The Bubble Bursts The co-opting of the liberals by the Pak establishment this time around has left the initiative firmly in the hands of the right wingers. The depoliticisation of civil society has led to a leaderless mob in society..throw in the deceptive nature of economic facts and figures being tossed about along with high inflation and you have a recipe for disaster.

Why do Pakistanis consider Mahmud Ghazni, Mohammad Ghauri and Aurangzeb Great Muslims? Its easy to generalise...Aurenzeb isn`t perceived by pashtuns as a good man those who have read about him know of his brutality and hypocricy in putting down the rebellion of Khushal Khan Khattak, conversely Ahmad Shah Abdali is considered a hero by Pan Islamists and Pashtuns but many in punjab still speak of his name with dread.

Khan Abdul Wali Khan: His Fathers Shadow? has anyone heard of a book which partially or on it`s own deals with the hyderabad tribunal? I remember hearing about one?

Khan Abdul Wali Khan: His Fathers Shadow? ahmadzai lala: My late uncle one told me the exact same story..he told me it was said to him by a former chief of police who had served in larkana?

I have however heard of one comment by a former NAP activist saying someone in the NAP was involved..

Mind you Rafi raza mentioned sherpaos disillsuionment with the PPP in his book so the possibility of the FSF`s involvement is very possible..considering the tactics of paks ruling establishment and ZAB included it is possible.

Khan Abdul Wali Khan: His Fathers Shadow? Another nice write up by one of Pakistan`s most respected human rights campaigners.

OBITUARY: A valiant fighter for people’s rights

http://www.dawn.com/2006/01/28/fea.htm#1


By I.A. Rehman


WITH the passing away of Abdul Wali Khan, Pakistan has lost one of its senior most politicians, if not the senior most, who played a significant part in the struggles of his people for more than six decades.

Born in the year of the Soviet revolution, when the aspirations of the colonized people all over the world began to soar to new heights, Wali Khan had from early life a challenging task carved out for him. Although the house of his father, Bacha Khan, was establishing new traditions among the Utmanzais in several areas, including pursuit of excellence in education and the arts and community welfare through social work, for Wali Khan politics became the first and the last love. Apart from the hazards of fighting for independence in a crown colony, his task was made difficult by his inheritance. On the one hand he was inspired by his father’s ideals of non-violence, humility and selfless service and on the other hand he was exposed to his uncle’s long journey along the path of nationalist, democratic politics and which ended in pragmatism. While he drew upon both elements of his family’s legacy, time and circumstance demanded a search for new approaches to the community’s goals and he earned distinction by realizing this.

Wali Khan had many years of experience as a Khudai Khidmatgar when Pakistan came into being and the Pukhtoon struggle for what they always considered their rights entered a new and more difficult phase. Wali Khan willingly accepted the sacrifices that this struggle demanded and continued fighting to his last for the rights of his people in a democratic, federal Pakistan. His struggle against One Unit and the autocratic rule of Ayub Khan marked the most glorious phase of his long political career. During the East Bengal crisis, he was in that magnificent minority that stood up against the madness of the military operation against their fellow Pakistani citizens. The contribution made by the opposition under his leadership during the framing of the 1973 Constitution, particularly to the adoption of the parliamentary system and some relief to the federating units, has never been fully recognized but was considerable nonetheless.

But if perseverance in Bacha Khan’s tradition of public service demanded great sacrifices Wali Khan’s brush with pragmatism presented him with serious perils. History is yet to pronounce its verdict as to what might have happened if Wali Khan had used his influence to save the Bhutto-Bizenjo accord of 1972 or avoided putting his trust in Ziaul Haq’s words in 1977 or whether the brief ANP-PPP accord of 1988-89 could be given a longer life. However, even the harshest of Wali Khan’s critics must bear in mind the Herculean nature of the mission of anyone who is called upon to keep the banner of democracy flying in a society afflicted with love for praetorian rule. Perhaps nobody will deny Wali Khan’s substantial contribution to the country’s political culture, of which his decision to quit active politics after losing the election in 1990 was only one of the many illustrations.

