An Aside on Benazir

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warpster #95 Thanks for your ``back-to-office report`` and thanks in particular for remembering to put forward my question concering the ``General Inflation Index``. Being a martial race, of course, our general indices come in the form of real life generals, not just the limp statistical general indices that the rest of the world uses. :-)

I was struck by one thing he mentioned, at the end: that the Pakistan army has had enough of war with India and that the Indian army feels overstretched too. If that is true, then I think we have a real chance for peace. War is in any case too important to be left to the generals, and in the hands of civilians somehow nations are able to work out their problems without sacrificing young lives to the altar of the gods of nationalism. The human cost is not blood shed of thousands of innocent people, but merely periodic increases in blood pressure of a handful of diplomats around the negotiating table. (You can see where I am on all this!!).

Incidentally, I attended a similar briefing last week. It was a retired US state department official namewho had served in Pakistan in the 1950`s and also in the 1970s, named Ambassador Dennis Kux, who has written a book recently on US-Pakistan relations (he has also written a book on US-India relations). Most of his discussion too had more to do with the past, like Brigadier sahib. He too was of the view that Pakistan was doing quite well in the 1950`s and also mentioned how the Americans invited the South Koreans back in the 1960`s to visit Pakistan in order to learn how to develop economically!! However, the 1965 war basically started Pakistan on the wrong track and those days are gone. He did not have too much to say about the future (like Brigadier Sahib, he too is of the age when people start reminiscing about the past): but he did mention that the Pakistani and Indian communities served as an asset in building bridges between the US and South Asia that he would have given anything to possess back then.

Tying these talks together: I think that the expatriate community of Pakistanis and Indians - whether in Singapore or the US or Europe of the middle east or Africa or anywhere else - owe it to South Asia to try and bring Pakistan and India together. These expatriate communities are quite influential in their home countries, since they are the same flesh and blood to begin with, and include some of the best educated and best off people (the 4 million Paki expats around the world have the same total income as the remaining 130 million Pakistanis, and that too in hard currency!!).

Long post, and hope the time spent reading it wasnt a complete waste. cheers.

Re: Warpster #95

In the absence of actual numbers, its difficult to say conclusively that the Pakistani and Indian armies are (a) top heavy and (b) top heavier than they were in, say, 1971. I would argue that, based on anecdotal evidence, this is true for both armies.

For example, in the Pakistn Army, every post of ``Director`` (i.e., Brigadier) at GHQ has been upgraded to that of ``Director General`` (i.e., Major General) and all the PSOs have become Lt. Generals. In addition, several additonal DGs posts have been created.

The Indians have also upgraded their GHQ posts and created regional commands with more brass. However, the Indians, in one way, have not become top heavy enough. Since the IA COAS is still only a General, the GOC of the various Army commands (e.g., Eastern Command, Western, etc) is still only a Lt. Gen. and so has a Lt. Gen as his deputy and Lt. Gen.s as his corps commanders. The COAS should be a Field Marshall and the regioal army commanders Generals to keep the rank structure rational.

However, all this does not necessarily mean that we have top heavy armies since the size of both armies has expanded as well. However, anecdotally, I will stick with the top heavy thesis.

Regards.

tahmed #90

I attended the talk. The silver haired Brigadier Siddiqui (founder editor of Defence Journal), in his 70s, was visiting Singapore (his Son works here) and came along with his wife. The audience was sparse, mostly people with interests in South Asia, a mixture of academics with origins from Singapore, India, and Bangladesh. He is also apparently a part of track2/3 and visits India on a regular basis.

He had a distinctive punjabi accent and as he chose to talk sitting from the table and was softspoken and one had to pay real close attention to hear him. He spoke for 40 minutes and then there was Q&A for another half an hour.

The details of his opinions can be found in his 1996 book ``The Military in Pakistan`` published by Vanguard press; from a brief perusal, it appears to be worth a read and is fairly objective.

I posed your question regarding General inflation. Apparently Pakistan now has twice the number of Generals compared to the pre 1971 situation (before Bangladesh). He quite explicitly used the word ``top heavy`` and seemed to imply that the adding of divisions and generals was a result of Indo-Pak rivalry. I dunno if the Indian army has become similarly top heavy. Thats an empirical question with a real answer.

Other things I recall, in no particular order:

He asserted that Pakistanis by and large share the same genes as many Indians (i.e. similar ethnicity and culture)

That the Indian and Pak Army are professional outfits and, in the past, have fought wars on a civilized basis (i.e. no wanton bombing of civilian targets) and for that reason a nuclear exchange was unlikely

Pakistan`s military strength was mostly a result of American military aid in the 50s and 60s.

