers for the land on the reservoir periphery
above normal conservation level of 915 feet
that could be flooded once in five years. This land would remain the
property of the original owners for cultivation
with the only undertaking that they would not claim any damages to crops
for occasional flooding. The
comprehensive resettlement package proposed for Kalabagh Dam is in fact
most innovative and attractive than
those previously adopted for Mangla and Tarbela dams.
Unsubstantiated apprehensions
But some friends from Sindh are expressing apprehensions that the
project would turn their land into a desert.
There would be no surplus water to fill the reservoir at Kalabagh.
Cultivation in riverain (sailaba) areas would be
adversely affected. Sea water intrusion in the Indus estuary would
accentuate. The mangrove forests, which are
already threatened would be further affected adversely. Fish production
and drinking water supply below Kotri
would be adversely affected.
Dams don`t consume any water. Instead these store water during flood
season and then make it available on crop
demand basis for the remaining dry periods of the year. The real
demonstration of this came after full
commissioning of Tarbela Dam in 1976. During pre-storage period of
1960-67, the average annual canal
withdrawals of Sindh were 35.6 million acres feet (MAF). After the
Tarbela Dam started functioning the
corresponding figure rose to 44.5 MAF with over 22% increase in the Rabi
season. In fact, Rabi diversions alone
increased from 10.7 to 15.2 MAF. It is estimated that after the
completion of Kalabagh Dam, canal withdrawals of
Sindh would further increase. Most of this increase would come in the
crucial early Kharif cotton sowing season.
Thus the oft-repeated apprehension regarding desertification of Sindh
defies even the basic logic of a storage
reservoir.
The Water Apportionment Accord (WAA) of 1991 has allocated, on the
average, about 12 million acre feet
additional supplies to the provinces almost all of which is in Kharif
season. On the other hand, surplus water is
available only within 70-100-day flood period. It is estimated that to
provide additionally allocated water over the
year, a storage of about 3.6 MAF would be needed (out of this, 2.2 MAF
would be in the early Kharif season of
April to July).
By the turn of the century, the three storage facilities would lose
about 3 MAF of live capacity.
In lieu of these two requirements about 6.6 MAF of surplus water would
become available. Against this, live
storage capacity at Kalabagh is 6.1 MAF. Hence there should be
absolutely no doubt that surplus water would not
be available to fill the reservoir.
Initial studies have indicated that construction of high level outlets
at Kalabagh is economically unviable.
Notwithstanding this, if any province wants to build these outlets, then
its share of water would be strictly governed
by WAA, 1991.
An impression is also prevailing that with Kalabagh Dam, riverain areas
of Sindh, commonly called `sailaba`, would
got out of production due to control over floods. It can be appreciated
from configuration of the riverain area that
`sailaba` crops are grown on the land adjacent to the mainstream and the
creeks. Though crops are sown on the
soil moisture soon after the floods, these need more than one watering
to mature. As a result `sailaba` lands give
poor yields, and farmers are generally required to provide irrigation
facility through shallow tubewells or lift-pumps.
Prime movers on these tubewells have to be removed during the flood
season to avoid damage.
Sindh has presently 660,000 acres of `Sailaba` cultivated area from
Guddu Barrage to the sea. This area is initially
sown due to the moisture provided by flooding with river stage of
300,000 cusecs and above.
Flood peaks above 33,000 cusecs would still be coming after the Kalabagh
Dam is built, without much detriment
to the present cultural practices, while large floods would be
effectively controlled. This would, in fact, be
conducive to installation of permanent tubewells to provide perennial
irrigation facility in riverain areas. Towards
this end, a separate scheme is being included in NWRDP.
Effect on delta waters
The fear that the present extent of sea water intrusion in the Indus
Delta would be further aggravated by the dam is
not substantiated by facts and data. Studies indicate that presently the
total effect of the Indus estuary is only limited
to the lower most portion of the delta and gets dissipated below Garho
and Chowgazo gauges. This is further
confirmed by the fact that the gauge heights at Garho are comparatively
insensitive to Indus discharges of upto
700,000 cusecs. Therefore, the sea water intrusion, which seems to be at
its maximum even now, is unlikely to be
aggravated further by Kalabagh Dam.
