Lighting The Nuclear Fire
Battle lines drawn around Musharraf
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Seven months into its newfound relationship with the United States, Pakistan finds itself isolated - the US and its coalition partners have condemned its latest series of missile tests, and they are increasingly accepting the Indian claim that Pakistan-sponsored terrorism is the cause of the troubles in Kashmir.
And just as the nation is becoming isolated and confused by the international turn of events, so too is its leader, President General Pervez Musharraf, who appears to be caught between the devil and the deep blue sea on the domestic front.
Imtiaz Alam, a commentator on political affairs, points out that the ``commando president`` - even as Islamabad puts Pakistan on a war footing - ``is being opposed by both liberals and religious extremists for entirely opposite reasons. The liberals want him to come down heavily against the extremists who threaten both internal and external security. The religious extremists detest him for abandoning the Taliban and are not even willing to trust him in his war against India, which they hate.``
US President George W Bush has told Musharraf to work harder to stop cross-border incursions into Indian-controlled Kashmir. ``He must perform,`` Bush said. These remarks from a great ally endorse the view that Pakistan is still sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir, even though Musharraf has pledged not to.
Opposition politicians in Pakistan now want Musharraf to step down and hand over power to an independent caretaker as the only way to forge national unity. This sentiment was expressed in a resolution filed by more than 15 mainstream political and religious-political parties in Lahore last week that said, ``Musharraf should immediately resign from all his de facto positions and hand over power to a neutral caretaker government which should unite the nation, face the challenge posed by India and hold fair and free election.``
But at the same time, the opposition is making it clear that it is against Musharraf and not the military itself - in an apparent move to capitalize on anti-Musharraf sentiment said to be simmering within military ranks because of his political ambitions. ``We have full confidence in our military capabilities and preparedness, but Musharraf stands discredited and lacks the stature and moral authority to deal with the current threat to national security and territorial integrity of Pakistan,`` said a spokesman for the Pakistan People`s Party, led by former premier Benazir Bhutto.
Critics also say that Musharraf has pitted himself against domestic forces over the years - most recently though the April 30 referendum that extended his rule for five years which was roundly criticized at home. This has made it difficult for him to have enough political standing to pursue dialogue with India, they added.
The opposition conference by the All Parties Conference in Lahore came just days before Musharraf`s consultative meeting with politicians on tensions with India, which rose after last week`s attack in Indian-administered Kashmir that New Delhi blames on Pakistani militants.
Because opposition parties boycotted Musharraf`s meeting with politicians, one newspaper reported that it was attended by ``all the king`s men`` who have little public support and who have always been regarded as establishment-backed. ``It reveals how isolated Islamabad is at home, despite a serious challenge to the national existence,`` said Alam.
The April referendum that gave Musharraf another five years in office appears to have created an unbridgeable divide between political forces and Musharraf, one that would only widen until elections planned in October.
Many people believe that the Musharraf is also using the tense situation with India - he has said that Pakistanis would defend ``every inch`` of the country - to win back people`s sympathies that critics say he had lost by ``fabricating`` the referendum result.
This is the first time in Pakistan`s history that a sitting government has faced such criticism at a time of grave external threat. In the past, the country stood united when Pakistan and India fought wars in 1965 and 1971, even though the then military rulers had also created enough cause for opposition resentment.
But this time, the opposition, frustrated by Musharraf`s agenda of political exclusion and his plans to keep all power concentrated in him through his planned amendments to the constitution, are not ready to give him any room to relax, despite the current war clouds. The parties say that Musharraf - who is president, chief executive as well as army chief - cannot lead the country in a war.
``We demand the appointment of a full-time army chief who could devote all his attention to the country`s defense and who could meet the threat to national security and territorial integrity,`` said Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, a veteran politician who chaired the opposition`s Lahore conference. ``If [British prime minister Neville] Chamberlain can be replaced by [Winston] Churchill in the middle of World War II, certainly Musharraf can step down and hand over power to a nationally acceptable government in the larger interest of uniting the country in this hour of need,`` asserted Khan.
In fact, some of Musharraf`s harshest critics hold him responsible for the current impasse with India. They refer to his role in the 1999 undeclared Kargil conflict with India that scuttled the so-called Lahore Peace Process, initiated after Indian Premier Atal Bihari Vajpayee`s train trip to Lahore in February 1999. They say it was due to Musharraf`s role in Kargil as army chief that India never took his repeated peace offers seriously.
``We are with the nation and not with Pervez Musharraf, who disrupted the Lahore process with his Kargil misadventure without the consent of the then prime minister,`` argued Zafar Ali Shah, a close associate of former premier Nawaz Sharif, whom Musharraf deposed in an October 1999 coup. ``If he had any concern for the nation, he would not have divided it by his political misadventures despite a military standoff with India for the last six months,`` Shah pointed out.
Some critics say that Musharraf should accept that he is no longer acceptable to the nation and that his government has lost what international stature it had gained after the September 11 attacks after the referendum, whose conduct had been criticized even by some of the Musharraf government`s newfound allies in foreign governments.
``More alarming than Indian intentions is the situation at home. This is time for national unity, for subordinating self-interest to the national good. But the military government with its divisive policies is ill-suited to deliver this goal,`` columnist Ayaz Amir wrote in the English-language daily Dawn.
Musharraf`s changed status is illustrated by his remark some while ago when he questioned ``why should I contact the Pakistan Muslim League (N) when Its `N` [leader Nawaz Sharif] is missing?`` Now, he has sent a senior military officer to talk to Nawaz Sharif in Saudi Arabia, where he is in exile, on possible cooperation.
Before Musharraf`s coup in 1999, three military dictators had ruled Pakistan since its independence in 1947, but only General Yahya Khan (1969-71) had an exit plan. He held elections and handed over government to an elected representative. Field Marshal Ayub Khan (1958-62) was hounded out of office after countrywide protests, while General Zia ul-Haq (1977-85), who died in an airplane crash, had no plans to relinquish power.
Now, with opposition to him mounting, Musharraf might well be wondering how he is going to survive the next five years he has given himself in power.
http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DE30Df02.html
Posted by
cutandpaste
May 29, 2002 11:28 pm
India/Pakistan Battle lines drawn around Musharraf
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Seven months into its newfound relationship with the United States, Pakistan finds itself isolated - the US and its coalition partners have condemned its latest series of missile tests, and they are increasingly accepting the Indian claim that Pakistan-sponsored terrorism is the cause of the troubles in Kashmir.
And just as the nation is becoming isolated and confused by the international turn of events, so too is its leader, President General Pervez Musharraf, who appears to be caught between the devil and the deep blue sea on the domestic front.
Imtiaz Alam, a commentator on political affairs, points out that the ``commando president`` - even as Islamabad puts Pakistan on a war footing - ``is being opposed by both liberals and religious extremists for entirely opposite reasons. The liberals want him to come down heavily against the extremists who threaten both internal and external security. The religious extremists detest him for abandoning the Taliban and are not even willing to trust him in his war against India, which they hate.``
US President George W Bush has told Musharraf to work harder to stop cross-border incursions into Indian-controlled Kashmir. ``He must perform,`` Bush said. These remarks from a great ally endorse the view that Pakistan is still sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir, even though Musharraf has pledged not to.
Opposition politicians in Pakistan now want Musharraf to step down and hand over power to an independent caretaker as the only way to forge national unity. This sentiment was expressed in a resolution filed by more than 15 mainstream political and religious-political parties in Lahore last week that said, ``Musharraf should immediately resign from all his de facto positions and hand over power to a neutral caretaker government which should unite the nation, face the challenge posed by India and hold fair and free election.``
But at the same time, the opposition is making it clear that it is against Musharraf and not the military itself - in an apparent move to capitalize on anti-Musharraf sentiment said to be simmering within military ranks because of his political ambitions. ``We have full confidence in our military capabilities and preparedness, but Musharraf stands discredited and lacks the stature and moral authority to deal with the current threat to national security and territorial integrity of Pakistan,`` said a spokesman for the Pakistan People`s Party, led by former premier Benazir Bhutto.
Critics also say that Musharraf has pitted himself against domestic forces over the years - most recently though the April 30 referendum that extended his rule for five years which was roundly criticized at home. This has made it difficult for him to have enough political standing to pursue dialogue with India, they added.
The opposition conference by the All Parties Conference in Lahore came just days before Musharraf`s consultative meeting with politicians on tensions with India, which rose after last week`s attack in Indian-administered Kashmir that New Delhi blames on Pakistani militants.
Because opposition parties boycotted Musharraf`s meeting with politicians, one newspaper reported that it was attended by ``all the king`s men`` who have little public support and who have always been regarded as establishment-backed. ``It reveals how isolated Islamabad is at home, despite a serious challenge to the national existence,`` said Alam.
The April referendum that gave Musharraf another five years in office appears to have created an unbridgeable divide between political forces and Musharraf, one that would only widen until elections planned in October.
Many people believe that the Musharraf is also using the tense situation with India - he has said that Pakistanis would defend ``every inch`` of the country - to win back people`s sympathies that critics say he had lost by ``fabricating`` the referendum result.
This is the first time in Pakistan`s history that a sitting government has faced such criticism at a time of grave external threat. In the past, the country stood united when Pakistan and India fought wars in 1965 and 1971, even though the then military rulers had also created enough cause for opposition resentment.
But this time, the opposition, frustrated by Musharraf`s agenda of political exclusion and his plans to keep all power concentrated in him through his planned amendments to the constitution, are not ready to give him any room to relax, despite the current war clouds. The parties say that Musharraf - who is president, chief executive as well as army chief - cannot lead the country in a war.
``We demand the appointment of a full-time army chief who could devote all his attention to the country`s defense and who could meet the threat to national security and territorial integrity,`` said Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, a veteran politician who chaired the opposition`s Lahore conference. ``If [British prime minister Neville] Chamberlain can be replaced by [Winston] Churchill in the middle of World War II, certainly Musharraf can step down and hand over power to a nationally acceptable government in the larger interest of uniting the country in this hour of need,`` asserted Khan.
In fact, some of Musharraf`s harshest critics hold him responsible for the current impasse with India. They refer to his role in the 1999 undeclared Kargil conflict with India that scuttled the so-called Lahore Peace Process, initiated after Indian Premier Atal Bihari Vajpayee`s train trip to Lahore in February 1999. They say it was due to Musharraf`s role in Kargil as army chief that India never took his repeated peace offers seriously.
``We are with the nation and not with Pervez Musharraf, who disrupted the Lahore process with his Kargil misadventure without the consent of the then prime minister,`` argued Zafar Ali Shah, a close associate of former premier Nawaz Sharif, whom Musharraf deposed in an October 1999 coup. ``If he had any concern for the nation, he would not have divided it by his political misadventures despite a military standoff with India for the last six months,`` Shah pointed out.
Some critics say that Musharraf should accept that he is no longer acceptable to the nation and that his government has lost what international stature it had gained after the September 11 attacks after the referendum, whose conduct had been criticized even by some of the Musharraf government`s newfound allies in foreign governments.
``More alarming than Indian intentions is the situation at home. This is time for national unity, for subordinating self-interest to the national good. But the military government with its divisive policies is ill-suited to deliver this goal,`` columnist Ayaz Amir wrote in the English-language daily Dawn.
Musharraf`s changed status is illustrated by his remark some while ago when he questioned ``why should I contact the Pakistan Muslim League (N) when Its `N` [leader Nawaz Sharif] is missing?`` Now, he has sent a senior military officer to talk to Nawaz Sharif in Saudi Arabia, where he is in exile, on possible cooperation.
Before Musharraf`s coup in 1999, three military dictators had ruled Pakistan since its independence in 1947, but only General Yahya Khan (1969-71) had an exit plan. He held elections and handed over government to an elected representative. Field Marshal Ayub Khan (1958-62) was hounded out of office after countrywide protests, while General Zia ul-Haq (1977-85), who died in an airplane crash, had no plans to relinquish power.
Now, with opposition to him mounting, Musharraf might well be wondering how he is going to survive the next five years he has given himself in power.
http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DE30Df02.html
Lighting The Nuclear Fire
PAKISTAN`s FLAG on INDIA`s RED FORT
http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/may2002-daily/29-05-2002/metro/k1.htm
By our correspondent
KARACHI: City Nazim Naimatullah Khan has said that the Karachiites were yearning for a Jihad call from President Musharraf, reiterating that the brave military of the nuclear power, Pakistan, which enjoyed full support of 140 million people, was well capable of hoisting the Pakistani flag on Delhi`s Red Fort.
He was addressing a huge gathering after leading a mammoth rally, which, started from the gate of the Quaid-i-Azam`s mausoleum at the Shahrah-e-Quaideen and after taking a U-turn reached the mausoleum`s VIP gate at New M A Jinnah Road in a bid to mark the nuclear tests day-Yaum-e-Takbeer-on Tuesday. ``India must not think of waging war against Pakistan as all of its cities are targets of our nuclear bombs and missiles and the 140 million Pakistanis are ready to fight along with their military, whose motto is Jihad,`` he maintained.
The participants of the rally, the ``Defence of Pakistan March`` by the City Government, raised their hands in the air and replied ``yes``, when their City Nazim asked whether they were ready if President Musharraf gave them call for Jihad. Naimatullah said that India must keep in mind that Muslims ruled the
Sub-continent for over 800 years and left their numerous imprints in the form of the Taj Mahal, castles etc and now Pakistanis might claim for such heritages of their ancestors. ``Mahmood Ghaznavi had attacked India 17 times and we will make the 18th invasion if India does not mend it ways``, he added.
Naimatullah said that India, which was depending on the international community, could neither pressurise Pakistan nor deprive it of its essential part, Kashmir. If India was proud of its military then it must realise that hundreds of thousands of its military personnel had so far not managed to defeat just a few thousand Mujahideen in Indian-held Kashmir for the last 15 years.
Terming Karachi the heart of Pakistan, he said that the metropolis was inhabited by people who had either migrated from different states of India or parts of Pakistan, saying that all Karachiites were ready to sacrifice their lives for upholding Islam and Pakistan. The surroundings echoed to shouts of ``Allah-o-Akbar`` and ``La ilaha il Allah`` when City Nazim concluded his speech with shouting slogans, ``Naara`ay Takbeer``, ``Pakistan Ka Matblab Kya?`` respectively.
Scores of trucks, buses, mini-buses, coaches, motorbikes, taxis, and other forms of transport were carried the participants while a large number of them were towards the venue, set up between the VIP gate and the Cosmopolitan Club. Hundreds of women also participated in the rally while a large number of them were also carrying their infants. A large number of school children and teachers also attended the rally.
Earlier, a number of processions, which were taken out from the offices of all 18 Towns and 178 Union Councils, started assembling at Mazaar-i-Quaid after 5pm. The participants offered Asr prayers at Masjid-e-Bab-e-Rahmat before starting their march. There was a heavy deployment of police all along the route of the march. Police were seen stationed atop some buildings situated along the road and near the stage.
The crowd, which moved for around half an hour behind Naimatullah all the way from Shahrah-e-Quaideen to New M A Jinnah Road continued chanting pro-Islamic, pro-Pakistan and anti-India slogans. They were also carrying flags, banners and placards with different slogans. A large number of the workers of Shabab-e-Milli - the youth wing of the Jama`at-e-Islami -- were carrying a huge national flag on the occasion.
Posted by
cutandpaste
May 29, 2002 11:28 pm
`Karachiites yearning for a Jihad call`PAKISTAN`s FLAG on INDIA`s RED FORT
http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/may2002-daily/29-05-2002/metro/k1.htm
By our correspondent
KARACHI: City Nazim Naimatullah Khan has said that the Karachiites were yearning for a Jihad call from President Musharraf, reiterating that the brave military of the nuclear power, Pakistan, which enjoyed full support of 140 million people, was well capable of hoisting the Pakistani flag on Delhi`s Red Fort.
He was addressing a huge gathering after leading a mammoth rally, which, started from the gate of the Quaid-i-Azam`s mausoleum at the Shahrah-e-Quaideen and after taking a U-turn reached the mausoleum`s VIP gate at New M A Jinnah Road in a bid to mark the nuclear tests day-Yaum-e-Takbeer-on Tuesday. ``India must not think of waging war against Pakistan as all of its cities are targets of our nuclear bombs and missiles and the 140 million Pakistanis are ready to fight along with their military, whose motto is Jihad,`` he maintained.
The participants of the rally, the ``Defence of Pakistan March`` by the City Government, raised their hands in the air and replied ``yes``, when their City Nazim asked whether they were ready if President Musharraf gave them call for Jihad. Naimatullah said that India must keep in mind that Muslims ruled the
Sub-continent for over 800 years and left their numerous imprints in the form of the Taj Mahal, castles etc and now Pakistanis might claim for such heritages of their ancestors. ``Mahmood Ghaznavi had attacked India 17 times and we will make the 18th invasion if India does not mend it ways``, he added.
Naimatullah said that India, which was depending on the international community, could neither pressurise Pakistan nor deprive it of its essential part, Kashmir. If India was proud of its military then it must realise that hundreds of thousands of its military personnel had so far not managed to defeat just a few thousand Mujahideen in Indian-held Kashmir for the last 15 years.
Terming Karachi the heart of Pakistan, he said that the metropolis was inhabited by people who had either migrated from different states of India or parts of Pakistan, saying that all Karachiites were ready to sacrifice their lives for upholding Islam and Pakistan. The surroundings echoed to shouts of ``Allah-o-Akbar`` and ``La ilaha il Allah`` when City Nazim concluded his speech with shouting slogans, ``Naara`ay Takbeer``, ``Pakistan Ka Matblab Kya?`` respectively.
Scores of trucks, buses, mini-buses, coaches, motorbikes, taxis, and other forms of transport were carried the participants while a large number of them were towards the venue, set up between the VIP gate and the Cosmopolitan Club. Hundreds of women also participated in the rally while a large number of them were also carrying their infants. A large number of school children and teachers also attended the rally.
Earlier, a number of processions, which were taken out from the offices of all 18 Towns and 178 Union Councils, started assembling at Mazaar-i-Quaid after 5pm. The participants offered Asr prayers at Masjid-e-Bab-e-Rahmat before starting their march. There was a heavy deployment of police all along the route of the march. Police were seen stationed atop some buildings situated along the road and near the stage.
The crowd, which moved for around half an hour behind Naimatullah all the way from Shahrah-e-Quaideen to New M A Jinnah Road continued chanting pro-Islamic, pro-Pakistan and anti-India slogans. They were also carrying flags, banners and placards with different slogans. A large number of the workers of Shabab-e-Milli - the youth wing of the Jama`at-e-Islami -- were carrying a huge national flag on the occasion.
Lighting The Nuclear Fire
Battle lines drawn around Musharraf
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Seven months into its newfound relationship with the United States, Pakistan finds itself isolated - the US and its coalition partners have condemned its latest series of missile tests, and they are increasingly accepting the Indian claim that Pakistan-sponsored terrorism is the cause of the troubles in Kashmir.
And just as the nation is becoming isolated and confused by the international turn of events, so too is its leader, President General Pervez Musharraf, who appears to be caught between the devil and the deep blue sea on the domestic front.
Imtiaz Alam, a commentator on political affairs, points out that the ``commando president`` - even as Islamabad puts Pakistan on a war footing - ``is being opposed by both liberals and religious extremists for entirely opposite reasons. The liberals want him to come down heavily against the extremists who threaten both internal and external security. The religious extremists detest him for abandoning the Taliban and are not even willing to trust him in his war against India, which they hate.``
US President George W Bush has told Musharraf to work harder to stop cross-border incursions into Indian-controlled Kashmir. ``He must perform,`` Bush said. These remarks from a great ally endorse the view that Pakistan is still sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir, even though Musharraf has pledged not to.
Opposition politicians in Pakistan now want Musharraf to step down and hand over power to an independent caretaker as the only way to forge national unity. This sentiment was expressed in a resolution filed by more than 15 mainstream political and religious-political parties in Lahore last week that said, ``Musharraf should immediately resign from all his de facto positions and hand over power to a neutral caretaker government which should unite the nation, face the challenge posed by India and hold fair and free election.``
But at the same time, the opposition is making it clear that it is against Musharraf and not the military itself - in an apparent move to capitalize on anti-Musharraf sentiment said to be simmering within military ranks because of his political ambitions. ``We have full confidence in our military capabilities and preparedness, but Musharraf stands discredited and lacks the stature and moral authority to deal with the current threat to national security and territorial integrity of Pakistan,`` said a spokesman for the Pakistan People`s Party, led by former premier Benazir Bhutto.
Critics also say that Musharraf has pitted himself against domestic forces over the years - most recently though the April 30 referendum that extended his rule for five years which was roundly criticized at home. This has made it difficult for him to have enough political standing to pursue dialogue with India, they added.
The opposition conference by the All Parties Conference in Lahore came just days before Musharraf`s consultative meeting with politicians on tensions with India, which rose after last week`s attack in Indian-administered Kashmir that New Delhi blames on Pakistani militants.
Because opposition parties boycotted Musharraf`s meeting with politicians, one newspaper reported that it was attended by ``all the king`s men`` who have little public support and who have always been regarded as establishment-backed. ``It reveals how isolated Islamabad is at home, despite a serious challenge to the national existence,`` said Alam.
The April referendum that gave Musharraf another five years in office appears to have created an unbridgeable divide between political forces and Musharraf, one that would only widen until elections planned in October.
Many people believe that the Musharraf is also using the tense situation with India - he has said that Pakistanis would defend ``every inch`` of the country - to win back people`s sympathies that critics say he had lost by ``fabricating`` the referendum result.
This is the first time in Pakistan`s history that a sitting government has faced such criticism at a time of grave external threat. In the past, the country stood united when Pakistan and India fought wars in 1965 and 1971, even though the then military rulers had also created enough cause for opposition resentment.
But this time, the opposition, frustrated by Musharraf`s agenda of political exclusion and his plans to keep all power concentrated in him through his planned amendments to the constitution, are not ready to give him any room to relax, despite the current war clouds. The parties say that Musharraf - who is president, chief executive as well as army chief - cannot lead the country in a war.
``We demand the appointment of a full-time army chief who could devote all his attention to the country`s defense and who could meet the threat to national security and territorial integrity,`` said Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, a veteran politician who chaired the opposition`s Lahore conference. ``If [British prime minister Neville] Chamberlain can be replaced by [Winston] Churchill in the middle of World War II, certainly Musharraf can step down and hand over power to a nationally acceptable government in the larger interest of uniting the country in this hour of need,`` asserted Khan.
