This Really Gets My Goat
#107
With such legislation, the Pak Army`s financial interests will be in direct conflict with the ground level support offered to Taliban in Pakistan. The right hand will be accountable for what the left hand is doing unlike before.

Yeah in the 80s, multiple Presidential waivers and even Congressional waivers) rained down on Pakistan along with military aid(entirely separate from the Afghan jihad funding) as long as the US needed Pakistan. But in those days the US was paying for only one side of the war in Afghanistan. I doubt the US needs to have the US taxpayer paying for both sides of the NATO-Taliban war as is happening now.

This Really Gets My Goat PS#105
The nice thing about this if Pakistan wants Taliban to win Kabul, it will have to accomplish that at its own expense(or that of Gulf states) and not on US taxpayer money, which already pays for the US/NATO deployment that the Taliban is fighting.

This Really Gets My Goat #103
Good, if the Pak Army is fully on board with US/NATO on Afghanistan and Taliban, then the Pak Army will not have any problems with this proposed US legislation or any of the comments being made by Americans:


http://www.dawn.com/2007/01/25/top1.htm

A new legislation, already endorsed by the House of Representatives, calls for stopping US military assistance to Pakistan if Islamabad fails to halt the resurgence of Taliban inside its territory.
...

The proposed legislation urges the US president to certify that Islamabad is making all efforts to “prevent Taliban from operating in areas under its sovereign control, including in the cities of Quetta and Chaman” before releasing any funds or approving licenses for enhancing its military capability.
...

Recognising Pakistan’s importance in the war against terror, it grants the US president the power to forge a “strategic partnership” but places limitations on the president’s authority to provide credit on favourable terms for purchase of military equipment and spares.It emphasises that for fiscal years 2008 and 2009, US military assistance to Pakistan may not be provided” unless the president “determines and certifies” that the Pakistan government is taking all actions against Taliban.

These include credit for military sales and purchases in Foreign Assistance Act and Section 23 of Arms Export Control Act along with licenses for any item controlled under this Act.

The US president may waive the limitation on assistance for a fiscal year if he determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that it is important to the national security interest of the United States to do so.

The areas where Pakistan needs to take action against the resurgent Taliban militia have been identified as Quetta, Chaman, the North West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
..


http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2e421edc-a65c-11db-937f-0000779e2340.html

Lisa Curtis, a former CIA analyst now at the Heritage Foundation, says increased rhetoric from Washington is partly aimed at eliminating doubts among some members of the Pakistani government and armed forces that the US is committed to the operations in Afghanistan.

“I think there is probably a serious debate within the Pakistani security establishment on this issue and that is why we need to be clear on what the US commitment and goals are in the region so that this debate can stop and Pakistanis can put their full force behind reining in the Taliban.”

...
Stephen Cohen, an expert on Pakistan at the Brookings Institution, says Gen Musharraf may have over-estimated the strength of the US-Pakistan relationship in deciding not to crack down on the Taliban.

“[The Pakistanis] are aware that the Pakistan-US relationship broke once before over the nuclear programme and perhaps it might break again over Pakistan’s support for the Taliban,” says Mr Cohen. “But their calculation is that they have support at the top of the US government so don’t need to worry much about what the Afghans and Indians are saying.”

While US officials are stepping up pressure on Islamabad, Democrats in Congress are likely to urge George W. Bush, US president, to tackle Pakistani support for the Taliban. One piece of legislation before Congress would tie US aid to Pakistan to a presidential certification that Pakistan was co-operating in the struggle against the Taliban.

If passed, the legislation would have a very sobering effect on Islamabad. Alan ­Kronstadt, a South Asia expert at the non-partisan Congressional Research Service, ­estimates that the Pentagon is providing Pakistan with about $80m (€62m, £41m) a month – 25 per cent of Pakistani military expenditure – for counter-terrorism operations.

This Really Gets My Goat
PPS to my posts #94 and #95

On Pakistani expectations that the US/NATO will not stay in Afghanistan much longer:

http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/24/opinion/edsaikal.php
By Amin Saikal International Herald Tribune

WEDNESDAY, MAY 24, 2006

While Musharraf may be personally committed to a policy of noninterference in Afghanistan, he cannot claim the same for Pakistan`s military intelligence, known as the ISI, which functions as a government within the government, and the radical Islamic political forces that dominate Pakistan`s Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan provinces, on the border with Afghanistan.

