The Death of a Nawab http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006 11 17 story_17-11-2006_pg3_5



Daily Times, Lahore, Pakistan
Friday, November 17, 2006


Bhashani: the man that was
By Afzal Khan


.....[Maulana Bhasani] was ... builder of politics of democratic opposition in the post-partition era and on June 24, 1949, founded the first viable opposition party - the East Pakistan Awami Muslim League (EPAML). He remained a central figure and both a maker and shaker of events, particularly during the most turbulent phase in East Pakistani politics, before and after 1971.


The EPAML was a reaction to the machinations of the Muslim League establishment under Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and Khaleequz Zaman who, in complicity with Nawabs of Dhaka and the Bengali aristocracy worked to vilify and marginalise authentic Bengali leaders and top figures of Pakistan movement like Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy, Maulvi Fazlul Haq, the mover of Lahore Resolution and Bhashani. They were branded as traitors. Liaquat called Suharwady a ``mad dog let loose by India``.


Neither Bhashani nor Suharwardy immediately returned to Pakistan after partition to claim their share in power. Bhashani remained in Assam to protect Bengali settlers against persecution and expulsion while Suharwardy stayed in Calcutta as the prime minister of undivided Bengal to stop the terrible Hindu-Muslim bloodbath. On his return, Suharwardy was divested of the membership of the Constituent Assembly and banned from addressing any public rally. Bhashani`s election to the provincial assembly in a by-election was annulled by the governor who also disqualified him until 1950. Thus every trick in the book was used to derail the growth of democracy in the formative years of Pakistan.


In the 1954 provincial election, Bhashani, along with Suharwardy and Fazlul Haq, formed a United Front of six political parties that won a landslide victory nearly obliterating the Muslim League which could secure only seven seats in the 300-member assembly. This time the Ghulam Mohammad-Ayub-Sikandar Mirza axis conspired to nullify popular mandate and dismissed the Fazlul Haq government on sedition charges for asserting East Pakistan`s demand for provincial autonomy. The die was cast for the disintegration of Pakistan. .....

Advani in Karachi Jinnah converted from an Ismaili Khoja to an Ithna Ashari (the dominant Shia ideology), which, given his uncompromising character, was not something he would’ve done without strong belief

Advani in Karachi [Jinnah knew that to achieve his political aims he had to shun Nehru`s secularism and use religion as a rallying point ..... the legacy that Jinnah left is a legacy of exclusion. The plurality of the vision that Gandhi and Nehru nurtured was missing in Pakistan]

http://www.indiatoday.com/itoday/20050627/cover5.shtml&SET=T

India Today
June 27, 2005

Antithesis Of Nehru
By Mushirul Hasan

[Prof Mushirul Hasan, an eminent historian, is a former VC of Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi]

Whether Mohammad Ali Jinnah was secular or not cannot be an unqualified statement. Jinnah can quite easily be described as a secular politician who at times was pushed into taking non-secular positions in the public eye. But more often he used political spaces to further what he regarded as communitarian concerns. When he did that, he very dexterously used religion, because Islam has historically provided a rallying point for the mobilisation of the Muslim community. M.A. Ansari, Congress president, had this perceptive comment to make on June 26, 1927: ``(Jinnah) is a nationalist at heart, turned into a communalist by the exigencies of the time, but I have little faith in anyone who can change his conviction so readily to suit the circumstance.`` Perhaps, L.K. Advani needs to reflect on his statement about Jinnah.

It is important to remember that from 1937-38 on, there is very little secularism in Jinnah`s political pursuits. If you read his speeches and his correspondence, and if you follow the process of the dismantling of adversaries in the erstwhile provinces of British India, you see how the secular garb lay in shreds. His language is belligerent, strident and often conflict-ridden. The very vocabulary of the two expressions that Jinnah is most associated with, ``The Day of Deliverance`` in 1939 after the resignation of the Congress ministries and the call for ``Direct Action`` in August 1947, suggests a shift towards the principle of exclusion. Contrary to the image he cultivated in the early years of his public life, Jinnah had now realised that in order to achieve his aims he had to use not the secular banner of Nehru but a religious one. This, he no doubt used very effectively.

By definition, the state Jinnah founded could not acquire a secular character because it was built on the principle of religious nationalism. This has been established and is no longer talked about in the confines of this debate. This is why Pakistan has had a tortuous process of constitution-making and Zia-ul-Haq was able to foist a constitution which is so obviously in complete disregard of Jinnah`s speech in the Constituent Assembly. A secular Pakistan was not ever going to be feasible and though Pakistan today is a secular society, its polity is by and large not secular.

George Fernandes` contention in the wake of the controversy over Advani`s visit that Nehru was himself pseudo-secular is a shoddy attempt to re-evaluate the history of Partition. Some of Nehru`s positions vis-à-vis Jinnah and the Muslim League were overstated. In some ways, Nehru`s standing on the communal question leaves much to be desired. The problem was a lot more complex than is presented in his writings and in his speeches. Having said that, Nehru was the quintessential secularist and was very concerned about the intrusion of religion into politics. I don`t think that even Fernandes can deny the fact that Nehru was extremely consistent in upholding this very principle. So ideologically, I think the positions of Nehru and Jinnah are almost completely at variance with each other because Nehru championed the composite evolution of a composite society; Jinnah contested composite traditions and talked of a civilisational conflict. Nehru, despite the partition of the country and the bloodshed, emerges as the most consistent protagonist of a secular India. At the same time Pakistan was refurbishing its Islamic image. After 1947, Nehru tirelessly fought communal tendencies. Whereas the legacy that Jinnah left is a legacy of exclusion. The plurality of the vision that Gandhi and Nehru nurtured was missing in Pakistan. So ideologically, I see no compatibility between these two individuals. To understand the role of Gandhi, Nehru and Jinnah, we need to write not the history but the histories of Partition.

Advani in Karachi I have pointed out how Mantolives has expressed contempt for Bangladeshi references whenever they contradict his wholesale lies. But come to think of it, Mantolives had even pooh-poohed articles in DAWN to prove the very same facts to be non-facts! What else can you expect from someone who enjoys being a wholesale dealer of lies.

Anyway, I have no intention of glorifying Mantolives` nonsense by engaging in a serious debate with him. My posts are for those who are interested in facts and not for those who knowingly and dishonestly misinterpret archives to turn facts into non-facts.

Advani in Karachi Mantolives # 564

I am not surprised that Mantolives can`t accept anything from Prof. Waheeduzzaman. This is quite in line with his earlier staements on what he thought of the National Encyclopaedia of Bangladesh or of statement of facts in editorials in Bangladesh papers like New Age.

And his incessant reference to ``US National Archives`` is ludicrous and he knows that. The fault is with Mantolives` willful misinterpretation to prove facts to be non-facts, namely, that Suhrawardy was denied entry into Pakistan when he tried to go from Calcutta to Dacca on the plea that he was an enemy of Pakistan and an Indian agent. And Liaqat Ali very conveniently brushed off Suhrawardy`s externment on the plea that it was a matter for the provincial government of East Pakistan and then had Suhrawardy ruthlessly expelled from the Constituent Assembly on a specious plea that paralleled the charge that Suhrawady was an Indian agent.

Mantolives knows all that. Nevertheless he must deliberately misinterpret ``US National Archives`` to turn facts into non-facts. Mantolives is not indulging in ``half truths`` - he is indulging in in wholesale lies.

Mantolives can wallow in his wholesale dishonesty as much as he wants to. I couldn`t care less even if I wanted to. My posts are meant for those who are not into expressing contempt for a reference merely because the author is a Bangladeshi Professor or because the source is the National Encyclopaedia of Bangladesh or an editorial in a Bangladesh newspaper.

Here`s another quote:

---

..... True, as was quoted in almost every academic screed on Pakistan, [Jinnah] wanted the newly independent state to be one with equal rights. Such a Pakistan didn`t happen.

Jinnah was the one who made it an eternal impossibility. Before the sophistry of the westernised liberal, there was the proto-Islamist who institutionalised religious hate by advocating a state for the Muslims, independent of the incompatible Hindus. This from his speech at the Muslim League convention in Lahore in 1940: ``Very often the hero of (Hindus) is a foe of the (Muslims) ... To yoke together two such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a State.`` .....