That he had to struggle all his life for causes the state of Pakistan was created to defend was not Khan Abdul Wali Khan’s tragedy alone; the victims of this tragedy to a larger extent were, and are, the people of Pakistan. There will be time to put Wali Khan’s work in a proper perspective and also to assess what might be referred to as his errors of judgment and the present moment warrants only a salute to a consistent and valiant campaigner for the rights of the people to democracy and equity.

Khan Abdul Wali Khan: His Fathers Shadow? Zeena: there is no need to attack the dead, it achieves nothing, especially when the attacks or not fact based and more emotion driven.

Being someone from NWFP as well..I can say if one reads up on the 1990 elections..in Wali Khans home constituency they had Gulbadin hekmatyars people canvassing for support! The rigging that went on in the 1990 election is a historical fact..I agree with you that in numerical terms the ANP has never been enormously popular in NWFP, but it has consistently been there because of a political pphilosophy and it`s workers..that is why it has outlived more strong and effective leaders like Fazle haq and Mehtab Abbassi..but just remember in Pakistans First past the post system no political party has ever polled more than 50% of the vote..except for Fauji refernedums..where you get votes which would embarrass Husni Mubarak.

TA: There was a genuiane hatred for the Soviet invasion and the freedom struggle was totally indigienous although it was later hijacked by the CIA, right wing et al, Wali Khan and other secularists were marginalised by the time martial law was lifted.

Khan Abdul Wali Khan: His Fathers Shadow? Re: # 68

HP correct facts but a bit dated..Hindko speakers are now a minority in Peshawar having been displaced by Pashtun migration and the effects of the Afghan war has led to dari actually being one of the most spoken languages in Peshawar. Since 1988 in fact pashtuns have steadily dominated Peshawar politics and hindko speakers have increasingly integrated with pashtuns out of economic neccessity.

The Hazara belt has virtually no ANP presence now, one is as you said..other factors is the increasing integration of the region into Punjabs economy and the adoption of hindko as the lingua franca by the pashtun minority residing in that region. The leftist moveent in the hazara belt in the 1970`s and 80`s tapped into local dislike of the often pashtun landlords. The beneficiaries of that initially was the PPP..now though the region is politically dominated by independants and the Muslim League (almost always pro federal government groups..despite Nawaz Sharifs considerably popularity there his partys influence is fast declining..with the JUI and JI also wielding considerable influence in the Northern part of the region. Although Pashtuns do represent around 75% of the population seat distribution favours the hazara belt ..which again till the MMAsvictory ensured pashtuns did not wield decisive influence over NWFP politics (the ANP/NAP/NDP) never penetrated FATA effectively because of the FCR which to date bans political activities in the region (except those by the federal government). DI Khan is another issue..the ANP never had firm roots in that region, till the early 1990`s only the PPP posed an effective challenge to the JUI. Now its broken down into independant groups of nouveau rich who usually associate with the PML.

The Rise and Fall of Civilizations Well it`s inevitable that all empires fall..some do get a second wind though...but the easiest way to figure out an empire in decline..besides the general ones of unbalanced deficit spending and accumalating debt..or trade imbalances is simple...when it believes in it`s divine right to rule..

Khan Abdul Wali Khan: His Fathers Shadow? to the comment about the ANP not being representative of NWFP..yes by strict interpretation that is true..the hazara belt of NWFP tends to vote Muslim League in reaction to Pashtun Nationalism. However the reality is till the 2002 elections NWFP never had a single party in total domination of the province unlike Punjab. Even so the NDP, NAP and ANP were usually the largest or the second largest party in provincial elections. The PPP-JUI combo became the dominant group post 1988 though.

ahmadzai & hp:

Very true...the FP editorial summed up some of the obstacles Wali Khan faced..

