Educational Practices in Private Schools in Pakistan Tahmed,

No, it was St. Mary's Lalazar, IIRC Ayub Khan gave them the land and they shifted. I was there from 1970 till end '73. Was at St. Pats from 1977 till 82, with a small break.

Small world after all.

BTW, Hamidm, when were you at St. Mary's? I recall Father Byrne's (if I have the name right) St. Bernards; huge dogs! My brother was at St. Mary's some years after me and shares your opinion of the 'desi' missionaries, or at least of one from Sri Lanka whose name now escapes me. He was the acting headmaster for a while. My late father knew Cecil Chaudhury quite well and had a great deal of respect for him; I think he's done a great job at St. Anthonys; have a couple of young cousins there.

Educational Practices in Private Schools in Pakistan Well, what a small world! I too was at St. Mary's a looooong time ago! Was too young, though (KG through 3), to have many memories. If I may be so bold as to inquire, when did all you other St. Maryians leave?

School Days Aaah, brings back memories. I, too, was at St. Pats for a few years, though before FK Khan but, I hope!, after Tahmed Sahib!

Bishop, then Father, Lobo was the Principal and Tony "beeRi babu" D'Souza was incharge of the Cambridge section. Played a bit of basketball and hockey, not much since I was bad at most team games!

17 August 1988 Every few months I check out Chowk to see if there is anything interesting going on.

17 August 1988 Some basic corrections, if I may be so allowed:

Zia was sent to Jordan as head of the Pakistani Military Training Mission there, not to command an IS brigade. The Pakistanis are supposed to have planned Black September for the Jordanians, not sure about this but likely to be true. The GoC 2nd Inf. Div. resigned his commission (although an East Banker, he was married to a Palestinian) in the middle of battle and Zia stepped in and took over as GoC on his own initiative before the already confused and muddled Jordanians screwed things up completely (although, given PakArmy performance in 1965 and 1971, I'm one to talk!). This is why King Hussein was eternally grateful to him.

Zia was G1 Ops in Multan with the Armoured Div but not slated to command a unit, the professional kiss of death. Gul Hassan sacked the CO of 25 Cav (I think that was the unit; Zia's laDlas later on) for his units miserable performance and told Zia to take over. That is what saved him.

Zia was ALWAYS personally devout and a misfit in the Mess as a junior officer; would hang out with JCOs, etc. He NEVER drank but was always a chamcha of the highest order. The rumours of him being a secret drinker are nonsense. I've even heard that idiot Sumit Ganguly repeat them on NPR.

Regards.

Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa Agha on Pakistan Military BTW, Riaz, I agree with your pessimism. Fool me once (and I did support BB in 1988) shame on you, fool me twice and then a third time? What does that say about the Awaam?

I agree that Musharraf has to go, but does BB-AZ/NS have to come back?

Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa Agha on Pakistan Military Major Sahib,

Just curious, when did the PM troops fire on the Kaaba? Presumably during WWI but when exactly? Which battalioln? And under what circumstances?

The Naval War College Bomb Blasts Romair,

Just curious about one thing. Let's say that the GoP unilaterally withdraws from the GWoT and stops aiding the US. Do you really think that these jihadi terrorists would all pack up their weapons and go to Afghanistan and Iraq to fight Uncle Sam? That none of them would want to 'Islamize' Pakistan? That all of the bombings and violence would go away? That the Islamists we have would happily debate the pros and cons of implenting Sharia in Pakistan and willingly abide by the majority vote if the majority says, "Thanks but no thanks; we don't really want to ban music, TV and amputate hands for the first offense."

American Muslims and Presidential Elections 2008 I agree with Feroz, McCain's best bet is a Hillary nomination; despite the fact that the Christian right dislikes McCain, they truly hate Hillary AND the young Obama crowd will not go out to vote for Hillary. The best thing that could happen for McCain would be if Obama is ahead in the popular vote and elected delegate count but the superdelegates go for Hillary. That would give her the nomination and really get Obama and his supporters angry. McCain has a shot at winning then.

American Muslims and Presidential Elections 2008 Romair and Hamidm,

Not sure that, despite his middle name and Muslim ancestry--although he says that his father had become an atheist long before he came to the US, Obama will be any less pro-Israeli than Clinton. Take a look at: http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1200308099552&pagename=JPost%2FJP Article%2FPrinter

Remember, Clinton is the one who said that he would take up a gun in the defense of Israel.

