Is Accidental Nuclear War Impossible?

HELLO,

CAN YOU PLESE GIVE ME THE R-MAIL ID OF Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy?

MY EMAIL IS smitay@rediffmail.com

I agree with your hypothesis regarding a nuclear accident possibly leading to a `reflex` nuclear exchange. Are there any simulations (or scenarios) that explore this (and similar) possibilities?

Brilliantly clear, incisive, chilling.

As usual.

Re: Pervez Hoodbhoy

I agree with the scope of your article. I also agree that both India and Pakistan need to sober up from their post nuclear hang overs and look reality in the face. Your article was well timed, because we, Indians and Pakistanis, need to go beyond the false comfort of possessing nuclear weapons and instead, we should be discussing means to institute a crediable command, control and communications regime that would prevent an accidental war.

When I was in college, one of my professors had taught at the United States Army War College, in Montgomery, Alabama. He once asked me about Pakistan`s nuclear capability and I told that it really existed, but in an overt sense. He then told me that Pakistan army should not have any troubles creating an effective control and command system, because most of the present generation of senior Pakistani officers, this was `89, had been educated in the US during the 1950s and the 1960s when the US Army itself was dealing with very issue. Hence, they should be familar with all the arguments and would not have to, if they needed to, rationalize such a concept to suit their requirements. I trust the same applies to the Indian military from their time in the Soviet Union which was trying to solve the same problem.

My question to you is and in this I share your fears in trusting the operational commnd of these weapons to local unit commanders; how do you and from where do you propose accquiring PALs and other key technologies to prevent their misuse ?

Europe? United States is out of the question, because of the Pressler and other such sanctions. Even if Pakistan agrees to CTBT and FMCT, the word of the president of the United States, without a congressional repeal of those sanctions, is meaningless. For Pakistan to accuire those technologies would mean a vote to over turn those measures. Withour their repeal, the United States can not legally sell us the technology. Since Pressler and other punitive sanctions against Pakistan have no sun set provisions, and knowing the five most favorite words of the US Congress are, ``congress shall make no law``, I do not realistically see that happening.

Are you then suggesting an indignious approach and if not, then how ?

Pervez Hoodbhoy:

Why are you always harbinger of bad news?

Seriously, the one quality missing from politicians and power brokers across both sides of the great divide is common sense.

Shall we resort to seven rounds of du`a-e-Qunoot or surahYasin? Or to a chorus of Kay sera, sera?

This process of rationalisation is extremely frustrating.

regards

Your article stirred the misgivings that are deep within my mind about this whole matter of a so-called ``nuclear deterrent`` in South Asia. Scary indeed! It would be so nice to turn back the clock to before May 1998 wouldn`t it.

I suppose, many don`t even have faith in either government actually have the organizational ability to mount a nuclear missile attack nor an appropriate response to one. I mean, a few nuclear tests doesn`t make them equipped with first-strike warheads, na? Sadly, they are clearly more prepared for this eventuality than anything else in their national interests.

Given the recent barrage of missiles that flew over Pakistan and the Pakistan`s armed forces inability to identify them. I would be extremely wary about its ability to defend in the event India fires its missiles via its nuclear submarines (as then it might look like the US is again targeting Afghanistan).

Thank you for making an effort to shake us out of our collective smug complacency; for trying to awaken us from our blank, disinterested, dulled stupor.