Happy 56th Anniversary, Pakistan and India Ref Fawad

`` was wondering .....has hinduism in any way been influenced by islam?``

The most significant example is probably the ``Bhakti`` movement which was deeply influenced by Sufi Pirs. Can someone write in more detail about the interactions between Sufism and the ``Bhakti`` movement?

In the same period you also have the rise of saints like Kabir and Guru Nanak, who tried to bridge the two religions.

Dissing Ideologies shammi,

Some info on ``Project Pluto`` the US effort to build a nuclear powered ramjet:

http://www.nv.doe.gov/news&pubs/publications/historyreports/news&views/pluto.htm

There is also a discovery or PBS documentary on it that they run from time to time

Refugees of A Refugee Camp ROmair,

Could you provide us your estimate of which Pakistani institutions are participating in the Super 7 project and what their responsibilities are?

For instance on the LCA:

Overall program management: ADA

Flight Control: CLAW (CAIR, ADA, NAL ...)

HUD: CSIO

Mission Computer: HAL

Radar: LRDE

etc etc

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-5/sainis.html

Refugees of A Refugee Camp #108

My reading on the Super 7 program:

1)The Pakistani`s have considerable input in the requirements analysis/conceptual design phase.

2)On detailed design they are participating in areas where they have expertise:western avionics/ weapons integration.

3)In several critical areas (materials, flight control, mission comp develop etc) there is/will be an attempt to develop Pakistani expertise. I do not know which institutes, govt run companies are involved or how much of an ability they have to absorb this.

4)For manufacturing the pattern followed for the K-8 was that initially the aircraft was assembled in Kamra with about 25% Pakistani parts (tail assembly) with a plan to progressively increase the number of domestic parts (the program seems to have stalled though with only 8 examples produced)

5)Similar pattern will be attempted for the FC-1 but due to a large increase in complexity over the K-8 and since it is the first time Pakistan will assemble an entire jet figter, for assembly at Kamra it will require a substantial investment in jigs/machine tools so maybe the first batch may be Chengdu assembled with some Pak parts. Anyway the idea will be to finally assemble domestically with progressive increase in the % of domestic parts.

The first mock-up was displayed at Chengdu this year (or was this a roll-out of the first prototype, who knows?). Since most developmental work is being done at Chengdu, and since I assume all (initial at least) flight testing work will take place in China, I dont understand what a ``roll-out at Kamra`` means. I would expect the first batch out of Kamra to be a full production version.

Refugees of A Refugee Camp Pakistani top gun:

Combat Commanders School (CCS) at Sargodha.

Breaking News: Suicide Bomb in Karachi ROmair

Can the self righteousness dude, nobody buys your snake oil anymore.

Lighting The Nuclear Fire ``since im assuming ur indian doesnt that kind of stuff already go on in bombay and goa ???``

ghar ki murgi daal barabar :-))))

When Riz Khan Came to Town Saxena


``...overkill...would you agree?....(i won`t say what for the benefit of those who haven`t seen it)...``


Yaar, but really can one have too much of it? I really liked the movie though. Made me want to learn spanish and find a job for a ``Maltiadore`` (sp?) and move to the promised Mexican land.


btw, you now know what to scream when you get rear ended by one of the ubiquitous fruit-pickers/wetbacks filled pickup :-)

When Riz Khan Came to Town Saxena


``Yu comprende barrio culture?``


Sorry boss, yu tu mama... is set in upper class Mexico city nothing to do with Barrio culture. For a dose of that see ``Training Day``.

Refugees of A Refugee Camp Tulu is skopen in southern Konkan/ northern Karnataka and has no written form. I think Aishwarya Rai is a native Tulu speaker.

The Perfect Murder ``has any pakistani had the arrogance and gall to write such a racist , sterotype-laden piece of trash ...``

You dont read many Pakistani newspapers do you? (or even ROmair for that matter):-)

(Btw I agree such stereotypes are dangerous and useless)

The Perfect Murder #326

Is the war thing finally getting to Hamidm, the civilian version of the Glenlivet swilling, golf playing Pakistani generals? His observations seem to have swung away from the velocity of Fedorov`s shots and the lenght of the shorts girls are wearing this summer in Michigan to the amount of heeng in Hindoo Aloo-Gobi.