In fact, some of Musharraf`s harshest critics hold him responsible for the current impasse with India. They refer to his role in the 1999 undeclared Kargil conflict with India that scuttled the so-called Lahore Peace Process, initiated after Indian Premier Atal Bihari Vajpayee`s train trip to Lahore in February 1999. They say it was due to Musharraf`s role in Kargil as army chief that India never took his repeated peace offers seriously.
``We are with the nation and not with Pervez Musharraf, who disrupted the Lahore process with his Kargil misadventure without the consent of the then prime minister,`` argued Zafar Ali Shah, a close associate of former premier Nawaz Sharif, whom Musharraf deposed in an October 1999 coup. ``If he had any concern for the nation, he would not have divided it by his political misadventures despite a military standoff with India for the last six months,`` Shah pointed out.
Some critics say that Musharraf should accept that he is no longer acceptable to the nation and that his government has lost what international stature it had gained after the September 11 attacks after the referendum, whose conduct had been criticized even by some of the Musharraf government`s newfound allies in foreign governments.
``More alarming than Indian intentions is the situation at home. This is time for national unity, for subordinating self-interest to the national good. But the military government with its divisive policies is ill-suited to deliver this goal,`` columnist Ayaz Amir wrote in the English-language daily Dawn.
Musharraf`s changed status is illustrated by his remark some while ago when he questioned ``why should I contact the Pakistan Muslim League (N) when Its `N` [leader Nawaz Sharif] is missing?`` Now, he has sent a senior military officer to talk to Nawaz Sharif in Saudi Arabia, where he is in exile, on possible cooperation.
Before Musharraf`s coup in 1999, three military dictators had ruled Pakistan since its independence in 1947, but only General Yahya Khan (1969-71) had an exit plan. He held elections and handed over government to an elected representative. Field Marshal Ayub Khan (1958-62) was hounded out of office after countrywide protests, while General Zia ul-Haq (1977-85), who died in an airplane crash, had no plans to relinquish power.
Now, with opposition to him mounting, Musharraf might well be wondering how he is going to survive the next five years he has given himself in power.
http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DE30Df02.html
Posted by
cutandpaste
May 29, 2002 11:28 pm
India/Pakistan Battle lines drawn around Musharraf
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Seven months into its newfound relationship with the United States, Pakistan finds itself isolated - the US and its coalition partners have condemned its latest series of missile tests, and they are increasingly accepting the Indian claim that Pakistan-sponsored terrorism is the cause of the troubles in Kashmir.
And just as the nation is becoming isolated and confused by the international turn of events, so too is its leader, President General Pervez Musharraf, who appears to be caught between the devil and the deep blue sea on the domestic front.
Imtiaz Alam, a commentator on political affairs, points out that the ``commando president`` - even as Islamabad puts Pakistan on a war footing - ``is being opposed by both liberals and religious extremists for entirely opposite reasons. The liberals want him to come down heavily against the extremists who threaten both internal and external security. The religious extremists detest him for abandoning the Taliban and are not even willing to trust him in his war against India, which they hate.``
US President George W Bush has told Musharraf to work harder to stop cross-border incursions into Indian-controlled Kashmir. ``He must perform,`` Bush said. These remarks from a great ally endorse the view that Pakistan is still sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir, even though Musharraf has pledged not to.
Opposition politicians in Pakistan now want Musharraf to step down and hand over power to an independent caretaker as the only way to forge national unity. This sentiment was expressed in a resolution filed by more than 15 mainstream political and religious-political parties in Lahore last week that said, ``Musharraf should immediately resign from all his de facto positions and hand over power to a neutral caretaker government which should unite the nation, face the challenge posed by India and hold fair and free election.``
But at the same time, the opposition is making it clear that it is against Musharraf and not the military itself - in an apparent move to capitalize on anti-Musharraf sentiment said to be simmering within military ranks because of his political ambitions. ``We have full confidence in our military capabilities and preparedness, but Musharraf stands discredited and lacks the stature and moral authority to deal with the current threat to national security and territorial integrity of Pakistan,`` said a spokesman for the Pakistan People`s Party, led by former premier Benazir Bhutto.
Critics also say that Musharraf has pitted himself against domestic forces over the years - most recently though the April 30 referendum that extended his rule for five years which was roundly criticized at home. This has made it difficult for him to have enough political standing to pursue dialogue with India, they added.
The opposition conference by the All Parties Conference in Lahore came just days before Musharraf`s consultative meeting with politicians on tensions with India, which rose after last week`s attack in Indian-administered Kashmir that New Delhi blames on Pakistani militants.
Because opposition parties boycotted Musharraf`s meeting with politicians, one newspaper reported that it was attended by ``all the king`s men`` who have little public support and who have always been regarded as establishment-backed. ``It reveals how isolated Islamabad is at home, despite a serious challenge to the national existence,`` said Alam.
The April referendum that gave Musharraf another five years in office appears to have created an unbridgeable divide between political forces and Musharraf, one that would only widen until elections planned in October.
Many people believe that the Musharraf is also using the tense situation with India - he has said that Pakistanis would defend ``every inch`` of the country - to win back people`s sympathies that critics say he had lost by ``fabricating`` the referendum result.
This is the first time in Pakistan`s history that a sitting government has faced such criticism at a time of grave external threat. In the past, the country stood united when Pakistan and India fought wars in 1965 and 1971, even though the then military rulers had also created enough cause for opposition resentment.
But this time, the opposition, frustrated by Musharraf`s agenda of political exclusion and his plans to keep all power concentrated in him through his planned amendments to the constitution, are not ready to give him any room to relax, despite the current war clouds. The parties say that Musharraf - who is president, chief executive as well as army chief - cannot lead the country in a war.
``We demand the appointment of a full-time army chief who could devote all his attention to the country`s defense and who could meet the threat to national security and territorial integrity,`` said Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, a veteran politician who chaired the opposition`s Lahore conference. ``If [British prime minister Neville] Chamberlain can be replaced by [Winston] Churchill in the middle of World War II, certainly Musharraf can step down and hand over power to a nationally acceptable government in the larger interest of uniting the country in this hour of need,`` asserted Khan.
In fact, some of Musharraf`s harshest critics hold him responsible for the current impasse with India. They refer to his role in the 1999 undeclared Kargil conflict with India that scuttled the so-called Lahore Peace Process, initiated after Indian Premier Atal Bihari Vajpayee`s train trip to Lahore in February 1999. They say it was due to Musharraf`s role in Kargil as army chief that India never took his repeated peace offers seriously.
``We are with the nation and not with Pervez Musharraf, who disrupted the Lahore process with his Kargil misadventure without the consent of the then prime minister,`` argued Zafar Ali Shah, a close associate of former premier Nawaz Sharif, whom Musharraf deposed in an October 1999 coup. ``If he had any concern for the nation, he would not have divided it by his political misadventures despite a military standoff with India for the last six months,`` Shah pointed out.
Some critics say that Musharraf should accept that he is no longer acceptable to the nation and that his government has lost what international stature it had gained after the September 11 attacks after the referendum, whose conduct had been criticized even by some of the Musharraf government`s newfound allies in foreign governments.
``More alarming than Indian intentions is the situation at home. This is time for national unity, for subordinating self-interest to the national good. But the military government with its divisive policies is ill-suited to deliver this goal,`` columnist Ayaz Amir wrote in the English-language daily Dawn.
Musharraf`s changed status is illustrated by his remark some while ago when he questioned ``why should I contact the Pakistan Muslim League (N) when Its `N` [leader Nawaz Sharif] is missing?`` Now, he has sent a senior military officer to talk to Nawaz Sharif in Saudi Arabia, where he is in exile, on possible cooperation.
Before Musharraf`s coup in 1999, three military dictators had ruled Pakistan since its independence in 1947, but only General Yahya Khan (1969-71) had an exit plan. He held elections and handed over government to an elected representative. Field Marshal Ayub Khan (1958-62) was hounded out of office after countrywide protests, while General Zia ul-Haq (1977-85), who died in an airplane crash, had no plans to relinquish power.
Now, with opposition to him mounting, Musharraf might well be wondering how he is going to survive the next five years he has given himself in power.
http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DE30Df02.html
Of Violent Birth and Peaceful Death
PAKISTAN`s FLAG on INDIA`s RED FORT
http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/may2002-daily/29-05-2002/metro/k1.htm
By our correspondent
KARACHI: City Nazim Naimatullah Khan has said that the Karachiites were yearning for a Jihad call from President Musharraf, reiterating that the brave military of the nuclear power, Pakistan, which enjoyed full support of 140 million people, was well capable of hoisting the Pakistani flag on Delhi`s Red Fort.
He was addressing a huge gathering after leading a mammoth rally, which, started from the gate of the Quaid-i-Azam`s mausoleum at the Shahrah-e-Quaideen and after taking a U-turn reached the mausoleum`s VIP gate at New M A Jinnah Road in a bid to mark the nuclear tests day-Yaum-e-Takbeer-on Tuesday. ``India must not think of waging war against Pakistan as all of its cities are targets of our nuclear bombs and missiles and the 140 million Pakistanis are ready to fight along with their military, whose motto is Jihad,`` he maintained.
The participants of the rally, the ``Defence of Pakistan March`` by the City Government, raised their hands in the air and replied ``yes``, when their City Nazim asked whether they were ready if President Musharraf gave them call for Jihad. Naimatullah said that India must keep in mind that Muslims ruled the
Sub-continent for over 800 years and left their numerous imprints in the form of the Taj Mahal, castles etc and now Pakistanis might claim for such heritages of their ancestors. ``Mahmood Ghaznavi had attacked India 17 times and we will make the 18th invasion if India does not mend it ways``, he added.
Naimatullah said that India, which was depending on the international community, could neither pressurise Pakistan nor deprive it of its essential part, Kashmir. If India was proud of its military then it must realise that hundreds of thousands of its military personnel had so far not managed to defeat just a few thousand Mujahideen in Indian-held Kashmir for the last 15 years.
Terming Karachi the heart of Pakistan, he said that the metropolis was inhabited by people who had either migrated from different states of India or parts of Pakistan, saying that all Karachiites were ready to sacrifice their lives for upholding Islam and Pakistan. The surroundings echoed to shouts of ``Allah-o-Akbar`` and ``La ilaha il Allah`` when City Nazim concluded his speech with shouting slogans, ``Naara`ay Takbeer``, ``Pakistan Ka Matblab Kya?`` respectively.
Scores of trucks, buses, mini-buses, coaches, motorbikes, taxis, and other forms of transport were carried the participants while a large number of them were towards the venue, set up between the VIP gate and the Cosmopolitan Club. Hundreds of women also participated in the rally while a large number of them were also carrying their infants. A large number of school children and teachers also attended the rally.
Earlier, a number of processions, which were taken out from the offices of all 18 Towns and 178 Union Councils, started assembling at Mazaar-i-Quaid after 5pm. The participants offered Asr prayers at Masjid-e-Bab-e-Rahmat before starting their march. There was a heavy deployment of police all along the route of the march. Police were seen stationed atop some buildings situated along the road and near the stage.
The crowd, which moved for around half an hour behind Naimatullah all the way from Shahrah-e-Quaideen to New M A Jinnah Road continued chanting pro-Islamic, pro-Pakistan and anti-India slogans. They were also carrying flags, banners and placards with different slogans. A large number of the workers of Shabab-e-Milli - the youth wing of the Jama`at-e-Islami -- were carrying a huge national flag on the occasion.
Posted by
cutandpaste
May 29, 2002 11:28 pm
`Karachiites yearning for a Jihad call`PAKISTAN`s FLAG on INDIA`s RED FORT
http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/may2002-daily/29-05-2002/metro/k1.htm
By our correspondent
KARACHI: City Nazim Naimatullah Khan has said that the Karachiites were yearning for a Jihad call from President Musharraf, reiterating that the brave military of the nuclear power, Pakistan, which enjoyed full support of 140 million people, was well capable of hoisting the Pakistani flag on Delhi`s Red Fort.
He was addressing a huge gathering after leading a mammoth rally, which, started from the gate of the Quaid-i-Azam`s mausoleum at the Shahrah-e-Quaideen and after taking a U-turn reached the mausoleum`s VIP gate at New M A Jinnah Road in a bid to mark the nuclear tests day-Yaum-e-Takbeer-on Tuesday. ``India must not think of waging war against Pakistan as all of its cities are targets of our nuclear bombs and missiles and the 140 million Pakistanis are ready to fight along with their military, whose motto is Jihad,`` he maintained.
The participants of the rally, the ``Defence of Pakistan March`` by the City Government, raised their hands in the air and replied ``yes``, when their City Nazim asked whether they were ready if President Musharraf gave them call for Jihad. Naimatullah said that India must keep in mind that Muslims ruled the
Sub-continent for over 800 years and left their numerous imprints in the form of the Taj Mahal, castles etc and now Pakistanis might claim for such heritages of their ancestors. ``Mahmood Ghaznavi had attacked India 17 times and we will make the 18th invasion if India does not mend it ways``, he added.
Naimatullah said that India, which was depending on the international community, could neither pressurise Pakistan nor deprive it of its essential part, Kashmir. If India was proud of its military then it must realise that hundreds of thousands of its military personnel had so far not managed to defeat just a few thousand Mujahideen in Indian-held Kashmir for the last 15 years.
Terming Karachi the heart of Pakistan, he said that the metropolis was inhabited by people who had either migrated from different states of India or parts of Pakistan, saying that all Karachiites were ready to sacrifice their lives for upholding Islam and Pakistan. The surroundings echoed to shouts of ``Allah-o-Akbar`` and ``La ilaha il Allah`` when City Nazim concluded his speech with shouting slogans, ``Naara`ay Takbeer``, ``Pakistan Ka Matblab Kya?`` respectively.
Scores of trucks, buses, mini-buses, coaches, motorbikes, taxis, and other forms of transport were carried the participants while a large number of them were towards the venue, set up between the VIP gate and the Cosmopolitan Club. Hundreds of women also participated in the rally while a large number of them were also carrying their infants. A large number of school children and teachers also attended the rally.
Earlier, a number of processions, which were taken out from the offices of all 18 Towns and 178 Union Councils, started assembling at Mazaar-i-Quaid after 5pm. The participants offered Asr prayers at Masjid-e-Bab-e-Rahmat before starting their march. There was a heavy deployment of police all along the route of the march. Police were seen stationed atop some buildings situated along the road and near the stage.
The crowd, which moved for around half an hour behind Naimatullah all the way from Shahrah-e-Quaideen to New M A Jinnah Road continued chanting pro-Islamic, pro-Pakistan and anti-India slogans. They were also carrying flags, banners and placards with different slogans. A large number of the workers of Shabab-e-Milli - the youth wing of the Jama`at-e-Islami -- were carrying a huge national flag on the occasion.
The Perfect Murder
India seeks face-saving for resolution of crisis
By Kamran Khan
KARACHI: Pakistani military leadership under President General Musharraf is ``absolutely confident`` that the freedom struggle in Kashmir has entered a crucial phase where an Indian military adventurism along the Line of Control or the working boundary would trap the Indian army in a Vietnam or Afghanistan-like situation and hasten the freedom process for the Kashmiri Muslims.
Interviews with officials, familiar with the current thinking at the General Headquarters (GHQ), revealed the government of Pakistan has also determined that the recent international efforts for mediation, particularly from Russia, represent an implicit Indian desire to extricate itself from an untenable diplomatic and military posture.
``In such a situation when the much awaited phase of international diplomacy is just beginning, how can we give India a head start,`` says a senior official, explaining the logic behind General Musharraf`s hard-line address to the nation on Monday. ``Actual concessions to India can only be part of give and take during bilateral negotiations.``
Relevant Pakistani officials believe that the robust military preparedness by the Pakistani Army, Navy, Air Force -- all three forces now equipped with tactical nuclear weapons -- and an expected ``impetus`` to anti-military guerrilla activities by the freedom fighters may turn the Indians` dream for a decisive war in Kashmir into a nightmare for the Indian military.
This military perception, enunciated very recently by the Military Operations Directorate, Commander Corps 10, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and other relevant military formations, contributed to the General Musharraf`s address to the nation during which he resolutely refused to give further concessions to the Indian military on Monday.
General Musharraf, a veteran of 1965 and 1971 wars with India, is also considered to be one of the most important architects of the military`s Kashmir strategy. The general had gained a rare insight into India`s military capabilities, while serving as Pakistan Army`s Director-General Military Operations (DGMO) in the early 1990s.
A military source said: ``Operational plans on Kashmir made under Musharraf at the MO (Military Operations Directorate) still form the core of the current strategy of the Pakistan Army in Kashmir.``
He added: ``As far as the military strategy and planning is concerned, Gen Musharraf is far ahead than the ageing Indian prime minister.`` Last week, General Musharraf and the top brass of Pakistani military establishment decided to stand firm on Kashmir policy after unanimously agreeing that the recent military posturing by India may ultimately push the Indian military into an even deeper strategic quagmire in Kashmir. ``Which army of the world can wage war when it is being attacked by its own people from right, left, front and the back,`` asked a senior Pakistani military source. ``Once the hostilities break out, can anyone perceive any other scenario for the Indian army in Kashmir.``
To meet the likely military scenario in Kashmir, one of the most important military moves made recently by the GHQ was to deploy a major chunk of Pakistani Special Services Groups (SSG) commandos all along the Line of Control for penetration -- in case of Indian military strike -- into held Kashmir, where friendly population and battle-hardened Kashmiri guerrillas are desperate to embrace them for a decisive military push, leading to complete liberation.
Sources close to two banned Jihadi groups have, meanwhile, disclosed in separate interviews in Karachi that they were ``not bothered`` by the recent decision of the military government to take new measures to block the traffic of freedom fighters from Pakistan into held Kashmir.
Responding to suggestions from the US government, the Pakistani military leaders had decided last week to introduce new security measures to stop the movement of Kashmiri militants from Azad Kashmir to held Kashmir. ``Three layers of security positions manned round the clock by the heavily armed Indian troops can`t stop us from reaching destinations well inside Kashmir Valley,`` vowed a Jihadi, who gave his name as Abu Hamza. ``How can Pakistani troops do something that 12 divisions of Indian army so grossly failed to achieve,`` he adds.
Other Jihadi sources said that because of favourable weather condition hundreds of fresh militants had entered Kashmir in April and in the first three weeks of the current month, until a few days before the military government announced fresh measures to stop infiltration into held Kashmir.
Local Jihadi sources have revealed that in the past few weeks they received numerous calls for help from various Muslim groups in Indian state of Gujarat and Maharashtra, where thousands of Muslims were killed and their properties were destroyed in the worst anti-Muslim riots that had erupted in March this year. ``In the wake of a war with Pakistan, Indian Muslims would give the biggest surprise to Indian security forces all over mainland India,`` Abu Hamza remarked.
President Musharraf`s Monday`s speech in general and his remarks about attacks on Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and scheduled caste by ``extremist Hindu terrorists`` appear to have won him a rare appreciation from the Pakistani militant religious quarters. ``The freedom struggle in Kashmir has primed to a point where the final push for liberation seems to be the logical next phase,`` says (retd) Colonel Salman Ahmed, one of the most reputed special forces officer of the Pakistan Army. ``Neither can we nor the Indian army forget what happened in the former East Pakistan, where the Indian army has timed its military intervention with the full bloom insurgency,`` says Col Salman, who thought that the Indian leadership would commit a Himalayan blunder by igniting a military confrontation in Kashmir. ``Kashmir is going to repeat the scenes of insurgency and the final acts of a liberation struggle seen in the last days of former East Pakistan, but now the key actors have changed sides,`` declared Col Salman.
Pakistan military sources also draw some comfort from the fact that an unprecedented concentration of Indian military resources in Kashmir has stripped India of numerical superiority of its troops deployed along the international borders. ``For a conventional military ground offensive, a numerical superiority of 3:1 is usually desired but because of heavy concentration in Kashmir, Indian military can hardly maintain that kind of numerical strength along the international borders,`` says an official source. For its part, Pakistani official sources said, a favourable situation on ground in Kashmir allows complete strategic manoeuvrability for the strike corps of the Pakistan Army positioned at Mangla and Multan.
Informed sources said that to meet an all-out war situation with India, the Strategic Command Force -- the central military organisation that control Pakistan`s nuclear assets -- was reviewing the recent reported movement of tactical nuclear weapons by the Indian forces. ``All the money, research and energy spent on developing tactical and strategic assets would go waste if we do not meet this great threat to the security of Pakistan by keeping these assets wrapped somewhere in lock and key,`` commented a senior Pakistani official.
As the Pakistan Navy successfully test-fired a medium range ship-to-ship missile, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead on Tuesday, flotilla of Pakistan Navy frigates and submarines was engaged in aggressive patrolling of the sea, senior Pakistani officials said. The Pakistan Navy has also commissioned its surveillance aircraft such as P-3 Orion and Atlantique to collect real-time maritime intelligence on Indian naval patrolling.
http://www.sulekha.com/redirectnh.asp?cid=204347
Posted by
cutandpaste
May 29, 2002 12:49 am
Army believes Kashmir freedom is nearIndia seeks face-saving for resolution of crisis
By Kamran Khan
KARACHI: Pakistani military leadership under President General Musharraf is ``absolutely confident`` that the freedom struggle in Kashmir has entered a crucial phase where an Indian military adventurism along the Line of Control or the working boundary would trap the Indian army in a Vietnam or Afghanistan-like situation and hasten the freedom process for the Kashmiri Muslims.
Interviews with officials, familiar with the current thinking at the General Headquarters (GHQ), revealed the government of Pakistan has also determined that the recent international efforts for mediation, particularly from Russia, represent an implicit Indian desire to extricate itself from an untenable diplomatic and military posture.
``In such a situation when the much awaited phase of international diplomacy is just beginning, how can we give India a head start,`` says a senior official, explaining the logic behind General Musharraf`s hard-line address to the nation on Monday. ``Actual concessions to India can only be part of give and take during bilateral negotiations.``
Relevant Pakistani officials believe that the robust military preparedness by the Pakistani Army, Navy, Air Force -- all three forces now equipped with tactical nuclear weapons -- and an expected ``impetus`` to anti-military guerrilla activities by the freedom fighters may turn the Indians` dream for a decisive war in Kashmir into a nightmare for the Indian military.
This military perception, enunciated very recently by the Military Operations Directorate, Commander Corps 10, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and other relevant military formations, contributed to the General Musharraf`s address to the nation during which he resolutely refused to give further concessions to the Indian military on Monday.