Another apprehension is that sea water intrusion into existing aquifer
system would cause serious quality
deterioration. The groundwater contained in the aquifer is effectively
saline as far north as Hyderabad. Therefore,
intrusion of sea water along shoreline of the delta is of little
consequence. This is further supported by the fact that
there is southward oriented groundwater gradient throughout this
aquifer. Considering the very low transmissivities
of the aquifer, upward sea water intrusion can be almost ruled out.
Out of the total 1.53 million acres (MA) tidally inundated historic
Indus Delta, mangrove forest cover an area of
almost 0.32 N/a. In this forest, spreading from Karachi in the west to
Rann of Kutch in the east, 95% of the
plantation now consist of a salt tolerant variety.
The extent of the active delta area (as distinct from the historic delta
area described above) is about 294,000
acres. Out of this, the mangroves cover only 7,400 acres or 2.5% of the
area. Most of the remaining area is in
form of mud-flats. The reason for this area being too small could be a
combination of factors. Recently, NED
University of Engineering and Technology carried out a study titled
``What really threatens us and our mangroves``.
This brings out that reduction in mangroves is essentially due to
frequency of tidal inundation being too small instead
of fresh water reduction caused by upstream obstruction, which started
with Sukkur Barrage in 1932. Other major
causes are uncontrolled overgrazing and cutting due to extreme
population pressure of Karachi.
Therefore, in order to revive the mangroves, real need is for replanting
salt tolerant varieties with provision for
controlled doses of fresh water. Obviously, this possibility would be
much enhanced with an upstream storage
facility like the one proposed at Kalabagh.
A recent study has shown that there is no clear evidence to suggest that
fisheries stocks in the river reach below
Kotri have declined due to progressive reduction in the surface water
supplies. On the other hand, fish production
has been constantly increasing as indicated by statistics.
As such, the dam is unlikely to have any adverse effect on fish
production in the area.
In the riverain area downstream to Kotri Barrage, groundwater is
predominantly saline or brackish and as such not
suitable for either irrigation or water supply. After the construction
of Kalabagh Dam, winter supply in the river
would improve thus assuring more drinking water.
Dam means no loadshedding
In fact, the dam with its initial installed capacity of 2400 MW
(ultimate 3600 MW) would add to the system a very
large chunk of cheap hydropower. In an average year, 11413 million
kilowatts hours (MKWhs) of electricity
would be generated at Kalabagh. Further, as a result of conjunctive
operation an additional 336 MKWhs and up
to 600 megawatts (MW) of additional peak power would be generated at
Tarbela. To put these figures in
perspective, if Kalabagh was in place and working today, there would
have been no loadshedding in Pakistan.
The energy generated at Kalabagh would be equivalent to 20 million
barrels of oil per year. Kalabagh would
reduce the frequency and severity of flooding along the Indus,
particularly between the dam site and Indus/Panjnad
confluence, 300 miles downstream. For the riverain areas lower down in
Sindh, it would enable conversion of the
existing `Sailaba` areas to the year round tubewell irrigation.
On a conservative basis, the overall direct benefits of Kalabagh Dam
would be around Rs20 billion per annum.
Thus the investment cost of the project would be thus used for sowing
and final maturing of the Kharif crops and
entire Rabi crops.
Irrigation-oriented operation of the project gives the highest overall
economic return. Thus the full live storage of
6.1 MAF would be available, guaranteeing assured irrigation supplies
throughout the year, including replacement of
the storage loss on the three existing reservoirs.
#7 Posted by maliani on July 6, 1998 3:48:37 pm
Re: Mr Hussan Zia
Since Pakistan is a federation (well at least theoretically) it is therefore expected that the federating units will have a say at least in the decision making process about the issues concering their vital interests. Since Kalabagh Dam is defintely an issue of vital interest for Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and Balochistan. The elected assemblies of the three provinces have passed several resolutions opposing the construction of
Kalabagh Dam.