I think that Obama, if he is elected, will continue the US's 'special relationship' with Israel; at most he might put a little bit more pressure on them but nothing fundamental (no pun intended) will change. For the forseeable future, the Jewish-Israeli lobby will be about 10x more powerful than the Muslim one. And lets face it, why would the US ever be 'pro Muslim' in the same way that it is pro-Israeli? We hate the US and, in any case, there is no such thing as the Ummah for the US being pro about; just a bunch of countries whose people hate the US, some a bit more and some a bit less.

If the Muslims in the US are ever to count for anything in influencing US foreign policy, as I wrote here on Chowk years ago, socialize with the 'real' Americans, work for the local Democratic/Republican party, run for Town Council, serve on the zoning board, go to July 4th picnics, have a beer after work, join the PTA/Kiwanis/Elks and worry about high school test scores and not about getting a one-hour break for Friday prayers, let your daughters date the neighbor's sons and, horrors, marry outside the faith.

In short, become Americans who came from an Islamicate society and not practicing Muslims who live an insulated and isolated life in the US. One of my colleagues at work, a very nice guy actually--lovely people he and his wife--is a Reformed Jew, strong Israel supporter, and loves his BLT for lunch.

If Muslims here in the US don't adapt along these lines, we aren't going to have much influence over US foreign policy since we will be too foreign to count for much.

Monday Morning Blast in Rawalpindi ... An eyewitness account Romair,

Selig Harrison is a long-time Pakistan hater; suspect he is on RAW's payroll ;-) His book on Baluchistan is an excellent account of the insurgency and why it failed, despite its obvious anti Pakistan bias.

His analysis is occasionally on the money despite the crap about an Afghan empire (carved up by the Sikhs before the British came on the scene) or the Pathan animosity towards Pakistan: most of the Pathans I've known personally have been Pakistani nationalists, even those from the tribal areas! Which is not to say they loved Punjabis, but that they didn't hate Pakistan as a "Punjabistan" the way some Sindhis and Baluchis I've known hate it.

There is probably a great deal of merit to greater decentralization of Pakistan and greater provincial autonomy but it would have to be done, I think, along with breaking up the provinces along linguistic/ethnic lines a la India. However, breaking up Punjab, for e.g., into three or four provinces would raise the question of what to do about Sindh? Do the muhajirs get their own suba now?

Monday Morning Blast in Rawalpindi ... An eyewitness account Pew:

Thanks.

A History of the Pakistan Army by Brian Cloughley Dear Major Sahib,

Thank you for the compliments. The more I read your recent ravings, the more I shake my head in sorrow at what decades of alcohol abuse have done to a once promising brain.

You are, again, deliberately mischaracterizing what I have said. My response was to Romair's blanked statement that insurgencies can't be defeated militarily. I was merely pointing out they can be and have been. The French in Algeria was a political defeat; the French in Indochina was a military defeat that forced a political one. De Gaulle thought that the Algerian War could not be sold to the French populace or to the 'West.' He cut his losses politically. France was not forced out of Algeria by a string of military defeats; quite on the contrary. It had military successes.

I was further pointing out that the tactics needed to ensure such a victory are not ones that any Western power would now be willing to use now but certain non-Western ones have happily used similar tactics in the recent past.

Given what you have just said about the French, how does that line up with your earlier characterization of NATO? Last I looked, France is still in NATO (sort of...). BTW, De Gaulle was court-martialled and convicted twice by the 'legitimate' French government. The second time he was sentenced to death. Of course, this was the Vichy govt and so losing the war it lost its legitimacy but, under international law, it was the legitimate govt of France when it sentenced him to death. Should de Gaulle have bowed to the 'legitimate' govt and gone back to France to be executed? In any case, I fail to see what was the point of that comment. Did you meant that military operations in FATA are illegitimate because Musharraf came to power via a coup?

Usurpation and legitimacy is a pretty slippery argument. I believe Justice Munir quite famously expounded on this in his ruling.... ;-) Where would you put Nawaz Sharif's physical attack on the Supreme Court? Did that render his govt illegitimate? Surely it was an unconstitutional redering his govt illegitimate? In a sorry political system like ours, effectiveness is probably a better judgement criteria than legitimacy, and the Musharraf govt certainly is NOT effective.