Several ISI officers, and their supporters in the Pakistani government and radical Islamic circles, are said to have been deeply disgruntled with the ``loss`` of Afghanistan when the Taliban regime fell. These forces believe that sooner or later the coalition troops will leave, opening the way for Afghanistan`s future to be determined by its neighbors.

In such an event, they want Pakistan to be well positioned to protect its strategic interests and to prevent other regional actors, especially Iran and India, from gaining a vital foothold. Like the Taliban, they are emboldened by U.S. failures in Iraq and the U.S. announcement that it would withdraw up to 4,000 troops from Afghanistan as soon as NATO has expanded its troop deployment from 10,000 to 15,000 over the next two months. They are further encouraged by an assumption that NATO`s commitment to Afghanistan cannot be open-ended, given the reluctance of many of its member states to get involved in a long-term conflict.


http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/11/29/wafghan29.xml
Accept defeat by Taliban, Pakistan tells Nato

By Ahmed Rashid in Islamabad
Last Updated: 2:00am GMT 30/11/2006

Senior Pakistani officials are urging Nato countries to accept the Taliban and work towards a new coalition government in Kabul that might exclude the Afghan president Hamid Karzai.

Canadian soldiers at the scene of a suicide bomb attack in Kandahar. Support in Canada for the Nato mission is fading

Pakistan`s foreign minister, Khurshid Kasuri, has said in private briefings to foreign ministers of some Nato member states that the Taliban are winning the war in Afghanistan and Nato is bound to fail. He has advised against sending more troops.

Western ministers have been stunned. ``Kasuri is basically asking Nato to surrender and to negotiate with the Taliban,`` said one Western official who met the minister recently.

...
Lt Gen Ali Mohammed Jan Orakzai, governor of the volatile North West Frontier Province has stated publicly that the US, Britain and Nato have already failed in Afghanistan. ``Either it is a lack of understanding or it is a lack of courage to admit their failures,`` he said recently.

Gen Orakzai insists that the Taliban represent the Pashtun population, Afghanistan`s largest and Pakistan`s second largest ethnic group, and they now lead a ``national resistance`` movement to throw out Western occupation forces, just as there is in Iraq.
...
Many Afghans fear that Pakistan is deliberately trying to undermine Mr Karzai and Nato`s commitment to his government in an attempt to reinstall its Taliban proxies in Kabul – almost certainly leading to all-out civil war and possible partition of the country.

This Really Gets My Goat #96
I was asked to substantiate this statement of mine in #85

``Well, the Afghans say that he is training suicide bombers in Balochistan these days. I think he himself admits he visits the region to encourage people to join up for waging jihad in Afghanistan.``

So I showed in #94 #95 that that is what the Afghans are indeed saying.

This Really Gets My Goat One more reference:
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=123&art_id=qw1169662320542B212
January 24 2007 at 08:24PM

``Afghan officials released a video last week in which captured Taliban spokesperson Mohammad Hanif said Taliban leader Mullah Omar was living in the Pakistani city of Quetta under the protection of Pakistan`s ISI intelligence service.

Hanif said former ISI chief Hamid Gul was organising the training of suicide bombers at a religious school in Pakistan.``

Believe him, don`t believe him, its your choice.

This Really Gets My Goat HP #93
If you can`t see my answers to your questions there in plain sight and plain English in my post #87, then I can`t help you any further.

Re Hamid Gul
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/21/world/asia/21quetta.html
``Hamid Gul, the former director general of Pakistani intelligence, remains a public and unapologetic supporter of the Taliban, visiting madrasas and speaking in support of jihad at graduation ceremonies.