By trampling all over the constitutional forum of the federal system, Main Nawaz Sharif has practically dealt a dangerous blow to the federation of Pakistan which can be fatal in the long term. I hope the policy makers in Punjab keep in mind East Pakistan saga while planning Kalabagh dam!!!!
A lot of concern has been expressed about the harmful effect of Kalabagh Dam due to flooding of Nowshera town and rise of water table in Peshawar valley. It is feared that as a result of rise of water level due to ponding up at Kalabagh, the water level in Kabul river will rise due to back water effect, thus posing serious threat to the town of Nowshera and Peshawar valley. In this context it is pertinent to mention the Chinese experience of Sanmenxia reservoir constructed on the Yellow river in the year 1960. Due to acute sedimentation problem, this dam had to be redesigned and reconstructed within a short period of four years, because back water deposit extended up stream with remarkable rapidity endangering industrial and agriculture activities in the vicinity of the reservoir. The effect of sediment has extended for considerable distance upstream of the reservoir. The configuration of Kalabagh Dam is more or less similar to Sanmenxia dam and therefore we must take a lesson from the Chinese experience. Though it is not possible to forecast accurately the trend of siltation after construction of Kalabagh Dam, it is certain that a very high risk is involved which needs to be avoided. Moreover, geological experts have many reservations about the Kalabagh Dam site as it is located in an area with many geological faults, which may endanger the safety of the dam. Besides, the reservoir area is in close proximity of Khewra and Kohat salt ranges which will pollute the water causing high salinity, thereby affecting its suitability for irrigation.
Since Pakistan is a federation (well at least theoretically) it is therefore expected that the federating units will have a say at least in the decision making process about the issues concering their vital interests. Since Kalabagh Dam is defintely an issue of vital interest for Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and Balochistan. The elected assemblies of the three provinces have passed several resolutions opposing the construction of
Kalabagh Dam.
By trampling all over the constitutional forum of the federal system, Main Nawaz Sharif has practically dealt a dangerous blow to the federation of Pakistan which can be fatal in the long term. I hope the policy makers in Punjab keep in mind East Pakistan saga while planning Kalabagh dam!!!!
A lot of concern has been expressed about the harmful effect of Kalabagh Dam due to flooding of Nowshera town and rise of water table in Peshawar valley. It is feared that as a result of rise of water level due to ponding up at Kalabagh, the water level in Kabul river will rise due to back water effect, thus posing serious threat to the town of Nowshera and Peshawar valley. In this context it is pertinent to mention the Chinese experience of Sanmenxia reservoir constructed on the Yellow river in the year 1960. Due to acute sedimentation problem, this dam had to be redesigned and reconstructed within a short period of four years, because back water deposit extended up stream with remarkable rapidity endangering industrial and agriculture activities in the vicinity of the reservoir. The effect of sediment has extended for considerable distance upstream of the reservoir. The configuration of Kalabagh Dam is more or less similar to Sanmenxia dam and therefore we must take a lesson from the Chinese experience. Though it is not possible to forecast accurately the trend of siltation after construction of Kalabagh Dam, it is certain that a very high risk is involved which needs to be avoided. Moreover, geological experts have many reservations about the Kalabagh Dam site as it is located in an area with many geological faults, which may endanger the safety of the dam. Besides, the reservoir area is in close proximity of Khewra and Kohat salt ranges which will pollute the water causing high salinity, thereby affecting its suitability for irrigation.