The Last Crusade Harpreet #322

Yes your questions are ofcourse very justified. but honestly whatever war plans exist will not be discussed openly. The problems are are actually even more complex than Mr Jha realizes:

1)``India should open a dialogue with Pakistan to get a better idea of where Musharraf stands``

Its a bit too late for that, where Mr Musharraf stands on that issue is well known.

2)The ``limited war`` options Mr Jha proposes are not really as limited as they seem. A naval blockade is internationally recognized as an act of war. A strike at training camps does not cause much damage and will be easily rebuilt. But on the positive side if strikes are limited to POK it does not constitute violation of Pakistani soverignity.

3)Diverting Indus waters cannot be done overnight. Massive canal works will be required. Also internationaly there are several conventions to protect rights of lower riparian states. Also the Indus water ``Treaty`` is a treaty and not just an agreement, so there are several international complications. The threat of doing this has been made implicitly but to no effect, so actually taking action on this threat will take several years and the results on Pakistani society will be unpredicitable.

4)About nuclear war-fighting, I agree with him its just a complicated game of ``bluff`` being played. I would hazard a guess that nuclear war plans are very rudimentary on both sides, this is the scariest part.

btw, you may want to read ``Dragonfire`` by Humphrey Hawksley. who knows maybe this cheap thriller called it right? (like tom clancy with the planes)

The Last Crusade For ROmair who keeps pleading for the ``goras`` to come back and save his a..

A Review of Chandrashekhar Dasgupta`s War and Diplomacy in Kashmir,

1947-48 Sage Publications, New Delhi. 2002. ISBN: 0-7619-9588-9.

Price: US$17.75. 239 pages)

http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DE22Df01.html

May 21, 2002 atimes.com

By Sreeram Chaulia

Peace will come only if we have the strength to resist invasion and

make it clear that it will not pay.

- Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to Governor General Louis

Mountbatten, December 26, 1947

Having won accolades for more than 30 years as one of the brightest

and best Indian Foreign Service officers, the legendary

Chandrashekhar Dasgupta has once again proved his mettle by writing a

highly original, revelatory and myth-shattering book on the genesis

of the Kashmir imbroglio. No competent historian until now has been

able to portray the undeclared 1947-8 India-Pakistan war over Kashmir

from the standpoint of British strategic and diplomatic calculations.

It comes as no surprise that the Promethean ``CD`` (as Dasgupta is

admiringly called by the ``old boys`` of his St Stephen`s College,

Delhi, and in the diplomatic corps) decided to fill the gap with a

lucid and well-referenced treatise on the perfidies of Whitehall and

its representatives who remained in authoritative positions on the

subcontinent even after formal transfer of power to the domains of

India and Pakistan.

While the origins of the Kashmir conflict are highly contested by

both the claimant parties and this debated history has produced

several partisan as well as impartial accounts, Dasgupta`s work is

the first to unearth the complex military and diplomatic decision-

making in the crowded 15-month war that was influenced and distorted

by Britain.

British aces on the eve of the Kashmir crisis

Immediately after Indian and Pakistani independence, by a peculiar

quirk of circumstances, Britain had a number of ``men on the spot`` at

its disposal to protect and buttress its interests. First, the

governor-general and head of state in India was Lord Louis

Mountbatten of the British Royal Navy. True to his blue-blooded

lineage and decorated career rendering yeoman service to ``His

Majesty, the King of England``, Mountbatten took

regular ``appreciations`` and advice on his role in India from Clement

Attlee, Defense Minister Alexander Albert, the UK chiefs of staff,

British high commissioners in Delhi and Karachi, and the Secretary of

State for Commonwealth Relations, Noel Baker. In the words of

Mountbatten`s aide, Ismay, anything that brought the two dominions,

India and Pakistan, into a crisis ``was a matter in which the

instructions of His Majesty the King should be sought [by the

Governor-General]`` (p 21).

Second, Field Marshall Auchinleck remained supreme commander of the

British Indian army even after August 15 1947, and closely conferred

with Commanders-in-Chief Rob Lockhart and Roy Bucher, Air Chief

Marshall Thomas Elmherst and a host of other generals in both India

and Pakistan. Their importance as trump cards for guaranteeing

British strategic objectives was underlined by the Commonwealth

Affairs Committee in London, which proclaimed that in an emergency

involving India and Pakistan, ``the Minister of Defense, in

consultation with the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations,

should send instructions to the Supreme Commander`` (p 33). Throughout

the Kashmir war, Nehru and Patel had occasions to be furious with the

solicitation of external instructions by British commanders who owed

primary loyalties to London.