General Musharraf, a veteran of 1965 and 1971 wars with India, is also considered to be one of the most important architects of the military`s Kashmir strategy. The general had gained a rare insight into India`s military capabilities, while serving as Pakistan Army`s Director-General Military Operations (DGMO) in the early 1990s.
A military source said: ``Operational plans on Kashmir made under Musharraf at the MO (Military Operations Directorate) still form the core of the current strategy of the Pakistan Army in Kashmir.``
He added: ``As far as the military strategy and planning is concerned, Gen Musharraf is far ahead than the ageing Indian prime minister.`` Last week, General Musharraf and the top brass of Pakistani military establishment decided to stand firm on Kashmir policy after unanimously agreeing that the recent military posturing by India may ultimately push the Indian military into an even deeper strategic quagmire in Kashmir. ``Which army of the world can wage war when it is being attacked by its own people from right, left, front and the back,`` asked a senior Pakistani military source. ``Once the hostilities break out, can anyone perceive any other scenario for the Indian army in Kashmir.``
To meet the likely military scenario in Kashmir, one of the most important military moves made recently by the GHQ was to deploy a major chunk of Pakistani Special Services Groups (SSG) commandos all along the Line of Control for penetration -- in case of Indian military strike -- into held Kashmir, where friendly population and battle-hardened Kashmiri guerrillas are desperate to embrace them for a decisive military push, leading to complete liberation.
Sources close to two banned Jihadi groups have, meanwhile, disclosed in separate interviews in Karachi that they were ``not bothered`` by the recent decision of the military government to take new measures to block the traffic of freedom fighters from Pakistan into held Kashmir.
Responding to suggestions from the US government, the Pakistani military leaders had decided last week to introduce new security measures to stop the movement of Kashmiri militants from Azad Kashmir to held Kashmir. ``Three layers of security positions manned round the clock by the heavily armed Indian troops can`t stop us from reaching destinations well inside Kashmir Valley,`` vowed a Jihadi, who gave his name as Abu Hamza. ``How can Pakistani troops do something that 12 divisions of Indian army so grossly failed to achieve,`` he adds.
Other Jihadi sources said that because of favourable weather condition hundreds of fresh militants had entered Kashmir in April and in the first three weeks of the current month, until a few days before the military government announced fresh measures to stop infiltration into held Kashmir.
Local Jihadi sources have revealed that in the past few weeks they received numerous calls for help from various Muslim groups in Indian state of Gujarat and Maharashtra, where thousands of Muslims were killed and their properties were destroyed in the worst anti-Muslim riots that had erupted in March this year. ``In the wake of a war with Pakistan, Indian Muslims would give the biggest surprise to Indian security forces all over mainland India,`` Abu Hamza remarked.
President Musharraf`s Monday`s speech in general and his remarks about attacks on Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and scheduled caste by ``extremist Hindu terrorists`` appear to have won him a rare appreciation from the Pakistani militant religious quarters. ``The freedom struggle in Kashmir has primed to a point where the final push for liberation seems to be the logical next phase,`` says (retd) Colonel Salman Ahmed, one of the most reputed special forces officer of the Pakistan Army. ``Neither can we nor the Indian army forget what happened in the former East Pakistan, where the Indian army has timed its military intervention with the full bloom insurgency,`` says Col Salman, who thought that the Indian leadership would commit a Himalayan blunder by igniting a military confrontation in Kashmir. ``Kashmir is going to repeat the scenes of insurgency and the final acts of a liberation struggle seen in the last days of former East Pakistan, but now the key actors have changed sides,`` declared Col Salman.
Pakistan military sources also draw some comfort from the fact that an unprecedented concentration of Indian military resources in Kashmir has stripped India of numerical superiority of its troops deployed along the international borders. ``For a conventional military ground offensive, a numerical superiority of 3:1 is usually desired but because of heavy concentration in Kashmir, Indian military can hardly maintain that kind of numerical strength along the international borders,`` says an official source. For its part, Pakistani official sources said, a favourable situation on ground in Kashmir allows complete strategic manoeuvrability for the strike corps of the Pakistan Army positioned at Mangla and Multan.
Informed sources said that to meet an all-out war situation with India, the Strategic Command Force -- the central military organisation that control Pakistan`s nuclear assets -- was reviewing the recent reported movement of tactical nuclear weapons by the Indian forces. ``All the money, research and energy spent on developing tactical and strategic assets would go waste if we do not meet this great threat to the security of Pakistan by keeping these assets wrapped somewhere in lock and key,`` commented a senior Pakistani official.
As the Pakistan Navy successfully test-fired a medium range ship-to-ship missile, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead on Tuesday, flotilla of Pakistan Navy frigates and submarines was engaged in aggressive patrolling of the sea, senior Pakistani officials said. The Pakistan Navy has also commissioned its surveillance aircraft such as P-3 Orion and Atlantique to collect real-time maritime intelligence on Indian naval patrolling.
http://www.sulekha.com/redirectnh.asp?cid=204347
The Perfect Murder
INDIA
Republic of India
Head of state: Kocheril Raman Narayanan
Head of government: Atal Bihari Vajpayee
Capital: New Delhi
Population: over 1 billion
Official language: Hindi
Death penalty: retentionist
People from socially and economically marginalized sections of society continued to be particularly vulnerable to torture and ill-treatment by both the police and non-state actors. The numbers of deaths in custody among members of these groups remained high, while their access to redress continued to be difficult despite the existence of progressive legislation. Human rights defenders continued to be harassed by both the police and non-state actors, and some of their activities were labelled ``anti-national``by the government. Excessive force was often used by law enforcement officers while policing peaceful demonstrations. Inter-caste and inter-religious tensions were often politically exploited, leading to several violent incidents throughout the country in which the police were believed to have taken a partisan role. Security concerns were addressed by the government through proposals for new and particularly stringent special legislation intended to grant wide powers of arrest and detention to law enforcement personnel. The criminal justice system continued to be extremely slow, under-resourced and to provide weak safeguards for the accused. Law enforcement officers were allowed de facto impunity both inside and outside areas of armed conflict. Impunity was encouraged by provisions in most existing security legislation, by political protection and by slow judicial proceedings and lack of implementation of findings by commissions of inquiry.
Background
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance continued in office throughout the year, despite recurring tensions between the BJP and some of its allies. State elections were held in five states in May. Their results reflected a growing importance in state-level politics of caste and regional parties respectively in the northern and in the southern states. Tensions between the Hindu and Muslim communities continued to be fuelled by different political groups, and clashes between the police and some Muslim groups intensified after the government declared its support for the bombing campaign in Afghanistan which followed the attacks in the USA on 11 September. In Kashmir, human rights abuses continued to be committed both by armed groups, and police and security forces on a large scale. An average of 100 civilians were killed there each month. Tensions between India and Pakistan on the issue of the support to armed groups in Kashmir became a subject of international debate in the context of the bombing campaign in Afghanistan by the USA and its allies. These tensions further increased, leading to a military build-up on the border between the two countries, following an attack on the Union Parliament on 13 December by members of an armed group. In the northeast, a cease-fire between the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Issac-Muivah) and the central government was extended in July for one year. Violent protests led by non-Naga organizations in the neighbouring state of Manipur prevented the cease-fire being extended beyond Nagaland, as initially proposed.
Special legislation
Calls by the USA for a ``global campaign against terrorism`` following the attacks in the USA on 11 September provided a context for several initiatives by the Indian government to tighten security legislation in the country. A new Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) was promulgated in October, giving the police wide powers of arrest and providing for up to six months` detention without charge or trial for political suspects. As the Ordinance was not discussed in Parliament during the winter session, it was repromulgated in December. Human rights organizations were concerned that some provisions were not consistent with the rights to freedom of expression and association set out in international human rights standards. Similar ``anti-terrorism`` bills were adopted or under examination in several states, including West Bengal, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. In November the Foreign Contribution (Management and Control) Bill 2001 was drafted. The Bill was intended to replace the Foreign Contributions Regulation Act and to curb the flow of foreign funds to both ``terrorist`` groups and non-governmental organizations.
The authorities continued to use the lapsed Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) to detain people in Jammu and Kashmir by linking them to ongoing cases filed before 1995. Hundreds of people remained in detention under the TADA, despite Supreme Court orders for a review of all cases.
Impunity
In August, government officials proposed granting amnesties to police officers facing trial for committing human rights abuses in their official capacity during the period of militancy in Punjab between 1984 and 1994. These proposals were neither officially confirmed nor withdrawn by the end of the year.
The government failed to act on recommendations made by several commissions of inquiry after identifying the involvement of police and security forces in human rights violations. The recommendations of the Shrikrishna Commission, concerning the communal riots which took place in Mumbai in 1992 and 1993 following the destruction of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, were implemented extremely slowly. Seventeen police officers had been issued with charge-sheets by the end of the year for having taken sides with violent Hindu groups during the riots which claimed 1,788 lives. Similarly, the recommendations of the Pandian Commission on the unlawful killings in April 2000 of protesters at Barakpore, Jammu and Kashmir, were not implemented by the government. The report itself was not made public. Special security laws, including the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, the POTO and the National Security Act, as well as the Protection of Human Rights Act, continued to retain provisions granting virtual impunity for government officials and army officers committing abuses while acting in their official capacity.
Discrimination
Socially and economically marginalized sections of society such as women, dalits, adivasis (tribal people) and religious minorities continued to suffer abuses as a result of discrimination by both the police and non-state actors. Their access to justice remained limited, despite the existence of some progressive pieces of legislation, as the criminal justice system tended to reproduce in its functioning the gender, caste and class discrimination exisiting in the society.
Discrimination against members of dalit communities received international attention when the issue was discussed during the UN World Conference against Racism (WCAR), held in South Africa in September. However, the final declaration of the WCAR did not acknowledge discrimination based on ``work and descent`` as a form of racism.
Since the attacks in the USA of 11 September and on the Union Parliament in December, the Muslim community became increasingly vulnerable to victimization by both the state and some Hindu political groups. Tensions between the police and Muslim groups erupted into rioting in different parts of the country, including Lucknow and Malegaon. Tension also escalated in connection with the intensification of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad`s campaign for the reconstruction of the Ram temple in Ayodhya, at the site of a mosque destroyed by Hindu rioters in 1992.
Human rights defenders
Harassment of human rights defenders by both state officials and other groups and individuals remained a constant feature throughout the year. There were reports of beatings, shootings and the use of excessive force by the police to try to prevent human rights defenders organizing peaceful protests against the government and non-state actors. Organizations assisting tribal communities to prevent their land being taken for industrial projects were particularly targeted. Several activists had false charges brought against them in an attempt to discredit their work. The government initiated inquiries into cases of suspected abuses against human rights defenders, but charges were rarely brought and investigations were often little more than a formal exercise.
Four adivasis (tribal people) were killed in April when police opened fire on a peaceful meeting in Mehndikheda, Madhya Pradesh, held to discuss allegations of abuses of the rights of adivasis by local police and forest officials. An administrative inquiry set up to investigate the killings fell short of international standards for an independent and impartial inquiry. Its report had not been made public by the end of the year.
Azam Ali, District Secretary of the Nalgonda branch of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee (APCLC), was killed in February by unidentified gunmen while on his way to a meeting to commemorate the death of the Joint Secretary of the APCLC, who was killed in November 2000. Despite the immediate establishment of a judicial inquiry into the killing, its report was not made public by the end of the year. Harassment of other members of the APCLC, including death threats, continued unchecked.
The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Human Rights Defenders had not been invited to visit the country by the end of the year.
Torture and ill-treatment
Torture by both state agents and non-state actors remained widespread throughout the country. Members of marginalized sections of society were particularly vulnerable. The National Human Rights Commission reported that 127 people had died in police custody between April 2000 and March 2001.
On 26 October Raja Ram was reportedly arrested with his two brothers after a neighbour had called the police because of a dispute. The three men, belonging to the dalit community, were allegedly beaten with sticks and rods at the Mariyaon police station in Lucknow. Raja Ram was hung upside down and water was poured into his nose. The three were released on bail after the police reportedly filed the case under section 151 of the Indian Penal Code (preventive detention) in order to legalize the arrests. Raja Ram died on 29 October. A case was filed for murder against five police officers. However, the Lucknow police authorities allegedly denied any responsibility, arguing that Raja Ram died because of disease.
By the end of 2001 India had not ratified the UN Convention against Torture, which it had signed in October 1997, nor had national legislation been drafted to enable its ratification. Therefore, no code or law specifically forbids torture as a criminal offence. Several provisions introduced by the POTO were believed to facilitate the use of torture in police custody.
The UN Special Rapporteur on torture was not granted access to the country by the end of the year, despite repeated requests.
Human rights commissions
There were no indications of progress by the government in considering amendments recommended in 2000 by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to the Protection of Human Rights Act 1993. The NHRC thus continued to be unable to investigate allegations of human rights violations committed by members of the army or paramilitary forces, as well as incidents which took place more than a year before a complaint was made. In September, the NHRC attended the World Conference against Racism and took an independent view from the government, in favour of the inclusion of caste discrimination as a form of racism.
In November the NHRC announced its opposition to the enactment of the POTO, judging it to be ``draconian`` and superfluous, and considering the existing laws sufficient to deal with ``terrorism`` if properly enforced.
State human rights commissions (SHRCs) were created in Maharashtra and Chattisgarh in July, bringing to 12 the number of states having an SHRC. Difficult working conditions, including lack of resources, continued to be reported by some SHRCs.
Abuses by armed groups
There were continued reports of abuses by armed groups in many states, including torture and deliberate killings of civilians. In areas of armed conflict, such as Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast, hundreds of non-combatants, including children, were killed in indiscriminate violence. Conflicts in the states of Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and parts of Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal, involving different factions of the naxalite (armed left-wing) groups and the police, claimed many civilian lives.
Death penalty
At least 16 people were sentenced to death in 2001. It was not known if any executions were carried out, nor how many prisoners were held on death row. The government of India does not publish statistical information about the implementation of the death penalty.
Legislation to extend the use of the death penalty to crimes of rape remained pending. The Explosive Substances (Amendment) Bill 1999, which extends the scope of the death penalty by making the possession of lethal explosives a capital offence, was passed by parliament at the end of the year. The POTO provides for the death penalty for ``terrorist`` offences which result in death. The concern that this would lead to an increase in the number of death sentences was heightened by the fact that provisions of the Ordinance made unfair trials more likely.
AI country reports/visits
Reports
India: Words into action - recommendations for the prevention of torture (AI Index: ASA 20/003/2001)
India: The battle against fear and discrimination - the impact of violence against women in Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan (AI Index: ASA 20/016/2001)
India: Time to act to stop torture and impunity in West Bengal (AI Index: ASA 20/033/2001)
India: Briefing on the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (AI Index: ASA 20/049/2001)
http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2002.nsf/asa/india!Open
Posted by
cutandpaste
May 29, 2002 12:49 am
Covering events from January - December 2001INDIA
Republic of India
Head of state: Kocheril Raman Narayanan
Head of government: Atal Bihari Vajpayee
Capital: New Delhi
Population: over 1 billion
Official language: Hindi
Death penalty: retentionist
People from socially and economically marginalized sections of society continued to be particularly vulnerable to torture and ill-treatment by both the police and non-state actors. The numbers of deaths in custody among members of these groups remained high, while their access to redress continued to be difficult despite the existence of progressive legislation. Human rights defenders continued to be harassed by both the police and non-state actors, and some of their activities were labelled ``anti-national``by the government. Excessive force was often used by law enforcement officers while policing peaceful demonstrations. Inter-caste and inter-religious tensions were often politically exploited, leading to several violent incidents throughout the country in which the police were believed to have taken a partisan role. Security concerns were addressed by the government through proposals for new and particularly stringent special legislation intended to grant wide powers of arrest and detention to law enforcement personnel. The criminal justice system continued to be extremely slow, under-resourced and to provide weak safeguards for the accused. Law enforcement officers were allowed de facto impunity both inside and outside areas of armed conflict. Impunity was encouraged by provisions in most existing security legislation, by political protection and by slow judicial proceedings and lack of implementation of findings by commissions of inquiry.
Background
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance continued in office throughout the year, despite recurring tensions between the BJP and some of its allies. State elections were held in five states in May. Their results reflected a growing importance in state-level politics of caste and regional parties respectively in the northern and in the southern states. Tensions between the Hindu and Muslim communities continued to be fuelled by different political groups, and clashes between the police and some Muslim groups intensified after the government declared its support for the bombing campaign in Afghanistan which followed the attacks in the USA on 11 September. In Kashmir, human rights abuses continued to be committed both by armed groups, and police and security forces on a large scale. An average of 100 civilians were killed there each month. Tensions between India and Pakistan on the issue of the support to armed groups in Kashmir became a subject of international debate in the context of the bombing campaign in Afghanistan by the USA and its allies. These tensions further increased, leading to a military build-up on the border between the two countries, following an attack on the Union Parliament on 13 December by members of an armed group. In the northeast, a cease-fire between the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Issac-Muivah) and the central government was extended in July for one year. Violent protests led by non-Naga organizations in the neighbouring state of Manipur prevented the cease-fire being extended beyond Nagaland, as initially proposed.
Special legislation
Calls by the USA for a ``global campaign against terrorism`` following the attacks in the USA on 11 September provided a context for several initiatives by the Indian government to tighten security legislation in the country. A new Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) was promulgated in October, giving the police wide powers of arrest and providing for up to six months` detention without charge or trial for political suspects. As the Ordinance was not discussed in Parliament during the winter session, it was repromulgated in December. Human rights organizations were concerned that some provisions were not consistent with the rights to freedom of expression and association set out in international human rights standards. Similar ``anti-terrorism`` bills were adopted or under examination in several states, including West Bengal, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. In November the Foreign Contribution (Management and Control) Bill 2001 was drafted. The Bill was intended to replace the Foreign Contributions Regulation Act and to curb the flow of foreign funds to both ``terrorist`` groups and non-governmental organizations.
The authorities continued to use the lapsed Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) to detain people in Jammu and Kashmir by linking them to ongoing cases filed before 1995. Hundreds of people remained in detention under the TADA, despite Supreme Court orders for a review of all cases.
Impunity
In August, government officials proposed granting amnesties to police officers facing trial for committing human rights abuses in their official capacity during the period of militancy in Punjab between 1984 and 1994. These proposals were neither officially confirmed nor withdrawn by the end of the year.
The government failed to act on recommendations made by several commissions of inquiry after identifying the involvement of police and security forces in human rights violations. The recommendations of the Shrikrishna Commission, concerning the communal riots which took place in Mumbai in 1992 and 1993 following the destruction of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, were implemented extremely slowly. Seventeen police officers had been issued with charge-sheets by the end of the year for having taken sides with violent Hindu groups during the riots which claimed 1,788 lives. Similarly, the recommendations of the Pandian Commission on the unlawful killings in April 2000 of protesters at Barakpore, Jammu and Kashmir, were not implemented by the government. The report itself was not made public. Special security laws, including the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, the POTO and the National Security Act, as well as the Protection of Human Rights Act, continued to retain provisions granting virtual impunity for government officials and army officers committing abuses while acting in their official capacity.
Discrimination
Socially and economically marginalized sections of society such as women, dalits, adivasis (tribal people) and religious minorities continued to suffer abuses as a result of discrimination by both the police and non-state actors. Their access to justice remained limited, despite the existence of some progressive pieces of legislation, as the criminal justice system tended to reproduce in its functioning the gender, caste and class discrimination exisiting in the society.
Discrimination against members of dalit communities received international attention when the issue was discussed during the UN World Conference against Racism (WCAR), held in South Africa in September. However, the final declaration of the WCAR did not acknowledge discrimination based on ``work and descent`` as a form of racism.
Since the attacks in the USA of 11 September and on the Union Parliament in December, the Muslim community became increasingly vulnerable to victimization by both the state and some Hindu political groups. Tensions between the police and Muslim groups erupted into rioting in different parts of the country, including Lucknow and Malegaon. Tension also escalated in connection with the intensification of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad`s campaign for the reconstruction of the Ram temple in Ayodhya, at the site of a mosque destroyed by Hindu rioters in 1992.
Human rights defenders
Harassment of human rights defenders by both state officials and other groups and individuals remained a constant feature throughout the year. There were reports of beatings, shootings and the use of excessive force by the police to try to prevent human rights defenders organizing peaceful protests against the government and non-state actors. Organizations assisting tribal communities to prevent their land being taken for industrial projects were particularly targeted. Several activists had false charges brought against them in an attempt to discredit their work. The government initiated inquiries into cases of suspected abuses against human rights defenders, but charges were rarely brought and investigations were often little more than a formal exercise.
Four adivasis (tribal people) were killed in April when police opened fire on a peaceful meeting in Mehndikheda, Madhya Pradesh, held to discuss allegations of abuses of the rights of adivasis by local police and forest officials. An administrative inquiry set up to investigate the killings fell short of international standards for an independent and impartial inquiry. Its report had not been made public by the end of the year.
Azam Ali, District Secretary of the Nalgonda branch of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee (APCLC), was killed in February by unidentified gunmen while on his way to a meeting to commemorate the death of the Joint Secretary of the APCLC, who was killed in November 2000. Despite the immediate establishment of a judicial inquiry into the killing, its report was not made public by the end of the year. Harassment of other members of the APCLC, including death threats, continued unchecked.
The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Human Rights Defenders had not been invited to visit the country by the end of the year.
Torture and ill-treatment
Torture by both state agents and non-state actors remained widespread throughout the country. Members of marginalized sections of society were particularly vulnerable. The National Human Rights Commission reported that 127 people had died in police custody between April 2000 and March 2001.
On 26 October Raja Ram was reportedly arrested with his two brothers after a neighbour had called the police because of a dispute. The three men, belonging to the dalit community, were allegedly beaten with sticks and rods at the Mariyaon police station in Lucknow. Raja Ram was hung upside down and water was poured into his nose. The three were released on bail after the police reportedly filed the case under section 151 of the Indian Penal Code (preventive detention) in order to legalize the arrests. Raja Ram died on 29 October. A case was filed for murder against five police officers. However, the Lucknow police authorities allegedly denied any responsibility, arguing that Raja Ram died because of disease.
By the end of 2001 India had not ratified the UN Convention against Torture, which it had signed in October 1997, nor had national legislation been drafted to enable its ratification. Therefore, no code or law specifically forbids torture as a criminal offence. Several provisions introduced by the POTO were believed to facilitate the use of torture in police custody.
The UN Special Rapporteur on torture was not granted access to the country by the end of the year, despite repeated requests.