#6 Posted by maliani on July 6, 1998 3:30:57 pm
Here are some books, reports and articles available on Kalabagh Dam:
Anatomy of Kalabagh Dam (1992)
by Engineer Abdul Rasool Memon
(Former GM WAPDA and CE Irrigation)
Publisher: Pakistan Study Center
Allama I. I. Kazi Campus
University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan
Available at the Grainger Engineering Library
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Proceedings of the PASSP Seminar on
Kalabagh Dam (Karachi, 1992)
Publisher: Convener Information and Publication
Pakistan Association of Scientists and Scientific Professions
Block-5, Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Karachi 75300, Pakistan
Available at the Grainger Engineering Library
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
An Assessment of the Kalabagh Dam Project
on the River Indus, Pakistan (1990)
by Muhammad Nasir Gazdar [Preface]
[Foreword by Philip B. William], President, International Rivers Network
Publisher: Environmental Management Society
141-A, SMCHS, Karachi, Pakistan
Phone: (92-21)454120 Fax: (92-21)454-7532
Available through Probe International
Adding to the Legacy: World Bank Funds Kalabagh Dam
World Rivers Review, Nov/Dec 1989, vol 4, no 6
Kalabagh Dam Project - Executive Summary (October 1988)
Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority
and Kalabagh Consultants
Available through Probe International
Damming the Waters of Life by Muhammad Nasir Gazdar
International Third World, May 1988
Available through Probe International
Kalabagh Dam Project
Feasibility Study (8 vols.), February, 1975
Associated Consulting Engineers Ltd.
1/C-2 M. M. Alam Road Gulbarg III Lahore, Pakistan
Available at Colorado State University Library
Other sources are:
International Rivers Network (http://www.irn.org)
Introduction, Clippings, Technical Report,
Maps, Sponsors, Contacts, IRN
Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams by Patrick McCully, IRN Campaigns Director. Published by Zed Books, 1996
Probe International:
The problem with large-scale Hydro Dams in the Third World
Canada eyes Pakistan
hydroelectric prospects during power study visit,
World Water and Environmental Engineering, Jan/Feb, 1990
Anatomy of Kalabagh Dam (1992)
by Engineer Abdul Rasool Memon
(Former GM WAPDA and CE Irrigation)
Publisher: Pakistan Study Center
Allama I. I. Kazi Campus
University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan
Available at the Grainger Engineering Library
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Proceedings of the PASSP Seminar on
Kalabagh Dam (Karachi, 1992)
Publisher: Convener Information and Publication
Pakistan Association of Scientists and Scientific Professions
Block-5, Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Karachi 75300, Pakistan
Available at the Grainger Engineering Library
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
An Assessment of the Kalabagh Dam Project
on the River Indus, Pakistan (1990)
by Muhammad Nasir Gazdar [Preface]
[Foreword by Philip B. William], President, International Rivers Network
Publisher: Environmental Management Society
141-A, SMCHS, Karachi, Pakistan
Phone: (92-21)454120 Fax: (92-21)454-7532
Available through Probe International
Adding to the Legacy: World Bank Funds Kalabagh Dam
World Rivers Review, Nov/Dec 1989, vol 4, no 6
Kalabagh Dam Project - Executive Summary (October 1988)
Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority
and Kalabagh Consultants
Available through Probe International
Damming the Waters of Life by Muhammad Nasir Gazdar
International Third World, May 1988
Available through Probe International
Kalabagh Dam Project
Feasibility Study (8 vols.), February, 1975
Associated Consulting Engineers Ltd.
1/C-2 M. M. Alam Road Gulbarg III Lahore, Pakistan
Available at Colorado State University Library
Other sources are:
International Rivers Network (http://www.irn.org)
Introduction, Clippings, Technical Report,
Maps, Sponsors, Contacts, IRN
Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams by Patrick McCully, IRN Campaigns Director. Published by Zed Books, 1996
Probe International:
The problem with large-scale Hydro Dams in the Third World
Canada eyes Pakistan
hydroelectric prospects during power study visit,
World Water and Environmental Engineering, Jan/Feb, 1990
#5 Posted by BG on July 1, 1998 10:18:00 am
re shahid mustafa
i agree with your efforts to bring back the discussion to a non-provincial/ethnocentric focus. Yes, you are right: the elite-most clique, who is to blame for most of the extortion and exploitation while it has ruled, is to blame for many of pakistan`s problems -- not one province or ethnicity.