---

Advani in Karachi ..... True, as was quoted in almost every academic screed on Pakistan, [Jinnah] wanted the newly independent state to be one with equal rights. Such a Pakistan didn`t happen.wanted the newly independent state to be one with equal rights. Such a Pakistan didn`t happen.

Jinnah was the one who made it an eternal impossibility. Before the sophistry of the westernised liberal, there was the proto-Islamist who institutionalised religious hate by advocating a state for the Muslims, independent of the incompatible Hindus. This from his speech at the Muslim League convention in Lahore in 1940: ``Very often the hero of (Hindus) is a foe of the (Muslims) ... To yoke together two such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a State.`` .....

Advani in Karachi www.bangladesh-web.com

News From Bangladesh
October 26, 1997

Jinnah: Power Hungry, Corrupt And Hypocritical?
By Ahmed Ziauddin, Brussels, Belgium.
Zia@kubrussel.ac.be

[Prof. Ahmed Ziauddin is with the Faculty of Law, Catholic University, Brussels, Belgium]

..... what Jinnah did after Pakistan`s independence .....

When the time came, Jinnah opted to become the Governor General of Pakistan instead of Prime Minister because, under the Constitution, Governor General could give instructions to the Prime Minister. Jinnah, after becoming Governor General, not only appointed the Prime Minister but himself chose and appointed all the members of the Cabinet.

He was the President of Muslim League, and did not relinquish party presidentship even after becoming the Governor General. Thus, Jinnah accumulated all power in him as the leader of the party, head of the administration and the State, a virtual dictator.

He even assumed authority to take care of the government`s Kashmir and Frontier Departments.

As a Governor General, he caused Legislative Assembly to endorse these additional powers. He even presided over Cabinet meetings, unprecedented in parliamentary democracy. He often, without the knowledge of the Prime Minister, instructed the Provincial Governors, Ministers and Departmental Secretaries. Parliamentary norms were not applicable to Jinnah.

In fact, the way Jinnah ran the administration, though briefly, he established the precedent to concentrate all powers in one hand and hold a number of positions by a single person, the tendency that gave birth to military autocracy in Pakistan.

Advani in Karachi www.bangladesh-web.com

NEWS FROM BANGLADESH
June 29, 1999

GENESIS OF RUTHLESS AUTHORITARIANISM AND UNDEMOCRATIC MODE OF
GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN: AN ASSEESSMENT OF EARLY YEARS (1947-’55)

By M. Waheeduzzaman Manik

[Dr. M. Waheeduzzaman (Manik) writes from Clarksville, Tennessee, USA where he is a Professor and the Chair of the Department of Public Management at Austin Peay State University]

..... it was Jinnah who had laid the foundation of ruthless authoritarianism and centralized political structure in Pakistan. It was Jinnah who created the precedents of undemocratic and autocratic modes of governance in Pakistan. He was as much responsible as his successors for the continuation of the undemocratic tradition of authoritarian mode of governance in Pakistan. At the independence of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, Jinnah had both the charisma and authority to introduce democratic norms and institutions in the new nation. Yet, from the beginning, he demonstrated his disdain towards democratic norms and practices. At his behest, an oligarchy was formed for ruling Pakistan with iron fist. The ruling oligarchy was completely divorced from the rudiments of democratic principles and values.

Although Mohammad Ali Jinnah had ruled the nation only for 13 months, his tradition of assumption and exercise of “absolute” state power had dangerous effects on the subsequent rulers of Pakistan. Instead of instituting the ‘institutional rule’, he installed his ‘personal rule’. The way the nation was administered by the founding father and his
chief lieutenant Liaquat Ali Khan had invariably conditioned the behavior of the successive regimes. The main intent of this paper is to examine the genesis of ruthless autocracy and authoritarianism in Pakistan. Once Jinnah’s passion for the use of unlimited power and authoritarian mode of governance is reviewed, the undemocratic and autocratic behavior and actions of Ghulam Mohammad are discussed in detail. Aimed at substantiating my generalizations, several citations from well-recognized works have been quoted. Finally, some concluding observations will be made. (Let me also point out the scope of this commentary: no attempt has been made to cover Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan years. Hopefully, each of these despicable regimes can be the focus of separate articles. The power relationship between the Central Government and the Provinces will be discussed in a separate article).

Jinnah’s Passion for Unlimited Power & Undemocratic Mode of Governance

Jinnah was undoubtedly the most effective and powerful President of All- India Muslim League (AIML). There was a total absence of any leader of Jinnah’s stature in the entire AIML to question or challenge his policies or desires in the mid-forties. His words were like dictates from the absolute monarch. He always encouraged lieutenants or loyalists in the party, not colleagues per se. Thus, at the independence of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, Jinnah was all of the following: Quaid-I-Azam, Governor General of Pakistan, President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (which was also the Central Legislature of Pakistan) and the President of Pakistan Muslim League.

In his seminal book titled Pakistan: A Political Study, Keith Callard, one of the early writers on the government and politics of Pakistan, had succinctly observed that people of Pakistan “looked for guidance to their Great Leader, Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. There was no one else, he was Pakistan; and wherever he went he was received by vast crowds with adulation amounting almost to worship.” Keith Callard also underscored that Jinnah “was by nature a commander and leader of men. He was not to be treated as a colleague or even primus inter pares, for he demanded lieutenants who would serve him rather than partners who would argue with him. In manner he was cold, brilliant and unyielding, a man to inspire either fury or devotion. He organized the campaign for Pakistan as though he were a commander-in-chief issuing orders of the day to encourage the troops and tactical directions to control the provincial commanders” (Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, (New York, N.Y: The Mcmillan Company, 1957, pp. 19-20. Henceforth this book will be cited as Keith Callard, 1957). .....

Jinnah’s passion for the assumption and consolidation of state powers was evident when the date of partition was nearing. He had selected himself to be the Governor General of Pakistan. According to Ayesha Jalal, “On July 2, 1947, Jinnah formally told Mountbatten that he intended to become Pakistan’s first Governor General. Of course Mountbatten was outraged. It complicated the partition process, as planned by him [Mountbatten], and especially the already odious business of dividing the Indian army. He knew that as Governor-General he would have wide ranging powers over the Muslim areas, powers which he could not possibly afford to let any other individual exercise. Moreover, as the Governor-General of Pakistan, Jinnah felt he would be better placed to ensure the division of the army, and the army was what he needed most of all to clamp central authority over Pakistan’s provinces. At any rate, the Prime Minister of Pakistan would have to take orders from the Governor-General. ‘In my position’, Jinnah told the bemused Viceroy, ‘it is I who will give the advice and others will act on it.’ Mountbatten concluded that Jinnah had either gone ‘mad’ or was suffering from an acute form of ‘megalomania ” (Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 292).

It is apparent from Ayesha Jalal’s observation that Jinnah made a deliberate choice to assume the position of Governor General of Pakistan. He had planned ahead of time to dictate the terms of reference to the Prime Minister. As the undisputed leader of the All-
India Muslim League (AIML), Mohammad Ali Jinnah had consolidated all organizational authorities and powers in his hands even before Pakistan came into being on August 14, 1947. Therefore, he knew it well that there will be no one from his party to oppose him. In fact, he used to act like the Head of the Muslim State before Pakistan was even created. Keith Callard had pointed out long time back in 1957 that as “President of the Muslim League he (Jinnah) felt that he was the effective head of the Muslim nation” (Keith Callard, 1957, p. 20).

The first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP) met on August 10, 1947 (Four days before independence). Jogendra Nath Mondal was made the interim President of CAP. Aimed at controlling both the process and outcome of the Central legislature of Pakistan, Jinnah, the Governor General designate of Pakistan, expressed his desire to be the President of Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. The members of the CAP obliged, and on August 11, 1947, they unanimously elected Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the President and Tamijuddin Khan, the Vice President of the CAP. The CAP also passed a resolution conferring on Mohammad Ali Jinnah the title of Quaid-I-Azam (the Great Leader) – a title to be invariably employed in official correspondence of the Government of Pakistan. As
noted by Keth Callard, “When Pakistan was formed the Quaid-I-Azam was recognized to be above the political battle, a figure to whom all might turn for authority and justice and protection. He became Governor-General and President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan; he (Jinnah) was the personification of the state” (Keith Callard, 1957, p. 20).