With nationals of a third country leading the opposing armies and top

executive structures of India and Pakistan, the Kashmir war of 1947-8

was unique in the annals of modern warfare, yet fell into the

predictable pattern of third world conflicts that were ``moderated``

or ``finessed`` by great power pressures. Without full national control

over respective armies, India and (to a lesser extent) Pakistan were

unable to determine the course and outcome of the war as their

political elites wished.

Twin British `instructions` and the fatal tilt

Two broad British interests, conveyed and acted out through

Mountbatten and other operatives, were at stake in an India-Pakistan

war. One was integrity of the commonwealth and avoidance of inter-

dominion warfare. Reduced to a ``half great power`` by 1945, London

foresaw immense prestige and economic and political merit in

retaining both India and Pakistan in its sphere of influence and knew

the dangers inherent in taking sides, irrespective of the legality or

morality of the Indian or Pakistani case. In July 1947, Whitehall

issued a ``Stand Down`` instruction to British authorities if

hostilities broke out between the two dominions ``since under no

circumstances could British officers be ranged on opposite sides`` (p

19). Averting open war thus became a sine qua non of British purpose,

regardless of the relative rectitude of the two sides.

``Stand Down`` was not, however, meant to be neutrality, leave alone

benevolent neutrality, for the larger geopolitical reassessment

conducted by British planners in 1946-7 was clear that ``our strategic

interests in the subcontinent lay primarily in Pakistan`` (p 17).

Hopes of a defense treaty with India were present but not deemed as

vital as the retention of Pakistan, ``particularly the North West``,

within the commonwealth. The bases, airfield and ports of the North

West were invaluable for commonwealth defense. Besides, the UK chiefs

of staff reasoned that Pakistan had to be kept on board to preserve

British ``strategic positions in the Middle East and North Africa``.

Employing typical communal logic, the former colonial masters also

felt that estranging Pakistan would harm Britain`s relations with

the ``whole Mussulman bloc``, a premise that would be fatal when the

Kashmir war came up before the UN Security Council. Briefed that

the ``area of Pakistan is strategically the most important in the

continent of India and the majority of our strategic requirements

could be met … by an agreement with Pakistan alone`` (p 17),

Mountbatten and the British personnel on the ground knew whom not to

displease if it really came to a choice between India and Pakistan.

Prelude in Junagadh

A curtain-raiser to this tilt came over the disputed accession of

Junagadh in September 1947, when British service chiefs tried to

falsely convince Nehru and Patel that the Indian army was ``in no

position to conduct large-scale operations`` to flush out the Nawab`s

private army from neighboring Mangrol. Patel rebutted bitterly to

Mountbatten, ``senior British officers owed loyalty to and took orders

from Auchinleck rather than the Indian government`` (p 26). The

governor-general, who constituted a defense committee of the cabinet

during the stand-off appointing himself, not Nehru, as the chairman,

backed off and allowed Junagadh`s incorporation into the Indian

union, not before cheekily suggesting ``lodging a complaint to the

United Nations against Junagadh`s act of aggression``. Kashmir would

be a different kettle of tea because Pakistan had a much greater

interest in it and the British were wary of the dangers of ``losing``

Pakistan from their grand strategic chessboard.

Constraining India at war

Before the Pakistani ``tribal`` invasion of Kashmir in October 1947,

General Lockhart was secretly informed by his British counterpart in

Rawalpindi of the preparations underway for the raids. The commander-

in-chief shared the crucial information with his two other British

service chiefs but not with the Indian government (Nehru discovered

this delinquency only in December, leading to Lockhart`s dismissal).

After the invasion and the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India,

Lockhart and Mountbatten worked feverishly behind the scenes to

prevent inter-dominion war, which in fact meant restraining Indian

armed retaliation against the invading Pakistani irregulars.

Patel`s directive that arms be supplied urgently to reinforce the

Maharaja`s defences ``was simply derailed by the commander-in-chief

acting in collusion with Field Marshal Auchinleck``. (p 42).

Mountbatten, privately chastising Jinnah for actively abetting the

tribal invasion, publicly advised the Indian government that it would

be a folly to send munitions to a ``neutral`` state since Pakistan

could do the same and it would end up a full-scale war. Nehru and

Patel were certain than an informal state of war already existed and

urged an airlift of Indian armed forces to relieve Srinagar from the

rampaging Pathans. The service chiefs warned that an airlift

involved ``great risks and dangers``, but Nehru refused to be deterred.

