The Constipated Faujiz

#319 Sadna,

What you are saying about the Pakistani military is exactly what lefties/pinkos/fellow-travellers said about NATO strategy against the Warsaw Pact. Nuclear weapon use was an integral component of NATO`s plans to repel a Soviet attack and all the anti-US forces in Europe were in accord that it is better to be ``Red than Dead.``

Now, if everyone in Europe and the US actually felt like that, we would all be learning Russian by now instead of discarding Scientific Socialism into the dustbin of history. Same goes for Pakistanis in the Army. If no one actually planned on using nukes against Indian forces attacking Lahore, or ``liberating`` AK or ``linking up`` with Afghanistan, etc., then the Indians would have already done something of this sort. I agree that behind the nuclear umbrella, we are taking a pretty big punga with India and at some point its possible that their patience will wear thin....

Nuclear weapons are strange things. Once a country has them, it can never be defeated or conquered by an external enemy. Which is why most states want them. Nuclear weapons freeze the status quo.
This is exactly what has happened in the sub-continent. The current peace talks are proof.
However, India is the status-quo state and Pakistan the revisionist one. Pakistan is a unique nuclear power, in the sense that it attempted to use the threat of nuclear conflict in support of revanchism, which is why Kargil happened so soon after both states became overtly nuclear, after almost thirty years of peace. Pakistani leaders were quickly disillusioned , when the US demanded an unconditional pakistani pullback, unlike calls for a in-place cease fire in earliar conflicts. The big powers simply will not tolerate armed conflict between nuclear armed nations. Any hopes of marching into Srinagar dissapeared in the mushroom cloud in the chagai hills, I am afraid.

bong dongs #325 Here is my 2 cents:

1) Look at it this way: Now that India has nuclear weapons, what has it achieved with them? These weapons are basically irrelevant as far as all other nuclear powers are concerned other than Pakistan - and for Pakistan they have been a Gift of the BJP as I have been saying. Thus, do you think ANY other country in possession of nukes in the world - China, US, Russia, France, Israel (unannounced) - would have in any way had a different policy towards India if it did not possess the bombs? Or is there any country (other than Pakistan, which can now talk to India as a military equal, thanks to the Indian governments that were so intent on nuclearizing India) that is impressed one bit by the indian nukes? Indeed, post USSR Ukraine voluntarily got rid of its nukes, realizing they were no use. Is the average Indian safer due to nukes in India than without them? I dont think so.

Thus, I dont see exactly what risk you see that rushed BJP to blast those bombs, or for india to engage in nuclearization.

2. I am not sure what leads you to believe that China gave fully weaponized nukes to pakistan. I suspect it is the same arrogant thinking in india that led BJP to believe that pakistan was bluffing when it said it had the nukes. After all, it doesnt require much genius to master a 60 year old technology (although the BJP obviously thinks otherwise, given the way they were jumping with joy - just as our mullahs think otherwise as they jump to that rascal Qadeer`s defense. cretins, all of them!)

Anyway, coming back to your question: I will agree with you that ONCE Pakistan had started on the path of nuclearization, there wasnt much choice for India to do the same. Its just that India`s program was not driven by Pakistan`s effort as much as it was by Indian governments still living in the past when nuclear power meant international prestige.

So, my question to you is: What came first, the chicken (say, India`s nuclear program) or the egg (Pakistan`s program)?

My second question is: Does the first question matter? If indian leadership had been using its head rather than its ego, it would have done back in 1971 what it has doing now: calling for peace rather than arrogantly declaring kashmir to be off limits to any discussion. Anyway, ``der ayay, durust ayay`` (it is OK to be late as long as it is correct). Let us hope this entire discussion we are having on nukes proves academic, and one day both countries get rid of nukes and conventional sabre rattling and start living as civilized people.

#325
1)The indefinite extension of NPT and India`s isolation among countries opposing this extension. The associated risk of being stuck perpetually as a non-nuclear state (in NPT terms)

2)Extensive proliferation of China to Pakistan incuding complete weaponized warhead designs, delivery systems, reactor at Kaushab, possible supply of fissile materials itself.
This degraded Indian deterrance as Indian designs were untested.

whats your opinion on these two points?

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bongdongs #323 You already provided the correct answer!! (i.e. when you say ``I`m afraid there will be lot of subjectivity in that as well.``) No need to foresake your roti. :-)

bongdongs #323 Just to expand a bit more on your answer: Often something is good in the short run, bad in the medium run, good again in the longer run, and so ad infinitum.

Thus, in case of 1998 (and this is a purely subjective reading of the situation, not intended to start another round of bitter exchanges with outraged Indians coming out of the woodwork as if the world`s future depended on these chowk interactions):

Time Period 1 (Immediate): India - 0, Pakistan - 1.
Reason: Immediate result was that Pakistan achieved clear nuclear parity with India. BJP (although its chamchas on chowk will never admit it) basically saw the world turn upside down as reality shattered their illusions and celebrations turned to panic.

Time Period 2 (Within few months): India - 0, Pakistan - 1.
Reason: Sanctions lifted. Pakistan became too dangerous to be kept in the economic doghouse.

Time Period 3 (Within several months): India - 1, Pakistan - 1.
Reason: BJP switched policy from one of pushing Pakistan into pariah status internationally, and seeking peace. Both countries benefitted.

Time Period 4 (Kargill and military takeover): India - 1, Pakistan - 0.
Reason: The strong Pakistan military reaction to the vajpayee visit, resulted in Kargil (which was clearly designed to kill the peace process) and ultimately to the military take over. Kargill bolstered indian support for BJP, thus providing stability at a critical time for India (i.e. when foreign companies were increasingly seeing india as outsourcing destination).