As the Governor General, Jinnah had handpicked Nwabzada Liaquat Ali Khan to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. There is no doubt that Quaid-I-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan was capable of running the administration. Yet, Jinnah decided to retain the de-facto authorities of the Head of the Government in his hands. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet had to hold offices at the pleasure of Jinnah, the Governor General of Pakistan. In other words, Jinnah combined the roles of both the Head of the State and Head of the Government. Was it unconstitutional on the part of Governor General to intrude in carrying out of executive functions of the Prime Minister? I don’t think that it was unconstitutional per se because of the existence of contradictory constitutional provisions. Henry Frank Goodnow has summarized the context: “Prior to 1956 [Constitution] the governing constitutional laws were similar, but the relationship between the Governor General and the cabinet ministers was not entirely clear. The Pakistan Provisional Constitutional Order of 1947 had provided that the Governor General and the provincial governors would act on the advice of their ministers. On the other hand, an unrepealed provision of the Government of India Act of 1935 provided that the ministers were to be chosen by the Governor General and would hold office at his pleasure” (Henry Frank Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964, p.54).

In view of the above-mentioned provision of 1935 Act, Jinnah had the legal basis to establish the Governor General’s hold on the Cabinet. Yet, it needs to be recognized that he had deliberately ignored the provision in the 1947 Provisional Order in which it was stated that the Governor General would act on the advice of the Cabinet. It is also fair to suggest that it was Jinnah’s responsibility to see to it that the contradictory provision of 1935 was being repealed with the passage of 1947 Provisional order. It is very difficult for me to comprehend after so many years how and why a constitutional lawyer of Jinnah’s stature had used a dead provision of 1935 Act over a provision of 1947 for the purpose of dwarfing the independence of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. At any rate, Jinnah had created a dangerous precedent that directly impacted the relationship between the Governor General and the Prime Minister of Pakistan in the following years.

With assumption of the Presidency of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Governor General Jinnah virtually controlled the functions, the process, and the outcomes of the legislative branch of the central government. Such concentration of both the legislative and executive powers of the State in Jinnah’s office of Governor General was nothing short of nullification of the separation of powers between the legislative and the executive branches of government. It was unfortunate that the legislative branch of the central government was rendered impotent from the very beginning of independent Pakistan. Additionally, Jinnah had retained substantial decision-making powers of the Muslim League even though Chowudhury Khaliquzzaman was chosen to be the Chief organizer of the party (later he became the President of Pakistan Muslim League).

In his assessment of the nature of Jinnah’s power, Keith Callard observed: “No constitutional ruler and few autocrats have possessed such plentitude of power. He had full authority over the civil administration and armed forces. By his own order he could amend the existing constitution and promulgate laws that would be beyond the effective of review of any court. These were not powers which existed only on paper and which in practice were limited by the conventions of constitutional responsibility. On the contrary, cabinet ministers understood clearly that they held office as the agents of the Governor-General, and the [Constituent] Assembly, with its powerless opposition, was in no mood to challenge any action of its own President” (Keith Callard, 1957, p. 20). .....

Advani in Karachi http://www.virtualbangladesh.com/commentary/jinnah.html

THE IMPACT OF JINNAH`S ANTI-BANGALEE DESIGN ON THE POLITICAL SCENE OF BANGLADESH IN THE EARLY YEARS OF PAKISTAN: AN ASSESSMENT
By M. Waheeduzzaman Manik

[Dr. M. Waheeduzzaman (Manik) writes from Clarksville, Tennessee, USA where he is a Professor and the Chair of the Department of Public Management at Austin Peay State University]

..... Although the overwhelming number of Muslim population in Bengal had supported the Muslim League`s demand for Pakistan, the central leadership of All-India Muslim League (AIML) was disproportionately skewed in favor of non-Bengali leaders of different provinces. Jinnah had effectively used most of the popular leaders of Bengal for the purpose mobilizing support in favor of his ``Two-Nation Theory`` and the demand for separate homeland for the Muslims of India.

Yet, Jinnah had preferred to promote and project the non-Bengali loyalists, rightists and collaborationists in the leadership roles at both AIML and Bengal Provincial Muslim League (BPML). It was by his deliberate anti-Bengali design that most of the celebrated and popular Muslim League leaders of Bengal were either banished or marginalized immediately before or after the creation of Pakistan. Instead of fostering and nurturing charismatic and independent-minded Bengali leaders, Jinnah handpicked those leaders of Bengal to assume the leadership roles in East Bengal (now Bangladesh) who were certified as anti-Bangalee and spineless loyalists or collaborationists. Thus the dice of Pakistan`s anti-Bengali design was cast even before Pakistan`s independence was achieved.

The seed of colonial mode of governance in East Bengal (East Pakistan) was planted by Jinnah, the Founder of Pakistan. The genesis of the disintegration of Pakistan and Bangalees` relentless struggle first for maximum autonomy and later for complete independence were, to a great extent, conditioned by Jinnah`s quest for installing anti-Bangalee collaborationist and rightist Muslim Leaguers in both the party apparatus and Governmental structure of East Bengal (throughout this commentary, I have used East Pakistan and East Bengal interchangeably or synonymously with reference to the geographic area that emerged as Bangladesh on December 16, 1971).

Lest it be thought that this writer is overstating the fact! Yet, the following verifiable facts will lend credence to my generalizations on Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Founding Father of Pakistan.

After the passage of the Lahore Resolution (known as Pakistan Resolution) on March 23, 1940, the moribund Bengal Provincial Muslim League (BPML) started emerging as the mass organization for the first time. With the popularity of Pakistan Movement, Jinnah`s grip over AIML and BPML was also getting tighter. There are some scholars who have attributed the popularity of Pakistan movement in Bengal to Jinnah`s ``personal popularity`` and ``organization skills.`` There are observers who have asserted that ``religious zeal`` had prompted the millions of people to support Pakistan Movement. There are also writers who have singled out the alleged or perceived ``Congress mis-rule`` to be the determining factor that forced the Bengali Muslims to support the demand for Pakistan. There is no doubt that these explanations might sound intuitively pleasing or plausible. However, such claims might sound fantastic but not realistic at all.

Yet, these superfluous claims or assertions lack credibility. Although there was religious fervor in Pakistan movement from the beginning to the end, the magnitude and extent of ``Islamic solidarity`` of Bengali Muslims differed substantially from the Muslims of North and North-Western provinces of India. There is no doubt that religion had played a clear role in the process of creating or developing a sense of ``Islamic Creed`` or ``Muslim Solidarity`` among the Bangalee Muslims during the movement for Pakistan. However, there is no reason to subscribe to the idea that ``Islam`` was the ``only`` factor or consideration that united the Muslims in Bengal behind Pakistan movement. In fact, there were dominant factors other than ``religion`` that motivated the Bangalee Muslims to lend their overwhelming support to Muslim League`s demand for Pakistan. The Muslims in Bengal were more pragmatists or a rationalists than religionists. The truth of the matter is that after the adoption of Lahore Resolution on March 23, 1940, the Muslim masses started to believe genuinely that they might achieve an independent Muslim nation-state provided they vigorously support the movement for the establishment of Pakistan. The rising Muslim middle class found the demand for Pakistan more attractive or prospective option for their own personal and professional growth. Their dreams of securing jobs in both public and private sectors, and their strong desires for succeeding in business enterprises in an independent Muslim State, were more relevant to them than religious consideration. The Muslim masses in Bengal had found the demand for Pakistan to be a pragmatic way to rid themselves of the bondage of socio-economic stagnation. For common Bengali Muslims, the establishment of Pakistan would create limitless opportunities for their own social mobility.

Khalid Bin Syeed, one of the most distinguished scholars on Pakistan Movement, succinctly refuted the myth about Jinnah`s organizational capabilities and perceptions of alleged mal-administration of congress: ``It was only after the Lahore Resolution was passed and the demand for a Muslim state came to the forefront that Muslims in their thousands flocked to the Muslim League. Thus, neither Jinnah`s organizing ability nor the alleged Congress misrule by themselves could have transformed the [Muslim] League into a mighty force. The demand for Pakistan…., this stimulant which put life and vigor into the Muslim League`` Khalid Bin Syeed, Pakistan: The Formative Years, London: Oxford University press, 1968, p. 179).