In November, as the situation worsened in the Jammu-Poonch-Mirpur

sector and Nehru asked for immediate military relief, Mountbatten and

Lockhart painted somber pictures of the incapacity of the Indian

armed forces. When Nehru still insisted on action to ``rid Jammu of

raiders``, the British slyly changed the order to mean

merely ``evacuating garrisons``.

In the absence of Pakistani ``appeals`` to the raiders to withdraw and

with more evidence of invader brutalities in Kashmir, the Indian

cabinet exhorted more and more forceful policies - air interdiction

of Afridi invasion routes and even a counter-attack into West

Pakistan to ``strike at bases and nerve centres of the raiders``. A

desperate Moutbatten then mooted complaint against the tribal

invasion to the United Nations as the proper course of action and

simultaneously promised full military preparations for a counter-

attack. Nehru accepted this in good faith, hoping the British service

chiefs would keep their part of the agreement. ``This proved to be a

fatal error. The Governor-General was determined to thwart the

cabinet`` (p 101). General Bucher saw to it that no measures were made

for a lightning strike across the border and Britain also imposed a

sudden cut in oil supplies in early 1948, with serious implications

for India`s capacity to carry out military operations in Kashmir.

Ismay, Mountbatten`s chief of staff and British high commissioner to

India, Shone, reported to London that Pakistan was ``the guilty state

conniving in actual use of force in Kashmir`` (p 58). Attlee was, of

course, unprepared to alienate Pakistan and ``the whole of Islam`` and

accepted the latter`s contention that Karachi could appeal to the

tribal invaders only after a ``fair`` solution was reached in Kashmir.

Noel Baker marshalled this thinly veiled pro-Pakistan approach at the

Commonwealth Relations Office and then transferred his communal bias

to the UN Security Council (UNSC) in the early months of 1948.

British skullduggery at the UN

Around the same time, the partition of Palestine earned bitter Arab

recriminations against Britain and America, and the Foreign Office in

London decided, ``Arab opinion might be further aggravated if British

policy on Kashmir were seen as being unfriendly to a Muslim state`` (p

111). Aneurin Bevin`s pro-Pakistan line, shared by Noel Baker, meant

that British proposals in the Security Council were supportive of

Pakistan on every major point. Kashmir`s accession to India was

ignored and the problem of irregular invasion pushed under the

carpet. ``The only yardstick used by Bevin and Noel-Baker was

acceptability to Pakistan. Indian reactions, not to mention legal or

constitutional factors, were hardly taken into account`` (p 114).

Close British allies America, Canada, and France were brought around

to supporting the Pakistani stand, but not before US Secretary of

State George Marshall plainly stated that his government ``found it

difficult to deny the legal validity of Kashmir`s accession to India``

(p 121). But in the desire not to present a rival proposal and thus

convey to the USSR divisions in the ``Anglo-Saxon camp``, Washington

reluctantly followed the British agenda. American ambassador to

India, Grady, went on record saying the US ``would have adopted a more

sympathetic attitude to India, had it not been for the pressure

exerted by the British delegates``. Even as loyal a Briton as

Mountbatten had to record, ``power politics and not impartiality are

governing the attitude of the Security Council`` (p 123). Attlee

himself was disturbed at the undue discretion Noel Baker was

exercising in New York and wrote: ``all the concessions are being

asked from India, while Pakistan concedes little or nothing. The

attitude still seems to be that it is India which is at fault whereas

the complaint was rightly lodged against Pakistan`` (p 129). Following

a rethink by the major players, the April resolutions of the UNSC,

despite Noel Baker`s best efforts, called for withdrawal of the

invaders from ``Azad Kashmir`` for which ``Pakistan should use its best

endeavours``, to be followed by a plebiscite as Nehru had agreed. The

August 1948 UNCIP (United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan)

resolution restated the sequential de-escalation with greater

clarity.