Human rights commissions
There were no indications of progress by the government in considering amendments recommended in 2000 by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to the Protection of Human Rights Act 1993. The NHRC thus continued to be unable to investigate allegations of human rights violations committed by members of the army or paramilitary forces, as well as incidents which took place more than a year before a complaint was made. In September, the NHRC attended the World Conference against Racism and took an independent view from the government, in favour of the inclusion of caste discrimination as a form of racism.
In November the NHRC announced its opposition to the enactment of the POTO, judging it to be ``draconian`` and superfluous, and considering the existing laws sufficient to deal with ``terrorism`` if properly enforced.
State human rights commissions (SHRCs) were created in Maharashtra and Chattisgarh in July, bringing to 12 the number of states having an SHRC. Difficult working conditions, including lack of resources, continued to be reported by some SHRCs.
Abuses by armed groups
There were continued reports of abuses by armed groups in many states, including torture and deliberate killings of civilians. In areas of armed conflict, such as Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast, hundreds of non-combatants, including children, were killed in indiscriminate violence. Conflicts in the states of Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and parts of Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal, involving different factions of the naxalite (armed left-wing) groups and the police, claimed many civilian lives.
Death penalty
At least 16 people were sentenced to death in 2001. It was not known if any executions were carried out, nor how many prisoners were held on death row. The government of India does not publish statistical information about the implementation of the death penalty.
Legislation to extend the use of the death penalty to crimes of rape remained pending. The Explosive Substances (Amendment) Bill 1999, which extends the scope of the death penalty by making the possession of lethal explosives a capital offence, was passed by parliament at the end of the year. The POTO provides for the death penalty for ``terrorist`` offences which result in death. The concern that this would lead to an increase in the number of death sentences was heightened by the fact that provisions of the Ordinance made unfair trials more likely.
AI country reports/visits
Reports
India: Words into action - recommendations for the prevention of torture (AI Index: ASA 20/003/2001)
India: The battle against fear and discrimination - the impact of violence against women in Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan (AI Index: ASA 20/016/2001)
India: Time to act to stop torture and impunity in West Bengal (AI Index: ASA 20/033/2001)
India: Briefing on the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (AI Index: ASA 20/049/2001)
http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2002.nsf/asa/india!Open
The Perfect Murder
28 May 2002
Summary
Historical distrust and tensions between India and Pakistan have reached practically unsustainable levels. New Delhi cannot tolerate paramilitary attacks such as the one against its parliament in December, but the regime of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf simply may not be able to rein in the militants. Any concession on Islamabad`s part could set off a destabilizing political backlash, but this reality also moves the countries closer to a war footing. The United States, meanwhile, has willingly used the threat of war to pressure Islamabad for cooperation in its battle against al Qaeda. Washington realizes that actual war between India and Pakistan would harm its own interests, but for New Delhi there has never been a better time to act.
Analysis
Tension between India and Pakistan has been a feature of the international system since Britain withdrew from the subcontinent and its imperium was partitioned between predominantly Muslim Pakistan and predominantly Hindu India. The rhetoric has concerned Kashmir, but the reality is that each nation deeply distrusts the intentions of the other. As with other conflicts, the litanies of injustice on both sides are real but ultimately irrelevant. India and Pakistan are two nations that regard the very existence of the other as a threat to their fundamental interests.
From India`s viewpoint, Pakistan represents the only serious national security challenge. However bad Sino-Indian relations might become, China`s ability to sustain an invasion deep into India, with a supply line running over the Himalayas, is negligible. To the east, India is buffered by deep jungles and weak nations. To the south lies the Indian Ocean, which is militarily dominated by the United States, a country whose interests frequently have diverged from India`s but which never has threatened India`s existence. In other words, India is effectively an island except on its western frontier. There lies Pakistan: insecure, fragmented and therefore unpredictable.
If Pakistan were to cease to exist, India`s strategic situation would shift to invulnerability on land, thus opening up strategic opportunities at sea.
On a deeper level, the Pakistani-Indian frontier represents the borderland between the Islamic and Hindu worlds. Whatever the current condition of India, the broad historical threat is that the Islamic world one day might unite. In that case, the manageable threat posed by Pakistan would become a potentially unmanageable situation, in which the weight of re-emergent Islamic power would thrust up against an India that might not be able to resist. These are hypothetical fears, far in the future, but they are not trivial.
Islamabad is acutely aware of India`s hopes and fears. Given India`s enormously greater size and military potential, logic would dictate that it would be in Pakistan`s strategic interest to reach a stable accommodation with its neighbor, but two problems prevent this.
First, Islamabad perceives -- not irrationally -- that India`s ultimate goal is the dismemberment of Pakistan. Rather than stabilizing the situation, any concession to India would simply increase the disadvantage at which Pakistan is already operating.
Second, Pakistan as a nation is fragile. It is divided by ethnic group as well as by worldviews. The essentially secular Pakistan of the founders and their heirs collides with the profoundly religious Pakistan that has re-emerged. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for a Pakistani government to make substantial concessions to India. Any concession -- in Kashmir, for example -- would come at the expense of an ethnic group and a religious perspective that has the potential to destabilize the entire regime if displeased, thereby increasing the danger to national survival.
Under these conditions, it has been Pakistan`s historical imperative to avoid engaging India in any negotiations that might lead to a comprehensive settlement. This is because of both reasonable fears of India`s long-term intentions and even more reasonable fears of the domestic response to any concession. For instance, if Pakistan were to accept the current Line of Control in Kashmir, the consequences would be destabilizing.
Pakistan has therefore adopted a three-part strategy that is essentially military in nature.
First, it has created a military force designed to impose heavy costs on any Indian offensive. While this has strained Pakistan`s economy in comparison with India`s, the country has had, as force multipliers, the advantages both of terrain and of being on the defensive.
Second, it has developed nuclear weapons -- not only to counter India`s nuclear force but also to deter India from threatening its existence. In the central region of the front, where terrain is less defensible, Islamabad is aware that India potentially could launch an attack that would split the country in half. Pakistan`s nuclear force, like that of Israel, is designed to prevent conventional defeat by making the risk of success too high for its foe.
Third and most risky, Islamabad has adopted a strategy of permitting paramilitary operations by various groups against Indian installations, such as that against its parliament in December. It might be overstating it to say this is part of a strategy. Rather, these well may be groups whose operations the government can`t control or, alternatively, whose operations it chooses not to control for domestic reasons. Clamping down on these groups might pose political challenges at home.
The paradox is that the domestic benefits of permitting these operations inevitably increase the risk of Indian military action. It has been Pakistan`s strategy to present a substantial defense along the frontier while using the nuclear threat as the final deterrent. If India were to penetrate the frontier to any depth, it is not clear whether Pakistani forces would fall back, regroup and allow guerrillas to operate to the rear of the Indian forces or whether they would rapidly grow nuclear. This is precisely the indeterminacy Islamabad wants to create.
The situation was fairly stable, if noisy, until the United States entered the picture after Sept. 11. For Washington, the essential strategic problem in the region has been Pakistan, not Afghanistan. After the defeat of the Taliban regime, al Qaeda redeployed into Pakistan, joining forces that were already there. In the same way that Islamabad found it less risky to permit paramilitary operations against India than to prevent them, it found it less risky to permit al Qaeda forces sanctuary than to close them down -- not to mention permitting U.S. forces to take on al Qaeda in Pakistani territory.
Following the attack on India`s Parliament, New Delhi created the first post-Sept. 11 crisis. The United States used that crisis to back the government of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf into a corner: While publicly seeking to defuse the crisis, Washington used the Indian threat to change the equation for Pakistan. Officials made it clear that, in fact, permitting al Qaeda to operate in Pakistan is a greater threat to regime survival than permitting U.S. forces to operate against al Qaeda. If India attacked Pakistan and the United States remained neutral or actively participated, the consequences for Pakistan would be catastrophic.
Musharraf publicly conceded, and U.S. forces entered Pakistan. Obviously, with India and the United States involved, Musharraf had to re-evaluate the value of his nuclear capability. The United States clearly had the ability to destroy Pakistan`s nuclear facilities more effectively than India might. When Washington announced a shift in its nuclear policy to permit first strikes, Pakistan was the unmentioned audience. Musharraf clearly heard and understood. Unconfirmed rumors have persisted in the region for several months that Pakistan`s nuclear arsenals already are in U.S. hands or that U.S. observers are at least positioned at various facilities. The Times of India recently published an article to this effect, without providing evidence.
Musharraf, however, has limited control, whatever his desires might be. Operations against al Qaeda in Pakistan clearly have been less than successful because of limits on Pakistani cooperation. Musharraf`s ability to control anti-Indian groups is similarly limited. Thus, the recent attack on an Indian facility by Pakistan-based paramilitaries has reignited the crisis with India -- at the same time that the United States is revisiting the issue of Pakistan`s support for U.S. operations against al Qaeda.
Washington has been moving steadily closer to India, particularly in the area of military cooperation. This is partly out of recognition that the two countries have similar interests in combating Islamic groups in Pakistan. It also is because the United States wants to replicate its maneuvers of earlier this year, using India as the lever to compel cooperation from Pakistan.
Washington expects it can manage the India-Pakistan confrontation effectively, but there are two reasons this might not be the case this time. First, Musharraf simply may have reached the limits of his power. He just may not be able to provide the United States and India with the degree of control over Islamic factions that they seek.
Indeed, Musharraf has known his limits all along and has been playing for time, hoping the crisis can be defused. The Islamic groups do not want to see the crisis defused, since their goal is to create a cauldron that draws in U.S. forces on the ground, sucking them into a war of attrition that will, in the long run, enhance their own position. Since Musharraf cannot deliver what is demanded, he is being forced to consider alternative solutions to the crisis. The solution is to increase the fearsomeness of his military -- in short, brush aside U.S. threats and brandish Pakistan`s nuclear capability.
The second problem is India. New Delhi understands that there will never be a better time to deal with Pakistan. Paramilitary attacks are genuinely intolerable to India. They also provide an excuse for war to which the United States cannot ultimately object, given its views on al Qaeda and its support for Israel. Washington is neither politically nor militarily in a position to block New Delhi. Therefore, if India ever intends to deal with Pakistan, now is the time to act.
There are two problems with action. First, from the Indian standpoint, the Pakistani nuclear threat must be treated as real and likely to be used in the event of war. This leaves New Delhi with two options. One is a non-regime threatening strategy of special operations against Islamic groups in Pakistan, but this would not solve the core problem. The second option is a broader attack into Pakistan, designed to shatter the country. That attack could be carried out only with a pre-emptive strike against Pakistani nuclear facilities. The issue is the degree of confidence India has in its own surgical nuclear capabilities -- or the United States` willingness to take out Pakistani weapons in order to prevent nuclear escalation.
This brings us to the second problem. The dismemberment of Pakistan would compound rather than solve the United States` problem. The chaos that would follow would create precisely the conditions al Qaeda needs for its own security. Entire areas of the country, in the least hospitable terrain, would become more secure for al Qaeda than before. Therefore, from the U.S. standpoint, using the threat of an Indian attack is ideal; a successful Indian attack would be harmful.
India`s calculus is not the same, however. If it is accepted that Pakistan represents a permanent strategic threat to India, the question of war is not whether but when. Given the current political situation and correlation of forces, if this isn`t the perfect time, what is?
If war is inevitable, it is difficult to see how India can act without taking out Pakistan`s nuclear capability. It is unclear how India could take those out without nuclear weapons, or without U.S. precision-guided munitions, Special Operations and other covert forces. But at the end of the day, the United States does not want Pakistan in chaos, it does not want an Indian nuclear strike and it certainly doesn`t want Pakistan -- facing a use-it-or-lose-it scenario -- to launch its own nuclear strike.
The United States probably could paralyze Pakistan`s nuclear force. That, however, would open the door to Indian attack, since the United States could not prevent paramilitary operations and cannot permit India to achieve its historical goal -- at least not until al Qaeda has been dealt with. On the other hand, India cannot afford to miss this historic opportunity.
We are therefore in an extraordinarily difficult crisis. The three players each have strategic interests that simply don`t mesh. If Washington convinces New Delhi to wait, it will have to convince Islamabad to stay in India`s crosshairs and India to put up with intolerable attacks. If India proceeds, it essentially would save al Qaeda by shattering Pakistan. In the event of complete mismanagement, a nuclear exchange costing millions of lives is a genuine possibility.
India has given Pakistan a small window of opportunity to solve the problem it cannot solve. It gives the United States a period of time to defuse a situation that, in STRATFOR`s view, could suddenly and catastrophically get out of hand.
STRATFOR.com
http://www.stratfor.com
Posted by
cutandpaste
May 29, 2002 12:49 am
Triangle of Tension: India, Pakistan and the United States28 May 2002
Summary
Historical distrust and tensions between India and Pakistan have reached practically unsustainable levels. New Delhi cannot tolerate paramilitary attacks such as the one against its parliament in December, but the regime of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf simply may not be able to rein in the militants. Any concession on Islamabad`s part could set off a destabilizing political backlash, but this reality also moves the countries closer to a war footing. The United States, meanwhile, has willingly used the threat of war to pressure Islamabad for cooperation in its battle against al Qaeda. Washington realizes that actual war between India and Pakistan would harm its own interests, but for New Delhi there has never been a better time to act.
Analysis
Tension between India and Pakistan has been a feature of the international system since Britain withdrew from the subcontinent and its imperium was partitioned between predominantly Muslim Pakistan and predominantly Hindu India. The rhetoric has concerned Kashmir, but the reality is that each nation deeply distrusts the intentions of the other. As with other conflicts, the litanies of injustice on both sides are real but ultimately irrelevant. India and Pakistan are two nations that regard the very existence of the other as a threat to their fundamental interests.
From India`s viewpoint, Pakistan represents the only serious national security challenge. However bad Sino-Indian relations might become, China`s ability to sustain an invasion deep into India, with a supply line running over the Himalayas, is negligible. To the east, India is buffered by deep jungles and weak nations. To the south lies the Indian Ocean, which is militarily dominated by the United States, a country whose interests frequently have diverged from India`s but which never has threatened India`s existence. In other words, India is effectively an island except on its western frontier. There lies Pakistan: insecure, fragmented and therefore unpredictable.
If Pakistan were to cease to exist, India`s strategic situation would shift to invulnerability on land, thus opening up strategic opportunities at sea.
On a deeper level, the Pakistani-Indian frontier represents the borderland between the Islamic and Hindu worlds. Whatever the current condition of India, the broad historical threat is that the Islamic world one day might unite. In that case, the manageable threat posed by Pakistan would become a potentially unmanageable situation, in which the weight of re-emergent Islamic power would thrust up against an India that might not be able to resist. These are hypothetical fears, far in the future, but they are not trivial.
Islamabad is acutely aware of India`s hopes and fears. Given India`s enormously greater size and military potential, logic would dictate that it would be in Pakistan`s strategic interest to reach a stable accommodation with its neighbor, but two problems prevent this.
First, Islamabad perceives -- not irrationally -- that India`s ultimate goal is the dismemberment of Pakistan. Rather than stabilizing the situation, any concession to India would simply increase the disadvantage at which Pakistan is already operating.
Second, Pakistan as a nation is fragile. It is divided by ethnic group as well as by worldviews. The essentially secular Pakistan of the founders and their heirs collides with the profoundly religious Pakistan that has re-emerged. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for a Pakistani government to make substantial concessions to India. Any concession -- in Kashmir, for example -- would come at the expense of an ethnic group and a religious perspective that has the potential to destabilize the entire regime if displeased, thereby increasing the danger to national survival.
Under these conditions, it has been Pakistan`s historical imperative to avoid engaging India in any negotiations that might lead to a comprehensive settlement. This is because of both reasonable fears of India`s long-term intentions and even more reasonable fears of the domestic response to any concession. For instance, if Pakistan were to accept the current Line of Control in Kashmir, the consequences would be destabilizing.
Pakistan has therefore adopted a three-part strategy that is essentially military in nature.
First, it has created a military force designed to impose heavy costs on any Indian offensive. While this has strained Pakistan`s economy in comparison with India`s, the country has had, as force multipliers, the advantages both of terrain and of being on the defensive.
Second, it has developed nuclear weapons -- not only to counter India`s nuclear force but also to deter India from threatening its existence. In the central region of the front, where terrain is less defensible, Islamabad is aware that India potentially could launch an attack that would split the country in half. Pakistan`s nuclear force, like that of Israel, is designed to prevent conventional defeat by making the risk of success too high for its foe.
Third and most risky, Islamabad has adopted a strategy of permitting paramilitary operations by various groups against Indian installations, such as that against its parliament in December. It might be overstating it to say this is part of a strategy. Rather, these well may be groups whose operations the government can`t control or, alternatively, whose operations it chooses not to control for domestic reasons. Clamping down on these groups might pose political challenges at home.
The paradox is that the domestic benefits of permitting these operations inevitably increase the risk of Indian military action. It has been Pakistan`s strategy to present a substantial defense along the frontier while using the nuclear threat as the final deterrent. If India were to penetrate the frontier to any depth, it is not clear whether Pakistani forces would fall back, regroup and allow guerrillas to operate to the rear of the Indian forces or whether they would rapidly grow nuclear. This is precisely the indeterminacy Islamabad wants to create.
The situation was fairly stable, if noisy, until the United States entered the picture after Sept. 11. For Washington, the essential strategic problem in the region has been Pakistan, not Afghanistan. After the defeat of the Taliban regime, al Qaeda redeployed into Pakistan, joining forces that were already there. In the same way that Islamabad found it less risky to permit paramilitary operations against India than to prevent them, it found it less risky to permit al Qaeda forces sanctuary than to close them down -- not to mention permitting U.S. forces to take on al Qaeda in Pakistani territory.
Following the attack on India`s Parliament, New Delhi created the first post-Sept. 11 crisis. The United States used that crisis to back the government of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf into a corner: While publicly seeking to defuse the crisis, Washington used the Indian threat to change the equation for Pakistan. Officials made it clear that, in fact, permitting al Qaeda to operate in Pakistan is a greater threat to regime survival than permitting U.S. forces to operate against al Qaeda. If India attacked Pakistan and the United States remained neutral or actively participated, the consequences for Pakistan would be catastrophic.
Musharraf publicly conceded, and U.S. forces entered Pakistan. Obviously, with India and the United States involved, Musharraf had to re-evaluate the value of his nuclear capability. The United States clearly had the ability to destroy Pakistan`s nuclear facilities more effectively than India might. When Washington announced a shift in its nuclear policy to permit first strikes, Pakistan was the unmentioned audience. Musharraf clearly heard and understood. Unconfirmed rumors have persisted in the region for several months that Pakistan`s nuclear arsenals already are in U.S. hands or that U.S. observers are at least positioned at various facilities. The Times of India recently published an article to this effect, without providing evidence.
Musharraf, however, has limited control, whatever his desires might be. Operations against al Qaeda in Pakistan clearly have been less than successful because of limits on Pakistani cooperation. Musharraf`s ability to control anti-Indian groups is similarly limited. Thus, the recent attack on an Indian facility by Pakistan-based paramilitaries has reignited the crisis with India -- at the same time that the United States is revisiting the issue of Pakistan`s support for U.S. operations against al Qaeda.
Washington has been moving steadily closer to India, particularly in the area of military cooperation. This is partly out of recognition that the two countries have similar interests in combating Islamic groups in Pakistan. It also is because the United States wants to replicate its maneuvers of earlier this year, using India as the lever to compel cooperation from Pakistan.
Washington expects it can manage the India-Pakistan confrontation effectively, but there are two reasons this might not be the case this time. First, Musharraf simply may have reached the limits of his power. He just may not be able to provide the United States and India with the degree of control over Islamic factions that they seek.
Indeed, Musharraf has known his limits all along and has been playing for time, hoping the crisis can be defused. The Islamic groups do not want to see the crisis defused, since their goal is to create a cauldron that draws in U.S. forces on the ground, sucking them into a war of attrition that will, in the long run, enhance their own position. Since Musharraf cannot deliver what is demanded, he is being forced to consider alternative solutions to the crisis. The solution is to increase the fearsomeness of his military -- in short, brush aside U.S. threats and brandish Pakistan`s nuclear capability.
The second problem is India. New Delhi understands that there will never be a better time to deal with Pakistan. Paramilitary attacks are genuinely intolerable to India. They also provide an excuse for war to which the United States cannot ultimately object, given its views on al Qaeda and its support for Israel. Washington is neither politically nor militarily in a position to block New Delhi. Therefore, if India ever intends to deal with Pakistan, now is the time to act.
There are two problems with action. First, from the Indian standpoint, the Pakistani nuclear threat must be treated as real and likely to be used in the event of war. This leaves New Delhi with two options. One is a non-regime threatening strategy of special operations against Islamic groups in Pakistan, but this would not solve the core problem. The second option is a broader attack into Pakistan, designed to shatter the country. That attack could be carried out only with a pre-emptive strike against Pakistani nuclear facilities. The issue is the degree of confidence India has in its own surgical nuclear capabilities -- or the United States` willingness to take out Pakistani weapons in order to prevent nuclear escalation.
This brings us to the second problem. The dismemberment of Pakistan would compound rather than solve the United States` problem. The chaos that would follow would create precisely the conditions al Qaeda needs for its own security. Entire areas of the country, in the least hospitable terrain, would become more secure for al Qaeda than before. Therefore, from the U.S. standpoint, using the threat of an Indian attack is ideal; a successful Indian attack would be harmful.
India`s calculus is not the same, however. If it is accepted that Pakistan represents a permanent strategic threat to India, the question of war is not whether but when. Given the current political situation and correlation of forces, if this isn`t the perfect time, what is?
If war is inevitable, it is difficult to see how India can act without taking out Pakistan`s nuclear capability. It is unclear how India could take those out without nuclear weapons, or without U.S. precision-guided munitions, Special Operations and other covert forces. But at the end of the day, the United States does not want Pakistan in chaos, it does not want an Indian nuclear strike and it certainly doesn`t want Pakistan -- facing a use-it-or-lose-it scenario -- to launch its own nuclear strike.
The United States probably could paralyze Pakistan`s nuclear force. That, however, would open the door to Indian attack, since the United States could not prevent paramilitary operations and cannot permit India to achieve its historical goal -- at least not until al Qaeda has been dealt with. On the other hand, India cannot afford to miss this historic opportunity.
We are therefore in an extraordinarily difficult crisis. The three players each have strategic interests that simply don`t mesh. If Washington convinces New Delhi to wait, it will have to convince Islamabad to stay in India`s crosshairs and India to put up with intolerable attacks. If India proceeds, it essentially would save al Qaeda by shattering Pakistan. In the event of complete mismanagement, a nuclear exchange costing millions of lives is a genuine possibility.