The most relevant question that needs to be raised is this: who were the chief messengers of Muslim League`s demand for Pakistan in Bengal? The messengers of Pakistan movement to Bengali middle classes and masses in 1940s were A.K. Fazlul Huq, Shaheed Suhrawardy and Abul Hashim, the most celebrated and trusted Bengali leaders of that era. Although they had championed the cause of Pakistan movement, they were not willing to be anti-Bangalee collaborationists or die-hard Jinnah loyalists. Doubtless, they might have sincerely believed that the establishment of Pakistan would emancipate the Bengali Muslims from the economic and social miseries. Yet, they were not willing to compromise the interests of Bangalees. Jinnah had used them to popularize his Two-Nation Theory and Demand for Pakistan. Yet, he had neutralized or banished these doyens of Bengal politics at an appropriate time so that no one from East Bengal (East Pakistan) could effectively challenge his authoritarian mode of governance.

Sher-e-Bangla A.K. Fazlul Hoque, the mover of 1940 Lahore Resolution for Muslim homeland, was expelled from the All-India Muslim League in 1941. It needs to be noted that Fazlul Huq, the most charismatic leader of Bengal, with more popularity and name recognition throughout India than M.A. Jinnah at least till mid-`30s, had joined the Muslim League in 1937 after forming the Krishak Praja Party (KPP)- Muslim League coalition Government in Bengal. He held leadership roles in both All-India Congress and All-India Muslim League. Fazlul Huq was also involved in the formation of Muslim League in 1906 (he was 33 years old in 1906! Nawab Salimullah had personally commended his extraordinary brilliance and talent). He was the chief of Krishak Praja Party, the party that won more Muslim seats in Bengal Provincial Legislature in 1937 election than Muslim League. He was already a legendary figure in Bengal politics before he formally joined the Muslim League in 1937. His role as the Premier of Bengal was a catalyst in attracting the Muslim middle class and peasantry to the Muslim League. His accomplishments as the Premier of Bengal were beneficial and relevant to Bengali Muslim middle class and peasantry. Doubtless, the rising tide of Muslim nationalism and demand for Pakistan had gained an impetus with Sher-e- Bangla A.K. Fazlul Huq`s joing the Muslim League.

Although his support for Pakistan Movement was genuine, Fazlul Huq did not tolerate Jinnah`s unfair interference in Bengal politics. Instead of taking dictates from Jinnah or Liaquat Ali Khan, Fazlul Huq had resigned from the Muslim League for which he had to be in political exile for more than 10 years. Aimed at the collapse of Huq`s Ministry in Bengal, Jinnah, with his ruthless brilliance, personally saw to it that Muslim League support is withdrawn from KPP-Muslim League coalition Government. The collapse of KPP-ML coalition Ministry had devastating effect on the Bengali Muslims. Fazlul Huq was forced to form a coalition Government with Shyma Prashad Mukherji (known as Shayma-Huq Ministry). Yet, M.A. Jinnah could care less. His sole goal was to send Fazlul Huq to political wilderness in an era when the demand for Pakistan caught up the imagination of 33 million Bengali Muslims. Jinnah was personally involved in spreading blatant falsehoods and inaccuracies about Fazlul Huq throughout Bengal. He was called ``traitor.`` It is interesting to note that Fazlul Huq had been vilified by both progressive faction (led by Shaheed Suhrawardy and Abul Hashim) and rightist faction (led by Maulana Akram Khan and Nazimuddin) of Bengal Provincial Muslim League! Aimed at demeaning and discrediting Fazlul Huq, the leaders of Bengal Muslim League had addressed several hundred public meetings in most of the districts in Bengal. Nothwithstanding his enormous popularity, Sher-e-Bangla was not invincible. Muslim League`s defamatory propaganda had worked. Fazlul Huq`s Ministry had collapsed in 1943.

With Jinnah`s blessing, Nazimuddim had formed the Ministry in Bengal in 1943. For all practical purposes, Jinnah, indeed, had succeeded in dismantling Sher-e-Bangla`s stronghold in Bengal politics. (I have a plan to elaborate on Jinnah`s anti-Huq crusade in a separate article. Therefore, suffice it at this time to point out that Fazlul Huq did not regain his popularity among the Bangalee masses till he formed the United Front with Maulana Bhasani and Suhrawardy during the historic election in 1954. He felt elated and to some extent vindicated when he found out that the United Front literally routed out the ruling Muslim League from East Pakistan).

It was Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy who had emerged as the most dynamic leader of Bengal Muslim League. His role as the General Secretary of BPML till 1943 was crucial in the process of recruiting dedicated and capable party workers. He was personally instrumental in the formation of Muslim National Guards. He was the most energetic Minister in Fazlul Huq`s cabinet in charge of Labor Ministry. He personally cultivated support from industrial workers in favor of Pakistan movement. He was also the most active member in Nazimuddin Cabinet that was formed after the collapse of Shayma-Huq cabinet in 1943. His popularity among the students had motivated many from younger generation to be the most vocal supporters of Pakistan movement. As the Chief Minister of Bengal in 1946, he shouldered the responsibility of lending logistic support to Pakistan Movement. His role during Direct Action Day in 1946 was pivotal towards hastening the achievement of Pakistan (even though his action or inaction on that fateful day in the history of Bengal had tarnished his image among Hindu community). Suhrawardy had also moved the amendment to the original 1940 Lahore Resolution in the Delhi convention of Muslim League Legislators in 1946 even though he himself was a staunch supporter of an independent United Bengal.

Abul Hashim, another progressive leader with tremendous organizational skills, had succeeded Suhrawardy as the General Secretary of BPML in 1943. Thousands of people had joined Muslim League in most of Bengal districts during his tenure as the General Secretary of the party. With the help of dedicated Muslim students, Hashim could bring Bangalee Muslims en masse under the fold of the Muslim League. The numerical and organizational strength of the party in Bengal was reflected in the landslide victory of Muslim League candidates in 1945-`46 elections. Yet, Abul Hashim`s wings of power or influence in East Bengal political scene were clipped by Jinnah and his sycophants both before and after Pakistan was achieved.

Both Suhrawardy and Hashim tremendously contributed in the process of transforming the Bengal Provincial Muslim League into a viable mass organization that was capable of leading Pakistan Movement. Their dynamic leadership had liberated BPML from the domination of the non-Bengali Nawabs of Dacca and the upper-class leadership. For the first time, pro-Bengali, progressive and middle class leaders dominated the leadership of Bengal Muslim League. However, Muslim League in Bengal was divided into two distinct factions: the progressive group was led by Suhrawardy and Hashim whereas the rightwing conservative faction was affiliated to Khawaja Nazimuddin and Maulana Akram Khan.

The most relevant fact is that M. A. Jinnah had decided to nurture and sponsor the conservative elements in the party. Aimed at packing the East Pakistan Muslim League with Jinnah loyalists, it was the deliberate policy of Jinnah to either ignore or malign the progressive members of the Bengal Muslim League. For example, the followers of both Suhrawardy and Hashim were taunted or humiliated by Jinnah loyalists and collaborationists even before the establishment of Pakistan. Instead of recognizing Shaheed Suhrawardhy`s popularity, organizational skills and crucial contribution to Pakistan movement at a critical juncture, the centralized All-India Muslim League leadership had consciously lent its support to Khawaja Nazimuddin`s bid to become the leader of Muslim League legislators in Bengal on August 5, 1947 (only 9 days before Pakistan was born!). With the selection of a reactionary, conservative and discredited leader of BPML for assuming the role of Chief Minister of East Bengal (East Pakistan) over a progressive and dynamic leader of Suhrawardy`s caliber and stature, M.A. Jinnah had in effect sealed off the political fate of H.S. Suhrawardy and his followers in East Bengal (East Pakistan).

While Suhrawardy and Hashim were stalwarts in pre-partition Bengal Muslim League, Maulana Bhasani was the legendary figure in Assam Muslim League. As the President of Assam Provincial Muslim League, he had spearheaded the Pakistan movement in Assam. Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani was discredited and maligned immediately after his return to East Bengal from Assam. Nazimuddin-Akram Khan clique quickly forgot his crucial contribution in favor of Pakistan during referendum in Sylhet. Maulana Bhasani had won a seat in East Bengal Provincial Legislative Assembly (EBLA) from South Tangail constituency. However, the Muslim League clique against Maulana Bhasani with an aim to dislodge him from the Provincial Assembly hatched a conspiracy out. His election to the Assembly was declared null and void on flimsy ground. Above all, he was declared disqualified by the provincial Governor to run for election for holding any public office!