And when on March 23, 1973, the Federal Security Force thugs
pounced on an opposition public rally at the Liaquat Bagh in the Punjab garrison
town of Rawalpindi and mowed down some one dozen people and wounded many more
with their automatic gunfire, the NWFP turned into a ticking tinderbox. The
public emotions were running very high in the province, as almost all the dead
and most of the wounded were from the NWFP, mostly belonging to the Khan’s NAP,
the existing NAP’s predecessor. Had the enraged cadres of the NAP had their way
and paraded the dead bodies on the streets in Peshawar and other cities of the
province, the tinderbox would have exploded into an unpredictable horrendous
conflagration to the great grief of our national unity and solidarity. But the
Khan firmly put his foot down, sternly held back his infuriated party cadres,
escorted the dead bodies to Peshawar and had them buried quietly and solemnly by
their bereaved families in their ancestral places.

The Khan was the most, and calculatedly at that,
misunderstood and misrepresented person, too. When he counselled the Pakistan
government not to get involved in America’s adventure against the Soviet
invaders in Afghanistan as, he argued, it was bound to boomerang on Pakistan in
the long run, his detractors branded him a Soviet agent. When he urged Islamabad
to keep out of the squabbles of the warring factions of Afghanistan after the
Soviet retreat for fear of its negative fallout on Pakistan’s own polity, they
questioned his intents. And when he pleaded for rapprochement with India
contending it was in Pakistan’s own best interests, they instantly labelled him
an Indian agent.

And he was a true democrat, staunchly committed to
democratic principles and undiluted civil rule. When late ZA Bhutto, then the
country’s president, gave choice between civilian rule and martial law, the Khan
opted for an interim constitution, saying that even though it was badly flawed
it was better than the baton’s rule. And he agreed to the constitution of 1973,
even though he found it inadequate and not conforming fully to the principles of
federalism which held as the perquisite for ensuring national solidarity and
inter-provincial harmony.

Khan Abdul Wali Khan: His Fathers Shadow? Interesting article...