re: these `relics of the past`
my understanding is that there are differences in the heirarchies and the wealth and power structures of baluchistan and sarhad, versus sindh and punjab. baluchistan has very little fertile land and a great proportion of baluchs are nomadic -- hardly the typical zamindaar-haari setup prevalent in punjab and sindh. i believe that in sarhad also, tribal social relations are much more egalitarian because the prevalence of `zamindaars` is , again, not as dominant as in punjab and sindh.
however, to blame everything on `these relics of the past` (interestingly the zamindari system was introduced by the british to enable more effective expropriation of wealth from the indigenous people and there is nothing inherently `punjabi` or `sindhi` about it either) takes blame away from our government, civil service and army, not all of whom are or have been zamindaars. and we all know that the civil service and army were designed as imperial arms of the british raaj. (i am not blaming the raaj for everything. it made sense for them to set up the army and civil service this way, but our ruling elite never tried to change it either because it served them well). and, finally, our capitalist class has done very little for the country, besides going for their share of the spoils -- but what does one expect from capitalists anyway? :)
going back to kalabagh dam: there is a great deal of evidence that dams, whatever ethnicity they are and wherever they are, have been huge disasters. all those who are interested in the pros and cons of the project - irrespective of its `ethnicity` - would be served well to read the references provided by m. aliani and other books/articles on dams in general. it would be very useful if we tried to learn about the experience of our neighbors in india and in nepal. in india a lot of damage has been done, but a lot has also been averted by the narmada bachao andolan. in nepal, there was a successful movement to block a huge world bank dam project some years ago. i have mentioned this before, but here it goes again: there is a great documentary on the narmada dam project called `kaisay jeebo ray` by jharna javeri which is highly informative and moving.
once again, i applaud your efforts to separate the argument about the dam as an economic project from the ethnicity of those for it or opposed to it.
re m aliani
thank you for your excellent references.
i agree with your efforts to bring back the discussion to a non-provincial/ethnocentric focus. Yes, you are right: the elite-most clique, who is to blame for most of the extortion and exploitation while it has ruled, is to blame for many of pakistan`s problems -- not one province or ethnicity.
re: these `relics of the past`
my understanding is that there are differences in the heirarchies and the wealth and power structures of baluchistan and sarhad, versus sindh and punjab. baluchistan has very little fertile land and a great proportion of baluchs are nomadic -- hardly the typical zamindaar-haari setup prevalent in punjab and sindh. i believe that in sarhad also, tribal social relations are much more egalitarian because the prevalence of `zamindaars` is , again, not as dominant as in punjab and sindh.
however, to blame everything on `these relics of the past` (interestingly the zamindari system was introduced by the british to enable more effective expropriation of wealth from the indigenous people and there is nothing inherently `punjabi` or `sindhi` about it either) takes blame away from our government, civil service and army, not all of whom are or have been zamindaars. and we all know that the civil service and army were designed as imperial arms of the british raaj. (i am not blaming the raaj for everything. it made sense for them to set up the army and civil service this way, but our ruling elite never tried to change it either because it served them well). and, finally, our capitalist class has done very little for the country, besides going for their share of the spoils -- but what does one expect from capitalists anyway? :)
going back to kalabagh dam: there is a great deal of evidence that dams, whatever ethnicity they are and wherever they are, have been huge disasters. all those who are interested in the pros and cons of the project - irrespective of its `ethnicity` - would be served well to read the references provided by m. aliani and other books/articles on dams in general. it would be very useful if we tried to learn about the experience of our neighbors in india and in nepal. in india a lot of damage has been done, but a lot has also been averted by the narmada bachao andolan. in nepal, there was a successful movement to block a huge world bank dam project some years ago. i have mentioned this before, but here it goes again: there is a great documentary on the narmada dam project called `kaisay jeebo ray` by jharna javeri which is highly informative and moving.
once again, i applaud your efforts to separate the argument about the dam as an economic project from the ethnicity of those for it or opposed to it.
re m aliani
thank you for your excellent references.