Once the establishment of Pakistan became a reality on August 14, 1947, the Punjabi and other non-Bengali Muslim League leaders started consolidating their positions in the Governments of both at the Center and provinces. Choudhury Khaliquzzaman was elected as the Chief Organizer of the Muslim League when Jinnah had assumed the office of Governor General of Pakistan. Jinnah also became the President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. The self-appointed Governor General and President of the Constituent Assembly had handpicked Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The actual decision-making authority of Pakistan in the initial year after independence was centralized in the offices of the Governor General and Prime Minister. Both Jinnah ana Liaquat Ali Khan decided to employ Muslim League under the leadership of Choudhury Khaliquzzaman as an instrument of subjugating and controlling the East Bengal political scene.

The ruling coterie of Pakistan had realized it quite early that the die-hard loyalists needed to be promoted and installed in East Bengal Muslim League establishment. Aimed at humiliating and demonizing the most popular and celebrated Muslim League leaders of East Bengal (East Pakistan), the ruling coterie of Pakistan adopted a deliberate policy of filling the East Bengal (East Pakistan) Branch of Muslim League with the collaborationist, reactionary and anti-Bangalee leaders. At the behest of both Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, Choudury Khaliquzzaman, the Chief of Organizer of the All-Pakistan Muslim League, had literally leased the party in East Bengal to Khawaja Nazimuddin and Maulana Akram Khan. They, in turn, sponsored those Bengali leaders who were loyal to them. Neither Nazimuddin nor Akram Khan had any mass support or charisma. Nor did they have any extraordinary organizational capabilities.

As the Chief Minister of East Bengal, Khwaja Nazimuddin also saw to it that neither Suhrwardy nor his followers have any prominent role in East Bengal politics. He lost no time to characterize Suhrawardy as the ``Indian agent`` and an ``enemy of Pakistan.`` Nazimuddin had misused his official position for the purpose of relieving H.S. Suhrawardy from the membership of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. As if that was not enough of an insult for the one of the most dynamic contributors to Pakistan Movement in Bengal! It is a fact that the East Bengal Government of Khawaja Nazimuddin prohibited Suhrawardy from entering or addressing public meetings in any place of East Bengal. It was on July 13, 1948 when Liaquat Ali Khan, Jinnah`s handpicked Prime Minister of Pakistan, informed Suhrawardy that the action of expulsion from East Bengal taken against him was a ``matter entirely for the Provincial Government and he (Liaquat Ali Khan) can`t interfere in their administration.``

One of the professed goals of Nazimuddin and Akram Khan coterie was to keep the doors of the Muslim League closed to the most progressive and dynamic members of Bengal Provincial Muslim League. The progressive forces were systematically eliminated from positions of importance by the right wing forces of the party. The followers of both Suhrawardy and Hashim were specifically singled out to be excluded even from the primary membership of the Muslim League. Both Maulana Bhasani and Suhrawardy protested this exclusionary policy of the East Bengal Muslim League. A deputation of dissatisfied East Bengal Muslim Leaguers under the leadership of Ataur Rahman Khan had visited Choudhury Khaliquzzaman, the Chief Organizer of the Pakistan Muslim League. The East Bengal delegates requested that Maulana Akram Khan ``be immediately directed to make the membership of the party available to the dissident groups.`` However, neither representation nor pressure from the dissidents did open the door of the Muslim League for those whose views were at variance with the ruling coterie.

The policy of exclusion had devastating effect on the efficacy of the Muslim League in the changing political climate of East Bengal. Notwithstanding the many limitations of Muslim League, over the years since 1937 this party had become inclusive of the mainstream linguistic, souci-economic and regional groups of people. Yet, the rightwing grip over both the party and the Government of East Bengal seriously eroded the mass support for Muslim League. The ruling Muslim League regime in East Bengal had miserably failed to redress the genuine grievances of East Bengal. The governmental policies and procedures of suppression and persecution of the dissident groups in East Bengal had effectively alienated the mainstream Banglee population of East Bengal.

Both Jinnah and Liaquat totally ignored the fact that fifty six percent of the total population of Pakistan were from East Bengal. The discriminatory policy of the Central Government of Pakistan against East Bengal started manifesting only after few months of independence. To the chagrin of East Bengal, the Central Government of Pakistan had become the exclusive domain of West Pakistanis. The representation of Bangalees in various services including Military and Civil Service under the Central Government was negligible. West Pakistanis deputed from the Central Government had filled most of the crucial administrative positions including the position of Chief Secretary in the Government of East Bengal. The exports and imports were central subjects to be dominated by West Pakistanis. The trade, commerce, banking, industries and other public or private sector enterprises were totally controlled by West Pakistanis. The allocation of annual expenditures for development of East Bengal was negligible in comparison with West Pakistan even though East Bengal was assessed for greater amount of revenues. Most of the foreign earnings were generated from East Pakistan exports. Yet, foreign exchange allocation for East Bengal government was almost nil. Since the Federal capital was located in Karachi, the federal expenditures had no beneficial effects on the economy of East Bengal.

The Bengalis started resenting the discriminatory policies of the Central Government. The progressive Bengali leaders (in some instances even conservative Muslim Leaguers) had started protesting this kind of blatant and unfair policies and programs of the ruling elite of Pakistan Government. For example, one Bangalee member of Pakistan`s Constituent Assembly pointed out as early as February, 1948 that a ``feeling is growing among the East Pakistanis that Eastern Pakistan is being neglected and treated nearly as a `colony` of West Pakistan.`` It was obvious that the Central Government was not willing to redress the genuine grievances of Bangalees. Instead of redressing pressing problems of East Bengal, Pakistan`s ruling elite kept on sermonizing Bangalees to be more of Pakistanis. The typical anti-Bangalee attitude of Jinnah and Liaquat Government was manifested in Prime Minister Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan`s arrogant response to a Bangalee leader`s question on Provincial autonomy for East Bengal (at the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on March 2, 1948): ``Today in Pakistan there is no difference between the Central Government and Provincial Government. The central Government is composed of the provinces. …. We must kill this provincialism for all times.``

The beginning of the end of Pakistan in East Bengal had started as early as in 1948 when the Muslim League Government at both the Center and East Bengal were pushing for Urdu to be the ``only`` State Language of Pakistan.. The language issue started mobilizing the people of East Bengal even before the year 1947 was out. Neither Jinnah nor Liaquat Ali Khan was willing to recognize that Urdu, an alien language to Bangalees, could never be imposed on East Bengal. They never recognized the fact that the then Chief Minister of East Bengal, Khawaza Nazimuddin, was aggravating and alienating the Bangalee population when he started aggressive campaign in favor of Urdu to be the State language of Pakistan. Jinnah`s ``Urdu, and Urdu alone shall be the State Language of Pakistan`` speeches in Dacca (on March 21, 1948 at Race Course Maidan, and on March 24, 1948 at the Special Convocation Ceremony of Dacca University) had been instantly criticized by the most articulate segments of Bangalees.

In a Radio Address to East Pakistanis before his departure from East Pakistan on March 28, 1948, Jinnah had harshly rebuked the critics of his language policy. He characterized the opponents of Urdu language as the ``opponents`` of Pakistan. He said that the supporters of Bengali as a state language are nothing but the ``paid agents`` of foreign countries. Aimed at castigating those who had the guts to demand Bengali to be one of the State languages of Pakistan, an imbecile Jinnah had labeled the champions of Bengali language as ``communists,`` ``enemies of Pakistan,`` ``breakers of integrity of Pakistan,`` ``defeated and frustrated hate-mongers,`` ``champions of provincialism,`` `` breakers of peace and tranquility,`` ``political assassins and political opportunists,`` ``traitors,`` `` inhabitants of fools` paradise,`` and ``self-serving, fifth columnists`` etc. He commended the Chief Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin for using various forms of repressive and aggressive measures against the supporters of Bengali language. Jinnah had repeatedly reminded the proponents of Bangla language that the Central Government of Pakistan ``is determined to take appropriate stern actions`` against these evil forces.