India has given Pakistan a small window of opportunity to solve the problem it cannot solve. It gives the United States a period of time to defuse a situation that, in STRATFOR`s view, could suddenly and catastrophically get out of hand.
STRATFOR.com
http://www.stratfor.com
Lighting The Nuclear Fire
India seeks face-saving for resolution of crisis
By Kamran Khan
KARACHI: Pakistani military leadership under President General Musharraf is ``absolutely confident`` that the freedom struggle in Kashmir has entered a crucial phase where an Indian military adventurism along the Line of Control or the working boundary would trap the Indian army in a Vietnam or Afghanistan-like situation and hasten the freedom process for the Kashmiri Muslims.
Interviews with officials, familiar with the current thinking at the General Headquarters (GHQ), revealed the government of Pakistan has also determined that the recent international efforts for mediation, particularly from Russia, represent an implicit Indian desire to extricate itself from an untenable diplomatic and military posture.
``In such a situation when the much awaited phase of international diplomacy is just beginning, how can we give India a head start,`` says a senior official, explaining the logic behind General Musharraf`s hard-line address to the nation on Monday. ``Actual concessions to India can only be part of give and take during bilateral negotiations.``
Relevant Pakistani officials believe that the robust military preparedness by the Pakistani Army, Navy, Air Force -- all three forces now equipped with tactical nuclear weapons -- and an expected ``impetus`` to anti-military guerrilla activities by the freedom fighters may turn the Indians` dream for a decisive war in Kashmir into a nightmare for the Indian military.
This military perception, enunciated very recently by the Military Operations Directorate, Commander Corps 10, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and other relevant military formations, contributed to the General Musharraf`s address to the nation during which he resolutely refused to give further concessions to the Indian military on Monday.
General Musharraf, a veteran of 1965 and 1971 wars with India, is also considered to be one of the most important architects of the military`s Kashmir strategy. The general had gained a rare insight into India`s military capabilities, while serving as Pakistan Army`s Director-General Military Operations (DGMO) in the early 1990s.
A military source said: ``Operational plans on Kashmir made under Musharraf at the MO (Military Operations Directorate) still form the core of the current strategy of the Pakistan Army in Kashmir.``
He added: ``As far as the military strategy and planning is concerned, Gen Musharraf is far ahead than the ageing Indian prime minister.`` Last week, General Musharraf and the top brass of Pakistani military establishment decided to stand firm on Kashmir policy after unanimously agreeing that the recent military posturing by India may ultimately push the Indian military into an even deeper strategic quagmire in Kashmir. ``Which army of the world can wage war when it is being attacked by its own people from right, left, front and the back,`` asked a senior Pakistani military source. ``Once the hostilities break out, can anyone perceive any other scenario for the Indian army in Kashmir.``
To meet the likely military scenario in Kashmir, one of the most important military moves made recently by the GHQ was to deploy a major chunk of Pakistani Special Services Groups (SSG) commandos all along the Line of Control for penetration -- in case of Indian military strike -- into held Kashmir, where friendly population and battle-hardened Kashmiri guerrillas are desperate to embrace them for a decisive military push, leading to complete liberation.
Sources close to two banned Jihadi groups have, meanwhile, disclosed in separate interviews in Karachi that they were ``not bothered`` by the recent decision of the military government to take new measures to block the traffic of freedom fighters from Pakistan into held Kashmir.
Responding to suggestions from the US government, the Pakistani military leaders had decided last week to introduce new security measures to stop the movement of Kashmiri militants from Azad Kashmir to held Kashmir. ``Three layers of security positions manned round the clock by the heavily armed Indian troops can`t stop us from reaching destinations well inside Kashmir Valley,`` vowed a Jihadi, who gave his name as Abu Hamza. ``How can Pakistani troops do something that 12 divisions of Indian army so grossly failed to achieve,`` he adds.
Other Jihadi sources said that because of favourable weather condition hundreds of fresh militants had entered Kashmir in April and in the first three weeks of the current month, until a few days before the military government announced fresh measures to stop infiltration into held Kashmir.
Local Jihadi sources have revealed that in the past few weeks they received numerous calls for help from various Muslim groups in Indian state of Gujarat and Maharashtra, where thousands of Muslims were killed and their properties were destroyed in the worst anti-Muslim riots that had erupted in March this year. ``In the wake of a war with Pakistan, Indian Muslims would give the biggest surprise to Indian security forces all over mainland India,`` Abu Hamza remarked.
President Musharraf`s Monday`s speech in general and his remarks about attacks on Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and scheduled caste by ``extremist Hindu terrorists`` appear to have won him a rare appreciation from the Pakistani militant religious quarters. ``The freedom struggle in Kashmir has primed to a point where the final push for liberation seems to be the logical next phase,`` says (retd) Colonel Salman Ahmed, one of the most reputed special forces officer of the Pakistan Army. ``Neither can we nor the Indian army forget what happened in the former East Pakistan, where the Indian army has timed its military intervention with the full bloom insurgency,`` says Col Salman, who thought that the Indian leadership would commit a Himalayan blunder by igniting a military confrontation in Kashmir. ``Kashmir is going to repeat the scenes of insurgency and the final acts of a liberation struggle seen in the last days of former East Pakistan, but now the key actors have changed sides,`` declared Col Salman.
Pakistan military sources also draw some comfort from the fact that an unprecedented concentration of Indian military resources in Kashmir has stripped India of numerical superiority of its troops deployed along the international borders. ``For a conventional military ground offensive, a numerical superiority of 3:1 is usually desired but because of heavy concentration in Kashmir, Indian military can hardly maintain that kind of numerical strength along the international borders,`` says an official source. For its part, Pakistani official sources said, a favourable situation on ground in Kashmir allows complete strategic manoeuvrability for the strike corps of the Pakistan Army positioned at Mangla and Multan.
Informed sources said that to meet an all-out war situation with India, the Strategic Command Force -- the central military organisation that control Pakistan`s nuclear assets -- was reviewing the recent reported movement of tactical nuclear weapons by the Indian forces. ``All the money, research and energy spent on developing tactical and strategic assets would go waste if we do not meet this great threat to the security of Pakistan by keeping these assets wrapped somewhere in lock and key,`` commented a senior Pakistani official.
As the Pakistan Navy successfully test-fired a medium range ship-to-ship missile, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead on Tuesday, flotilla of Pakistan Navy frigates and submarines was engaged in aggressive patrolling of the sea, senior Pakistani officials said. The Pakistan Navy has also commissioned its surveillance aircraft such as P-3 Orion and Atlantique to collect real-time maritime intelligence on Indian naval patrolling.
http://www.sulekha.com/redirectnh.asp?cid=204347
Posted by
cutandpaste
May 29, 2002 12:49 am
Army believes Kashmir freedom is nearIndia seeks face-saving for resolution of crisis
By Kamran Khan
KARACHI: Pakistani military leadership under President General Musharraf is ``absolutely confident`` that the freedom struggle in Kashmir has entered a crucial phase where an Indian military adventurism along the Line of Control or the working boundary would trap the Indian army in a Vietnam or Afghanistan-like situation and hasten the freedom process for the Kashmiri Muslims.
Interviews with officials, familiar with the current thinking at the General Headquarters (GHQ), revealed the government of Pakistan has also determined that the recent international efforts for mediation, particularly from Russia, represent an implicit Indian desire to extricate itself from an untenable diplomatic and military posture.
``In such a situation when the much awaited phase of international diplomacy is just beginning, how can we give India a head start,`` says a senior official, explaining the logic behind General Musharraf`s hard-line address to the nation on Monday. ``Actual concessions to India can only be part of give and take during bilateral negotiations.``
Relevant Pakistani officials believe that the robust military preparedness by the Pakistani Army, Navy, Air Force -- all three forces now equipped with tactical nuclear weapons -- and an expected ``impetus`` to anti-military guerrilla activities by the freedom fighters may turn the Indians` dream for a decisive war in Kashmir into a nightmare for the Indian military.
This military perception, enunciated very recently by the Military Operations Directorate, Commander Corps 10, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and other relevant military formations, contributed to the General Musharraf`s address to the nation during which he resolutely refused to give further concessions to the Indian military on Monday.
General Musharraf, a veteran of 1965 and 1971 wars with India, is also considered to be one of the most important architects of the military`s Kashmir strategy. The general had gained a rare insight into India`s military capabilities, while serving as Pakistan Army`s Director-General Military Operations (DGMO) in the early 1990s.
A military source said: ``Operational plans on Kashmir made under Musharraf at the MO (Military Operations Directorate) still form the core of the current strategy of the Pakistan Army in Kashmir.``
He added: ``As far as the military strategy and planning is concerned, Gen Musharraf is far ahead than the ageing Indian prime minister.`` Last week, General Musharraf and the top brass of Pakistani military establishment decided to stand firm on Kashmir policy after unanimously agreeing that the recent military posturing by India may ultimately push the Indian military into an even deeper strategic quagmire in Kashmir. ``Which army of the world can wage war when it is being attacked by its own people from right, left, front and the back,`` asked a senior Pakistani military source. ``Once the hostilities break out, can anyone perceive any other scenario for the Indian army in Kashmir.``
To meet the likely military scenario in Kashmir, one of the most important military moves made recently by the GHQ was to deploy a major chunk of Pakistani Special Services Groups (SSG) commandos all along the Line of Control for penetration -- in case of Indian military strike -- into held Kashmir, where friendly population and battle-hardened Kashmiri guerrillas are desperate to embrace them for a decisive military push, leading to complete liberation.
Sources close to two banned Jihadi groups have, meanwhile, disclosed in separate interviews in Karachi that they were ``not bothered`` by the recent decision of the military government to take new measures to block the traffic of freedom fighters from Pakistan into held Kashmir.
Responding to suggestions from the US government, the Pakistani military leaders had decided last week to introduce new security measures to stop the movement of Kashmiri militants from Azad Kashmir to held Kashmir. ``Three layers of security positions manned round the clock by the heavily armed Indian troops can`t stop us from reaching destinations well inside Kashmir Valley,`` vowed a Jihadi, who gave his name as Abu Hamza. ``How can Pakistani troops do something that 12 divisions of Indian army so grossly failed to achieve,`` he adds.
Other Jihadi sources said that because of favourable weather condition hundreds of fresh militants had entered Kashmir in April and in the first three weeks of the current month, until a few days before the military government announced fresh measures to stop infiltration into held Kashmir.
Local Jihadi sources have revealed that in the past few weeks they received numerous calls for help from various Muslim groups in Indian state of Gujarat and Maharashtra, where thousands of Muslims were killed and their properties were destroyed in the worst anti-Muslim riots that had erupted in March this year. ``In the wake of a war with Pakistan, Indian Muslims would give the biggest surprise to Indian security forces all over mainland India,`` Abu Hamza remarked.
President Musharraf`s Monday`s speech in general and his remarks about attacks on Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and scheduled caste by ``extremist Hindu terrorists`` appear to have won him a rare appreciation from the Pakistani militant religious quarters. ``The freedom struggle in Kashmir has primed to a point where the final push for liberation seems to be the logical next phase,`` says (retd) Colonel Salman Ahmed, one of the most reputed special forces officer of the Pakistan Army. ``Neither can we nor the Indian army forget what happened in the former East Pakistan, where the Indian army has timed its military intervention with the full bloom insurgency,`` says Col Salman, who thought that the Indian leadership would commit a Himalayan blunder by igniting a military confrontation in Kashmir. ``Kashmir is going to repeat the scenes of insurgency and the final acts of a liberation struggle seen in the last days of former East Pakistan, but now the key actors have changed sides,`` declared Col Salman.
Pakistan military sources also draw some comfort from the fact that an unprecedented concentration of Indian military resources in Kashmir has stripped India of numerical superiority of its troops deployed along the international borders. ``For a conventional military ground offensive, a numerical superiority of 3:1 is usually desired but because of heavy concentration in Kashmir, Indian military can hardly maintain that kind of numerical strength along the international borders,`` says an official source. For its part, Pakistani official sources said, a favourable situation on ground in Kashmir allows complete strategic manoeuvrability for the strike corps of the Pakistan Army positioned at Mangla and Multan.
Informed sources said that to meet an all-out war situation with India, the Strategic Command Force -- the central military organisation that control Pakistan`s nuclear assets -- was reviewing the recent reported movement of tactical nuclear weapons by the Indian forces. ``All the money, research and energy spent on developing tactical and strategic assets would go waste if we do not meet this great threat to the security of Pakistan by keeping these assets wrapped somewhere in lock and key,`` commented a senior Pakistani official.
As the Pakistan Navy successfully test-fired a medium range ship-to-ship missile, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead on Tuesday, flotilla of Pakistan Navy frigates and submarines was engaged in aggressive patrolling of the sea, senior Pakistani officials said. The Pakistan Navy has also commissioned its surveillance aircraft such as P-3 Orion and Atlantique to collect real-time maritime intelligence on Indian naval patrolling.
http://www.sulekha.com/redirectnh.asp?cid=204347
Lighting The Nuclear Fire
28 May 2002
Summary
Historical distrust and tensions between India and Pakistan have reached practically unsustainable levels. New Delhi cannot tolerate paramilitary attacks such as the one against its parliament in December, but the regime of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf simply may not be able to rein in the militants. Any concession on Islamabad`s part could set off a destabilizing political backlash, but this reality also moves the countries closer to a war footing. The United States, meanwhile, has willingly used the threat of war to pressure Islamabad for cooperation in its battle against al Qaeda. Washington realizes that actual war between India and Pakistan would harm its own interests, but for New Delhi there has never been a better time to act.
Analysis
Tension between India and Pakistan has been a feature of the international system since Britain withdrew from the subcontinent and its imperium was partitioned between predominantly Muslim Pakistan and predominantly Hindu India. The rhetoric has concerned Kashmir, but the reality is that each nation deeply distrusts the intentions of the other. As with other conflicts, the litanies of injustice on both sides are real but ultimately irrelevant. India and Pakistan are two nations that regard the very existence of the other as a threat to their fundamental interests.
From India`s viewpoint, Pakistan represents the only serious national security challenge. However bad Sino-Indian relations might become, China`s ability to sustain an invasion deep into India, with a supply line running over the Himalayas, is negligible. To the east, India is buffered by deep jungles and weak nations. To the south lies the Indian Ocean, which is militarily dominated by the United States, a country whose interests frequently have diverged from India`s but which never has threatened India`s existence. In other words, India is effectively an island except on its western frontier. There lies Pakistan: insecure, fragmented and therefore unpredictable.
If Pakistan were to cease to exist, India`s strategic situation would shift to invulnerability on land, thus opening up strategic opportunities at sea.
On a deeper level, the Pakistani-Indian frontier represents the borderland between the Islamic and Hindu worlds. Whatever the current condition of India, the broad historical threat is that the Islamic world one day might unite. In that case, the manageable threat posed by Pakistan would become a potentially unmanageable situation, in which the weight of re-emergent Islamic power would thrust up against an India that might not be able to resist. These are hypothetical fears, far in the future, but they are not trivial.
Islamabad is acutely aware of India`s hopes and fears. Given India`s enormously greater size and military potential, logic would dictate that it would be in Pakistan`s strategic interest to reach a stable accommodation with its neighbor, but two problems prevent this.
First, Islamabad perceives -- not irrationally -- that India`s ultimate goal is the dismemberment of Pakistan. Rather than stabilizing the situation, any concession to India would simply increase the disadvantage at which Pakistan is already operating.
Second, Pakistan as a nation is fragile. It is divided by ethnic group as well as by worldviews. The essentially secular Pakistan of the founders and their heirs collides with the profoundly religious Pakistan that has re-emerged. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for a Pakistani government to make substantial concessions to India. Any concession -- in Kashmir, for example -- would come at the expense of an ethnic group and a religious perspective that has the potential to destabilize the entire regime if displeased, thereby increasing the danger to national survival.
Under these conditions, it has been Pakistan`s historical imperative to avoid engaging India in any negotiations that might lead to a comprehensive settlement. This is because of both reasonable fears of India`s long-term intentions and even more reasonable fears of the domestic response to any concession. For instance, if Pakistan were to accept the current Line of Control in Kashmir, the consequences would be destabilizing.
Pakistan has therefore adopted a three-part strategy that is essentially military in nature.
First, it has created a military force designed to impose heavy costs on any Indian offensive. While this has strained Pakistan`s economy in comparison with India`s, the country has had, as force multipliers, the advantages both of terrain and of being on the defensive.
Second, it has developed nuclear weapons -- not only to counter India`s nuclear force but also to deter India from threatening its existence. In the central region of the front, where terrain is less defensible, Islamabad is aware that India potentially could launch an attack that would split the country in half. Pakistan`s nuclear force, like that of Israel, is designed to prevent conventional defeat by making the risk of success too high for its foe.
Third and most risky, Islamabad has adopted a strategy of permitting paramilitary operations by various groups against Indian installations, such as that against its parliament in December. It might be overstating it to say this is part of a strategy. Rather, these well may be groups whose operations the government can`t control or, alternatively, whose operations it chooses not to control for domestic reasons. Clamping down on these groups might pose political challenges at home.
The paradox is that the domestic benefits of permitting these operations inevitably increase the risk of Indian military action. It has been Pakistan`s strategy to present a substantial defense along the frontier while using the nuclear threat as the final deterrent. If India were to penetrate the frontier to any depth, it is not clear whether Pakistani forces would fall back, regroup and allow guerrillas to operate to the rear of the Indian forces or whether they would rapidly grow nuclear. This is precisely the indeterminacy Islamabad wants to create.
The situation was fairly stable, if noisy, until the United States entered the picture after Sept. 11. For Washington, the essential strategic problem in the region has been Pakistan, not Afghanistan. After the defeat of the Taliban regime, al Qaeda redeployed into Pakistan, joining forces that were already there. In the same way that Islamabad found it less risky to permit paramilitary operations against India than to prevent them, it found it less risky to permit al Qaeda forces sanctuary than to close them down -- not to mention permitting U.S. forces to take on al Qaeda in Pakistani territory.
Following the attack on India`s Parliament, New Delhi created the first post-Sept. 11 crisis. The United States used that crisis to back the government of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf into a corner: While publicly seeking to defuse the crisis, Washington used the Indian threat to change the equation for Pakistan. Officials made it clear that, in fact, permitting al Qaeda to operate in Pakistan is a greater threat to regime survival than permitting U.S. forces to operate against al Qaeda. If India attacked Pakistan and the United States remained neutral or actively participated, the consequences for Pakistan would be catastrophic.
Musharraf publicly conceded, and U.S. forces entered Pakistan. Obviously, with India and the United States involved, Musharraf had to re-evaluate the value of his nuclear capability. The United States clearly had the ability to destroy Pakistan`s nuclear facilities more effectively than India might. When Washington announced a shift in its nuclear policy to permit first strikes, Pakistan was the unmentioned audience. Musharraf clearly heard and understood. Unconfirmed rumors have persisted in the region for several months that Pakistan`s nuclear arsenals already are in U.S. hands or that U.S. observers are at least positioned at various facilities. The Times of India recently published an article to this effect, without providing evidence.
Musharraf, however, has limited control, whatever his desires might be. Operations against al Qaeda in Pakistan clearly have been less than successful because of limits on Pakistani cooperation. Musharraf`s ability to control anti-Indian groups is similarly limited. Thus, the recent attack on an Indian facility by Pakistan-based paramilitaries has reignited the crisis with India -- at the same time that the United States is revisiting the issue of Pakistan`s support for U.S. operations against al Qaeda.
Washington has been moving steadily closer to India, particularly in the area of military cooperation. This is partly out of recognition that the two countries have similar interests in combating Islamic groups in Pakistan. It also is because the United States wants to replicate its maneuvers of earlier this year, using India as the lever to compel cooperation from Pakistan.
Washington expects it can manage the India-Pakistan confrontation effectively, but there are two reasons this might not be the case this time. First, Musharraf simply may have reached the limits of his power. He just may not be able to provide the United States and India with the degree of control over Islamic factions that they seek.
Indeed, Musharraf has known his limits all along and has been playing for time, hoping the crisis can be defused. The Islamic groups do not want to see the crisis defused, since their goal is to create a cauldron that draws in U.S. forces on the ground, sucking them into a war of attrition that will, in the long run, enhance their own position. Since Musharraf cannot deliver what is demanded, he is being forced to consider alternative solutions to the crisis. The solution is to increase the fearsomeness of his military -- in short, brush aside U.S. threats and brandish Pakistan`s nuclear capability.
The second problem is India. New Delhi understands that there will never be a better time to deal with Pakistan. Paramilitary attacks are genuinely intolerable to India. They also provide an excuse for war to which the United States cannot ultimately object, given its views on al Qaeda and its support for Israel. Washington is neither politically nor militarily in a position to block New Delhi. Therefore, if India ever intends to deal with Pakistan, now is the time to act.
There are two problems with action. First, from the Indian standpoint, the Pakistani nuclear threat must be treated as real and likely to be used in the event of war. This leaves New Delhi with two options. One is a non-regime threatening strategy of special operations against Islamic groups in Pakistan, but this would not solve the core problem. The second option is a broader attack into Pakistan, designed to shatter the country. That attack could be carried out only with a pre-emptive strike against Pakistani nuclear facilities. The issue is the degree of confidence India has in its own surgical nuclear capabilities -- or the United States` willingness to take out Pakistani weapons in order to prevent nuclear escalation.
This brings us to the second problem. The dismemberment of Pakistan would compound rather than solve the United States` problem. The chaos that would follow would create precisely the conditions al Qaeda needs for its own security. Entire areas of the country, in the least hospitable terrain, would become more secure for al Qaeda than before. Therefore, from the U.S. standpoint, using the threat of an Indian attack is ideal; a successful Indian attack would be harmful.
India`s calculus is not the same, however. If it is accepted that Pakistan represents a permanent strategic threat to India, the question of war is not whether but when. Given the current political situation and correlation of forces, if this isn`t the perfect time, what is?
If war is inevitable, it is difficult to see how India can act without taking out Pakistan`s nuclear capability. It is unclear how India could take those out without nuclear weapons, or without U.S. precision-guided munitions, Special Operations and other covert forces. But at the end of the day, the United States does not want Pakistan in chaos, it does not want an Indian nuclear strike and it certainly doesn`t want Pakistan -- facing a use-it-or-lose-it scenario -- to launch its own nuclear strike.