#4 Posted by Hasan Khan on July 1, 1998 12:09:02 am
It amazes me how many articles and replies are written against Kalabagh dam and none in favor of it. Why are all Punjabis so quiet? Don`t we have any arguments in favor of the dam?
Let me start by pointing out the foremost problem facing the country for now. It is the population growth. By UN`s estimates even if you bring down the rate of growth to less than 2.0 Pakistan`s population will stabilize at 500 million. How are you going to feed, house, cloth and educate these masses of people? We already import wheat and rice. How do you think we will do when there are 500 mil of us? The argument by the author that we should control our population instead of building the dam sounds very funny to me. Yes we should control the rate of population growth but how are we going to feed the people who are already or will soon become part of the living population. You need the dam just to feed and fulfill the energy demands of the current population.
One point I don`t understand is that only Punjab will benefit from the construction of dam. Let me ask you this, which province is the major producer of food for the country? Punjab...Sindh comes distant second. Punjab is not going to consume all the food it will produce due to increased food producing lands. The food will go the other provinces. Food produced in Punjab (and Sindh) already reaches all the way up to Afghanistan.
Same goes for power production. More than 60% of country`s population lives in Punjab. How are the people of Punjab going fulfill their energy needs? Oil and gas powered turbines are much more expensive to build and maintain. They also harm the environment more than a dam. The other cheap power source is nuclear energy. We all know the issues involved whenever the words Pakistan and nuclear are spoken in the same breath. I doubt it seriously that we will have enough resources and ``permission from the west`` to build enough reactors.
Speaking of environment, Pakistan`s environment is already doomed. With 500 mil people in a country of size of Texas, preserving environment is a luxury. I am pro environment but when it comes to feeding millions of people versus, a river delta, I will choose the people (all four provinces` people). People talk of Mangrove forests being destroyed, these forests are already being cut to extinction by the locals as a source of fuel. Considering the population growth, these trees are not going to survive very long whether the dam is built or not...unless people are given alternative energy sources. Then people talk of water logging caused by irrigation. This argument completely escapes me. What should we do now? Stop irrigating land? There are very practical solutions to water logging, like digging water ways to take excess water out to a river or sea. This is already being done in Punjab and Sindh.
And last but not the least, why shouldn`t the most populous province of the country, ask for a dam that will cheaply and realistically feed and cloth its people? Punjab didn`t complain when Karachi was being built, very wrongly and short sightedly, as the only economic center of the country. Punjab doesn`t whine about the abundant natural resources of of NWFP and Baloochistan. Sindh has agriculture and also the most valuable resource, the sea port. This is how a country runs people. You trade with other parts of the country. Punjab supplies food (among other commodities) and other provinces provide minerals, raw materials, and tourism (among other commodities). This is how wealth is created. Dam is not going benefit only Punjab...it will benefit the country as a whole. Even if it did help Punjab alone, isn`t Punjab part of Pakistan? A prosperous Punjab, or any other province for that matter, is good for the country as a whole.
Let me start by pointing out the foremost problem facing the country for now. It is the population growth. By UN`s estimates even if you bring down the rate of growth to less than 2.0 Pakistan`s population will stabilize at 500 million. How are you going to feed, house, cloth and educate these masses of people? We already import wheat and rice. How do you think we will do when there are 500 mil of us? The argument by the author that we should control our population instead of building the dam sounds very funny to me. Yes we should control the rate of population growth but how are we going to feed the people who are already or will soon become part of the living population. You need the dam just to feed and fulfill the energy demands of the current population.
One point I don`t understand is that only Punjab will benefit from the construction of dam. Let me ask you this, which province is the major producer of food for the country? Punjab...Sindh comes distant second. Punjab is not going to consume all the food it will produce due to increased food producing lands. The food will go the other provinces. Food produced in Punjab (and Sindh) already reaches all the way up to Afghanistan.
Same goes for power production. More than 60% of country`s population lives in Punjab. How are the people of Punjab going fulfill their energy needs? Oil and gas powered turbines are much more expensive to build and maintain. They also harm the environment more than a dam. The other cheap power source is nuclear energy. We all know the issues involved whenever the words Pakistan and nuclear are spoken in the same breath. I doubt it seriously that we will have enough resources and ``permission from the west`` to build enough reactors.