Jinnah`s shameless advocacy for Urdu to be the only State language of Pakistan clearly demonstrated his contempt for Bangalees and utter disregard for democratic principle of majority rule. In fact, his outlandish anti-Bengali language speeches in Dacca had sparked the first phase of language movement in 1948. Following his footprints, Liaquat Ali Khan, Nazimuddin and Nurul Amin made concerted efforts to impose Urdu as the only State language of Pakistan. The historic 1952 Language Movement withstood the naked and brute aggression against Bengali, the mother tongue of Bangalees. Instead of being silenced or browbeaten by the renegades, reactionary, rightist and collaborationist forces of Pakistan, Bangalees had continued their fight for establishing Bengali as one of the State languages of Pakistan.

The ruling Muslim League coterie took it for granted that East Bengal would forever remain subservient to the Central Government of Pakistan. Although the Muslim League started loosing public support in East Bengal even within the first year after independence, Jinnah`s personal charisma and his authoritarian style of leadership kept the party together. Obviously, the Muslim League had remained relatively a viable political party as long as Jinnah was alive. The ruling coterie also took it for granted that public support will remain constant for the party that ``fought for and achieved Pakistan.`` The real crack in the popularity of the party started manifesting after Jinnah`s sudden death on September 11, 1948. (Khawaja Nazimuddin`s anti-Bangalee policies and programs had accrued handsome dividends for him. The ruling coterie of Pakistan under Liaquat Ali Khan`s leadership had chosen him to succeed Jinnah as the Governor General of Pakistan. Nurul Amin, another Jinnah loyalist, had succeeded Khawaja Nazimuddin as the Chief Minister of East Bengal).

It is obvious that the political development in East Bengal (East Pakistan) was very much conditioned by the policies of both the Central and provincial Governments. The main intent of the Central ruling elite was to perpetuate their colonial policy in East Pakistan through the use of the loyalist and collaborationist Muslim League Government. Both Nazimuddin and Nurul Amin regimes in East Bengal had implemented various repressive and discretionary measures. Instead of remaining subjugated by the ruling elite of Pakistan, the dissident Muslim Leaguers (mainly from Suhrawardy-Hashim faction of pre-independent Bengal Muslim League) had joined hands with other progressive forces of East Bengal (East Pakistan) to mobilize and organize themselves. Their sole objective was to oppose the oppressive, repressive and discriminatory policies and programs of both the Central Government of Pakistan and the Government of East Pakistan (East Bengal). They also felt the acute need for a political party to ventilate and articulate the genuine grievances of East Bengal.

The emergence of East Pakistan Awami Muslim League (EPAML) on June 23, 1949 as the first opposition party in East Bengal filled such a need. The student community and intelligentsia of East Bengal were also the vanguards in building resistance movements in the early years of Pakistan. The students had provided the leadership of the language movements both in 1948 and 1952. The relentless struggle of Bangalees for freedom and self-determination continued till they achieved complete independence through a liberation war in 1971.

Advani in Karachi One doesn`t have to depend on the words of Wali Khan to believe his allegations against Jinnah - the allegations can be verified in declassified documents, now availble to the public, in the India Office in London. It is interesting that while many in Pakistan have inveighed against the ``treachery`` of Wali Khan, none have dared to haul him to the court for libel. And this, in a country, where blasphemy is a capital offence and where political opponenets get exiled if they are not sent atop the gallows!

G.M. Syed, too, openly criticised Jinnah. Here`s an excerpt from a July, 1987 interview (around the time Wali Khan`s book was published) that lends credence to Wali Khan`s allegations verifiable by publicly available records at the India Office in London:

---

Q. Why did you leave the Congress and join the Muslim League?

A. We expected the Congress to help us enact laws to protect the peasantry. When Congress did not help us, we felt frustrated and joined the League. (The expectation was unrealistic because most of the MLAs [Members of Legislative Assembly] , both Hindu and Muslim, were Zamindars.)

Q. Why did you leave the League ?

A. Even when I was in the League, I had maintained relations with Congress leaders. When Congress adopted the Quit India resolution, Jinnah called a meeting of the League Working, Committee. Here Jinnah moved a resolution, saying that the `Quit India resolution
was directed against Muslims, and not against the British. I spoke against this resolution, and so did some others but Jinnah said he had given word to the British, never to come to terms with the Congress. Therefore, this resolution must be adopted. While other critics fell silent, I insisted on my vote of dissent being recorded. It is still there. I began to feel more and more that Jinnah was serving British interests and not Muslim interests. I, therefore,
left the League in 1945.

---

As the imprerial power trying to perpetuate its hold over the colony the British followed a policy of widening the Hindu-Muslim communal/political divide with the aim of

a)countering/nullifying the Congress`s national movement

b)promoting the division of British India into two/more states and thereby to secure a foothold for British strategic interests in a friendly Pakistan/European missionary-controlled NorthEast/etc.

It was to this end that Jinnah had been secretly communicating with Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, and Lord Zetland, the secretary of state for India, over the 1930s to come to an understanding that would be mutually beneficial for Jinnah and the British rulers against their common enemy.

Advani in Karachi Jinnah had inveighed against the ``tyranny of the majority`` to advance the goals of the Muslim League establishment (primarily the aristocrats of the United Provinces and the mercantile class of the Bombay Presidency). It was ironic and apt that Jinnah`s Pakistan has had to remain wary of the ``majority`` ever since it came into being. First, it was the Hindu-tainted majority in East Pakistan that was the enemy. But even after the 1971 partition of Pakistan, the country remains firmly under the ``tyranny of the minority`` to keep the majority at bay.

Pakistan`s military and the ISI were never representative of the hopes and aspirations of ordinary Pakistanis. It is highly educative to keep in mind the geographical concentration of military personnel - eighty percent of officers, rank and file, come from only five districts: Attock, Rawalpindi, Chakwal, Jhelum and Gujrat in Punjab; and three districts of NWFP: Mardan, Peshawar and Kohat - the ill-gotten wealth of the military funnels prosperity to a very narrow segment in the country (professionally & geographically).

It is this mal-distribution of the military (kept alive artificially by the British propounded ``martial races theory``) that has made it easier for the military`s top brass to manipulate the lower ranking soldiers into upholding the corporate interests of Pakistan`s
military.

It is not surprising that General Tikka Khan who earned infamy as the Butcher of Bengal in 1971 had gone on to earn infamy as the Butcher of Balochistan after the 1971 partition of Pakistan.

Jinnah has left a lasting legacy in the country he sired - today Pakistan remains firmly under the ``tyranny of the minority``, an ironic but unsurprising outcome of the Pakistan Movement that owed its birth to the fear of the majority.

Advani in Karachi Wali Khan`s book, based on now declassified documents at the India Office in London, provides interesting reading on Jinnah`s secret liasion with the British rulers in pre-independence India. The book has been published as:

Facts Are Sacred by Jaun Publishers (1986)

It was also available in India as:

Facts Are Facts: The Untold Story Of India`s Partition by Vikash Publishing House (1987)

This is what Wali Khan wrote about his research on the now declassified documents, ``Not that I regarded the Congress` and Bacha khan`s charges as wholly without basis. But I had not imagined that the truth was infinitely uglier than their portrayal of it. The evidences were there in black and white, written and signed by the guilty ones themselves, secured for posterity in their own official library - the communications [between] highest British dignitary in India, the Viceroy, and the minister concerned with Indian affairs in Whitehall. Given such authoritative sources where was the room for disbelief? Indeed, when I was going through these documents there were moments when my mind would get boggled. I would take out my glasses and hold my head in my hands bewildered at what I had read. Unable to continue, I would put away the books and go out for a cup of coffee.``

As the imprerial power trying to perpetuate its hold over the colony the British followed a policy of widening the Hindu-Muslim communal/political divide with the aim of

a)countering/nullifying the Congress`s national movement

b)promoting the division of British India into two/more states and thereby to secure a foothold for British strategic interests in a friendly Pakistan/European missionary-controlled NorthEast/etc.

Wali Khan was astounded to discover that Jinnah had been secretly communicating with Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, and Lord Zetland, the secretary of state for India, over the 1930s to come to an understanding that would be mutually beneficial for Jinnah and the
British rulers against their common enemy.