Wasted asset
http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/jan-2006/27/columns1.php
M.A. NIAZI
Khan Abdul Wali Khan`s passing removes yet another of the political leaders who played a crucial role in Pakistan`s crisis years of the 1970s, and while looking back to him and his era, one wonders how events might have been shaped had the anti-democratic heritage of the 1950s and 1960s not acted upon him in that era.
Wali Khan was labelled a `nationalist`, a pejorative term, with all its hidden implications of secessionism and `anti-Pakistan` sentiment, but there was a period when he was perfectly willing to play a role on the national stage, and where his considerable political skills made him emerge as a possible Prime Minister. It is one of the wistful pleasures of playing the `what-might-have-been` game to contemplate the possibility.
His family`s political opposition to Pakistan during the Independence Movement was not an insurmountable obstacle. After all, his uncle, Dr Khan Sahib, had been the first Chief Minister-designate of West Pakistan, an office to which he would have succeeded had it not been for his untimely death. If the brother of Bacha Khan could be accepted as Chief Minister of West Pakistan in 1955, why would the son of Bacha Khan have been unacceptable as Prime Minister of the same territory in the 1980s?
Wali Khan was no doctrinaire ideologue. This was proven by the smooth alliances he personally participated in, first with the JUI in the short-lived NWFP Mufti government, where he conceded the Chief Ministership to Mufti Mahmood even though his NAP had more seats, and then with the IJI in 1990, when he again gave the smaller partner, the IJI/PML, the same slot.
Yet he was not a rootless politician, interested only in gaining power. His economics were not radical, but he had a definite view of how a federal structure should empower the provinces. This also made him committed to the cause of democracy and representative government, which also put him in the opposition for long periods of time, including stints in jail, and his trial, along with other NAP leaders, before the Hyderabad Tribunal. Naturally, coming from a smaller province, this was an important part of his platform, but the centralising bureaucratic-military establishment turned a legitimate political and constitutional position into proof of his being anti-Pakistan.
Wali Khan`s integrity was his hallmark, as was his wry sense of humour. The best example of that is his reaction to one of the charges before the Hyderabad Tribunal, that he had been sent Rs 20 million by Indira Gandhi, then Indian PM, through a certain emissary. He filed a civil suit against the emissary for the recovery of those Rs 20 million, arguing that while could not imagine why Indira would send him such a sum, he had not got the money, and obviously the emissary had embezzled money which should have come to him.
Examining his record, it is easier to trace the `nationalist` or anti-Pakistan label to his family rather than to any views of his own. While his federalism fell within the American states`-rights tradition, he was never known for supporting the Pukhtoonistan demand that was linked to his father, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. One analyst remarked many years ago that Ghaffar Khan`s problem with Pakistan (reflected by his request to be buried in a `free country`, Afghanistan) lay in his Pukhtun stubbornness, whereby he found himself on the wrong side of a stand taken in the 1930s, to which he stuck even after Partition.
One reminiscence of Bacha Khan sheds some light on this. Asked in 1948 whether he had accepted Pakistan, his reply was that he had taken oath as a member of the Constituent Assembly. This was a sensible reply, though later the political harassment he faced may have driven him to the conclusion that he was probably right in the first place. His son, on the other hand, must be credited with greater loyalty to Pakistan. He too faced similar persecution, and attempts to give him a bad name and hang him, but he never left the path of patriotism and peaceful politics.
His father was effectively excluded from mainstream politics by the persecution he suffered. It was not his lack of patriotism that was the problem, it was his radicalism. By the standards of his time, there was a lot of occupied territory out there to his left, but it is as if the decidedly conservative establishment of the 1950s wanted to suppress all possible changes to the status quo. Ghaffar Khan was by no means the only political leader to face such treatment in that era, but the masses had to be stirred up against him, and the easiest charge that could be laid was treason.
Of course, it did not help that Ghaffar Khan, what with his old Congress ties, favoured better relations with India. This aspect of his politics, which is a valid stance to take, earned him the title of Indian agent, which was later to be used against his son, as described above. While there was a large section of public opinion which took a strongly anti-Indian position, based on an analysis of the Pakistan Movement and the Congress leadership`s constant betrayals, this did not preclude debate. However, a section of the establishment demanded unquestioning anti-Indian sentiment for two purposes: first, to justify the role of the military in politics, and secondly, to batter politicians with the charge of treason.
There is a strong contrast between how the Redshirts fared after Partition, compared with the other diehard opponents of the Pakistan Movement, and Congress allies, the religious right. The JUI, which derived itself from the anti-Pakistan Congress auxiliary, the Jamiat Ulema Hind, won favour with the establishment by Mufti Mehmood`s support of Ayub Khan. The Jamaat Islami made its peace with the establishment during the 1970s by leading the resistance to Bhutto, another disturber of the status quo. It was then allowed to claim the role of the defender of the ideology of Pakistan, of the state whose creation it had opposed. Like his father, Wali Khan never made common cause with the establishment, though he certainly joined alliances with political forces of widely differing, even antithetical, views.
This brings us to the 1970s, when Wali was also opposing Bhutto, but on his own terms. Bhutto, who broken the hold of the establishment for a brief window of opportunity, probably realised that the only challenger he had for the support of the masses could be Wali Khan. Therefore, it became necessary to destroy him. This was done by the methods of the 1950s and 1960s, in which Bhutto had been trained by his years in the Ayub Cabinet. Bhutto is not to be blamed. First, he must have realised that he was fighting on two fronts: against other political forces, as well as the establishment. It was easier to eliminate the opposition rather than the establishment, even though for this he needed to use establishment methods, and thereby had to co-opt the establishment itself. Bhutto was a man of flaws as great as his good qualities, but perhaps his worst crime was to try to bend the establishment to his agenda, rather than to follow its agenda.
At one level, Wali Khan was a success story. Over the years, he gained the respect even of his political opponents, and even though some of them found him irritating at times, they acknowledged his considerable abilities. However, the question that arises is why he never held public office. Was it just because he was an opposition politician? A combination of circumstances also prevented him breaking out of the NWFP. Particularly by the end of the Zia era, his moment had gone. Not only was he too old, but his stand on the Afghan Jihad divided the NWFP, and also made it difficult for him to do what any non-Punjabi politician has to do to attain power, and which only Bhutto managed to achieve-obtain mass support in the Punjab.
In the end, the question remains: how would Wali Khan have fared if there had been a continuous civilian representative process from the 1960s onwards? Certainly differently than he actually did. That he did not play the role he was actually cut out for, was probably a disappointment for him. But did the nation not lose more? Pakistan has undergone 30 years of military rule, apart from at least another 15 in which the military loomed large, and assumed veto powers. In essence, this has been amateur rule, by men of good will, but untrained in the art of ruling a free people. Leaders of Wali Khan`s calibre would challenge one of the reasons they trot out to justify their interventions: the poor quality of civilian leadership. But in the long run, it is the nation as a whole that loses. We have not had so many politicians or statesmen that we can afford to waste such assets. If Wali Khan`s potential was not fulfilled, Pakistan lost more than he did.
E-mail queries and comments to: maniazi@nation.com.pk