Afghan intelligence officials recently produced a captured insurgent who said Mr. Gul facilitated his training and logistics through an office in the Pakistani town of Nowshera, in the North-West Frontier Province, west of the capital, Islamabad. NATO and American officials in Afghanistan say there is also evidence of support from current midlevel Pakistani intelligence officials. Just how far up that support reaches remains in dispute. ``




``Daud came to power in 1973; people who came to Pakistan were Shah Zahir Shah’s relatives Bhutto did not shelter any people. People who moved to Pakistan during the Bhutto era are pretty much in the northern alliance now. The leftist took over in 1978, Bhutto was enjoying some nice evenings in Adela Jail at that time. ``

On the contrary, as this following article and many other sources say, Bhutto`s govt actively supported jihadi activities from 1974 onward and gave its primary support to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, not the present members in of the Northern Alliance.

http://www.pathfinder.com/asiaweek/96/1206/is1.html

``It`s difficult to believe that not so long ago this man and the Pakistani army chiefs he now castigates fought on the same side in the last great battle of the Cold War. And won. It is also ironic that he was first trained by the Pakistanis. But for over 20 years, a pernicious interplay of personalities, pride and geopolitics has been ineluctably pushing Massoud and Pakistan into a conflict that is far from played out.
...

Instead of the military academy, Massoud began studying engineering at Kabul`s Polytechnic college. Within months, though, he joined Islamist student activists committed to the overthrow of the left-leaning president, Mohamed Daoud. A bungled coup attempt in the spring of 1974 resulted in a sweeping crackdown on the Islamist movement and the flight of many survivors, including Massoud, to Pakistan.

The arrival of the Afghan exiles in Pakistan coincided with growing Pakistani nervousness over Daoud and his strident support for the cause of Pushtunistan -- an irredentist vision of a greater Afghanistan embracing Pushtun tribal lands in Pakistan. It was the commander of Pakistan`s Frontier Corps, Brig. Naseerullah Babar (most recently the home minister in Benazir Bhutto`s outgoing administration) who moved to counter that threat. With approval from then-president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, he set up a secret military-training program for the Afghan students near Peshawar, Pakistan.

``I told the government we must have some elements to influence events in Afghanistan in case there was trouble,`` Babar later explained. ``We took them under our wing and started giving them small-arms and specialized training.`` It was a watershed decision: a first step in a steady shift toward what the British had euphemistically dubbed ``forward policy`` -- direct intervention in Afghan politics.

Massoud was among those in the first batch of Afghan students to go through a monthlong course held under tight secrecy at the Cherat Army camp near Peshawar. His instructors were members of the elite Special Service Group while he and his companions dressed in the uniforms of Babar`s Frontier Corps -- ostensibly Pakistanis from the tribal areas. Years later one officer involved in the program was to recall the young Massoud: ``He was one of the bright boys of training, a sharp fellow.``

But it was a former Kabul University student leader, the Pushtun firebrand Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who by sheer force of personality came to dominate the small community of exiles and impress the Pakistanis with his powers of leadership. ``He was a young man, highly intelligent and dedicated,`` Babar recalled. ``He had a capacity for organization that as a soldier I could recognize.`` Before long, Hekmatyar overshadowed the movement`s ostensible leader, the gentle and bookish Tajik theology professor Burhanuddin Rabbani.

Within six months, the Islamist movement was overtaken by a series of events that left deep emotional scars on Massoud and permanently blighted his perceptions of Pakistan. In late July 1975, ISI pressure sent the young Afghans into eastern Afghanistan for a wave of attacks on government offices. ``I told Mr. Bhutto it is time we conveyed a message to Daoud,`` said Babar, who later recalled the operation as a success.

But for the young Afghans, the result was a debacle. Massoud himself led over 30 students to his native Panjshir valley in the naive hope the population would rise against Daoud. But even before government commandos were helicoptered into the valley the next day, the local populace had chased the revolutionaries into the mountains. It was a tragi-comedy that left nearly half of Massoud`s comrades dead or arrested, and it was followed by a brutal crackdown on other suspect Islamists by an unnerved Daoud.

Two months later, Massoud returned to Pakistan to find the small, exiled Afghan community riven by recriminations over the deaths. Hekmatyar, an ardent advocate of ``armed struggle,`` formed his own faction and later a party, the hard-line Hizb. Rabbani continued to head the more gradualist Jamiat party and Massoud remained loyal to him. The split soon degenerated into a murderous rivalry with Babar`s subordinates supporting Hekmatyar, the man they saw as the Afghans` natural leader. ``Pakistan took Hekmatyar`s side completely,`` Massoud said, ``and we became the opposition!``

In 1976 with the approval of Pakistani officers, an ambitious Hekmatyar moved against key figures in Rabbani`s faction claiming they were spies. Among the first to disappear was one of Massoud`s closest friends, a young Pushtun named Jan Mohammad. Under torture in an Army camp at Nowshera, near Peshawar, Mohammad made confessions purportedly implicating Massoud. He was later murdered. Massoud was subsequently arrested and narrowly avoided a similar fate.