He mentioned the 1965 war as a watershed in Pakistan`s military self perceptions. The expectation was that Pakistan would make substantial territorial gains and force India to the negotiating table. The idea was that EPakistan would keep Indian army busy while WPakistan would launch attacks. It didnt work that way and the outcome was a huge disappointment to Pakistan. Basically Pakistan ran out of US supplied Ammunition after 2 weeks (apparently the same was true of India) and the war ended in a stalemate. Ayub Khan who had ruled from 1958 lost his charisma and credibility as a military leader, although it would take a medical problem to fell him in 1968.

The Brig was the Pak army spokesperson during the `71 war. He was fully aware of parroting untruths (we are doing well in E Pakistan) and was extremely reluctant to report the surrender when it did happen as it was at considerable variance with the previous press conferences. He also noted that unlike these days, the press spokesperson was an anonymous entity.

He thought Yahya Khan was a good man but overtaken by events and lacked competence. He considered the 1970 december elections as the high point of Pakistani civil and military society as it was free and fair. Thanks to Bhutto`s post election statements and actions, the situation developed where by Mid January Bhutto, Yahya and a couple of generals decided against transfer of power. Mujibur was quite willing to be PM of Pakistan. Bhutto also y aired the somewhat quaint notion of 2 majority parties for a brief whhile. The Brig. also mentioned that things were not helped by Mujibur not visiting Pak immediately after the elections (apparently he had an invite from the President); there was a fear that he might be assasinated.. this lack of trust led to the March `71 situation and the ensuing civil war.

The Brig mentioned that he didn`t quite get along with Tikka Khan and mentioned the killing of Bangladesh civilians as ``criminal``; apparently this also had something to do with his (the Brig`s) premature retirement. Tikka apparently admitted to the army killing 34,000 people (as opposed to the 3 million figure proposed by other sources). The real numbers are probably in between.

He highly recommended the Hamoodur Rahman report on the 1971 war as required reading.

The Brig. also ruled out any role for a mediator (US or UN) in India Pak talks and believes that the `72 Simla agreement made substantial progress.

In response to a question where someone mentioned ``cross-border`` terrorism, he remarked (like the foreign minister) that it was ``cross LOC`` and not cross border, clearly indicating that Pakistani mainstream is not open to convering LOC into border.

He did mention Pak`s support to Mujahedin during Zia`s regime but denies the impact of religious extremists on Pakistan`s military or polity. This denial I think sheds light on Pakistani`s self perceptions (I am moderate, My friends are moderate, so Pakistan as a whole is made of moderate elements and extremism is not a factor)

He also mentioned that India views itself as a wannabe superpower (the word hegemony was offered apologetically, a throwback to the 70s) and that it had a long term agreement with Russia on nuclear technology. This perception (of India`s supposed desire to be a superpower) also is quite revealing.

He didnt talk too much about Kargil, except to say that there was a failure of Indian Intelligence and that the Indians suffered casualties to recover positions and that the Assamese regiments suffered the most. He openly admitted the presence of Pakistani regulars and mujahedin in Kargil and that Kargil was in process as Lahore visit was being made. He claims Kargil hastened the drafting of a nuclear doctrine from India in August `99. He also claimed that the Indian nuclear button was with the armed forces and not the PM.

He was optimistic about Agra, despite lack of agreement, saying that it was a good start. In his view, the Indian army is war weary and overstretched from Kashmir to Assam and Nagaland; And the Pakistani army has also had enough of war. All this and the economic situation in Pakistan made him hopeful for progress in future talks.

Thats all..

Your reporter

Warpster

Kiran # 93,

Yes i do respect your need for discretion on chowk! However a few of the chowkies living in Canada [and elsewhere ]have revealed their hideout, and so have I !

Fear not , i think no one is going to land at each others door steps !

sa:)

Shirin #92:

You said it! Now, if Larkana is too far, I`ll even settle for Karachi kay pink amrood. Yes, Larkana bibi to ab humein amrood ka ``am`` bhi nahi dein gi. :)

As for where I am in Canada, I think we need to get one on one for that, chowk isn`t exactly a place to discuss geographical locations. I`m sure you`ll agree discretion is necessary.

Regards,

Kiran

Shirin #92:

You said it! Now, if Larkana is too far, I`ll even settle for Karachi kay pink amrood. Yes, Larkana bibi to ab humein amrood ka ``am`` bhi nahi dein gi. :)

As for where I am in Canada, I think we need to get one on one for that, chowk isn`t exactly a place to discuss geographical locations. I`m sure you`ll agree discretion is necessary.