Khan Abdul Wali Khan: His Fathers Shadow? HP: I forgot to mention..this article was both well written and timely..kudos to you..

Manto: A lot of people share the blame for ZAB`s judicial murder most obviously Zia himself..but ZABs own actions played a major role in Zia`s arrival..the emasculation of the judiciary...the undemocratic dismissal of the Baluchistan provincial government, the use of the military in Baluchistan. As far as the religo-political parties were concerned, the banning of gambling etc was done by ZAB..the PPP has always had a tacit alliance with the JUI in the frontier often against the ANP..and use the JUI as a means usurping the JI`s role in Afghanistan..especially post 1985. As for Qayyum Khan his brief stint as a Congressite aside...he is known historically as a Muslim Leaguer.

Back to Wali Khan, I remember a few particular stories of him ..one was when asked if he was a Pakistani, he said I am a Pashtun for 5,000 years, I am a Muslim for 1,400 years and I am a Pakistani for only 40 years..the other story was one during Ayub Khans conferences in the twilight of Ayubs government. During almost every speech of his at the conference a confidante of Ayub kept saying out loud how that speech was a great speech.. and how he would like to meet the man who gave it..and where had the man been all thse years..finally Wali Khan snapped and fired back I was in prison by your oders..and tahts why you`ve not heard of me!

Khan Abdul Wali Khan: His Fathers Shadow? Manto: Again I disagree..
Again thats simply incorrect it`s universally known that Ghaffar Khan and his son did not see eye to eye on politics in Pakistan. His politics as I have said were closer to Dr Khan Sahibs.

1: The Republican Party was created by the establishment, the establishments role was one of holding on to power not neccessarily Anti Bengal as it was pro religiious parties that ended up being sidelined by that move..when neccessary the establishment would co-opt popular leaders like Suhrawardy. Iskandier Mirza believed that the KK movement should be brought into the mainstream.

2: Qayyum Khan was a Muslim Leaguer for most of his life....calling his role in affair as an intra Congress affair... would be like calling ZAB a Muslim Leaguer on the basis that he spent more of his life as a League member then as a PPP one!

3: Yes he is a major leader (now retired) but it was not party policy..a former chairman of the HRCP is a close confidante of Asfandyar now..

4: How was it an ideological alliance? While I concede the NWFP government under Mufti Mehmood did push through some right wing policies that was more to do with their numerical numbers in the provincial assembly. Ghaffar Khan and his religious background is another issue in itself, the KK was a ``tehrik`` a movement encompasses all shades of opinion..the NAP-JUI was a political alliance was to my knowledge the only time they forged such an alliance that too post election. It is also incorrect when you say the JUI-and ANP are in alliance at the local level. In fact in Peshawar the JUI district Nazim and close friend of Fazlur Rehman came to power with PPP support, similarly in Nowshera . The PPP has made both political post election and electoral alliances with the JUI both at the federal and provincial level.