The affair was one he was neither to forget nor forgive.

For the now-divided exiles, the military coup of 1978 that killed Daoud and brought the Communist party to power rescued them from irrelevancy. In the spring of 1979, Massoud and a band of Jamiat men turned their backs on Pakistan and trekked back to the Panjshir and a spreading revolt. ``


``Again what a retired ISI chief has to do with the current situation? How much influence Tenet has over the US policy or how much influence retired chief of RAW has over the current policy.``

If today George Tenet expresses an opinion on the current situation involving the US somewhere in the world, his expert opinion is more likely to reflect the current reality than yours or mine.

This Really Gets My Goat
#86
``James Woolsey was CIA chief. He now works for neocon groups…Is the CIA supporting neocons… Or Gill worked for Indian govt and now he writes anti-Pakistan articles…does he sill represent Govt of India? ``

Do you not see some difference between government complicity when a man writes articles and govt complicity when a man trains/indoctrinates suicide bombers?

``I asked you specific questions about your claims that the Army has jihadi agenda and you still have to reply to my questions…``

As I said, it will be of no use for me to reply to your ``questions``. You will simply make more dismissive statements like before without giving any basis for them, this is your style of ``debating`` which goes nowhere.

However since you will keep claiming your ``logic`` is unanswerable, I will reply.

`` Why do you think the Pak army would give up all that money and the US support for its control of Pakistan? ``

I presume you mean control of Afghanistan. Pak Army wants it all. It does not want to give up on all that money and US support and it does not want to give up control of Afghanistan. So it is supporting the Taliban and denying it is doing so. Doing this has worked for the last 2 odd years and by it Pak establishment hopes to create a ground situation in Afghanistan which will force NATO to compromise with Taliban and install a Taliban dominated govt in Kabul.

It is no surprise that the Pak Army is doing this, this is its longstanding policy of ``win-win`` war of thousand cuts which Pak Army waged in Afghanistan in the Soviet era and has been waging against India in J&K for years.

The US/NATO are responding by raising the cost to Pakistan of its denials.


``You also claim that the pak army and the religious parties do not expect US to remain in Afghanistan for long. Why would they have these expectations?``

I don`t ``claim``, this is a view expressed by many. The Soviets left, didn`t they? nazarhayatkhan on this very board said that the US/NATO can`t win in Afghanistan. If his view is shared by Pak Army brass, then they are already planning for what happens in Afghanistan after the US/NATO exit which they anticipate.

``Religious parties were never and they still are not part of the ruling class in Pakistan. To be a ruling class they need to show permanent interests in state’s resources. The religious parties have never shown that interests so they could only be an accomplice of the army they don’t become the ruling class by merely supporting the army. ``

This is a quibble over terminology. The religious parties have enormous leverage over Pakistani state`s Afghan policy and they are using their ideology and fighters which are still needed for the Afghan policy to make their domestic position stronger in a way other political parties cannot. They also currently hold the deciding vote for whether Musharraf gets another term or not.

``In fact, Indian presence in Afghanistan is used as a ruse by Pakistan.``

The whole argument for backing the most religious extremist mujahiddeen was that they would be anti-India and anti-Pashtunistan, so that Pakistan does not have to face enemies on both borders. Some people take these concerns to be reasonable, some others (like myself) think it is indeed a ruse by Pakistan, followed for 30 odd years since the Soviets left, to demand domination of its clients over the Kabul government as the price for peace there.

``As I asked earlier: do the religious groups in Pakistan form a permanent interest in the state resources? As long as they don’t, they pretty much have no control over the policy.``

As I said earlier, they are indispensible tools of state policy. They have the funding sources and contacts in Arab countries, they have the madrassas and mosques to preach, they have the cadres and the organisations. Pak Army can`t run a covert war policy with PPP or PML cadres, for that it needed/needs the JI and/or JUI.

