The Calculus of Miscalculated Human Misery ڪ پاڪستان لاءِ به اطمينان بخش نظر نٿي اچي. ڇاڪاڻ ته گذريل ڪجهه عرصي دران ڪلچرل قبيلائي علائقن مان نڪري اقتدار ۽ طاقت جي مرڪز اسلام آباد تائين پهتل انتهاپسندن في الحال ته منظر نامو بدلائي ڇڏيو آهي. ميلوڊي ۽ آبپاره جي وچ تي قائم ڳاڙهي مسجد المعروف لال مسجد جي برقعا پوش ڏنڊا بردار مذهبي خواتين پاران روڊن تي نڪري اچي پوليس اهلڪارن کي يرغمال بڻائڻ ۽ ٽن عورتن تي بدڪرداريءَ جي تهمت هڻي کين زوريءَ گهر مان کنڀي اچي مدرسي ۾ واڙي ڇڏڻ، حڪومتي عملداريءَ کي چئلينج ڪرڻ نه سڏجي ته ان کي ڪهڙو نالو ڏجي؟

Inzi Post-Bob: An Interview
#62 by hamidm2 on March 25, 2007 8:06pm PT
Re: # 61

dost-mittar,

........... i agree with you 100% and that is what i keep on trying to tell nice, well-meaning but hopelessly naive moderate muslims like tahmed ........``moderate Muslims will never win against jihadis as long as they keep in denial that there are certain things that need to be condemned regardless of whether or not they are permissible in Islam``

You two appear to be seriously delinquent in your knowledge of history and politics.

This is the first instance in the Muslim history that fanatics, not orthodox have taken control of the political landscape in the Muslim world. The Muslim fanatics have blindsided the moderate Muslims and the western media is playing that up for its own political and territorial goals.

Barring the first few years of Islam, political leadership of the Muslims had always been moderate. The Umayyads or the Abbasids in Baghdad and the Umayyads in Spain were not fanatics. The Mughals and the rulers before them were not fanatics. Some rulers might have been more orthodox than the others but mostly they maintained a moderate polity. The Sassanids, or the other Persians rulers were not fanatics by any means. The Turkish Empire was perhaps the most secular administration in the Muslim world. However, some of them did use Islam when politically expedient. They were many movements sponsored by fanatics in Islam but that is not uncommon in other religions too.

Why the fanatics control the debate in the Islamic world can be rationalized in several ways but it mostly has to do with the general political conditions in the Islamic world which is controlled by the moderate Muslims in every country.

The moderate leadership in the Islamic countries avoids liberalism and modernism like plague thus allowing the fanatics to become the only alternate for the political opposition. The fanatics have also used sensationalism and other means such as terrorism to place the average Muslim on the defensive.

Many things have to happen to change the control of the political debate in the Muslim world. Such as:
1. The governing coalitions in the Muslim world should be encouraged to embrace liberal policies.
2. A culture of tolerance, promotion of cultural values not derived from Islam and education at all levels will need enormous encouragement from people around the world.

All this requires sustained efforts as change does not happen overnight.

The moderate Muslims will win the dialog because history is on their side. Any effort to force the issue militarily or through calling people evil doers will not work. As we see now in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: The Choice Between Alliance and Acrimony

Afghanistan Update

Barnett Rubin:

During his visit to Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan from March 1 to March 5, 2006, President George W. Bush praised Afghan successes, telling President Karzai,“You are inspiring others, and the inspiration will cause others to demand their freedom.” He did so the day after the administration’s own intelligence chiefs reported that the antigovernment insurgency in Afghanistan is growing and presents a greater threat “than at any point since late 2001.” Some Afghan officials say the world thus far has put Afghanistan on life support, rather than investing in a cure. The following conditions make it clear that Afghanistan has the potential to be a disastrous situation if intelligent, measured steps are not taken:

• An ever-more deadly insurgency with sanctuaries in neighboring Pakistan, where leaders of al-Qaeda and the Taliban have found refuge;
• A corrupt and ineffective administration without resources and a potentially dysfunctional parliament;
• Levels of poverty, hunger, ill health, illiteracy, and gender inequality that put Afghanistan near the bottom of every global ranking;
• Levels of aid that have only recently expanded above a fraction of that accorded to other post-conflict countries;
• An economy and administration heavily influenced by drug traffickers;
• Massive arms stocks despite the demobilization of many militias;
• A potential denial of the Islamic legitimacy of the Afghan government by a clergy that feels marginalized;
• Ethnic tensions exacerbated by competition for resources and power;
• Interference by neighboring states, all of which oppose a long-term U.S. presence in the region;
• Well-trained and well-equipped security forces that the government may not be able to pay when aid declines in a few years;
• Constitutional requirements to hold more national elections (at least six per decade) than the government may be able to afford or conduct;
• An exchange rate inflated by aid and drug money that subsidizes cheap imports and hinders economic growth; and
• Future generations of unemployed, frustrated graduates and dropouts from the rapidly expanding school system.

Read the whole report, which is well worth reading.

And don`t miss this portion either:

The United States, with aid from France and the United Kingdom, has been training a new national army, which has now reached about 26,000 troops. The ANA was designed by the Department of Defense, and it deploys troops with embedded U.S. trainers. The U.S. model of an army, however, has a high price tag. According to the World Bank, the ANA cost 13 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in fiscal year 2004–2005, and total security sector spending topped 17 percent.20 Currently, the ANA depends on U.S. trainers for air support, logistics, and medical evacuation. Transferring the ownership of these functions to the ANA will cost even more.
The Coalition has slowed ANA growth. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld informed the Afghan government that the United States will expect it to pay the military’s salaries from its budget in 2006–2007. According to Afghan sources, he also told Kabul that the ceiling for the ANA would be 45,000 men, compared to the 70,000
that the Afghan Ministry of Defense thinks it needs. Although the belated concern for fiscal sustainability is welcome, this unilateral decision has placed the Afghans in a difficult position. The United States, not Afghanistan, determined the salary levels of the ANA, and now the United States is insisting that this impoverished, insecure country, just embarking on a major development strategy, take on this fiscal burden. Secretary Rumsfeld has reportedly assured the Afghans that the United States will ensure Afghanistan’s external security, but the failure of the United States to neutralize the Taliban and al-Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan has made the Afghans skeptical of such guarantees. Because Afghanistan cannot have a foreign-supported army for long, some adjustment of the quantity or quality of the force is inevitable. Besides simply making the ANA smaller, the Afghan government could move away from the U.S.-inspired structure toward a more cost-effective, if less professional, army, such as one based on conscription and compensation in kind (housing and other facilities) rather than cash. Similar adjustments must be made for the Afghan National Police (ANP). Current plans to raise police salaries to a level comparable to that of the ANA will further inflate the budget beyond the country’s means. Because of the insufficiency of both international and national security forces, the Afghan government continues to raise informal militias, mostly in Pashtun areas, where the Taliban are active. This has created some anxiety among non-Pashtuns, who have seen their much larger militias disbanded. The need for regional and ethnic equity must be taken into account in the structure of the security forces.

Truth Behind US-India Nuclear Deal
Sounds like from almost a client state of the Soviet Union now we are headed towards becoming a client state of the US. Looking at the current International situation, it may not be a bad thing at all.

Have the Indian govt. responded to these observations yet?
One change that I know of is about the yearly audits. Though, the US president will have to yearly certify the compliance .


“The Committee of International Relations of the United States House of Representatives passed the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation and Promotion Act of 2006 (H.R. 5682 available in PDF). The Congressional document throws light on the proposed Nuclear Deal in a manner that New Delhi failed to do. The nuclear deal is intended to cap and roll back India’s nuclear weapons program under the garb of providing enriched fuel to purportedly run nuclear power plants in India. We refer to relevant clauses in the document Act itself.