Regards,

Kiran

Kiran # 91,

Oh ho , you too !i had the same lament !now we both deserve a case of `Larkhana key pink Umrood`s from Temporal saheb`! magar unhoon ney to Larkhana walli maim Saheba sey mazaq mazaq mein kaafi kuch khey diya ?

Darn it ! the magician is still roaming aroung in ``Aam key bagh-aat `` !

[P.S. where abouts are u in canada ?]

love,

sa:)

A well put together document Temporal saheb. Now, only if I could find pink Amroods in Canada!?!

*Sigh *

p.s: How does it feel to open up another can of worms? Behas beraye behas shuru hogayee yehaan to, as usual!

A well put together document Temporal saheb. Now, only if I could find pink Amroods in Canada!?!

*Sigh *

p.s: How does it feel to open up another can of worms? Behas beraye behas shuru hogayee yehaan to, as usual!

warpster #89 ``assume you mean by armymen, army officers (from second leut onwards). Could I have the motive behind your query ? ``

By armymen I meant army officers as well as the troops. My motive: to test my theory that the military, like all useless bureaucracies, has become increasingly top-heavy with every mother`s son becoming a general. And this providing an indication where we need to start slashing defense budgets (starting with the ``lal feeta`s`` on top of the food chain).

Thanks in advance (if you get the chance to ask this question among others you may have, i.e.).

tahmed: ok I will ask ur question re the brigadiers. I assume you mean by armymen, army officers (from second leut onwards). Could I have the motive behind your query ? Other queries welcome as well as I am going in with a ``tabula rasa`` attitude. I was wondering if it might be better to have an events forum for posting these types of announcements and requests..

Saturday, 28 July 2001, 9am (maybe 10am) - 12pm, Block AS7, NUS

`Dynamics of Military Triumphalism and Revisionism in Pakistan`



A seminar to be presented by

Brigadier Abdul Rehman Siddiqi,

Executive Director,

Regional Institute of Peace and Security Studies,

Karachi, Pakistan

The product of an essentially non-violence and constitutional struggle against the British rule, India and Pakistan were at each others throat soon after independence. The ensuing Kashmir war made military power as mainstay of Pakistan`s security and of its very existence. The influx of the US military aid and the resulting extension and modernization of military forces spawned a kind of Prussianism or militarism in Pakistan. The 1965 war was a direct consequence of the old confidence in the military triumphalism against India. The 1971 war, was among other factors, the follow up of the inconclusive 1965 war.

However, military defeat and the loss of East Pakistan holds the reappraisal and revision of the effectiveness of the military option: hence the evolution of revisionism or a revisionist military strategy in 1998. India and Pakistan both went nuclear to change materially the strategist landscape. From an activist military posture in conventional terms, Pakistan shifted to the strategy of deterrence or war avoidance behind the nuclear shield.



Profile of Brigadier Abdul Rehman Siddiqi

Following service in Pakistan`s armed forces, Brigadier (retd.) Abdul Rehman Siddiqi`s career as a writer, editor and publisher has been devoted to in-depth study of military history and the analysis of civil-military relations in Third World countries, especially Pakistan. He has travelled widely in connection with his work as a defence analyst, writer and columnist. He has also lectured regularly at the National Defence College, the Command and Staff College, the Naval Staff College and the Air War College. In 1975 he launched the monthly Defence Journal, which he continued to edit until 1997. Brig. (retd.) Siddiqi is a noted writer in Urdu and a student of classical music. He is currently Executive Director of the Regional Institute for Peace and Security Studies in Karachi.

As we go off into tangents and this writing
becomes history, I just wanted to add that
the daughter of Z.A. Bhutto is still welcome
in my house!

Ras

Re: Kaffir K. Khan

As far as having a ``good time`` goes, at least for the PakArmy officers sent abroad on courses, the expectation was that they would do extremely well on the course. Naturally some sifarishis do get in, proportionately probably more now since there are so few courses available, but the selection criteria used to be very strict. A course abroad is certainly greatly covetted but its not an open invitation to have a good time. I don`t know about the Navy or the Air Force, but I expect its the same thing there as well.

Re: Kafir K. Khan

I didn`t say that we have an excellent intelligence gathering apparatus in the US, the UK or anywhere else in the West. All I said was that Defense Attaches get an intelligence gathering allowance. I assume the ones in India, Bangladesh, Nepal, the Gulf, etc, might actually try to do something in the intelligence gathering category but for the rest of them, its just an addition to the salary. I thought I made the salary augmentation aspect of this fairly clear.

Regards.

warpster #82 Here is one question for the speaker on Pakistan defense: What is the number of armymen below the rank of brigadier vs. the number at the rank of brigadier or above? What were these figures 30 years ago?