The United States probably could paralyze Pakistan`s nuclear force. That, however, would open the door to Indian attack, since the United States could not prevent paramilitary operations and cannot permit India to achieve its historical goal -- at least not until al Qaeda has been dealt with. On the other hand, India cannot afford to miss this historic opportunity.
We are therefore in an extraordinarily difficult crisis. The three players each have strategic interests that simply don`t mesh. If Washington convinces New Delhi to wait, it will have to convince Islamabad to stay in India`s crosshairs and India to put up with intolerable attacks. If India proceeds, it essentially would save al Qaeda by shattering Pakistan. In the event of complete mismanagement, a nuclear exchange costing millions of lives is a genuine possibility.
India has given Pakistan a small window of opportunity to solve the problem it cannot solve. It gives the United States a period of time to defuse a situation that, in STRATFOR`s view, could suddenly and catastrophically get out of hand.
STRATFOR.com
http://www.stratfor.com
Posted by
cutandpaste
May 29, 2002 12:49 am
Triangle of Tension: India, Pakistan and the United States28 May 2002
Summary
Historical distrust and tensions between India and Pakistan have reached practically unsustainable levels. New Delhi cannot tolerate paramilitary attacks such as the one against its parliament in December, but the regime of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf simply may not be able to rein in the militants. Any concession on Islamabad`s part could set off a destabilizing political backlash, but this reality also moves the countries closer to a war footing. The United States, meanwhile, has willingly used the threat of war to pressure Islamabad for cooperation in its battle against al Qaeda. Washington realizes that actual war between India and Pakistan would harm its own interests, but for New Delhi there has never been a better time to act.
Analysis
Tension between India and Pakistan has been a feature of the international system since Britain withdrew from the subcontinent and its imperium was partitioned between predominantly Muslim Pakistan and predominantly Hindu India. The rhetoric has concerned Kashmir, but the reality is that each nation deeply distrusts the intentions of the other. As with other conflicts, the litanies of injustice on both sides are real but ultimately irrelevant. India and Pakistan are two nations that regard the very existence of the other as a threat to their fundamental interests.
From India`s viewpoint, Pakistan represents the only serious national security challenge. However bad Sino-Indian relations might become, China`s ability to sustain an invasion deep into India, with a supply line running over the Himalayas, is negligible. To the east, India is buffered by deep jungles and weak nations. To the south lies the Indian Ocean, which is militarily dominated by the United States, a country whose interests frequently have diverged from India`s but which never has threatened India`s existence. In other words, India is effectively an island except on its western frontier. There lies Pakistan: insecure, fragmented and therefore unpredictable.
If Pakistan were to cease to exist, India`s strategic situation would shift to invulnerability on land, thus opening up strategic opportunities at sea.
On a deeper level, the Pakistani-Indian frontier represents the borderland between the Islamic and Hindu worlds. Whatever the current condition of India, the broad historical threat is that the Islamic world one day might unite. In that case, the manageable threat posed by Pakistan would become a potentially unmanageable situation, in which the weight of re-emergent Islamic power would thrust up against an India that might not be able to resist. These are hypothetical fears, far in the future, but they are not trivial.
Islamabad is acutely aware of India`s hopes and fears. Given India`s enormously greater size and military potential, logic would dictate that it would be in Pakistan`s strategic interest to reach a stable accommodation with its neighbor, but two problems prevent this.
First, Islamabad perceives -- not irrationally -- that India`s ultimate goal is the dismemberment of Pakistan. Rather than stabilizing the situation, any concession to India would simply increase the disadvantage at which Pakistan is already operating.
Second, Pakistan as a nation is fragile. It is divided by ethnic group as well as by worldviews. The essentially secular Pakistan of the founders and their heirs collides with the profoundly religious Pakistan that has re-emerged. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for a Pakistani government to make substantial concessions to India. Any concession -- in Kashmir, for example -- would come at the expense of an ethnic group and a religious perspective that has the potential to destabilize the entire regime if displeased, thereby increasing the danger to national survival.
Under these conditions, it has been Pakistan`s historical imperative to avoid engaging India in any negotiations that might lead to a comprehensive settlement. This is because of both reasonable fears of India`s long-term intentions and even more reasonable fears of the domestic response to any concession. For instance, if Pakistan were to accept the current Line of Control in Kashmir, the consequences would be destabilizing.
Pakistan has therefore adopted a three-part strategy that is essentially military in nature.
First, it has created a military force designed to impose heavy costs on any Indian offensive. While this has strained Pakistan`s economy in comparison with India`s, the country has had, as force multipliers, the advantages both of terrain and of being on the defensive.
Second, it has developed nuclear weapons -- not only to counter India`s nuclear force but also to deter India from threatening its existence. In the central region of the front, where terrain is less defensible, Islamabad is aware that India potentially could launch an attack that would split the country in half. Pakistan`s nuclear force, like that of Israel, is designed to prevent conventional defeat by making the risk of success too high for its foe.
Third and most risky, Islamabad has adopted a strategy of permitting paramilitary operations by various groups against Indian installations, such as that against its parliament in December. It might be overstating it to say this is part of a strategy. Rather, these well may be groups whose operations the government can`t control or, alternatively, whose operations it chooses not to control for domestic reasons. Clamping down on these groups might pose political challenges at home.
The paradox is that the domestic benefits of permitting these operations inevitably increase the risk of Indian military action. It has been Pakistan`s strategy to present a substantial defense along the frontier while using the nuclear threat as the final deterrent. If India were to penetrate the frontier to any depth, it is not clear whether Pakistani forces would fall back, regroup and allow guerrillas to operate to the rear of the Indian forces or whether they would rapidly grow nuclear. This is precisely the indeterminacy Islamabad wants to create.
The situation was fairly stable, if noisy, until the United States entered the picture after Sept. 11. For Washington, the essential strategic problem in the region has been Pakistan, not Afghanistan. After the defeat of the Taliban regime, al Qaeda redeployed into Pakistan, joining forces that were already there. In the same way that Islamabad found it less risky to permit paramilitary operations against India than to prevent them, it found it less risky to permit al Qaeda forces sanctuary than to close them down -- not to mention permitting U.S. forces to take on al Qaeda in Pakistani territory.
Following the attack on India`s Parliament, New Delhi created the first post-Sept. 11 crisis. The United States used that crisis to back the government of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf into a corner: While publicly seeking to defuse the crisis, Washington used the Indian threat to change the equation for Pakistan. Officials made it clear that, in fact, permitting al Qaeda to operate in Pakistan is a greater threat to regime survival than permitting U.S. forces to operate against al Qaeda. If India attacked Pakistan and the United States remained neutral or actively participated, the consequences for Pakistan would be catastrophic.
Musharraf publicly conceded, and U.S. forces entered Pakistan. Obviously, with India and the United States involved, Musharraf had to re-evaluate the value of his nuclear capability. The United States clearly had the ability to destroy Pakistan`s nuclear facilities more effectively than India might. When Washington announced a shift in its nuclear policy to permit first strikes, Pakistan was the unmentioned audience. Musharraf clearly heard and understood. Unconfirmed rumors have persisted in the region for several months that Pakistan`s nuclear arsenals already are in U.S. hands or that U.S. observers are at least positioned at various facilities. The Times of India recently published an article to this effect, without providing evidence.
Musharraf, however, has limited control, whatever his desires might be. Operations against al Qaeda in Pakistan clearly have been less than successful because of limits on Pakistani cooperation. Musharraf`s ability to control anti-Indian groups is similarly limited. Thus, the recent attack on an Indian facility by Pakistan-based paramilitaries has reignited the crisis with India -- at the same time that the United States is revisiting the issue of Pakistan`s support for U.S. operations against al Qaeda.
Washington has been moving steadily closer to India, particularly in the area of military cooperation. This is partly out of recognition that the two countries have similar interests in combating Islamic groups in Pakistan. It also is because the United States wants to replicate its maneuvers of earlier this year, using India as the lever to compel cooperation from Pakistan.
Washington expects it can manage the India-Pakistan confrontation effectively, but there are two reasons this might not be the case this time. First, Musharraf simply may have reached the limits of his power. He just may not be able to provide the United States and India with the degree of control over Islamic factions that they seek.
Indeed, Musharraf has known his limits all along and has been playing for time, hoping the crisis can be defused. The Islamic groups do not want to see the crisis defused, since their goal is to create a cauldron that draws in U.S. forces on the ground, sucking them into a war of attrition that will, in the long run, enhance their own position. Since Musharraf cannot deliver what is demanded, he is being forced to consider alternative solutions to the crisis. The solution is to increase the fearsomeness of his military -- in short, brush aside U.S. threats and brandish Pakistan`s nuclear capability.
The second problem is India. New Delhi understands that there will never be a better time to deal with Pakistan. Paramilitary attacks are genuinely intolerable to India. They also provide an excuse for war to which the United States cannot ultimately object, given its views on al Qaeda and its support for Israel. Washington is neither politically nor militarily in a position to block New Delhi. Therefore, if India ever intends to deal with Pakistan, now is the time to act.
There are two problems with action. First, from the Indian standpoint, the Pakistani nuclear threat must be treated as real and likely to be used in the event of war. This leaves New Delhi with two options. One is a non-regime threatening strategy of special operations against Islamic groups in Pakistan, but this would not solve the core problem. The second option is a broader attack into Pakistan, designed to shatter the country. That attack could be carried out only with a pre-emptive strike against Pakistani nuclear facilities. The issue is the degree of confidence India has in its own surgical nuclear capabilities -- or the United States` willingness to take out Pakistani weapons in order to prevent nuclear escalation.
This brings us to the second problem. The dismemberment of Pakistan would compound rather than solve the United States` problem. The chaos that would follow would create precisely the conditions al Qaeda needs for its own security. Entire areas of the country, in the least hospitable terrain, would become more secure for al Qaeda than before. Therefore, from the U.S. standpoint, using the threat of an Indian attack is ideal; a successful Indian attack would be harmful.
India`s calculus is not the same, however. If it is accepted that Pakistan represents a permanent strategic threat to India, the question of war is not whether but when. Given the current political situation and correlation of forces, if this isn`t the perfect time, what is?
If war is inevitable, it is difficult to see how India can act without taking out Pakistan`s nuclear capability. It is unclear how India could take those out without nuclear weapons, or without U.S. precision-guided munitions, Special Operations and other covert forces. But at the end of the day, the United States does not want Pakistan in chaos, it does not want an Indian nuclear strike and it certainly doesn`t want Pakistan -- facing a use-it-or-lose-it scenario -- to launch its own nuclear strike.
The United States probably could paralyze Pakistan`s nuclear force. That, however, would open the door to Indian attack, since the United States could not prevent paramilitary operations and cannot permit India to achieve its historical goal -- at least not until al Qaeda has been dealt with. On the other hand, India cannot afford to miss this historic opportunity.
We are therefore in an extraordinarily difficult crisis. The three players each have strategic interests that simply don`t mesh. If Washington convinces New Delhi to wait, it will have to convince Islamabad to stay in India`s crosshairs and India to put up with intolerable attacks. If India proceeds, it essentially would save al Qaeda by shattering Pakistan. In the event of complete mismanagement, a nuclear exchange costing millions of lives is a genuine possibility.
India has given Pakistan a small window of opportunity to solve the problem it cannot solve. It gives the United States a period of time to defuse a situation that, in STRATFOR`s view, could suddenly and catastrophically get out of hand.
STRATFOR.com
http://www.stratfor.com
Of Violent Birth and Peaceful Death
India seeks face-saving for resolution of crisis
By Kamran Khan
KARACHI: Pakistani military leadership under President General Musharraf is ``absolutely confident`` that the freedom struggle in Kashmir has entered a crucial phase where an Indian military adventurism along the Line of Control or the working boundary would trap the Indian army in a Vietnam or Afghanistan-like situation and hasten the freedom process for the Kashmiri Muslims.
Interviews with officials, familiar with the current thinking at the General Headquarters (GHQ), revealed the government of Pakistan has also determined that the recent international efforts for mediation, particularly from Russia, represent an implicit Indian desire to extricate itself from an untenable diplomatic and military posture.
``In such a situation when the much awaited phase of international diplomacy is just beginning, how can we give India a head start,`` says a senior official, explaining the logic behind General Musharraf`s hard-line address to the nation on Monday. ``Actual concessions to India can only be part of give and take during bilateral negotiations.``
Relevant Pakistani officials believe that the robust military preparedness by the Pakistani Army, Navy, Air Force -- all three forces now equipped with tactical nuclear weapons -- and an expected ``impetus`` to anti-military guerrilla activities by the freedom fighters may turn the Indians` dream for a decisive war in Kashmir into a nightmare for the Indian military.
This military perception, enunciated very recently by the Military Operations Directorate, Commander Corps 10, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and other relevant military formations, contributed to the General Musharraf`s address to the nation during which he resolutely refused to give further concessions to the Indian military on Monday.
General Musharraf, a veteran of 1965 and 1971 wars with India, is also considered to be one of the most important architects of the military`s Kashmir strategy. The general had gained a rare insight into India`s military capabilities, while serving as Pakistan Army`s Director-General Military Operations (DGMO) in the early 1990s.
A military source said: ``Operational plans on Kashmir made under Musharraf at the MO (Military Operations Directorate) still form the core of the current strategy of the Pakistan Army in Kashmir.``
He added: ``As far as the military strategy and planning is concerned, Gen Musharraf is far ahead than the ageing Indian prime minister.`` Last week, General Musharraf and the top brass of Pakistani military establishment decided to stand firm on Kashmir policy after unanimously agreeing that the recent military posturing by India may ultimately push the Indian military into an even deeper strategic quagmire in Kashmir. ``Which army of the world can wage war when it is being attacked by its own people from right, left, front and the back,`` asked a senior Pakistani military source. ``Once the hostilities break out, can anyone perceive any other scenario for the Indian army in Kashmir.``
To meet the likely military scenario in Kashmir, one of the most important military moves made recently by the GHQ was to deploy a major chunk of Pakistani Special Services Groups (SSG) commandos all along the Line of Control for penetration -- in case of Indian military strike -- into held Kashmir, where friendly population and battle-hardened Kashmiri guerrillas are desperate to embrace them for a decisive military push, leading to complete liberation.
Sources close to two banned Jihadi groups have, meanwhile, disclosed in separate interviews in Karachi that they were ``not bothered`` by the recent decision of the military government to take new measures to block the traffic of freedom fighters from Pakistan into held Kashmir.
Responding to suggestions from the US government, the Pakistani military leaders had decided last week to introduce new security measures to stop the movement of Kashmiri militants from Azad Kashmir to held Kashmir. ``Three layers of security positions manned round the clock by the heavily armed Indian troops can`t stop us from reaching destinations well inside Kashmir Valley,`` vowed a Jihadi, who gave his name as Abu Hamza. ``How can Pakistani troops do something that 12 divisions of Indian army so grossly failed to achieve,`` he adds.
Other Jihadi sources said that because of favourable weather condition hundreds of fresh militants had entered Kashmir in April and in the first three weeks of the current month, until a few days before the military government announced fresh measures to stop infiltration into held Kashmir.
Local Jihadi sources have revealed that in the past few weeks they received numerous calls for help from various Muslim groups in Indian state of Gujarat and Maharashtra, where thousands of Muslims were killed and their properties were destroyed in the worst anti-Muslim riots that had erupted in March this year. ``In the wake of a war with Pakistan, Indian Muslims would give the biggest surprise to Indian security forces all over mainland India,`` Abu Hamza remarked.
President Musharraf`s Monday`s speech in general and his remarks about attacks on Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and scheduled caste by ``extremist Hindu terrorists`` appear to have won him a rare appreciation from the Pakistani militant religious quarters. ``The freedom struggle in Kashmir has primed to a point where the final push for liberation seems to be the logical next phase,`` says (retd) Colonel Salman Ahmed, one of the most reputed special forces officer of the Pakistan Army. ``Neither can we nor the Indian army forget what happened in the former East Pakistan, where the Indian army has timed its military intervention with the full bloom insurgency,`` says Col Salman, who thought that the Indian leadership would commit a Himalayan blunder by igniting a military confrontation in Kashmir. ``Kashmir is going to repeat the scenes of insurgency and the final acts of a liberation struggle seen in the last days of former East Pakistan, but now the key actors have changed sides,`` declared Col Salman.
Pakistan military sources also draw some comfort from the fact that an unprecedented concentration of Indian military resources in Kashmir has stripped India of numerical superiority of its troops deployed along the international borders. ``For a conventional military ground offensive, a numerical superiority of 3:1 is usually desired but because of heavy concentration in Kashmir, Indian military can hardly maintain that kind of numerical strength along the international borders,`` says an official source. For its part, Pakistani official sources said, a favourable situation on ground in Kashmir allows complete strategic manoeuvrability for the strike corps of the Pakistan Army positioned at Mangla and Multan.
Informed sources said that to meet an all-out war situation with India, the Strategic Command Force -- the central military organisation that control Pakistan`s nuclear assets -- was reviewing the recent reported movement of tactical nuclear weapons by the Indian forces. ``All the money, research and energy spent on developing tactical and strategic assets would go waste if we do not meet this great threat to the security of Pakistan by keeping these assets wrapped somewhere in lock and key,`` commented a senior Pakistani official.
As the Pakistan Navy successfully test-fired a medium range ship-to-ship missile, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead on Tuesday, flotilla of Pakistan Navy frigates and submarines was engaged in aggressive patrolling of the sea, senior Pakistani officials said. The Pakistan Navy has also commissioned its surveillance aircraft such as P-3 Orion and Atlantique to collect real-time maritime intelligence on Indian naval patrolling.
http://www.sulekha.com/redirectnh.asp?cid=204347
Posted by
cutandpaste
May 29, 2002 12:49 am
Army believes Kashmir freedom is nearIndia seeks face-saving for resolution of crisis
By Kamran Khan
KARACHI: Pakistani military leadership under President General Musharraf is ``absolutely confident`` that the freedom struggle in Kashmir has entered a crucial phase where an Indian military adventurism along the Line of Control or the working boundary would trap the Indian army in a Vietnam or Afghanistan-like situation and hasten the freedom process for the Kashmiri Muslims.
Interviews with officials, familiar with the current thinking at the General Headquarters (GHQ), revealed the government of Pakistan has also determined that the recent international efforts for mediation, particularly from Russia, represent an implicit Indian desire to extricate itself from an untenable diplomatic and military posture.
``In such a situation when the much awaited phase of international diplomacy is just beginning, how can we give India a head start,`` says a senior official, explaining the logic behind General Musharraf`s hard-line address to the nation on Monday. ``Actual concessions to India can only be part of give and take during bilateral negotiations.``
Relevant Pakistani officials believe that the robust military preparedness by the Pakistani Army, Navy, Air Force -- all three forces now equipped with tactical nuclear weapons -- and an expected ``impetus`` to anti-military guerrilla activities by the freedom fighters may turn the Indians` dream for a decisive war in Kashmir into a nightmare for the Indian military.
This military perception, enunciated very recently by the Military Operations Directorate, Commander Corps 10, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and other relevant military formations, contributed to the General Musharraf`s address to the nation during which he resolutely refused to give further concessions to the Indian military on Monday.
General Musharraf, a veteran of 1965 and 1971 wars with India, is also considered to be one of the most important architects of the military`s Kashmir strategy. The general had gained a rare insight into India`s military capabilities, while serving as Pakistan Army`s Director-General Military Operations (DGMO) in the early 1990s.
A military source said: ``Operational plans on Kashmir made under Musharraf at the MO (Military Operations Directorate) still form the core of the current strategy of the Pakistan Army in Kashmir.``
He added: ``As far as the military strategy and planning is concerned, Gen Musharraf is far ahead than the ageing Indian prime minister.`` Last week, General Musharraf and the top brass of Pakistani military establishment decided to stand firm on Kashmir policy after unanimously agreeing that the recent military posturing by India may ultimately push the Indian military into an even deeper strategic quagmire in Kashmir. ``Which army of the world can wage war when it is being attacked by its own people from right, left, front and the back,`` asked a senior Pakistani military source. ``Once the hostilities break out, can anyone perceive any other scenario for the Indian army in Kashmir.``
To meet the likely military scenario in Kashmir, one of the most important military moves made recently by the GHQ was to deploy a major chunk of Pakistani Special Services Groups (SSG) commandos all along the Line of Control for penetration -- in case of Indian military strike -- into held Kashmir, where friendly population and battle-hardened Kashmiri guerrillas are desperate to embrace them for a decisive military push, leading to complete liberation.
Sources close to two banned Jihadi groups have, meanwhile, disclosed in separate interviews in Karachi that they were ``not bothered`` by the recent decision of the military government to take new measures to block the traffic of freedom fighters from Pakistan into held Kashmir.
Responding to suggestions from the US government, the Pakistani military leaders had decided last week to introduce new security measures to stop the movement of Kashmiri militants from Azad Kashmir to held Kashmir. ``Three layers of security positions manned round the clock by the heavily armed Indian troops can`t stop us from reaching destinations well inside Kashmir Valley,`` vowed a Jihadi, who gave his name as Abu Hamza. ``How can Pakistani troops do something that 12 divisions of Indian army so grossly failed to achieve,`` he adds.
Other Jihadi sources said that because of favourable weather condition hundreds of fresh militants had entered Kashmir in April and in the first three weeks of the current month, until a few days before the military government announced fresh measures to stop infiltration into held Kashmir.
Local Jihadi sources have revealed that in the past few weeks they received numerous calls for help from various Muslim groups in Indian state of Gujarat and Maharashtra, where thousands of Muslims were killed and their properties were destroyed in the worst anti-Muslim riots that had erupted in March this year. ``In the wake of a war with Pakistan, Indian Muslims would give the biggest surprise to Indian security forces all over mainland India,`` Abu Hamza remarked.
President Musharraf`s Monday`s speech in general and his remarks about attacks on Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and scheduled caste by ``extremist Hindu terrorists`` appear to have won him a rare appreciation from the Pakistani militant religious quarters. ``The freedom struggle in Kashmir has primed to a point where the final push for liberation seems to be the logical next phase,`` says (retd) Colonel Salman Ahmed, one of the most reputed special forces officer of the Pakistan Army. ``Neither can we nor the Indian army forget what happened in the former East Pakistan, where the Indian army has timed its military intervention with the full bloom insurgency,`` says Col Salman, who thought that the Indian leadership would commit a Himalayan blunder by igniting a military confrontation in Kashmir. ``Kashmir is going to repeat the scenes of insurgency and the final acts of a liberation struggle seen in the last days of former East Pakistan, but now the key actors have changed sides,`` declared Col Salman.