``Again there is no history that suggests that the pak army is ideologically motivated.``

There is history to suggest that it is at a minimum ideologically motivated to consider Hindus the eternal existential enemy (and the Taliban in contrast existential allies); also to protect its interests versus Pakistani civilian institutions and to follow the orders of the Army Chief. It has also in the last 30 years been ideologically motivated to consider a non-puppet govt in Afghanistan as a existential threat to Pakistan.

``In fact, you are well aware that without the US, there was going to be no Jihad in Afghanistan. ``

On the contrary, Bhutto began sheltering mujahiddeen leaders and encouraging jihad uprisings in the mid 70s itself.


``It is a good booty on individual level and perhaps good enough to run the afghan government but maintaining the Pak army requires not only serious money but also ability to procure modern arms year in and year out, do you think the Pak army would not understand this simple arithmetic?

By supporting the Taliban, Pakistan becomes an enemy of the US and NATO so what would the Army gain by taking a risk that can possibly jeopardize all the goodies over $5 billion a year and military supplies which help the Pak army maintain its control over Pakistan.``


As I said earlier, the Pak Army wants it all, US support, arms and aid AND control over Afghanistan`s government. The route it sees to having it all is to help the Taliban make military gains in Afghanistan and to deny all such help, until a time when the US/NATO are forced to make a deal with the Taliban on Pakistan`s terms. It will not be the first time Pakistan follows such a policy in its neighbouring regions.

Just yesterday a retired ISI chief was suggest that NATO agree on a ceasefire so that the problem can be solved through negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The question arises that if Pakistan officialdom has nothing to do with Taliban military attacks, then what good would a NATO ceasefire do any Pak-Afghan talks, and why on earth should Afghan officialdom have to talk to Pakistan about powersharing in Afghanistan`s own government?

This Really Gets My Goat #80
``And who cares about Hamid Gul types. He left services a long time ago. He is not a pak govt spokesperson. He holds no official position. He can say whatever he wants only immature and amateur would worry abt his stories. ``

Well, the Afghans say that he is training suicide bombers in Balochistan these days. I think he himself admits he visits the region to encourage people to join up for waging jihad in Afghanistan.

This Really Gets My Goat HP#80
Um, you are the one who essentially said in #59 that for the Pakistan Army to have a jihadi agenda today does not make any sense. I was replying to that point in #72, that by the same measure Pak policy in the past also did not make any sense but the lack of sense didn`t prevent Pakistan from following it.

This Really Gets My Goat #79
It also doesn`t matter which best Western-oriented school a general went to, because as long as he is in the Army either he implements orders/policies dictated by the Army chief or he resigns.

So at any given time it only matters which policy school the current Army chief and his advisors (including ISI/MI top brass who run the Afghan covert policy) adhere to.

This Really Gets My Goat Kulharee #74
The policy of deniability (of both Pakistan and the US) meant that most of these proxy war policies were out of ambit of public discussion or decisionmaking.

This Really Gets My Goat #66
Well, feel free to call it cop out or anything else. I usually waste my time digging up stuff to support my contentions and to challenge yours and then you simply brush them off with disparaging remarks about me or whoever/whatever I quote. It is a waste of my time to try to wake up someone pretending to be asleep.


btw, the Pak Army having a jihadi agenda in today`s date doesnot make sense to you, then you need to read about Pak policy from 1989-2001 which will make even less sense. For example it makes no sense for a security establishement to foster conflict by supporting pathological cases like Hekmatyar and creating more Afghan refugees instead of settling the conflict among many factions and sending refugees back home. But that`s precisely what happened.

It made even less sense for the Pak Army to later fight an extended war(often along sectarian lines) on the same side as America`s no.1 declared enemy Bin Laden/Al Qaeda and to happily run jihadi training camps alongside his. But that`s precisely what happened. It all made sense to those steeped in ideology and Saudi funds.

It makes no sense for a nation to collectively call the US anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslims when the US is keeping that nation`s economy in good shape by pouring billions of dollars into it in debt rescheduling, aid, military aid and weapons.

It makes no sense for Hamid Gul types to be virulently anti-American when in fact they themselves admit that the US winked at Pak nuclear and missile development and proliferation throughout the 80s and when the US allowed Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to completely and utterly decide on how virtually every cent of billions of dollars worth of US-supplied aid and weapons were going to be distributed to Pakistan`s Afghan clients.