There is no need to take Khan Abdul Wali Khan`s word, anyone can verify them on their own because these are availble in declassified official records. Here`s from Wali Khan`s preface to the book:

``..In writing the account, I like other writers, have made full use of the diaries and memories of concerned British officials, especially in relation to their attitude and policies towards our movement. Besides that material I have used my own knowledge of facts and political experiences, as also the principles of induction and deduction of offer certain conclusion. We have a saying in Pushto that if we say round, yellow and sour, wise men immediately know that we are referring to orange. Similar was my quest for clues.

After release from Mr. Bhutto`s jail when I went to London and had some free time from medical treatment I came to know about the classified government document in the India Office Library which had now been thrown open to public. They could now be read on the premises and even photocopies of any portion could be obtained. According to British rules all secret official documents are declassified and made available to scholars after a lap[se] of 30 years.

I was keen on collecting all possible historical material on our movement. Readers of this book will see that Bacha khan`s politics and the Khudai Khidmatgar movement became red rags for the colonials for two reasons. First, the British were determined to squash any movement that aimed at Indian independence and thus constituted a threat to their rule. Secondly, they were resolved to crush any activity which in their view would help a hostile outside power against them.

It is known that the independence movement within India was being spearheaded by the Indian National Congress which was representative of all the religious and other creeds, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Christian, Parsi-no matter what the persuasion, the party was open to all. The British strategy, as it soon developed, was to somehow weaken the Congress and to aid and abet bodies functioning in opposition to it.

Secondly, India was geographically so placed that it had oceans on three sides and a rampart of a mighty range of mountains on the forth. There were also a few mountain passes in the north-west and the only danger from a hostile foreign power could come through them. Russia was of course considered the main source of that danger. The Khudai Khidmatgars could not become instruments in either of the two thrusts of British policies, so they became an object of harassment from the very start.

In the India Office library I set about looking for documents relating to the external aspects of the British rule in India. I wished to find out the point of time and exact factors that saw basic changes in British policies towards Moscow - the steps if adopted to confront the first ideological state to emerge on the world map in 1917.

The Viceroy of India used to send a weekly report addressed to the Secretary of State for India in London. The latter replied outlining the government`s policy issues of the moment. I decided that I only needed to carefully study this weekly correspondence to get all the material wanted. I began from the time immediately following Lenin`s death.

What I saw and read was beyond anything I had imagined. My object was the British foreign policy in relation to India, but as a bonus I got a close view of how with all[Whitehall] looked on the internal affairs of India.

Our elders used to tell us about how Britain intrigued to get its way in the subcontinent. Their stories, their doubts and suspicions had seemed hard to believe. I used to think that Bacha khan had become unduly embittered with the colonial rulers because of the agonies he and his followers had suffered at their hands. I was particularly skeptical about the Congress charges that the British were responsible for fanning communal passions within the country to further their imperialistic designs. I used to think that such accusations were exercises in finding scapegoat. It is a common human failing to blame others for the consequences of one`s own follies.

Not that I regarded the Congress` and Bacha khan`s charges as wholly without basis. But I had not imagined that the truth was infinitely uglier than their portrayal of it. The evidences were there in black and white, written and signed by the guilty ones themselves, secured for posterity in their own official library - the communications [between] highest British dignitary in India, the Viceroy, and the minister concerned with Indian affairs in Whitehall. Given such authoritative sources where was the room for disbelief? Indeed, when I was going through these documents there were moments when my mind would get boggled. I would take out my glasses and hold my head in my hands bewildered at what I had read. Unable to continue, I would put away the books and go out for a cup of coffee.

It will be unfair not to give full credit to the British. They did whatever good or bad they thought was necessary for their people- they did not hesitate to put all that down with total candour. There was no hypocrisy to oneself, no pulling of veils for anyone else. Everyone is here bared to the last stitch. No friend or relative or colleague is spared. All participants in all conspiracies are named. Even the Indians who played the British game have been exposed with out regard to how their compatriots would be shocked when they would come to know of the secret doings of the idols they had worshipped.

Studying this correspondence of over 20 years, between 1922 and 1942, I realised that all my preceding labour in collecting material from diaries and memories had gone waste. The conclusions that I was collecting the evidence for were all given there as explicitly as one could wish. The government of India`s policies against the Soviet Union was down in cold details.

Those policies were of course no surprise. What did come as a revelation was the shameful role played by certain eminent leaders of India in Indian affairs. The worst was the conduct of certain Muslim leaders. It was an embarrassment reading about them. The accusation of the Congress and Bacha khan were not a fraction of what the highest British officials had unblushingly laid down here.

What pains I had taken to prove that the thing was an orange. I went through hundreds of papers, pursued the trail of countless books to collect the evidence of roundness, yellowness, sourness. All that now was rendered unnecessary. The masters themselves here say: why all this effort; what need for proof; logic, reasoning, political sense to what purpose; we ourselves attest that it is an orange. Once I almost decided to abandon my book and just compile this correspondence in to a book let to show to the nation the other side of the picture and let it decide itself who were really its well-wishes, and who wanted to consign it to perpetual slavery of the British.

But after much thought I decided to stay with my earlier plan. Publishing only the documents, while it would expose Bacha khan`s critics, it would not serve my original purpose of presenting the story of Bacha khan`s political struggle and the khudai khidmatgar`s great endeavors. That would also check the course of disreputable politicking which only aims at misleading simpleminded Muslims and distorting the facts of history through loudmouthed falsehood and slanders. Truth emerges one day. Diamond shines forth even in a pile of ashes...``

Advani in Karachi People like Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi were deeply religious in personal life. But they were not the type who would use religion for political objectives.

Jinnah was a stark contrast to people like Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi. Jinnah was certainly not particularly religious in his personal life. But he was was certainly not above pandering to religious hatred to achieve his political objective. And he did that even after he had seen the massive ethnic cleansing in the aftermath of the partition.

West Pakistan had been cleansed of Sikhs and Hindus within months, nay weeks, of partition. An overwhelming majority of the country`s Hindus were in East Pakistan. The rulers from West Pakistan soon realized that they have nothing to lose and everything to gain by demonizing the Hindus left in Pakistan. If nothing else, it was the means to disenfranchise a significant section in East Pakistan and turn East Pakistanis into a minority. It was this evil urge to contain the perceived threat, from Pakistan`s majority wing in any democratic setup, that led rulers in West Pakistan to talk of ``parity`` and of ``separate electorates.``

On March 21, 1948, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan and its first Governor-General, while on his first and only visit to East Bengal, declared in Dhaka University convocation that while the language of the province can be Bengali, the ``State language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Any one who tries to mislead you is really an enemy of Pakistan.``

The use of the phrase ``enemy of Pakistan`` was deliberate. It was a loaded phrase, particularly mischievous in view of the massive ethnic cleansing in West Pakistan in the last seven months.

Jinnah`s demagoguery was deplorable but not surprising. He was merely repeating what Liaqat Ali Khan and his cohorts had been saying in the Constituent Assembly for the last one month. On February 23, 1948: Dhirendra Nath Datta, a Bengali opposition member, had moved a resolution in the first session of Pakistan`s Constituent Assembly for recognizing Bengali as a state language along with Urdu and English. Non-Bengali Assembly members, led by Liaqat Ali Khan, had immediately pounded on Mr. Datta`s religion to denounce the claim of Bengali as nothing but a Hindu conspiracy. Many a snide remark was made on the ``Hindu`` character of the language that was the mother tongue of the majority of Pakistanis.

But, fortunately, most East Pakistanis were not fooled. They realized that these non-Bengali members had deliberately chosen to forget that a language may have grammar but it has no religion. Any competent language is capable of expressing a gamut of religious beliefs. It is as easy to translate the Geeta into Arabic as it is to translate the Koran into Sanskrit. There was absolutely no basis for denouncing Bengali as a Hindu language. If anything, it was a Muslim language because a majority of the Bengalis were indeed Muslims.

But the ruling class in West Pakistan had its own agenda. And it certainly did fit that agenda to denounce Bengali as a Hindu language and to look down on East Pakistan`s majority as less than ``good Muslims.``

It is not surprising that, during the genocide in 1971, the Shaheed Minar was one of the first targets of Yahya Khan`s barbaric army. Nor was it surprising what they did to Dhirendra N. Datta. He was an octogenarian by that time. The barbaric soldiers chose to drag this old man out of his house in Comilla and to summarily execute him in front of his neighbors and family. It was, thus, that West Pakistan`s ruling elite punished Mr. Datta for having proposed Bengali as a national language of Pakistan some 23 years ago.