Speaking of environment, Pakistan`s environment is already doomed. With 500 mil people in a country of size of Texas, preserving environment is a luxury. I am pro environment but when it comes to feeding millions of people versus, a river delta, I will choose the people (all four provinces` people). People talk of Mangrove forests being destroyed, these forests are already being cut to extinction by the locals as a source of fuel. Considering the population growth, these trees are not going to survive very long whether the dam is built or not...unless people are given alternative energy sources. Then people talk of water logging caused by irrigation. This argument completely escapes me. What should we do now? Stop irrigating land? There are very practical solutions to water logging, like digging water ways to take excess water out to a river or sea. This is already being done in Punjab and Sindh.
And last but not the least, why shouldn`t the most populous province of the country, ask for a dam that will cheaply and realistically feed and cloth its people? Punjab didn`t complain when Karachi was being built, very wrongly and short sightedly, as the only economic center of the country. Punjab doesn`t whine about the abundant natural resources of of NWFP and Baloochistan. Sindh has agriculture and also the most valuable resource, the sea port. This is how a country runs people. You trade with other parts of the country. Punjab supplies food (among other commodities) and other provinces provide minerals, raw materials, and tourism (among other commodities). This is how wealth is created. Dam is not going benefit only Punjab...it will benefit the country as a whole. Even if it did help Punjab alone, isn`t Punjab part of Pakistan? A prosperous Punjab, or any other province for that matter, is good for the country as a whole.
#3 Posted by BG on June 25, 1998 6:34:03 pm
I have said this somewhere else, but please bear with me while I repeat myself:
Almost all dam projects in the world have been COMPLETE FAILURES. The world bank has been the biggest funder and initiator of dams and by its own evaluations and reports, at least half of its dam projects have been environmental, financial disasters that have displaced hundreds of thousands of people who have been deprived of homes and means of sustenance.
I dont care if the dam is undemocratic or punjabi or whatever -- ITS SURE TO BE A DISASTER AND A TRAGEDY because that`s what all dam projects have been. And that is enough reason for anyone to oppose it. I dont care if politicians from the smaller provinces are using this issue for their own twisted reasons, their opposition to the dam is a good thing. After the nuclear blasts and the oil spill off the coast of baluchistan, Pakistan does not need another environmental disaster.
Almost all dam projects in the world have been COMPLETE FAILURES. The world bank has been the biggest funder and initiator of dams and by its own evaluations and reports, at least half of its dam projects have been environmental, financial disasters that have displaced hundreds of thousands of people who have been deprived of homes and means of sustenance.
I dont care if the dam is undemocratic or punjabi or whatever -- ITS SURE TO BE A DISASTER AND A TRAGEDY because that`s what all dam projects have been. And that is enough reason for anyone to oppose it. I dont care if politicians from the smaller provinces are using this issue for their own twisted reasons, their opposition to the dam is a good thing. After the nuclear blasts and the oil spill off the coast of baluchistan, Pakistan does not need another environmental disaster.
#2 Posted by naveed siddiqi on June 25, 1998 2:33:32 pm
That the Kalabagh dam raises an enormous number of complex questions is not in doubt. I also resent a government trying to issue this `dictat` without a public debate. It is a sure recipe for disaster. When will we learn?
However, as an ordinary Pakistani with a moderate degree of intelligence, I would like to know the FACTS uncharged with emotions from both sides of the argument presented in an uncomplicated manner. I believe that the current debate is highly charged and polarised on provincial grounds and as such is not conducive to finding the best outcome.
A few common sense questions come to mind:
What are the forthcoming problems that Pakistan faces on irrigation/availability of water?
How serious are they?
What solutions are available to resolve these problems (presumably construction of the Kalabagh Dam is not the only solution)? What do international experts say?
What makes the Kalabagh dam the best solution from the cost/benefit point of view?