Yes, Bhutto was a popular leader and he should have lived..his murder was totally wrong. Hence Wali Khans joining with the MRD, and working with the PPP in the 1988 elections. Again that I imagine is a reflection of his fathers influence..despite the torture his family faced Wali Khan was still a democrat and accepted the PPP`s National influence..for someone who had seen his son tortured (i believe Asfandyar Wali had some of his toe nails extracted) and close friends tortured, his brother in law hounded out of the army and himself imprisoned and his name slandered..and then to make peace with the PPP after that is quite an accomplishment. I mean even Benazir back in 1998 took out a rally against Kalabagh dam after hearing Wali Khan was coming out of retirement for it..

Khan Abdul Wali Khan: His Fathers Shadow? Re: # 8 Manto: Actually I believe Asfandyar Wali later on pledged support if a bill came up for a vote..he had met with Kasuri the present FM..who was in charge of the NA committee on law at the time. If I remember right only one ANP senator was around for the vote against the honour killing resolution so it was not party policy.

The bits about Ghaffar Khans politics don`t have much to do with Wali Khan per se...but i disagree with some of your points. If i remember right the Republican Party was allied to the Awami League. So opposing East Pakistan was not an issue...Dr Khan Sahib had fallen out with his brother over the republican party. As for the Jinnah-Ghaffar Khan issue..Qayyum Khans role in that issue has been well documented..the KK was under all out attack in 1948 by the Qayyum Khan government..thousands had been arrested many shot dead ...some of the KK schools were razed to the ground on top of that..that Ghaffar Khans family see Jinnah in a different light is no big realisation.

With regard to the Nizam-e-Mustafa issue..again that has little to do with Wali Khan ..he was wrongly imprisoned by Bhutto under trial by a tribunal that was pretty much a joke and his party outlawed under the amendment passed by the PPP government outlawing groups which ``opposed pakistans ideology``..the tribunal and the law were a joke and created a situation where the same laws were subsequently used against the PPP and it`s leader. His alliance with the JUI..again that is realpolitik..many people in his party disagreed preferring to ally with the PPP, but there was too much bad blood between ZAB and Wali Khan for that to ever happen..still much the same was done by the PPP at the time..they allied themselves with elements of the JUI as well..and post 1988 the JUI under Fazlur Rehman was till 1997 one of the PPP`s closest allies..

Khan Abdul Wali Khan: His Fathers Shadow? Inaa Lillahi Waina Ilayhi Rajoun..my prayers are with his near and dear.

He was a man of many contradictions, one can`t really compare him with his father. Bacha Khan was the leader of a movement, Wali Khan was in the end an honest, principled but flawed politician. It would probably be fairer to compare him to his Uncle, Dr Khan Sahib.

His views on partition probably earn him the most critcisim, but despite that one should not forget his support for the 1973 constitution, the Simla accord..his insistence on the NAP-JUI`s NWFP governments resignation on principle in protest against the Baluchistan Operation (something unheard of nowadays in the politics of opportunism). His burying the hatchet with the PPP despite the brutality he, his friends and family faced at the hands of ZAB`s government. He also turned down many offers by Zias government of key posts while most of his PNA former allies had long since been bought of by Zia`s deceptive charm.

The decision to join the IJI, was in the twilight of his influence and was more down to the role played by his wife and the Bilours, even that was based on realpolitik..a decision which influences the ANPs policy to this day...that is for the ANP to survive it had to ally itself with one major force or the other (which invariably means the PPP & co or the PML &co and whichever group the establishment decides to support). Still it was a regrettable decision and did split the party again.

I have been told that one reason for his defeat in 1990 was the role the ISI played in manipulating the results of his seat so that those ANP people they preferred wouldwin, although other friends from his area say he did deserve to lose asalmost all locals had allied against him.