Advani in Karachi http://us.rediff.com/news/2005/jun/08raman.htm

..... Jinnah was not a fundamentalist Muslim. He did not want the Muslim clerics to have any say in the governance of an independent Pakistan or in the formulation and implementation of the laws of the country. However, he was not secular. He was responsible for the polarisation between the Muslims and the Hindus, the consequences of which the Indian subcontinent continues to witness even today.

Anyone, who had studied the British archives of the period before 1947, would have known how Jinnah let himself be used by the British colonial administration before 1947 in order to divide and weaken the independence struggle of Mahatma Gandhi. Periodic Hindu-Muslim riots in different parts of India were not the creation of Jinnah. They were an unfortunate occurrence even before Jinnah made its appearance in Indian politics.

But Jinnah, with the quite encouragement of the British, imparted to them a virulence which they did not have before he started demanding the Partition of India on the basis of his two-nation theory that the Hindus and the Muslims could not live together in the same nation. The British used the aggravated communal tension and violence as a result of Jinnah`s policies to try to deny independence to India on the ground that the Indians would not be able to govern themselves and that the people belonging to different religions would be at each other`s throat if they left the country[1].

When, despite their machinations with the help of Jinnah, Gandhi`s independence struggle continued to gather momentum, they cunningly encouraged Jinnah`s demand for the partition of India. After having opposed it initially, Gandhi had to ultimately agree to it. It was the British fear that a largely Hindu India might not serve the Western interests that led them to encourage Jinnah`s demand for Partition. Their calculation that an independent Muslim nation would serve the Western interests proved right.
Jinnah`s two-nation theory was [not] ..... by the Pashtuns and the Balochs. The Pashtuns led by Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, who came to be known as the Frontier Gandhi, and the Balochs led by their tribal sardars, strongly opposed the policies of Jinnah and supported Gandhi. There was a time when Jinnah could not set foot in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan because of the strong local support to Gandhi and opposition to him. .....

..... The Jamaat-e-Islami Hind strongly opposed the demand of the Indian Muslim League headed by Jinnah for the partition of India on the basis of the two-nation theory because it feared that the coming into existence of Pakistan could endanger the position of the Muslims in the rest of India.

Gandhi believed in a non-violent independence struggle. Non-violence had no appeal for Jinnah. He used violence to push forward his struggle for a separate Muslim nation. He instigated communal clashes, which resulted in bloody massacres of Hindus and Muslims. Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and other Congress leaders condemned these massacres, Gandhi went on a fast unto death and they repeatedly toured the affected areas in order to calm the communal passions.

Jinnah rarely condemned the communal riots and used them to advance his cause for an independent Pakistan. His first statement calling for inter-religious amity, from which Advani has quoted [2], came after Jinnah had achieved Pakistan and felt that continuing his communal politics in an independent Pakistan could prove counter-productive.

But, by then, it was too late. The communal poison injected by him into the civil society of the areas which now constitute Pakistan and Bangladesh acquired a virulence which could not be eradicated. He found himself marginalised by his colleagues in the Muslim League. The Jamaat-e-Islami and other religious parties came to the forefront.

This set in motion the train of events, which ultimately led to the proclamation of Pakistan as a theocratic state and an Islamic republic and the inclusion in the preamble to its constitution of the principle that the State shall be governed according to the will of Allah. This gave an exalted position to the mullahs as the only people competent to interpret the will of Allah.

Jinnah has always been a controversial leader in the subcontinent`s history and he does not command even today much respect among the Sindhis, the Balochs and large sections of the Pashtuns. While the Balochs and the Pashtuns opposed the creation of Pakistan, the Sindhis supported it and their leader the late G M Syed was a co-sponsor of the famous Lahore Resolution, calling for the creation of Pakistan. Even he got disillusioned by the post-1947 evolution of Pakistan as a nation dominated by the Punjabi Muslims. Before his death in the 1990s, he admitted that he had committed a Himalayan blunder by co-sponsoring the Lahore Resolution. .....

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[1] Churchill doubted that India - which he thought was more of a geographic expression than a country - could achieve good government without the presence of outside and impartial (i.e., British) authority. He believed that as soon as the British left, Hindus and Moslems would begin to slaughter one another - Patrick Garrity in his article ``A Man Of Al Seasons``

[2] Jinnah said in Pakistan`s Constituent Assembly: ``You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in the state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that has nothing to do with the business of the state ... you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.``

Advani in Karachi http://www.hindu.com/2005/06/08/stories/2005060806951300.htm

The HINDU
Wednesday, June 8, 2005

Jinnah and Savarkar

Describing Mohammad Ali Jinnah as a secularist partakes of the very same terminology and semantics that the Sangh Parivarideologues choose to define their own brand of secularism.

L.K. Advani`s statement about Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah`s espousal of secularism hangs precariously on a single quote, taken from Jinnah`s Presidential speech to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, delivered on August 11, 1947.

In the speech, Jinnah said: ``You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in the state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed — that has nothing to do with the business of the state ... you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.``

Jinnah`s early discomfort with Islamic orthodoxy is a well-documented fact, and so is his lack of acceptability among the Muslim masses.

But the spiralling demand for Pakistan between 1940 and 1947 had transformed Jinnah as a staunch advocate of Pakistan and a communalist. It also changed the fortunes of the Muslim League for the better.

While the ire of the sangh parivar against Mr. Advani is understandable, it has more to do with Mr. Advani`s apology for the demolition of the Babri Masjid than his remarks on Jinnah.

Describing Jinnah as a secularist partakes of the very same ideological terminology and semantics that the Sangh Parivar ideologues chose to define their own brand of secularism. To understand this, one needs to turn to the writings and speeches of V.D. Savarkar.

In his core text, Hindutva, Savarkar was expressing similar sentiments when he argued that ``at some future time the word Hindu may come to indicate a citizen of Hindusthan and nothing else; that day can only rise when all cultural and religious bigotry has disbanded its forces pledged to aggressive egoism, and religions cease to be `isms` and become merely the common fund of eternal principles that lie at the root of all that are common foundation on which the Human State majestically and firmly rests.``

Despite ``reasonable`` digressions like these, Savarkar argues relentlessly for a Hindu Rashtra, and very much in the same vein as Jinnah seeks to make a distinction between Hindutva or Hinduness, Hindu religion and Hinduism.

The future and foundations of India had to be Hindu, argued Savarkar, and these foundations were non-negotiable. Once that is achieved, then, the effort would be to develop ``a sense of attachment to the greater whole, whereby Hindus, Mohammedans, Parsis, Christians and Jews would feel as Indians first and every other thing afterwards.`` He repeated the same sentiment in the Calcutta session of the Hindu Mahasabha in 1939, while discussing the rights of the non-Hindu minorities.

It is the very stuff of revisionist history of the kind politicians favour that propels Savarkar into being projected by the Sangh Parivar as a nationalist, despite arguing in 1937, three years before Jinnah formally mooted the two-nation theory, that Hindus and Muslims were ``two antagonistic nations living side by side in India``. A similar fate has befallen Jinnah, once hailed by Gokhale as the ``ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity.`` Both sought foundations for their putative states on the basis of a single race, ethnicity and cultural unity. While Jinnah realised his goal of a Muslim state, Savarkar`s dream of a Hindu Rashtra remains a pipe dream.

The Call http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_29-4-2005_pg1_4

The Daily Times, Lahore, Pakistan
Friday, April 29, 2005

Christian injured for not reciting kalma

LAHORE: About eight people severely tortured a Christian in Chak 2 (South) near Mandi Bahauddin district for not reciting the kalma. According to a fax sent by the Holy Rosary Church to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), Shahbaz Masih, who worked as a tractor driver for a local landlord, was picked up by several people from his house on the night of April 2 and taken to an undisclosed location. Later, the people told Shahbaz’s family that they had killed him and his body was lying in a field near his village. Shahbaz’s family members went to the location and found the boy alive. They took him to hospital, where he recorded a statement with his family and church authorities. According to the preliminary inquiry by the church, both of Shahbaz’s legs were broken because he refused to recite the kalma.