Time Period 5 (Current times): India - 1; Pakistan - 1.
Reason: Back on peace track. Nothing like a nuclear stalemate and balance of terror to get governments talking peace.

Time Period 6 (Future): Who the hell knows.

PS: To repeat, the above is not meant to be the last word on this, and any posters in the woodwork who are itching to write nasty posts insulting my ancestors are requested to drink a glass of water instead and take a walk.

PPS: to bongdongs, if you find time between roti chaakri, your thoughts would still be welcome (although not necessarily agreed with).

#322

``... surely the results can be more objectively viewed...``

I`m afraid there will be lot of subjectivity in that as well. A lot of stuff will also be classified (what exactly was discussed in those Talbot-Jaswant talks?). But will be a useful exercise I`ll try and research and write it up from my perspective (time permitting, roji roti ki naukri is placing some demands :-))

bongdongs #317 How about summarizing the results of the `98 tests as well? ;-)

We can disagree on the reasons, but surely the results can be more objectively viewed.

#317

My summary has been:

reasons for the `98 tests:

1)The indefinite extension of NPT and India`s isolation among countries opposing this extension. The associated risk of being stuck perpetually as a non-nuclear state (in NPT terms)

2)Absolutely no progress towards N-disarmament by the N-5 (an essential part of the NPT)

3)US pressure on the CTBT (Test Ban Treaty) and FMCT. A need to pre-empt the ``entry into force`` of the CTBT.

4)Extensive proliferation of China to Pakistan incuding complete weaponized warhead designs, delivery systems, reactor at Kaushab, possible supply of fissile materials itself.
This degraded Indian deterrance as Indian designs were untested.

5)Pressure from the Indian pro-bomb scientific lobby (I think Perkovich over-emphasises this)

6)An evaluation that having overt nuclear programs will give India an edge economically and technologically. Economically, due to the large Pakistani dependence on aid (hadn`t foreseen 9/11 at that point). Technologically, due to larger scientific base and much smaller dependence on imported/stolen technology.

7)The rise to power of the BJP, which right from its Jan Sangh days espoused the bomb.

8)Internal political point-scoring.

Assigning relative weights to each point is difficult.

AlephNull #308, #309, #310
Thanks! I remember reading somewhere that part of the US government`s/CIA?`s nonproliferation strategy was `encouragement` of anti-nuclear intellectuals in countries like India.

So whenever Zia Mian?(also at Princeton like Ramanna, I believe), Hoodbhoy, or Roy or any of their fellow travellers speaks with selective outrage about India/Pakistan but never mentions China or NK, or even the US`s refusal to ratify the CTBT, I remember that. However, in the past days, I searched and searched but couldnot resurrect that reference, so cannot vouch for this rememberance being authentic at all.

btw, who knows how many chowk `intellectuals` caught this(or even care):
http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/mar2004-daily/01-03-2004/oped/o3.htm

``In a group discussion in National Defence College, I argued against nuclear weapons because I firmly believe that they are not useable, least of all in Pakistan. But the brigadier disputed my contention, and vehemently claimed that one could be used. I countered by asking him, where would he use it? He said in east Punjab or Delhi. Then I said its fallout would be equally destructive to Pakistan. He had a ready answer to that, and instinctively suggested that Pakistan would already have been destroyed.

This kind of logic coming from the students of the highest military training institute in the country should send chills down anyone’s spines. What I am trying to say is that the Military, all three arms in particular, and ordinary people in Pakistan, in general tend to believe that nuclear weapons are a good thing for Pakistan and their absence makes Pakistan’s defences vulnerable to threats from India. Given half a chance, these generals, (only one out of twelve became a general, and that too because of strong safaris, reportedly by the then President to the then Chief of Army Staff) are likely to use nuclear weapons at the first indication of a military defeat at the hands of India. This should worry Indians more.``

arjun #314 You wouldnt be holding your breath if you understood plain english and read what i had said to you originally.

#309 by AlephNull

“So a truer description of what happened may be of ‘selective proliferation’ under the guise of non-proliferation. From that point of view, the biggest blow that India struck by testing in ’98 was at the US State Department.”

I read your several posts with interest on the subject. I must say that the range you display shows an avid interest of probably SME (Subject Matter Expert) proportions. My post would be short as I have some eyes problem and it is hard for me to read with enough concentration to absorb your POV w/o thinking that I may have missed something.
However, to just open the discussion initially from our previous disconnect, I may need to surmise it a little. We were discussing or attempting to figure out India’s true intent behind ’98 blast.
See next Post.

#309 by AlephNull
Continue other post

There were many ‘justifications’ advanced by some of our friends and some of them you have already agreed with, were not worth the effort. Here is a few that made sense.

1. The scientific need- important but can only be considered in conjunction with other strategic or political objectives.
2. The china factor- it is there but IMO, not a huge factor at the time of the blast itself. I will come back to it, as this may be the ultimate important factor once Pakistan nuke puzzle is out of the way.
3. The Pakistan factor- as a sole objective does not have much legs but if considered in the overall Indian ambitions of regional ascendancy-this becomes an important factor.
4. Internal political situation- does have lots of merit but there is no point in discussing this, as it was a short term objective and more emotional in nature than of any substance.

Serious posting problems. See another post.

#309 by AlephNull
Continue other post
Last part.

You have also introduced a new element as quoted above-The US state dept- It does not seem that you are putting it as one of the objectives of the ’98 blast but among many aftershocks of the blast. Incidentally, before we ended of our previous discussion, that’s where, I felt that we would have ended up, if I had not felt that there was element of condescend in your posts. I may have rushed to judgment as I have become more familiar with your style now.

I will post more as I feel better, but I think I have given a fair range for you to expand until I am able to see better.

Chowk Staff-

Just in case you aren`t aware yet, there are problems in posting.
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