Pakistan military sources also draw some comfort from the fact that an unprecedented concentration of Indian military resources in Kashmir has stripped India of numerical superiority of its troops deployed along the international borders. ``For a conventional military ground offensive, a numerical superiority of 3:1 is usually desired but because of heavy concentration in Kashmir, Indian military can hardly maintain that kind of numerical strength along the international borders,`` says an official source. For its part, Pakistani official sources said, a favourable situation on ground in Kashmir allows complete strategic manoeuvrability for the strike corps of the Pakistan Army positioned at Mangla and Multan.
Informed sources said that to meet an all-out war situation with India, the Strategic Command Force -- the central military organisation that control Pakistan`s nuclear assets -- was reviewing the recent reported movement of tactical nuclear weapons by the Indian forces. ``All the money, research and energy spent on developing tactical and strategic assets would go waste if we do not meet this great threat to the security of Pakistan by keeping these assets wrapped somewhere in lock and key,`` commented a senior Pakistani official.
As the Pakistan Navy successfully test-fired a medium range ship-to-ship missile, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead on Tuesday, flotilla of Pakistan Navy frigates and submarines was engaged in aggressive patrolling of the sea, senior Pakistani officials said. The Pakistan Navy has also commissioned its surveillance aircraft such as P-3 Orion and Atlantique to collect real-time maritime intelligence on Indian naval patrolling.
http://www.sulekha.com/redirectnh.asp?cid=204347
Of Violent Birth and Peaceful Death
28 May 2002
Summary
Historical distrust and tensions between India and Pakistan have reached practically unsustainable levels. New Delhi cannot tolerate paramilitary attacks such as the one against its parliament in December, but the regime of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf simply may not be able to rein in the militants. Any concession on Islamabad`s part could set off a destabilizing political backlash, but this reality also moves the countries closer to a war footing. The United States, meanwhile, has willingly used the threat of war to pressure Islamabad for cooperation in its battle against al Qaeda. Washington realizes that actual war between India and Pakistan would harm its own interests, but for New Delhi there has never been a better time to act.
Analysis
Tension between India and Pakistan has been a feature of the international system since Britain withdrew from the subcontinent and its imperium was partitioned between predominantly Muslim Pakistan and predominantly Hindu India. The rhetoric has concerned Kashmir, but the reality is that each nation deeply distrusts the intentions of the other. As with other conflicts, the litanies of injustice on both sides are real but ultimately irrelevant. India and Pakistan are two nations that regard the very existence of the other as a threat to their fundamental interests.
From India`s viewpoint, Pakistan represents the only serious national security challenge. However bad Sino-Indian relations might become, China`s ability to sustain an invasion deep into India, with a supply line running over the Himalayas, is negligible. To the east, India is buffered by deep jungles and weak nations. To the south lies the Indian Ocean, which is militarily dominated by the United States, a country whose interests frequently have diverged from India`s but which never has threatened India`s existence. In other words, India is effectively an island except on its western frontier. There lies Pakistan: insecure, fragmented and therefore unpredictable.
If Pakistan were to cease to exist, India`s strategic situation would shift to invulnerability on land, thus opening up strategic opportunities at sea.
On a deeper level, the Pakistani-Indian frontier represents the borderland between the Islamic and Hindu worlds. Whatever the current condition of India, the broad historical threat is that the Islamic world one day might unite. In that case, the manageable threat posed by Pakistan would become a potentially unmanageable situation, in which the weight of re-emergent Islamic power would thrust up against an India that might not be able to resist. These are hypothetical fears, far in the future, but they are not trivial.
Islamabad is acutely aware of India`s hopes and fears. Given India`s enormously greater size and military potential, logic would dictate that it would be in Pakistan`s strategic interest to reach a stable accommodation with its neighbor, but two problems prevent this.
First, Islamabad perceives -- not irrationally -- that India`s ultimate goal is the dismemberment of Pakistan. Rather than stabilizing the situation, any concession to India would simply increase the disadvantage at which Pakistan is already operating.
Second, Pakistan as a nation is fragile. It is divided by ethnic group as well as by worldviews. The essentially secular Pakistan of the founders and their heirs collides with the profoundly religious Pakistan that has re-emerged. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for a Pakistani government to make substantial concessions to India. Any concession -- in Kashmir, for example -- would come at the expense of an ethnic group and a religious perspective that has the potential to destabilize the entire regime if displeased, thereby increasing the danger to national survival.
Under these conditions, it has been Pakistan`s historical imperative to avoid engaging India in any negotiations that might lead to a comprehensive settlement. This is because of both reasonable fears of India`s long-term intentions and even more reasonable fears of the domestic response to any concession. For instance, if Pakistan were to accept the current Line of Control in Kashmir, the consequences would be destabilizing.
Pakistan has therefore adopted a three-part strategy that is essentially military in nature.
First, it has created a military force designed to impose heavy costs on any Indian offensive. While this has strained Pakistan`s economy in comparison with India`s, the country has had, as force multipliers, the advantages both of terrain and of being on the defensive.
Second, it has developed nuclear weapons -- not only to counter India`s nuclear force but also to deter India from threatening its existence. In the central region of the front, where terrain is less defensible, Islamabad is aware that India potentially could launch an attack that would split the country in half. Pakistan`s nuclear force, like that of Israel, is designed to prevent conventional defeat by making the risk of success too high for its foe.
Third and most risky, Islamabad has adopted a strategy of permitting paramilitary operations by various groups against Indian installations, such as that against its parliament in December. It might be overstating it to say this is part of a strategy. Rather, these well may be groups whose operations the government can`t control or, alternatively, whose operations it chooses not to control for domestic reasons. Clamping down on these groups might pose political challenges at home.
The paradox is that the domestic benefits of permitting these operations inevitably increase the risk of Indian military action. It has been Pakistan`s strategy to present a substantial defense along the frontier while using the nuclear threat as the final deterrent. If India were to penetrate the frontier to any depth, it is not clear whether Pakistani forces would fall back, regroup and allow guerrillas to operate to the rear of the Indian forces or whether they would rapidly grow nuclear. This is precisely the indeterminacy Islamabad wants to create.
The situation was fairly stable, if noisy, until the United States entered the picture after Sept. 11. For Washington, the essential strategic problem in the region has been Pakistan, not Afghanistan. After the defeat of the Taliban regime, al Qaeda redeployed into Pakistan, joining forces that were already there. In the same way that Islamabad found it less risky to permit paramilitary operations against India than to prevent them, it found it less risky to permit al Qaeda forces sanctuary than to close them down -- not to mention permitting U.S. forces to take on al Qaeda in Pakistani territory.
Following the attack on India`s Parliament, New Delhi created the first post-Sept. 11 crisis. The United States used that crisis to back the government of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf into a corner: While publicly seeking to defuse the crisis, Washington used the Indian threat to change the equation for Pakistan. Officials made it clear that, in fact, permitting al Qaeda to operate in Pakistan is a greater threat to regime survival than permitting U.S. forces to operate against al Qaeda. If India attacked Pakistan and the United States remained neutral or actively participated, the consequences for Pakistan would be catastrophic.
Musharraf publicly conceded, and U.S. forces entered Pakistan. Obviously, with India and the United States involved, Musharraf had to re-evaluate the value of his nuclear capability. The United States clearly had the ability to destroy Pakistan`s nuclear facilities more effectively than India might. When Washington announced a shift in its nuclear policy to permit first strikes, Pakistan was the unmentioned audience. Musharraf clearly heard and understood. Unconfirmed rumors have persisted in the region for several months that Pakistan`s nuclear arsenals already are in U.S. hands or that U.S. observers are at least positioned at various facilities. The Times of India recently published an article to this effect, without providing evidence.
Musharraf, however, has limited control, whatever his desires might be. Operations against al Qaeda in Pakistan clearly have been less than successful because of limits on Pakistani cooperation. Musharraf`s ability to control anti-Indian groups is similarly limited. Thus, the recent attack on an Indian facility by Pakistan-based paramilitaries has reignited the crisis with India -- at the same time that the United States is revisiting the issue of Pakistan`s support for U.S. operations against al Qaeda.
Washington has been moving steadily closer to India, particularly in the area of military cooperation. This is partly out of recognition that the two countries have similar interests in combating Islamic groups in Pakistan. It also is because the United States wants to replicate its maneuvers of earlier this year, using India as the lever to compel cooperation from Pakistan.
Washington expects it can manage the India-Pakistan confrontation effectively, but there are two reasons this might not be the case this time. First, Musharraf simply may have reached the limits of his power. He just may not be able to provide the United States and India with the degree of control over Islamic factions that they seek.
Indeed, Musharraf has known his limits all along and has been playing for time, hoping the crisis can be defused. The Islamic groups do not want to see the crisis defused, since their goal is to create a cauldron that draws in U.S. forces on the ground, sucking them into a war of attrition that will, in the long run, enhance their own position. Since Musharraf cannot deliver what is demanded, he is being forced to consider alternative solutions to the crisis. The solution is to increase the fearsomeness of his military -- in short, brush aside U.S. threats and brandish Pakistan`s nuclear capability.
The second problem is India. New Delhi understands that there will never be a better time to deal with Pakistan. Paramilitary attacks are genuinely intolerable to India. They also provide an excuse for war to which the United States cannot ultimately object, given its views on al Qaeda and its support for Israel. Washington is neither politically nor militarily in a position to block New Delhi. Therefore, if India ever intends to deal with Pakistan, now is the time to act.
There are two problems with action. First, from the Indian standpoint, the Pakistani nuclear threat must be treated as real and likely to be used in the event of war. This leaves New Delhi with two options. One is a non-regime threatening strategy of special operations against Islamic groups in Pakistan, but this would not solve the core problem. The second option is a broader attack into Pakistan, designed to shatter the country. That attack could be carried out only with a pre-emptive strike against Pakistani nuclear facilities. The issue is the degree of confidence India has in its own surgical nuclear capabilities -- or the United States` willingness to take out Pakistani weapons in order to prevent nuclear escalation.
This brings us to the second problem. The dismemberment of Pakistan would compound rather than solve the United States` problem. The chaos that would follow would create precisely the conditions al Qaeda needs for its own security. Entire areas of the country, in the least hospitable terrain, would become more secure for al Qaeda than before. Therefore, from the U.S. standpoint, using the threat of an Indian attack is ideal; a successful Indian attack would be harmful.
India`s calculus is not the same, however. If it is accepted that Pakistan represents a permanent strategic threat to India, the question of war is not whether but when. Given the current political situation and correlation of forces, if this isn`t the perfect time, what is?
If war is inevitable, it is difficult to see how India can act without taking out Pakistan`s nuclear capability. It is unclear how India could take those out without nuclear weapons, or without U.S. precision-guided munitions, Special Operations and other covert forces. But at the end of the day, the United States does not want Pakistan in chaos, it does not want an Indian nuclear strike and it certainly doesn`t want Pakistan -- facing a use-it-or-lose-it scenario -- to launch its own nuclear strike.
The United States probably could paralyze Pakistan`s nuclear force. That, however, would open the door to Indian attack, since the United States could not prevent paramilitary operations and cannot permit India to achieve its historical goal -- at least not until al Qaeda has been dealt with. On the other hand, India cannot afford to miss this historic opportunity.
We are therefore in an extraordinarily difficult crisis. The three players each have strategic interests that simply don`t mesh. If Washington convinces New Delhi to wait, it will have to convince Islamabad to stay in India`s crosshairs and India to put up with intolerable attacks. If India proceeds, it essentially would save al Qaeda by shattering Pakistan. In the event of complete mismanagement, a nuclear exchange costing millions of lives is a genuine possibility.
India has given Pakistan a small window of opportunity to solve the problem it cannot solve. It gives the United States a period of time to defuse a situation that, in STRATFOR`s view, could suddenly and catastrophically get out of hand.
STRATFOR.com
http://www.stratfor.com
Posted by
cutandpaste
May 29, 2002 12:49 am
Triangle of Tension: India, Pakistan and the United States28 May 2002
Summary
Historical distrust and tensions between India and Pakistan have reached practically unsustainable levels. New Delhi cannot tolerate paramilitary attacks such as the one against its parliament in December, but the regime of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf simply may not be able to rein in the militants. Any concession on Islamabad`s part could set off a destabilizing political backlash, but this reality also moves the countries closer to a war footing. The United States, meanwhile, has willingly used the threat of war to pressure Islamabad for cooperation in its battle against al Qaeda. Washington realizes that actual war between India and Pakistan would harm its own interests, but for New Delhi there has never been a better time to act.
Analysis
Tension between India and Pakistan has been a feature of the international system since Britain withdrew from the subcontinent and its imperium was partitioned between predominantly Muslim Pakistan and predominantly Hindu India. The rhetoric has concerned Kashmir, but the reality is that each nation deeply distrusts the intentions of the other. As with other conflicts, the litanies of injustice on both sides are real but ultimately irrelevant. India and Pakistan are two nations that regard the very existence of the other as a threat to their fundamental interests.
From India`s viewpoint, Pakistan represents the only serious national security challenge. However bad Sino-Indian relations might become, China`s ability to sustain an invasion deep into India, with a supply line running over the Himalayas, is negligible. To the east, India is buffered by deep jungles and weak nations. To the south lies the Indian Ocean, which is militarily dominated by the United States, a country whose interests frequently have diverged from India`s but which never has threatened India`s existence. In other words, India is effectively an island except on its western frontier. There lies Pakistan: insecure, fragmented and therefore unpredictable.
If Pakistan were to cease to exist, India`s strategic situation would shift to invulnerability on land, thus opening up strategic opportunities at sea.
On a deeper level, the Pakistani-Indian frontier represents the borderland between the Islamic and Hindu worlds. Whatever the current condition of India, the broad historical threat is that the Islamic world one day might unite. In that case, the manageable threat posed by Pakistan would become a potentially unmanageable situation, in which the weight of re-emergent Islamic power would thrust up against an India that might not be able to resist. These are hypothetical fears, far in the future, but they are not trivial.
Islamabad is acutely aware of India`s hopes and fears. Given India`s enormously greater size and military potential, logic would dictate that it would be in Pakistan`s strategic interest to reach a stable accommodation with its neighbor, but two problems prevent this.
First, Islamabad perceives -- not irrationally -- that India`s ultimate goal is the dismemberment of Pakistan. Rather than stabilizing the situation, any concession to India would simply increase the disadvantage at which Pakistan is already operating.
Second, Pakistan as a nation is fragile. It is divided by ethnic group as well as by worldviews. The essentially secular Pakistan of the founders and their heirs collides with the profoundly religious Pakistan that has re-emerged. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for a Pakistani government to make substantial concessions to India. Any concession -- in Kashmir, for example -- would come at the expense of an ethnic group and a religious perspective that has the potential to destabilize the entire regime if displeased, thereby increasing the danger to national survival.
Under these conditions, it has been Pakistan`s historical imperative to avoid engaging India in any negotiations that might lead to a comprehensive settlement. This is because of both reasonable fears of India`s long-term intentions and even more reasonable fears of the domestic response to any concession. For instance, if Pakistan were to accept the current Line of Control in Kashmir, the consequences would be destabilizing.
Pakistan has therefore adopted a three-part strategy that is essentially military in nature.
First, it has created a military force designed to impose heavy costs on any Indian offensive. While this has strained Pakistan`s economy in comparison with India`s, the country has had, as force multipliers, the advantages both of terrain and of being on the defensive.
Second, it has developed nuclear weapons -- not only to counter India`s nuclear force but also to deter India from threatening its existence. In the central region of the front, where terrain is less defensible, Islamabad is aware that India potentially could launch an attack that would split the country in half. Pakistan`s nuclear force, like that of Israel, is designed to prevent conventional defeat by making the risk of success too high for its foe.
Third and most risky, Islamabad has adopted a strategy of permitting paramilitary operations by various groups against Indian installations, such as that against its parliament in December. It might be overstating it to say this is part of a strategy. Rather, these well may be groups whose operations the government can`t control or, alternatively, whose operations it chooses not to control for domestic reasons. Clamping down on these groups might pose political challenges at home.
The paradox is that the domestic benefits of permitting these operations inevitably increase the risk of Indian military action. It has been Pakistan`s strategy to present a substantial defense along the frontier while using the nuclear threat as the final deterrent. If India were to penetrate the frontier to any depth, it is not clear whether Pakistani forces would fall back, regroup and allow guerrillas to operate to the rear of the Indian forces or whether they would rapidly grow nuclear. This is precisely the indeterminacy Islamabad wants to create.
The situation was fairly stable, if noisy, until the United States entered the picture after Sept. 11. For Washington, the essential strategic problem in the region has been Pakistan, not Afghanistan. After the defeat of the Taliban regime, al Qaeda redeployed into Pakistan, joining forces that were already there. In the same way that Islamabad found it less risky to permit paramilitary operations against India than to prevent them, it found it less risky to permit al Qaeda forces sanctuary than to close them down -- not to mention permitting U.S. forces to take on al Qaeda in Pakistani territory.
Following the attack on India`s Parliament, New Delhi created the first post-Sept. 11 crisis. The United States used that crisis to back the government of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf into a corner: While publicly seeking to defuse the crisis, Washington used the Indian threat to change the equation for Pakistan. Officials made it clear that, in fact, permitting al Qaeda to operate in Pakistan is a greater threat to regime survival than permitting U.S. forces to operate against al Qaeda. If India attacked Pakistan and the United States remained neutral or actively participated, the consequences for Pakistan would be catastrophic.
Musharraf publicly conceded, and U.S. forces entered Pakistan. Obviously, with India and the United States involved, Musharraf had to re-evaluate the value of his nuclear capability. The United States clearly had the ability to destroy Pakistan`s nuclear facilities more effectively than India might. When Washington announced a shift in its nuclear policy to permit first strikes, Pakistan was the unmentioned audience. Musharraf clearly heard and understood. Unconfirmed rumors have persisted in the region for several months that Pakistan`s nuclear arsenals already are in U.S. hands or that U.S. observers are at least positioned at various facilities. The Times of India recently published an article to this effect, without providing evidence.
Musharraf, however, has limited control, whatever his desires might be. Operations against al Qaeda in Pakistan clearly have been less than successful because of limits on Pakistani cooperation. Musharraf`s ability to control anti-Indian groups is similarly limited. Thus, the recent attack on an Indian facility by Pakistan-based paramilitaries has reignited the crisis with India -- at the same time that the United States is revisiting the issue of Pakistan`s support for U.S. operations against al Qaeda.
Washington has been moving steadily closer to India, particularly in the area of military cooperation. This is partly out of recognition that the two countries have similar interests in combating Islamic groups in Pakistan. It also is because the United States wants to replicate its maneuvers of earlier this year, using India as the lever to compel cooperation from Pakistan.
Washington expects it can manage the India-Pakistan confrontation effectively, but there are two reasons this might not be the case this time. First, Musharraf simply may have reached the limits of his power. He just may not be able to provide the United States and India with the degree of control over Islamic factions that they seek.
Indeed, Musharraf has known his limits all along and has been playing for time, hoping the crisis can be defused. The Islamic groups do not want to see the crisis defused, since their goal is to create a cauldron that draws in U.S. forces on the ground, sucking them into a war of attrition that will, in the long run, enhance their own position. Since Musharraf cannot deliver what is demanded, he is being forced to consider alternative solutions to the crisis. The solution is to increase the fearsomeness of his military -- in short, brush aside U.S. threats and brandish Pakistan`s nuclear capability.
The second problem is India. New Delhi understands that there will never be a better time to deal with Pakistan. Paramilitary attacks are genuinely intolerable to India. They also provide an excuse for war to which the United States cannot ultimately object, given its views on al Qaeda and its support for Israel. Washington is neither politically nor militarily in a position to block New Delhi. Therefore, if India ever intends to deal with Pakistan, now is the time to act.
There are two problems with action. First, from the Indian standpoint, the Pakistani nuclear threat must be treated as real and likely to be used in the event of war. This leaves New Delhi with two options. One is a non-regime threatening strategy of special operations against Islamic groups in Pakistan, but this would not solve the core problem. The second option is a broader attack into Pakistan, designed to shatter the country. That attack could be carried out only with a pre-emptive strike against Pakistani nuclear facilities. The issue is the degree of confidence India has in its own surgical nuclear capabilities -- or the United States` willingness to take out Pakistani weapons in order to prevent nuclear escalation.
This brings us to the second problem. The dismemberment of Pakistan would compound rather than solve the United States` problem. The chaos that would follow would create precisely the conditions al Qaeda needs for its own security. Entire areas of the country, in the least hospitable terrain, would become more secure for al Qaeda than before. Therefore, from the U.S. standpoint, using the threat of an Indian attack is ideal; a successful Indian attack would be harmful.
India`s calculus is not the same, however. If it is accepted that Pakistan represents a permanent strategic threat to India, the question of war is not whether but when. Given the current political situation and correlation of forces, if this isn`t the perfect time, what is?
If war is inevitable, it is difficult to see how India can act without taking out Pakistan`s nuclear capability. It is unclear how India could take those out without nuclear weapons, or without U.S. precision-guided munitions, Special Operations and other covert forces. But at the end of the day, the United States does not want Pakistan in chaos, it does not want an Indian nuclear strike and it certainly doesn`t want Pakistan -- facing a use-it-or-lose-it scenario -- to launch its own nuclear strike.
The United States probably could paralyze Pakistan`s nuclear force. That, however, would open the door to Indian attack, since the United States could not prevent paramilitary operations and cannot permit India to achieve its historical goal -- at least not until al Qaeda has been dealt with. On the other hand, India cannot afford to miss this historic opportunity.
We are therefore in an extraordinarily difficult crisis. The three players each have strategic interests that simply don`t mesh. If Washington convinces New Delhi to wait, it will have to convince Islamabad to stay in India`s crosshairs and India to put up with intolerable attacks. If India proceeds, it essentially would save al Qaeda by shattering Pakistan. In the event of complete mismanagement, a nuclear exchange costing millions of lives is a genuine possibility.
India has given Pakistan a small window of opportunity to solve the problem it cannot solve. It gives the United States a period of time to defuse a situation that, in STRATFOR`s view, could suddenly and catastrophically get out of hand.
STRATFOR.com
http://www.stratfor.com
The Perfect Murder
India and Pakistan ``only have differences of religion,`` he said. ``Otherwise it is the same culture, the same way of life.``
The South Asian neighbors have fought two wars over Kashmir and remain sharply at odds over the region, which was divided between them after they gained independence from Britain in 1947 and is claimed in its entirety by both.