++++++++++++++++++

Romair,

I am not exactly advocating that Pakistan fight the US war for it; I am saying that the insurgency is defeatable militarily. You will notice my doubts about the political will aspect of it.

A History of the Pakistan Army by Brian Cloughley Romair,

I wasn't talking about genocide; depopulation meant specifically forcing the people out of their villages into govt controlled compouds where the Army could control who came in, who left, if any strangers were around, etc. The village chiefs in areas that were not treated so were made responsible for any insurgent act that took place there, so to encourage them to report any suspicious activity. Village militias, harkis, were raised, armed and trained by the French to act against the ALN insurgents with Army support made available (via helicopters) in case of heavy attack. The Army carried out summary executions of villagers suspected of collaborating with the ALN. Each part of French Algeria was made the responsibility of a specific Army/Legion unit so any increase in insurgent activity was held directly against a specific CO. Captured ALN members were often given the choice between being shot or working for the French; many chose to turn coat. Incidentally, the ALN wised up and infiltrated their own men into several French units.

A major difference between the French in Algeria and the US in Iraq/Afghanistan is that the French had hundreds if not thousands of Arabic speakers they could trust and many village headmen spoke some French (often ex soldiers) and the US has a few dozen Arabic and Pushto speakers at best; ones they can actually trust. I remember reading that a combat brigade in Iraq a couple of years ago had only one Arabic speaker who had top-secret clearance. Without good intelligence, any counter-insurgency is pretty much useless since, presumably, the aim is not to nuke the country side but to actually control it. The Americans could bomb Vietnam until the water buffalos came home (assuming any water buffalos were still alive) but they never actually controlled the countryside; that was the main difference between the US and France in Algeria. The Soviets in Afghanistan did essentially what the Americans did and couldn't figure out why the insurgency could not be defeated--that and they never mounted cross-border raids on Pakistan, which the US did all the time in Laos and Cambodia.

The FATA insurgency is certainly controllable/defeatable provided the Army wants to do it, is willing to pay the cost and can find some competent officers to carry out the policies. I doubt this will actually happen

A History of the Pakistan Army by Brian Cloughley Bongdongs,

No, haven't seen it but I've heard of it, of course. I do want to see it; supposed to be one of the best films made.

A History of the Pakistan Army by Brian Cloughley Major Amin,

If you look at French military tactics in Algeria it becomes clear what has to be done if a successful counterinsurgency campaign is to be waged. These include quadrillage, brutal collective punishment including systematic executions, using colons (settlers) on ratonnades (rat hunts; to kill young Arab men) and turning captured insurgents into govt-run death squads, depopulating the mountains and forcing their people to live in govt camps--like the British did to the Boers in S. Africa, physically fencing off and laying minefields on the borders, and so on. I agree that there is more than just ruthlessness here; it is intelligently planned ruthlessness and a willingness to employ whatever is needed to achieve victory.

No one would say that what the French did does not count as war crimes; of course they are. Massive ones. My point here is that if you are not there to win, you shouldn't be there in the first place. I think the US should never have invaded Iraq (which I have said more than once on Chowk; I was never a supporter of the Iraq War) and should leave it as soon as possible; preferably yesterday. Staying in merely prolongs the inevitable.

The Americans are far too squeamish for that level of face-to-face ruthlessness displayed by the French or, for that matter, our beloved jihadis who fight for the honor of beheading prisoners. In one sense ordering B52 cruise missile strikes on buildings which could well contain civilians may be "ruthless" but it is not what is going to win a counter insurgency. As far as the Pakistanis in E. Pakistan go, the Army violence there was never as systematically organized and planned as was the French in Algeria but it certainly succeeded in defeating the Mukti Bahini at the cost of heavy civilian casualties--NOT the 3 million of Indian and Bengali propaganda but probably upwards of 200,000-300,000 plus.

May I suggest Alastair Horne's classic work on the Algerian War, "A Savage War of Peace" to understand how to fight a successful counterinsurgency and see how much that differs from what the Americans are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan? The US strategy is bound to fail in these countries, the surge and turning some Sunni tribes against al Qaeda notwithstanding. Incidentally, Horne is a former British WWII infantry officer so knows something about armies and military operations.