The Bucher-Gracey deal

Baker`s pitch that ``stabilization`` of the situation required the

induction of regular Pakistani army soldiers into Jammu and Kashmir,

though not succeeding in the UNSC, found another votary in General

Roy Bucher, Lockhart`s replacement as commander-in-chief of the

Indian army. Behind the back of his government, Bucher had top-secret

confabulations with his British counterpart in Pakistan, Douglas

Gracey, in March 1948. An informal truce was agreed upon (with the

assent of Pakistan premier Liaqat Ali Khan) where Bucher promised not

to launch any offensive into territory controlled by the ``Azad

Kashmir`` forces and to withdraw Indian troops from Poonch town and

the environs of Rajouri. ``Each side would remain in undisputed

military occupation of what are roughly their present positions … and

it will be essential for some Pakistan Army troops to be employed in

the Uri sector`` (p 139). Upon learning of this scheme, Nehru and

Patel flatly rejected it as unauthorized contradiction of their aim

of expelling occupants from the entire territory of Jammu and

Kashmir.

The Bucher-Gracey deal never materialized, but it presaged Pakistan`s

unilateral push of its regular battalions into raider-held areas in

May, a crucial movement known to Bucher in advance but conveniently

hidden from Nehru until it was too late. Noel Baker hush-hushed the

violation of ``Stand Down`` when Gracey personally ordered the influx

of the Pakistani army with British officers into Kashmir, citing

threats to British interests: ``Pakistan might leave the Commonwealth;

the hostility of the Muslim population of the world to the UK might

be increased`` (p 160).

A `very secret` alliance

In September 1948, as an Indian advance into Mirpur looked imminent,

Pakistan sent its deputy army chief to London on a ``very secret

mission`` to negotiate a defense treaty with Britain. Attlee welcomed

Liaqat`s demarche and the preliminary discussions ``served to enhance

the pro-Pakistan tilt in British policy`` (p 170). As a reward for

Pakistan`s eagerness to join the West, London offered the Pakistan

army ``hints``, ``tips`` and ``assurances`` about Indian army plans in the

last three months of the Kashmir war. Most appallingly, while

maintaining the fa?ade of neutrality, the UK High Commission in

Karachi noted, ``from London, assurance had now been given by H M G

that an attack by India on west Punjab would not be tolerated`` (p

171, emphasis original). Bucher restricted Indian offensive action to

the utmost and relayed all vital intelligence to his opposing number

in Pakistan, allowing the latter to relocate forces in most

vulnerable sectors. Attlee also bent the rules of ``Stand Down`` in

favor of Pakistan, what with British officers planning and

executing ``Operation Venus`` in Naoshera.

Besides military aid, Pakistan`s offer of a defense pact elicited

Noel Baker`s promise to return the Kashmir question to the UNSC

before India evacuated invaders from the whole of Jammu and Kashmir.

In November, Britain tried mobilizing support in the UNSC for

an ``unconditional ceasefire``, freezing the trench lines but

permitting Pakistan to retain troops in Jammu and Kashmir. America

turned it down as ``inappropriate`` and inconsistent with UNCIP and

UNSC resolutions. John Foster Dulles complained, ``the present UK

approach to Kashmir appears extremely pro-Pakistan as against the

middle ground`` (p 195). The final UNCIP proposals, reaffirming the

earlier resolutions, fell short of Indian expectations, but Nehru had

no other option than accepting them since Bucher and his cohorts had

convinced the cabinet with their ``superior expertise`` that India

was ``militarily impotent``.

Conclusions

Drawing upon recently declassified British Foreign Office

archives, ``CD`` has dug out some of the most telltale and hermetically

sealed secrets of Whitehall malfeasance during the first Kashmir war.

The much-trumpeted British ``sense of fairness`` comes unstuck in this

damning book, inducing the reader to wonder what kind of neutrality

it was that caused General Cariappa to remark he was ``fighting two

enemies - army headquarters headed by Roy Bucher and the Pakistani

army headed by Messervy`` (p 137). What kind of impartiality was it

that the British high commissioner in India could upbraid the British

chief of the Indian Air Force for ``foolish, unnecessary and

provocative action`` (p 209)? The counter-factual conclusion one

gleans from War and Diplomacy in Kashmir is that the history of

Kashmir and of the subcontinent would have been a lot different had

Britain not toyed with facts and legality to serve its ulterior ends

through eminences grises in India and Pakistan or had America taken a

keener interest in the region and not left the nitty-gritty in the

hands of its ``Anglo-Saxon ally``.