In recent days more than a million troops have massed along the India-Pakistan border, exchanging gun and artillery fire amid fears that tension between the nuclear-armed nations could turn into an all-out war.
The Dalai Lama, who has lived in northern India since fleeing Tibet following China`s occupation in 1959, said he was praying for peace in Kashmir.
``So, now, at this moment I have nothing to say, except as a prayer,`` the Buddhist monk said following meetings with New Zealand`s acting prime minister and foreign minister.
Foreign Minister Phil Goff said he and the Dalai Lama discussed the ``concern we both had about the built-up of tension between India and Pakistan and the potential for that dispute to lead catastrophically to a nuclear conflict.``
Goff said he also urged the Dalai Lama and the Chinese authorities to ``re-engage in dialogue`` to resolve their own differences.
Beijing brands the Dalai Lama a separatist who wants to break Tibet away from China`s control. The Dalai Lama says he is only seeking greater autonomy for his homeland. He won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989 for his nonviolent campaign.
``We hope that with the changes happening in China, there will be a change in (their) approach ... and there can be meaningful dialogue between the Chinese authorities and the Dalai Lama,`` Goff said.
Posted by
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May 28, 2002 01:48 pm
Describing India as his ``second home,`` exiled Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama on Tuesday urged New Delhi and Islamabad to seek a peaceful resolution to the Kashmir (news - web sites) crisis.India and Pakistan ``only have differences of religion,`` he said. ``Otherwise it is the same culture, the same way of life.``
The South Asian neighbors have fought two wars over Kashmir and remain sharply at odds over the region, which was divided between them after they gained independence from Britain in 1947 and is claimed in its entirety by both.
In recent days more than a million troops have massed along the India-Pakistan border, exchanging gun and artillery fire amid fears that tension between the nuclear-armed nations could turn into an all-out war.
The Dalai Lama, who has lived in northern India since fleeing Tibet following China`s occupation in 1959, said he was praying for peace in Kashmir.
``So, now, at this moment I have nothing to say, except as a prayer,`` the Buddhist monk said following meetings with New Zealand`s acting prime minister and foreign minister.
Foreign Minister Phil Goff said he and the Dalai Lama discussed the ``concern we both had about the built-up of tension between India and Pakistan and the potential for that dispute to lead catastrophically to a nuclear conflict.``
Goff said he also urged the Dalai Lama and the Chinese authorities to ``re-engage in dialogue`` to resolve their own differences.
Beijing brands the Dalai Lama a separatist who wants to break Tibet away from China`s control. The Dalai Lama says he is only seeking greater autonomy for his homeland. He won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989 for his nonviolent campaign.
``We hope that with the changes happening in China, there will be a change in (their) approach ... and there can be meaningful dialogue between the Chinese authorities and the Dalai Lama,`` Goff said.
The Perfect Murder
The conflict between India and Pakistan is gathering pace. The officials statements that are released from Delhi and Islamabad are becoming more and more militant. However, both India and Pakistan continue to claim that neither one will start a war first and that military actions will be possible only in the case of aggression by the other side. There are not many people who believe these statements, taking into consideration the fact that both Pakistan and India are obviously getting ready for a war, concentrating their troops on the border and testing their missiles. Pakistan even withdrew its peacemaking contingent from Sierra-Leone, so it looks like this: ?if you want peace, get ready for war.?
British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw is expected to visit Delhi and Islamabad this week together with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. It is not hard to guess the subject of the talks: the politicians will talk about the cessation of the conflict. Noone can guarantee that this mission will be successful. Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee claimed that Delhi was not going to listen to the opinion of the international community and exercise restraint with Pakistan. This statement is like a cross on the visit of the British premier and UN Secretary-General.
Currently, India is taking rather a tough position as far as the conflict is concerned. Delhi believes that this is the only way to cause Pakistan to stop supporting Kashmir separatists. It is worth mentioning that India is in a better situation that Pakistan. The reputation of a country that supports terrorism is not good for Pakistan. Delhi realizes this advantage, and it is trying to use it as much as possible. This is where the harsh tone of Indian statements comes from.
For example, Indian Home Minister Lal Krishna Advani stated today that a war with Pakistan is already taking place. The minister believes that Pakistan and its terrorists have declared war on India several years ago. He estimated the current situation in the region as ?challenging? for India, which needs to find other ways to solve its conflict with Pakistan. He claimed that there has been a common war between the two countries during the last couple of weeks, but the phantom war (terrorism) has lasted for two decades. Advani added that India?s losses from the phantom war have been much greater than in the armed conflict.
The fact that the ruling party of India is the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is not optimistic either. This party is well-known for its radicalism and irreconcilability. A lot of observers believe that the recent Indo-Muslim massacre in Gujarat was provoked by BJP?s policy. The Indian premier is considered to be a moderate politician, and Advani is conspicuous for his radicalism. It is hard to say whose influence is bigger in the government.
It seems that Delhi is more and more inclined to solve the issue of terrorism very quickly, as the Indian government is ready to start amilitary conflict with Pakistan if there is a necessity. The consequences of this would be very lamentable, since neither Delhi, nor Pakistan will stop when it comes to nuclear weapons. Negotiations may put an end to the conflict, but there is not much hope for this.
Oleg Artyukov
PRAVDA.Ru
http://english.pravda.ru/main/2002/05/27/29356.html
Posted by
cutandpaste
May 28, 2002 01:48 pm
WHO IS GOING TO RECONCILE INDIA AND PAKISTAN? The conflict between India and Pakistan is gathering pace. The officials statements that are released from Delhi and Islamabad are becoming more and more militant. However, both India and Pakistan continue to claim that neither one will start a war first and that military actions will be possible only in the case of aggression by the other side. There are not many people who believe these statements, taking into consideration the fact that both Pakistan and India are obviously getting ready for a war, concentrating their troops on the border and testing their missiles. Pakistan even withdrew its peacemaking contingent from Sierra-Leone, so it looks like this: ?if you want peace, get ready for war.?
British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw is expected to visit Delhi and Islamabad this week together with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. It is not hard to guess the subject of the talks: the politicians will talk about the cessation of the conflict. Noone can guarantee that this mission will be successful. Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee claimed that Delhi was not going to listen to the opinion of the international community and exercise restraint with Pakistan. This statement is like a cross on the visit of the British premier and UN Secretary-General.
Currently, India is taking rather a tough position as far as the conflict is concerned. Delhi believes that this is the only way to cause Pakistan to stop supporting Kashmir separatists. It is worth mentioning that India is in a better situation that Pakistan. The reputation of a country that supports terrorism is not good for Pakistan. Delhi realizes this advantage, and it is trying to use it as much as possible. This is where the harsh tone of Indian statements comes from.
For example, Indian Home Minister Lal Krishna Advani stated today that a war with Pakistan is already taking place. The minister believes that Pakistan and its terrorists have declared war on India several years ago. He estimated the current situation in the region as ?challenging? for India, which needs to find other ways to solve its conflict with Pakistan. He claimed that there has been a common war between the two countries during the last couple of weeks, but the phantom war (terrorism) has lasted for two decades. Advani added that India?s losses from the phantom war have been much greater than in the armed conflict.
The fact that the ruling party of India is the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is not optimistic either. This party is well-known for its radicalism and irreconcilability. A lot of observers believe that the recent Indo-Muslim massacre in Gujarat was provoked by BJP?s policy. The Indian premier is considered to be a moderate politician, and Advani is conspicuous for his radicalism. It is hard to say whose influence is bigger in the government.
It seems that Delhi is more and more inclined to solve the issue of terrorism very quickly, as the Indian government is ready to start amilitary conflict with Pakistan if there is a necessity. The consequences of this would be very lamentable, since neither Delhi, nor Pakistan will stop when it comes to nuclear weapons. Negotiations may put an end to the conflict, but there is not much hope for this.
Oleg Artyukov
PRAVDA.Ru
http://english.pravda.ru/main/2002/05/27/29356.html
The Perfect Murder
By Edward Luce and Farhan Bokhari in Islamabad
Published: May 27 2002 20:56 | Last Updated: May 27 2002 20:56
General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan`s military ruler, said on Monday that Pakistan would not make any further sacrifices of the country`s ``honour and dignity`` as the price of avoiding war with India.
India, which has hundreds of thousands of troops on high alert along the Line of Control, the international border that divides the disputed province of Kashmir, has strongly hinted that it will launch military strikes on its nuclear-armed neighbour unless Pakistan ceases its alleged sponsorship of terrorism.
But in a one-hour interview with the Financial Times, Gen Musharraf flatly denied that there was any cross-border terrorist infiltration of India`s portion of Kashmir. Gen Musharraf, who earlier gave a 25-minute broadcast to the nation, also ruled out any possibility of handing over 20 alleged terrorists - India`s other key demand.
``India cannot be both the accusers and judges,`` said Gen Musharraf. ``We have made it very clear that there is no activity along the Line of Control.``
He added: ``I am a military man. And while I do not want war, I am not scared of war. However the avoidance of war cannot come at the cost of compromising our honour and dignity.``
In a strong hint that Pakistan would retaliate heavily to any Indian military action, Gen Musharraf said that Pakistan was neither a ``walk-over`` nor weak. Pakistan is to test a third nuclear-capable missile on Tuesday, following two tests at the weekend.
``We have good military deterrence,`` he said. ``We not only have a good defensive capability but a good offensive defensive capability. It would not be responsible for a head of state to discuss our nuclear deterrent. But the level of conventional forces that we maintain is more than adequate to implement our strategy of deterrence.``
Gen Musharraf`s message in unlikely to assuage India, which maintains that infiltration has continued across the LOC at the same rate or higher than previous years. Hopes had also been raised in New Delhi that Pakistan would hand over at least the 10 Indian passport holders on the list of 20 alleged terrorists that reside in Pakistan.
But Gen Musharraf told the FT that some of the names that India submitted were ``ridiculous``, including those of people who had allegedly committed crimes in 1980. ``We can give India a list of names who committed crimes in 1947 [when India was partitioned],`` he said.
On cross-border infiltration, Gen Musharraf said that he was considering ``unilaterally`` stepping up the presence of United Nations observers on Pakistan`s side of the LOC to verify the absence of ``infiltration activity``.
India says that Pakistan-based groups were responsible for the assassination last week of Abdul Gani Lone, a leading Kashmiri separatist, in Srinagar and for the massacre the previous week of 34 Indian soldiers and their families in Jammu.
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1021991066565&p=1012571727102
Posted by
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May 28, 2002 01:48 pm
Musharraf: there will be no more sacrifices By Edward Luce and Farhan Bokhari in Islamabad
Published: May 27 2002 20:56 | Last Updated: May 27 2002 20:56
General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan`s military ruler, said on Monday that Pakistan would not make any further sacrifices of the country`s ``honour and dignity`` as the price of avoiding war with India.
India, which has hundreds of thousands of troops on high alert along the Line of Control, the international border that divides the disputed province of Kashmir, has strongly hinted that it will launch military strikes on its nuclear-armed neighbour unless Pakistan ceases its alleged sponsorship of terrorism.
But in a one-hour interview with the Financial Times, Gen Musharraf flatly denied that there was any cross-border terrorist infiltration of India`s portion of Kashmir. Gen Musharraf, who earlier gave a 25-minute broadcast to the nation, also ruled out any possibility of handing over 20 alleged terrorists - India`s other key demand.
``India cannot be both the accusers and judges,`` said Gen Musharraf. ``We have made it very clear that there is no activity along the Line of Control.``
He added: ``I am a military man. And while I do not want war, I am not scared of war. However the avoidance of war cannot come at the cost of compromising our honour and dignity.``
In a strong hint that Pakistan would retaliate heavily to any Indian military action, Gen Musharraf said that Pakistan was neither a ``walk-over`` nor weak. Pakistan is to test a third nuclear-capable missile on Tuesday, following two tests at the weekend.
``We have good military deterrence,`` he said. ``We not only have a good defensive capability but a good offensive defensive capability. It would not be responsible for a head of state to discuss our nuclear deterrent. But the level of conventional forces that we maintain is more than adequate to implement our strategy of deterrence.``
Gen Musharraf`s message in unlikely to assuage India, which maintains that infiltration has continued across the LOC at the same rate or higher than previous years. Hopes had also been raised in New Delhi that Pakistan would hand over at least the 10 Indian passport holders on the list of 20 alleged terrorists that reside in Pakistan.
But Gen Musharraf told the FT that some of the names that India submitted were ``ridiculous``, including those of people who had allegedly committed crimes in 1980. ``We can give India a list of names who committed crimes in 1947 [when India was partitioned],`` he said.
On cross-border infiltration, Gen Musharraf said that he was considering ``unilaterally`` stepping up the presence of United Nations observers on Pakistan`s side of the LOC to verify the absence of ``infiltration activity``.
India says that Pakistan-based groups were responsible for the assassination last week of Abdul Gani Lone, a leading Kashmiri separatist, in Srinagar and for the massacre the previous week of 34 Indian soldiers and their families in Jammu.
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1021991066565&p=1012571727102
The Perfect Murder
Luke Harding in Pakhlan, on the line of control, Kashmir
Monday May 27, 2002
The Guardian
The shell came clattering over the mountain just as Mohammed Arif Bhat ventured outside to rescue his sheep. It fell through the cool Himalayan air and crashed into a sloping forest of pine trees, horse chestnut and white blossom.
Mohammed`s three sisters heard the explosion - and then silence. When the bombardment ceased, they went to look for their brother.
The shell had landed 20 feet away from where Mohammed, an 18-year-old student, had been crouching on a stone wall. ``We tried to wake him up. But the shrapnel had hit him in the front and back of his head,`` his sister Shaheena, 22, said. ``We loved him very much. He was the only male in our family.``
``We have lost our hopes,`` she added.
Mohammed`s death six days ago was random, meaningless and cruel. His village, Pakhlan, is less than three miles from the ``line of control``, the frontline in Kashmir between Indian and Pakistani forces. The invisible Pakistani gunners on the other side of the densely forested mountain had been trying to hit the Indian army brigade headquarters lower down the valley. They killed Mohammed instead.
But India and Pakistan, now standing on the brink of an all-out war, have over time developed an insouciant attitude towards death. There are now daily artillery battles between Indian and Pakistani forces. Since January, after militants launched an audacious and symbolic attack on India`s parliament building, nearly a million men have been dug in on either side of the border.
When relations between India and Pakistan are good - which is not often - the shelling stops. When they are bad, it starts again.
But few of Pakhlan`s 1,000 villagers understand that the subcontinent is on the verge of a different, more chilling, kind of war, fought not with shells but nuclear-tipped missiles. ``We don`t know what is going on. We just know that when the shells start landing things are bad,`` Shaheena said.
Who did she blame for Mohammed`s death? ``We don`t want to blame anybody.``
The line of control divides Pakistan and Indian occupied Kashmir. The border has scarcely changed since January 1949, when Indian and Pakistani troops fought each other to a standstill over the disputed territory and signed a ceasefire.
Driving towards it, it becomes clear that any invasion would be almost impossible. The whole area is hugely militarised. The ruler-straight road from Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir`s summer capital, passes through a valley enclosed by the mountains of Gulmarg, India`s only ski resort. The apple orchards and rice fields gradually disappear. The route then rises above the turbulent olive-green Jhelum river and bumps through a landscape of sheer peaks, glinting tin roofs, and shimmering willows. Indian soldiers are everywhere, checking identity papers or standing on patrol under the shade of poplars. Army convoys clatter towards the frontline in a whirl of dust.
Since the latest escalation in hostilities, firing has taken place on a daily basis, sending residents in the border town of Uri jumping into their home-made underground bunkers. ``The entire roof of my house was destroyed last week in shelling,`` Shah Zaman Patman, 40, a civil servant said. ``I`ve had to move out.`` Who did he blame for the current standoff? ``I`m fed up with both India and Pakistan.``
Mr Patman and other locals are phlegmatic about the prospect of a full-blown conflict. ``The shelling has been going on for a long time. It is already like a war for us,`` he said. The residents of these Himalayan mountains are not stupid: most of the time, they point out, the shells miss. The last shelling in Mohammed`s village was over a year ago. To reach his house involves a steep 30-minute trek.
The air is fresh and scented with resin. In the near distance is a snow-topped mountain. The mountain belongs to Pakistan. The shells landed in the village between 5.25am and 5.40am. There were 20 of them. ``Three of the shells landed in the village itself; the others crashed into the forest on the opposite side,`` Nazir Ahmed, 30, a shopkeeper, said. ``It was brutal.``
The Indian authorities have developed a perfunctory attitude towards shelling victims: there are, after all, plenty of them. The local deputy-general of police gave Mohammed`s family 100,000 rupees (about £1,500) in compensation. After an autopsy, Mohammed`s body was returned to the village the day he was killed. His funeral was held at 9pm. Mohammed`s sisters, Shaheena, Jabeena, 17, and Nasreena, 12, are wondering what to do next.
``Our parents are dead. Mohammed was the only breadwinner. When he was not studying he also worked as a labourer to get us some money,`` Shaheena said. ``The last thing he said to me was: `Keep my breakfast for when I come back.` The shells had already started falling and he wanted to bring in our sheep and cattle.``
The shell landed on a ziaryat, or holy site, sacred to a Kashmiri saint, Baba Dawood Khaki. Ironically the site, a pile of boulders decorated with red flags, is supposed to offer protection from evil.
Yesterday Mohammed`s sisters sat in the sunshine and took his school textbooks out of his fraying satchel. They produced a notebook in which Mohammed had written an essay on communal harmony. ``Hindus and Muslims are brothers,`` he wrote. ``They are both human beings and should respect each other.`` It is a reasonable enough sentiment, but one that faces extinction as India and Pakistan hurtle
Posted by
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May 28, 2002 01:48 pm
Resigned to war in the missiles` shadow Luke Harding in Pakhlan, on the line of control, Kashmir
Monday May 27, 2002
The Guardian
The shell came clattering over the mountain just as Mohammed Arif Bhat ventured outside to rescue his sheep. It fell through the cool Himalayan air and crashed into a sloping forest of pine trees, horse chestnut and white blossom.
Mohammed`s three sisters heard the explosion - and then silence. When the bombardment ceased, they went to look for their brother.
The shell had landed 20 feet away from where Mohammed, an 18-year-old student, had been crouching on a stone wall. ``We tried to wake him up. But the shrapnel had hit him in the front and back of his head,`` his sister Shaheena, 22, said. ``We loved him very much. He was the only male in our family.``
``We have lost our hopes,`` she added.
Mohammed`s death six days ago was random, meaningless and cruel. His village, Pakhlan, is less than three miles from the ``line of control``, the frontline in Kashmir between Indian and Pakistani forces. The invisible Pakistani gunners on the other side of the densely forested mountain had been trying to hit the Indian army brigade headquarters lower down the valley. They killed Mohammed instead.
But India and Pakistan, now standing on the brink of an all-out war, have over time developed an insouciant attitude towards death. There are now daily artillery battles between Indian and Pakistani forces. Since January, after militants launched an audacious and symbolic attack on India`s parliament building, nearly a million men have been dug in on either side of the border.
When relations between India and Pakistan are good - which is not often - the shelling stops. When they are bad, it starts again.
But few of Pakhlan`s 1,000 villagers understand that the subcontinent is on the verge of a different, more chilling, kind of war, fought not with shells but nuclear-tipped missiles. ``We don`t know what is going on. We just know that when the shells start landing things are bad,`` Shaheena said.
Who did she blame for Mohammed`s death? ``We don`t want to blame anybody.``
The line of control divides Pakistan and Indian occupied Kashmir. The border has scarcely changed since January 1949, when Indian and Pakistani troops fought each other to a standstill over the disputed territory and signed a ceasefire.
Driving towards it, it becomes clear that any invasion would be almost impossible. The whole area is hugely militarised. The ruler-straight road from Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir`s summer capital, passes through a valley enclosed by the mountains of Gulmarg, India`s only ski resort. The apple orchards and rice fields gradually disappear. The route then rises above the turbulent olive-green Jhelum river and bumps through a landscape of sheer peaks, glinting tin roofs, and shimmering willows. Indian soldiers are everywhere, checking identity papers or standing on patrol under the shade of poplars. Army convoys clatter towards the frontline in a whirl of dust.
Since the latest escalation in hostilities, firing has taken place on a daily basis, sending residents in the border town of Uri jumping into their home-made underground bunkers. ``The entire roof of my house was destroyed last week in shelling,`` Shah Zaman Patman, 40, a civil servant said. ``I`ve had to move out.`` Who did he blame for the current standoff? ``I`m fed up with both India and Pakistan.``
Mr Patman and other locals are phlegmatic about the prospect of a full-blown conflict. ``The shelling has been going on for a long time. It is already like a war for us,`` he said. The residents of these Himalayan mountains are not stupid: most of the time, they point out, the shells miss. The last shelling in Mohammed`s village was over a year ago. To reach his house involves a steep 30-minute trek.
The air is fresh and scented with resin. In the near distance is a snow-topped mountain. The mountain belongs to Pakistan. The shells landed in the village between 5.25am and 5.40am. There were 20 of them. ``Three of the shells landed in the village itself; the others crashed into the forest on the opposite side,`` Nazir Ahmed, 30, a shopkeeper, said. ``It was brutal.``
The Indian authorities have developed a perfunctory attitude towards shelling victims: there are, after all, plenty of them. The local deputy-general of police gave Mohammed`s family 100,000 rupees (about £1,500) in compensation. After an autopsy, Mohammed`s body was returned to the village the day he was killed. His funeral was held at 9pm. Mohammed`s sisters, Shaheena, Jabeena, 17, and Nasreena, 12, are wondering what to do next.
``Our parents are dead. Mohammed was the only breadwinner. When he was not studying he also worked as a labourer to get us some money,`` Shaheena said. ``The last thing he said to me was: `Keep my breakfast for when I come back.` The shells had already started falling and he wanted to bring in our sheep and cattle.``
The shell landed on a ziaryat, or holy site, sacred to a Kashmiri saint, Baba Dawood Khaki. Ironically the site, a pile of boulders decorated with red flags, is supposed to offer protection from evil.
Yesterday Mohammed`s sisters sat in the sunshine and took his school textbooks out of his fraying satchel. They produced a notebook in which Mohammed had written an essay on communal harmony. ``Hindus and Muslims are brothers,`` he wrote. ``They are both human beings and should respect each other.`` It is a reasonable enough sentiment, but one that faces extinction as India and Pakistan hurtle