What is the potential cost to different provinces of Pakistan in terms of environmental, human and financial impact? What solutions are proposed to mitigate this?
What compensation mechanisms (monetary and otherwise) are available to those provinces which share the greatest impact burden? Presumably if construction of this is in our supreme national interest, those provinces which may potentially suffer adverse environmental consequenses should be adequately compensated by Punjab which is muted to be the main beneficiary.
Once the Kalabagh Dam is constructed, what safeguards are in place to avoid decisions on the operation of the Dam being made which are only of benefit to any one province?
What is the benefit to Pakistan in terms of GDP growth? What are the realistic funding solutions for a project such as this? What evidence is there to support such assertions? I believe statements by Ishaq Dar (the Commerce Minister) that we will fund this through borrowing on the International bond markets just makes him look foolish because there are enough Pakistanis now who understand the pre-requisites of project financing and do not take kindly to such idle words. Some truthful statements, Mr Dar, please.
I believe that if the Kalabagh Dam is really the best solution for Pakistan then we should go ahead with it. However, I am not willing to give my support until I, as a Pakistani citizen, become convinced that there is a serious problem; the dam is the best solution and moreover that every step possible has been taken to mitigate the adverse impact on smaller provinces.
If there have been various studies by international consultants, I would like to know the results of these. I cannot believe that any 2 consultants would agree unanimously on the problems or the solutions. Perhaps we can get an idea of the areas where there is more consensus and where there is more debate?
Food for thought. I wonder how many Pakistanis share this view.
However, as an ordinary Pakistani with a moderate degree of intelligence, I would like to know the FACTS uncharged with emotions from both sides of the argument presented in an uncomplicated manner. I believe that the current debate is highly charged and polarised on provincial grounds and as such is not conducive to finding the best outcome.
A few common sense questions come to mind:
What are the forthcoming problems that Pakistan faces on irrigation/availability of water?
How serious are they?
What solutions are available to resolve these problems (presumably construction of the Kalabagh Dam is not the only solution)? What do international experts say?
What makes the Kalabagh dam the best solution from the cost/benefit point of view?
What is the potential cost to different provinces of Pakistan in terms of environmental, human and financial impact? What solutions are proposed to mitigate this?
What compensation mechanisms (monetary and otherwise) are available to those provinces which share the greatest impact burden? Presumably if construction of this is in our supreme national interest, those provinces which may potentially suffer adverse environmental consequenses should be adequately compensated by Punjab which is muted to be the main beneficiary.
Once the Kalabagh Dam is constructed, what safeguards are in place to avoid decisions on the operation of the Dam being made which are only of benefit to any one province?
What is the benefit to Pakistan in terms of GDP growth? What are the realistic funding solutions for a project such as this? What evidence is there to support such assertions? I believe statements by Ishaq Dar (the Commerce Minister) that we will fund this through borrowing on the International bond markets just makes him look foolish because there are enough Pakistanis now who understand the pre-requisites of project financing and do not take kindly to such idle words. Some truthful statements, Mr Dar, please.
I believe that if the Kalabagh Dam is really the best solution for Pakistan then we should go ahead with it. However, I am not willing to give my support until I, as a Pakistani citizen, become convinced that there is a serious problem; the dam is the best solution and moreover that every step possible has been taken to mitigate the adverse impact on smaller provinces.
If there have been various studies by international consultants, I would like to know the results of these. I cannot believe that any 2 consultants would agree unanimously on the problems or the solutions. Perhaps we can get an idea of the areas where there is more consensus and where there is more debate?
Food for thought. I wonder how many Pakistanis share this view.
#1 Posted by temporal on June 23, 1998 11:56:02 pm
DAMNING KALABAGH
The damn dam will not be built if those opposed to it can mobilise another work-creation scheme of equal proportion.
Ther percentage-wallah bacteria has to feed on the commission.
So what else is new?
The damn dam will not be built if those opposed to it can mobilise another work-creation scheme of equal proportion.
Ther percentage-wallah bacteria has to feed on the commission.
So what else is new?
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