Incidentally, ``CD```s research has also demythified Nehru`s alleged

pacifism, feebleness and ``softness`` towards Pakistan. The Indian

prime minister emerges from the narrative as, to use a term he

disapproved, a courageous ``realist`` who thoroughly understood the

geopolitical and military context of Kashmir. It has, of late, become

fashionable in Indian politics to demean Nehru as a dreamy utopian

who practiced appeasement and squandered Indian advantages in foreign

policy. ``CD`` has shown that whatever mistakes India made in 1947-8

had to do with the sabotage of external agents who kept Nehru in the

dark on several outstanding counts.

In terms of policy relevance, this book should be read by those who

currently advocate ``third party arbitration`` to solve South Asian

disharmony. It is useful to know from history that facilitators and

mediators had and have their own gooses to cook in Kashmir.

The Last Crusade Of course this will be like water off a turtles back to ROmair, Hobbyty and their ilk anyway others may be interested:

ISI is responsible, says son; mourners heckle hardliner Geelani

Muzamil Jaleel & Mufti Islah

Srinagar, May 21: Senior Hurriyat leader Abdul Gani Lone, considered the most moderate voice in the separatist camp and who barely weeks ago had said that time had come for jihad to end in the Valley, was assassinated here on Tuesday by unidentified militants.

Lone was shot soon after attending a rally—attended by about 15,000 people—at Martyrs` graveyard in the Idgah locality of downtown Srinagar to mark the 12th death anniversary of Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq. Lone`s family blamed Pakistan, its ISI and hardline Hurriyat leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani for the killing.

As Lone`s body reached his Sant Nagar residence, hundreds of his supporters and relatives assembled there shouting slogans in favour of independence of Kashmir. Said Lone`s son Sajjad Lone: ``I want to tell the world who did it. It is ISI, Pakistan and Geelani. We will definitely ask them. They will have to pay for it,` he shouted as relatives tried to calm him down.

When Geelani showed up, he had to beat a hasty retreat after a group of Lone supporters, agitated and angry, abused at him. ``We want nothing. What do you have to do here?`` they shouted.

Lone`s driver Abdul Rasheed and one of the few eyewitnesses, described the scene: ``I was walking ahead of him. He was accompanied by his body guards (J-K policemen) when a man appeared and shot at him. He first threw something, perhaps a grenade, which did not explode and dropped in a drain.``

``Within seconds he opened fire at Lone sahib,`` he said. ``We tried to rush towards Lone sahib`s body but he fired at us too. I escaped bullets but another bodyguard was injured.``

Hurriyat chairman Abdul Gani Bhat and JKLF leader Javed Mir were just a few dozen metres behind Lone. ``We had left the rally together. As we were walking, somebody from the crowd shook my hand but while doing so he tripped, this incident made us stop for a few minutes by which time Lone had moved ahead,`` he said. ``Then there was firing and we could not understand what was going on.``

Said Javed Mir said: ``I heard a few gunshots and then people started running. There was utter confusion and somebody fell down. When we came closer, it was Lone sahib and his guards.``

Earlier, the rally had begun from the Razaykadal (downtown) headquarters of Mirwaiz`s Awami Action Committee after mid-day prayers. An estimated 15,000 people had assembled at the Idgah grounds to attend the rally. All through, people chanted slogans in favour of freedom and Pakistan. Incidentally, Jamat leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani was not present. Lone did not address the gathering.

Even as the Hurriyat leaders started addressing the rally, splinter groups from among the people tried to shout them down with slogans like Saudabazi nahin chalegi (No sell out will be allowed).

Clearly aimed at the moderate Hurriyat leadership, these groups--mostly young men--were showing their anger against recent overtures of Lone and Mirwaiz especially emanating for their Dubai conference with Pakistan`s Kashmir Committee chief Sardar Abdul Qayoom Khan and other Kashmiri leaders from Britain, USA and Canada.

The leaders there had sought an end to violence as a strategy and stressed on political and peaceful means to resolve the Kashmir conflict given the ``changing realities`` post-September 11.

In Pakistan, the United Jehad Council alleged that Indian agencies were behind Lone`s death. ``It is a big tragedy, we express our sorrow and grief,`` a UJC spokesman said in Muzaffarabad, capital of the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

The Last Crusade Mian Regressive

``Test page to see arabie script.Insha`Allah urdu & farsi will follow``

Seems like it was Allahs will that the infidels would not be able to see your rantings in Arabic.

Praise be to Allah for small mercies!