Again true to himself he retired from politics (another oddity in Pak politics) rather then accept offers by Nawaz Sharif to contest from Lahore or for a senate seat. The story ( i maybe wrong) goes that in response to his supporters lacklustre show in the election he distributed bangles amongst them! (which is quite an insult in pashtun areas)

Still again in his final political press conference the contradiction popped up again..the pashtun nationalist or secularist? Post 9/11 despite the bitterness in the pashtun belt over the US attack on Afghanistan. Wali Khan said that had the US not attacked Afghanistan, that country would have turned into an Arab colony since Osama Bin Laden had a well-equipped army of 16,000 people which far outnumbered the trained soldiers in the Afghan army (the last bit is a quote from Sarfar Ahmads article in the Daily Times).

Whatever else said...his death marks the end of an era..

Iran, Geopolitics and the Bomb The answer is simple...Israel because of it`s overwhelming Military power does not invoke the Samson option except as a matter of last resort. It is a well known fact that Israels security is underwritten by the US, one only has to look at the Yom Kippur was to confirm that fact, after all the US went to a Nuclear alert & launched one of the biggest ever military airlifts in history to ensure Israel could turn the tide.

That is not unusual, India does much the same..the US policy during the Cold war was more akin to Pakistans policy..that is one of refusing a no first strike agreement which would give the Soviets with their numerical superiority an advantage. In fact the US has considered Nukes as an option even in low intensity conflicts like Korea and Gulf war mark 1..

Ahmedinajads comments aren`t something new, one party states tend to use propaganda quite often, and when they are hardliners like him they tend to use it even more. Focussing on his comments this time seems more like something which suited those opposing Iran.

Pakistan’s Territorial Integrity: Lessons from American Democracy Contrary to what people assume..the `73 constitution besides the mutilated part by ZAB, ZIA, NS and Mush..also had some key provisions which were not implemented that were meant to resolve the issue of provincial rights..one was the pledged abolition of the concurrent list after 5 years..as well as the implementation of the order to separate judicial and executive powers. Now in this day and age of devolution of power one has to look at how even those provisions are insufficient.

The Government of India Act 1935 that Pakistan adopted as its first working
constitution gave the federation 96 items of powers. The 1956 constitution reduced
it to 49. This number was retained in the 1962 constitution but in 1973 it was
enlarged to a massive 114.

Kalabagh represents a systemic problem of a lack of understanding of the concept of a federation..constituent Units are equal to other units regardless of there size or opulation..that is why the federal system in the US or Canada works effectively the senate has actual powers ..there is no question of bbig brother sacrficing..these are accepted norms in a federal system. The double standards that were applied to the Bengalis are interesting..in arguments about the NFC between West and East Pakistan it was the ruling establishment which insisted population should not be a criteria..similarly despite not having any representation in the power matrix Bengalis gave up their population representation in exchange for parity..for the sake of Pakistan. The broader concepts of water distribution betray a lack of understanding of the concept of lower riparian water rights. Pakistans provinces..are a bit of a joke..what real power do they exercise..except for Sind..3 out of 4 are dependant on federal transfers..in baluchistans case because the federation has almost all tax collection power the province depends on Islamabad for 90% ..because Islamabad defaults on payments like gas royalty..the provincial government is forced to borrow again from the federal government to keep running..the situation is so bad that according to one estimate..In the case of Balochistan, the total debt (even without accounting for the massive liabilities for employees
provident fund payments, accrued gratuity entitlement and the pension liability built up over the years)
is 2.5 times total revenues (including transfers under the NFC Award)!

Contrary to what is assumed..it has been politicians who have signed some of pakistans more significant agreements..the 56 & 73 constitutions, the simla agreement,..the 1991 water accord..it is the failure of a respect for the rule of law that creates the issue...any guarantees offered by Musharraf are not worth the paper they are written on..

No constitutional system is perfect..the US system created the grounds for the US civil war..the Indian system which has developed positive democratic conventions ..has not been effective enough to channelise ethnic/religious resentment always...the British system failed in dealing with Scottish and Irish resentment..the Japanese system has an inability to reform itself and so on..what is the key is the development of some form of institutional credibility..a court system which may get it wrong but gets it right more often..