Inspite of the nuclear- related sanctions in 1989, the US kept up funding/arms to Pak for mujahiddeen until 1992 and the CIA did its very best to get Pak client Hekmatyar his military victory over other mujahiddeen and Najibullah till then. But in 1992 after a blink of an eye the US went from ally no. 1 and sucker no.1 to enemy no.1 for Pakistan. That makes no sense either.

So yes, if Pak policy today makes no sense that shouldn`t be a surprise. The security establishment is caught between the US and the Taliban, and neither side is going to give way without extreme violence. This could have been anticipated on 9/11 itself, so Pak Army strategy to allow fleeing Taliban fighters to remain safe in sanctuaries and fighting fit to fight in 2006-2007 didn`t make any sense either. What a surprise.

It was basically not a U turn that Musharraf took on 9/11 it was more of a W turn. To do so makes sense to a lot of people who are as I said before are steeped in ideology. To pretend you don`t know of any such people in Pakistan simply doesn`t work. Musharraf himself using the Hudaibiya treaty as justification, described his U turn as a temporary expedient in his post 9/11 speech.

This Really Gets My Goat HP #59
I can dig up references in support of everything I said but given what usually happens when I do, I will not do so. What I will say is that I think you are living in an alternate reality and time will make milk milk and water water.

This Really Gets My Goat PS: #55
And unless I am mistaken, that was from before the `peace deal`.

This Really Gets My Goat #53
I scratched around and found that Taliban sympathizers apparently used that motto as a stick to beat them with.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FE14Df04.html

All political and religious organizations in the tribal areas have traditionally been heavily under the thumb of the state, yet recent developments smell of a powerful underground network of jihadi organizations penetrating the region, especially South and North Waziristan.

A compact disc (CD) is widely in circulation all over the tribal belt, including Miranshah`s bazaar. The CD has video film with shots of attacks by tribals on the Pakistan army, seemingly shot by an amateur with a digital camera.

The significance of the CD is its Pashtu commentary, in which tribals are urged to rise up against the Pakistani armed forces, which are called ``Firqa-i-Pervezi`` (Pervezi sect - that of President General Pervez Musharraf) , and Musharraf himself is labeled an ally of the ``Crusaders``.

Ordinary CDs are available in Pakistani markets for US$1 to $1.50, but due to heavy demand, the CD in question in Miranshah and in neighboring tribal areas costs up to $4.

Similarly, ``Message to soldiers``, an Urdu-language pamphlet, is being widely distributed and read. The two-page missive appreciates the Pakistan army`s services in defense of the country, and then says: ``... these services for the country and nation apart, after the fall of the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan, the reins of the Pakistan army is the hands of a person who is a stigma on the forehead of the whole Muslim nation and who has darkened the bright past traditions of the Pakistan armed forces.

``... Your motto used to be faith, unity, god-fearing and jihad. Oh soldiers of the Pakistan army, why are these words meaningless now? You are now contrary to these slogans. Your general has faith in [President George W] Bush and is part of the infidel`s coalition. His god-fearing is dependent on the will of Jews and Christians, and he wants to decorate you [soldiers] with a medal of bravery by the genocide of the tribal people. This is not the jihad fi Sabilillah [ war in the way of Allah] but the war in the way of satan.``

After long citations from the holy Koran and then their interpretations, the pamphlet says: ``Come to your senses. Are you not the same ones who helped Afghan and Arab fighters and who God bestowed you victory against a superpower [USSR]? Why are you staining yourself, and say now what is the difference between you and the hypocrites defined in the Koran? Killing all US coalition partners is a virtuous act. Yet you are a US coalition partner.

``Remember! This is advice from your Muslim brothers. Use your vision and give up a job under which you are forced to obey a black American like Pervez Musharraf, and do some business in which God will bless you ... otherwise we will take revenge that the world will remember, and also your next seven generations. So far, only 300 army soldiers have been killed [in South Waziristan], three armored personal carriers and 15 army trucks destroyed ... we warn you just stop, and remember the US and their partners cannot do anything against us.
From Waziristan tribals.``